Can someone translate this for me?

[Roach Clips]

Can anyone tell me what this guy is saying here? Because I have no clue as to what he is talking about about.

We have to recognize that our discourse shapes our reality, however as powerful as language is there is always a gap between the way the world is and the way we describe it. This is due to signifiers never representing an object that exists externally. Signifiers do not represent signifieds, but that they merely represent other signifiers. When I say the word, “dog,” it has meaning only in terms of how much it is like or unlike other concepts. It lacks a stable, intrinsic meaning, words are defined by metaphors. This means that language can never express “reality.”
This gap between the way the world is, and the way we describe it is a lack, which is called "The real", Due to these imperfections in language, we are left traumatized. In order to deal with this uncomfort and trauma, we create "fantasies" that help us feel better about the world around us.
The lack just isn't within individuals, rather the lack engulfs society as a whole. One such fantasy created by society is that the state must be a perpetual war-machine that eliminates all that does not fit within its conceptualized world. This leads security to be the bases and sole criterion for political legitimation.
Within a sovereign society, the concept that security has to be the base of political legitimation is a form of disciplinary power, so unrevealed, that it poses an iminent threat to society. The idea that we must anihilate the Other to protect the necessity of life, only furthers the gap between ourselves and the Other.
But what if the Other was out to end the sovereign society? Do you not have a responsibility to the Self Others? You can not uphold an INFINITE responsibility to the other, while you are upholdin one other. So what is one to do? If a cat comes to my door and I give it milk, do I then have an infinite obligation to give all cats milk? Or rather, do I just have an obligation to the cats that come to my door. While taking into account the fact the other is ontologically prior to the self, we have to come up with a criterion for determining what the ethics behind giving the first cat milk was as opposed to the other cats. I had an ethical obligation to give the other cats milk. but I do not have an obligation to give the first cat milk. Why would this be. This is what Jaques Derrida refers to as the 'Gift of Death' In order to help the other I must sacrifice the other other. This means in order for disciplinary power for the sakes of life's necessity to be justified, I have to be sacrificing the other other in return for the sake of the other.
This justifies the securitization mindset, but what outweighs what? Do the consequences outweigh the INFINITE obligation to the other? Or do we have to seek deontology? This comes to a binary between consequentialism and deontology. Do we necessitate securing ourselves while sacrificing the other other, or do we look to uphold the obligation to the other. What we see here is rather two parallel binaries. Deontology V. Consequentialism and Lacking and Ethics V Securitization and Consequentialism.
We can not fix a lack within language, so we can not factor it in to the equation. The securitization mindset justifies war adventurism, however we have to uphold the responsibility to the Self Other and sacrifice the other other. Therefore, you can ethically uphold the responsibility to the other, while being within the securitization mindset, because you are upholding your responsibility to the Other through sacrificing the other other for the security of the Self Other.

So in your oppinion which is the best criterion for the utilitarian mindset?

[Penumbrae]

Yikes. Take one part Lacan, one part Foucault, a healthy dash of Levinas and Derrida, and bake in one large geopolitical oven. No wonder analytic philosophers constantly deride the "Continentals;" their language is utterly opaque to the uninitiated.

The author (ha!) appears to be saying that:
(a) the divide between language and "reality" motivates in part the paranoid attempt to secure oneself against possible threats, especially politically/militarily
(b) this paranoia is to be avoided
(c) "we" have an infinite obligation to "the Other," that is to say, what is defined by what is "not-we" (although I'm sure that the author would, along with Levinas, say that it is "we" that is defined by "the Other," but that's another matter entirely)
(d) our responsibility to "the Other" may be in principle infinite, but is utterly impractical (that's the cat analogy)
(e) so we must choose which "Others" to which we obligate ourselves.

This leads to a dilemma, he or she seems to say, as we fall back into some kind of decision-theory as to which "Others" to which we are obliged and which ones we are not, especially when one group of those "Others" is adamantly bent on harming you and others like you. Do we choose on the basis of impracticality, deontology, or...?

Personally I find the very concept of "infinite responsiblity" to be utterly unintelligble even given the "ontological priority" of the Other (which I don't buy, either). Importing utilitarianism in this whole mess seems to me to be entirely beside the point, as well.

