HELP... theory of knowledge + revelation

[DerekK]

I'm new to IIDB (see my "hello" thread here (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=3722759#post3722759) if knowing a bit about me helps you understand my querie here).

I write a blog wherein I interact with the often neo-Fundamentalist ramblings found in the Newspaper of my former academic institution (Boyce College/Southern Baptist Seminary).

Usually I just read the articles, and when something pops out as quite obviously absurd, or orthodox in the most Christians will never even think to challenge this assumption way, I grapple with it or criticize it outright, on my blog.


So, a recent article on the Newspaper recently set off my alarm bells. This one right here. (http://www.towersonline.net/story.php?grp=news&id=362) The important part (emphasis mine):

Preaching from Deuteronomy 4, Mohler said the world is experiencing a crisis today because many people do not believe there is any basis for human knowledge. But Christians must counter the world's confusion by pointing to God's Word—the Bible—as the basis for knowledge, he said.

"Christianity depends upon … a Christian theory of knowledge that is based in revelation alone," Mohler said. "My colleagues, there is no greater challenge than this: to make certain as we begin this new academic year that we know on what authority we speak."

Now, I don't want people to "do my homework for me" or anything, but I could use some pointers. Ever since I read that article, I've been pondering how to frame my objection(s). So I've spent several days now (hours, easily) studying up on epistemology and theory of knowledge, on the internet. Several articles on Infidels.org were helpful, and a few elsewhere.

But my problem is this:

I'm looking for something that specifically addresses "basis" when it comes to your theory of knowledge, or epistemology. Because I'm fairly certain that even a neo-Fundie like Mohler (or the friends/family/former class-mates that read my blog) wouldn't be so stupid as to insist that revelation is our only way of knowing, or that revelation by itself = theory of knowledge. But it still seems dubious, to me, to base my entire idea of "knowing" on what adds up to blindly trusting the testimony of another person (who claims to speak for God).

I don't want to go off half-cocked, so I figure there has to be somebody who can either share their viewpoints, or point me to a few good articles that deal more directly with this topic. Something concerning the foundation that an epistemology rests on. Hopefully somebody critically analyzing the obviously theistic claim that "good and true" epistemology must be founded upon revelation and nothing else. Bonus if the author sheds light on good reasons to use something else as a "basis for knowledge."

Heck, even thinking back to 8 months ago before my current heretic-thought-patterns, I don't think I could've honestly looked at how I think and behave and said that the Bible was my basis for knowledge. Let alone now..

Anyway. What saith the gathered crowd of infidels, pagans, and apostates? Advice, pointers, suggestions, personal experience, links to excellent essays, and ridicule, all appreciated.

[blip]

Everyone asks me about what will happen when they finally arrive. Is this just curiosity? We're always asking how would this fit into that system, or whether this would make sense in that context, or what it will feel like when we get there. et started and you will know; it cannot be described. It is said widely in the East, "Those who know, do not say; those who say, do not know". It cannot be said; only the opposite can be said.

The guru cannot give you the truth. Truth cannot be put into words, into a formula. That isn't the truth. That isn't reality. Reality cannot be put into a formula. The guru can only point out your errors. When you drop your errors, you will know the truth. And even then you cannot say. This is common teaching among the great Catholic mystics. The great Thomas Aquinas, toward the end of his life, wouldn't write and wouldn't talk; he had seen. I had thought he kept that famous silence of his for only a couple of months, but it went on for years.

He realized he had made a fool of himself, and he said so explicitly. It's as if you had never tasted a green mango and you ask me, "What does it taste like"? I'd say to you, "Sour", but in giving you a word, I've put you off the track. Try to understand that. Most people aren't very wise; they seize upon the word - upon the words of scripture, for example - and they get it all wrong. "Sour", I say, and you ask, "Sour like vinegar, sour like a lemon"?

No, not sour like a lemon, but sour like a mango. "But I never tasted one", you say. Too bad! But you go ahead and write a doctoral thesis on it. You wouldn't have if you had tasted it. You really wouldn't. You'd have written a doctoral thesis on other things, but not on mangoes. And the day you finally taste a green mango, you say, "God, I made a fool of myself. I shouldn't have written that thesis". That's exactly what Thomas Aquinas did.

A great German philosopher and theologian wrote a whole book specifically on the silence of St. Thomas. He simply went silent. Wouldn't talk. In the prologue of his Summa Theologica, which was the summary of all his theology, he says, "About God, we cannot say what He is but rather what He is not. And so we cannot speak about how He is but rather how He is not". And in his famous commentary on Boethius' De Sancta Trinitate he says there are three ways of knowing God (1) in the creation, (2) in God's actions through history, and (3) in the highest form of the knowledge of God - to know God tamquam ignotum (to know God as the unknown).

The highest form of talking about the Trinity is to know that one does not know. Now, this is not an Oriental Zen master speaking. This is a canonized saint of the Roman Catholic Church, the prince of theologians for centuries. To know God as unknown. In another place St. Thomas even says as unknowable. Reality, God, divinity, truth, love are unknowable; that means they cannot be comprehended by the thinking mind. That would set at rest so many questions people have because we're always living under the illusion that we know. We don't. We cannot know.

What is scripture, then? It's a hint, a clue, not a description. The fanaticism of one sincere believer who thinks he knows causes more evil than the united efforts of two hundred rogues. It's terrifying to see what sincere believers will do because they think they know. Wouldn't it be wonderful if we had a world where everybody said, "We don't know"? One big barrier dropped. Wouldn't that be marvelous?

A man born blind comes to me and asks, "What is this thing called green"? How does one describe the color green to someone who was born blind? One uses analogies. So I say, "The color green is something like soft music". "Oh", he says, "like soft music". "Yes", I say, "soothing and soft music". So a second blind man comes to me and asks, "What is the color green"? I tell him it's something like soft satin, very soft and soothing to the touch. So the next day I notice that the two blind men are bashing each other over the head with bottles.

One is saying, "It's soft like music"; the other is saying, "It's soft like satin". And on it goes. Neither of them knows what they're talking about, because if they did, they'd shut up. It's as bad as that. It's even worse, because one day, say, you give sight to this blind man, and he's sitting there in the garden and he's looking all around him, and you say to him, "Well, now you know what the color green is". And he answers, "That's true. I heard some of it this morning!"

The fact is that you're surrounded by God and you don't see God, because you "know" about God. The final barrier to the vision of God is your God concept. You miss God because you think you know. That's the terrible thing about religion. That's what the gospels were saying, that religious people "knew", so they got rid of Jesus. The highest knowledge of God is to know God as unknowable. There is far too much God talk; the world is sick of it.

There is too little awareness, too little love, too little happiness, but let's not use those words either. There's too little dropping of illusions, dropping of errors, dropping of attachments and cruelty, too little awareness. That's what the world is suffering from, not from a lack of religion. Religion is supposed to be about a lack of awareness, of waking up. Look what we've degenerated into.

Come to my country and see them killing one another over religion. You'll find it everywhere. "The one who knows, does not say; the one who says, does not know". All revelations, however divine, are never any more than a finger pointing to the moon. As we say in the East, "When the sage points to the moon, all the idiot sees is the finger". Jean Guiton, a very pious and orthodox French writer, adds a terrifying comment "We often use the finger to gouge eyes out". Isn't that terrible? Awareness, awareness, awareness! In awareness is healing; in awareness is truth; in awareness is salvation; in awareness is spirituality; in awareness is growth; in awareness is love; in awareness is awakening. Awareness.

I need to talk about words and concepts because I must explain to you why it is, when we look at a tree, we really don't see. We think we do, but we don't. When we look at a person, we really don't see that person, we only think we do. What we're seeing is something that we fixed in our mind. We get an impression and we hold on to that impression, and we keep looking at a person through that impression.

