Paradigm: An OK Concept for an A-OK People

[coberst]

Paradigm: An OK Concept for A-OK People

Margaret Masterman has written the essay “The Nature of a Paradigm” for inclusion in the book “Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge”.

Her conclusions are: “That there is normal science—and that it is exactly as Kuhn says it is...it is normally a habit-governed, puzzle-solving activity, not a fundamentally upheaving or falsifying activity…‘paradigm’ and not ‘hypothesis’ is now the ‘O.K. word’.”

Kuhn’s paradigm is a fundamental and new idea in the philosophy of science and deserves examination and understanding. Masterman contends that comprehending this new concept can best be undertaken by recognizing that ‘paradigm’ falls within three main epistemological categories.

As a “set of beliefs”, as a successful metaphysical speculation, as a standard, as a “way of seeing”, as an organizing principle itself, as a map, and “with something which determines a large area of reality”--it is a metaparadigm .

Kuhn also defines ‘paradigm’ as a universally recognized scientific achievement, as a concrete achievement, as a set of political institutions, and as likened to an accepted judicial decision—it is a sociological paradigm .

Finally, Kuhn speaks of a more concrete form for paradigm as a text book, as tools, as instrumentation, as a grammar, as an analogy, and as a gestalt figure—it is a construct paradigm .

If you have not yet read “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” by Thomas Kuhn you must go directly to your closest college library, get a ‘Friend of the Library’ card for a small yearly fee, and study this book. Anybody wanting to be an enlightened and important person must study this book.

Do you agree that anyone wishing to become an enlightened and important person must study this book?

[Kosh3]

No. The importance of a person does not need to relate to whether they have read Kuhn. It is damn interesting material though. I havn't read Kuhn's book, but I have read an essay or two of his and some secondary stuff.

[kennethamy]

Paradigm: An OK Concept for A-OK People

Margaret Masterman has written the essay “The Nature of a Paradigm” for inclusion in the book “Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge”.

Her conclusions are: “That there is normal science—and that it is exactly as Kuhn says it is...it is normally a habit-governed, puzzle-solving activity, not a fundamentally upheaving or falsifying activity…‘paradigm’ and not ‘hypothesis’ is now the ‘O.K. word’.”

Kuhn’s paradigm is a fundamental and new idea in the philosophy of science and deserves examination and understanding. Masterman contends that comprehending this new concept can best be undertaken by recognizing that ‘paradigm’ falls within three main epistemological categories.

As a “set of beliefs”, as a successful metaphysical speculation, as a standard, as a “way of seeing”, as an organizing principle itself, as a map, and “with something which determines a large area of reality”--it is a metaparadigm .

Kuhn also defines ‘paradigm’ as a universally recognized scientific achievement, as a concrete achievement, as a set of political institutions, and as likened to an accepted judicial decision—it is a sociological paradigm .

Finally, Kuhn speaks of a more concrete form for paradigm as a text book, as tools, as instrumentation, as a grammar, as an analogy, and as a gestalt figure—it is a construct paradigm .

If you have not yet read “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” by Thomas Kuhn you must go directly to your closest college library, get a ‘Friend of the Library’ card for a small yearly fee, and study this book. Anybody wanting to be an enlightened and important person must study this book.

Do you agree that anyone wishing to become an enlightened and important person must study this book?


I don't know exactly when this book came out, but it is at least 50 years ago. So it is not exactly the latest scoop. And Kuhn, himself, who has since died, recanted some portions of it.

Since it was published, it has been subjected to a great deal of criticism, and although the notion of the paradigm is valuable heuristically, it has been much less influential with philosophers of science, than with the general literary public (historians, sociologists, and, of course, the teachers of English literature who hang on to any passing fad long after the experts have absorbed the good, and discarded the bad) Even Kuhn allowed that the idea was too vague to be of much use by itself.

One of the most important criticisms of the book (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) is that it confuses the history and sociology of science, with the philosophy and methodology of science. It ignores the difference between a description of what scientists do, with a normative "rational reconstruction" of scientific method.