I hope at least, though, I've rendered it into something a bit clearer.

[David B]

I thik that a rough translation of the quote is 'I am a pretentious wanker'.

David B

[Roach Clips]

Ya, you made it a bit clearer. I'm not familiar with philosophy and thought this was just a load of BS because I couldn't understand it. The funny thing is this guy posted this in a forum who's members average age is 12-16 and, apparently, intending for people to discuss his idea. Even though no one did because no one understand it, either.

[kennethamy]

Yikes. Take one part Lacan, one part Foucault, a healthy dash of Levinas and Derrida, and bake in one large geopolitical oven. No wonder analytic philosophers constantly deride the "Continentals;" their language is utterly opaque to the uninitiated.

The author (ha!) appears to be saying that:
(a) the divide between language and "reality" motivates in part the paranoid attempt to secure oneself against possible threats, especially politically/militarily
(b) this paranoia is to be avoided
(c) "we" have an infinite obligation to "the Other," that is to say, what is defined by what is "not-we" (although I'm sure that the author would, along with Levinas, say that it is "we" that is defined by "the Other," but that's another matter entirely)
(d) our responsibility to "the Other" may be in principle infinite, but is utterly impractical (that's the cat analogy)
(e) so we must choose which "Others" to which we obligate ourselves.

This leads to a dilemma, he or she seems to say, as we fall back into some kind of decision-theory as to which "Others" to which we are obliged and which ones we are not, especially when one group of those "Others" is adamantly bent on harming you and others like you. Do we choose on the basis of impracticality, deontology, or...?

Personally I find the very concept of "infinite responsiblity" to be utterly unintelligble even given the "ontological priority" of the Other (which I don't buy, either). Importing utilitarianism in this whole mess seems to me to be entirely beside the point, as well.

I hope at least, though, I've rendered it into something a bit clearer.

My question is, how can you tell he said what you said he said (whatever that was)?

Could you tell me what "the ontological priority of the other" means, so I can decide whether it is too expensive for me? If you don't want to buy it, well, maybe I can get it cheap. But would it be worth what I am willing to pay for it?

[untermensche]

Due to these imperfections in language, we are left traumatized.
HORSESHIT ALERT!

[kennethamy]

HORSESHIT ALERT!

Now, now. But when the OP writes that before that explanation, he thought it was just "a load of BS" I would like to assure him that sometimes, first thoughts are best thoughts.

Now, if only someone would explain the explanation....

[untermensche]

Now, now. But when the OP writes that before that explanation, he thought it was just "a load of BS" I would like to assure him that sometimes, first thoughts are best thoughts.

Now, if only someone would explain the explanation....
Alright.
Due to these imperfections in language, we are left traumatized.
This is a jump that needs some explaining.

"I am ever so distressed when I see the dog. The fact that Fifi cannot be fully explained with language is a chasm in my psyche."

[Penumbrae]

My question is, how can you tell he said what you said he said (whatever that was)?

Oy. It takes a great deal of slogging through the aforementioned figures' works as well as noticing when someone wishing to be erudite is merely regurgitating tropes and terms from those works with little comprehension thereof. I might add that for a French intellectual, Foucault is incredibly clear and Derrida is worth reading despite his many "followers." Levinas, on the other hand, is simply whacked-out theology--more on this below.

Could you tell me what "the ontological priority of the other" means, so I can decide whether it is too expensive for me? If you don't want to buy it, well, maybe I can get it cheap. But would it be worth what I am willing to pay for it?

The concept of the "ontological priority of the Other" is derived initially from Hegel's "Master and Bondsman" passage in his Phenomenology of Spirit (also immensely worth reading, if very difficult), also known as the "master-slave dialectic." For our purposes here let's just say that consciousness cannot constitute identity by itself, but rather through a relation to another. This relation in Hegel is originally antagonistic, but eventually each party (he keeps it to two to simplify matters) recognizes how each depends upon each. Levinas (and the phrase "ontological priority of the Other" is his) takes this up and asserts rather that however one wishes to identify "the self" it is constituted by some Other that gets to it before it gets to the Other. For instance, an infant's sense of self is constituted by the caretaker, the child's by peers as well, etc. Because of this, Levinas says, we (as selves) have an infinite obligation to whatever Other comes along.

