Was Nietzsche a male chauvinist? –- Lafcadio vs. inbuninbu

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

This thread has been set up for a formal debate between Lafcadio and inbuninbu on the following question:

"Was Nietzsche a male chauvinist?"

Lafcadio will affirm the position that Nietzsche was a male chauvinist and inbuninbu will oppose. The debate will have 4 rounds and statements will be submitted concurrently as agreed to from the parameters (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showpost.php?p=2213604&postcount=16).

A Peanut Gallery (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=2231540#post2231540) is set up in the Philosophy forum for the rest of us to comment on the debate.

Good luck to both participants!

- NS, FD Moderator

[inbuninbu]

Was Nietzsche a male chauvinist?

First, I would like to thank Lafcadio for giving me the opportunity to debate in the first place.

I will attempt to show that Nietzsche's philosophy is not compatible with male chauvinism.

A male chauvinist is defined (at least for the purposes of this debate) as the belief in the superiority of men over women.

The first issue that comes to mind is that Nietzsche rejected the notion of absolute values. That is exactly what the "death of God" was about--the death of objective values.

(...) The insane man jumped into their midst and transfixed them with his glances. "Where is God gone?" he called out. "I mean to tell you! We have killed him, you and I! We are all his murderers! But how have we done it? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its sun? Whither does it now move? Whither do we move? Away from all suns? Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an above and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite nothingness? (...)"
(The Gay Science, 125)

But isn't the notion of superiority one of objectivity? Does "superiority" mean anything in a world without objective values?

Of course, the mere assertion that the concept of superiority (or any other value-concept) and relativism are mutually exclusive is not satisfactory. After all, Nietzsche seems to continuously make value statements throughout his writings. For example, his many disapproving statements regarding Christianity. " The Christian church has left nothing untouched by its depravity; it has turned every value into worthlessness, and every truth into a lie, and every integrity into baseness of soul."(The Antichrist 62) is one of many.

So, what are values in a philosophy without absolute values? In particular, what does "superiority" mean? What does it mean in Nietzsche's philosophy at large?

Indeed, right before the rather infamous sections in Beyond Good and Evil where some of his most notorious writings on women reside, he writes:

Learning changes us; it does what all nourishment does which also does not merely "preserve"--as physiologists know. But at the bottom of us, really "deep down", there is, of course, something unteachable, some granite of spiritual "fatum", of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined selected questions. Whenever a cardinal problem is at stake, there speaks an unchangeable "this is I"; about man and woman, for example, a thinker cannot relearn but only finish learning--only to discover ultimately how this is "settled in him." At times we find certain solutions of problems that inspire strong faith in us; some call them henceforth their "convictions." Later--we see them only as steps to self-knowledge, signposts to the problem we are--rather, to the great stupidity we are--to out spiritual fatum, to what is unteachable very "deep down."
After this abundant civility that I have just evidenced in relation to myself I shall perhaps be permitted more readily to state a few truths about "woman as such"--assuming that it is now known from the outset how very much these are after all only--my truths.
(Beyond Good and Evil 231)
Also consider:

Judgments, judgments of value about life, for it or against it, can in the end never be true: they have value only as symptoms, they are worthy of consideration only as symptoms; in themselves such judgments are meaningless.
(Twilight of the Idols, The Problem of Socrates 2)

Of course, one can try to make naturalistic valuations without crossing the line into metaphysics. For example, one "litmus test" of moralities which Nietzsche employs is whether it is "life-affirming" or not. For example, the following illustrates a naturalistic--one might even say "darwinistic"--morality.

What is good?--Whatever augments the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself, in man.
What is evil?--Whatever springs from weakness. (...)
(The Antichrist 2)

(...) I call an animal, a species, an individual corrupt, when it loses its instincts, when it chooses, when it prefers, what is injurious to it. (...)
(The Antichrist 6)


Pity thwarts the whole law of evolution, which is the law of natural selection. It preserves whatever is ripe for destruction; it fights on the side of those disinherited and condemned by life; by maintaining life in so many of the botched of all kinds, it gives life itself a gloomy and dubious aspect.
(Antichrist 7)

This naturalistic, life-driven morality is what I assert is the central morality that Nietzsche subscribes to.

Where is it that Nietzsche's views on women fit into this? That is where I expect this debate to end up.

From a naturalistic perspective, I see it as a difficult case to make that women are life-denying--indeed, women are essential at the biological level, at the very least, for life to continue at all.

For that matter, at the very beginning of Beyond Good and Evil is:

Supposing truth is a woman---what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar at they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women?
(Beyond Good and Evil, Preface)


Of course, man doesn't make any sense without woman, much as a philosopher makes no sense without truth.

What inspires respect for woman, and often enough even fear, is her nature, which is more "natural" than man's, the genuine, cunning suppleness of a beast of prey, the tiger's claw under the glove, the naivete of her egoism, her uneducability and inner wildness, the incomprehensibility, scope, and movement of her desires and virtues--
(Beyond Good and Evil 239)


It is very hard to imagine Nietzsche giving something he saw as "inferior" any respect at all.

What is it then, that I am asserting in this opening statement?
1. Nietzsche's relativism is incompatible with metaphysical superiority.
2. Women do not violate a naturalistic morality.
3. Nietzsche did not think that women are inferior to men in any philosophically consequential way.

[Lafcadio]

I must admit that until I started to prepare my argumentation for this debate and do a more serious and sustained research on Friedrich Nietzsche, his life and his work, I never doubted his position on women, nor did I (and still do not) consider it significant in the view one should have of Nietzsche. Meanwhile, I noticed that some remarkable figures of our history gain, in time, various archetypal values being surrounded with a legendary aura by the future generations trapped in ideological battles, in need for an intellectual legitimization, in a crisis for an authoritative representative armed with an exquisite, attractive style and an aphoristic (hence easily quotable, but also in a selective way) discourse.
Nietzsche fits the above description, but beyond those just mentioned Nietzsche has other assets. His venomous rhetoric, his anti-traditionalist position, being a ferocious critic of European spirit from classical Greece to the second half of the XIXth century, and maybe caused by these, the high regard he still enjoys in many academic circles. We face a cohort of nietzscheans finding in this philosopher their trusted ally to protect and promote their beliefs, focusing their efforts in various interpretations of his work. He already came to my attention being recruited for racism, nazism, anarchism, postmodernism, misogynism [1] and now feminism.

