Moral realism & objectivity: Hiero5ant vs. Alonzo Fyfe vs. Francois Tremblay

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

This thread has been set up for a 3-way formal debate between Hiero5ant, Alonzo Fyfe, and Francois Tremblay. Each debate participant will argue and defend three different perspectives on secular morality as it pertains philosophically to realism and objectivity:

Hiero5ant will argue for the position of normative noncognitivist subjectivist moral antirealism.


"There are no such things as true moral values, true moral principles, or true moral laws, because sentences which are moral assertions are not the kind of sentences that can even be true or false, any more than "Please close the door" or "Hooray for closed doors!!!!" can be true or false."

Alonzo Fyfe will argue for the position of desire utilitarian subjectivist moral realism.

"Propositions containing moral terms have a truth value. Some of them are true, and their truth value is independent of the mental states of the person uttering the proposition. Moral properties are not intrinsic to any object, event, or states of affairs. They are fully dependent on desire such that, if there is no desire, there is no value. Furthermore, things have value only insofar as they are desired."

Francois Tremblay will argue for the position of objectivist moral realism.

"My position is that there are moral facts, and that those facts proceed from objective principles - from science, psychology, the facts of living in society, and other areas where morality applies. In short : morality is causality applied to those areas where humans act."

The debate will have 4 rounds and statements will be submitted concurrently, as agreed to from the parameters (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showpost.php?p=1932375&postcount=69).

A Peanut Gallery (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=103688) is set up in the Moral Foundations & Principles forum for the rest of us to comment on the debate.

Good luck to all of the participants!

- NS, FD Moderator

[Francois Tremblay]

Before I begin, I would like to thank the IIDB for hosting this debate, and my colleagues Alonzo Fyfe and Andrew Lee (Hiero5ant) for sharing it. I welcome the opportunity to exchange ideas on secular morality, as this has always been a controversial topic.

The range of positions in this debate is an eloquent demonstration of this fact. In few other issues would you have one person who is against the very notion that an issue even exists, and two other people who have diametrically opposite views on what the proper approach consists of.

As I stated in the pre-debate discussion, my position is that there are moral facts, and that those facts proceed from objective principles - from science, psychology, the facts of living in society, and other areas where morality applies. In short : morality is causality applied to those areas on which humans act.

This is not to say that I do not find merit in the other positions in this debate, I agree with Mr. Fyfe in the sense that our specific desires have a great influence on how we instantiate human values. In that sense, there is a complementarity between his position and mine. We also both agree that value would not exist if desire did not exist, although we differ on the relation between the two.

And I agree with Mr. Lee that there is a kind of moral outlook which we are quite justified in disbelieving - the idea that things and categories of actions have non-contextual, inherent value. Theists, of course, think that this value is given by God. This inherentism, or absolutism, is famously expressed by the Ten Commandments. I am pretty certain that all three of us agree that such a view is outdated, invalid, and probably incoherent. Once again, our views complement themselves in that way also.

But I disagree strongly with the notion that there are no moral facts. For instance, there is a sense in which a rejection of moral facts is trivially false. We all have to act an incalculable number of times during our lives, including to sustain our own lives. If we did not at least have the goal of surviving, none of us would be here. Therefore I can safely say that Mr. Lee has at least one value and knows a small number of moral facts, related to his survival and his desire to come on this board and debate with us. Anyone who argues for complete moral antirealism is contradicting himself with every word.

Furthermore, there is a sense in which rejecting the possibility of moral facts is also epistemically perverse. Since we must all act, whether we like it or not, to reject the possibility of a rational standard of action is self-defeating. It seems to me much like a scientist saying "forget it", rejecting naturalism outright, and using God to explain every single fact of nature.

Even if there was no known way to deduce moral facts (which is not the case), moral subjectivism would no more be acceptable than subjectivism in biology, physics, or construction. Where there is no objective evidence, one must either remain silent (which is impossible in this case) or assume we will find a solution later and actively seek one.



Now, I barely talked to Mr. Fyfe before, and I don't know Mr. Lee at all, and I hope they will excuse me if I am betting wrongly in what I am going to say. If I was a betting man, I would be ready to bet a lot of money that, in our private lives, all three of us judge and act pretty much in the same way. Although we would not use the same words to express our disapproval, we probably all think that murder, coercion, theft, cruelty, and so on, are generally morally negative. We probably all think that self-accomplishment, fulfilling relationships, happiness, pleasure, and so on, are generally morally positive.

We probably all get up in the morning (unless one works a grave shift), work or otherwise occupy ourselves, eat, drink, think, mean well to others, want to live a good and full life, have a hobby that we can do well and are comfortable with, have friends or family that we care about, and so on and so forth.

I am mentioning these things because I want to point out that the real issue at hand is not really about what we should do, but how we deduce the existence of moral facts. In this, we have to make a very important distinction. This debate is not about the reasons why people do things, or the reasons why they think they do things - about description - but about the actual existence of moral facts - prescription.

This is an important distinction, because some of the arguments against moral facts hinge on it. Let me give you an example. Most people think that evolution is an incomplete or downright false position on the existence and diversity of life. We can describe the popular positions on the issue as composed of evolution and varied religious positions that adopt some form of Creationism.

On the other hand, we know that the scientific facts point in only one direction. All life is the result of a process of evolution that has been going on for more than 3.5 billion years. There is no doubt possible about the validity of evolution.

In this sense, we can say that while popular opinion is very diverse, the facts do not support such a diversity of opinion. In the same way, if moral facts exist, then the diversity of positions on them does not constitute a counter-argument. Morality may differ from culture to culture, and from individual to individual, but this does not make morality subjective any more than diversity of opinion makes biology subjective.

Evolutionary arguments are also irrelevant to the debate. While no one denies that our instinctual sense of morality is in a large part explainable by evolutionary psychology, it is wholly irrelevant because it is a descriptive device. Evolution cannot be a prescriptive device because, while evolution does tend to make individuals more adapted to survive and flourish, it specifically selects for reproductive success, and selects genes instead of organisms. Also, adaptations take tens of thousands of years to appear on the scene, and thus could not return prescriptions as regards to our modern technological world



So how can we find moral facts ? As I stated at the beginning, my position is that morality is causality applied to those areas on which humans act. I propose this, not as my specific position, but as a general basis for all moral systems. All such systems can be reduced to a selection and evaluation of values and actions.

We study causality in many disciplines, especially in science. Part of the role of science is to find how parts interact in order to form the emergent properties that we observe all around us. Some of these causal facts are relevant to human action.

(1) The nature of a thing's effects is determined by the nature of the thing itself as well as by the conditions in which it effects. (law of causality)
(2) The nature of an action's effects is determined by the nature of the action itself as well as by the conditions in which it effects. (from 1)
(3) Both the nature of human action and its conditions are the province of science and other rational disciplines.
(4) Therefore moral facts can be studied rationally. (from 2 and 3)

This basis gives us the possibility of studying morality not as a political or social tool but as a scientific problem. On paper, it is even possible to measure value and value-judgments, using something like the "turp" which Plantinga uses as a unit of morality.

For the sake of simplicity, I will use an example that everyone can agree on, the value of nutrition. I think everyone will agree that human beings have a metabolism which requires specific nutrients in order to continue functioning. A normal diet will give one all the necessary nutrients to have a healthy metabolism. Failing to eat and drink - to act towards the value of nutrition - will lead to one's death in short order.

I think we would all agree that (I1) is a scientific fact :

(I1) Human beings have a metabolism which requires nutrients to be sustained.

Now (I1) is not within our power to change, it is a fact of life. On the other hand, its implementation in ourselves is within our power to support or hinder. It is not a natural fact or an involuntary fact. We can decide to eat and drink, or not eat and drink. Therefore (I1) leads to :

(I2) Human beings need to eat and drink in a certain way in order to survive.

Being a human need - something we need to gain and/or keep - nutrition can be translated as a value - something we work to gain and/or keep. (I2) can be translated very easily in moral terms :

(V) Nutrition is a value.

Which in terms of actions implies :

(O) All other factors being constant, we ought to eat and drink, in a manner consistent with proper nutrition..

The first two being "is" statements and the last two being "ought" statements. As we can see, it is easy to transpose a scientific fact into a value, which is a moral fact. More specifically, I would consider (V) and (O) to be moral facts, since they refer to prescription.

I think that all these propositions are uncontroversial, except amongst some nihilists. Most people would agree that morality is a possibility, but would simply say that there are insurmountable barriers to its study, most notably the is-ought dichotomy. It remains very unclear why we should think so, and the burden of proof is on the moral antirealist to prove the validity of this dichotomy. Mr. Lee has stated in the pre-debate that :

[S]entences which are moral assertions are not the kind of sentences that can even be true or false, any more than "Please close the door" or "Hooray for closed doors!!!!" can be true or false.

Yet it is unclear why a proposition such as (V) should be considered more similar to "Please close the door" than to (I1) or (I2). Unlike "Please close the door", (V) represents a causal fact which can be true or false. If (I1) was false, then (I2) and (V) would also be false, and so would (O) : they all express the same causal fact.



I realize very well that some people may object at this point that anyone is free to follow or not to follow propositions such as (V) as moral standards, and that there is no inherent moral obligation. In one sense, this line of reasoning is trivial. Of course anyone is free to do whatever they want. That is why we need morality in the first place. Moral facts do not demand automatic belief any more than scientific facts do.

But there is another sense in which the question is irrelevant, which leads me to explain the principle that we are all perceived egoists. Note that this is different from saying that everyone is an egoist. Those are two distinct claims. Perceived egoism refers to the idea that, when we make a decision, we always think that we are doing what is best for ourselves. Otherwise we would choose another, better action.

But always remember the "perceived". We all think we do what is best for ourselves. This does not mean that we hold rational values while doing so. There are a lot of actions that I would call evil, misguided, self-destructive, but I know very well that the moral agents that perform them do not share my position. They all think they are doing what is best.

Perceived egoism is very different from egoism itself. Egoism, as a general class of moral systems, is about looking at moral issues from the inside out, from the individual outwards, instead of imposing a vision from the outside in. Egoist systems see morality not as something that must be imposed in the name of a collectivist ideal or as an arbitrary social construction, but as something that starts with the moral agent and his own values as central.

As an individualist, I am squarely in the egoist camp. My position is that each individual should seek his highest self-interest, and not sacrifice himself to others, nor sacrifice others for himself. That we all come together because we all have similar values and we can only fulfill them by cooperating and forming a society based on the rule of law.

Either way, the necessity of perceived egoism dispels all objections to the relevancy of moral facts.



There are two kinds of objectivity under question here. The first is whether there exists objective moral facts (on which Mr. Lee disagrees with us), and the second is whether their source is objective or subjective (on which I disagree with Mr. Fyfe). My position is that moral facts are objective and that their source is objective. This is perhaps an overly subtle issue. My two colleagues have the occasion to explain their own positions, so I will not dwell on this for now.

