Is God-belief epistemically justifiable? -- James Lazarus vs. wiploc

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

This thread has been set up for a formal debate between James Lazarus and wiploc on the following question:

Is God-belief epistemically justifiable?

James Lazarus will argue and defend the affirmative position and wiploc will argue and defend the negative position. The debate will have 5 rounds and statements will be submitted concurrently as agreed to from the parameters (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showpost.php?p=1932411&postcount=18).

A Peanut Gallery (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=104664) is set up in the Existence of God(s) forum for the rest of us to comment on the debate.

Good luck to both participants!

- NS, FD Moderator

[Jim Lazarus]

God-Belief And Epistemic Justifiability
J. G. Lazarus


I. Introduction

While I am an atheist, this should not really be considered a mock debate. And, with this firmly in mind, I expect that a number of brows are destined to furrow - oblivious as to why a non-believer would consider putting any effort into arguing for the negation of his or her own position. To this, I would point to the wise words of our own Reginald Finley, who has observed that, “…A true free-thinker will always consider the possibility that he or she could be wrong�. Thus, you can infer my intent as concerned with this exchange. For years I have held, and assume my opponent has held, to the position that god-belief is not epistemically justified – or for that matter, justifiable whatever.

I often find enjoyment in questioning my own viewpoints on various philosophical and religious issues, testing my position’s validity. This is my aim in this debate, and therefore I have put together a two-argument case arguing for the epistemic justifiability of god-belief, putting to test the (our, my) atheistic position. The representative of atheism in this debate will be Wiploc, and I would like to thank him for agreeing to participate in this dialogue with me. I would also like to express my gratitude toward Nightshade and the IIDB for hosting and setting up this exchange.

I will not be providing any *entirely* new arguments here, but will be presenting a revised version of a classical argument, as well as arguing for the validity of modern advancements in theo-philosophic thought. My case for the epistemic justifiability of theism will include:

(1) Arguing That Theistic Belief Is Properly Basic – and by consequence establishing that god-belief is justified on epistemic grounds even should it lack any substantial evidence for its legitimacy whatever.

(2) The Ontological Argument – presenting a refined version of this argument, blending in the work of recent advancements and attempting to establish the justification of god-belief a priori.

Throughout this debate I will defend the evidences I have provided, and will offer rebuttals against any argument(s) that my opponent might offer. The conclusion will be the invalidity of atheism and the recognition that god-belief holds more then sufficient epistemic justification to be considered a warranted view.

II. Proper Basicality And Theism

A central atheological argument that has been presented against theism throughout history and today is that:

(1) If there is no sufficient propositional evidence for theism, then theistic belief is irrational or unreasonable.
(2) There is no sufficient propositional evidence for theism.
(3) Therefore, theistic belief may be considered irrational or unreasonable.

Historically, apologists have tried to show that premise (2) of the argument is a false claim (and, of course, whether they have succeeded or not will be decided throughout the course of this debate). However, a number of modern apologists have turned their attention from (2) and have instead recognized (1) to be a questionable claim. They argue that this is because (1) grounds its epistemology on what is called Classical Foundationalism. According to these apologists, Classical Foundationalism can very well be shown to be an inadequate basis for epistemology – the theory itself not only having dubious implications for many of our common beliefs, but also suffering from the fatal flaw of being self-referentially incoherent.

In the following remnants of this section, I shall attempt to provide arguments toward the idea that Classical Foundationalism is inadequate, and will present what is called Reformed Foundationalism (or, rather, Reformed Epistemology) to act as a more valid alternative.

The conclusion of this critique by consequence will be the falsity of premise (1) in the provided atheistic argument, due to theistic belief being a properly basic belief which by its nature need not provide any propositional evidence to be tolerated as a warranted view.

A) Classical Foundationalism

The many things which we believe (and rightly believe), are accepted on the basis of other prior things which we believe. For instance, I believe that Mark is a better writer than Suzie because I believe I have read both Mark and Suzie’s term papers, and Mark has expressed himself better and far more interestingly than Suzie in his paper as compared to hers. I also believe that Mark has a short temper due to the many times I have seen him become angry over seemingly insignificant issues, and I have inferred the first belief concerning Mark’s temper from the second.

In these cases, as Everitt has noted [1], if the first belief X is to be justified by the second belief Y, it must not simply be caused by Y, but also be genuinely supported by Y, although how this relation is to be comprehended has been a subject of debate amongst foundationalists.

Considering this, however, we come to a commonly recognized problem. If a set of beliefs are derived from a prior set of beliefs, which in turn are further derived from an even prior set of beliefs, and so on and so forth, we must ask whether or not there is an infinite regress to our held beliefs. But, this can obviously not be the case, since we certainly come to certain conclusions about various things – which we may very well not be able to do if our prior beliefs are never ending. Ergo, philosophers have posited an insightful answer to this dilemma: that there are a certain set of beliefs which provide for us as foundational, what we may call basic beliefs – beliefs which have no prior support and may be accepted as true. Beliefs which we infer or relate from these basic beliefs we may call derived beliefs.

But now with this, of course, we find ourselves encountered by yet a further dilemma. What, precisely, are these basic beliefs that set the groundwork for all others? Throughout history, Plantinga tells us, we have seen two kinds of suggestions:

Ancient Foundationalism: Only those propositions which are self-evident or evident to the senses are properly basic.

Modern Foundationalism: Only those propositions which are self-evident or incorrigible are properly basic.

Now let us say that a “Classical Foundationalist� is an individual who subscribes to either of these positions [2].

B) Rationality, Derived Beliefs, And The God-Problem

As observed in the provided atheological argument, many people have held to the position that theistic belief is rational if and only if there is an adequate quantity of evidence for it. As W. K. Clifford has expressed, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence� [3].

Individuals have derived this basic principle as they have grounded their epistemology in Classical Foundationalism, where the rationality of god-belief is determined by examining how it is related to other priorly established propositions.

Thus, let us say that these individuals support the position that:

Proposition (A): A set of propositions E exists (“E� standing for “evidence�). Theistic belief is rational if and only if evident with respect to E.

In set (E) is contained the foundations of knowledge, (F). (F) would be the basic beliefs discussed earlier. And as said, only those claims which are genuinely related to and properly rested on (F) are to be considered epistemically justified.

It is here, in summation, that we gain the main principal of foundationalism:

Principal (B): A belief that p is justified if and only if p is properly basic (i.e. self-evident, incorrigible, etc.) or is derivable from properly basic beliefs.

Moving with this, let us say that being “rational� is to:

· Do the right thing with respect to one’s believings
· Violate no epistemic rules (and perhaps more specifically, to follow the structure foundationalism has provided discussed above)

And thus, we are presented with our historical theistic/atheistic problem: Is God-Belief Rational?

C) The Attack On Foundationalism

(C1) Foundationalism As Too Restrictive

Reformed Epistemologists such as Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and Alston have committed themselves to showing that Proposition (A) is false. However, Proposition (A) is only false insofar as Classical Foundationalism is too restrictive, and commits us to widespread scepticism. It is the contention of these critics that fixing the restrictiveness of Classical Foundationalism with their alternative Reformed Epistemology will result in theistic belief as actually being a properly basic belief, and thus it need not be related to set (E), as it may already be rightly categorized in set (F).

How, exactly, is Classical Foundationalism too restrictive? Nicholas Everitt provides us an example of how Plantinga reaches this conclusion:

“…Take my belief that I remember having toast for breakfast this morning. This is not self-evident. One cannot see that it is true simply by inspecting the proposition itself as one can with 1+1=2. But nor does it simply report to my current conscious state: even if we think that my remembering something requires that I should be in a certain conscious state, it clearly requires more than this. It also requires that something should have happened in the past, namely that I ate toast for breakfast. It therefore cannot be considered a basic belief. But nor can I derive it from any of my basic beliefs. I somehow know “straight off� that I remember having toast for breakfast, without having any grounds or evidence for that belief. Even if when challenged I can produce evidence for other people that my claim is true, I can know without needing to produce any such evidence, and even if there is no evidence. Yet people are sometimes justified in believing that they remember having toast for breakfast, so it follows that classical foundationalism must be false.�[4]

Thus, we can see that Classical Foundationalism entails dubious consequences for many of our common, everyday beliefs. Plantinga’s attack here proves that Classical Foundationalism is far too restrictive, and contemporary foundationalists have agreed. Yet, Plantinga argues, there is much more wrong with Classical Foundationalism than only its restrictiveness.

(C2) Classical Foundationalism As Self-Referentially Incoherent

The second main criticism against Classical Foundationalism argues that Principle (B) fails on its own grounds. Michael Martin sums up Plantinga’s attack as follows:

“…Plantinga argues also that foundationalists are unable to justify [Principle (B)] on its own terms; that is, they have not shown that [Principle (B)] follows from properly basic statements or is probable relative to these. Moreover, [Principle (B)] is not itself self-evident or incorrigible or evident to the senses. Consequently, he argues, a foundationalist who accepts [Principle (B)] is being ‘self-referentially inconsistent’; such a person accepts a statement that does not meet the person’s own conditions for being properly basic. Thus he concludes that Classical Foundationalism is ‘bankrupt’."[5]

Now, with these provided criticisms from Plantinga and other advocates of RE, let us observe the alternative epistemological theory that they provide.

D) Basic Belief In God

(D1) The Basic Establishment

Despite his objections, Plantinga’s alternative Reformed Foundationalism seems to be what Everitt describes as, “surprisingly similar� to the classical foundationalist approach. Reformed Foundationalism embraces the idea that there are certain properly basic beliefs, but with the argument for the need to liberalize Classical Foundationalism in (C1), advocates of Plantinga’s new option have made it their prerogative to establish god-belief as being properly categorized in set (F), thus nullifying the need for any further evidence in order to justify theism. The arguments they provide for the proper basicality of god-belief are the following.

(D2) Calvinism Unleashed

In the tradition of a long line of Reformed Thinkers, supporters of RE hold to the position that the classical arguments for theism need not even be pursued or put to use for the rationality of theism. Rather, Plantinga holds to the idea that human beings are pre-inclined to god-belief. He writes:

“Were it not for the existence of sin in the world human beings would believe in God with the same natural spontaneity that we believe in [the existence of] other persons, an external world, or the past. This is a natural human condition; it is because of our presently unnatural sinful condition that many of us find belief in God difficult or absurd. The fact is, Calvin thinks, one who does not believe in God is in an epistemically sub-standard position – rather like a man that does not believe that his wife exists, or thinks that she is like a cleverly constructed robot and has no thoughts, feelings, or consciousness."[6]

Thus, Plantinga provides one reason for supporters of Reformed Epistemology to accept theism as a properly basic belief.

(D3) Emotional Depth And Scripture

Plantinga and other supporters have further argued that such things as reading the Bible, gazing at a flower, and numerous other “tingly feelings� and aesthetic depth may produce properly basic belief in the existence of a deity. Knowledge straight off that such a being exists, without turning to any other evidences to derive this belief from.

(D4) Religious Experience

The Argument From Religious Experience (ARE) has long been an argument for the existence of God. Reformed Epistemologists have felt that the existence of these religious experiences – the feelings of the Holy Spirit, etc., may provide as direct reason to believe in the existence of a God.

Now, this argument supporting RE differs in a significant degree with ARE, and is thus not subject to the many objections provided by atheists which conclude in the inadequacy of spiritual experience.