Then one may rightfully ask: how do we read and interpret Nietzsche?
Though I start from the same premises as Gilles Deleuze [2], from the nietzschean means of expression – the aphorism and the poem, the interpretation and the evaluation, I disagree with the deconstructivist attempts of understanding Nietzsche and classifying him as a precursor of feminism, especially when he becomes prescriptive. In Ecce Homo (1889) he describes his previous work Beyond Good and Evil (1886) as a “critique of modernity� (women's emancipation was part of the modernity he witnessed [3]) but also a “school for the gentilhomme�. In Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883-85), the main character is a prophet, a symbol of the archaic sapience, a pre-socratic wisdom for which Nietzsche shows nostalgia. This wisdom springs from a patriarchal culture, and we can't expect Nietzsche to undermine its authenticity and preach a modern idea of equality, en vogue since the French Revolution, an equality which follows from slave morality he criticized so often. Once we get acquainted with the nietzschean language, style and eventually his XIXth century’s context, the prescriptive message should reveal as a teaching for the modern man.

Nietzsche's evolution under the influence of Schopenhauer (though not followed by an immediate reaction, Nietzsche's early works are, concerning our topic, much less schopenhauerian than the latest) and a series of symbolic male figures (Montaigne, Napoleon, Goethe), the hatred for the female-only family (he confessed in Ecce Homo [4]: “When I look for my profoundest opposite, the incalculable pettiness of the instincts, I always find my mother and my sister - to be related to such canaille would be a blasphemy against my divinity. The treatment I have received from my mother and my sister, up to the present moment, fills me with inexpressible horror ...�) can't be ignored. But as this is my opening statement, I consider the message coming from his works persuasive enough and clearly shaping an argument for his chauvinism, therefore I won't focus on Nietzsche's biographical elements in the following paragraphs.
I will rather have a quick glance at some of Nietzsche's works [5] and reveal a derogatory characterization of woman from two points of view. One is straightforward and reflecting Nietzsche's reaction to the socio-political tendencies of his time but also illustrating a proverbial reality of man and woman, which from the former reason (i. e. the reflection) I identify it as his belief, while expecting a coherent position from him on this question. The other one I will shape following Deleuze's advice and identifying the active and the reactive forces in the man-woman duet.

In Thus Spake Zarathustra, I 18, On old and young women, Nietzsche lets himself be heard through Zarathustra, the prophet.
The woman is the plaything for the recreation of man (“Therefore wanteth he woman, as the most dangerous plaything. Man shall be trained for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior: all else is folly.�), the child-bearer and the mother (“everything in woman hath one solution - it is called pregnancy�, “Better than man doth woman understand children�). Man is the warrior but also the perpetual child, a homo ludens [6] (“In the true man there is a child hidden: it wanteth to play.�), woman being among his most precious playthings.
The honour is only of man, a woman can understand only love (“In your love be your honour! Little doth woman understand otherwise about honour.�). Therefore in their extreme evilness, only man can be morally evil, woman’s evilness being a malicious manifestation (“Let man fear woman when she hateth: for man in his innermost soul is merely evil; woman, however, is mean.�). Woman should obey her man (“The happiness of man is, "I will." The happiness of woman is, "He will."�) as the submission is the only way the woman can be meaningful, otherwise she’s shallow (“Obey, must the woman, and find a depth for her surface. Surface, is woman's soul, a mobile, stormy film on shallow water.�), unlike man (“Man's soul, however, is deep, its current gusheth in subterranean caverns: woman surmiseth its force, but comprehendeth it not.�) and it can be further noticed that the mysterious side of man is a matter of comprehension while the mysterious side of woman is a matter of game and playing (“Everything in a woman is a riddle�). The man can play with the woman, while the woman cannot comprehend the man in his depth, only in his childish behaviour.
Zarathustra’s listener, an old woman, concludes “Zarathustra knoweth little about woman, and yet he is right about them!� before giving him the scandalous and still controversial advice “"Thou goest to women? Do not forget thy whip!"�.

In Ecce Homo, Why I write such good books, 5 Nietzsche further develops this picture. As Zarathustra, he knows about women declaring himself “the first psychologist of the eternal womanly� because of his dionysiac heritage, so their view is similar: woman is much more wicked than man, and her salvation is in the children she must bear. But now he also displays a critique against woman’s emancipation, defaming the female supporters of this movement as abnormal, unfeminine and unable to procreate (“the abortive women, the "emancipated", who lack the stuff for children�) and also describing the struggle for rights as a “symptom of sickness� opposing the natural state which is a war between sexes where woman has undisputably the first place. He ravingly continues: “The woman’s emancipation – is the instinctive hatred of the woman who has turned out ill, that is to say is incapable of bearing, for her who has turned out well – the struggle against the man is only mean, subterfuge, tactic. When they elevate themselves as "women in herself", as "higher woman", as "idealist" woman, they want to lower the general level of rank of woman; no surer mean for achieving that than high school education, trousers and the political rights of voting cattle�). His targets are also the XIXth century male supporters for woman’s emancipation represented by “the typical old maid� Henrik Ibsen, whose task is to poison the “naturalness� of sexual love.
August Strindberg [7] is known to have a similar view of a war between sexes where man falls victim to woman because he lacks the most efficient weapon of womanhood – the lack of scruples, while his consciousness is his doom. Though Strindberg completed his works (Countess Julie, The Father) before he was acquainted with Nietzsche’s philosophy, some critics, like Edmund Gosse, believed in a nietzschean influence in Strindberg’s works as the intellectual attraction between the two is well-known (Nietzsche wrote to Peter Gast: “Strindberg has written to me, and for the first time I sense an answering note of universality.�). Also, Lucian Blaga in his essay from 1926, Nietzsche and Strindberg, observed the similarity between the two visions, but identifying among other differences the nietzschean will of power shifted in Strindberg’s works from metaphysics to personal conflicts between man and woman.

Beyond Good and Evil, as Nietzsche himself confesses in Ecce Homo, follows Thus Spake Zarathustra. The diatribe against woman is reissued in the paragraphs 231-239. In Beyond Good and Evil, 232 we can read about the rotten nature of woman's emancipation (“Woman wishes to be independent, and therefore she begins to enlighten men about "woman as she is" - this is one of the worst developments of the general uglyfing of Europe�) argumented by a natural inferiority of woman (“Woman has so much cause for shame; in woman there is so much pedantry, superficiality, schoolmasterliness, petty presumption, unbridledness, and indiscretion concealed - study only woman's behaviour towards children! - which has really been best restrained and dominated hitherto by the fear of man�) and followed by a rejection of woman’s intellectual rights among men (“Is it not in the very worst taste that woman thus sets herself up to be scientific? […] But she does not want truth - what does woman care for truth? From the very first, nothing is more foreign, more repugnant, or more hostile to woman than truth - her great art is falsehood, her chief concern is appearance and beauty.�). A discriminatory tradition of excluding woman from various intellectual fields is given as conclusion to this paragraph: “We men desire that woman should not continue to compromise herself by enlightening us; just as it was man's care and the consideration for woman, when the church decreed: mulier taceat in ecclesia! It was to the benefit of woman when Napoleon gave the too eloquent Madame de Staël to understand: mulier taceat in politicis! - and in my opinion, he is a true friend of woman who calls out to women today: mulier taceat de muliere!�.
The argument follows in the same direction several paragraphs later (238): “To be mistaken in the fundamental problem of "man and woman", to deny here the profoundest antagonism and the necessity for an eternally hostile tension, to dream here perhaps of equal rights, equal training, equal claims and obligations: that is a typical sign of shallow-mindedness;� continued by ideas sprung from a patriarchal culture of millenia: “a man who has depth of spirit as well as of desires, and has also the depth of benevolence which is capable of severity and harshness, and easily confounded with them, can only think of woman as orientals do: he must conceive of her as a possession, as confinable property, as a being predestined for service and accomplishing her mission therein - he must take his stand in this matter upon the immense rationality of Asia, upon the superiority of the instinct of Asia, as the Greeks did formerly;�. The last paragraph (239) holds the culmination, Nietzsche showing himself as reactionary (even for his times), praising the patriarchal, slavery-based society and spreading with generosity insulting epithets to women's emancipation's supporters. It warns against the “disenchantment of woman�, ending with a hammer blow [8]: “And no God concealed beneath it - no! only an "idea," a "modern idea"!�.