Perhaps a more productive topic to discuss at this point would be, the values I think there is in the world, and how we can judge actions based on these values. My own moral position, which is Objectivist in nature, could be called rational individualism. It is based on two main premises :

1. Reason is our sole means to knowledge, including knowledge of moral facts. Only the examination of the relevant facts - scientific or otherwise - can justify moral righteousness.
2. We are all individual and separate biological organisms and moral agents. No one can benefit or suffer for another, think or act for another. At best, we can act to help or hurt each other, but we are still acting as individuals.

Given these basic principles, what values do I think exist ? We already have a hierarchical system of values in humanistic psychology, which is called Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, and is generally accepted in the field. David Kelley gives a similar account of human needs on page 81 of The Logical Structure of Objectivism, albeit one that also includes vital philosophical concerns (bold his) :

Material needs such as needs for health and food: these values contribute directly to survival.

Spiritual needs such as needs for conceptual knowledge, self-esteem, education and art: these values are spiritual in the sense that they primarily pertain to consciousness, and contribute to survival by helping Reason to function properly.

Social needs such as needs for trade, communication, friendship and love: these values are social in that they occur only through interaction with others. Logically, their status as values is due to the fact that they contribute to the fulfillment of spiritual and material needs.

Political needs such as needs for freedom and objective law, which are needs concerning the organization of society. These provide the context for fulfilling our material, spiritual and social needs.

All of these needs translate to values, as I noted in my example. Thus we all have material, spiritual (or mental), social, and political values. These values are based on objective fact, and do not depend on our desires, whims, culture, and so on. They are all objectively justifiable.

There are also a number of Objectivist virtues. A virtue is a mental attitude that is favourable to the pursuit of rational values. They are also means by which we can integrate moral behaviour in our daily lives, so that it becomes second nature. Some examples of virtues are rationality, integrity, productiveness, honesty, pride, autonomy, justice, non-sacrifice, existential independence, non-coercion and benevolence. David Kelley justifies them in detail in chapters 5 and 6 of The Logical Structure of Objectivism, a book which, by the way, I recommend to anyone interested in the philosophy of morality.

From there, we can judge actions by deducing the values that they effect, given their specific context. In the matter of value-judgment, a caveat is necessary. As I said before, my position is not that categories of actions can be classified as good or evil, only "generally good" or "generally evil" at best. My position is that absolutist classifications are incoherent, and that value-judgment is necessarily a case-by-case process.

This is where I see my position and Mr. Fyfe's position as complementary. While an action will effect specific values, it may effect them in very different ways. We all need to eat, but we do not eat the same things. Someone in Latvia might eat a dinner of bizugis with pea balls and a glass of maizes kvass, and I might have a piece of tourtière with maple syrup and a glass of milk. We both have very different desires as regards to how we want to achieve any given value. But it remains an inescapable biological fact that we both need to eat to survive.

I will stop here for now : no doubt the second round will bring a lot of interesting issues and questions to treat. Thank you.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

3,000 word limit! That's all I get! My Post-It notes have more than 3,000 words!

(What if I edit out all the verbs?)

Better get started.

Conclusion

(1) Propositions containing moral terms have an objective truth value, this truth value is the same for everybody, and it is substantially independent of what the person thinks or wants that truth value to be. It is possible for whole societies to believe "X is immoral" and be mistaken.

(2) Value depends on psychological states -- specifically, on desires. Change desires, and you change the value of things. All propositions that presuppose desire-independent value are false.


ACTION THEORY

I am going to start with premises from the most widely used theory of intentional action. This theory is a modern version of the theory proposed by David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature. Additional information can be found under Folk Psychology as a Theory (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/folkpsych-theory/) on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


(1) All intentional action is caused by an interaction between beliefs and desires, forming intentions, which in turn cause intentional actions.

In other words: (Beliefs + Desires) -> Intentions -> Intentional Action

For example: My writing this post is an intentional action. It is caused by my desire to leave the world better than it would have otherwise been, a belief that dispelling false beliefs about 'better' would help accomplish this, and a belief that this debate will help dispel some false beliefs.

Beliefs and desires are both necessary and sufficient to explain all intentional action. The absence of either beliefs or desires make intentional action impossible, and we do not need any third entity to explain intentional action.

As with any theory of this type, it cannot be deductively proved by reference to more fundamental premises. The theory is verified or falsified by its ability to explain the phenomena it seeks to explain. Though an exhaustive proof is outside of the scope of this debate, an effective criticism would take the form of an intentional action that does not fit this formula.


(2)Beliefs and desires are propositional attitudes.

The words 'belief' and 'desire' refer to brain states. They describe how the brain is wired just as 'for-next loop' and 'subroutine' describe how a computer is wired. (See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for Functionalism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/))

All propositional attitudes can be written in the form, "Agent [attitude] that [proposition]." Sam hopes that Bush will win the next election. Mike doubts that he will get a raise this year. Judy is happy that she still has a job.

All propositional attitudes can be reduced to 'belief' and 'desire'. 'Belief' attitudes include 'knows', 'doubts', suspects', 'thinks', and others. 'Desire' attitudes include 'hopes', 'fears', 'is concerned', 'wants', 'likes', etc.

I must clarify a distinction between two meanings of 'desire' that can cause confusion. If I say, "I want that hammer", it is not (typically) the case that 'I desire that I have that hammer'. It is more accurate to say 'I desire that I have a warm house, and having that hammer would be useful in making it the case that I have a warm house."

The distinction here is between 'desires-as-a-means (or tool)' and 'desires-as-an-end'. My desire for the hammer is a 'desires-as-a-means'. My desire for the warm house is a 'desires-as-an-end'. When I speak of 'desires' in this theory, it is only in the sense of 'desires-as-an-end'. All 'desires-as-a-means' statements can be reduced to a union of 'desires-as-ends' and 'beliefs' statements. So 'desires-as-a-means' is not being ignored, but reduced to its more basic components.

The distinction between 'means' and 'ends' in value was first presented by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics


(3)A belief that P is an attitude that the proposition 'P' is true.

(4) A desire that P is an attitude that the proposition 'P' is to be made or kept true.

A belief that God exists is an attitude that the proposition 'God exists' is true. A person with a 'belief that P' will act as if 'P' is true -- even though P may be false.

A desire to have sex with Penny is an attitude that the proposition "I am having sex with Penny" is to be made or kept true. A person with a desire that P will act so as to make or keep 'P' true, devoting energy toward this end proportional to the strength of the desire.


Definition: If there exists a desire that P, and 'P' is true, the desire is fulfilled.

Definition: If there exists a desire that P, and 'P' is false, the desire is thwarted.

These are stipulated definitions that I borrow from C.I Lewis, A Theory of Knowledge and Valuation.

Any state of affairs in which 'P' is true is a state that fulfills the desire in question. Any state of affairs in which 'P' is false is such as to thwart the desire in question. The agent does not need to know that 'P' is true, or even believe that 'P' is true, for the desire to be fulfilled. All that is required is that 'P' is in fact true. Thus, a parent who sacrifices his life in order to save his child, does not need to know that his actions succeeded in order for his desire to be fulfilled. If the child, in fact, survives, the parent's desire is fulfilled. If not, the parent's desire has been thwarted.


(5)All intentional action aims at fulfilling the most and the strongest of the agent's desires.

The above example of a parent saving a child's life provides an illustration of how desire fulfillment is the goal of action. The more and the stronger of the parent's desires could be fulfilled in a state where the child continued to live. The desires thwarted by the parent dying were fewer and/or weaker than those fulfilled by the child living.

I am going to start wielding Occham's Razor at this point. The set of propositions given above best explains and predicts the range of human intentional actions, including such things as a parent's act to save his child. I have no need for "free will", "intrinsic value", "a soul" or anything other than beliefs, desires, and intentions.

My challenge to anybody who wants to add some other entity is to show that it serves a purpose. Is there anything in intentional human action that the propositions above cannot handle? If not, then by the power vested in me by Occam's Razor, I say: "Begone with your free will, intrinsic value, souls, and whatnot. They are not needed here."


OBJECTING TO THE THEORY

Are these premises that everybody can agree with?

There are many philosophers who do not. In fact, there are many who argue that the whole theory can be scrapped. (See, for example, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for Eliminative Materialism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/).)

I have no room to address this debate here. I will note that, even though eliminativists identify some problems with this theory, they do not provide a better alternative. They only say, "A better theory must exist somewhere."

I could create a similar argument against our contemporary physics. Given the rate at which new "theories of everything" have been announced and replaced in recent years, I can argue that the most widely used, contemporary 'theory of everything' will some day be replaced as well. Yet, this is no argument for getting rid of the best theories we have today. We must wait until that better theory comes along. Until it does, the theory we have today remains the best theory available. It certainly makes more sense to be using the best theory available than to use the second or third or nth best theory, or some theory that does not exist yet. Besides, until we have that better theory, we have no reason to assume that this theory will ever actually be bested.

So, until a better theory of intentional action comes along, I will regard the above propositions as true premises in any argument involving intentional action.


VALUE

(6) Beliefs can be correct or incorrect.
(7) Desires are not 'correct' or 'incorrect'.

This identifies a significant difference between beliefs and desires -- one that the common subjectivists get right.

A person's belief -- for example, a belief that he will live forever -- can be more or less correct. However, a person's desire -- for example, a desire to live forever -- has no external reality to compare it to that allows us to call the desire 'correct' or 'incorrect'.

Let us assume that there is a person with a desire that P, where P = "I am eating chocolate ice cream" -- a state less awkwardly expressed as a desire for chocolate ice cream. If "P" happens to be false, this does not mean that the desire is wrong. It only means that the agent has some work to do. He has to go to his freezer, grab the chocolate ice cream and a spoon, and start shoveling chocolate ice cream into his mouth. Where desires exist, they motivate agents to act so as to make or keep the proposition 'P' that is the object of the desire true.

Some argue that desires can be more or less correct. A desire is correct if the desire is for something that has real value, and a desire is incorrect if it is a desire for something having no real value. For example, the claim that homosexuality is wrong because it is 'unnatural' assumes the possibility that desires can be 'correct' or 'incorrect' depending on whether the desire is for something that has real value (is natural) or for something having no real value (is unnatural).

Some evolutionary ethicists argue the same way. They assert that a desire is 'correct' if it supports the objective of propagating the species, and is 'incorrect' if it is inconsistent with this end. They treat 'propagating the species' as having real value the same way that the people above treat 'natural' as having real value.

I am going to employ Occam's Razor here and say that there is no need to postulate any type of real value in either what is natural, or in what promotes the survival of a species. Without evidence for the existence of such a property, there is no basis for holding that desires can be 'correct' or 'incorrect'.


(8)The state of being 'such as to fulfill the desires in question' is real.

If the proposition, "[Agent] desire that [P]" is true, then the proposition, "[State in which 'P' is true] is such as to fulfill the desire [of Agent]" is also true. These are, in fact, two different ways of saying the same thing. If "Fred likes chocolate ice cream" is true, then "Chocolate ice cream is something that Fred likes" is also true -- it says the same thing.

Where there is more than one desire, we can determine whether the object of evaluation, "Is such as to fulfill the more and the stronger desires". My writing this essay fulfills some of my desires -- and thwarts others. I have a computer game on the next computer that I would like to play, that desire is being thwarted. But, writing this essay is such as to fulfill the more and the stronger of these desires.