As for why I dont' buy it: this is first of all, always an abstract Other, despite Levinas's attempts to particularize it; every time he does, it's always couched in typically ethically uncontroversial terms. "The Other is the homeless person on the street, the child crying in war..." and so on. What, I suppose, is the obligation one has if the Other is trying to kill you? Do not slaves have the obligation to kill their masters? Anyway, one cannot have, in my opinion, an obligation to any abstract entity. Further, why can't it be the case that rather than having "ontological priority," the Other is co-constituted along with the self? Why must there be "ontological priority" at all? The reason, I'm afraid, is that Levinas is rather a strange kind of theologian and is recapitulating the creation myth in his "ethics as first philosophy." The Other creates the self and thereafter the self is infinitely obligated to obey its deity-like commands (commands issued, naturally, in silence). Nothing can command infinite obligation simply because we are not ourselves infinite.

That's probably far less clear than it could be, but it's been a good long while since I've delved into this stuff. Perhaps someone more immersed in contemporary French thought can have a go at it.

[kennethamy]

That's probably far less clear than it could be, but it's been a good long while since I've delved into this stuff. Perhaps someone more immersed in contemporary French thought can have a go at it.

How clear could it be? This kind of thing is an embarassment to the intellect, and of course, is what people generally have in mind when they talk about philosophy as "just semantics", and find it laughable. It is really a pity, because philosophy can be done sensibly, and when people who might appreciate, and even be interested in philosophy first get a taste of that kind of thing, they would never go near philosophy again, and I wouldn't blame them a bit. It has been well-said that in France, after Descartes, "the lights went out". The following essay might interest you:

http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:_2Ze3FQbf5cJ:www.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/wrongthoughts.html+stove+what+is+wrong+with+our+thoughts%3F&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1&ie=UTF-8

[comiezapr]

I thik that a rough translation of the quote is 'I am a pretentious wanker'.

David B

Confirmed!

[Penumbrae]

How clear could it be? This kind of thing is an embarassment to the intellect, and of course, is what people generally have in mind when they talk about philosophy as "just semantics", and find it laughable. It is really a pity, because philosophy can be done sensibly, and when people who might appreciate, and even be interested in philosophy first get a taste of that kind of thing, they would never go near philosophy again, and I wouldn't blame them a bit. It has been well-said that in France, after Descartes, "the lights went out".

I certainly agree that philosophy can be done, as you say, "sensibly." But what satisfies "sensibility" may not satisfy every problem philosophically rendered. Granted, one can be entirely procrustean in this regard, but it's not as if Hume's atomism of the present doesn't lead to Kant's transcendental idealism (in order to save natural causation, by the by). Difficult issues require difficult thoughts; any philosophical novitiate, by the same token, cracking open any issue of The Journal of Symbolic Logic or Erkenntnis will likewise be lost or turned away, much moreso a post from someone who takes upon themselves the mantle of "logician" or "philosophical analyist" without much work logic or philosophical analysis at all. However I will grant that those misusers of Continental jargon far outnumber the misusers of analytic jargon, which is why you find the above sort of claptrap more frequently.

This is why I was careful to distinguish the befuddled mentioners of philosophical jargon from those who actually use it. The Foucault of Surveillier et punir should not be conflated with "Foucauldians," just as "deconstructionists" ought to be avoided but Derrida ought not. Just as Plato ought not be confused with either "platonism" or "platonists." Philosophy is not entirely intelligible separated from its history, and one often does well to explore that history if only to avoid similar mistakes in the future (such as idealism, for instance).

It's primarily the case, at least in my experience, that those like the above-quoted poster are "educated" in "philosophy" only through English or (heaven forfend) Comparative Literature departments, which is tantamount to learning about astronomy from the school of engineering. What I've always found irritating is philosophers dismissing each others' work as "irrelevant" or "muddled" without actually conversing with one another.

ETA: Good IPU, I'm a longwinded SOB--I'll shut up now.

[comiezapr]

Actually, most philosphers that do disregard other philosophers as confused or irrelevant do converse with those philosophers they dismiss. Personally, at least 1/5th of the work i read in philosophy is by people i think are absolutly rediculous, like Focoult, Derridera, Heidegger and Satre. I have yet to be enlightened by these idiots, but i find it necessary to know the depths of the intellectual garbage heap so that i am adequatly prepared to dismiss it during discussion.