I think the two points of view I proposed above are proven. Beyond the obvious denigration which needs no additional conclusion, in Nietzsche's view, the man is the active force, while the woman is the reactive force (as similarily the christianity is a reactive force as a slave morality), as the man holds the intellect and the creative power, while the woman, inferior and opposing in these regards, manipulates man's endowment to defeat him. Woman's emancipation is wrong in this regard for leveling a fertile mechanism of inequality which keeps the humanity functioning.



[1] My conclusion is drawn from various sources. I will exemplify with:
Robert C. Holub - Nietzsche: Socialist, Anarchist, Feminist (http://learning.berkeley.edu/robertholub/research/essays/American_Nietzsche.pdf)
Dan Stone - Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and Interwar Britain, Liverpool University Press, 2002

[2] Gilles Deleuze - Nietzsche, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992 (romanian translation by Bogdan Ghiu, Bucharest: ALL Educational, 2002)

[3] Robert C. Holub - Nietzsche and The Women's Question (http://learning.berkeley.edu/robertholub/teaching/syllabi/Lecture_Nietzsche_Women.pdf)

[4] The third section from Why I Am So Wise has two versions. One version was copied by Heinrich Köselitz (Peter Gast) before he sent the manuscript to Nietzsche's family who destroyed it for obvious reasons and was discovered almost a century later.

[5] Here I must say few words about those Nietzsche's works I mentioned in this statement. For the quotes I inserted to back up my interpretations I used the following:
Thus Spake Zarathustra, translation by Thomas Common, Project Gutenberg eText
Beyond Good and Evil, translation by Helen Zimmern, Project Gutenberg eText
Ecce Homo, translation by R. J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin, 1979
My journey through the selected passages of Ecce Homo followed Rober C. Holub's (see [3]) as I don't have any English translation and I could find online only German and French translations. I used my own translations only for isolated phrases. For more quotes from this book, if necessary for my further arguments in this debate, I will translate myself from one or more of the available versions.
However, for a better and more coherent lecture of the text, and therefore my main source for interpretations, I used the following:
Aşa grăit-a Zarathustra, Romanian translation by Horia Stanca, Bucharest: Humanitas, 2000
Dincolo de bine şi de rău, Romanian translation by Francisc Grünberg, Bucharest: Humanitas, 1992
Ecce Homo, Romanian translation by Liana Micescu, Bucharest: Centaurus SRL, 1991

[6] I use Johan Huizinga's concept to encapsulate the game player and the creative force of the game player as an active force in the cultural development

[7] Strindberg shares with Nietzsche also the contempt on Ibsen. In The Gothic Rooms he says that when the stupid Ibsen will be exposed the world will regain its naturalness.

[8] Or How One Philosophizes With a Hammer is the subtitle of Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols, a book where the idols are the ideas Nietzsche fights against. As he himself warns us in Ecce Homo, these idols (ideas) are also ancient, as well as new.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

The next two concurrent statements will make up Round 2.

[Lafcadio]

As estabilished in the setup of the debate and further strengthened by the previous two statements, the notion of chauvinism is defined through superiority. The relation is a comparative one and regards one term being ranked higher than others on a certain scale.
Whether the frame of referrence is absolute and relative, a set of its concepts or entities, which share a common nature which may be evaluated, can be compared and ranked accordingly. There cannot be a life affirming affirming principle if there are is no life denying principle, nor the vice versa.
It may happen, however, that the elements presented for ranking to be unsuitable for comparision or lacking comparable features, or that by the claimed (which I agree with as long as it's a general statement) relativity, the ranks to be actually ordered upside down. Situations in which I expect their supporter, at least, to try to build a coherent view, a view which conflicts mine and argues for an alternative interpretation.
I have not encountered, so far, such a view. Nietzsche's relativity cannot be taken as universal and omnipresent, with certainty, otherwise it would annul itself through self-appliance. Nietzsche's own truths, as confessed in Beyond Good and Evil, 231, represent his own view, whose subjectivity he feels in debt to underline with the respect to that “something unteachable� we all have. Nietzsche's own truths, as confessed throughout his work, represent his attempts to expose the gods. The life, indeed he says as quoted above, cannot be judged, but not the life affirming or denying principles. The quotes from The Antichrist, judgements of value, illustrate the weak morality, life denying principles, on which I'm building my own argument.

To address the other two objections, I must cross a bridge between the two opening statements. Life affirming is equivalent with active, life denying is equivalent with reactive. The active forces, in Deleuze's view [1], are those acting in the sense of the will of power, those which are characterized by “to give� and “to create�.

Nietzsche's does not hold woman's inferiority (in the two views I proposed, straightforward or as balancing term in the will of power) because of her fertility and motherhood, some essential biological functions that undisputably categorize woman to be life affirming. Woman is not inferior through her delicacy, beauty, mystery.
I argue not for a biological superiority (woman to be child / life deliverer while man not), but a superiority in spirit (virtues, intellect).
A woman's superior education and involvement in the intellectual fields are life denying as they uglify her, corrupt her genuine life affirming feminity (“In the eyes of all true women science is hostile to the sense of shame. They feel as if one wished to peep under their skin with it - or worse still! under their dress and finery.� - Beyond Good and Evil, 127) and deny it (“When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature.� - Beyond Good and Evil, 144). Nietzsche further argues (238) that to deny the antagonism between the two, to dream that man and woman would ever have equal rights, undifferentiated education, similar claims or obligations is a sign of obtusity and incapacity in front of the life questions.
Hence, the woman becomes life denying in her competition with the man. The inequality between man and woman is a life affirming principle while woman is also life denying by opposing man in his creativity. These conclusions I drew already in my opening statement, in a slightly different form.
In humanity's culture and intellectual history, the only way for woman to be life affirming is to play a role of non-interferrence and of non-creation, which is for her to be the weak, to be part of the herd. So, with no possibility to escape, she becomes reactive [2]. Nietzsche himself notices “how much of the "slave" is still left in woman, for instance!� (Beyond Good and Evil, 261).