And we do this with almost everything. If you understand that, you will understand the loveliness and beauty of being aware of everything around you. Because reality is there; "God", whatever that is, is there. It's all there. The poor little fish in the ocean says, "Excuse me, I'm looking for the ocean. Can you tell me where I can find it"? Pathetic, isn't it? If we would just open our eyes and see, then we would understand.

http://www.soulwise.net/99adm03.htm

[Chris Porter]

This appears to be speaking of presuppositional apologetics, or the transendental argument for god.

Here is an overview with a criticism of the use of presuppositional apologetics. (http://www.answers.com/topic/presuppositional-apologetics)

You can find more, now that you have the terminology to research it.

[kennethamy]

I'm new to IIDB (see my "hello" thread here (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=3722759#post3722759) if knowing a bit about me helps you understand my querie here).

I write a blog wherein I interact with the often neo-Fundamentalist ramblings found in the Newspaper of my former academic institution (Boyce College/Southern Baptist Seminary).

Usually I just read the articles, and when something pops out as quite obviously absurd, or orthodox in the most Christians will never even think to challenge this assumption way, I grapple with it or criticize it outright, on my blog.


So, a recent article on the Newspaper recently set off my alarm bells. This one right here. (http://www.towersonline.net/story.php?grp=news&id=362) The important part (emphasis mine):



Now, I don't want people to "do my homework for me" or anything, but I could use some pointers. Ever since I read that article, I've been pondering how to frame my objection(s). So I've spent several days now (hours, easily) studying up on epistemology and theory of knowledge, on the internet. Several articles on Infidels.org were helpful, and a few elsewhere.

But my problem is this:

I'm looking for something that specifically addresses "basis" when it comes to your theory of knowledge, or epistemology. Because I'm fairly certain that even a neo-Fundie like Mohler (or the friends/family/former class-mates that read my blog) wouldn't be so stupid as to insist that revelation is our only way of knowing, or that revelation by itself = theory of knowledge. But it still seems dubious, to me, to base my entire idea of "knowing" on what adds up to blindly trusting the testimony of another person (who claims to speak for God).

I don't want to go off half-cocked, so I figure there has to be somebody who can either share their viewpoints, or point me to a few good articles that deal more directly with this topic. Something concerning the foundation that an epistemology rests on. Hopefully somebody critically analyzing the obviously theistic claim that "good and true" epistemology must be founded upon revelation and nothing else. Bonus if the author sheds light on good reasons to use something else as a "basis for knowledge."

Heck, even thinking back to 8 months ago before my current heretic-thought-patterns, I don't think I could've honestly looked at how I think and behave and said that the Bible was my basis for knowledge. Let alone now..

Anyway. What saith the gathered crowd of infidels, pagans, and apostates? Advice, pointers, suggestions, personal experience, links to excellent essays, and ridicule, all appreciated.

Perhaps this will help: John Locke, the great 17th century English philosopher, pointed out that although it is doubtless true that if God's word is revealed to us, then it must be the truth, since God is omniscient, and all-good, and so, would never lie; nevertheless, we have to be able to tell whether we have, indeed been revealed to. Is what seems to us to be a revelation really a revelation, or is it, perhaps something that has natural causes (indigestion, or LSD) and only appears to us to be a revelation? Or is it even the Devil masquerading as God. So, we cannot take it for granted that what we believe to be a revelation is a revelation, even if we can take it for granted that what is a revelation is the truth.

But how, then do we determine that what seems to be a revelation really is a revelation? Here, our only recourse is our brain, our intellect. So, in the end, the intellect trumps revelation. Not because we cannot believe revelation, since we assuredly can. But we have to know that we are being revealed to. And only our intellect can tell us that (if anything can).

P.S. I hope that I need not mention that it would be circular to think that revelation can tell us whether we have a revelation: or maybe it would just lead to a vicious infinite regress, since we would then have to rely on revelation (again) to certify the revelation that told us that the first revelation was, indeed, a revelation. And so on.

[DerekK]

Chris,

I'm a bit familiar with the debate within Christian apologetics, between presuppositionalism and evidentialism. I agree with you that part of the reasoning behind the claim that Scripture (revelation) must be the basis of our entire epistemology probably stems from a presuppositionalist mindset. Thanks for the link to the Wiki/About article, and the suggestion to research along those lines for possible critique/refutation of the presup-position.

However, I think the issue I'm trying to think through can be kept to just epistemology, and not branch out into potentially starting a debate on apologetic approach. Can you suggest reading I might do, in order to investigate what different people (atheists and agnostics are of particular interest, currently) say should be the "basis" of the theory of knowledge? Are there articles here, or elsewhere, that perhaps suggest empiricism (or some other evidence based approach) as "the basis for knowledge"?



Kennethamy,

Indeed. That's exactly one of the reasons the Towers article tripped my warning bells. To even assert that revelation is the foundation of epistemology is to engage in the intellectual act of deciding that you believe the assertion to be true. To me, this means that the thesis "Scripture = basis of knowledge" is virtually identical to saying "The testimony of others = basis of knowledge." We decide to believe what the pastor/preist/apostle tells us "is" revelation. In this sense, I feel kinda like Mohler is saying that the basis of the Christian's knowledge is to simply believe what Mohler says the Bible says..

Do you have any suggestions insofar as internet articles/essays go, that might gain me further insight into "foundations" of epistemology, be they revealed Holy writ, evidence, intellect, et cetera?

[kennethamy]

Kennethamy,

Indeed. That's exactly one of the reasons the Towers article tripped my warning bells. To even assert that revelation is the foundation of epistemology is to engage in the intellectual act of deciding that you believe the assertion to be true. To me, this means that the thesis "Scripture = basis of knowledge" is virtually identical to saying "The testimony of others = basis of knowledge." We decide to believe what the pastor/preist/apostle tells us "is" revelation. In this sense, I feel kinda like Mohler is saying that the basis of the Christian's knowledge is to simply believe what Mohler says the Bible says..

Do you have any suggestions insofar as internet articles/essays go, that might gain me further insight into "foundations" of epistemology, be they revealed Holy writ, evidence, intellect, et cetera?

It is claimed, of course, that the Scriptures are an important source of revelation, but do Clergymen also claim that what they preach has been revealed to them? I hadn't heard that, but it might be true for all I know. It has been claimed that mystic experiences, and miraculous events, are sources of revelation. But the question remains, not whether revelation is true, since if it is the word of God, it must be, but how we can tell that what is claimed as revelation is revelation.

As for readings in what is called "religious epistemology" William P. Alston has written a number of books on that subject, and he is pretty smart. But if you google "religious epistemology" you should get a number of references. Another fine search engine, by the way, is answers.com

[Chris Porter]

Chris,

I'm a bit familiar with the debate within Christian apologetics, between presuppositionalism and evidentialism. I agree with you that part of the reasoning behind the claim that Scripture (revelation) must be the basis of our entire epistemology probably stems from a presuppositionalist mindset. Thanks for the link to the Wiki/About article, and the suggestion to research along those lines for possible critique/refutation of the presup-position.

However, I think the issue I'm trying to think through can be kept to just epistemology, and not branch out into potentially starting a debate on apologetic approach. Can you suggest reading I might do, in order to investigate what different people (atheists and agnostics are of particular interest, currently) say should be the "basis" of the theory of knowledge? Are there articles here, or elsewhere, that perhaps suggest empiricism (or some other evidence based approach) as "the basis for knowledge"?
(snip)
I should have been more clear. I have a rule of thumb that says don't bother arguing concepts of knowledge or how one knows things, with people who hold to presuppositionalism/transcendentalism as a means of grounding their knowledge. This would include Objectivists and some Christian apologetics. The reason is, I believe those thought patterns are hermetically sealed from argument, as anyone holding them must, by the nature of their beliefs about knowledge, think you hold them same beliefs, but are lying about them. This puts you (someone who does not ground their theories of knowledge in this fashion) at a moral disadvantage from the first word out of your mouth. I think it is arguing with someone that must assume you are a liar. I find it distasteful, useful only for the exercise, and if I will not ever meet that person face to face.