I can also make true propositions concerning what is 'such as to fulfill the more and the stronger of the desires of others'. After all, if I know which of these propositions are true, and I know what others believe, then I can predict their behavior. Failure to predict their behavior means that I have to revisit my theory about what they believe and about what is 'such as to fulfill the desires in question' where the desires in question are those of the people whose behavior I am predicting.

Those 'others' need not just be individuals. I may be interested in knowing what will be "such as to fulfill the more and the stronger desires of a group of others". That group may be "customers", "employees", "neighbors", "mother-in-law", "voters", or, in some cases, "everybody ". In all of these cases, the property of being "such as to fulfill the more and the stronger of the desires in question" is very real, and very useful.


(9)We talk about these very real and very useful states all the time, and we do so using the language of value.

Or, in other words:

(9') "Good" = "Is such as to fulfill the desires in question"; "Bad" = "Is such as to thwart the desires in question".

Everything in the phenomenology of value can either be eliminated or reduced to a statement of the form "is such as to fulfill the desires in question" (which is a proposition, referring to a real property of things, and having a truth value, and is sometimes true). A proof of this would have to go through an exhaustive list of everything in the phenomenology of value, and either demonstrate its reduction or its elimination. However, a critique of this needs only to identify something that cannot be reduced or eliminated.

Ultimately, our common concept of "good" and "bad" is broader than this. The proposition "X is good" actually means "There exists reasons for action to bring about X" -- and "Y is bad" means "There exists reasons for action to bring about not-Y". These reasons for action might include such things God's wish or intrinsic value.

However, the only reasons to bring about X (or to not bring about Y) that actually do exist are desires -- or 'X is such as to fulfill the desires in question'. Therefore, all assertions of a 'reason for action' other than 'is such as to fulfill the desires in question' are false. Only propositions of this form that can be reduced to "is such as to fulfill the desires in question" can be true. (See J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong)


(10)Desires can be good or bad

I stated above that a desire cannot be 'correct' or 'incorrect' -- the subjectivist is right on this. However, desires can still be 'good' or 'bad'. A desire can be 'such as to fulfill other desires' (such as a desire to help a person in distress, or a desire can be 'such as to thwart other desires' (such as a desire to rape or kill).

Propositions identifying a desire as being "such as to fulfill other desires" or "such as to thwart other desires" are sometimes true. Unless the 'other desires' is limited to those of the speaker, the truth value of such a proposition is independent of the attitudes of the person making the claim.


(11)Our language uses different words for different relationships between states of affairs and desires.

For example, the word "illness" is used to when a change in physical or mental functioning is "such as to thwart the desires in question", where "the desires in question" are those of the person said to be ill. "Injury" does the same thing. The difference between the two is that an "illness" has a micro-cause (a cause that our primitive ancestors could have only guessed at), and "injury" has a macro-cause (a cause that our primitive ancestors could see).

The term 'illness' can also be used for describing a state where a person has a desire for that which does not have real value. However, since nothing has real value, all such attributions of illness of this type are false.

The word "useful" can refer to any object according to its ability to fulfill just about any desire, but it is only used to refer to things that fulfill desires indirectly. A hammer or tool is not "such as to directly fulfill the desires in question." It is "such as to indirectly bring about the desires in question."

The word "wrong", if we look at its context, best makes sense as a term that evaluates desires (the way 'illness' evaluates physical and mental functioning), and does so relative to all desires that exist (the way 'illness' does so relative to the desires of the person whose functioning is being evaluated). Basically, an intentional act is 'wrong' if it is an action that a person with good desires would not have performed. And a 'good desire' is a desire that tends to fulfill all other desires.


(12)The "object of evaluation" and "desires in question" for each value term are either written into the meaning of the term, or determined in context.

I have given examples above where these terms are written into the meaning of the term. The "object of evaluation" for illness and injury are written into the meaning of the term -- as are the desires in question.

In other instances, it is determined by context.

If my wife were to say to me, in a conversation, "She went to the movie," I typically know who "she" is. Among the planet's billions of "shes", I can identify "she" by paying attention to the context in which the statement is made.

Value terms also acquire a part of their meaning from their context.

If I take a bite out of a hamburger and say, "This is a really good hamburger!", the context suggests that the desires in question are my own. However, if I am offered a hamburger and say, "That looks like a really good hamburger, but I have to watch my weight." "Good" in this context refers to only a subset of my desires (those associated with what I taste). It does not refer to all of my desires. We determine 'the desires in question' by context.

The need to use context to determine the meaning of a term is an ordinary part of language, which applies even in physics and mathematics, and is not an invitation to subjectivism.

[Hiero5ant]

“Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days?� – Adeimantus

In one sense, the argument for moral realism begins in _The Republic_ with Plato’s response to the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus to show how morally good acts have intrinsic value separate from any consequences of their observance. Morality, on Plato’s account, is an emulation of the One True Heavenly Form of The Good. But even if one accepts Platonic ontology, Adeimantus’s challenge still goes unanswered – even given acceptance of Plato’s account of the ideal state and the form of The Good, there remains no rational reason to accept the conclusion that one ought to behave in conformity with it, especially not when, as Adeimantus points out, one can often fulfill one’s desires at least as easily by contravening The Good as conforming to it.

What I argue is that the problem with Plato’s argument for moral realism in _The Republic_ does not stem from deficiencies of his ontology. Rather than failing by virtue of a false premise, it necessarily fails because a flaw in its very structure. No matter what set of facts one plugs into such a structure -- facts of utility, divine commands, categorical imperatives, or what have you -- one can never compel the conclusion that one ought to behave in conformity with them. This is so because moral oughts simply aren’t facts. As such, moral claims are not merely “not true�. Instead, they are not the kinds of things that can even be true or false.


ARGUMENT AGAINST MORAL REALISM


I) Moral Realism provides the best explanation of the meaning of moral statements if and only if Moral Realism accurately describes how actual people actually use moral language.

II) If Moral Realism accurately describes how actual people actually use moral language, then all moral disagreements between rational people necessarily involve factual disagreements.

III) Not all moral disagreements between rational people necessarily involve factual disagreements.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

.: C) Moral Realism is not the best explanation for the meaning of moral statements.



PREMISE ONE: “Moral Realism provides the best explanation of the meaning of moral statements if and only if Moral Realism accurately describes how actual people actually use moral language.�


I presume that this will be the least controversial portion of the argument. What any good theory in any domain claiming to be the best explanation ought to do is accurately describe the phenomena in question, and then show how these phenomena follow as a logical consequence of known mechanisms and postulated laws. Readers should keep in mind that Realism and Antirealism are not themselves ethical theories, they are metaethical theories – they are each attempts to explain the status and content of moral statements, and as such are not concerned to justify any specific moral claims.

The very necessity for some metaethical theory is itself revealing, and should provide the first hint that some variety of antirealism is probably correct. Why, after all, do we have to argue about *words* instead of arguing about the *world*? If “goodness� and “badness� were empirically observable properties, we wouldn’t even be having this kind of debate. Yet “The Good� has no weight, takes up no space, makes no sounds, reflects no light, is not measurable not only by any current means, but by any conceivable means.

So if Moral Realism wants to earn its keep as an explanatory theory for the way humans use moral language, it has to do it the old fashioned way: by accurately describing the phenomenon in question, and doing so by positing the least possible number of unobserved entities and mechanisms.


PREMISE TWO: “If Moral Realism accurately describes how actual people actually use moral language, then all moral disagreements between rational people necessarily involve factual disagreements.�


This premise falls almost instantly out of the very definition of Moral Realism. Moral Realism is the theory that moral sentences state facts, therefore people who disagree about some moral statement must be disagreeing about at least one fact.

Readers should note that I have placed an important qualification in this premise: that the people involved are rational. Included in this concept of being rational is the notion that each person is equally capable of making the same inferences from data as the other. It would be ludicrous for anyone to deny that people can make different inferences from the same set of facts, and I make no such claim. In this premise I only assert what can fairly be asserted any Realist theory about any domain of human discourse, be it physics or history or biology.


PREMISE THREE: “Not all moral disagreements between rational people necessarily involve factual disagreements.�


Many, if not most, moral arguments involve some sort of disagreement about facts – for example, someone who says that abortion is morally acceptable might point to the social impact of mothers forced to raise unwanted babies, while opponents of abortion may cite studies showing that such impact is really negligible. Here I assert that, even given the same set of epistemologically sufficient data, there are still conceivable and actual instances where rational persons can and do reach contradictory moral conclusions.

The classic example forced on freshmen in Intro to Ethical Philosophy courses is the Kantian Husband and the Utilitarian Wife, arguing whether or not to lie to the Nazi guard about the Jew they are hiding in their attic. The Kantian argues that, however tragic the consequences may be, it is always and everywhere morally impermissible to tell a lie. The Utilitarian counters that lying in this instance is in fact morally required, because lying will clearly bring about a result in which the greatest happiness for the greatest number is realized.

Here we have an instance in which it is stipulated that both persons are aware of the relevant facts, and are aware of the precise consequences of either course of action. And yet there is still a disagreement of the most profound nature. Here is clear that their disagreement is not about any fact, either past, present, or future – the Kantian does not deny that lying would maximize utility, and the Utilitarian does not deny that lying treats the Nazi as a means, and not as an end (or, if you prefer the alternate formulation, “proposes a course of action whose universalization cannot be willed without contradiction�). It should be obvious that what they are disagreeing about is not a fact (unless one wants to make the utterly question-begging statement that they disagree over “the fact that one ought to maximize happiness�). Rather, one of them subjectively desires one state of affairs, while the other subjectively desires a contradictory one. This disagreement is no more reconcilable than a disagreement over whether chocolate ice cream is better than vanilla.

The subjectivist realist at this point can attempt an escape that is unavailable to his objectivist realist counterpart: he can claim that moral claims do state facts, but that these facts are merely the bare facts that the speaker (or, sometimes, the speaker’s linguistic community) has those subjective desires. Now, whether or not someone desires something is an objective fact – they either do or they don’t, their neurons are either arranged in such a way or they are not arranged in such a way. But here, both parties know perfectly well what the other person does and does not desire. They are not disagreeing over whether the husband is, in fact, subjectively a Kantian. They are disagreeing about whose desires ought to be fulfilled, not over whether those desires actually exist. So even the subjectivist realist can point to no fact over which they disagree.


WHAT IS MISSING FROM THE REALISTS’ THEORIES?


Human sentences can be declarative (“The door is open.�), interrogative (“Is the door open?�), imperative (“Open the door!�), or exclamatory (“Hooray for the open door!!!�). It is quite simply gibberish to talk about what the “answer� to a declarative sentence is, or to talk about the “truth� of an interrogative. At the heart of the present debate is precisely the question of what sort of sentences moral claims are.

Moral prescriptions – “thou shalt not steal�; “do unto others as you would have them do unto you�; “no man is another man’s slave� – are precisely that: they are prescriptions. They are commands to do or refrain from doing certain things. Moral commands are the apotheosis of the imperative rather than the declarative sentence; as such it is gibberish to talk about moral rules being “true� or “false�, in the same way it is gibberish to talk about “Open the door!� being “true� or “false�.