[1] Gilles Deleuze - Nietzsche

[2] A similar idea I encountered in Danielle Costa's essay - Mill and Nietzsche's Ideas about the Rightful and Natural Positions of Women in Society (http://www.indyflicks.com/danielle/papers/paper01.htm)

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

inbuninbu has informed me that he will not be able to post his next statement within the time limit. He will have a grace period, extending his deadline by 3 days.

- NS, FD Moderator

[inbuninbu]

First, I will address Lafcadio's opening statement. Lafcadio seems to be deviating significantly from what I thought we were supposed to be arguing about.

Specifically, Lafcadio needs to establish that Nietzsche was a male chauvinist. A male chauvinist is defined as a man who believes that men are superior to women. He also should show how this fits within Nietzsche's philosophy

The way that I interpret Lafcadio's argument is: Nietzsche said lots of mean things about women, so he felt that they are inferior. But there is no clear indication of how his statements assert the superiority of men.

All he has established is that Nietzsche wrote a number of things about women. He asserts that the writings are denigrating (read: offensive), and that that is enough to conclude that Nietzsche believed that women are inferior. That is a very weak case, in my opinion.

Lafcadio asserts that Nietzsche's statements are derogatory. He does not state what ideology in which he finds those statements derogatory, or how they are derogatory from within it. Even if he showed that Nietzsche's writings on women are offensive and tasteless to most people (which he did not), that does not say anything about what Nietzsche actually meant.

I realize that my opening post could have been clearer.

Let's use a trivial example (this is, perhaps, not the best example, but it should get the point across) to explore how we can look at gender and value.

Suppose we need to dig a hole and haul away the dirt. To do that, we require a shovel and a wheelbarrow. We can compare two shovels, and if we can dig more efficiently with one of them, we'd say that it is superior to the other one (assuming faster is better in the relevant value-system). We can do the equivalent with the wheelbarrow. But what happens when we ask the question, "which is superior, shovels or wheelbarrows?" Does the question make any sense? If we could only have one of them on a desert island(or some such situation), we might have a preference to bring one or the other. But that changes the problem being addressed.

Now, I think that example addresses an important point that I tried to make in my first post. When speaking of superiority, what do we mean by it? Do we not mean "greater value"? And what value system are we operating under?

Nietzsche's over-riding value is life. And in the most physical, direct way, women are essential for life. Women are essential for men and vice-versa. What is essential has the highest value, does it not? Regardless of Nietzsche's psychoses about women, or his lack thereof, we cannot say that men are superior to women from within Nietzsche's philosophy.

Now suppose a revolution comes along. Some shovels and wheelbarrows decide that wheelbarrows shouldn't have to haul all of that dirt! They say that the wheelbarrows are oppressed, and the shovels are the ones oppressing them. So, it is decided the best way to "improve" women is to give them the education of a shovel.

Nietzsche certainly was opposed to the women's emancipation movement at some level. He felt that men and women were fundamentally different, and thought it was ridiculous to try to make women into men.

And indeed, did not the dumping of what was "woman" in the 19th century confess some degree of belief in the "inferiority of women"? Woman needed to be "educated" to be like men; men are better.

Now, you don't have to agree with any of that second part, though it is interesting. Superiority does not come into play.

Nietzsche said many things critical of women. But he criticized virtually everything and everyone--including men. His criticism of women does not in itself prove he felt women to be inferior. And indeed, his most notorious writing about women are often not about women at all, but how men percieve them, or some other topic.

"Nietzsche said a lot of mean things about women" simply does not suffice.

I think I have addressed my main point. But to follow up with some side points...

Indeed, Nietzsche was a critic of modernity, and was critical of women's emancipation as a part of this. Nietzsche was opposed to the modern tendency to "equalize", and applied it to women's emancipation just as he applied it to democracy. I do not argue against that. But that is not relevant. Inequality and superiority are not the same concept.

Nietzsche's evolution under the influence of Schopenhauer (though not followed by an immediate reaction, Nietzsche's early works are, concerning our topic, much less schopenhauerian than the latest) and a series of symbolic male figures (Montaigne, Napoleon, Goethe), the hatred for the female-only family (he confessed in Ecce Homo [4]: “When I look for my profoundest opposite, the incalculable pettiness of the instincts, I always find my mother and my sister - to be related to such canaille would be a blasphemy against my divinity. The treatment I have received from my mother and my sister, up to the present moment, fills me with inexpressible horror ...�) can't be ignored.

On the contrary, it can be ignored. If we were looking at this from the perspective of "Nietzsche had a dysfunctional view of women; what were its causes?", it would be relevant. But not only is it not established that he had a dysfunctional view of women, it is not relevant even if it was true.

I will rather have a quick glance at some of Nietzsche's works [5] and reveal a derogatory characterization of woman from two points of view.

As mentioned before, the use of the word "derogatory" confuses the topic. The issue isn't whether Nietzsche is critical of women--he is critical of pretty much everything. The issue is one of superiority. For example, Nietzsche is intensely critical of Judaism in The Antichrist, but does he think that Jews are inferior? He thinks exactly the opposite. It isn't as simple as Lafcadio would like to make it out to be.

Secondly, derogatory from who's point of view? For example, I would not argue that the notion that the role of women is dictated by their biology is derogatory from within the value system of Feminism. However, is it derogatory from within Nietzsche's philosophy?

The woman is the plaything for the recreation of man (“Therefore wanteth he woman, as the most dangerous plaything. Man shall be trained for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior: all else is folly.�), the child-bearer and the mother (“everything in woman hath one solution - it is called pregnancy�, “Better than man doth woman understand children�). Man is the warrior but also the perpetual child, a homo ludens [6] (“In the true man there is a child hidden: it wanteth to play.�), woman being among his most precious playthings.

Those excerpts could easily (and rightfully) be interpreted as speaking of how man views woman. That is to say, it is not about women at all, just how men see them. It also shows how Nietzsche views the role of women as being heavily influenced by their biology (a view also held by Nietzsche's contemporary, Freud). Also, while man is compared to a child, I cannot doubt that he wrote that women were children, it would be used as one more example of his "mean-spiritedness towards women".

But this is not relevant. It doesn't have anything to do with the notion of superiority. I won't say those writings aren't uncontroversial. I won't even say they don't run contrary to feminism (generally speaking). But we aren't talking about that, are we?