Firstly, the most common objection to ARE is that all believers in religion have spiritual experiences, and they cannot all be right about their own conceptions of God. But yet we are not discussing here whether or not individuals are correct in their own conceptions of what the deity they are experiencing is like, but rather whether or not they are in fact having this genuine experience. Many atheists concede that they do, and thus there seems to be no epistemic violations in a believer’s acceptance that there is a God, whether or not they’re correct about their own particular conception of what that God is like being a secondary issue (e.g. in Wiploc’s past debate with Ravi and Tsurmon, all participants successfully argued over the existence of the Abrahamic God, although the specific nature of that God differs significantly between the three Abrahamic creeds, and even more so within the denominations of those general creeds [7]).

Secondly, it is objected that ARE cannot provide as objective evidence for a deity, because not all individuals claim to experience it, and it is only relevant and unquestionably true in the mind of the believer. But yet this support for RE is not claiming that religious experience is objective evidence – but instead involves itself in whether or not it permits an individual to be self-warranted in accepting theism.

Thus, these objections to ARE do not apply to religious experience as a support for RE.

Reformed Foundationalists here conclude that the reasons and considerations discussed in (D2)-(D4) are sufficient to establish theism as a properly basic belief, thus showing that the atheological argument provided in the beginning of this section is faulty. Therefore, a theist need not provide any additional propositional evidence for their view that theistic belief is a justified position.

E) Weeding Out Plantinga’s Garbage Arguments

Now, in the above sections (C) and (D) I discussed the many arguments that Plantinga and supporters of RE typically give as reasons to prefer their alternative epistemological theory to Classical Foundationalism. Many of these arguments, however, are clearly inadequate, and so I will provide some considerations in this section as to where Plantinga has gone wrong, and where I might best argue that he has gone right.

(E1) The Derivability Of Classical Foundationalism

In sub-section (D2) I discussed Plantinga’s second main criticism to the standard foundationalist theory. In his attack, he has argued that Principle B is a principle that fails on its own grounds, as it itself cannot be said to be properly basic, nor is it derived. Yet, as many supporters of the standard foundationalist theory have argued, Plantinga is simply wrong about the latter point.

Michael Martin has argued, for instance, that Principle (B) may certainly be derivable, and that there is no reason to believe that it cannot be. Plantinga has certainly not shown that it is not. Martin writes:

“…Even if Plantinga can show that [Principle (B)] is not self-evident…he has not shown that could not be deductively or inductively inferred from statements that are self-evident or incorrigible or evident to the senses. As Philip Quinn has argued, the classical foundationalist can use the broadly inductive procedures suggested by Plantinga to arrive at [Principle (B)]. Since the community of classical foundationalists is responsible for its own set of examples of properly basic beliefs and the conditions that justify them, it would not be surprising that the hypothesis they came up with in order to account for their examples would be [Principle (B)]."[I][8]

And in light of this, it would seem that there is no good reason for us to suppose that Plantinga’s criticism in (D2) is accurate. Indeed, should it be accurate, it would seem that RE itself would be subject to its criticism, as the principle of RE is similarly not properly basic nor derivable, if Plantinga should have his way.

(E2) The Arrogance Of Calvin And The Non-Basicality Of Various Provided Examples

Calvin’s argument is simply arrogant and presumptuous. I find his argument from “pre-inclined belief� to be blatantly absurd, and would find it to be disrespectful even as an objective observer lacking any presupposed biases. I will not be arguing for it here as a valid means of supporting Reformed Foundationalism.

Yet, there are other problems, too, with various other examples Plantinga has provided us. Consider the examples of reading the Bible and certain feelings of emotional and aesthetic depth when gazing at a flower. The belief that I am reading the Bible or the belief that I am gazing at a flower such that it makes me feel a certain way are not properly basic in any sense, and fall a long way short of establishing god-belief as being properly basic. There are in fact many presupposed beliefs in all of these instances, as shown by many criticisms of Plantinga’s theory. Due to this it is to be concluded that these arguments provided by Plantinga are entirely faulty.

(E3) Religious Experience

Spiritual experiences, however, are not as foolish as Plantinga’s other provided examples in regards to providing theism a reason to be considered properly basic. Considering the inapplicability of traditional arguments against religious experience as a proof of God as concerned with my support of it in sub-section (D4), we can say that such experiences provide the individual with a self-warrant to hold to god-belief. Moreover, by holding to these experiences and establishing theism as properly basic on these grounds is not in violation of any epistemic rules, and so may be safely called acceptable.

F) From Classical To Contemporary – And From Contemporary To Reformed

It must be noted that Classical Foundationalism has indeed experienced a number of modifications in contemporary times by supporters of the theory. Already it has been embraced by these contemporary foundationalists that memories and various other beliefs which Plantinga mentions in his (D1) criticism of Classical Foundationalism may be accepted as properly basic. Thus, we safely move from the more strict qualifications of Classical Foundationalism for proper basicality into Contemporary Foundationalism, with its much more liberal approach.

However, Contemporary Foundationalism has not recognized spiritual experiences as properly basic beliefs – but rather has mainly concerned itself with the above provided examples of memory beliefs and so on. Yet, we have seen reasons to suppose that spiritual experiences may very well be accepted as properly basic, and thus we can safely move from the works of contemporary foundationalists into Reformed Epistemology.

G) Concerning Defeaters

Plantinga and others have noted that theism may continue to be considered a properly basic belief insofar as there are offered no “defeaters� that put the existence of God to question [9]. That is, should there be an objection provided against the truth-value of the existence of God, the belief that God exists can no longer be considered properly basic until such a time when the believer adequately addresses the provided atheistic objection and shows where it is faulty. Once this is done, theism may once again be safely considered properly basic.

Thus, it becomes my responsibility to offer undercutters for any and all of Wiploc’s provided defeaters in order to successfully continue supporting the position that god-belief is properly basic.

H) Conclusion

It is therefore concluded that theism is a properly basic belief, and that it is epistemically justified even with no substantial evidences to support its position.

II. The Ontological Argument

Now, while Reformed Epistemology may show that god-belief is properly basic even without substantial evidence, this by no means requires or means that there is no such substantial evidence. Similarly to how an individual may be able to provide evidences to prove that they remember having eaten breakfast ten minutes ago, yet being able to believe such a thing directly sans any evidence, god-belief may provide evidences to prove that god-belief is true while still being properly basic. In this section and in the following sections, we shall observe a revised version of a classical argument which attempts to justify the theistic position.

A) Preliminary Terminology

In modern times, we have seen a number of apologists support modal theistic arguments for the conclusion of God. To revert back to Plantinga, he himself presents a refined Ontological Argument (OAG) that is, according to Everitt, “strikingly unlike� the older and more tired versions of Anselm and Descartes. To understand this argument, however, it is necessary that I elaborate on the terminology that I will be putting to use here, as it may be foreign to those who haven’t studied the subject extensively.

Modal theistic arguments put to use “possible-worlds� talk. Supporters of this particular version of the OAG have put to use such vocabulary in their argument, and thus it is necessary that we examine what they mean when they do so.

The best description of this terminology that I have on hand is also by Everitt, who writes:

“We commonly think that the world could have been different in various ways from the way in which it in fact is. Some differences would have been very small (for example, a moment ago you might have blinked although in fact you did not); some differences would have been very large (for example, it could have been the case that life never developed on earth); and other differences would have been all-embracing (for example, if the laws of physics had been completely different then what they are). Possible worlds talk is a way of expressing these various possibilities. Thus to say, ‘There is a possible world in which you blinked a moment ago’ is to say, ‘(In this actual world) it could have been the case that you blinked a moment ago’. To say, ‘In every possible world, 2+2=4’ is to say, ‘(In this actual world) 2+2 necessarily equals 4’. More idiomatically, 2+2 not only does equal 4, it has to equal 4. To say, ‘There is no possible world where bachelors are married’ is to say, ‘(In this actual world) bachelors cannot be married’.�[10]

Thus, Everitt explains to us that the point of using possible worlds talk is to have a convenient way of expressing claims about what is necessarily so, what simply cannot be so, and/or what could have been so.

Now just as importantly - to say, “there is a possible world in which X�, does not limit itself to mean that, “On Earth, it could be or could have been that X�, but rather it is to be applied to the entire universe. Also one must notice that this actual world in which we live is also to be considered a possible world, for the way in which things are currently or the way in which things have obtained is a possible way for such things to be.

Finally, one should note that possible worlds talk is not incompatible with causality or determinism. Rather, if one needs to be overly technical, one could say that possible worlds talk is to say that, “It is possible that the causal chain from the beginning could have been such that I would have blinked a moment ago rather than not�. Hence, philosophers can and do safely use this terminology to approach various kinds of philosophical discussions, problems, or considerations.

With this, we can begin to approach this revised OAG.

B) Maximal Attributes, Excellence, And Greatness

Plantinga begins his argument by introducing to us the idea of “excellence� – the term itself being used in a unique sense. An entity is rightly described as excellent to the extent that it is: (1) Powerful; (2) Knowledgeable; and (3) Benevolent (“Good�). Thus we can move further by saying that an entity is maximally excellent if and only if it holds the above-mentioned attributes to the greatest possible proportion. We might say that the greatest possible proportion is as much as can possibly be conceived within the bounds of logic. We can equate these “maximal attributes� with what Wiploc has coined “punk� omni-attributes.

Now, it seems possible that a being may be maximally excellent in one possible world, and yet not in another – i.e. that being’s excellence may be maximal considering the contingencies of one possible world, but not so considering the possible contingencies of another possible world.

With this established, let us consider two entities – Entity X and Entity B. Let us say that the former entity displays maximal excellence in one possible world, and yet given the contingencies in another possible world, he is not maximally excellent in this latter world. Entity B, however, can be said to display both maximal excellence in this world and in the possible worlds in which Entity X lacks maximal excellence. We can then say that Entity B is greater than Entity X, because Entity B displays far more excellence than X does, as it experiences more excellence in many more possible worlds. With this, we can call Entity B maximally great, in comparison with Entity X. As Everitt notes, “ excellence is so robust that it survives [as maximally excellent] in every possible world� [11].

With all of this established, let us help ourselves to this principle:

Principle Z: A being is rightly described as maximally great if and only if it exemplifies maximal excellence in all possible worlds.

We must now ask whether or not this principle displays any logical inconsistencies. Observers of this argument - as well as Plantinga - agree that it does not, and thus it is at least possible to say that we can conceive of a being which exemplifies maximal greatness. So we may help ourselves to claim:

(1) There is a possible world in which an entity displays maximal greatness.

But yet as we’ve reviewed, a thing can only be rightly called maximally great if it exemplifies maximal excellence in all possible worlds. Therefore, this requires us to admit that:

(2) In our own actual (possible) world, there is an entity that is maximally great.

From this premise and our Principle (Z), it is necessarily so that:

(3) In our own actual (possible) world, there is a being which displays maximal excellence.

And therefore:

(4) In our own actual (possible) world, there is a being which is maximally powerful, maximally knowing, and maximally good.

Concluding in:

(5) God exists.

Everitt himself admits that the argument contains no obvious problems to it whatever [12] – and it itself has been at times called “The Victorious Ontological Argument�.

Note also that parodies of this particular variant of the OAG are not a possibility. To attempt a construction of another being which exemplified maximal greatness would be an equivocation of what is meant by an entity being maximally great. Indeed, adding another being into the argument would mean that the two entities would share [I]equal greatness, and one would not exemplify maximality over the other. It is also noted that it is only because of the entity’s maximal greatness that the argument is even able to be constructed in the first place – so it may only work solely for a single being – specifically, that one being who holds maximality over all others as defined above. Criticizers of this particular variant of the OAG have recognized it may not be parodied, and have consequently avoided this line of argumentation.