When someone condemns slavery from a Kantian standpoint, the sentence “slavery is wrong� does not translate as a synonym for “By the way, you may be interested to know that slavery treats humans as a means only, and not as an end.� Presumably, the slaveholders are already aware of that. When a Millian Utilitarian says that genocide is wrong, he is not saying “You know, I’ve just discovered the most fascinating tidbit: genocide does not lead to the maximization of happiness for the greatest number!� Quite the contrary. Persons making moral claims are asserting a positive obligation on persons to act or refrain from acting in a certain way. They are not trying to alert the listener to some new set of facts in the world of which they were previously unaware. They are stating an imperative.

One must be cautious at this point not to confuse this as a vindication for “shallow prescriptivism� – the view that moral imperatives are synonymous with simple imperatives like “close the door� or “never commit genocide�. Moral claims, while belonging to the same genus as simple commands, represent a unique species with at least two distinguishing characteristics: universalizability and desire independence.

“Universalizability� describes a familiar feature of moral discourse, namely that people understand moral imperatives to be applicable to all similarly situated persons. When someone informs someone else that, say, they have a moral obligation to release their slaves, they are doing something different from simply ordering them to do so. Rather, they assert that all persons similarly situated, past, present, future, hypothetical, and actual, have an obligation to do so.

By “desire independence� I certainly don’t mean to suggest that people’s moral beliefs have no relation to their own desires about what should and should not be done in the world. In fact, it is the heart of my theory that all moral claims are merely the expressions of subjective desires of the speaker. Rather, “desire independence� as I use it is a technical term which refers to the property implicitly accepted in moral discourse by both speaker and listener that the moral principle in question would be “true� even if neither party desired it to be so. When someone claims, for example, that homosexuality is morally wrong, they do not mean to claim that if at some point in the future they begin to desire a homosexual relationship, that homosexuality will become morally acceptable.

Like any metaethical theory, Moral Realism must provide a cogent account of these features of the way actual people actually use moral language: prescriptivity, universalizability, and desire independence.


THE POSITIVE THEORY: NONCOGNITIVIST ANTIREALISM


One rather delightful aspect of having a fondness for desert landscape ontologies is that the burden of proof almost always lies on one’s opponent. As such it is important to point out that it is the objective realist who must show through clear and convincing evidence that these mysterious entities called “values� exist. The default position is that they do not.

Subjectivist realists have it a bit easier. They are not committed to the existence of some weird “property of the Good� floating somewhere in the aether. But the burden is still on them to show as metaethicists that the prescriptivist, univeralist, and desire-independent aspects of moral language can be more parsimoniously accounted for than under antirealism.

Realist theories of moral language assert that moral claims refer to actual facts in the world; by contrast, antirealist theories assert that they do not. Noncognitivism is a variety of normative antirealism. It asserts that not only do moral claims not refer to facts, but moral claims are not even capable of referring to facts.

To explain noncognitive antirealism, one needs to explain what it means for a process to be “cognitive�.

In the loose, vernacular sense of course, “cognitive� refers simply to “anything the brain does.� This would thus cover anything from explorations of transfinitist set theory to the mere mechanical operation of our heart and respiratory systems. But as a philosophical term “cognitive� refers only to a limited subset of these phenomena: those mental processes involved in truth-functional language use. If someone therefore said “Hooray for America!!!� this would not count as a cognitive act, since that sentence cannot be true or false, even though it may be a genuine expression of a real mental state of speaker. On the other hand, if someone said, “America was formed in 1968 by Martians,� they would be performing a cognitive act – asserting a falsehood.

It is crucial to note that, while “Hooray for America!!!� is noncognitive, “I like America� is not. The difference is that the latter states a claim about a matter of objective fact (whether or not the speaker does in fact have that view), whereas the former does not state a claim that could possibly be true or false in the way that “The cat is on the mat� can be true or false.

The metaethical theory I am defending in this debate is the theory that sentences about morality are noncognitive acts. Moral principles are instead a species of imperative, and as such all assertions regarding the “truth� of moral principles are massively in error.

How does noncognitivism explain the salient features of moral discourse?

The noncognitivism I advocate is a kind of error theory. It says that people are mistaken when they talk about the “truth� of moral rules. To explain this mistake, it invokes a mechanism already known to exist. We often hear people talk about great works of art, such as Bach or Dante, embodying “the Truth�, or as “telling the Truth�. We also talk about certain lifestyles like agricultural labor being “honest� – as though being a refrigerator repairman involved “the assertion of contrafactual states of affairs�. This is because the word “true� in the English language has a broad penumbra of meanings separate from its core technical meaning, that of expressing a truth-functional proposition. It is entirely understandable that confusion would ensue among language-users not practiced in making the distinction between truthfunctionality and other forms of discourse. We thus shouldn’t be any more surprised to hear people talking about morals as being “true� any more than we should be to hear people talking about Bach being “true�. But in neither case should we leap to the conclusion that such utterances express a truthfunctional claim.

Universalizability and prescriptivity are likewise explainable by noncognitivist antirealism. We all, as human beings, want the world to be a certain way, and when we make moral claims as distinct from simple commands, we are trying to change the attitudes of others such as to realize the world we wish to see. To say that morals are imperatives accounts for prescriptivity neatly, and universalizability is merely an expression of the fact that moral asserters happen to have grander designs on the world than the mere closing of an individual door.


WHAT NONCOGNITIVISM IS NOT


Noncognitivists do not deny that in moral discourse we see behaviors that resemble behaviors in truth-functional discourse: syllogistic reasoning from metaprinciples, the adducing of evidence to support conclusions, the effort to maintain consistency with other normative commitments. We merely deny that the conclusions reached from moral reasoning state propositions that are true in the way that descriptions of trees and clouds and quasars are true.

Noncognitivists do not deny that there can be true instantiations of “good things� relative to stipulative standards. If we stipulate that “things done on Tuesdays are evil�, or that “the best hockey team is the one that scores the most goals in 60 minutes�, then of course it’s true that my eating breakfast last Tuesday was evil, and true that the Canadiens defeated the Boston Bruins in the last game of last year’s NHL East Quarterfinal. Likewise, one is free to stipulate that “when I say X is good, I just mean that it fulfils the desires in question� or “when I say X is good, I just mean that it fulfils the requirements of rational egoism�. But stipulating that a word be used in such a way does not erase the way it is actually used, and most importantly, stipulating a set of facts is still not the same as stipulating an obligation to have certain attitudes towards them.

Noncognitivists do not deny that some things are more prudent than others – that is, we do not deny that “people who don’t smoke live longer� or that “societies without theft are more stable and prosperous�. What we deny is that “living longer� or “having a stable society� have some mysterious property floating around them that rationally compels any given person to work towards them, especially not when working against them would manifestly be contrary to their interests and desires.

Noncognitivist antirealism is the best explanatory theory of the way humans use moral language. It posits no metaphysically mysterious unobservable free-floating “properties of the Good�. It accounts for moral disagreement by recognizing that it is simply an understandable consequence of the fact that different persons have different subjective desires, different subjective material interests, and different subjective visions of how the world ought to be. And it explains how people can be in error regarding the ontological status of these mysterious moral properties by appealing to a well-known psychological and linguistic mechanism: a confusion about what it means for something to be “true�.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

The next three statements will make up Round 2.

[Francois Tremblay]

In my opening case, I have presented a line of argumentation in favour of moral realism. Mr. Fyfe has done the same in his own opening case. He has made it quite clear that his case pertains to desires, not beliefs (a word which seems to designate propositions in this context). Since my case pertains to moral propositions, not to desires that lead to conditional moral propositions (such as "X is good because I need it to achieve goal Y"), I see our cases as being complementary. Also, a value can entail a desire when the agent becomes aware of the existence of that value, under certain conditions.

Of course, Mr. Fyfe also argues that values cannot be divorced from the nature of desires, but since his case restricts itself to desires in the first place, it seems to be an ultimately circular argument. There is a much more complex dynamic between "belief" and "desire" than simply "beliefs and desire both inform action" : both inform each other also. As such, it is unclear why he restricts himself to examining the nature of desire and its effects. Perhaps he may want to clarify this point.

In my view, desire is only the last element of a long and dynamic chain, and to say that desire dictates morality seems to me as absurd as saying that the last word of a sentence determines its meaning. We have to ask ourselves : where does that desire come from ? Is it the end result of a rational or irrational process ? While, as I said, I have no objections to Mr. Fyfe's reasoning, it seems to me that his approach is rather myopic.



Mr. Lee's burden, on the other hand, is quite different. As I mentioned before, the crux of the conflict between moral realism and moral antirealism consists of what is called the is-ought dichotomy. Can ought statements be obtained from is statements ? But Mr. Lee's case is even deeper than that, in that he questions the very status of ought statements as propositions (statements that can be true or false) - in short, he holds a noncognitivist position.

I do not think that Mr. Lee has fulfilled his burden of proof. Here is his argument as presented :

I) Moral Realism provides the best explanation of the meaning of moral statements if and only if Moral Realism accurately describes how actual people actually use moral language.

II) If Moral Realism accurately describes how actual people actually use moral language, then all moral disagreements between rational people necessarily involve factual disagreements.

III) Not all moral disagreements between rational people necessarily involve factual disagreements.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

.: C) Moral Realism is not the best explanation for the meaning of moral statements.

The syllogism is constructed soundly, and I would go as far as to say that it is true, at least in general. I am not, however, conceding the debate. I agree with the argument, but its conclusion has absolutely nothing to do with this debate.

Remember that I discussed the difference between description and prescription. This debate is about the existence and nature of moral facts, not the meaning of moral statements used by various people. Our goal here is not to compare who can "accurately describe how actual people actually use moral language", but to argue whether moral language can be used in a realist manner.

We are concerned not with how and why people use moral language, but rather with verifying the accuracy of such language. When James says "what Ed just did was good", we are not interested in why James said that, but whether the sentence can be true, and if so, whether James said a truth and why it is a truth. This is not descriptive, but rather prescriptive. In no way are descriptive issues relevant to the debate, and I have not and will not discuss descriptive issues during this debate, simply because they are irrelevant.

As an aside, I already addressed the issue of individual and cultural differences in my opening case. We should expect that "Moral Realism is not the best explanation for the meaning of moral statements", insofar as no one is bound to follow any form of moral realism at all. That is why we need morality in the first place. Diversity of opinion only makes more urgent the need for a solution, and does not deny any particular solution.

Now, I don't want to give the impression that Mr. Lee did not justify his choice of targets. He does provide a justification for the aim of what he calls his "meta-ethical" argument. He says :

The very necessity for some metaethical theory is itself revealing, and should provide the first hint that some variety of antirealism is probably correct. Why, after all, do we have to argue about *words* instead of arguing about the *world*? If “goodness� and “badness� were empirically observable properties, we wouldn’t even be having this kind of debate. Yet “The Good� has no weight, takes up no space, makes no sounds, reflects no light, is not measurable not only by any current means, but by any conceivable means.