To address Lafcadio's conclusion:

I think the two points of view I proposed above are proven. Beyond the obvious denigration which needs no additional conclusion, in Nietzsche's view, the man is the active force, while the woman is the reactive force (as similarily the christianity is a reactive force as a slave morality), as the man holds the intellect and the creative power, while the woman, inferior and opposing in these regards, manipulates man's endowment to defeat him. Woman's emancipation is wrong in this regard for leveling a fertile mechanism of inequality which keeps the humanity functioning.

The first part I have already addressed. Seeing man as active and woman as passive is not necessarily valuing men above women. The rest of it doesn't seem to be cleary established anyway. The last sentence is interesting. I would ask you to clarify; you could mean a variety of things.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

The next two concurrent statements will make up Round 3.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

inbuninbu & Lafcadio,

Please note that the time limit to post your next statements has passed. As the rules permit, however, you will have a 3 day grace period.

Thank you for your consideration,

- NS, FD Moderator

[inbuninbu]

Nietzsche's does not hold woman's inferiority (in the two views I proposed, straightforward or as balancing term in the will of power) because of her fertility and motherhood, some essential biological functions that undisputably categorize woman to be life affirming. Woman is not inferior through her delicacy, beauty, mystery.
I argue not for a biological superiority (woman to be child / life deliverer while man not), but a superiority in spirit (virtues, intellect).

According to this, I interpret your argument to be that Nietzsche asserts that men and women have different characteristics, and that men are superior to women in some things (and presumably, women to men in others). You assert that Nietzsche held men to be superior to women in certain characteristics (but for brevity I will use "intellect").

But there is a problem. One cannot argue that men (generally speaking, of course), are not superior to women in upper-body strength. One may make similar statements about womens' superiority in certain characteristics as well. But we are not arguing about superiority in a certain characteristic; we are arguing about superiority alone.

So, if you can show that Nietzsche believed that men have superior spirit/intellect to women, you also have to show that spirit/intellect is the highest or most important quality that a human being can have in his philosophy.

First let us wonder if Nietzsche really felt the intellect/spirit to be the superior instinct(s). As a philosopher/intellectual, the easy answer would be yes, but it is not that simple. Nietzsche found the philosophers to have a very hostile attitude towards life.

The consensus of the sages--I recognized this ever more clearly--proves least of all that they were right in what they agreed on: it shows rather that they themselves, these wisest men, shared some physiological attribute, and because of this adopted the same negative attitude to life--had to adopt it.
Twilight of the Idols, The Problem of Socrates, 2

To elevate reason to the dominant, sacred instinct/virtue is to diminish the others. Indeed, what Nietzsche yearned for was the instincts in balance--what he called Dionysian.

As the ox ought he to do; and his happiness should smell of the
earth, and not of contempt for the earth.
Thus Spake Zarathustra, The Sublime Ones

I think Lafcadio is applying his own value system--where intellect is the superior instinct--without showing that Nietzsche shares that assumption.

As a final note, I would mention that there is evidence to show that Nietzsche did not hold women to be inferior intellectually via his choices during his life.

His intellectual and (one-sided) romantic relationship with Lou Salome rejects any notion that Nietzsche had any strong rejection of intellectual women. I can't imagine a thinker of Nietzsche's caliber (or ego) considering an intellectual relationship with an "inferior".


It never occurred to me for a single moment that you should 'recite and write' for me; but I would greatly wish to be allowed to be your teacher. In the end, to be quite frank: I am looking for people who could be my heirs..."
taken from Nietzsche, a Philosophical Biography (by Rudiger Safranski)


If Nietzsche really thought women were inferior to men, would he have aspirations of having one become his heir?

Moreover, Nietzsche voted in favor of allowing a woman entrance into Basel.(as noted in Robert C. Holub - Nietzsche and The Women's Question) Again, this shows that, at the very least, on a practical level, Nietzsche was more accepting of intellectual women than his contemporaries.

[Lafcadio]

The first image I mentally pictured while reading my opponent’s previous statement was that of misunderstanding and possibly shallow reading. My opening statement and the points I tried to cover are reduced to a set of “mean things� about women.
There is not enough time and space here to address each sentence in an exhaustive proof, so I’ll try to present a shorter justification.
I counted in my opening statement the word “woman� mentioned 60 times, the word “women� 9 times, the word “man� 30 times and the word “men� 3 times. If my statement presents just a blunt mean characterization of the woman, with no regard to a certain reference, what are the 33 male references for? Why aren’t they issued in my opponent reply, which in this approximative presentation, roughly misses a third of my gender references?
To show a clearer point I will extract three quotes from my opening statement, but with an added emphasis: “Woman should obey her man�, “woman is much more wicked than man�, “a rejection of woman’s intellectual rights among men� (the three quotes are from three different paragraphs, addressing different works of Nietzsche). Such statements from my side go unchallenged and meanwhile I’m accused of addressing only woman’s denigration without a relevant reference that would prove an inferiority claimed by the semantics of the term “chauvinism� as we agreed on.
A further remark like “Also, while man is compared to a child, I cannot doubt that he wrote that women were children, it would be used as one more example of his "mean-spiritedness towards women"� strengthens my impression of misunderstanding from my opponent’s side. The game is an act of creation. Dionysos himself has two main mythical ages, one of childhood and one of adulthood, as god, and even as god he was playful. I even referenced Huizinga’s concept to strengthen this proposal of interpretation.

An issue I thought it is clear but brought back was the question about what Nietzsche actually meant. Unlike my opponent, I suggested a method of interpretation (my second paragraph from my opening statement which starts with “Then one may rightfully ask: how do we read and interpret Nietzsche?�). As my proposal is still not dismissed or at least questioned, I find any objection that insinuates the lack of a method of interpretation from my side inappropriate and revealing a shallow understanding of my position.

The notion of chauvinism we’re debating does not encompass biological aspects, as in this debate’s setup it was agreed on: “such as the belief that males were generally superior to women in morals, virtues, and intellect�. The claim that women are biologically necessary for life cannot be conclusive for, nor directly infer the relation between man and woman as we’re debating it. Even in my own statements, I acknowledged (for the accuracy of the picture) how woman is positively valued by Nietzsche in aspects of her motherhood, fertility, delicacy or beauty.


I have several other comments to take in consideration, and I will dedicate a paragraph to each. The order of my replies might not be the same with the order of the comments, in their original form.

Considering the amount of quotes I provided and that I’m debating over them, I don’t think a label describing them (“derogatory�, for the case I question) can be confusing. In worst case for me, can be inappropriate or plain wrongly assigned, but this is a thing to be proven if challenged.