They are confused, or irrelevant, and i can say that educatedly. The same goes for practicing philosophers in the analytic tradition. Theres a reason analytic philosophers stopped debating with the continental literary folk; theyre just to stupid to have a profitable discussion.

The difference between abusers of continental philosophical jargon and analytic philisophical jargon lies with intentions; the abusers of continental jargon are aiming to confuse by stating a simple musing of common sense in thick language whereas the abusers of analytic terminology are intending to make a point only expressible in that terminology and just happen to not be well aquainted with the precise semantics of the terms.

All of the jargon in continental philosophy can be paraphrased into more natural terminology with the consequences of reducing the size of the text. The paraphrases in the analytic tradition would result in an enormous expansion of the size of the text. This says alot.

[Thomas II]

Yikes. Take one part Lacan, one part Foucault, a healthy dash of Levinas and Derrida, and bake in one large geopolitical oven. No wonder analytic philosophers constantly deride the "Continentals;" their language is utterly opaque to the uninitiated.

The author (ha!) appears to be saying that:
(a) the divide between language and "reality" motivates in part the paranoid attempt to secure oneself against possible threats, especially politically/militarily
(b) this paranoia is to be avoided
(c) "we" have an infinite obligation to "the Other," that is to say, what is defined by what is "not-we" (although I'm sure that the author would, along with Levinas, say that it is "we" that is defined by "the Other," but that's another matter entirely)
(d) our responsibility to "the Other" may be in principle infinite, but is utterly impractical (that's the cat analogy)
(e) so we must choose which "Others" to which we obligate ourselves.

This leads to a dilemma, he or she seems to say, as we fall back into some kind of decision-theory as to which "Others" to which we are obliged and which ones we are not, especially when one group of those "Others" is adamantly bent on harming you and others like you. Do we choose on the basis of impracticality, deontology, or...?

Personally I find the very concept of "infinite responsiblity" to be utterly unintelligble even given the "ontological priority" of the Other (which I don't buy, either). Importing utilitarianism in this whole mess seems to me to be entirely beside the point, as well.

I hope at least, though, I've rendered it into something a bit clearer.

Well done...I agree with your translation.:grin:

[blip]

There's a concept that sees we do not see things, we see our concept for things. We do not see trees, for instance. We only think we do, but what we actually see is our concept for trees rather than the tree itself. Very abstract notion. Not one that is understood, persay, but more "grasped" if anyone knows the difference between the two. I quoted something that explained alot of this here

http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=178093

But chances are, it won't be widely grasped. It's tough and very abstract.

[Penumbrae]

Actually, most philosphers that do disregard other philosophers as confused or irrelevant do converse with those philosophers they dismiss. Personally, at least 1/5th of the work i read in philosophy is by people i think are absolutly rediculous, like Focoult, Derridera, Heidegger and Satre. I have yet to be enlightened by these idiots, but i find it necessary to know the depths of the intellectual garbage heap so that i am adequatly prepared to dismiss it during discussion.

That really is unfortunate, as I do think that there is something worthwhile in those works (well, perhaps not Sartre) as well as much worthwhile in the analytic tradition as well (not to mention the pragmatic, Eastern, ancient, etc. traditions). But really, if you're getting nothing out of it, then by all means avoid it.

They are confused, or irrelevant, and i can say that educatedly. The same goes for practicing philosophers in the analytic tradition. Theres a reason analytic philosophers stopped debating with the continental literary folk; theyre just to stupid to have a profitable discussion.

Not necessarily so. I think, for instance, of Charles Taylor's work in Hegel, Ian Hacking's admittedly Foucauldian stance, in addition to Judith Butler's work in Speech Act theory and Simon Critchley's and David Wood's analytic outreach attempts. There's also Jay Bernstein's book Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics which is almost entirely couched in terms of contemporary analytic ethical theory. So I think that there are profitable exchanges occurring, just not as often as I'd like to see.

The difference between abusers of continental philosophical jargon and analytic philisophical jargon lies with intentions; the abusers of continental jargon are aiming to confuse by stating a simple musing of common sense in thick language whereas the abusers of analytic terminology are intending to make a point only expressible in that terminology and just happen to not be well aquainted with the precise semantics of the terms.