The bulk of atheistic criticisms against this argument, however, have merely provided grumbling complaints that it is simply not “convincing�. Yet, we know that such criticisms are entirely insufficient. One must necessarily show why this argument is invalid for it to be rightly defeated. Until it is shown to be so, it remains a standing proof of god’s existence.

III. Conclusion

In this presentation, I have provided two main arguments:

(1) The Proper Basicality Of Theism – that a theist is rationally justified in believing in god’s presence even should s/he lack any substantial evidence for the existence of God at all, due to theism being a belief appropriately categorized as basic.

And –

(2) The Ontological Argument – that there is a possible world in which an entity displays maximal greatness, and thus by corollary a maximally excellent being necessarily exists in this actual world.

The conclusion of this two-argument case is that theism is an epistemically justified position, which by consequence results in the futility of atheistic attacks against god-belief.

---------------------------------------

End Notes

(1) Nicholas Everitt, The Non-Existence Of God (London: Routledge, 2004), Chapter 2.

(2) Dr. Scott H. Moore, “Introduction To Reformed Epistemology (http://www3.baylor.edu/~Scott_Moore/handouts/intro_Refmd_Epist.html) �.

(3) Ibid.

(4) The Non-Existence Of God, Chapter 2.

(5) Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990), Chapter 10.

(6) Alvin Plantinga, Religious Belief Without Evidence, pg. 464.

(7) IIDB Debate: Theism, Atheism, And Agnosticism (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=100318) (Ravi, Wiploc, And Tsurmon)

(8) Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Chapter 10.

(9) Michael Sudduth, "Reformed Epistemology And Christian Apologetics (http://www.homestead.com/philofreligion/files/REApologeticsRevised.htm) ".

(10) The Non-Existence Of God, Chapter 3.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Ibid.

[wiploc]

First Atheist Statement:

Does it make sense to believe in god? We're talking about the perfect (omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent) god here, so the answer is no. That god obviously doesn't exist; it makes no sense to believe in it.

Now I’ll prove the perfect god doesn't exist using the PoE (Problem of Evil), so, you know, stop me if you've heard this. :)

Evil: If there were no evil, there would be no unhappiness. Evil is that which makes people unhappy. I'm defining it; that's the definition. By extension, the word can also refer to the unhappiness itself. Thus, the "problem of evil" is often called the "problem of unhappiness."

Good: The opposite of evil: that which makes people happy. Or, by extension, happiness itself.

Omnipotence: An omnipotent (all powerful, infinitely powerful) god could eliminate evil, could make everybody happy all the time. This would be a good thing. One might argue that some unhappiness could be good, because it could ... uh ... oh ... let's say it could lead to a greater happiness. A little unhappiness for a lot of happiness; such a deal! The problem with that argument is that an omnipotent god could give us the lot of happiness without charging us the little unhappiness. There is no way that a little unhappiness can be the cost of a greater happiness, not for an omnipotent god. An omnipotent god could make everyone very happy all the time, period.

Omniscience: The perfect god knows the future. He knows all possible ramifications of every possible event. He knows everything that would have happened if he had started the world off just a tad differently in an infinity of different ways. I don't expect omniscience to be an issue in this debate, but some would-be refuters of the PoE claim that god doesn't know the future, and therefore was only guessing about outcomes when he made the fruit of the tree of good and evil look tasty, when he told the Jews to cut the ends of their dicks off, when he made us concupiscent after the original sin, when he ordered the slaughter of the Mideonites, etcetera. There are two possible responses to this "defense." One is that if god is just guessing, if he doesn't know everything, then he, by definition, doesn't know everything: he isn't omniscient. The other is that this move doesn't help the theist case anyway. Since I don't expect omniscience to be an issue in this debate, I won't go any further with that second response.

Omnibenevolence: To be benevolent is to want good, that is, it is to want people to be happy. To be omnibenevolent is to strongly, totally, infinitely, and purely want people to be happy. In other words, god isn't omnibenevolent unless our happiness is one of his chief concerns; and he isn't omnibenevolent if he has any desires that significantly conflict with his desire for our happiness. If he has conflicting desires, he could somewhat benevolent, or on-balance benevolent, but not omnibenevolent.

Omnibenevolence Plus Omnipotence: One who is omnibenevolent is one who would always act to maximize human happiness unless prevented. One who is omnipotent could not be prevented from maximizing human happiness. Therefore, if an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being existed, we humans would always be ecstatic.

Conclusion: Since people are not always ecstatic, it is obvious that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent god does not exist. We know for a fact that god does not exist.


Defenses: Attempts to refute the PoE are often called "defenses," I don't know why. Nobody calls a math error a defense, why should they call the Free Will argument a defense? In any case, there are only five possible defenses against the PoE, and all of them are self refuting.

1. The God-Isn't-Really-Omnipotent defense: Theists will concede that god isn't really powerful enough to make people happy, and argue that therefore our unhappiness is no evidence that an omniscient omnibenevolent god doesn't exist.

2. The God-Isn't-Really-Omniscient defense: Theists will concede that god doesn't really know everything, that he has to guess what will make us happy, and argue that, since god isn't really all that good a guesser, our unhappiness is no evidence that an omnipotent omnibenevolent god doesn't exist.

3. The God-Isn't-Really-Omnibenevolent defense: Theists will concede that god isn't really that nice. They will argue that since he has other purposes more important to him than making people happy, our unhappiness is no evidence that an omnipotent omniscient god doesn't exist. The free will defense and the unknown purpose defense fall in this category.

4. The We-Are-Really-Happy defense: They will claim that we are happy. We are totally, awesomely, ecstatically happy all the time. Any apparent unhappiness is an illusion.

5. The Retreat-Into-Irrationality defense: Theists will say that god isn't bound by logic, isn't answerable to logic, doesn't make any sense. Therefore, they say, the PoE's logic-based conclusion that god doesn't exist is irrelevant and misleading.

My Responses to the Five Defenses:

Note that the first three defenses are total capitulations. They agree with the PoE, making exactly the same claim that the PoE does: they say the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent god does not exist. Why do theists make these moves? Why do they agree with the PoE while purporting to refute it? There are two reasons.

The first reason is obvious and straightforward: Many theists believe in a different god. It is perfectly legitimate for them to point out that the PoE's disproof of the perfect god doesn't amount to a disproof of other gods. No problem, then, they really are in agreement with the PoE.

The second, more common, reason is harder to articulate since it involves word magic and sleight of mouth. Theists, those who do believe in the perfect god, try to concede to the PoE in such a way that they won't know they have conceded. This argument reduces to something like, "God isn't omnipotent, but he is still omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent." It sounds silly, I know, but this is the most common move made by defenders against the PoE.

The fourth defense, the We-Are-Really-Happy defense, doesn't come up much since it is false on its face. But I've seen it done.

The fifth defense, the Retreat-Into-Irrationality defense is also tolerably rare. But some theists do try to two-step between logic-doesn't-work-so-your-logical-claims-are-worthless and but-I-get-to-make-logical-claims-about-your-logical-claims-in-spite-of-that without getting caught. This reminds us of the old joke about the boy who went to a psychiatrist for his bedwetting problem. "And did he cure you?" "Well, I still wet the bed, but now I'm proud of it." Those using the irrationality defense are admitting that belief in god is irrational, yet they are going with it anyway. Irrational and proud of it. The irrationality argument does not amount to a refutation of the PoE because the PoE is a logical argument, and every logical argument must necessarily assume that logic works.

In any case, those are the five possible defenses against the PoE. That's all there are, all there can ever be. The first three concede that the PoE is correct. The fourth one is an obvious absurdity and linguistic impossibility. The fifth defense is admittedly irrational. Which of these defenses will JLazarus try? I'm eager to see.

crc

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

The next two concurrent statements will make up Round 2.

[Jim Lazarus]

God-Belief And Epistemic Justifiability
Responding To Wiploc's Argument From Evil
J. G. Lazarus


I. Introduction

There are a number of irreparable problems with Wiploc’s version of the Argument From Evil (AE). The chief among them shall be discussed here, showing why the argument itself provides very weak support for the atheistic position. Note also that I may use quotes from some of Wiploc’s other debates in order to provide a fuller image of the argumentation and objections to existing theodicies, and if one is interested in checking those sources I have provided them in the endnotes.

II. Concerning Goodness

Wiploc provides us the following definitions of the terms “good� and “evil�:

Evil: If there were no evil, there would be no unhappiness. Evil is that which makes people unhappy. I'm defining it; that's the definition. By extension, the word can also refer to the unhappiness itself. Thus, the "problem of evil" is often called the "problem of unhappiness."

Good: The opposite of evil: that which makes people happy. Or, by extension, happiness itself.

Wiploc often calls these the “traditional definitions� of both of the terms in question [1]. Now I’m not quite sure what traditional definitions Wiploc is actually working on, since the terms themselves have been ascribed numerous meanings as philosophers have progressed from moral system to moral system. But nevertheless, let us apply these terms thus defined.

According to Wiploc’s “good�, one might be inclined to say that many of the actions we deem very immoral today should actually be considered ethically righteous. To use Alonzo Fyfe’s example [2], to say “good� is that which makes people happy is to say that a crazed axe murderer who just carved up and raped several victims, exclaiming, “Man! That was good!� would be entirely correct.

Now, let us say that if the axe murderer could not carve up and rape all of these victims, he would be extremely unhappy. Let us also admit that those victims would not be very partial to being carved up and raped. It is here where we come to a seemingly unsolvable conflict with Wiploc’s definition. What is the right action in this example, if good is simply what makes people happy?

Perhaps one could further stipulate that morality aims at the happiness of the most individuals? That the axed murderer should not murder all those individuals because that would cause more unhappiness in the set of individuals involved than if he refrained from murdering them.

Yet even this suffers from fatal problems. Chief among these is that we can imagine a scenario where the set of individuals involved would be more unhappy if the right thing was done, or more happy if the wrong thing was done. Let us say that instead of the axed murderer killing all these people, it is all these people who are axed murderers and they have a wish to axe an innocent, nine-year-old girl. More unhappiness would be caused if all of them did not get to axe her, and yet we understand that moral action points strictly away from such a deed.

It would seem then that the morality Wiploc uses as a foundation for his argument collapses, and thus – so does his entire argument, unless he is able to correct his definitions of terms accordingly.

Moving forward, one must recognize that many of the actions we consider moral today are not actions that always bring us happiness. I admit to being decidedly unhappy about not being able to rob millions of dollars from a bank without being considered morally flawed. It would be very convenient and pleasing for me if robbing a bank were considered ethically permissible. Rather, I would tentatively suggest that much of what we consider moral action is generally aimed to protect people’s well-being, which is not quite the same as happiness. My well-being does not always entail my satisfaction, although I’m sure most would agree with me that despite this, it is better for me. An example would be the common day situation where the mother tells her child to eat his or her own vegetables. Such action is displeasing for the child – but we recognize that it is “good� for him/her nonetheless. Another would be the discontent we feel when an individual’s well-being has been injured – such as when a person is hit by a drunk driver, or is beaten or wounded in some way.

Now, should we apply this idea as a substitute for Wiploc’s definition of “good�, we can see that it would successfully overcome the problems present in his theory. Reverting back to the axed murderer objection – we can see rather clearly the optimal action to carry out in the situation.