I'm currently reading a book called Truth: A History and a Guide for the Perplexed (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0312274947/internetinfidels), by Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, and as the author lays out the groundwork, he claims there are four major ways we decide what is true. The first is the truth you feel-emotionally verified truth. The second is the truth you are told-true is what your superior tells you is true. The third is true by reason-what is true is what you use critical thinking skills to deduce is true. And the last is truth by experience-that which is true because your senses tell you is true.

It seems to me that these four ways are all ways in which we ground our knowledge or what we claim as our knowledge.

[kennethamy]

I'm currently reading a book called Truth: A History and a Guide for the Perplexed (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0312274947/internetinfidels), by Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, and as the author lays out the groundwork, he claims there are four major ways we decide what is true. The first is the truth you feel-emotionally verified truth. The second is the truth you are told-true is what your superior tells you is true. The third is true by reason-what is true is what you use critical thinking skills to deduce is true. And the last is truth by experience-that which is true because your senses tell you is true.

It seems to me that these four ways are all ways in which we ground our knowledge or what we claim as our knowledge.

Does the author offer this taxonomy of ways of knowing as just a kind of anthropological description of how people attempt to decide what is true, because if so, he has left out things like divination or tea-leaf reading. Or is this supposed to be a taxonomy not of how some people actually attempt to find out what is true, but of reliable methods of discovering the truth? If the latter, then how does "emotionally verified truth" qualify. Does that mean I can discover what is true by consulting my emotions? Or what about what my superior tells me is true. Does that mean that I should consult my boss on whether it is true that the Sun is 93,000,000 from Earth?

Myself, I try to stick to reason and evidence because I think that those are the only reliable ways to ground our knowledge. It is the suicide-bombers, and others of their ilk who seek the methods of asking their superior, or consulting their emotions. I certainly would not like to emulate them. A more reliable taxonomy of that kind is contained in Peirce's famous essay, The Fixation of Belief

http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:QQKbk9hQ9y8J:www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html+the+fixation+of+belief+peirce&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1&ie=UTF-8

or in W.C.K.Cliffords, The Ethics of Belief

http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:lE9l0OgnMccJ:www.infidels.org/library/historical/w_k_clifford/ethics_of_belief.html+the+ethics+of+belief+clifford&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1&ie=UTF-8

[Chris Porter]

Does the author offer this taxonomy of ways of knowing as just a kind of anthropological description of how people attempt to decide what is true, because if so, he has left out things like divination or tea-leaf reading. Or is this supposed to be a taxonomy not of how some people actually attempt to find out what is true, but of reliable methods of discovering the truth?

The latter.

If the latter, then how does "emotionally verified truth" qualify. Does that mean I can discover what is true by consulting my emotions? Or what about what my superior tells me is true. Does that mean that I should consult my boss on whether it is true that the Sun is 93,000,000 from Earth?

I haven't yet but read the first half of the first chapter. It's a history of how people attempt to figure out what is true. The author claims that there have been different methods, and is explaining each one.
I suspect the "tea-leaf reading" one comes under divination, and looking in the index, see that it is covered in the second chapter, that of "it's true if a superior tells you it's true" sort of true.
Myself, I try to stick to reason and evidence
Evidence? What is evidence? ;) (this is what the book is covering, of course)
because I think that those are the only reliable ways to ground our knowledge. It is the suicide-bombers, and others of their ilk who seek the methods of asking their superior, or consulting their emotions. I certainly would not like to emulate them. A more reliable taxonomy of that kind is contained in Peirce's famous essay, The Fixation of Belief

http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:QQKbk9hQ9y8J:www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html+the+fixation+of+belief+peirce&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1&ie=UTF-8

or in W.C.K.Cliffords, The Ethics of Belief

http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:lE9l0OgnMccJ:www.infidels.org/library/historical/w_k_clifford/ethics_of_belief.html+the+ethics+of+belief+clifford&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1&ie=UTF-8

Just going by the explanations in the book, I suspect I rely on sensory evidence, deductive evidence, and "what a superior tells me is true" evidence. (after all, if I'm reading biology papers, I rely on the author to be an authority I can trust). I know I rarely deal with "if it feels right, go for it" sort of truth, though I suspect some people are adept at that.

[kennethamy]

The latter.



I haven't yet but read the first half of the first chapter. It's a history of how people attempt to figure out what is true. The author claims that there have been different methods, and is explaining each one.
I suspect the "tea-leaf reading" one comes under divination, and looking in the index, see that it is covered in the second chapter, that of "it's true if a superior tells you it's true" sort of true.

Evidence? What is evidence? ;) (this is what the book is covering, of course)


Just going by the explanations in the book, I suspect I rely on sensory evidence, deductive evidence, and "what a superior tells me is true" evidence. (after all, if I'm reading biology papers, I rely on the author to be an authority I can trust). I know I rarely deal with "if it feels right, go for it" sort of truth, though I suspect some people are adept at that.

I think that what you must mean by "a superior" is, "an authority". I have no superiors that I know of (although my wife might dispute that). There is no doubt that I, and everyone else, turn to authorities for information. Lawyers, physicians, dictionaries, encyclopedias, atlases, and so on. But, now, how do those authorities get their information. What makes them authorities? Surely, jn the end, their access to evidence and reasoning from evidence. That is the source of their authority.So my reliance on them is based on my belief (well-founded, I hope) that they can support what they tell me with evidence and reasoning. So, of course, their authority is "secondary" and not primary.

In order to trust an authority, you have to evaluated the authority's credentials. The education; training; reputation with peers; his position (if he is a physician, is he head of his unit in a hospital of great standing?) His publications, if any. His experience. And so on. All of which would, again, depend on evidence and on reasoning. So, whether an authority is a credible authority would depend, once more, on evidence and reasoning. The mere word of someone you think is an authority is clearly not enough. You require reasons to believe he is an authority: and, in turn, the authority must, itself, rest on evidence and reasoning. Unless, of course, you are going simply to take the persons' word for it that he is an authority.

I forgot to mention that the authority has to be an authority on what he is talking about. No one, of any sense, buys a certain brand of car just because it is endorsed by an actor. What does that actor know about cars? And, just because Einstein was a great scientists, what was the worth of his pronouncements on foreign affairs? Nil.

The bumber sticker that appeared on cars, not so long ago: "Question authority" was right. What makes so and so an authority, and is so and so an authority on what he is telling you to believe or to do?

[DerekK]

It is claimed, of course, that the Scriptures are an important source of revelation, but do Clergymen also claim that what they preach has been revealed to them? I hadn't heard that, but it might be true for all I know.
Not usually. Especially not within Reformed circles, which is the point of view I'm trying to criticize. The UCC (united church of christ) believes something along the lines of new sources of revelation, but I don't think they limit it to just clergy.

My objective is to get at the view, not that the Pastor himself is literally speaking forth revelation, but that he speaks based upon authoritative (and singular) revelation contained in the Bible, which is therefore the basis of all knowledge.


It has been claimed that mystic experiences, and miraculous events, are sources of revelation. But the question remains, not whether revelation is true, since if it is the word of God, it must be, but how we can tell that what is claimed as revelation is revelation.
Exactly. And thanks for the Alston suggestion - I'll look him up.


...This puts you (someone who does not ground their theories of knowledge in this fashion) at a moral disadvantage from the first word out of your mouth. I think it is arguing with someone that must assume you are a liar. I find it distasteful, useful only for the exercise, and if I will not ever meet that person face to face.
It seems I probly don't have the option of avoiding such people face-to-face. Would you suggest simply telling such folks that as long as that's the underlining assumption that an entire discussion will be based on, I will not participate? Or, is there an "easy way" to short-circuit such a stance and show it to be faulty?