It's general theme, that there is really no accumulation of scientific knowledge, but that "paradigms" simply give way to other "paradigms" seems profoundly counter-intuitive, for I take it as a given that we know more about the world today than we did 200 years ago, and that we'll probably know more about the world than we do today, 200 years hence. And that much of this new knowledge about the world will be partly a rejection of what we thought we knew, but did not know, and most important, that what we learn new about the world will come from science.

It is also true that although it is not Kuhn's fault, his book abetted a strong and retrograde irrationalism not only in the philosophy of science (culminating with Feyerabend who informed us that voodoo and magic was as valid as physics) but certainly helped to give rise to the postmodern infestation of intellectual life and its "truth-deniers": some of which pops up on this board quite frequently.

[coberst]

I don't know exactly when this book came out, but it is at least 50 years ago. So it is not exactly the latest scoop. And Kuhn, himself, who has since died, recanted some portions of it.

Since it was published, it has been subjected to a great deal of criticism, and although the notion of the paradigm is valuable heuristically, it has been much less influential with philosophers of science, than with the general literary public (historians, sociologists, and, of course, the teachers of English literature who hang on to any passing fad long after the experts have absorbed the good, and discarded the bad) Even Kuhn allowed that the idea was too vague to be of much use by itself.

One of the most important criticisms of the book (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) is that it confuses the history and sociology of science, with the philosophy and methodology of science. It ignores the difference between a description of what scientists do, with a normative "rational reconstruction" of scientific method.

It's general theme, that there is really no accumulation of scientific knowledge, but that "paradigms" simply give way to other "paradigms" seems profoundly counter-intuitive, for I take it as a given that we know more about the world today than we did 200 years ago, and that we'll probably know more about the world than we do today, 200 years hence. And that much of this new knowledge about the world will be partly a rejection of what we thought we knew, but did not know, and most important, that what we learn new about the world will come from science.

It is also true that although it is not Kuhn's fault, his book abetted a strong and retrograde irrationalism not only in the philosophy of science (culminating with Feyerabend who informed us that voodoo and magic was as valid as physics) but certainly helped to give rise to the postmodern infestation of intellectual life and its "truth-deniers": some of which pops up on this board quite frequently.


The book was first published in 1962. If you consider 50 years to be too ancient for serious consideration I think you are mistaken.

You are correct; Kuhn’s work has received a great deal of scrutiny, which I think indicates its importance.

Kuhn’s idea of the ‘paradigm’ has received a good deal of criticism for being vague; but I think it is vague because, unlike normal science, he seeks to examine the whole problem as a gestalt and not to ignore those matters that do not fit within a paradigm as do the normal sciences.

I think that the concept is extremely valuable because it provides the lay person as well as the working scientist with a more comprehensive view of normal science but also all sciences. Almost everyone, especially the natural scientist, has a seriously warped comprehension of the natural sciences in particular and thus has a dangerous attitude toward all sciences as a result.

My study of Kuhn’s book leads me to conclude that your statement, which follows, is seriously in error.

“It's general theme, that there is really no accumulation of scientific knowledge, but that "paradigms" simply give way to other "paradigms" seems profoundly counter-intuitive, for I take it as a given that we know more about the world today than we did 200 years ago, and that we'll probably know more about the world than we do today, 200 years hence. And that much of this new knowledge about the world will be partly a rejection of what we thought we knew, but did not know, and most important, that what we learn new about the world will come from science.”

I am not familiar with the “retrograde irrationalism not only in the philosophy of science (culminating with Feyerabend who informed us that voodoo and magic was as valid as physics)” that you speak of.

I have devoted a great deal of time trying to understand Kuhn’s ideas and plan to spend a great deal more until I feel that I do understand the matter because I think that what he has introduced is very important.

[kennethamy]

The book was first published in 1962. If you consider 50 years to be too ancient for serious consideration I think you are mistaken.

You are correct; Kuhn’s work has received a great deal of scrutiny, which I think indicates its importance.

Kuhn’s idea of the ‘paradigm’ has received a good deal of criticism for being vague; but I think it is vague because, unlike normal science, he seeks to examine the whole problem as a gestalt and not to ignore those matters that do not fit within a paradigm as do the normal sciences.

I think that the concept is extremely valuable because it provides the lay person as well as the working scientist with a more comprehensive view of normal science but also all sciences. Almost everyone, especially the natural scientist, has a seriously warped comprehension of the natural sciences in particular and thus has a dangerous attitude toward all sciences as a result.