Let us call the situation of a single axed murderer who kills multiple people situation R. Let us say that the situation of multiple axed murderers killing a single small child is called situation T. In both situations R and T, the well-being of the axed murderer(s) stays the same should they not carry out their act as it would be prior to their committing of the act, whereas the well-being of the victim(s) would decrease significantly. And thus we can see that if we use “well-being� as the working virtue instead of happiness, one would be morally inclined to avoid the murder(s), despite one’s happiness being thwarted.

Now, this new definition of “good� is a cautious one. It may very well be as flawed as Wiploc’s seems to be. However, if this new definition is preferred, we can then apply it to the idea of God.

As a side note, however, we must also recognize that this is no way provides a foundation for ethics. As for why well-being or happiness are to be morally preferred, neither of us have said. Rather, I think that it would work to simply agree on a common virtue moral actions seem to aim toward, rather than trying to work out a complete moral system in this particular section of our debate.

III. Well-Being, Salvation, And God

As said, our own well-being does not mean we will really be happy. Yet, it seems sensible to agree that despite certain actions being disagreeable, they are morally preferable nonetheless. With this, let us consider how this definition works when applied to God and the world.

A) Worldly Non-Happiness And Well-Being

There is much non-happiness and suffering in the world, that much is obvious. The reasons for this supposing that a God exists are many, and a number of them will be considered in the following sections.

We have already seen, however, that non-happiness is not really antithetical to a God’s omni-benevolence, because happiness is not really a working virtue that moral action is chiefly concerned with (although I would certainly not object that it is something moral action at least considers, as happiness is not entirely irrelevant in a discussion about well-being).

If we use well-being, however, as the working virtue, then we might see that various evils in the world are not incompatible with a God’s existence. Displeasing situations or occurrences in this world which make us unhappy, may be the basis for our entering into the ultimate well-being achievable in the next world – i.e. certain situations or occurrences in this world which make us unhappy may very well lead us into salvation.

B) Application: Sickness And Mortal Peril

The above idea may very well be a valid justification for many of the “evils� non-believers bring to light. Let us take the example of certain sicknesses and various dangers in the world. When we feel we are in peril, or when our physical bodies are unhealthy (e.g. I had Legg-Calve-Perthes disease for a few years), it seems that we are much more prone to considering the seriousness of God’s plan. We can note the millions of individuals who enter into salvation because of ill-health or concern of danger. A large bulk of the population who undergo this usually find themselves entering into god-belief.

Note also that the objection of God finding ways which are more pleasant for the individual to enter salvation isn’t really plausible here. It is not when we are in contentment that we take God’s plan most seriously, but when our worldly happiness seems in jeopardy. Thus, objections against what has been called the “dental argument� do not really apply here [3].

Now, it would seem then, that for the price of some of our worldly happiness, we could find ourselves entering into eternal well-being and contentment. I feel this to be a workable system and not really contradictory to a God’s omni-benevolence whatever. God’s sternness and allowance of some of these things does not seem conflicting with his character – but rather fulfilling of his character, wanting us to enter salvation.

We must, however, consider other things. Surely God could find better ways for individuals to enter salvation than certain evil actions which are much more severe in nature than those I have already addressed? Murder, rape, warfare, etc. etc. Indeed, many of these “evils� do not accomplish salvation at all, so they cannot be said to be justified by such an end.

But I feel that the theologian who should rest on only a single reason for God’s allowance of evil has a naïve perspective about evil in the world. It is a much more complicated issue that presents itself in many various forms – so it is not sensible to simply say one answer or theodicy is sufficient.

Therefore, let us consider some of Wiploc’s objections to other theodicies. I may also supply one further argument later in this response.

IV. The Free Will Theodicy

(A) Defense

Wiploc states that the Free Will Defense (henceforth FWD) is what he calls a Category #3 defense, which attempts to argue that God is not really omni-benevolent. Yet, when considering the terminology we have priorly agreed to in the parameters of this debate, we see that this is not really true. God’s maximal benevolence (or Wiploc’s “punk� benevolence, as he would have it) is not being provided an equivocation should I apply it in this debate (and, of course, I will :) ). There is nothing non-benevolent about preferring Free Will and evil over Non-Free Will and no evil - and as we shall see in a bit, Wiploc has agreed to this himself. Consequently, I would say that the FWD might very well be applied to the god-concept agreed upon in our debate parameters as a valid under-cutter to my opponent’s version of AE.

Now, Wiploc expresses his objection to the FWD by arguing:

What can an omnipotent god do? Anything that doesn’t involve a contradiction. While he can’t make a candy that is both sweet and not sweet, he can make a candy that is both sweet and sour. While he can’t make a person who both has free will and doesn’t have free will, he can make a person who both has free will and is happy. This is inherent in the very definition of the god that modern Christians believe in. He can do anything that doesn’t involve a logical contradiction. [4]

To this, I would say that certainly, the modern conception of “God� is a being who can do anything that does not involve a logical contradiction. Wiploc is entirely correct about this. What Wiploc is not correct about, however, is that happiness with free will does not involve such a contradiction.

Let us say that Suzie wants X and will act accordingly to fulfill X and to fulfill it will make her happy – and to not fulfill it will cause her to be unhappy. Let us also say that Robert wants ~X, and that he will act to fulfill ~X and to fulfill it will make him happy – and not to fulfill it will make him unhappy. To make both individuals happy while allowing them to both hold to their free will would involve a logical contradiction.

We can see that this is the case with many human interactions. There are conflicting interests among us – and those that are fulfilled result in happiness, while those which are not fulfilled result in non-happiness. Thus, there is no possible way that God can make humans happy while allowing them to have free will. To argue that he could do so would be an equivocation of what is meant by free will.

And indeed, Wiploc has provided an argument in the past against this point which seems to provide such an equivocation. In his debate with Seebs, he provides the following argument concerning two people with mutually exclusive desires:

Let’s take your example: two people want the same thing. Let’s say they both want the last donut. Again, there are many ways to deal with this. It could happen that the person who doesn’t get the donut is in such a good mood that he doesn’t mind. It could happen to someone who is so benevolent, so altruistic, that he is happy the other guy got the donut. It could happen to someone who remembers his diet, so his pride in his self-restraint outweighs his disappointment in not getting the donut. The guy who is not going to get the donut could be distracted by a loud noise so that he never even sees the donut. [5]

(A1) The Good Mood Objection

In his first objection to the donut analogy, Wiploc argues that the individual who desires the donut could be made so happy that he doesn’t care if he doesn’t get it. Yet, for God to make people happy all the time to the degree that the individual wouldn’t care about losing the donut, seems to necessitate that God would be forced to interfere with the individual’s personality or outlook at some particular time or place such that he would gain that perspective. Therefore, this objection would be very much antithetical to free will.

Besides this, in most cases individuals do not approach a situation from the outlook that Wiploc suggests could be the case – i.e. that they could hold indifference to their desires being thwarted. This is necessarily so because in many cases objects are intensely desired – and the result could not sensibly be said to be tolerance - should it obtain that their desires not come to pass. Certainly, the individual could only be made happy in the first place if his desires are fulfilled rather than thwarted – so this requires that this individual experience fulfillment of certain desires of his own by God that may be antithetical to the desires of yet another person.

(A2) The Diet Objection

Once again, Wiploc’s example here is simply not relatable to actual cases. In many situations where there are two mutually exclusive desires, individuals do not have other over-riding desires or goals which would quell Suzie and Robert’s problem. In those cases that do experience such cases as the Diet and Good Mood objections that Wiploc provides, we see that such conflicts do dissolve naturally – although they are a minority, and in any plausible world we should expect them to be so.

(A3) The Distracting Noise Objection

If Wiploc were to make this objection to my current argument, he’d be cheating. I am not discussing a potential conflict of wills – where such a conflict would not obtain due to some queer noise that distracts Suzie, but rather a conflict which has been actualized. To prevent individuals from ever having conflicting desires, God would be hard pressed to ever allow us to experience existence as free beings. I would not say that such an idea is to be considered plausible, even considering God’s maximal power. And even if he could, this would hardly be much of a view of “Free Will� that we discuss in common language – the ability to live freely and make free choices. God’s actions would always steer us away from any situations where we would have to make any real or significant decisions such as these. Certainly an equivocation of free will if I’ve ever heard one. Indeed, what would be the point of Creation in the first place? There would be no significance or genuine plan – simply God baby-sitting and humanity walking along attached to puppet strings.

And so, we have a choice. Either we may have free will, or we may rid ourselves of non-happiness. Wiploc has already expressed his support for the former in his past debate with Seebs, saying:

The first move is a gimme: I wouldn't be willing to stand on stage with William Lane Craig and tell his stacked audience that I'm against free will, so I'm not even going to entertain the idea here. (Or elsewhere, for that matter. I don't know how to imagine not having free will, and I'd certainly be willing to sacrifice to keep mine.) [6]

Therefore, I conclude that the FWD is indeed a valid objection against Wiploc’s Argument From Evil.

(B) The Results Of Free Will

The conclusion of Free Will serving as a valid under-cutter to the AE is common knowledge to those who involve themselves in the philosophy of religion. The existence of many evils – murder, rape, warfare, etc. – is the fault of man, not God. And thus we can see that the evils we can conceive of are not antithetical to a God’s omni-benevolence whatever. Rather, many of the evils which exist are the product of man, or the perversion of God’s goodness and good works by man. The consequence of this is that the AE cannot provide as a good argument for the non-existence of God.

V. The Existence Of An Objective Good

There are, of course, two sorts of the “problem of evil�. The first is the atheological problem of evil, which asks whether or not the existence of evil is good evidence for the non-existence of god. The second is the theological problem of evil, which inquires as to reasons why God allows evil (assuming or already acknowledging his existence).

Now, Wiploc rests his argument on the idea of God’s maximal benevolence. Wiploc constructs his argument in agreement with the idea of an objective morality, and in such an idea he and I can agree. A major problem with my opponent’s position, however, is that as an atheist, Wiploc may indeed have trouble justifying his use of the idea of an objective good in the first place. Without presupposing the existence of God, how can Wiploc even begin to establish his argument against theism from the very get-go? At best, Wiploc would be presenting the theological problem of evil, which does nothing for an atheistic case at all.

As Greg Bahnsen has noted [7], an individual who does not hold to theism has no basis for an objective good. Indeed, as expressed by Russell Manion, if one is to observe nature, they will find nothing to provide as a proper ethical foundation. The characters in Manion’s paper discuss:

…I pressed him a little harder still. "You said you were a naturalist, but aren’t you being a little 'nihilistic' with your ethics here?" I find a little pejorative term here and there can go a long way in a debate.

Hardly a moment had passed when he began, "Yes, I am. In fact, I think all consistent naturalists would be nihilists. In the natural world we find no properties to which moral concepts correspond. In fact we cannot even imagine what such a natural phenomena would look like. We can describe an event, such as 'A' kills 'B,' as a set of physical movements. We can even describe our feelings on that event. But, though these feelings may say something about our own biochemical states, they say nothing about the event itself."

He continued, "I will agree that if the behavior of 'A' killing 'B' becomes normative, it will have a negative effect on social order. I will also agree that if the demise of society is immoral, then 'A's' behavior is immoral. But, just as we had to look at the consequences of 'A's' behavior to determine its morality, so we will have to look at the consequences of the demised society to determine its morality, and so on. No matter how many steps we take, we will not find in nature any property that corresponds to a moral concept.