...Felipe Fernandez-Armesto. . .claims there are four major ways we decide what is true.
I would automatically tend to favor reason and experience, out of those four. With "what I am told" being okay so long as it is subject to the filters of reason and experience.


The bumber sticker that appeared on cars, not so long ago: "Question authority" was right. What makes so and so an authority, and is so and so an authority on what he is telling you to believe or to do?
Sure... But many pastors, or somebody such as Mohler, do indeed qualify as "an authority" by most measures. Multiple degrees, high-ranking position within the institution, veteran of sorts in the field, they've spent years studying the subject, et cetera.

[Chris Porter]

(snip)It seems I probly don't have the option of avoiding such people face-to-face. Would you suggest simply telling such folks that as long as that's the underlining assumption that an entire discussion will be based on, I will not participate? Or, is there an "easy way" to short-circuit such a stance and show it to be faulty?(snip)
I don't think I have a way to address this, usually I see this in a conversation between others, and I avoid participating, so no, I don't think I can be of help here. And no, I don't know a way to quickly show how such a stance is faulty--mainly because I would be doing it "at" the other, and I'm already considered a liar by that other. So my attempts would be, if not futile, too cumbersome to overcome the innate distrust. I think we are all a bit like that, of course--we distrust people and what they say if we believe they are liars, so I've got some understanding of mindset, I just don't know how to diffuse it.

[Karen M]

Is there some reason why the “common sense” answer that the ability to know things comes from intelligence/logic doesn’t work for this thread?

[curbyIII]

To DerekK:

You might want to look at some papers/articles/books on Artifical Intelligence. I think AI can be thought of as grounded philosophy. To write a program you have to specify it completely and understand it completely. I think implementing and modelling the mind (and reasoning in general) with programs is an excellent way of gaining an understanding of the concepts themselves. If you're looking for the "correct way" of building a belief system from experience, then you might want to look at Bayesian inference/learning and belief nets.

[sweetiepie]

The notion that all knowledge comes from revelation seems reasonable if not absolutely necessary for a christian worldview. You, atleast indirectly, have God to thank for all information, and certainly all true information.

Similarly, all knowledge outputted by schools is knowledge granted to schools by God. Of course, to suppose that you speak on his authority is jumping the 'free will' gun, and to suppose that what schools make is actually 'knowledge' or 'true', could be a bit much.

Preaching from Deuteronomy 4, Mohler said the world is experiencing a crisis today because many people do not believe there is any basis for human knowledge. But Christians must counter the world's confusion by pointing to God's Word—the Bible—as the basis for knowledge, he said.
Not sure what he means by crisis?
The Bible, anyway, is definitely not the basis for -all- knowledge. It's a book. The knowledge provided by the bible is limited by the number of words inside it and the meanings of those words which exist outside of it. The bible does not, for example, tell you how to make a salami sandwich, or contain the building blocks necessary to imagine one.

[kennethamy]

Is there some reason why the “common sense” answer that the ability to know things comes from intelligence/logic doesn’t work for this thread?

No reason, but there are certainly causes. Obtuseness, refusal to think, ignorance, to name only a few of the causes.

As I have tried to point out, even if revelation were a source of knowledge, we could never know that it was, for we could never know that what we believed was a revelation was, indeed, a revelation without the use of reason.

[DerekK]

No reason, but there are certainly causes. Obtuseness, refusal to think, ignorance, to name only a few of the causes.
Heheheh.


So I've worked up my draft of how I'll try and tackle this. I'll post it below, and ask that anybody interested read through it and critique it. If it sucks, tell me why. If I should be more clear on a point, tell me which one. If I hit a grand slam, give me a high-five. Et cetera. After some review, I'll be posting it on my blog. (http://www.xanga.com/Caveat_Towers)

==================================


Original article by David Roach: "Mohler: God's Word is the authority... (http://www.towersonline.net/story.php?grp=news&id=362)"

I'd like to encourage readers to at least scan the entire original article, paying specific and careful attention to paragraphs four and five. In modern Christendom in general, you will seldom come across this particular line of reasoning. Even within Reformed Southern Baptist circles, such an assertion is rarely stated in so bald a manner.

Roach wrote:

"...Mohler said the world is experiencing a crisis today because many people do not believe there is any basis for human knowledge. But Christians must counter the world's confusion by pointing to God's Word—the Bible—as the basis for knowledge, he said.

"Christianity depends upon … a Christian theory of knowledge that is based in revelation alone," Mohler said."

Ignoring the questions immediately raised by the first sentence quoted (What crisis? What people believe that?), we are faced with a very grand statement. Basically, what Mohler is saying is, "the only foundation of our epistemology is the Bible." (Epistemology is fancy-talk for theory of knowledge.) In this view, the Christian Scriptures are the only basis for knowing.

As much as this declaration surely makes sense to the presuppositional crowd, it would appear to be a little troublesome when met with the banalities of life as we know it. For instance, it is a quick job to think of things we all know that are not based in revelation. The definitional truth of 2+2=4 requires no revelation for us to know it, and neither does the knowledge that an apple is red and tastes quite good. The Bible does not inform our knowledge of using computers, as another example. The Bible tells us none of these things, and more to the point, none of these examples require revelation before they can be known.

But there is a more important problem. When we try to give feet to the assertion that "revelation is the basis of epistemology" and see if it can run (or walk), a few things become interesting to note.

First, basing our theory of knowledge on revelation really just means basing our ability to know on what somebody tells us is revelation. Mohler, or a pastor or priest or Sunday school teacher, tells you what they think revelation is (the Bible). Or getting closer to the source, the early church fathers say that certain books are revelatory. Even closer: the prophet or apostle claims to speak directly for God. The end result is somewhat surprising. Functionally, the position "epistemology is based on revelation" actually becomes "epistemology is based on testimony." Making testimony (the statements or beliefs of others) the basis of your theory of knowledge is remarkably unreliable.

Second, for a Christian to assent to and affirm the teaching that revelation undergirds all knowledge, she must first engage her mind and decide if she believes it is true. This use of reason will vary: some will be taught revelation-based epistemology and accept it automatically, and at the other end of the spectrum some will research and study epistemology at length and then accept the Bible as the basis (or perhaps the other way around, accepting the teaching and then searching out reasons for why their decision was a good one). In the end, it seems that "epistemology is based on revelation" as an axiom actually becomes, for the individual, "epistemology is based on my ability to think."

This is the sticking point. Without a doubt, real revelation would be trustworthy, and a great source of knowledge. But we cannot assume just anything to be revelatory; we must decide among contenders. The Book of Mormon? Somebody's journal? The Qur'an? The Bible (which one?)? Deciding what you accept as revelation requires the use of your mind. Thus, in practice, intellect is necessarily more foundational to theory of knowledge than revelation is.

The statement (or doctrine) that "Christian epistemology should be based only in revelation" might sound good at first, but it just doesn't hold together when subjected to closer scrutiny.

[Kosh3]

Functionally, the position "epistemology is based on revelation" actually becomes "epistemology is based on testimony." Making testimony (the statements or beliefs of others) the basis of your theory of knowledge is remarkably unreliable.

The epistemology of testimony is a relatively new area in epistemology to come under study (in contrast to traditional epistemology which considered the agent alone and the ways in which he comes to know things). One thing is certain: the greatest body of our beliefs are taken on the basis of the testimony of others. We have the time and resources (of all types, finanicial, expertise, etc) to directly indepedently establish the veracity of only a vanishingly small number of our overall beliefs.

Testimony may not be the 'basis of epistemology', but it is the 'basis' of most of our beliefs.