You'll get no argument from me on that. However I do admit that there are proper uses of "Continental" jargon, uses in which those thoughts could not be properly expressed in any other way.

All of the jargon in continental philosophy can be paraphrased into more natural terminology with the consequences of reducing the size of the text. The paraphrases in the analytic tradition would result in an enormous expansion of the size of the text. This says alot.

Naturally I'll disagree about saying that "all of the jargon" in either tradition can be paraphrased as such. Unclear hand-wavers abound in both and one can pick them out if one is familiar enough with that form of philosophy, paraphrasis notwithstanding.

[kennethamy]

There's a concept that sees we do not see things, we see our concept for things. We do not see trees, for instance. We only think we do, but what we actually see is our concept for trees rather than the tree itself. Very abstract notion. Not one that is understood, persay, but more "grasped" if anyone knows the difference between the two. I quoted something that explained alot of this here

http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=178093

But chances are, it won't be widely grasped. It's tough and very abstract.

Oh, I "grasp" all right. It is just a reprise of the the representative theory of perception, except that you substitute concepts for the customary "ideas" or "sense-data" which makes the view even more implausible than it is. It is not tough at all, It is taught in philosophy 101.

But look, if you have an argument for such a bizarre view, trot it out. On what grounds do you think we don't see trees, but only concepts of trees. I have to confess to you, that I have never seen a concept in my life. Although, I think that I have concepts. Have you really ever seen a concept of a tree? What does it look like? Anything like a tree?

P.S. Why do you think that because someone thinks that what you believe is false that he simply doesn't understand you, with the implication that if he did understand you, he would think you were right? Isn't that pretty arrogant?

[blip]

Oh, I "grasp" all right. It is just a reprise of the the representative theory of perception, except that you substitute concepts for the customary "ideas" or "sense-data" which makes the view even more implausible than it is. It is not tough at all, It is taught in philosophy 101.

Okay, call it ideas rather than concepts. Same thing isn't it? So what have you told me so far?


But look, if you have an argument for such a bizarre view, trot it out.

I did. We have an idea that we are taught about something. We see this idea rather than the thing itself. You do not see a tree, you see your idea for it. What else needs be explained?


On what grounds do you think we don't see trees, but only concepts of trees.

You do, but nobody's ever reminded you of that. How could you think you don't if all you ever see is your conceopt for something? This might be a wee bit foreign and abstract for you. Sounds like it is, based on the nature of your objections.


I have to confess to you, that I have never seen a concept in my life.

BWAHAHAHAHAHA!!!! Then chances are, everything you see is a concept, but you don't know it. You see your idea for something rather than the actual thing, but if your mind is wrapped up in formulas, there is nothing I can tell you that will allow you to see this self evident truth. It's too simple for you.


Although, I think that I have concepts. Have you really ever seen a concept of a tree? What does it look like? Anything like a tree?

For me, it looks exactly like my concept of what I learned a tree should look like, same way as it does for you. You think you don't see concepts, but chances are, that's all you've seen for most of your life, but nobody told you that, they told you the opposite. You are seeing concepts.

There's an old Krishnamurti phrase "the moment the child learns the name of the bird, that bird has changed forever in the child's mind. No longer will the child see that bird again, and instead it will always see the name and characteristics he's been taught for that bird. But that's not the bird. That's hard to understand, so don't worry if you keep asking me the wrong questions.


P.S. Why do you think that because someone thinks that what you believe is false that he simply doesn't understand you, with the implication that if he did understand you, he would think you were right? Isn't that pretty arrogant?

It isn't right or wrong. I can tell the difference between disagreement that shows actual disagreement rather than misunderstanding. You won't find me in your science classes, nor will your professors. I'm no longer trapped.

[kennethamy]

Okay, call it ideas rather than concepts. Same thing isn't it? So what have you told me so far?



I did. We have an idea that we are taught about something. We see this idea rather than the thing itself. You do not see a tree, you see your idea for it. What else needs be explained?



You do, but nobody's ever reminded you of that. How could you think you don't if all you ever see is your conceopt for something? This might be a wee bit foreign and abstract for you. Sounds like it is, based on the nature of your objections.