Therefore, moral concepts are grounded either outside nature or not at all." [8]

Theism, however, certainly provides a proper foundation for an objective morality. Even Richard Taylor, who has debated theologians such as William Craig on the subject of whether or not ethics is natural or supernatural in nature, concedes that theism does in fact provide individuals a sound moral system:

“The idea of moral…obligation is clear enough, provided reference to some lawmaker higher…than those of the state is understood. In other words…our moral obligations…can be understood as those imposed by God. This does give a clear sense to the claim that our moral obligations upon us than our political obligations…� [9]

With this, it becomes clear that Wiploc’s Argument From Evil actually presupposes that which he aims to defeat. So, really, we must ask where the atheological argumentation in this debate is to be found – since all of the arguments thus far presented are actually reasons to believe in God!!

VI. Conclusion

Wiploc’s version of the Argument From Evil fails on numerous grounds. Some of those shortcomings that have been argued in this response are:

(1) Wiploc’s Terminology – Wiploc’s definitions of good and evil are lacking and do not provide for a valid process of sound moral action. Until such a time where Wiploc can fix this problem, his argument collapses.

(2) Moral Action As Harmonious With Divine Benevolence – If we are to substitute “well-being� as the working virtue in place of Wiploc’s “happiness�, we can see that God providing us a state of Ultimate Well-Being and allowing things to be such that we achieve that Well-Being provides a compatibility between the existence of evils and God’s existence.

(3) The Free Will Defense – Wiploc’s criticisms on the Free Will Theodicy are lacking, and thus the FWD stands as a valid under-cutter to his Argument From Evil.

(4) The Moral Argument – Wiploc’s AE already presupposes that which it aims to refute. There is no sound ethical foundation in a non-theistic worldview, and hence Wiploc’s reliance upon God’s maximal benevolence is self-defeating.

It is therefore concluded that Wiploc’s case against theism fails, and his positive-atheistic position remains lacking.

________________________________________

End Notes

(1) Theism, Atheism, And Agnosticism: Ravi, Wiploc, And Tsurmon (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=100318)

(2) "Desire Utilitarianism", By Alonzo Fyfe (http://www.strongatheism.com/philosophy/desireutil.html)

(3) The Problem of Evil: Wiploc and Seebs (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=66165)

(4) Theism, Atheism, And Agnosticism: Ravi, Wiploc, And Tsurmon (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=100318)

(5) The Problem of Evil: Wiploc and Seebs (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=66165)

(6) Ibid.

(7) "The Problem of Evil", By Dr. Greg Bahnsen (http://www.salemreformed.org/TheProblemofEvil.html)

(8) “The Other Side: Metaphysics And Meaning�, By Russell Manion

(9) Debate: Is The Basis For Morality Natural Or Supernatural? - William Lane Craig and Richard Taylor (http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html)

[wiploc]

Let me thank IIDB for hosting this debate, and the moderators for providing the dedicated assistance that makes this such a pleasant venue.

While I am an atheist, this should not really be considered a mock debate.

I want to thank you, JLazarus, for this serious effort. Your approach to apologetics surpasses that of most theists I encounter.


I. The Ontological Argument.

I'll start with your ontological argument. I have a problem with your definition of maximally excellent.



Now, it seems possible that a being may be maximally excellent in one possible world, and yet not in another

Sure, god might be maximally excellent in the real world, but non-existent in non-existent worlds. No problem. If god's non-existence in some impossible worlds doesn't detract from his greatness in this world, why should it detract from his greatness that he's also not-great in other possible worlds?

Plantinga may like to indulge in trans-world incoherencies, but the rest of us should be able to recognize them as incoherent. There is no useful sense in which it can be said to be "true" that the maximally excellent being in one possible world is the same person as the maximally excellent being in another. You can imagine that they are the same person; I can imagine that they are merely identical people. It makes no sense to say that one of us imagines right and the other imagines wrong.



We can equate these “maximal attributes� with what Wiploc has coined “punk� omni-attributes.

Not necessarily. The punk-omnipotent god can do anything that doesn't involve a logical contradiction. The maximally excellent god may not exist at all if he doesn't exist in all possible worlds. Since there are, obviously, possible worlds in which no gods exist, it follows that a maximally excellent (defined as, "as powerful as it is possible for a god to be in all possible worlds, even those possible worlds in which god doesn't exist") god can't do anything at all, regardless of whether it violates logic. :)

You are likely to get logically whip-sawed like that anytime you give two definitions to a single concept. In this case, you defined maximally excellent for the real world, and then immediately two-stepped into a many-worlds definition.



Criticizers of this particular variant of the OAG have recognized it may not be parodied, and have consequently avoided this line of argumentation.

"That movie was really excellent!"
"No it wasn't."
"How can you say that?"
"There are lots of possible worlds in which it sucks."



(2) The Ontological Argument – that there is a possible world in which an entity displays maximal greatness, and thus by corollary a maximally excellent being necessarily exists in this actual world.

This emphasizes the incoherency of trans-world arguments. The claim being made is that there is another world in which god exists in this world. That's humorously demented.


II. Theistic Belief as Properly Basic.

Okay, let's turn to the question of whether theistic belief is properly basic. The answer to that question is --- I think --- that the question is something of a red herring, a distraction from the issue at hand.

I agree that we can divide beliefs into the two categories: basic and derived. And I agree --- without for a moment believing that it really happens --- that, theoretically, someone could have a basic (un-derived) belief in some sort of god. Let us, for example, suppose that a man is reading a book about Greek culture when he is struck on the head by a meteorite, causing him to believe that he is the goddess, Diana the Huntress. His belief is not derived (it is not based on evidence) therefore it is basic. But who is to say whether it is properly basic? That's how the man's brain works now. He has no say about his belief. Nobody can fault him for his belief. Arguably, then, his belief that he is the goddess of the hunt is as proper as any other basic belief.

But does theism wish to ground its claim to epistemological legitimacy by saying that a theist is as rational as the next nut case? The answer to that question --- if they don't have any better arguments --- may be yes; but that still isn't what JLazarus and I are here to discuss.

We aren't here to discuss whether people's secret justifications for their beliefs can seem good enough to them. We are discussing whether theistic belief has a real justification, one that can pass scrutiny. We are agreed, I assume, that some beliefs are more reasonable than others; our question is whether theistic belief is among the good ones. This cannot be established by saying that some people just think they know that there's a god. That's not a far cry from settling for truth pluralism: "God may not be true for you, but he's true for me."



Firstly, the most common objection to ARE [the argument from religious experience] is that all believers in religion have spiritual experiences, and they cannot all be right about their own conceptions of God. But yet we are not discussing here whether or not individuals are correct in their own conceptions of what the deity they are experiencing is like, but rather whether or not they are in fact having this genuine experience.

I think this is an equivocation on the word "experience." Yes, they are having a real experience --- but it doesn't follow that they are having a real experience of god. They could be having a real experience of brain malfunction. They could be having a real experience of an emotion that they are culturally pre-disposed to interpret as an experience of a god. We, the disinterested observers, have no reason to suppose that the experiences in question are actual experiences of a god. And even if we did, for the sake or argument, assume that some kind of god was involved, that would still be no reason for us to believe that the god in question is the logically impossible omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent god. And this god, for the purposes of this discussion, is the only god we are interested in. This god is totally unsupported by whatever chemical imbalance, hallucination, or vision happens to be reported as a "religious experience."



As W. K. Clifford has expressed, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence�

I have to say it: that's an appealing quotation. Naturally, what evidence should be regarded as "sufficient" will vary with circumstances. In an awkward case like this ...
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood
and sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveller, long I stood
and looked down one as far as I could
to where it bent in the undergrowth;
Then took the other, as just as fair,
and having perhaps the better claim
because it was grassy and wanted wear;
though as for that, the passing there
had worn them really about the same,
... one would have to choose based on very little, based on far less information than one should require in choosing a spouse or choosing whether to believe that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

In the absence of Clifford's rule, we are reduced to such faint condemnations of epistemological misbehavior as, "Well, your reason for believing you should fly airplanes into the World Trade Center may be as good as my reasons for believing you shouldn't, but I still don't like it!"



(1) If there is no sufficient propositional evidence for theism, then theistic belief is irrational or unreasonable.

Again, this is wonderfully appealing. Much theistic belief comes from imagining that what we observe is unnatural, and that therefore something fantastical must have intervened to effect what we observe. Thus, if planets are observed to circle the sun, it is assumed that straight lines are natural and circles unnatural, and that therefore invisible angles must be forcing the planets to circle. And if motion is observed, then it is assumed that stoppedness is natural and motion unnatural, and that therefore a magical First Cause must account for motion. It is so tempting to wish that all theistic belief could be eliminated by crying, "Don't believe nonsense! Don't believe anything that there is no reason to believe!" Plantinga affects skepticism as to whether there is any such epistemic duty, but, if there were not, then how could one condemn the crusades, the inquisition, the destruction of the World Trade Center, and the War on Iraq? I understand that this isn't a real argument, that, logically speaking, this is no stronger than an argument like, "It must be alright for me to steal your money, because otherwise you would get to keep it." But still, it has its appeal.


III. The Character Argument.

The story so far: JLazarus has offered the possibility that theism is a properly basic belief; which failed because he neglected to show how such a basic belief might be more proper than any other belief, than, say, a basic belief that god does not exist, or a basic belief that lunar eclipses are caused by a dragon devouring the moon. He also offered the modal ontological argument, which fails because it is based on trans-world incoherencies. I, on the other hand, have shown, using the PoE (Problem of Evil) argument, that god, the god we are discussing, the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent god, does not exist --- because he is absolutely, positively, irrefutably a logical impossibility. But, at this very moment, even as I type this (if not in this world, then in one possible world), JLazarus sits typing an attempt to refute my PoE.

Let me take a moment to peek into that possible world, and see how he's doing. ... Ah, the Character of God argument. Nice. Let me just preemptively counter that with the Character of Tywin argument:

You are a poor struggling merchant who has managed to amass a bit of a nest egg, enough to allow you to get married. Tywin Lannister accosts you. He says he needs money quickly. He will take however much you have, and will pay back twice as much at the end of the week. You have two questions: Can he really pay you that much, and is he willing to? Can he pay you? Yes. The Lannisters are vastly rich. Ability to pay is no problem. As to willingness to pay, he says, "A Lannister always pays his debts. To pay you back is what I want more than anything else. My desire to pay you back is maximally excellent; it is strong, infinite, pure, unconflicted."

So, you give him the money, and he doesn't pay. Why not? He says it isn't in his character. He has the money, yes; and he wants to give you the money, yes; but it isn't in his character to give you the money.

I submit that there is a contradiction here. If he has the money, and if there are no other impediments to his giving you the money, then the only determinant of whether he gives you the money is whether he wants to. If he wants to give you the money, then it's in his character to give you the money, and he will. If it's not in his character to give you the money, then he doesn't want to. It's not possible for him to have a strong unconflicted desire to give you the money while having a character that forbids returning the money. That's a logical contradiction.

If it isn't in Tywin's character to give you the money, then he doesn't really want to; and if it isn't in the character of an omnipotent god to make you happy, then he isn't really omnibenevolent. That's the long and the short of it.

crc

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

The next two concurrent statements will make up Round 3.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

wiploc has requested that deadline be extended to Dec. 1. I have agreed to grant his request.

