Flaw in the Ontological Argument

[Exoheretic]

I've had this idea of a flaw in the ontological argument floating around in my head for a long time, but, surprisingly, I don't think I've ever seen it anywhere in response to the argument. Here it is:

The ontological argument (in one of its forms) defines God as possessing every perfection, and states as a premise that existence is a perfection. Therefore, by definition, God exists. However, in this argument, there is an unstated assumption that perfections objectively exist. I don't see how that can be true unless there is a supreme being to define what is perfect; therefore, the ontological argument is valid only if God exists. Quite clearly, then, it is an example of circular reasoning.

What does everyone think? Is this a valid objection to the ontological argument?

[ynquirer]

I've had this idea of a flaw in the ontological argument floating around in my head for a long time, but, surprisingly, I don't think I've ever seen it anywhere in response to the argument. Here it is:

The ontological argument (in one of its forms) defines God as possessing every perfection, and states as a premise that existence is a perfection. Therefore, by definition, God exists. However, in this argument, there is an unstated assumption that perfections objectively exist. I don't see how that can be true unless there is a supreme being to define what is perfect; therefore, the ontological argument is valid only if God exists. Quite clearly, then, it is an example of circular reasoning.

What does everyone think? Is this a valid objection to the ontological argument?

The ontological argument is of Platonic description. For a Platonist perfection exists in the realm of pure ideas, or rather perfection and necessity are the quality of pure ideas. Now if God is absolute perfection, God necessarily exists.

The argument does not entail circularity because there is grounds to discuss whether God or the gods are absolutely perfect – which in polytheism is clearly a false proposition. But in monotheism God certainly is assumed to be perfect. Then monotheism added to Platonism yields the ontological argument.

In other words, the ontological argument might not be said to be ‘flawed’. What one can possibly say is that it is forceful only for Platonists. It would be interesting to check whether or not Platonists around agree.

[curbyIII]

The ontological argument is of Platonic description. For a Platonist perfection exists in the realm of pure ideas, or rather perfection and necessity are the quality of pure ideas. Now if God is absolute perfection, God necessarily exists.

The argument does not entail circularity because there is grounds to discuss whether God or the gods are absolutely perfect – which in polytheism is clearly a false proposition. But in monotheism God certainly is assumed to be perfect. Then monotheism added to Platonism yields the ontological argument.

In other words, the ontological argument might not be said to be ‘flawed’. What one can possibly say is that it is forceful only for Platonists. It would be interesting to check whether or not Platonists around agree.

Wait a minute. Is this the ontological argument?:

God is defined to be absolutely perfect and to "have all perfections". Since existence is a perfection, god must have that too and so he must exist.

That's crazy. If that argument works, then so does this one:

The invisible pink unicorn is defined to be a pink, horse-like, horned, creature that exists. Therefore the IPU exists.

Just because I include existence in the definition of something does not make it actually exist!

[ynquirer]

Wait a minute. Is this the ontological argument?:

God is defined to be absolutely perfect and to "have all perfections". Since existence is a perfection, god must have that too and so he must exist.

That's crazy. If that argument works, then so does this one:

The invisible pink unicorn is defined to be a pink, horse-like, horned, creature that exists. Therefore the IPU exists.

Just because I include existence in the definition of something does not make it actually exist!

This is what I meant: the ontological argument lacks force from a positivist standpoint. Only if you are a Platonist - which you clearly are not - it may work.

[curbyIII]

This is what I meant: the ontological argument lacks force from a positivist standpoint. Only if you are a Platonist - which you clearly are not - it may work.

I don't understand. Why does it matter whether you are a Platonist or not?

[wiploc]

The ontological argument (in one of its forms) defines God as possessing every perfection, and states as a premise that existence is a perfection. Therefore, by definition, God exists. However, in this argument, there is an unstated assumption that perfections objectively exist. I don't see how that can be true unless there is a supreme being to define what is perfect; therefore, the ontological argument is valid only if God exists. Quite clearly, then, it is an example of circular reasoning. [emphasis added]

I don't see how having a god to define perfect will help unless you change the premise to say that god has every perfection, as perfection is defined by god. Or, better yet: ... as perfection would be defined by god if god really did exist.

Until someone defines "perfection," the argument is meaningless. It certainly is not true that the standard Christian god would be more nearly perfect if he existed.

crc

[ynquirer]

I don't see how having a god to define perfect will help unless you change the premise to say that god has every perfection, as perfection is defined by god. Or, better yet: ... as perfection would be defined by god if god really did exist.

Until someone defines "perfection," the argument is meaningless. It certainly is not true that the standard Christian god would be more nearly perfect if he existed.

crc

Perfection: The quality of an entity that has come to its completion, i.e. does not need to change.

[ynquirer]

I don't understand. Why does it matter whether you are a Platonist or not?

If you are a Platonist you accept that there are entitities that do not need to change; if you accept this, the ontological argument is compelling. Otherwise it is not.

[wiploc]

Perfection: The quality of an entity that has come to its completion, i.e. does not need to change.