[kennethamy]

The epistemology of testimony is a relatively new area in epistemology to come under study (in contrast to traditional epistemology which considered the agent alone and the ways in which he comes to know things). One thing is certain: the greatest body of our beliefs are taken on the basis of the testimony of others. We have the time and resources (of all types, finanicial, expertise, etc) to directly indepedently establish the veracity of only a vanishingly small number of our overall beliefs.

Testimony may not be the 'basis of epistemology', but it is the 'basis' of most of our beliefs.

That may be so, and maybe unfortunately. But wouldn't you want to add that most of our true beliefs are based on reliable testimony? After all, some people believe that a particular brand of car is the most reliable car to buy because some silly movie starlet says so. We still have to validate the reliability of the person who gives the testimony.

Of course in the particular case we are discussing, revelation, the additional question arises as to whether there is such a thing as reliable testimony in the first place. After all, for there to be reliable testimony, there has to be some credible subject matter for the testimony to be reliable about. Most people would not bother to choose among competing astrologers for which astrologer is the most reliable predictor of the future on the basis of the positions of the celestial bodies.

[Kosh3]

That may be so, and maybe unfortunately. But wouldn't you want to add that most of our true beliefs are based on reliable testimony? After all, some people believe that a particular brand of car is the most reliable car to buy because some silly movie starlet says so. We still have to validate the reliability of the person who gives the testimony.

well if they are true beliefs, then they are certainly more likely to have been obtained from reliable (credulous) sources of testimony.

Of course in the particular case we are discussing, revelation, the additional question arises as to whether there is such a thing as reliable testimony in the first place. After all, for there to be reliable testimony, there has to be some credible subject matter for the testimony to be reliable about. Most people would not bother to choose among competing astrologers for which astrologer is the most reliable predictor of the future on the basis of the positions of the celestial bodies.

the domain of astrology, or particular astrologers, could be judged incredulous (by their track record - by observing the way in which their past claims were related to the facts), and hence not satisfactory for the purposes of accepting testimony.

[kennethamy]

well if they are true beliefs, then they are certainly more likely to have been obtained from reliable (credulous) sources of testimony.



the domain of astrology, or particular astrologers, could be judged incredulous (by their track record - by observing the way in which their past claims were related to the facts), and hence not satisfactory for the purposes of accepting testimony.

So, it is really not enough just to point out that most of our beliefs are based on testimony which is a psychological point which tells us how our beliefs are formed, or what causes them. We also have to point out that not all beliefs are equal in so far as they are reliable beliefs. How to tell whether a belief is reliable, no matter how it is caused, is the philosophical-logical issue. Most true beliefs are, I suppose, obtained from reliable sources. But a belief obtained from a reliable source need not be true, nevertheless. Everyone makes mistakes. Naturally, we all think that our beliefs are true-otherwise we would not have those beliefs. No one has a belief he thinks is false. On the other hand, since we know we are not omniscient, we also know that some of our beliefs are false, even while we think they are true. How to discover which of our beliefs, all of which we think are true, are, in fact, false, is the job of logic or critical thinking. One way of doing that is to ask whether the soiurce of our belief is a credible source.

About astrology: all I was trying to point out is that for some matters, there is no such thing as a credible source, since the entire field is not credible. In our particular case, if a belief is formed by revelation, it is only those who assume that there is something to be revealed who can go on to ask whether what they think is a revelation really is a revelation. For those who do not assume that, there is no such thing as revelation, and so no such distinction as between "real" revelations and "fake" revelations. No more than for those who do not believe in astrology, is there a difference between good astrological predictions and bad astrological predictions.

[kennethamy]

Heheheh.


So I've worked up my draft of how I'll try and tackle this. I'll post it below, and ask that anybody interested read through it and critique it. If it sucks, tell me why. If I should be more clear on a point, tell me which one. If I hit a grand slam, give me a high-five. Et cetera. After some review, I'll be posting it on my blog. (http://www.xanga.com/Caveat_Towers)

==================================


Original article by David Roach: "Mohler: God's Word is the authority... (http://www.towersonline.net/story.php?grp=news&id=362)"

I'd like to encourage readers to at least scan the entire original article, paying specific and careful attention to paragraphs four and five. In modern Christendom in general, you will seldom come across this particular line of reasoning. Even within Reformed Southern Baptist circles, such an assertion is rarely stated in so bald a manner.

Roach wrote:

"...Mohler said the world is experiencing a crisis today because many people do not believe there is any basis for human knowledge. But Christians must counter the world's confusion by pointing to God's Word—the Bible—as the basis for knowledge, he said.

"Christianity depends upon … a Christian theory of knowledge that is based in revelation alone," Mohler said."

Ignoring the questions immediately raised by the first sentence quoted (What crisis? What people believe that?), we are faced with a very grand statement. Basically, what Mohler is saying is, "the only foundation of our epistemology is the Bible." (Epistemology is fancy-talk for theory of knowledge.) In this view, the Christian Scriptures are the only basis for knowing.

As much as this declaration surely makes sense to the presuppositional crowd, it would appear to be a little troublesome when met with the banalities of life as we know it. For instance, it is a quick job to think of things we all know that are not based in revelation. The definitional truth of 2+2=4 requires no revelation for us to know it, and neither does the knowledge that an apple is red and tastes quite good. The Bible does not inform our knowledge of using computers, as another example. The Bible tells us none of these things, and more to the point, none of these examples require revelation before they can be known.

But there is a more important problem. When we try to give feet to the assertion that "revelation is the basis of epistemology" and see if it can run (or walk), a few things become interesting to note.

First, basing our theory of knowledge on revelation really just means basing our ability to know on what somebody tells us is revelation. Mohler, or a pastor or priest or Sunday school teacher, tells you what they think revelation is (the Bible). Or getting closer to the source, the early church fathers say that certain books are revelatory. Even closer: the prophet or apostle claims to speak directly for God. The end result is somewhat surprising. Functionally, the position "epistemology is based on revelation" actually becomes "epistemology is based on testimony." Making testimony (the statements or beliefs of others) the basis of your theory of knowledge is remarkably unreliable.

Second, for a Christian to assent to and affirm the teaching that revelation undergirds all knowledge, she must first engage her mind and decide if she believes it is true. This use of reason will vary: some will be taught revelation-based epistemology and accept it automatically, and at the other end of the spectrum some will research and study epistemology at length and then accept the Bible as the basis (or perhaps the other way around, accepting the teaching and then searching out reasons for why their decision was a good one). In the end, it seems that "epistemology is based on revelation" as an axiom actually becomes, for the individual, "epistemology is based on my ability to think."

This is the sticking point. Without a doubt, real revelation would be trustworthy, and a great source of knowledge. But we cannot assume just anything to be revelatory; we must decide among contenders. The Book of Mormon? Somebody's journal? The Qur'an? The Bible (which one?)? Deciding what you accept as revelation requires the use of your mind. Thus, in practice, intellect is necessarily more foundational to theory of knowledge than revelation is.

The statement (or doctrine) that "Christian epistemology should be based only in revelation" might sound good at first, but it just doesn't hold together when subjected to closer scrutiny.


I think what you wrote is too wordy, and not organized so as to make your point clearly, so that the reader (your teacher) can see just what point you are trying to make.

I think you are just trying to make the point I ascribed to Locke. Namely, that even if we assume without argument that revelation must be true since it is the word of God, and omniscient God does not lie, there is still the problem of whether what parades as a revelation, really is a revelation. The classic case is from the book of Abraham in the Bible. Abraham believes it is revealed to him that he should murder his only son Isaac, and is about to do so, when it is again revealed to him that it was all a mistake, or a testing of his faith, and everything is fine and dandy again. But the question is whether Abraham ought to have believed that God would reveal to him that he should murder his only son. Or, should he have argued to himself something like, "God wouldn't tell me to do such a horrifying and morally wrong thing. Therefore, it really is not a revelation from God." ?