Nietzsche as being “critical of pretty much everything� is a generalizing, but also irrelevant claim. My first objection is easily provable by counter-examples. Claude Lorrain [1], for instance, is a painter about Nietzsche hold great admiration and was a reference for many of his musings and appreciations. Lorrain paintings hold “the supreme truth�, Glück’s Armida and two fragments from a Peter Gast’s symphony are viewed by Nietzsche as “Lorrain on notes�, a mediterranean autumn which impressed Nietzsche is described in Ecce Homo (Twilight of the Idols, 3) as “a Claude Lorrain extended to infinity�. Another personality Nietzsche holds great admiration of and no criticism is Napoleon [2], “the first and the most admirable man of the new world� or a “return to nature�. I don’t want to fall into the other extreme, and think that all the figures he admired escaped his criticism (for instance, Schopenhauer), just to point out that there are persons and ideas Nietzsche appreciated with no visible doubt, and the quasi-universal quantifier “pretty much everything� is unfit.
So, there is a series of remarkable persons, which in Nietzsche’s works were dominant, admired and presented as anticipations of the superman (as the latter is not historical, but fictive and incoming, with regard to Nietzsche’s time). Along there is a series of aphorisms and value judgements patronaged by these figures. Both series being not under the criticism, but on contrary, being admired by the German philosopher.
My second objection holds the observation that while criticized, the objects still can be compared and valued, therefore possibly placed in relations that support one’s superiority over another. I haven’t asserted superiority from the mere fact of a thing being criticized, yet I offered opportunities where such a multiple critique allows and maybe even encourages the comparison (“man is evil, woman is mean�).

Talking of Napoleon, it’s worth mentioning an idea from Gay Science, 362 [3]: we owe to Napoleon and not to the French revolution (labeled as “fraternity�, with other words promoting a herd morality) that we entered the classical age of war (conflict). Further, Nietzsche adds that Napoleon has the merit that in Europe the man will dominate again over the merchant, the philistine, even over the “woman� which has been pampered by Christianity, by the exalted spirit of XVIIIth century and even more by the “modern ideas�. From that I may infer that in Nietzsche’s eyes woman’s emancipation stands side by side with Christianity and French Revolution, uniformizing movements encouraging the weak. A weak which should be controlled by the powerful following the example of the figures I mentioned in the paragraph above, Napoleon being one of them.

In such way I reach to address another comment. It was claimed that we may ignore the influence of certain biographical events, because we haven’t labeled Nietzsche as dysfunctional in a certain aspect (in his relation with women, for instance).
Why to beg the question with such a methodology (starting from a label, and then looking for some premises to support it) and not take the other, safer path, of identifying some interpretable, analyzable aspects and then draw conclusions from them, if possible? Any such aspect (a historical figure which influenced Nietzsche, or his family tensions) can be interpretable. But as the purpose of the debate is not to find Nietzsche’s views dysfunctional or not (we would need a new reference for it, anyway), I just use aspects like those mentioned to strengthen a view I find fair about him. I am gathering additional premises for my exposures. To insinuate that I’m interested in anyway whether his view is dysfunctional or not is a strawman.

As I was talking about things and ideas Nietzsche criticized and about how inferiority binds to those I must mention the following bad analogy: “Nietzsche is intensely critical of Judaism in The Antichrist, but does he think that Jews are inferior?�. To replace Judaism with Jews in the phrase above is an unfounded equivocation. With the same premise (criticism on Judaism), one should rather search to prove that Nietzsche doesn’t think Judaism is inferior to another system of values, for instance, his own philosophy.

In another slippery analogy, that of the shovel and the wheelbarrow, the relation of inferiority is equivocated with the relation of necessity. It was claimed that “But what happens when we ask the question, "which is superior, shovels or wheelbarrows?" Does the question make any sense? If we could only have one of them on a desert island (or some such situation), we might have a preference to bring one or the other�. However, the example assumes the preference (and also the necessity) being required to establish and acknowledge a relation of superiority. Himalaya’s height is superior to Mont Blanc’s, and that doesn’t lead to someone having a preference for Himalaya over Mont Blanc, unless he has a special interest in the attribute the superiority is manifested. To close this circle of analogy, Nietzsche actually manifests his preference for male figures, in the aspects I suspect him for chauvinism. He prefers male figures, for their active, creative force in the cultural development of humanity. This is how his chauvinism is manifested as preference.

A quote of my comments to and excerpts from Thus Spake Zarathustra was interpreted as “speaking of how man views woman. That is to say, it is not about women at all, just how men see them�. I must remind that Zarathustra, the Nietzschean author of those aphorisms, is not an ordinary man, is not among those men that have a view of women, rather has a prophetic role and brings an opportunity for Nietzsche to preach his critiques and to teach his prescriptions. Zarathustra’s view is of woman, not of women.
Let’s also not forget that Nietzsche is a man, therefore someone claiming that Nietzsche’s works just illustrate what men see, must support with a good argumentation why Nietzsche is not among them, sharing the same view.

One last comment I will address is “Inequality and superiority are not the same concept�. Of course, they aren’t. But one is inferable from another in a certain context of premises. An inequality which is addressable in a certain aspect (like in my previous example with mountains) leads to a conclusion which may affirm a relation of superiority. In a similar way, I addressed man and woman regarding their intellect and morality.



[1] Ernst Bertram - Nietzsche; Versuch einer Mythologie, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1989 (Romanian translation by Ion & Maria Nastasia, Bucharest: Humanitas, 1998)

[2] Idem

[3] I had no English translation available for this paragraph

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

The next two concurrent statements will make up the concluding round.

[Lafcadio]

It was claimed that “But we are not arguing about superiority in a certain characteristic; we are arguing about superiority alone�. So I am forced to repeat what I already said: yes, we argue about “superiority in a certain characteristic�.
I will reproduce here the becoming of my position in the debate setup thread:
Lafcadio: “I'm ready to support the idea that Nietzsche believed in a superiority of men over women, not overall […], but in several matters, I would add "key" matters for a man like him: intellect, morality, virtues.�
Nightshade: “The debate will focus on Nietzche's writings, sayings, actions, etc. to determine whether or not he held male chauvinistic or gender superiority views, such as the belief that males were generally superior to women in morals, virtues, and intellect.�
I realize now that, sadly, we didn't agreed on the same parameters. However, as they were mentioned, I can't consider your objection.
Starting from this misunderstanding I’m challenged with a new burden of proof, to show that intellect (and, I assume, also morality and virtues) is most appreciated and valued in Nietzsche’s view over man and woman. A burden of proof that is not mine to take, not in this debate, and also may sustain an idea I don’t believe in nor wish to support. Therefore, all further speculations and insinuations on this theme are irrelevant.
Also, the connections between an acknowledged relation of inferiority and a consequence in social life are hazardous, though his ego was mentioned as an argument (which honestly I believe it rather is a counterargument - arrogant or egocentric persons surround themselves by people they can dominate, in a way or another). Unless someone can prove that all Nietzsche’s close acquaintances were superior (at least in his view) to him (be it only in the aspects we discussed his chauvinism here), there’s no reason to follow this track.