But we have to reject this as question-begging. Moral realists uphold that moral properties are empirically observable properties - otherwise moral realism wouldn't be realist ! It is not clear, however, why we should think that we are wrong. And indeed both my case and Mr. Fyfe's present ways to empirically observe moral properties - the former by observing various facts relevant to the effects of our actions, and the latter by observing various psychological states and the beliefs they rely on.

In view of this, it seems that Mr. Lee's approach to the debate is based on a question-begging premise, that moral properties are not empirically observable. I must therefore reject his case as unsupported, at least for now.

It also remains unclear why he thinks that statements involving words such as "good" or "evil" are noncognitive. He simply affirms that they are. This is not sufficient to dispel the burden of proof, and I hope Mr. Lee will give an argument in this respect as well.



Mr. Lee also puts a burden of proof on moral realists. He asks us to justify three features :

Prescriptivity. He does not make clear what this means, but from what he wrote, it seems to designate the idea that people who utter moral statements "are not trying to alert the listener to some new set of facts in the world of which they were previously unaware. They are stating an imperative".

Universalizability. This designates the idea that moral statements should be universal, in that they apply equally to all at all times.

Desire independence. This refers to the idea that moral statements are true regardless of our desires about the content of the statement.

Does Objectivist moral realism fulfill these criteria ? Let's examine them in turn again.

Prescriptivity. Here Mr. Lee seems to be using question-begging again. If moral realism is true, why should we expect the utterance of moral statements to be more than a communication of facts ? People may mean such statements to be more than a communication of facts, of course, but why should we see them as such ?

Indeed, if moral realism is true, and moral statements are solely justified by facts, then moral statements are merely statements of fact.. They have nothing to do with imperatives, no more than uttering the statement "the speed of light is approximately 300 000 km per second" has to do with making another person believe the fact expressed. The other person is simply wrong in believing otherwise, and in both cases uttering a true proposition is not an imperative.

Universalizability. My position of Objectivist moral realism fulfills the criteria. Since values refer to universal facts of human life and society, and not to desires or cultural factors, they apply to all human beings at all times. The instantiations of values do refer to desires and cultural factors, but they are not necessary for value-judgment.

Desire independence. Any moral realist position necessarily fulfills this criteria, since all facts of reality are true regardless of our desires.

With all due respect, I would suggest to replace these criteria with two more relevant ones :

Completeness. Any moral realist position must permit one to make value-judgments about a given action in a given context. Objectivist moral realism presents a scale of values and a method that permit us to judge an action and measure how "good" or "evil" it is. I will say more on this in a moment.

Moral obligation. Any moral realist position must justify moral obligation. We can explain this with the two criteria of universalizability and desire independence that Mr. Lee presented, and thus this criterion includes them both. If moral facts apply to all, and they are objective, then we can blame someone else for not following them.

Since my position fulfills both universalizability and desire independence, it also fulfills this criterion. Saying things like "he should have done X instead of Y" is perfectly meaningful, in that it indicates that someone did not follow all the facts of reality relevant to morality or the context where he performed X. Once again, by disagreeing with him as regards to what the good was in that instance, I am expressing a purely factual disagreement.



Mr. Lee's argument, however, does bring an interesting question. What do the words "good" and "evil" mean ? What do I mean by those words in an Objectivist moral realist context ?

In a general moreal realist sense, an action is good or evil depending on what values it effects, and how one takes this into account. This description is necessarily vague since moral realist positions are varied.

As for Objectivist moral realism, an action is good when it exchanges lower values for higher values, and evil when it exchanges higher values for lower values. This includes negative values, which are the opposites of the values I listed in my case. Examples of negative values for each level would be starvation (as an opposite to nutrition), faith (as an opposite to reason), malevolence (as an opposite to benevolence) and slavery (as an opposite to freedom). Exchanging a positive value for one of these negative values would always be an error.

Moral properties are, as I said, empirically observable in the same way than any other concept is observable, since moral properties are derived from rational facts. To say that "X is good", when speaking of an action, is the equivalent of saying "X is demonstrated to fulfill an objective human need", which is the equivalent of saying "we can observe the conditions that give rise to an objective human need that is fulfilled by X". The effects of a moral property are likewise observable : I can look at the results of actions taking place around me, and their successful or disastrous results.

Moral properties are not absolutes, in that they are generalities. For instance, to say "action X is good" does not mean that the action is certain to return the desired results all the time. It is possible, by factors of which we are not aware, that what we think is a good action will return negative results. The same is true for virtues. To say "rationality is good" does not mean that all results of rational processes will lead to good results. However, without rationality, we have no means to direct our actions towards good results.

A related issue is that values are not all-encompassing either. A value is a principle to be followed, but can always be overturned by a greater value. We may find the value of social recognition important, but there are occasions in which it may be no longer desirable - such as starvation. In that case, the higher value of nutrition takes precedence. As I pointed out before, prescriptive values exist in a hierarchy of importance, each level encompassing the others. If our material values are not fulfilled, then we can hardly pursue our spiritual, social or political values.

Moral properties apply to actions but do not apply to categories of actions. This must be mentioned since many atheists still believe that moral realism must answer questions of the type "is killing evil ?". The only rational answer, of course, is that killing in the context of hunting has a completely different status than killing in self-defense, or killing as murder. Categories of actions can only at best be described as "generally good" or "generally evil".



Since this is the last round that will be read and answered, I will now ask questions to Mr. Lee for him to answer in order to fulfill his side of the debate, at least in my eyes (and I think the eyes of many readers also). I discussed in detail the first two questions in my opening case, but I will repeat my justification again.

1. Can he justify his moral antirealism in the face of the fact that he upholds a number of values, that he had to objectively pursue in order to be able to participate in this debate ?

We all have to act an incalculable number of times during our lives, including to sustain our own lives. If we did not at least pursue material needs, none of us would be here. I am pretty sure Mr. Lee also values truth, otherwise he would surely see no use in debating. Therefore I can safely say that he has a number of values and knows a certain number of moral facts, including how to stuff a fork in his mouth to effect proper nutrition.

2. Can he justify his moral antirealism against the general irrationality of upholding antirealist positions in other disciplines, and in the face of the inevitability of human action ?

Since we must all act, whether we like it or not, to reject the possibility of a rational standard of action is self-defeating. Even if there was no known way to deduce moral facts (which is not the case), moral subjectivism would no more be acceptable than subjectivism in biology, physics, or construction. Where there is no objective evidence, one must either remain silent (which is impossible in this case) or assume we will find a solution later and actively seek one. An antirealism stance is not tenable.

3. Can he actually give any evidence for his proposed dichotomy between scientific facts and what we propose as moral facts (between "is" and "ought") ?

Thank you.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

So much to say, so few words!

Let's start with two things that Hiero5ant says that I agree with.

First:

So if Moral Realism wants to earn its keep …it has to do it the old fashioned way: by accurately describing the phenomenon in question, and doing so by positing the least possible number of unobserved entities and mechanisms.

This is true.

Yet, Hiero5ant's view requires these strange declarations that look and act in all ways like declarative statements (people everywhere treat them as literally true or false), but have no truth value -- a statement type that can be eliminated with no ill effect.

Second:

Why, after all, do we have to argue about *words* instead of arguing about the *world*?

The proposition behind this rhetorical question is also true.

Hiero5ant seems to assume that if one makes the statement, "Good = 'X'", they must attribute something to X that is not literally true of X -- some sort of prescriptivity.

At the heart of the present debate is precisely the question of what sort of sentences moral claims are. Moral prescriptions . . . are precisely that: they are prescriptions.

Some, represented by Tremblay, hold that this 'something else' takes the form of intrinsic prescriptivity. For Tremblay, this seems to be an intrinsic rationality that adheres to some values.

Others, represented by Hiero5ant, argue that these attributions of value to things like "brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number" or "is in accordance with a Kantian categorical imperative", or "happens on a Thursday" are non-truth-bearing declarations that are still, somehow, legitimate.

My view is that all declarations attributing a property to something (X is Y), whether it is mass, location, or goodness, that are not literally true of that thing, do have a truth value. That truth value is false.

I am not saying that people do not offer cheers like, "Hooray for America!". I do deny that they have any more legitimate role to play in moral considerations than "Go! Broncos!" or "Shucks, I just broke a nail."

When I offer that "'good' = 'is such as to fulfill the desires in question'" I am offering this as a literal substitution. There is nothing true of one that is not literally true of the other. I am not adding anything extra that requires either Tremblaysian intrinsic rationality or a Heiro5antian subjective non-truth-bearing assertion.

What this means is that if somebody wants to take the word "good" and offer it as a substitute for "happens on a Thursday", it does not matter -- as long as they obey the rule that attributing anything to "happens on a Thursday" that is not literally true of it, is false. They can then use some other word for what is literally true of 'is such as to fulfill the desires in question.' It would have no effect on the theory.

The words do not matter.

So, why is it thought that the claim "good = X" must attribute something to X that is not literally true of X?


(1) Because declarative statements are 100% description and 0% prescription, whereas value claims are prescriptive.

The prescription has to come from somewhere. Heiro5ant's says not to postulate any entities or mechanisms than what is needed to explain the phenomenon, but we have to account for the prescription.

Tremblay opts for intrinsic prescriptivity (rationality), Hiero5ant opts for non-truth-bearing prescriptive assertions. I offer that nothing is needed -- that desire provides the prescriptivity.

If S is a state of affairs in which 'P' is true, and Agent has a desire that P, then Agent has a motivating reason to bring about S. These motivating reasons are real. They are not built into the fabric of the object of evaluation, they are built into the brain. But, like a person's height, weight, pulse, and age, his desires are real.

Because prescription depends on desires, prescriptivity requires considering the desires of whomever one is prescribing for.

Prescribing for a person requires considering all of that person's desires. So, if I was wondering whether or not to prescribe S for Agent, I would look at his desire that {P1, P2, P3, . . . Pn}, and prescribe that which fulfills the more and the stronger of those desires. If I were to look at only one desire, I may make mistakes like, "You like the experience of weightlessness, so you should jump off of a tall building."

If I were to prescribe for my sister-in-law's family, considering the desires of only one person in that family is as invalid as considering only one desire when prescribing for a person. A valid prescription is for that which fulfills the more and the stronger of all of that family's desires.

If I were to prescribe universally, this requires considering all desires universally. Assertions like, "It would please me if everybody did X, therefore everybody has an obligation to do X" are as invalid as the prescription for jumping off of a tall building above.

For a valid prescription, the range of desires considered must match the range of the prescription. Universal prescriptions must consider all desires.

So, "It would please the NAZIs if all the Jews were exterminated, therefore the Jews have an obligation to go to the death camps" is invalid. Ultimately, prescribing universally argues for getting rid of the NAZIs in the least desire-thwarting way possible -- through the use of praise and blame to discourage NAZI attitudes, until there are no more NAZIs.

Is there anything about the phenomenology of prescription that requires that I add either Tremblay's intrinsically rational prescriptivity or Hiero5ant's non-truth-bearing morally prescriptive utterances? I see no purpose for either of these things, and am quite content to eliminate both.


(2) Because Hume said we can't.

Hume argued that since the term 'ought' describes a different sort of relationship from 'is', that we cannot derive 'ought' from 'is'.