- NS, FD Moderator

[Jim Lazarus]

God-Belief And Epistemic Justifiability
Addressing Wiploc's Criticisms
J. G. Lazarus

I. Introduction

In this debate thus far, we have seen three reasons to believe that theistic belief is in fact rationally justifiable. The reasons thus far argued are:

(1) The Proper Basicality Of God-Belief
(2) Plantinga’s Modal Ontological Argument
(3) The Moral Argument

In his second post, Wiploc provided numerous objections against both of my cases for (1) and (2), and is currently typing away building his case against my support for (3). Certainly, it is observable that if Wiploc cannot overcome (3) then his entire position in this debate collapses, being both unable to justify his own position, nor being able to tear down my own case for (1) – supposing that my case for (1) is sound, and that the proper basicality of theistic belief can only be refuted by offering a defeater that would put the truth-value of that belief to question.

Now, Wiploc’s criticisms of my opening case for theism in both (1) and (2) – while being both well thought out and intended – incorporate a number of serious misconceptions about my arguments, despite the clarifications I offered toward the objections he presented originally in my first post. Consequently, this third response will be largely devoted to addressing Wiploc’s counter-arguments and further expounding on my case for Reformed Foundationalism and the OAG in order to do away with further misreadings. Besides this, I will extend my case for (3) and will address the many common arguments against it.

Before I go on, however, I would like to thank Wiploc for his civility and the kind words that he offers that are present throughout this debate. I also cannot recall ever having a debate opponent whose writings were both enlightened and entertaining to the degree that Wiploc himself displays, and so I owe him thanks for the enjoyment I’ve experienced in our debate thus far.

Now, Wiploc begins his criticism of my case by opening with a few comments concerning my modal Ontological Argument. I will adopt his preference for presentation, and address each of his objections in turn.

II. Plantinga’s Ontological Argument

Wiploc begins his counter-argument by saying:

Sure, god might be maximally excellent in the real world, but non-existent in non-existent worlds. No problem. If god's non-existence in some impossible worlds doesn't detract from his greatness in this world, why should it detract from his greatness that he's also not-great in other possible worlds?

Wiploc brings up this point in response to my comments about a hypothetical maximally excellent being. Yet, I don’t base my argument on simply the existence of a maximally excellent being – but rather on a maximally great being, which is different in nature than simply a being which displays maximal excellence, as the former is something greater in nature. Wiploc’s argument here is actually one of the points I use in building the case for my own argument. Observe:

Now, it seems possible that a being may be maximally excellent in one possible world, and yet not in another – i.e. that being’s excellence may be maximal considering the contingencies of one possible world, but not so considering the possible contingencies of another possible world.

With this established, let us consider two entities – Entity X and Entity B. Let us say that the former entity displays maximal excellence in one possible world, and yet given the contingencies in another possible world, he is not maximally excellent in this latter world. Entity B, however, can be said to display both maximal excellence in this world and in the possible worlds in which Entity X lacks maximal excellence. We can then say that Entity B is greater than Entity X, because Entity B displays far more excellence than X does, as it experiences more excellence in many more possible worlds. With this, we can call Entity B maximally great, in comparison with Entity X. As Everitt notes, “ excellence is so robust that it survives [as maximally excellent] in every possible world�.

It is very much possible, as both I and Wiploc have pointed out, for a being to display maximal excellence is numerous possible worlds based on the contingencies of these possible worlds, and yet not display maximal excellence in other possible worlds, due to the contingencies present in that latter set. Note my discussion on both Entity X and Entity B. The argument provided is that while Entity X does not display maximal excellence in all possible worlds due to the certain contingencies of those possible worlds in which it lacks excellence, Entity B’s excellence is “so robust� that it survives as a maximally excellent being in the remainder of the possible worlds which the former Entity X does not. Consequently, we may call Entity B a maximally great being due to it’s far greater display of excellence as compared to Entity X, whose excellence is much more limited. It is on Entity B that I base my argument.

So, reverting back to Wiploc’s criticism, the answer to his question concerning the non-detraction of greatness of Entity B is that Entity B experiences no non-existence in possible worlds by definition, due to the degree of it’s “robustness� of excellence. Note also that my argument is for a maximally great being and not an infinitely great being, which is why it escapes from the criticisms of it being incoherent (as infinite greatness would entail existence in both impossible and possible worlds, the former being clearly problematic).

Wiploc seems to end his criticism of my argument on a discussion of maximal excellence, when I move much farther.

Now, moving forward a bit, when I equate maximal attributes to Wiploc’s “punk-omni attributes�, he has a problem with this. He says:

Not necessarily. The punk-omnipotent god can do anything that doesn't involve a logical contradiction. The maximally excellent god may not exist at all if he doesn't exist in all possible worlds. Since there are, obviously, possible worlds in which no gods exist, it follows that a [I]maximally excellent (defined as, "as powerful as it is possible for a god to be in all possible worlds, even those possible worlds in which god doesn't exist") god can't do anything at all, regardless of whether it violates logic.

Note, however, that Wiploc’s punk-omnipotence is precisely how I defined maximal attributes. The maximality of attributes as defended by myself is meant as a pre-subject to my discussion about possible worlds and Plantinga’s OAG. Simply, maximal divine attributes are attributes that are held to the greatest possible proportion. The greatest possible proportion, as I noted, is as much as can be conceived of within the bounds of logic. For instance, if I were to say that a being is maximally powerful, this would simply mean that this being is as powerful “as can be conceived of within the bounds of logic�. Possible worlds talk is irrelevant to the subject here. Possible-worlds discourse only becomes a factor once I make the distinction between “excellence� and “greatness�, and the consequences of this.

Progressing forward, it also seems clear that Wiploc is experiencing some confusion about the correct utility of possible worlds talk. This is apparent due to a number of his comments concerning the impossibility of parody, and his odd summation of my argument:

"That movie was really excellent!"
"No it wasn't."
"How can you say that?"
"There are lots of possible worlds in which it sucks."

And also:

This emphasizes the incoherency of trans-world arguments. The claim being made is that there is another world in which god exists in this world. That's humorously demented.

Now, I’m unsure as to whether or not Wiploc meant to employ the former quote as a bit of a joke – but just in case he did not and meant to provide his statement seriously (or if a reader mistakenly takes it seriously), I should again quickly run through what is meant by possible-worlds discourse.

When I say, “There is a possible world in which Wiploc purchased a blue suit yesterday rather than not�, I am merely saying that, “, it could have been the case that Wiploc purchased a blue suit yesterday, rather than not� (this assuming that Wiploc did not in fact purchase a blue suit yesterday). Possible-worlds talk is simply a way of discussing things which could have been, cannot be, or are necessarily so. It does not involve itself with some other parallel realm or universe, but rather with the causal chain of this universe, and the way of things.

So, to give an example of what one would say if the case of something is necessarily so, we can revert back to Everitt’s example. For necessity, we have the statement: “In every possible world, 2 + 2 = 4�. This is because 2 + 2 must equal 4. For an example of impossibility (i.e. a statement about something which cannot be), we can say: “There is no possible world where bachelors are married� – because bachelors, of course, cannot be married.

Reverting back to Wiploc’s statement, his dialogue would appear thus using possible-worlds discourse correctly:

"[In this world] That movie was excellent!"
"No it wasn't."
"How can you say that?"
"[In another possible world] It could have been the case that it sucked."

But yet we can see that this objection makes no sense. The first individual is discussing the excellency of the movie as it has actually been made, while the other is describing the possible lack of excellency of the movie should it have been made differently, and is using this objection as a reason to deny it’s excellency in the way it was in fact made. The fact that it could have been made differently – i.e. that there is a possible world in which the movie was made different and that it consequently sucked – has no bearing on the excellency of it in the way it was actually made, and thus the second person’s point is entirely irrelevant and amounts to nothing.

Note also, though, that this same point isn’t damaging to my OAG, should someone make the mistake of thinking so. I once again do not base my argument on an Entity X that may display maximal excellence in one set of possible worlds and not another (which is similar to the problem of Wiploc’s dialogue provided above), but rather on an Entity B, whose excellence is so robust that it sustains itself in that way in even the possible worlds where Entity X does not.

This clarification also provides an answer to Wiploc’s mistaken summation of my argument at the very end of his criticism. The claim being made is not really that because God displays maximal excellence in one possible world that it exists in this world, or that there is another possible world in which God displays maximal excellence in this world, but rather that God as a maximally great being exists by definition in this world, as well as all possible others (and again, emphasis on “possible� – I am not arguing for infinite greatness, simply maximal greatness). When I say that there is a possible world in which there is a maximally great being, I’m simply stating that it is not incoherent. And so no, the OAG should not be counted as “highly demented�.

III. Reformed Foundationalism

Moving into my criticisms of the provided atheological argument (or the De Jure objection, as Plantinga has called it), Wiploc says that he believes my defense is, “somewhat of a red herring�. He elaborates, stating that rather we are here to discuss whether or not an individual has good reasons/evidences to believe in theism, and that theism passes scrutiny. Yet the idea of requiring extra evidences for theism is precisely the issue at hand. By adopting the Classical Foundationalist approach and employing the De Jure objection, Wiploc expresses agreement with a position that I have thoroughly criticized. His statement about theism passing scrutiny, however, is agreed upon – this is precisely what I was talking about when I discussed defeaters.

The question in this debate is simply: “Is It Rational To Hold To God-Belief?� The answer for that is yes, because of the weakness of De Facto objections (objections scrutinizing the truth-value of theism – e.g. Wiploc’s Problem of Evil) and the faultiness of De Jure objections (a view that requires theism to have extra propositional evidence for the reasonableness of its position), due to theistic belief being properly basic. Because Wiploc has offered no good reasons to think that theism is wrong, and because that theists do not require any extra propositional evidence to hold to their position (due to theism’s proper basicality) theistic belief is entirely rational.

Wiploc, however, attempts to construct a parallel case for basicality that is clearly problematic. He says:

I agree that we can divide beliefs into the two categories: basic and derived. And I agree --- without for a moment believing that it really happens --- that, theoretically, someone could have a basic (un-derived) belief in some sort of god. Let us, for example, suppose that a man is reading a book about Greek culture when he is struck on the head by a meteorite, causing him to believe that he is the goddess, Diana the Huntress. His belief is not derived (it is not based on evidence) therefore it is basic. But who is to say whether it is properly basic? That's how the man's brain works now. He has no say about his belief. Nobody can fault him for his belief. Arguably, then, his belief that he is the goddess of the hunt is as proper as any other basic belief.

However, Wiploc’s objection here does not just count as a criticism of my case, but as a criticism against Foundationalism period. His argument is against the idea of proper basicality in the very first place. And thus we see a contradiction in Wiploc’s post – having had already priorly agreed with Foundationalism’s epistemological theory.

Secondly, I also addressed this issue in my opening case. While I can concede just for a moment that this individual's belief is basic, it is still not properly basic, by Wiploc’s very admission that the man holds to a delusion. As I laid out in my first post, a basic belief can only be properly basic if it is in violation of no epistemic rules. Obviously, holding to a delusion is in violation of epistemic rules, whether or not we can really fault the man for holding to the delusion or not. And thus, Wiploc’s objection against Foundationalist epistemology collapses.

Progressing forward, Wiploc goes on to object as to how I defend theism as being properly basic. He says:

I think this is an equivocation on the word "experience." Yes, they are having a real experience --- but it doesn't follow that they are having a real experience of god.