The last comment of Nietzsche’s help to Meta von Salis should show that the already existing friendship between the two played no role in gaining Nietzsche’s support. Which I doubt it’s the case, therefore I only can see here Nietzsche helping a friend.



In this debate there was only one interpretation – mine.
Though this is the last opportunity, I will no longer support my position with new arguments. I expected it more dedicated to what Nietzsche wrote and how we should read it instead of debating over what superiority means or what do we have to prove. The debate stalemated outside the view proposed by me and I found no alternative view, not in this thread.
I must admit that the course of the debate demotivated me. I cannot elaborate my interpretation, I cannot even look for a new one, while my first attempt failed in such a way, unable to get a focus on the proposed aspects.

However, it was an interesting experience, my first in this forum.
Perhaps, we can revive this debate in the Peanut Gallery thread and develop a discussion in a better, richer way.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

inbuninbu,

Please note that the time limit to post your concluding statement has passed. As the rules permit, however, you will have a 3 day grace period.

Thank you for your consideration,

- NS, FD Moderator

[inbuninbu]

Seeing as this is the final statement, I suppose a few initial comments are in order.

First, I would like to thank Lafcadio for debating me, and Nightshade for moderating.

I must admit, it seems like Lafcadio and I cannot get on the same page in this debate. I think we are approaching it from fundamentally different angles--both philosophically and rhetorically. The concurrent style of debate seems to have made everything nonlinear enough to amplify that a thousand-fold. But, I agreed to it, so I guess I should be quiet about it.

So this, my final statement, will be broken down into (1) an analysis of Lafcadio's overall argument(s), (2) a detailed analysis of his 3rd statement, and (3) a discussion of my overall argument.

First, to address Lafcadio's accusation of misunderstanding his position, I will address his first and second statements. That accusation is certainly possible, but it is mostly the responsibility of an author to effectively convey his or her ideas effectively. My own writing has not been of pristine quality, but I generally get the sense that the flow of my argument is understood. Perhaps I am daft, but I have found it difficult to sift out a concrete argument from Lafcadio's writing.

The reason I interpreted Lafcadio's argument as the age-old "Nietzsche said mean things about women" argument is that Lafcadio's writing appears to have more innuendo and references than actual argumentation.

For example, in the second and third paragraph of Lafcadio's opening statement, where he refers me to for his interpretation of Nietzsche, he merely makes reference to another person's interpretation of Nietzsche, and apparently expects me (and all readers) to be familiar with that particular interpretation. Most of what follows (as I think most will agree if they read or re-read his post) are assertive references to Zarathustra's "patriarchal culture", "symbolic male figures", and various hostile-sounding quotes. He also implies that Nietzsche is prescriptive, which does not fit with my interpretation.

In the final paragraph of Lafcadio's opening statement, he does state a few things about his position clearly. In the final sentence, he says that women's emancipation (to Nietzsche, at least) damages the functioning of humanity. But as I have pointed out, inequality and superiority are not the same thing, and he has not drawn a line from one to the other. He does try to address this point, but I will deal with it in the detailed analysis of Lafcadio's third statement.

For brevity, please refer to Lafcadio's second statement above.

In Lafcadio's second statement, he defines superiority as a relation that sets one term or terms higher than another or others. If we accept that definition, he still has not defined a scale under which we could conceivably be working. Though he does refer to life affirming and life-denying principles, he does not seem to indicate whether he is agreeable to looking at the situation under those terms.

He claims that Nietzsche's relativity cannot be taken as universal and omnipresent. Actually, it can be taken as universal and omnipresent--he does not argue for an ontological relativity--he argues for *moral* relativity.

He then says that "Life affirming is equivalent with active, life denying is equivalent with reactive.", but that is simply an unsubstantiated interpretation he is taking that I don't agree with.

He says he doesn't argue for a superiority in biology, but in spirit. But the debate isn't about superiority of spirit, it is about superiority itself. I will address this more in-depth in the detailed analysis of his third statement.

Lafcadio has not made a positive connection from women being oppressed/weak/etc. to superiority.

The statistical usage of words is irrelevant. As I stated above, the reason I took the interpretation I did is that I haven't seen a clear argumentative line leading to superiority.

Actually, I have challenged some of those statements, by giving a different interpretation of them. See above.

Now, I will address Lafcadio's third statement in-depth.


An issue I thought it is clear but brought back was the question about what Nietzsche actually meant. Unlike my opponent, I suggested a method of interpretation (my second paragraph from my opening statement which starts with “Then one may rightfully ask: how do we read and interpret Nietzsche?�). As my proposal is still not dismissed or at least questioned, I find any objection that insinuates the lack of a method of interpretation from my side inappropriate and revealing a shallow understanding of my position.


Lafcadio's proposal does not suggest any meaningful interpretation. Instead we get a reference to someone else's interpretation (which isn't available to me in the first place), sprinkled with a reference to aphorisms and poems. I haven't questioned Lafcadio's suggestion for interpretation, because there is no substance there to deal with.


The notion of chauvinism we’re debating does not encompass biological aspects, as in this debate’s setup it was agreed on: “such as the belief that males were generally superior to women in morals, virtues, and intellect�. The claim that women are biologically necessary for life cannot be conclusive for, nor directly infer the relation between man and woman as we’re debating it. Even in my own statements, I acknowledged (for the accuracy of the picture) how woman is positively valued by Nietzsche in aspects of her motherhood, fertility, delicacy or beauty.


Lafcadio claims that our debate doesn't encompass biological aspects, but if you actually check the parameters (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showpost.php?p=2213604&postcount=16) there is no such restriction. As I recall, he asked (during the proposal phase) if I felt that science has any place to determine one gender as superior to another. I said I did not. I do not because I do not believe the notion of "value" falls within the constraints of science. That has nothing to do with his assertion. His assertion seems to be that we have dismissed the material world from our scope--which we have not (at least I have not).

Also, he says that that women are valued for their motherhood, fertility, delicacy/beauty. Except that with the exception of fertility, none of those things are purely biological.


Considering the amount of quotes I provided and that I’m debating over them, I don’t think a label describing them (“derogatory�, for the case I question) can be confusing. In worst case for me, can be inappropriate or plain wrongly assigned, but this is a thing to be proven if challenged.

I really simply don't know what he is trying to say here.


Nietzsche as being “critical of pretty much everything� is a generalizing, but also irrelevant claim. My first objection is easily provable by counter-examples. (...)

My point was not that Nietzsche criticized absolutely everything and everyone. My point was that Nietzsche criticized a great deal. What I was trying to say is that Nietzsche's criticism is just that: criticism. It isn't supposed to be a end-all argument. I just want to point out that there is more subtlety here than he seems to make out. Criticizing people does not necessarily mean that you think they are inferior in the sense we are using the word.

From that I may infer that in Nietzsche’s eyes woman’s emancipation stands side by side with Christianity and French Revolution, uniformizing movements encouraging the weak.