Well, this is the standard interpretation. What Hume actually said that he cannot see how it can be done, and the person who thinks it can be done needs to explain how.

Here is that explanation. If "ought" = "is such as to fulfill the desires in question", then "ought" statements are "is" statements, and the derivation of "is" from "is" creates no problem.

However, there is a qualification. A conclusion of the form "is such as to fulfill the desires in question" requires that the premises mention, implicitly or explicitly (by stating them, by inferring them in context, or by writing them into the meanings of value-laden terms) the desires in question.

There is evidence that Hume would agree with this -- that his claim "'ought' cannot be derived from 'is'" should instead say "'ought' cannot be derived from 'is' without mentioning the passions."

When Hume talks about ethics, he talks in a way that is consistent with the thesis that 'good' means 'is such as to appeal to the passions in question.' Using both Hume's way of speaking and more modern language, his criteria are:

(1) Pleasing to self (directly fulfills the desires of the speaker)

(2) Useful to self (indirectly fulfills the desires of the speaker).

(3) Pleasing to others (directly fulfills the desires of others).

(4) Useful to others (indirectly fulfills the desires of others).

Or, in other words, "Is such as to fulfill (directly or indirectly) the more and the stronger of the passions (desires) in question."

[Note: Fellow IIDB member Pyrrho gave weight to this interpretation in a thread on this topic. (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=95030)]


(3) Because G.E. Moore said we can't.

G.E. Moore asserts that anybody who claims "good = X" commits the 'naturalistic fallacy'. He 'proves' this through his 'open question argument': If the question "Y is X, but is it good?' remains an open question, we know that the equation 'X is good' fails. Moore then asserts that, for all X, this is an 'open question'.

However, G.E. Moore's 'open question argument' is itself a fallacy -- called the 'masked man fallacy'.

Assume that a detective tells a prominent citizen, "The masked man robbing convenience stores is your brother." The citizen answers, "That cannot be, because, as you approached, I knew the name of my brother, but I did not know the name of the masked man. They cannot be the same person."

However, the fact that "Is the masked man my brother?" remains an open question does not prove that "the masked man is not my brother."

The citizen needs to find something that is actually true of the masked man that is not true of his brother. Analogously, we need to find something that is true of 'good' that is not true of 'is such as to fulfill the desires in question'. What we know (or believe) about each is not a property of the thing itself, it is a property of us. Our ignorance does not prove that they are not the same thing.


Heiro5ant's Example

Hiero5ant gives an example of a Utilitarian and a Kantian debating whether to tell the NAZIs about some Jews when they come knocking. Hypothetically, they agree on all of the facts. Yet they disagree about what to do.

Yet, if they agree on the facts, here are two facts that they should agree on.

(1) There is no such thing as a categorical imperative. All assertions of the form "X is in accordance with a categorical imperative" are false.

(2) The proposition, "X maximizes happiness and minimizes unhappiness implies X is required" is false, unless 'is required' is literally true of "maximizes happiness and minimizes happiness', which it is not.

Let us add a third person who says, "Because these Jews do not worship the one true God, they should be exterminated." This third person votes to hand the Jews over to the NAZIs. Now, is it the case that if these people agreed on all of the facts of the matter, they would disagree as to the conclusion? Well, if they agreed on all of the facts, they would also have to agree that God does not exist, and that the claim, 'turning the Jews over to the NAZIs would please God' is false.

Hiero5ant needs an example in which the people actually do agree on all of the facts of the matter, and are both rational, yet disagree on the conclusion.

Ultimately, Hiero5ant's argument is, "I can imagine a case in which two people agree totally on the facts of the matter, and yet disagree as to the conclusion, therefore morality requires non-truth-bearing prescriptive utterances." However, the capacity to imagine something proves very little. The fact that I can imagine a flying pig, does not prove that pigs can fly.

There is a grain of truth in Hiero5ant's assertion. Two people can agree on all of the facts and still have different desires, just as they can agree on all of the facts and still have different hair color. However, "'It would please me if everybody did X' implies ' everybody has an obligation to do X'" remains false. The fact that they have different desires does not imply different obligations. To prescribe universally, both must consider all desires, not just their own. Since 'all desires' is the same for both people, the universal prescription they would reach if they agreed to all of the facts would be the same as well.


Tremblay's Example

I have said that any argument with a value proposition as a conclusion requires a reference to "the desires in question" in the premises. Tremblay offers an argument for the value of nutrition that does not mention desires at all in the premises. Yet, he asserts, the argument yields a 'value' conclusion.

Namely:

(I1) Human beings have a metabolism which requires nutrients to be sustained.
(I2) Human beings need to eat and drink in a certain way in order to survive.
(V) Nutrition is a value.
(O) All other factors being constant, we ought to eat and drink, in a manner consistent with proper nutrition..

Agreeing that "nutrition" is that which is necessary to sustain life, I hold that the value of nutrition is not to be automatically granted. It depends on the value of the life it is sustaining.

For the most part, survival is something that "is such as to fulfill the desires in question". Most people can do a better job of making or keeping 'P' true (where 'P' is the object of a desire that 'P') by staying alive and putting their energy to work making or keeping 'P' true.

However, there are rare but real circumstances where a person can do a better job at making or keeping 'P' true by actions that result in his own death. A parent who desires that his child survive may find himself in a situation where keeping 'P' true, where 'P' = "my child survives", requires an act that ends his own life.

Other examples of cases where giving up survival is the best way to fulfill a desire includes cases where death is the only way to avoid extreme pain (as from an illness), to avoid revealing information through torture that may help an enemy, to prevent laying in a vegetative state while the money one had spent a lifetime saving in order to donate to charity is spent instead on some nurse to change his diapers.

This last case is a particularly relevant example. One of the techniques to hasten death for such a person is to remove all feeding tubes. The individual starves to death. This withholding of nutrition is, in such a case, 'such as to fulfill the desires in question'. In this case, the value of nutrition is zero, or even negative, and recognized as such.

We can fully account for, not only the positive value of nutrition (when it is positive), but the negative value of nutrition (when it is negative) by assessing whether nutrition will bring about a state that is such as to fulfill the desires of the person whose body we are talking about.

Yet, it is still the case that whether or not nutrition will produce a state that is 'such as to fulfill the desires in question' is a matter of objective fact. It may, at times, be hard to know, but the difficulty in knowing a fact does not prevent it from being a fact. Our inability to count the number of stars in the solar system does not prevent there from being a 'fact of the matter' concerning the number of stars in the universe.

The same analysis applies to the rest of the 'needs' that Tremblay mentions.

I would like to look at two more that provide additional insight into the relationship between objects of evaluation and desires.


Health

The proposition that 'health is good" is true in the same way that 'circles are round' is true. 'Health' is a value-laden term -- 'good' is built into the very definition of the term. So, it is no accident, nor is it a matter of intrinsic merit, that health is good.

Analogously, it is no accident that things that are 'dangerous' are things that increase the risk of severe desire-thwarting. Nothing warrants the term 'dangerous' unless this is true.


Knowledge

Here, I must look at some elements of Tremblay's essay that may or may not be consistent with my view, depending on their interpretation.

We are all perceived egoists

By "perceived egoist" Tremblay seeks to distinguish between the case of a person who is acting in a way that he thinks is in his own interests, and in a way that is actually in his own interests. Tremblay wants us to know that a person acting in a way that he thinks is in his own interest can be making a mistake, so there is a difference between that a person does do and what he should do.

This is similar to my statement that each person seeks to act so as to fulfill the more and the stronger of his desires, and actually acts so as to fulfill the more and the stronger of his desires given his beliefs. If his beliefs are inaccurate, he may fail to actually fulfill his desires.

To use the term 'egoist' in my version would be a very strange use of the term, and likely to cause more confusion than enlightenment.

Egoism is typically understood as a situation where a person seeks only his own health and comfort, and is concerned with the health and comfort of others only insofar as they are useful tools for seeking more health and comfort for himself.

I hold that, while a person seeks to fulfill his own desires, it is possible (and even common) for a person to desire the health and comfort of others -- sometimes to the degree that he sees value in his own health and comfort only when it is useful in allowing him to provide more health and comfort for others. It would be strange, at best, to call such a person an egoist.

I do not know which view Tremblay ultimately holds, but we do not need to resolve that particular issue here.

What is relevant to our evaluation of knowledge is that we both draw a distinction between the goal of action and the actual result where beliefs are false. Only in a situation where a person's beliefs are true (and the person draws rational conclusions) is it the case that a person acting so as to fulfill his desires will unerringly do so.

Consequently, both 'truth' and 'knowledge' tend to be things that 'are such as to fulfill the desires in question'. Their value can be handled on this system, though it remains entirely desire-dependent, and people can make mistakes.


Conclusion

Hiero5ant reports that he has a fondness for "desert landscape ontologies". So do I. However, I think that his desert landscape has a few weeds growing in it that need to be dispatched. Cheers and jeers exist, but not in a species that has any relevance to ethics.

And, as for Tremblay's 'rational values', I do not find any evidence that this involves anything other than rationally determining whether the object of evaluation "is such as to fulfill the desires in question".

I see no evidence that we require anything other than desires, objects of evaluation, and ordinary propositions that describe the relationships that exist between them.

[Hiero5ant]

Francois Tremblay:

When Francois says This debate is not about the reasons why people do things, or the reasons why they think they do things - about description - but about the actual existence of moral facts - prescription.

I fear that there may be some confusion on the scope of the debate, in that we may be talking past one another, using similar words to describe different concepts and different theories. If I have, through negligence or error, caused or contributed to some confusion, it’s probably best for me to clarify before proceeding. (Warning: egregious autoplagiarism imminent!)

Theories of Realism and Antirealism are theories about what language-users do when they use language in certain ways. The debate between Realism and Antirealism is a debate about the deep syntactic and semantic structures of certain fields of language, especially about whether the entities employed in those fields' ontologies are real, or are simply linguistic fictions employed for descriptive convenience. There are Realism/Antirealism debates in mathematics, in particle physics, and biology, to name a few. In each of these cases, the metatheoretical commitments are orthogonal to the actual observations and predictions within those domains of discourse.

For example, in biological taxonomy, there has been a great debate over whether the entities described are real. The conclusion that seems to have been arrived at by many is that species are real entities – albeit historical individuals rather than essential kinds -- and that higher taxonomic ranks like Order and Family are descriptive fictions that reflect biologists’ subjective interest in this or that feature of the organisms in question.

Now, having this Antirealist conclusion about Hominoidea (the superfamily of apes including humans, chimps, and gorillas) does not mean that apes don’t objectively exist, or that the diagnostic characteristics that identify apes aren’t objectively there, or that we can’t say anything meaningful or true about apes. It just means that by using the word “hominoidea� we haven’t “carved nature at its joints�, anymore than we have selected a natural kind when we talk about “apes born on Tuesdays�.

A close spiritual cousin of normative antirealism in ethics is nominalism in mathematics. One could even say that nominalism just is normative antirealism as applied to mathematics. Following the discovery of the central limitative theorems and the collapse of logical positivism in the early part of the last century, some variety of nominalism has become the default view in the philosophy of mathematics and logic.