So, I think that if that is what you are aiming for, you should just say that a revelation is supposed to be the word of God, and so, we can simply assume, for the sake of argument, that all revelations are true (although you might want to get back to this assumption later on). And then say that the issue you want to raise is whether (on the assumption that all revelations are true) we can assume that everything we think is a revelation, is a revelation. And, the answer to that is (obviously) no. We can be mistaken about whether what seems to be a revelation just as we can be mistaken about anything else. a proof of that (if it requires proof) is that people have conflicting apparent revelations, and a lot of religious wars are fought over some conflicting, apparent, revelations. But since conflicting revelations cannot both be true, at least one of them (maybe both of them) are not really revelations at all. The question then is, how to tell whether what may seem to be a revelation is, in fact, a revelation. The answer to that cannot be, "by revelation". Since that would lead into a vicious infinite regress. We would have to ask about that seeming revelation about whether a revelation was really a revelation, whether the second seeming revelation was truly a revelation. And so on. So the answer could not be that we tell whether a seeming revelation is really a revelation. The alternative answer to how to detemine whether what seems to be a revelation really is one, is "by reason and evidence". There is no alternative to thinking and trying to figure it out, so the path of revelation cannot be the yellow brick road to morality. Brains are still necessary.

[Kosh3]

kennethamy:

yes, I would generally agree. The difficulty though is in working out a way to justify testimony epistemically. The 'justified' bit of true justified belief seems problematic concerning testimony. If you take a reductionist account (Hume), and say that justification is formed by past observances between types of testimony and the observed facts, then there are problems with circularity (as the background knowledge we bring into the judgments of whether some source of beliefs is credulous will almost certainly itself contain testimony), and this supposes the possibility of never having found a correlation between testimony and truth, which has been argued by some to be an impossibility. If you take a antireductionist account of testimony (Reid), and say that there is an a priori justification to believe what others say, in default cases, and unless there are reasons not to, then other problems arise - such as that it just doesn't seem like this is the way we do it.

[kennethamy]

kennethamy:

yes, I would generally agree. The difficulty though is in working out a way to justify testimony epistemically. The 'justified' bit of true justified belief seems problematic concerning testimony. If you take a reductionist account (Hume), and say that justification is formed by past observances between types of testimony and the observed facts, then there are problems with circularity (as the background knowledge we bring into the judgments of whether some source of beliefs is credulous will almost certainly itself contain testimony), and this supposes the possibility of never having found a correlation between testimony and truth, which has been argued by some to be an impossibility. If you take a antireductionist account of testimony (Reid), and say that there is an a priori justification to believe what others say, in default cases, and unless there are reasons not to, then other problems arise - such as that it just doesn't seem like this is the way we do it.


Well, it would depend on the particular circumstances, I would think. If I stop someone on the street to ask him the time, then, unless I have some reason to think he would lie to me, his testimony is presumed innocent until proven guilty. On the other hand, if a witness at a trial is a hostile witness, then clearly the cross-examiner is not going to give the witness the benefit of doubt. How could there be any such general rule like Reid's? Whether testimony is taken at face value must always depend on background knowledge. That would be only commonsense. The fact that our evaluation depends on background knowledge does not make anything "circular" since the background knowledge is usually not the same. Clearly, in science, we test hypotheses empirically by using various instruments, and we also have to test these instruments (telescope or microscope, for instance) empirically in order to determine whether they are working properly. But even if the testing is empirical (how else?) there is no circularity involved, for we are not testing the same things, and there are independent variations in the way we test with the instruments, and the way we test the instruments themselves.

I don't understand your account of what you call Hume's view: but, as I already pointed out, we evaluate the testimony of others by evaluating their credentials, and if their credentials hold up, we our belief in their testimony is justified. That, of course, does not mean that we are not fallible, and that neither we nor the testifier cannot be mistaken.

Most of us evaluate the testimony of others every day, and although some of us are better at it than others, in general, we do pretty well. As we must in order to survive.

[Kosh3]

The fact that our evaluation depends on background knowledge does not make anything "circular" since the background knowledge is usually not the same.

no, not the same in their particulars, but acquired in the same manner - testimonially. It's basically the same issue as the old 'you can't justify induction using induction' thing from the problem of induction.

[kennethamy]

no, not the same in their particulars, but acquired in the same manner - testimonially. It's basically the same issue as the old 'you can't justify induction using induction' thing from the problem of induction.

As in the analogy I gave, the fact that although an instrument is used as an empirical aid to detemine things about the world, and that the instrument may, in turn, be empirically tested to determine whether it is in good working order, may look circular, but does not, it seems to me, pose any logical problems. Or, to vary the analogy: I may use a tool (like a screwdriver) to repair something, and, if the screwdriver breaks, I may have to use another screwdriver to repair it. But there is nothing circular about that.

[Kosh3]

As in the analogy I gave, the fact that although an instrument is used as an empirical aid to detemine things about the world, and that the instrument may, in turn, be empirically tested to determine whether it is in good working order, may look circular, but does not, it seems to me, pose any logical problems.

That is itself a problem considered in traditional epistemology: the circularity of justifying empirical verifications empirically (but, to perhaps immediately give you assurance, on the other hand, there is also a problem in that to repeatedly find some other thing to justify some kind of way of knowing (such as testimony, empirical observation) is to set up for an infinite regress of justification that can never end).

[kennethamy]

That is itself a problem considered in traditional epistemology: the circularity of justifying empirical verifications empirically (but, to perhaps immediately give you assurance, on the other hand, there is also a problem in that to repeatedly find some other thing to justify some kind of way of knowing (such as testimony, empirical observation) is to set up for an infinite regress of justification that can never end).


I just don't see what is circular about verifying that a telescope is in working order by examining it, just because we use a telescope to examine what is going on in the heavens.

It is true that we examine the heavens empirically, and we examine the telescope empirically. So what? How else would you suggest we do it?

[Kosh3]

if you don't understand, then I am not sure how to help you understand. As I said, its similar to the problem of induction. One way to try to say that induction is valid, is to say that "well, its worked lots in the past". But that of course is to use induction to justify induction, since you are inferring from the past to the future, which is epistemically circular.

Likewise with trying to justify empirical observations with empirical observations. If you are using x to see whether x is justified, then that justification can be said to offer no justification at all, since it utilizes the very thing in question in the first place.

I make no suggestions for ressolving such matters; I am just pointing out the epistemic problem.

[kennethamy]

if you don't understand, then I am not sure how to help you understand. As I said, its similar to the problem of induction. One way to try to say that induction is valid, is to say that "well, its worked lots in the past". But that of course is to use induction to justify induction, since you are inferring from the past to the future, which is epistemically circular.

Likewise with trying to justify empirical observations with empirical observations. If you are using x to see whether x is justified, then that justification can be said to offer no justification at all, since it utilizes the very thing in question in the first place.

I make no suggestions for ressolving such matters; I am just pointing out the epistemic problem.


Surely I am using very different evidence to check the telescope, than the evidence I use for determining what I intend to determine using the telescope. I did not use the same evidence for checking the telescope that I used in actually using the telescope. So there is no circularity. Perhaps you are just questioning the use of empirical evidence.

It is a far cry from the problem of justifying induction where (it is charged) it would be circular to use induction to justify induction because the same procedure of justification cannot be used to justify itself. If there is any similarity, it is only a surface similarity.

[Kosh3]

Surely I am using very different evidence to check the telescope, than the evidence I use for determining what I intend to determine using the telescope. I did not use the same evidence for checking the telescope that I used in actually using the telescope. So there is no circularity. Perhaps you are just questioning the use of empirical evidence.

Principally you did use the same kind of evidence. This is, afterall, discussion about kinds of evidence. The specifics of the evidences will of course be different - but not on a principle level.