So god is perfect regardless of whether he exists, and the ontological argument fails.

crc

[wiploc]

If you are a Platonist you accept that there are entitities that do not need to change; if you accept this, the ontological argument is compelling. Otherwise it is not.

I'm no Platonist, but I believe there are things that don't need to change, so I would love to hear this compelling argument.

crc

[trendkill]

What does everyone think? Is this a valid objection to the ontological argument?I don't know about the part that says God is necessary to define perfection. It seems to me, and I think this is pretty common among objectors to the argument, that it's enough to just say that "perfection" is a concept that is far too nebulous and difficult to define for it to be used the way the Ontological Argument tries to use it.

I'm no Platonist, but I believe there are things that don't need to change,I'd love to hear how this is possible.

[wiploc]

Originally Posted by wiploc
I'm no Platonist, but I believe there are things that don't need to change,

I'd love to hear how this is possible.
How is it possible? It's so obvious that I'm not even sure I understand the question, but I'll essay an answer so that you can redirect me if I'm not understanding. I'll answer in two parts.

Part the first: Plato was a doofus.

Part the second: There are things that don't need to change. Perhaps examples would be good here. Examples:

God. God doesn't exist, and that seems to be a permanent situation. Or, if he does exist, then he can keep that up too.
Gravity. I know that scientists have suggested that gravity changes over billions of years, but it doesn't have to. I mean, if the scientists come out and say, "We've decided gravity never changes," nobody is going to respond, "That's not allowed, because everything has to change."
Wind. When you heat air, it expands, and this makes wind. This will be true tomorrow too. One day there may be a heat death of the universe that means there won't be any wind because there won't be any air or any way to heat air. But the operating principle will remain unchanged. It will still be true that if there were air and if part of the air was heated, then there would be wind. I don't see any reason to suppose that this will ever change, and I certainly don't see any reason to suppose that it needs to change.
Even in the deepest depths of outer space, there will always be three feet to the yard.Since both parts of my answer seem so obviously correct as to defy doubt, I have to wonder whether I even understood the question I'm attempting to answer. Please give me guidance if I have failed to address your concerns.

crc

[trendkill]

How is it possible? It's so obvious that I'm not even sure I understand the question,Okay, it was a poorly-formed question. You could change one aspect of Platonism aside from the existence of the unchanging and it arguably would no longer be Platonism, of course. But I think it's pretty well-established among metaphysical naturalists that everything changes. Gravity has changed quite a bit according to Big Bang cosmology, I believe, so it can't really be considered unchanging, and even the concepts of "wind" and the length of a yard are dependent on the mind, which has not always existed and is always changing, if only slightly.

[wiploc]

Okay, it was a poorly-formed question. You could change one aspect of Platonism aside from the existence of the unchanging and it arguably would no longer be Platonism, of course. But I think it's pretty well-established among metaphysical naturalists that everything changes. Gravity has changed quite a bit according to Big Bang cosmology, I believe, so it can't really be considered unchanging, and even the concepts of "wind" and the length of a yard are dependent on the mind, which has not always existed and is always changing, if only slightly.

So, in your opinion, perhaps only gradually, triangles will eventually come to have four corners?

Seriously, you have your personal theory that everything (except your theory that everything changes) changes. There is no reason for other people to believe that.

Assume there are an infinite number of primes. Will this always be so? If not, then once the number primes become finite, will they stay finite? If, not will they keep switching back and forth? You can see that something (either the constancy of the primes or the fluxuation of the primes) must always be true. The claim that everything must change is unsupportable.

Now, if it helps, we can assume that I'm wrong. In which case, I am wrong, that is, I believe that some things don't need to change. In which case, regardless of the fact that I'm not a Platonist, you can tell me your compelling argument that god exists.

crc

[trendkill]

So, in your opinion, perhaps only gradually, triangles will eventually come to have four corners?I don't remember saying that specifically. If you could point out a triangle that always remains exactly the same, and has always existed, that would be a valid rebuttal. Proving that triangles never turn into squares would hardly prove that triangles are unchanging, though, any more than proving that frogs never change into butterflies would prove that frogs never change at all.


Seriously, you have your personal theory that everything (except your theory that everything changes) changes. There is no reason for other people to believe that.Lots of people seem to agree. Which was really my only claim. But it shouldn't be surprising that I think there's reason for other people to agree.

(except your theory that everything changes)Maybe I'm schizophrenic as well as misguided, because I don't remember ever writing that I am immortal or eternal. All beliefs that I now hold have changed in the past and will probably change in the future.

I'm not a Platonist

Maybe not a full-on Platonist, but your talk of unchanging principles (triangles, prime numbers, "wind" as a principle that exists even when there is no air, etc.) makes it seem that you view abstract concepts as both eternal and independent of matter or individual minds. I think "Platonic" is an apt description of that view.

[curbyIII]

Part the first: Plato was a doofus.

:notworthy:


If you are a Platonist you accept that there are entitities that do not need to change; if you accept this, the ontological argument is compelling. Otherwise it is not.