He goes on to say that they could be having a real experience of a “brain malfunction�, instead. This is, of course, entirely possible – but just as with all of our other experiences, we have no reason to believe that they are in fact otherwise than we perceive them. When we observe the computer and keyboard in front of us, we have no good reason to suppose that these are illusions, or that our brain is playing tricks on us. Similarly, theists have a firm belief that they are experiencing God. They have no good reason to believe that their brain is short-circuiting when they do.

This sort of argument suffers from the same shortcomings that all such objections from radical philosophical skepticism do. Can we really disprove solipsism or brain-in-vat type arguments? No, we cannot. But just as Michael Martin notes [1], we have no good reason to take such ideas seriously. We are entirely justified in trusting our human experiences as valid means to gaining information.

Wiploc continues, though, saying:

We, the disinterested observers, have no reason to suppose that the experiences in question are actual experiences of a god. And even if we did, for the sake or argument, assume that some kind of god was involved, that would still be no reason for us to believe that the god in question is the logically impossible omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent god. And this god, for the purposes of this discussion, is the only god we are interested in. This god is totally unsupported by whatever chemical imbalance, hallucination, or vision happens to be reported as a "religious experience."

And, as with the majority of Wiploc’s complaints, we see that I have already addressed this line of argumentation in my opening statement. Consider here:

Firstly, the most common objection to ARE is that all believers in religion have spiritual experiences, and they cannot all be right about their own conceptions of God. But yet we are not discussing here whether or not individuals are correct in their own conceptions of what the deity they are experiencing is like, but rather whether or not they are in fact having this genuine experience. Many atheists concede that they do, and thus there seems to be no epistemic violations in a believer’s acceptance that there is a God, whether or not they’re correct about their own particular conception of what that God is like being a secondary issue (e.g. in Wiploc’s past debate with Ravi and Tsurmon, all participants successfully argued over the existence of the Abrahamic God, although the specific nature of that God differs significantly between the three Abrahamic creeds, and even more so within the denominations of those general creeds).

As well as here:

Secondly, it is objected that ARE cannot provide as objective evidence for a deity, because not all individuals claim to experience it, and it is only relevant and unquestionably true in the mind of the believer. But yet this support for RE is not claiming that religious experience is objective evidence – but instead involves itself in whether or not it permits an individual to be self-warranted in accepting theism.

Wiploc does not address these remarks in his paragraph above, or subsequent paragraphs thereafter. The closest Wiploc does in fact come to an objection against my comments is when he complains about Reformed Foundationalism settling for something not too unlike truth pluralism. However, this is not at all true. My case for Reformed Foundationalism does not address whether or not something is true absolutely – an issue I take up with my Ontological Argument. Rather, my case is specifically devoted to establishing that it is reasonable for a theist to think and conclude his beliefs true, in the absence of any strong evidence to the contrary. Objective truth is entirely agreed upon, and is not undermined at all in this case. It is confusing how Wiploc would think as such, on the assumption that he’s read through my case thoroughly.

Before turning to his objections against the Character Argument, Wiploc finally concludes:

JLazarus has offered the possibility that theism is a properly basic belief; which failed because he neglected to show how such a basic belief might be more proper than any other belief, than, say, a basic belief that god does not exist, or a basic belief that lunar eclipses are caused by a dragon devouring the moon.

Now, one should note that I certainly have laid out an entire epistemological theory in my opening case. I have accepted contemporary foundationalist epistemology, and have provided arguments in support of the idea that religious experience should be acknowledged as reason to accept the proper basicality of god-belief. It is not my responsibility to go through every conceivable idea or belief there is in order to justify my case when I have already accepted the vast majority of contemporary work within this arena of philosophic thought.

Instead, we must question as to how Wiploc would think such things as properly basic. Certainly the belief that lunar eclipses are caused by dragons devouring the moon is a belief that is derived from quite a number of prior ones (e.g. that dragons actually exist, for one), or should it be based on a delusion identical to the man in Wiploc’s former example, it is in violation of epistemic rules and thus cannot be viewed as properly basic.

How, also, would Wiploc argue that atheism is a properly basic view, based on the guidelines I’ve presented and that he’s agreed with? Is he going to argue that there is a certain direct experience of God’s absence? As an atheist, I’ve never felt such a thing myself – nor have the many other non-theists that I’ve corresponded with. Perhaps Wiploc is a unique case, but I have my doubts.

It is thus concluded that Wiploc has not provided any good reasons to reject my case for the rationality of god-belief.

IV. The Moral Argument

The Moral Argument is one of the more popular theistic arguments today. It is used by both Presuppositionalists and Evidentialists (of course, both via their own distinct methods), and has been popular amongst such apologists like William Craig (who seems to use it in just about every debate he enters into). It is usually formalized as the following:

(1) If objective moral values exist, then God exists.
(2) Objective moral values exist.
(3) Therefore, God exists.

There are a number of objections usually provided against it, and I will answer those here. However, before I do so, we should consider a few quick definitions.

First, obviously, we have to ask what we mean when we say “morality�. Simply, morality is the study of human action – what actions we are to do and what actions we are not to do in various situations, based on the goodness of the former and the badness of the latter. An objective morality is a morality that is based on a foundation that is not a matter of personal opinion or subject to change between individual to individual, but is rather a firm basis – and thus moral actions in various situations would be necessary and applicable to all people. Moral subjectivism is the opposite view of objective ethics, which says that it is very much true that morality has no objective grounding.

Wiploc, however, has already voiced agreement that morality is objective by basing his Argument From Evil on the idea of God’s benevolence, and thus premise (2) of the argument is something we can already agree upon. It is instead premise (1) that will be the subject of disagreement. Note, however, that if Wiploc is unable to refute my case for (1), the conclusion of (3) necessarily follows.

With all of this said, we can continue on toward discussing the usual objections.

(A) The Euthyphro Dilemma

This is by far the most popular objection against the necessity of God as concerned with ethics. The Euthyphro Dilemma has been extended into it’s modern day form by advocates such as Kai Nielsen, who has derived it from the play “Euthyphro’s Circle�, written by Plato long ago. Simply, the Dilemma presents itself as a question, asking:

“Is good holy because it is loved by God, or does God love good because it is holy?�

This might seem to be a bit of a mind-bender for the unfamiliar, so to elaborate on this – the question essentially asks us whether or not good is established by God, or simply whether God just acknowledges what is good. If the answer is the former – i.e. that God decides what is good and bad – then morality is very much subjective to God’s will. God could have easily made rape good and charity bad, and we would have had to follow these alternate set of rules should God has chosen these moral rules instead of the ones we currently have established. Theists might object that God wouldn’t do such a thing because God is good – but such an objection fails because this already presupposes an independently existing moral standard by which we can measure God’s character – nullifying the need for his existence in regards to morality. Other theists might object that simply God *won’t* do this, despite the fact that he can, and thus we still have a real moral standard. But this also fails for the obvious reason that whether or not God does in fact change the laws of morality is irrelevant to the fact that he can, and insofar as that is true, morality is hopelessly subjective.

If, however, the theist does not answer that God established good but that God just acknowledges good, it defeats the theist’s position on the necessity of Divine Commands. This is so because if good is not dependent on God – but rather God just observes what good is – then obviously God’s existence is irrelevant to the objectivity of good. So this, also, is problematic for the theist.

So what’s the answer?

The problem with the Euthyphro Dilemma is that it presents us with a false dichotomy. Good is neither arbitrarily decreed by God nor existant sans His presence, but rather is rooted within the very nature of God’s character. The basis of morality is found intrinsically within Himself, and thus morality is both necessarily the way it is (God cannot randomly change it) and it cannot exist without Him.

Consequently, the Euthyphro problem fails.

(B) Epistemological Problems

Another popular objection against the necessity of Divine Commands is the problem of where we derive God’s commands from (i.e. where do we find them – and how are they evaluated?). Many theists will simply refer to their own holy book, but this is clearly problematic, for three main reasons:

(1) Which book?

The Quran? The Bible? How do you know?

(2) The Contextuality Of Moral Action

Relying upon the absolutism of scripture gives rise to conflicts because statements such as “Thou Shalt Not Lie�, “Thou Shalt Not Steal�, etc. are not always correct in every situation. There are times when one is morally obligated to lie, and times when it is entirely necessary to steal. So relying solely upon absolutist statements from scriptural texts can become very much immoral.

(3) Unaddressed Dilemmas

None of the scriptural texts address dozens of contemporary issues which confront us today as potential ethical problems. What is one to do about these conflicts, when they are not discussed?

For the record, I agree that all three of these are valid criticisms of basing one’s moral action solely on holy texts (and there are many other problems, I assure you). However, the issue at hand is not the application of ethics, where it would be necessary for me to delve into the derivability of Divine Commands extensively, but rather the issue is the meta-ethical question of how morality and moral action is objectively grounded. The question of derivability is an issue for another debate, - what Wiploc must justify is how God is not necessarily a part of reality for the existence of ethics.

(C) The Derivability Of “Ought�

Lastly, secular ethicists complain that theistic moral systems fail to bridge the problem of why one ought to follow divine commands. Yet, as Kai Nielsen has noted, when an individual asks as to why ought they value the moral point of view, they are not asking for a justification within the realm of ethics:

There’s a complete difference between giving a moral justification (a justification inside of morality) and a pragmatic justification for accepting the whole institution of morality. I wasn’t [I]at all defending hedonism, self-interest inside of morality; I’ve criticized that extensively. I’ve said, "Suppose somebody says, ‘Why accept the moral point of view at all?’ he’s not asking for a moral reason. He’s asking for a non-moral reason." And I’m saying we can give him a non-moral reason. (We can tell him to go get lost, too.) But if somebody says, "Why should I pay any attention to science?" he’s not asking for a scientific reason. He’s asking for a pragmatic reason to pay attention to science, and we can give him a reason for that. [2]

Thus, we can actually answer the question of why ought one be moral whether or not one is a theist. Andy Medina, for instance, in his paper against the Divine Command Theory, lists two reasons for adopting the moral point of view [3]:

(1) Because the individual wants to be moral (or, i.e., it is within the individual’s self-interest)
(2) Because the individual will regret what will happen if they are not moral.

Divine Commands fit into both of these categories, considering punishment in the after-life (for [2]) and the all-loving nature of God (for [1]). The argument is not that the problem with secular ethics is the motives one has for being moral, but rather the idea of a sound objectivity of ethics sans the god-concept. It is an important distinction, and one that may prove fatal to Wiploc’s position in this debate.

V. Conclusion

In this third round of our exchange, we have seen that Wiploc’s criticisms against my original case for Plantinga’s Ontological Argument were based on a number of misconceptions which do not at all apply. Further, we have seen that objections against my case for Reformed Foundationalism are extremely weak and in places even contradictory to Wiploc’s admitted support of Foundationalist epistemology. Lastly, an extensive case for the Moral Argument has been provided, securing yet another reason to believe that theism is rationally justified. It is therefore concluded that up to this point Wiploc has neither secured his position nor provided good reasons to not accept mine.

_____________________________

End Notes

(1) Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990), Introduction.

(2) The Craig-Nielsen Debate: God, Morality, And Evil (http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-nielsen0.html)

(3) "Does Objective Morality Presuppose God?" (http://www.strongatheism.com/philosophy/DCT.html)

[wiploc]

Round Three
Atheist Statement


There are a number of irreparable problems with Wiploc’s version of the Argument From Evil (AE). The chief among them shall be discussed here, showing why the argument itself provides very weak support for the atheistic position.

I unambiguously achieved exactly what I set out to achieve. I proved the absolute impossibility of one particular god. Since that god is the only god we are discussing (see set-up thread) (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=103437) I have perfectly succeeded in what I undertook.