[kennethamy]

Principally you did use the same kind of evidence. This is, afterall, discussion about kinds of evidence. The specifics of the evidences will of course be different - but not on a principle level.

Yes. Empirical evidence. And, I suppose that, as I said, you (or someone) could inquire into the foundations of empirical evidence, and whether such evidence is probative. That question is (in part) the issue of the justification of induction. But if you think that empirical evidence is probative, I don't see the circularity in using empirical evidence to test the instrument you use as a means of collecting empirical evidence.

Suppose I deduce a theorem in geometry from certain premises, and then I deduce those premises from other premises (which is, after all, what we do do in mathematics). Is that "circular" too? After all I am using deduction to prove premises which I used to prove other propositions.

[DerekK]

I think what you wrote is too wordy, and not organized so as to make your point clearly, so that the reader (your teacher) can see just what point you are trying to make.
Teacher? It's just an article for my Xanga, where I criticize articles from the newspaper at the Seminary, in hopes that students there will read it and be encouraged to think once or twice before swallowing what they're told.

I do think that I am perhaps a bit wordy, so I'm going to attempt to trim it, just a touch.



I think you are just trying to make the point I ascribed to Locke. Namely, that even if we assume without argument that revelation must be true since it is the word of God, and omniscient God does not lie, there is still the problem of whether what parades as a revelation, really is a revelation...
That's part of the point(s) I'm aiming at.

One point I want to make it that the claim ("revelation is the foundation for our epistemology") may seem like a wonderful pronouncement, but it is dishonest because it is functionally a completely different claim.

The second point is similar to Locke/you. Namely, we use our mind to decide what we believe is revelation.



So, I think that if that is what you are aiming for, you should just say that a revelation is supposed to be the word of God, and so, we can simply assume, for the sake of argument, that all revelations are true (although you might want to get back to this assumption later on). And then say that the issue you want to raise is whether (on the assumption that all revelations are true) we can assume that everything we think is a revelation, is a revelation. And, the answer to that is (obviously) no. We can be mistaken about whether what seems to be a revelation just as we can be mistaken about anything else. a proof of that (if it requires proof) is that people have conflicting apparent revelations, and a lot of religious wars are fought over some conflicting, apparent, revelations. But since conflicting revelations cannot both be true, at least one of them (maybe both of them) are not really revelations at all.
Going too far down that road will be non-applicable to most of my intended audience, because there is no question (for them) about what is revelation. The Bible is it - nothing else is considered.

*gets busy revising his article*

.....

[kennethamy]

Teacher? It's just an article for my Xanga, where I criticize articles from the newspaper at the Seminary, in hopes that students there will read it and be encouraged to think once or twice before swallowing what they're told.

I do think that I am perhaps a bit wordy, so I'm going to attempt to trim it, just a touch.




That's part of the point(s) I'm aiming at.

One point I want to make it that the claim ("revelation is the foundation for our epistemology") may seem like a wonderful pronouncement, but it is dishonest because it is functionally a completely different claim.

The second point is similar to Locke/you. Namely, we use our mind to decide what we believe is revelation.




Going too far down that road will be non-applicable to most of my intended audience, because there is no question (for them) about what is revelation. The Bible is it - nothing else is considered.

*gets busy revising his article*

.....

I can see that is true: that they believe that the Bible is the revealed word of God. But, surely, you can raise the question: why do they believe that, meaning, what are their reasons for believing that is true. That's the epistemological issue you said interested you. Their argument cannot be (or rather should not be) that the Bible is the revealed word of God because the Bible has revealed that (it is the revealed word of God) since that would obviously be circular. If the ability to think is non-applicable to most of intended audience, then, let us pray.

[Kosh3]

Suppose I deduce a theorem in geometry from certain premises, and then I deduce those premises from other premises (which is, after all, what we do do in mathematics). Is that "circular" too? After all I am using deduction to prove premises which I used to prove other propositions.

What is the means of knowing here? A sort of rational logical inquiry, right? So what I would ask you to do (I wouldn't in real life, but im just showing you what would happen) would be to justify that (rational logical inquiry) as a means for acquiring truth. Simply deriving further mathematical principles would not be plain evidence that justifies rational logical inquiry, since it uses the very thing it is supposed to justify. Just as, it is said, you can't justify induction using induction, nor can you with this.

If its sort of all worryingly annoying for you, then I can perhaps help out by noting that Alvin Goldman has argued that (taking the example of sense perception as a means for acquiring truth) since there is no necessary coherence between one visual observation and another at a different time (like, for instance, you could observe a carrot on a table, but then, on getting closer, see that it is an apple or something), that this is at least some (but, I take it from him, insufficient) evidence in favour of sense perception being a reliable means for formation of true beliefs, as that possibility is non-trivial evidentially.

He also argued on the basis of bayesian theory that (and I don't really quite grasp this) secondary evidence takings that cohere with former ones (retrospectively?) increase the probability of that being true in relation to alternative hypotheses (that was wordy, and probably incomprehensible, I know, but I know only little about Bayesian theory).

I guess another way around it would be simply to posit such things as "first principles", basic axioms that don't need justification. I personally am happy to do that. Things logically just can't be justified forever. The widest possible means for inquiry - basic human cognition - cannot be justified without directly using human cognition, and thus it would be epistemically circular to do so. Circularlity must enter at some point, or must an infinite regress.

[DerekK]

Alright, I revised myself... Have I improved at all?

BTW, thank you very much for the help and constructive criticism, et cetera. I appreciate it greatly.


=========================================



Original article by David Roach: "Mohler: God's Word is the authority... (http://www.towersonline.net/story.php?grp=news&id=362)"

I'd like to encourage readers to at least scan the entire original article, paying specific and careful attention to paragraphs four and five. A helpful note: Epistemology = Theory of Knowledge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology).

In modern Christendom in general, you will not often come across the line of reasoning presented within the original Towers article. Even within Reformed Southern Baptist circles, the assertion made is rarely stated in so bald a manner.

Roach wrote:

"...Mohler said the world is experiencing a crisis today because many people do not believe there is any basis for human knowledge. But Christians must counter the world's confusion by pointing to God's Word—the Bible—as the basis for knowledge, he said.

"Christianity depends upon … a Christian theory of knowledge that is based in revelation alone," Mohler said."
Ignoring the questions immediately raised by the first sentence quoted (What crisis? What people believe that?), we are faced with a very grand statement. Basically, what Mohler is saying is, "the only foundation of our epistemology is the Bible." In this view, the Christian Scriptures are the only basis for knowing.

As much as this declaration surely makes sense to the presuppositional crowd, it would appear to be a little troublesome when met with the banalities of life as we know it. For instance, it is a quick job to think of things we all know that are not based in revelation. The definitional truth of 2+2=4 requires no revelation for us to know it, and neither does the knowledge that an apple is red and tastes quite good. The Bible does not inform our knowledge of using computers, as another example. Scripture tells us none of these things, and more to the point, none of these examples require revelation before they can be known.

But there is a more important problem. When we try to give feet to the assertion that "revelation is the basis of epistemology" and see if it can run (or walk), a few things become interesting to note.

First, basing our theory of knowledge on revelation really just means basing our ability to know on what somebody tells us is revelation. Mohler, or a pastor or priest or Sunday school teacher, tells you what they think revelation is (the Bible). Or getting closer to the source, the early church fathers say that certain books are revelatory. Even closer: the prophet or apostle claims to speak directly for God. The end result is somewhat surprising. Functionally, the position "epistemology is based on revelation" actually becomes "epistemology is based on testimony." The wisdom of making testimony (the statements or beliefs of others) the basis of your theory of knowledge is questionable.