Now, a good way of stating nominalism for the layman is that "the laws of logic and mathematics are simply clever word-games, the manipulation of scratches on paper; "2+2=4" is not rooted in any empirical reality, and does not state any empirical truth". Thus phrased, it certainly sounds a lot like nihilism, but in the real world nominalist mathematicians and logicians go about their business in the same way, and reach the same conclusions, as their platonist counterparts. Why is this? Because the metatheory, nominalism, is a theory about what human brains are doing when they assert mathematical statements, and what the referents of those statements are. Statements about numbers don't refer to the real world the way statements about cats and mats refer to the real world, but this doesn't change much about the way people actually go about using the language. The two different kinds of statements, while superficially similar, are in fact radically different.

And so it is with nominalism in ethics. "The holocaust was wrong" does not state any empirical fact, and neither does "2+2=4". But merely because this counterintuitive conclusion is correct does not mean that either domain of discourse is "worthless" or "nonsense", any more than it means that people are wrong to hold such attitudes. It just means that people are deeply confused by surface syntax when they talk about "the number 2" being a real object that you might bump into at the bus stop, and they are likewise making a syntactic mistake when they talk about moral values as facts. Both domains of discourse simply aren't even trying to state truths about the world -- that's not what their purpose is. It is a sort of "cognitivist propositional fetishism" that says that language only serves a valuable function when it is making truth-functional claims about the universe.

So, when he says:

If we did not at least have the goal of surviving, none of us would be here. Therefore I can safely say that Mr. Lee has at least one value and knows a small number of moral facts, related to his survival and his desire to come on this board and debate with us. Anyone who argues for complete moral antirealism is contradicting himself with every word.

Furthermore, there is a sense in which rejecting the possibility of moral facts is also epistemically perverse. Since we must all act, whether we like it or not, to reject the possibility of a rational standard of action is self-defeating. It seems to me much like a scientist saying "forget it", rejecting naturalism outright, and using God to explain every single fact of nature.

Even if there was no known way to deduce moral facts (which is not the case), moral subjectivism would no more be acceptable than subjectivism in biology, physics, or construction.

I think he has missed the mark about what the Antirealist is arguing. I can deny that moral claims refer to objective moral facts without being “epistemically perverse�, and I can behave morally without “contradicting myself�. To show a genuine contradiction, he would have to show that acting morally entails that I am committed to “p and not p�. But there simply is no truth-functional sentence “p� to which I am committed along with its negation – although he is welcome to demonstrate the contrary.

However, it is almost trivially easy to show, based on his description of the origins of value, that he is committed to “p and not p�. This is because of a conflation between the concepts of “x is valued� and “x is an objective value�.

It is undeniable that I require proper nutrition to survive, and that as a consequence I, subjectively, value nutrition. But I also subjectively value Osama bin Laden not surviving, and therefore value him not getting his proper nutrition – even though he, presumably would rather go on living.

So now we have :

1) OBL’s nutrition is valued.
2) OBL’s not getting nutrition is valued.

Which translate, according to his argument, to:

1) OBL ought to get proper nutrition.
2) It is not the case that OBL ought to get proper nutrition.

Or, if you like, “p and not p�. QED.

I submit that the problem with this theory is that it involves a fallacious move from the mere fact that someone values something to the conclusion that there is some ethical obligation on anyone else to value it. People’s subjective values and material interests can and do conflict, and I simply don’t see how the objectivist can adjudicate between them in a way that is nonarbitrary and non-question-begging – in a way that shows that people can have an objective moral obligation to do something that is manifestly contrary to their own interests and desires.

As far as the is/ought dichotomy is concerned, it’s true that there is some concern over whether Hume’s formulation of it is metaphysically question-begging, so I won’t defend that here. Instead, I’ll reformulate it as an epistemological statement: instead of saying “no is ever implies an ought�, I will say that the epistemic burden of proof is on the objectivist realist to show how the proffered is implies the alleged ought.

Now, the burden of proof in philosophical arguments is like puke at a Christmas party: it always comes up sooner or later, and nobody wants it on them when it does. But rather than the burden being on me to show a metaphysical is/ought distinction, I say that the burden is on the realist to show as an epistemological matter that we should accept deductively any given “x ought to happen� claim from any “x does happen� claim. But since, as I showed above, his first attempted demonstration of how a moral fact derives from a physical fact leads almost immediately to contradiction, I don’t think he has overcome this burden.

The Euthyphro dilemma captures this distinction beautifully. Although it was formulated as a response to (pre-christian) Theistic Morality, it really can be used against any form of moral objectivism. Are things Good because humans as rational agents value them, or do rational agents value things because they are Good? He cannot say the former and still be an objectivist, because this is the very definition of subjectivism. Neither can he accept the latter, because his entire theory of values being “that which people act to gain or keep� depends on there being rational agents actually acting to gain or keep them. If there is some other property that defines the Good besides “that which people act to gain or keep�, he has yet to argue for it. Additionally, I haven't seen anything like an argument that attempts to derive any of the "higher-order" obligations like "slavery in general is wrong" or "no man should sacrifice others for himself" from the lower-order "obligations" of basic survival.

Noncognitivist Antirealism – the theory that when people say nutrition or liberty or nonviolence is “Good�, they are expressing their own subjective desires and commands (or perhaps those of their linguistic community) – explains the actual use of moral language better than the Objectivist Realist theory that people are referring to some independent “property of the Good�.

Alonzo Fyfe:

One thing that I am still dreadfully unclear on regarding DU is the scope of moral claims, specifically what the scope of “the desires in question� is supposed to be. When Smith tells Jones “Please close the door,� it seems obvious that the relevant desires being expressed are those of Smith. But whose desires are referred to when Smith says “lying is wrong�? Precisely how big is the conceptual tent? How was the size of the tent arrived at? Most importantly, what evidence from actual moral language by actual language users suggests that a tent of desires of precisely this size is what they are actually referring to, either intentionally or extentionally?

Of course, the shallow, straw-man formulation of DU would run into the same problems of simple contradiction that Francois’s theory does: Husband desires X, therefore X is good, wife desires not-X, therefore it’s not the case that X is good, therefore “p and not p�.

Alonzo suggests instead that the desires in question are pronomial, like “she� or “it�, and derive their referents from contextual ostension. Thus a person can indeed say, without contradiction, “She is from London, but she is not from London�, in the first case pointing (literally or figuratively) to Sara, and in the second case to Jane. You can sometimes hear the ostension just by listening. “She is from London, but she is not.�

The problem with this pronomial theory of moral reference is that essentially no one uses moral language this way. No one ever says things like “genocide is not wrong, but genocide is wrong." Moral debates, such as the one between the Kantian Husband and the Utilitarian Wife, are never resolved by pointing to one person while saying “lying is wrong� in the way that the referent of “she is from London� can be so resolved. We already stipulated that each is already fully aware of the other’s desires.

But the deeper problem with both Francois’s and Alonzo’s theories is that neither of them account for the property of prescriptivity. One conceptually essential aspect of moral statements is that acceptance of them as true or correct necessarily entails that one will therefore have the concomitant desire that they be actualized. This property of moral statements, known as “judgment internalism�, is unique among human language. As Mackie points out, if moral statements like “lying is wrong� are really truth-functional, then they are quite queer things indeed, metaphysically utterly unlike any other kind of truth-functional statements. I was disappointed as a child to learn that nothing can travel faster the speed of light, because I would rather like to travel to distant galaxies in my lifetime. But “being disappointed� is not a conceptually necessary component of accepting the truth-functional statements of General Relativity. Likewise in economics, it is an objective fact that in order to maximize efficiency, a certain number of businesses must routinely go bankrupt, ruining their owners and sending thousands daily into unemployment. But simply realizing this fact does not in and of itself, as matter of raw conceptual necessity, entail that anyone accepting it as true must have a particular moral attitude that assigns relative weights to GDP and stability in the labor force. And yet one cannot, under pain of contradiction, coherently hold and assert that “lying is wrong� or “the state should never interfere in the private marketplace� without also having the desires that such proscribed acts be prevented.

So what I haven’t seen so far from either of the Realist theories – and would like to see --is an account of this metaphysically bizarre relationship between accepting the “truth� of something and having a moral attitude towards it, except of course in the most trivial and noncontroversial sense that truths about one’s own subjective desires entail that one does, in fact, have those desires.

In contrast, noncognitivism is uniquely placed as an explanatory theory to account for metaphysical queerness. Whereas both of the Realists have to explain how the desire component derives from the truth component of accepting moral claims, the noncognitivist says that there is no truth component to moral claims, because moral claims aren’t even the kind of things that can be true or false. On this account, the realists are simply in error when they talk about people accepting the “truth� of moral statements, when they should instead be talking about simply “accepting� moral statements – that is accepting the attitude towards the phenomenon in question. As I said earlier, it is a sort of “cognitivist propositional fetishism� that says that when people say “it is ‘true’ that lying is wrong� they must be making some sort of objective, truth-functional statement about the world, when instead they are merely announcing certain subjective attitudes. The Realist is trying to “force-fit� moral language on the Procrustean bed of truth-functionality, when that is simply not the use to which it is being put.

It is important to note that when I talk about morality announcing attitudes, I do not mean to imply that I am a pure Expressivist. Neither, for that matter, am I a pure Prescriptivist. By these I mean that I resist the idea that when people make moral statements they are always “only� expressing hoorays or boos, or that they are always “only� making a direct and immediate imperative command identical in content to things like “please close the door.� That would be a linguistic Procrusteanism of a different sort.

Rather, there seems to be a context-dependent admixture of these two types of statements when morals are concerned. For example, a friend of mine recently asked for my advice regarding an abandoned bicycle left on a street-corner in the dead of night. Would taking it be stealing? Did he have an obligation to attempt to locate the owner and return it? In this case, he really was asking me to make an imperative statement that “taking the bike is wrong�. Likewise, when antiabortion protestors line up in screaming throngs outside planned parenthood buildings and make their moral claims to the doctors and patients as they enter, they are stating imperatives. But there are also contexts of discussion, such as debates like the ones over animal rights and abortion that take place on this board, where the conversants can’t really be meaningfully said to be “ordering each other around�. I think this latter kind of case is a good example of moral discourse that happens closer to the Pure Expressivist end of the scale as opposed to the Pure Prescriptivist end of the scale of possible moral usage. I have never been a personal witness to genocide; thus when I state my categorical moral view that it ought to be prevented and punished whenever possible, I am making more of a general expression of my own view, giving some sort of prediction about what actions and reactions I will have in some unnamed future event when genocide becomes a more immediate issue.

But even these more purely Expressivist instances should not be mistaken for the syntactic equivalents of truth-functional statements of desires and attitudes. Someone making the truth-functional report regarding their mental state that “I dislike U.S. foreign policy� is not performing the same kind of action as that same person who burns a flag in public. The former is illocutionary, and is a statement capable of being true or false; the latter is perlocutionary, and is not capable of being true or false, any more than the act of booing and hissing can be true or false. This is not to say, however, that someone who burns a flag or who hisses during a play might not actually have the attitudes we typically associate those acts with expressing. It is merely that it stretches the concept of “truth-functional statement� past the breaking point to say that such people would be “asserting that a contrafactual state of affairs obtains�.