Yes, you've mentioned this already, but WHY?

[wiploc]

Maybe not a full-on Platonist, but your talk of unchanging principles (triangles, prime numbers, "wind" as a principle that exists even when there is no air, etc.) makes it seem that you view abstract concepts as both eternal and independent of matter or individual minds. I think "Platonic" is an apt description of that view.

Fine, I'm a Platonist. Now let's hear this compelling ontological argument.

crc

[ynquirer]

Fine, I'm a Platonist. Now let's hear this compelling ontological argument.

Easy. As a Platonist, you only too well know that ideas are the sole real thing, while material bodies are just a delusive appearance. Right?

There are two types of ideas. Ideas that are pure in essence but impure in existence, in the first place, which means ideas that cannot appear in the material world but in a changing, imperfect way. These ideas are far from perfection, and human can reach them only through changing notions linked to particular data.

Yet the perfect idea is one that appears to the mind in an unchangeable form. This idea is perfect because in it essence and existence cannot be separated from each other. Its existence is not linked to any particular data but to the whole of it.

In other words, you cannot think of this unchangeable idea without at once ackowledging that it exists.

That's the idea of God. :)

[wiploc]

Easy. As a Platonist, you only too well know that ideas are the sole real thing, while material bodies are just a delusive appearance. Right?


You'll have to admit that that seems pretty stupid on the face of it. Let's just say I'm not that kind of Platonist.




There are two types of ideas. Ideas that are pure in essence


Me no speaky essence talk. Or, as Fezzik said, "I need a hint."




but impure in existence,


This too, I don't understand. In what sense in the existence of a corn dog "impure"?




in the first place, which means ideas that cannot appear in the material world but in a changing, imperfect way.


Why would it mean that?



These ideas are far from perfection, and human can reach them only through changing notions linked to particular data.


<Nods head as if trying to look like he understands>




Yet the perfect idea is one that appears to the mind in an unchangeable form.

Sex in a can!




This idea is perfect because in it essence and existence cannot be separated from each other. Its existence is not linked to any particular data but to the whole of it.


Is this more premise, or is it supposed to follow from what preceded?




In other words, you cannot think of this unchangeable idea without at once ackowledging that it exists.

That's the idea of God. :)


The idea of god varies from age to age, from place to place, and from person to person. Many people think of god without "acknowledging" that he exists. Some of us go so far as to believe that god does not exist.

Even though your premises are mysterious, we know that your argument is unsound (read: not compelling (even to Platonists, in-so-far as Platonists are rational)) because the conclusion is blatantly contrary to fact.

crc

[ynquirer]

You'll have to admit that that seems pretty stupid on the face of it.

It is really a pity that you confess to be a Platonist only to discover that Platonism "seems pretty stupid."

Let's just say I'm not that kind of Platonist..

What kind of Platonist are you?

[wiploc]

It is really a pity that you confess to be a Platonist only to discover that Platonism "seems pretty stupid."



I said I wasn't a platonist. I said Plato was a doofus.
You said I'm a Platonist anyway since I don't belive that everything needs to be flux.
So I went along with your claim that I'm a Platonist, in order to hear your "compelling" ontological argument.
So now you are pitying me for accepting your claim that I'm a Platonist.
What kind of Platonist are you?


The kind who doesn't believe everything needs to be in flux. I think that's an unsupportable claim. You said that makes me a Platonist. I'm the kind of Platonist that you call a Platonist, but I'm not the kind of Platonist who believes the stupid shit Plato said about imaginary stuff being more real than real stuff.

crc

[ynquirer]

I said I wasn't a platonist. I said Plato was a doofus.
You said I'm a Platonist anyway since I don't belive that everything needs to be flux.
So I went along with your claim that I'm a Platonist, in order to hear your "compelling" ontological argument.
So now you are pitying me for accepting your claim that I'm a Platonist.

The kind who doesn't believe everything needs to be in flux. I think that's an unsupportable claim. You said that makes me a Platonist. I'm the kind of Platonist that you call a Platonist, but I'm not the kind of Platonist who believes the stupid shit Plato said about imaginary stuff being more real than real stuff.

crc

I beg your pardon? I have never said you are a Platonist of either one kind or another. I just quoted you in saying that. You had that conversation with someone else, for whom you are obviously mistaking me right now. Please check the posts above.

[trendkill]

Fine, I'm a Platonist. Now let's hear this compelling ontological argument.That's not my department, see ynquirer's posts for that. I'll just say that you may have judged Plato a doofus prematurely. I think he was pretty smart myself, and I've got less in common with him than you do. Maybe you'd like him if you gave him a chance. :P

[wiploc]

I beg your pardon? I have never said you are a Platonist of either one kind or another. I just quoted you in saying that. You had that conversation with someone else, for whom you are obviously mistaking me right now. Please check the posts above.

Allow me to beg your pardon too.

I am the kind of Platonist that Trendkill calls a Platonist. I am the kind of Platonist who thinks Plato was a doofus, which is to say that, as far as I know, I am no Platonist at all.

crc