BWAHAHAHAHAHA!!!! Then chances are, everything you see is a concept, but you don't know it. You see your idea for something rather than the actual thing, but if your mind is wrapped up in formulas, there is nothing I can tell you that will allow you to see this self evident truth. It's too simple for you.



For me, it looks exactly like my concept of what I learned a tree should look like, same way as it does for you. You think you don't see concepts, but chances are, that's all you've seen for most of your life, but nobody told you that, they told you the opposite. You are seeing concepts.

There's an old Krishnamurti phrase "the moment the child learns the name of the bird, that bird has changed forever in the child's mind. No longer will the child see that bird again, and instead it will always see the name and characteristics he's been taught for that bird. But that's not the bird. That's hard to understand, so don't worry if you keep asking me the wrong questions.



It isn't right or wrong. I can tell the difference between disagreement that shows actual disagreement rather than misunderstanding. You won't find me in your science classes, nor will your professors. I'm no longer trapped.

How can I see ideas when ideas are (supposed to be) in my mind, and I have no eyes in my mind? The only faculties I have for seeing are my eyes (and I don't hear my ideas either; or taste them; or feel them, either) In English our relation to our ideas is that we have them; we don't see, hear, smell, taste, or feel them. We see, hear, etc. objects.

Have you some argument or other to show that when we believe we are seeing tables and chairs, we are not doing that, but rather seeing ideas of tables and chairs? Or do you expect me just to take your word for it (and of course, the word of "old Krishnamurti ".) Oracular sayings (even by old Krishnamurti) do not do the trick in philosophy. Arguments are needed. I say, "I see a table". You say, "You see an idea of a table". It is up to you to prove that you are right. I'm waiting.

[curbyIII]

I thik that a rough translation of the quote is 'I am a pretentious wanker'.

David B

:notworthy:




Due to these imperfections in language, we are left traumatized.


HORSESHIT ALERT!
:notworthy:

[blip]

How can I see ideas when ideas are (supposed to be) in my mind, and I have no eyes in my mind? The only faculties I have for seeing are my eyes (and I don't hear my ideas either; or taste them; or feel them, either) In English our relation to our ideas is that we have them; we don't see, hear, smell, taste, or feel them. We see, hear, etc. objects.

Have you some argument or other to show that when we believe we are seeing tables and chairs, we are not doing that, but rather seeing ideas of tables and chairs? Or do you expect me just to take your word for it (and of course, the word of "old Krishnamurti ".) Oracular sayings (even by old Krishnamurti) do not do the trick in philosophy. Arguments are needed. I say, "I see a table". You say, "You see an idea of a table". It is up to you to prove that you are right. I'm waiting.

Look, if you are a proof hound, you'll never understand the point. If you pick up a leaf and look at it, did you see a leaf or something you never saw before? What does our mind commonly tell us? Usually, our mind tells us that we saw a leaf, not something new. But the truth is that we saw something entirely new. There is no other such thing in the entire world as that individual thing you saw. No leafs, despite their similarity, are even close to being identical. They are similar at best. We miss the uniqueness of each individual thing because we replace our vision of this with our category or concept for it. The child learns the name of the bird (sparrow). Then he sees another fluffy thing flying through the air and he says "oh, a sparrow, I've seen those before, I'm bored with sparrows". But the child has never seen that individual bird before. And he won't see it now either. He will see his concept or category called "sparrow" and he will see a list of characteristics that he has stored in his head for this category, rather than the unique, individual thing that is in front of him. He will miss it's uniqueness. The way for categories to be truly accurate, is if we create a separate category for every living thing, because none of them are the same. They are not duplicated cars and tables, but our categories relegate them to this status

As you might see right now, this idea has absolutely nothing to do with proof or non proof. It's a different realm and has strictly to do with perception. Very hard for people to get away from the mechanical thinking of proof/no proof..

[blip]

Oh, I "grasp" all right. It is just a reprise of the the representative theory of perception, except that you substitute concepts for the customary "ideas" or "sense-data" which makes the view even more implausible than it is. It is not tough at all, It is taught in philosophy 101.

Did you really read that or did you assume you already knew what it meant and therefore skimmed it. The latter wouldn't surprise me one bit.