Before it would be worth qualifying this, he still hasn't drawn a clear, solid line from this to superiority to inferiority.


In such way I reach to address another comment. (...) Please see the original paragraph--it is long.

That wasn't my point. My point wasn't that he was interested in whether he was dysfunctional or not. My point is that it is prejudicial. It holds no bearing on what we are discussing. So he didn't get along with his all-female family. That is an incredibly weak source of evidence, if it qualifies as evidence at all.


As I was talking about things and ideas Nietzsche criticized and about how inferiority binds to those I must mention the following bad analogy: “Nietzsche is intensely critical of Judaism in The Antichrist, but does he think that Jews are inferior?�. To replace Judaism with Jews in the phrase above is an unfounded equivocation. With the same premise (criticism on Judaism), one should rather search to prove that Nietzsche doesn’t think Judaism is inferior to another system of values, for instance, his own philosophy.

Okay, that was a bad analogy, I'll give him that. To paint a better example, Nietzsche was immensely critical of Judaism, but Nietzsche felt that the Old Testament was a profound book. (No, Judaism and the Torah are not literally the same thing, but I think you get my point.) But my overall point is that Nietzsche's opinions are more subtle than he seems to think.


In another slippery analogy, that of the shovel and the wheelbarrow, the relation of inferiority is equivocated with the relation of necessity. It was claimed that “But what happens when we ask the question, "which is superior, shovels or wheelbarrows?" Does the question make any sense? If we could only have one of them on a desert island (or some such situation), we might have a preference to bring one or the other�. However, the example assumes the preference (and also the necessity) being required to establish and acknowledge a relation of superiority. Himalaya’s height is superior to Mont Blanc’s, and that doesn’t lead to someone having a preference for Himalaya over Mont Blanc, unless he has a special interest in the attribute the superiority is manifested. To close this circle of analogy, Nietzsche actually manifests his preference for male figures, in the aspects I suspect him for chauvinism. He prefers male figures, for their active, creative force in the cultural development of humanity. This is how his chauvinism is manifested as preference.


I am not equivocating necessity with superiority/inferiority. The two have a relationship. That which is required for a task has the highest possible value within the context of that task. My point with that analogy was that we still haven't clearly established what value system we are operating under. "Superior height" and "superior" are not the same thing. As he says, preference, necessity, or some other valuing factor is required. The notion of superiority that I am operating under is intimately related with value. We have to have some sort of value system before this debate can go anywhere. If we aren't operating under a value-system, then we can talk about man's superiority to woman in terms of the fact that men are on average taller than women. But I think this point is probably understood after reading the above paragraph.

Lafcadio then moves on to orient his argument from the notion of preference that I addressed(as I read it, at any rate). Since Nietzsche prefers male figures, it goes, then he is a chauvinist. But even if we agree with his assertion, there is a problem. In what way does he prefer them? I, as a heterosexual male, prefer female sexual partners. Does that make me a sexist? I don't think that women are superior than men because of this. As I will address below, the notion of superiority-in-itself relies on some external factor independent of context. Preferring a raft on a desert island makes sense in that context, but what is the context of superiority-in-itself?


A quote of my comments to and excerpts from Thus Spake Zarathustra was interpreted as “speaking of how man views woman. That is to say, it is not about women at all, just how men see them�. I must remind that Zarathustra, the Nietzschean author of those aphorisms, is not an ordinary man, is not among those men that have a view of women, rather has a prophetic role and brings an opportunity for Nietzsche to preach his critiques and to teach his prescriptions. Zarathustra’s view is of woman, not of women.
Let’s also not forget that Nietzsche is a man, therefore someone claiming that Nietzsche’s works just illustrate what men see, must support with a good argumentation why Nietzsche is not among them, sharing the same view.

Ummm... Zarathustra is a character in Thus Spake Zarathustra. The character did not write aphorisms. In the narrative, he spoke to his followers.
I never indicated that Nietzsche doesn't share the views of woman/women expressed by, say, Zarathustra. That is purely his own assertion, from what I can tell.

Of course, he may implying that if Nietzsche shares those views, then he must see women as inferior. But Lafcadio has not established that this portrait of how man sees woman includes inferiority.


One last comment I will address is “Inequality and superiority are not the same concept�. Of course, they aren’t. But one is inferable from another in a certain context of premises. An inequality which is addressable in a certain aspect (like in my previous example with mountains) leads to a conclusion which may affirm a relation of superiority. In a similar way, I addressed man and woman regarding their intellect and morality.


From this, I will make the following interpretation of his argument: Nietzsche believed that men were/are intellectually superior to women.

But as I have pointed out, we are not arguing over intellectual superiority, we are arguing over superiority in itself. See above, where I addressed this issue at length.

I wanted to focus, initially, on the semantics of "superiority", and build from there. What does superiority mean? What does superiority mean in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy. Before addressing particular issues of this or that evidence for or against Nietzsche's supposed male chauvinism, I felt and feel that this question must be resolved and agreed upon before meaningful discussion can really commence.

Now to address and expound upon my own argument.

Nietzsche's relativism rules out absolute values.
This is a significant point. The notion of "superiority" as opposed to "superior strength" or "superior intelligence" seems to invoke a sense of absolute values. The reason for this is that strength and intelligence can be measured absolutely. Absolute temperature, for example. They appeal to something external. But values or morality exist outside of that sphere. To be a meaningful statement, there has to be some quality that is external or objective in some sense.

The objection to this is that someone can value relativistically. That is certainly true. But when we say "superior" in the usual sense, we make some appeal to "external" qualities which fit into a value-system. For example, if we ask someone why they think person X is so great, they give reasons--they don't say "just because". "Because X is so kind", or some such. This implies that the most important thing for a human being is to be kind.

There is, of course, a way out of this. Nietzsche does make one appeal to an unquestionable value--life. That which affirms life is good. One might call this a "naturalistic morality". (Of course, this is a simplification.)

[Of course, if we include the eternal recurrence, there is a whole different bag of worms--because EVERYTHING IS GOOD. But that is too difficult a topic to address at the end of this debate. Consider it something to chew on.]

Now, if we want to show men to be superior to women under this value-system of life, we need to show that men affirm life more than women. But both men and women are necessary for life at it's most fundamental level.

The argument against this seems to be that Nietzsche felt that men were intellectually/spiritually superior to women, but this does not fall under the most fundamental value-system of Nietzsche's.

---
Well, that's all folks.

Like I said, I wish this debate could have been a little more focused. Too many topics and lines of thought. Maybe we can have a follow-up discussion.

Once again, thanks to Lafcadio and Nightshade.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

The formal debate is now complete. We would like to thank inbuninbu and Lafcadio for their participation. Discussion can be continued in the Peanut Gallery.

- NS, FD Moderator