Second, for a Christian to assent to and affirm the teaching that revelation undergirds all knowledge, she must engage her mind. The brain must be brought to bear on at least two questions. First, what exactly is revelation? Second, of all the things that people claim to be revelatory, which do I accept as true revelation? Some people claim personal revelation from God, others might present the Qur'an as revelation; many Christians will claim that the Bible is the only revelation available to us. The act of determining what is accepted (and proclaimed to others) as revelation requires the use of one's intellect. Thus, in practice "epistemology is based on revelation" as an axiom actually becomes, for the individual, "epistemology is based on my ability to think."

So I ask you: When the statement "theory of knowledge is based in Scripture alone" can be shown to be functionally equivalent to saying epistemology is based on the testimony of others; and when revelation can be shown to be secondary to the individual's ability to think within their theory of knowledge... What is the use of the original claim? Why make it?

[kennethamy]

Alright, I revised myself... Have I improved at all?

BTW, thank you very much for the help and constructive criticism, et cetera. I appreciate it greatly.


=========================================



Original article by David Roach: "Mohler: God's Word is the authority... (http://www.towersonline.net/story.php?grp=news&id=362)"

I'd like to encourage readers to at least scan the entire original article, paying specific and careful attention to paragraphs four and five. A helpful note: Epistemology = Theory of Knowledge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology).

In modern Christendom in general, you will not often come across the line of reasoning presented within the original Towers article. Even within Reformed Southern Baptist circles, the assertion made is rarely stated in so bald a manner.

Roach wrote:

"...Mohler said the world is experiencing a crisis today because many people do not believe there is any basis for human knowledge. But Christians must counter the world's confusion by pointing to God's Word—the Bible—as the basis for knowledge, he said.

"Christianity depends upon … a Christian theory of knowledge that is based in revelation alone," Mohler said."
Ignoring the questions immediately raised by the first sentence quoted (What crisis? What people believe that?), we are faced with a very grand statement. Basically, what Mohler is saying is, "the only foundation of our epistemology is the Bible." In this view, the Christian Scriptures are the only basis for knowing.

As much as this declaration surely makes sense to the presuppositional crowd, it would appear to be a little troublesome when met with the banalities of life as we know it. For instance, it is a quick job to think of things we all know that are not based in revelation. The definitional truth of 2+2=4 requires no revelation for us to know it, and neither does the knowledge that an apple is red and tastes quite good. The Bible does not inform our knowledge of using computers, as another example. Scripture tells us none of these things, and more to the point, none of these examples require revelation before they can be known.

But there is a more important problem. When we try to give feet to the assertion that "revelation is the basis of epistemology" and see if it can run (or walk), a few things become interesting to note.

First, basing our theory of knowledge on revelation really just means basing our ability to know on what somebody tells us is revelation. Mohler, or a pastor or priest or Sunday school teacher, tells you what they think revelation is (the Bible). Or getting closer to the source, the early church fathers say that certain books are revelatory. Even closer: the prophet or apostle claims to speak directly for God. The end result is somewhat surprising. Functionally, the position "epistemology is based on revelation" actually becomes "epistemology is based on testimony." The wisdom of making testimony (the statements or beliefs of others) the basis of your theory of knowledge is questionable.

Second, for a Christian to assent to and affirm the teaching that revelation undergirds all knowledge, she must engage her mind. The brain must be brought to bear on at least two questions. First, what exactly is revelation? Second, of all the things that people claim to be revelatory, which do I accept as true revelation? Some people claim personal revelation from God, others might present the Qur'an as revelation; many Christians will claim that the Bible is the only revelation available to us. The act of determining what is accepted (and proclaimed to others) as revelation requires the use of one's intellect. Thus, in practice "epistemology is based on revelation" as an axiom actually becomes, for the individual, "epistemology is based on my ability to think."

So I ask you: When the statement "theory of knowledge is based in Scripture alone" can be shown to be functionally equivalent to saying epistemology is based on the testimony of others; and when revelation can be shown to be secondary to the individual's ability to think within their theory of knowledge... What is the use of the original claim? Why make it?


"As much as this declaration surely makes sense to the presuppositional crowd, it would appear to be a little troublesome when met with the banalities of life as we know it. For instance, it is a quick job to think of things we all know that are not based in revelation. The definitional truth of 2+2=4 requires no revelation for us to know it, and neither does the knowledge that an apple is red and tastes quite good. The Bible does not inform our knowledge of using computers, as another example. Scripture tells us none of these things, and more to the point, none of these examples require revelation before they can be known.

But there is a more important problem. When we try to give feet to the assertion that "revelation is the basis of epistemology" and see if it can run (or walk), a few things become interesting to note."

Why that declaration would make sense to anyone is beyond me. And after your criticism of it, in the subsequent few lines, I don't understand what more there is to say. It wasn't revealed to me that Wellington won the battle of Waterloo, nor that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Can it possibly be true that anyone believes that our knowledge of these facts is based on revelation? Someone who is both sane, and asserts such a thing, must believe that such knowledge is not the kind of knowledge he has in mind; or else that for some reason, that sort of thing is not real knowledge. Something like that must be true. If it is not, then the view that all knowledge is based on revelation is not worth even discussing.

[DerekK]

Why that declaration would make sense to anyone is beyond me. And after your criticism of it, in the subsequent few lines, I don't understand what more there is to say. It wasn't revealed to me that Wellington won the battle of Waterloo, nor that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Can it possibly be true that anyone believes that our knowledge of these facts is based on revelation? Someone who is both sane, and asserts such a thing, must believe that such knowledge is not the kind of knowledge he has in mind; or else that for some reason, that sort of thing is not real knowledge. Something like that must be true. If it is not, then the view that all knowledge is based on revelation is not worth even discussing.
I don't think the neo-Fundie position is that all knowledge comes directly from revelation. The assertion is just that the Christian theory of knowledge is based on nothing but revelation. It seems a subtle (and perhaps nonsensical) distinction, but I had to be careful about it as I crafted my response, because I will be called on it if I conflate the two.

Make sense?

[kennethamy]

I don't think the neo-Fundie position is that all knowledge comes directly from revelation. The assertion is just that the Christian theory of knowledge is based on nothing but revelation. It seems a subtle (and perhaps nonsensical) distinction, but I had to be careful about it as I crafted my response, because I will be called on it if I conflate the two.

Make sense?

What is supposed to be the difference? Is the Christian theory of knowledge about knowledge? Do Christians believe we know that water is H20? How is that based on revelation?

[DerekK]

I guess it's an issue of primacy.

In their theory of knowledge, revelation is the base, the fundamental part - it is prime.

Perhaps in yours or mine, our ability to think and reason is the basis of our epistemology.

Using H20 as an example... I personally don't know that by direct experience or by "seeing" an H20 molecule - probably you don't either. We know it because we were told it, or because we saw it in a textbook. Nevertheless, our ability to think is what we use to determine if we find the claim "water molecules are made of H20" believable or not.

I think, for the neo-Fundie, there's just an extra level beneath intellect, as regards assenting to H20. That is, revelation. Science says H20, my ability to think complies, and Scripture doesn't disagree - so therefore the knowledge is true.

Where it matters is in other areas. For instance, science says the earth is ancient and that evolution happened; my ability to think and use reason/logic agrees after investigating the evidence; Scripture (God's revelation) says otherwise! So science and my brain must be wrong.

So, knowing "trivial" things isn't based on revelation - it's just that in our theory of how we know them, revelation is given authority. Thus, even if astronomy (and our intellect) says it is impossible for the Sun to stand still in the sky - revelation says it did happen. Since Scripture is the basis of epistemology, then contra science and contra our brains, the Sun must have stood still. Scripture as the basis of epistemology, it seems, simply means that the Bible wins.

Now does it make sense?

P.S. ...I really appreciate your dialoging with me on this, and your speedy replies. Thanks for the discussion!