Asserting and expressing are quite different sorts of things. So are asserting and commanding. Whatever people are doing when they use moral sentences, it still seems that it makes little sense to claim, as the realists do, that they are saying things that are capable of being true or false.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

The next three concurrent statements will make up Round 3.

[Francois Tremblay]

In the discussions of my fellow debaters about my position, there is one point that seems more salient than the others. It seems there are some misunderstandings about the relation between the values of one individual, and other individuals. Mr. Fyfe seems to think that egoism precludes the individual from caring about other people, and Mr. Lee seems to think that egoism precludes the individual from not caring about other people !

Both arguments are flawed. An egoist will rightly care for people who contribute to his own values. I care for my wife because we share a life together, which is to say that we share a great number of close values and cooperate in order to achieve them. That is to say, we love each other. And isn't love one of the greatest values of all ? In general, friendship, love, benevolence and trade are important values, and they are firmly planted in rational, egoist principles.

An egoist will also rightly and rationally desire (after an objective evaluation of the known facts) for individuals who attack the well-being of himself and others to be stopped in some way. Osama Bin Laden, for Americans, would be a good example of that. But the fact that many people wish harm to Bin Laden does not imply that Bin Laden should seek harm to himself. Mr. Lee's argument is fallacious because nutrition remains an objective value for Bin Laden as it is for all other human beings, regardless of what we think about Bin Laden. He is mixing descriptive and prescriptive again, as he has been since the beginning of this debate.

Talking about mixing descriptive and prescriptive, Mr. Lee protests ardently that he is the one who is on-topic. If you remember, his sole argument for "arguing metaethics" was that moral properties are not empirical.

As I pointed out in my round 2, this line of reasoning is circular. Moral realism necessarily holds that moral properties are empirical, and both Mr. Fyfe and myself have argued in favour of such an interpretation. Mr. Lee has the burden of proof to demonstrate that we are wrong and that a moral statement "does not state any empirical fact". If he fails to do this, then his only justification for discussing description fails.



My fellow debaters have each raised an important question. Mr. Lee tries to contradict moral objectivity by using the Euthyphro Dilemma. Mr. Fyfe argues that my position depends on life being valuable. I will address these points in turn.

The Euthyphro Dilemma is usually applied to the notion of morality within a theistic context. It goes like this :

If Divine Command Theory is true, then we have two options :
1. Are things good because God says they are good, or
2. Does God says things are good because they are good ?

If 1 is true, then morality is subjective, and God can change moral facts in whatever way he wants. If 2 is true, then morality is a standard applied to God or by God, and morality does not need God to exist at all.

Mr. Lee is trying to apply the Dilemma to moral objectivity as such :

If moral objectivity is true, then :
1. "are things Good because humans as rational agents value them, or"
2. "do rational agents value things because they are Good?"

If 1 is true, then "this is the very definition of subjectivism". I also cannot accept 2 because morality "depends on there being rational agents actually acting to gain or keep [values]".

However, both dilemmas are entirely different. In the Euthyphro Dilemma, God is the determiner of value but is not subject to value. In Lee's Dilemma, we are both the determiners of value and subject to value. Therefore I have to call him on a false analogy.

I do not hold that there are intrinsic values. My position is that values cannot exist without moral agents, but their nature is entailed by rational fact. Just as we may say that the law of gravity would never have been found without observers, and yet the law of gravity does not depend on our existence, we may say that values would not exist without moral agents, but their nature does not depend on a specific moral agent. Man as discoverer of values is a specific case of man as a moral agent, they are not the same or completely distinct.

So my answer to Lee's Dilemma is that he has made a false analogy. Values exist because of rational facts which are not agent-dependent, but agents are necessary for their existence.



Mr. Fyfe tries to reduce my position to his position, and that could be the case, if what I say could be reduced to a desire or desires. Now, I have no a priori objection to that. I would like to quote his objection, because this will be important :

Agreeing that "nutrition" is that which is necessary to sustain life, I hold that the value of nutrition is not to be automatically granted. It depends on the value of the life it is sustaining.

For the most part, survival is something that "is such as to fulfill the desires in question".

I understand his objection as being basically that survival itself can only be understood as a means to a desire, and not as an objective value. I would agree with him completely, if life was a value, if there was a "value [for] the life [that nutrition] is sustaining". The problem with his objection is that life is not a value at all. It is an absolute within the context of this debate.

Let me explain what I mean. I hope that the proposition "1+1<2" is uncontroversial. Given our mathematical conventions and the laws of logic, we rightly take it as granted. In most debates any of us is involved in, except perhaps metaphysical or mathematical ones, we would use the proposition "1+1<2" without batting an eyelash. It is an absolute within the context of the debate.

Life is not a value because it is not chosen. Insofar as we are moral agents, we are alive and surviving. A person who is not alive cannot make choices, and therefore is wholly outside of morality. Life is a necessary given if we are going to talk about morality at all.

Therefore complaining that I have assumed that a moral agent is alive or that moral statements incorporate the notion of survival is like saying that I assumed that 1+1=2 or that I assumed that moral agents are conscious. Of course one needs to assume survival, just as one needs to assume logic or consciousness. That is not a problem at all for moral realism.

True, we can decide to pursue material values or not to pursue them (hence my question to Mr. Lee at the end of round 2), and this can be metaphorically said as "pursuing death", but this is not the equivalent of saying that we can choose to live or die. We can choose to hinder our material values, but we cannot choose to die any more than we can choose to live. As moral agents, we are necessarily alive. Because of life being an absolute and perceived egoism, the classical survival/flourishing structure of morality is a purely structural issue which is wholly outside this debate.

Mr. Fyfe continues by pointing out cases where "giving up survival" - which really means abandoning fundamental material values - is the best way to fulfill some desires. Now, I do not accept his position that desires alone, detached from any other consideration, dictate value. But his examples of suicide to avoid extreme pain, not knuckling down under torture, and prevent laying in a vegetative state, are good examples of contexts which would make the pursuit of material values considerably less interesting. I have absolutely no objection to these examples, but they do not disprove life as an absolute, since all of these contexts (like any other moral context) presume that the moral agent is alive.



Due to the concurrent nature of the rounds in this debate, my fellow debaters have also made some objections that I already addressed. Mr. Lee asks us both to address the issue of moral obligation, and I have done so in round 2. Moral obligation in Objectivist moral realism is possible because values are objective and universal. Everyone is subject to the same objective facts and can therefore be blamed for not following them.

Mr. Fyfe said that I support "intrinsic prescriptivity", but as I stated in my opening case, "value would not exist if desire did not exist". Furthermore, the facts that lead to value are part of what it means to be human. Food is only useful insofar as we have a metabolism. The value of food is certainly not intrinsic.

He also said that rational values do not "[involve] anything other than rationally determining whether the object of evaluation is such as to fulfill the desires in question", but I have proven that he has failed to demonstrate this at this point. But even if he had managed to somehow prove that my case rests on one specific desire, which he has not yet been able to do, he will still not have proven that my entire case rests on the subjectivity of desires in general. It may still be the case that the specific desire is wholly objective, i.e. that it rests on rational premises. He has not addressed this flaw in his objection at all.



As it stands right now, on round 3, my position still stands unchallenged. That is to say, no one has presented a good reason to believe that any of the following propositions are false :

1. There are objective facts which pertain to moral issues.
2. These objective facts can be easily translated into values.
3. Moral realism, in whatever form, is the only reasonable position on moral issues.
4. Objectivist moral realism (and its premises, such as perceived egoism, rationality and science) is the best system of moral realism.

Thank you.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Francois Tremblay asked the question,

Where do desires come from?

Well . . . um . . . first a mommy desire and a daddy desire come to love each other very much . . .

. . . hold it. Sorry, I opened the wrong document.

Okay, Tremblay, you're interested in:

Is it the end result of a rational or irrational process?


Answer: No. It is the product of an arational process called 'evolution'.

Animals have an aversion to pain, a desire for sex, hunger and thirst (along with food preferences), and the capacity to learn new preferences (such as an aversion to wetting the carpet) through conditioning. They have all of this with very limited capacity to reason. Humans get many of their desires the same way. We have an evolved disposition for a brain structured so as to have certain desires, and the capacity to acquire others through interaction with our environment.

The brain is malleable; that is how we learn. Environmental factors can influence the structure of the body -- food scarcity can alter body shape and pox can alter appearance. However, these pale in comparison with the ability of the environment to influence neural pathways in the brain (beliefs and desires).

Positive and negative reinforcement -- particularly during childhood -- have a strong influence on our desires. Reward a child, and you strengthen the desire behind the behavior that brought the reward. Punish a child, and you inhibit the desires behind the behavior being punished. You do not even need to reward or punish the child in fact, simply make the child aware that the behavior will generate a reward or punishment.

Of course, other factors in the environment also provide positive and negative reinforcement.

Once the child has acquired a desire, it will influence his behavior even when there is no person (or God) to look over his shoulder. The person with an aversion to taking things that belong to others will leave the property of others alone, even when they know they can get away with it -- because they are adverse to taking it.

Desires are immune to reason. Reason with a person all you want, you will have as little effect on his desires as you will on his height or skin color. (Note: This applies to desires-as-ends; not to desires-as-means.)

I want to repeat this for the benefit of those in the back of the room.

You cannot reason a person into being moral. You can condition him (through positive and negative reinforcement), or threaten him if he should act contrary to morality, but reason is as impotent in modifying a person's desires as it is in modifying a person's cholesterol level and weight.

However, we can use reason to discover whether X 'is such as to fulfill the desires in question'. This ability persists even when the desires in question are all desires, regardless of whose they are.

Okay, somebody is now asking, 'Isn't this 'desires in question' arbitrary?' There are countless 'desires in question' to choose from. How do we choose?

We do not choose. If we can 'choose' arbitrarily whether a property applies to an object, then the claim that the property applies to the object is false. The very act of choosing in this type of context is an act of inventing something (or pretending to invent something) that isn't real.

Instead, pick a word for each 'desires in question' -- just as we have different words for each element or species. Pick a word for 'the desires of the agent', another for 'the most common desires', and another for 'all desires regardless of whose they are'. We will discover that the word we pick for 'all desires regardless of whose they are' will match almost perfectly our moral language.

To repeat, using a word to attribute a property to something (even 'goodness') where somebody else is free to make a contrary attribution, is to make a false claim. If it has basis in objective reality, then it is made-up, like God himself, accepted only because the speaker wants it.


Context

"It would please me if everybody did X; therefore, everybody has an obligation to do X" is not a valid inference. If it were, "It would please me if everybody gave me their money" would imply "everybody has an obligation to give me their money." But it does not.

The inference, though invalid, sure is tempting. Imagine a world where everybody has an obligation to do what pleases you -- where "if I like it, it must be right."


The God Solution

One way to get from "I like X" to "Everybody should do X" is to invoke God.

The reason you have an obligation to do X is not because it would please me, the speaker; but because it would please God. And you certainly do not want to displease God.

The speaker then attributes to God all of the same likes and dislikes t