Wiploc provides us the following definitions of the terms “good� and “evil�:
Quote:
Evil: If there were no evil, there would be no unhappiness. Evil is that which makes people unhappy. I'm defining it; that's the definition. By extension, the word can also refer to the unhappiness itself. Thus, the "problem of evil" is often called the "problem of unhappiness."

Good: The opposite of evil: that which makes people happy. Or, by extension, happiness itself.

Wiploc often calls these the “traditional definitions� of both of the terms in question [1]. Now I’m not quite sure what traditional definitions Wiploc is actually working on, since the terms themselves have been ascribed numerous meanings as philosophers have progressed from moral system to moral system. But nevertheless, let us apply these terms thus defined.

If X is 2 then X plus 3 equals 5. That's unassailable. You can't change that fact by saying, "Yes, but what if X was 12?" The fact that X plus 3 would equal something else if X was something other than two does not affect the fact that X plus 3 equals 5 if X is 2.

Likewise, if the words I use have the definitions I gave, then god does not exist. This proof is in no way undermined by saying that if we defined god in some other way then that other god could exist. It is obviously true that different gods may exist; I grant that point enthusiastically; but that has nothing to do with what we are discussing here.



According to Wiploc’s “good�, one might be inclined to say that many of the actions we deem very immoral today should actually be considered ethically righteous.

If I said my bicycle can't be in the breadbox because bicycles are bigger than breadboxes, and you responded, "Dinner is at eight," you would be changing the subject. You would be off topic. You would not have fielded a working refutation.

Likewise, when I prove that a god who wants to make everyone happy and can do what he wants can't exist in the same universe as unhappy people, then you are changing the subject when you bring up morality.

It's true that we use words like "good" and "happy" when we discuss ethics and righteousness, but this doesn't change the fact that god does not exist.



To use Alonzo Fyfe’s example [2], to say “good� is that which makes people happy is to say that a crazed axe murderer who just carved up and raped several victims, exclaiming, “Man! That was good!� would be entirely correct.

It would be a good thing if it made him happy. If it made other people unhappy, then it would also be an evil.



What is the right action in this example, if good is simply what makes people happy?

No, "right action" doesn't come into this. What we are discussing is what an omnipotent omnibenevolent god would do. Answer: make everybody happy. That is true by definition. He would do that if he could, and, if he existed, he could. He doesn't do that, therefore he doesn't exist.

"Right action" aside, perhaps you want to discuss how a god could make everyone happy if they wanted conflicting things. We are not omniscient, so we don't have to know how he would do it. But we know he could do it (because that's what the word omnipotent means) and we know he would know how to do it (because that's what the word omniscient means). How he did it might involve encouraging us to be tolerant of not getting what we want. It might involve teaching good parenting skills so that we don't raise children who want to hurt other people. It might involve, in some cases, simply refusing to create those people who will grow up to be rapists and axe murderers. All we know for sure is that an omniscient god would be aware of every ramification of everything that he did. Maybe if he had put the apple tree three inches to the left, maybe then everything would have been alright.

An omniscient god would know exactly what it would take to make people happy. An omnipotent god would be able to do what it took. An omnibenevolent god would make it so.



Perhaps one could further stipulate that morality aims at the happiness of the most individuals?

If you want to talk about morality, I'd be happy to do so, elsewhere or later; but I'm not going to let that confusing issue muddy the waters around this very simple issue.




As for why well-being or happiness are to be morally preferred, neither of us have said.

I didn't say happiness is to be preferred, morally or otherwise. All I said is that if a god was omnibenevolent---in the sense that he wants to make everybody happy---then he would want to make everybody happy. And if he was omnipotent, he would be able to do what he wanted. And if he was omniscient, he would know how.

That's bulletproof. There's not a thing you can do with it.



There is much non-happiness and suffering in the world, that much is obvious.

The prosecution rests. :)


The reasons for this supposing that a God exists are many, and a number of them will be considered in the following sections.

But the issue is whether this particular god exists. I have shown that he does not. Any other gods are irrelevant.



We have already seen, however, that non-happiness is not really antithetical to a God’s omni-benevolence, because happiness is not really a working virtue that moral action is chiefly concerned with

Admit your defeat then. Admit, on behalf of the theists you represent in this debate, that if god exists, and if he is omnipotent and omniscient, then he cannot be omnipotent in the way the way that I have defined omnipotence. Say, "Okay, happiness is not his chief concern. This doesn't mean he doesn't have other admirable concerns like morality or virtue or spiritual well-being, or some presumably admirable unknown purpose, but the idea that god is totally, infinitely, unconflictedly wanting for people to be happy is just wrong.

Theists should thank you for that. They should say, "Oh, I get it," and turn from believing in an impossible god to believing in gods that may exist.

(Note: If god wanted our happiness plus morality, or an unknown purpose, or whatever, he could have both. That's what omnipotence is about. So if we aren't happy, then it stands to reason that any existing gods either don't want us to be happy or don't care whether we are happy. The only thing that could keep an omnipotent god from making us happy if he wanted us happy would be a logical contradiction between our happiness and one of his other goals. The only goal he could have that would logically conflict with our happiness would be our unhappiness. If he wanted us both happy and unhappy, then there would be a logical conflict---but then he wouldn't be omnibenevolent. So, if any gods do exist, they can't be both omnipotent and omnibenevolent.)


If we use well-being, however, as the working virtue, then we might see that various evils in the world are not incompatible with a God’s existence.

I like it. Let's assume, just for this paragraph, that omnibenevolence is about well being rather than about happiness. Do we all have maximal well-being? No? Then god either isn't omnibenevolent or isn't omnipotent. That's one more god who has been proven not to exist.



Displeasing situations or occurrences in this world which make us unhappy, may be the basis for our entering into the ultimate well-being achievable in the next world – i.e. certain situations or occurrences in this world which make us unhappy may very well lead us into salvation.

Salvation and happiness are not logically contradictory. Therefore, an omnipotent god who wanted both would have both. Therefore, since we are not all happy, it follows that no omnipotent god who wants us to be both saved and happy exists.


Note also that the objection of God finding ways which are more pleasant for the individual to enter salvation isn’t really plausible here. It is not when we are in contentment that we take God’s plan most seriously,

Who designed us that way?




Now, it would seem then, that for the price of some of our worldly happiness, we could find ourselves entering into eternal well-being and contentment.

Absolutely. And if god didn't care about our worldly happiness, then he could exist. And such a god could be pretty darned good, but he wouldn't be omnibenevolent.



I feel this to be a workable system and not really contradictory to a God’s omni-benevolence whatever. God’s sternness and allowance of some of these things does not seem conflicting with his character – but rather fulfilling of his character, wanting us to enter salvation.

If his character includes omnibenevolence, the desire that we be happy, then this does contradict his character, unless of course he isn't omnipotent so he can't have both happiness and salvation.



IV. The Free Will Theodicy

(A) Defense

Wiploc states that the Free Will Defense (henceforth FWD) is what he calls a Category #3 defense, which attempts to argue that God is not really omni-benevolent. Yet, when considering the terminology we have priorly agreed to in the parameters of this debate, we see that this is not really true. God’s maximal benevolence (or Wiploc’s “punk� benevolence, as he would have it) is not being provided an equivocation should I apply it in this debate (and, of course, I will :)). There is nothing non-benevolent about preferring Free Will and evil over Non-Free Will and no evil...

And there is nothing omnipotent about not being able to have both.


What Wiploc is not correct about, however, is that happiness with free will does not involve such a contradiction.

<Sits up, arches eyebrow inquisitively.>



Let us say that Suzie wants X and will act accordingly to fulfill X and to fulfill it will make her happy – and to not fulfill it will cause her to be unhappy. Let us also say that Robert wants ~X, and that he will act to fulfill ~X and to fulfill it will make him happy – and not to fulfill it will make him unhappy. To make both individuals happy while allowing them to both hold to their free will would involve a logical contradiction.

In the defined situation, they cannot both be happy. Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent god would not have that situation arise.

Does god creating a universe in such a way that the situation doesn't arise amount to a violation of free will? If so, then god creating a universe in such a way that the situation does arise must also amount to a violation of free will. Either way, god decided at the beginning of time who would do what. If that negates free will in the first case, then it negates free will in the second.

If you are talking about that kind of free will (call it FWP, for Plantingan-style Free Will) then god cannot create free will regardless of whether he creates happiness.

If, on the other hand, you are talking about some kind of free will that god could create, then he could give us free will plus happiness as easily as he could give us free will plus unhappiness. Either way, the FWD fails utterly.





Let’s take your example: two people want the same thing. Let’s say they both want the last donut. Again, there are many ways to deal with this. It could happen that the person who doesn’t get the donut is in such a good mood that he doesn’t mind. It could happen to someone who is so benevolent, so altruistic, that he is happy the other guy got the donut. It could happen to someone who remembers his diet, so his pride in his self-restraint outweighs his disappointment in not getting the donut. The guy who is not going to get the donut could be distracted by a loud noise so that he never even sees the donut.

(A1) The Good Mood Objection

In his first objection to the donut analogy, Wiploc argues that the individual who desires the donut could be made so happy that he doesn’t care if he doesn’t get it. Yet, for God to make people happy all the time to the degree that the individual wouldn’t care about losing the donut, seems to necessitate that God would be forced to interfere with the individual’s personality or outlook at some particular time or place such that he would gain that perspective. Therefore, this objection would be very much antithetical to free will.

I suppose, if we really want to, we can imagine a world in which human happiness requires constant divine intervention. Who do you suppose would have created that world and those people to be like that?

Suppose god creates people so that they'll be unhappy unless he further intervenes.
Case A: Now suppose god withholds further intervention so the people are unhappy.
Case B: Suppose instead that god provides the further intervention so the people are happy.
Now are you going to tell me that in Case A people have free will and in Case B they don’t? I don't think so. They either have free will in both cases or they don't have free will in either case. Either way, the FWD fails.

So, free will is not determined by the frequency with which god intervenes. Could it be determined by the way in which he intervenes? Might we say that if he intervenes peripherally (a flat tire here, a sun spot there) that free will is not denied, but if god goes to the core of the matter (reaching into your mind and working the levers for you in order to determine your decision) then you don't have free will? I will concede that possibility for the sake of argument. But then, obviously, if god wanted to achieve free will in addition to some other particular outcome (like, say---just to pick one at random---human happiness) he would effect the other outcome by the use of peripheral manipulations rather than core manipulations. An omnipotent god could do that. It isn't logically impossible, so he could do it.




Once again, Wiploc’s example here [the example of someone who isn't made unhappy at not getting a donut] is simply not relatable to actual cases.

Once again, if there was an omnipotent omnibeneovolent god, the cases would be like that. We would be raised better, so we'd more resilient in the face of disappointment, or there would be more donuts, or something. An omniscient god could come up with the something; an omnipotent god could put the something into effect. One way or another, the situations that would result in actual unhappiness would be avoided.

Remember too that we would be out of practice at unhappiness. "Wow! Suzy. I didn't get a donut when I really really wanted one. This is amazing! Wait til I tell everybody. I've always wanted to be a celebrity."


In many situations where there are two mutually exclusive desires, individuals do not have other over-riding desires or goals which would quell Suzie and Robert’s problem.

Exactly. That's how we know there is no omnipotent omnibenevolent god.

I'm going to skip over the other objections to my donut example. They all play out the same way. Every situation either could be resolved without unhappiness (in which case god wo