My study of Kuhn’s book leads me to conclude that your statement, which follows, is seriously in error.

I have devoted a great deal of time trying to understand Kuhn’s ideas and plan to spend a great deal more until I feel that I do understand the matter because I think that what he has introduced is very important.

Well, does Kuhn think that there is an accumulation of knowledge? After all, it is his view that paradigms are "incommensurable" (his term) which means that there is no way that they can be evaluated against one another. Remember, paradigms are never refuted, according to Kuhn. They, or rather their proponents, just "fade away" and then the new paradigm replaces the old one, not because it is better (or, God forbid! true, and the old one is false). It is this (main) theme in Kuhn that leads to the irrationalism I mentioned, whereby, Paul Feyerabend, a a student and follower of Kuhn's, held that the paradigm of voodoo and magic, was not better or worse than that of physics, since, of course, the two paradigms are "incommensurable". The whole sad story of the track begun by Kuhn is well-told in the late David Stove's fine book, Anything Goes: The Origins of the Cult of Scientific Irrationalism[I].

You can get a fair idea of the argument at:

http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:jbocC72CZGUJ:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Stove+david+stove+irrationalism&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1&ie=UTF-8

Of course I don't think that a 50 year old book is any the less worth reading for its age. I think that a much older book, Descartes' [I]Meditations on First Philosophy is much better reading than Kuhn's (and more can be learned from it). I just mentioned the age of the book because I thought your post left the impression that it was hot off the presses.

As I pointed out, not only has scientific subjectivism followed in Kuhn's train, but the reprehensible postmodern movement cites Kuhn as one of their intellectual (if that is the word) forebears. As I said, that of course, is not Kuhn's fault, on the other hand, "as you sow, so shall you reap".

Of course, Kuhn should be read-critically. I have used him as a text several times, myself. It is an important book of the 20th century, and people should be familiar with it. The greatest contributions to any subject have come (paradoxically) from those who have made the most flagrant mistakes, since it is by understanding why they are mistakes, and attempting to correct them, that we have learned the most. Descartes (who I mentioned earlier) is a paradigm of such a figure.

[Kosh3]

Well, does Kuhn think that there is an accumulation of knowledge? After all, it is his view that paradigms are "incommensurable" (his term) which means that there is no way that they can be evaluated against one another.

Kuhn (1977) backed away from the 'irrationality' of paradigm overthrow claim, and claimed that there were grounds by which paradigms could be compared - transparadigm criteria for the acceptance of one paradigm over another. I get this from Alvin Goldman, who does not, unfortunately, go into detail.

1) Accuracy
2) Consistency
3) Scope
4) Simplicity
5) Fruitfulness

These constitute the "shared basis for theory choice".

Feyerabend, so far as I read him (long ago), said there was some incommensurability (aka Kuhn-loss), but not complete.

PS - thanks for the Stove link. When I find time I must read him.

[kennethamy]

Kuhn (1977) backed away from the 'irrationality' of paradigm overthrow claim, and claimed that there were grounds by which paradigms could be compared - transparadigm criteria for the acceptance of one paradigm over another. I get this from Alvin Goldman, who does not, unfortunately, go into detail.

1) Accuracy
2) Consistency
3) Scope
4) Simplicity
5) Fruitfulness

These constitute the "shared basis for theory choice".

Feyerabend, so far as I read him (long ago), said there was some incommensurability (aka Kuhn-loss), but not complete.

PS - thanks for the Stove link. When I find time I must read him.

Yes. First he made these jazzy claims which gave him all the fame, and then, he took it back. What does "some incommensurability" mean? It sounds like, "a little bit pregnant".

You are welcome. Stove skewers the view, and, thereby shows why no philosopher of science takes it seriously, and, equally, why all the litterateurs do. (I forgot to mention another strong criticism of the view: Israel Scheffler's, Science and Subjectivity which you also might like to look at.

[Kosh3]

Go to complete incommensurability, where discussion between proponents of two competing paradigms breaks down completely as there is no common ground of understanding between one another, and then go back a step.

[Kosh3]

This page, by the way, is absolutely priceless.

http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/stovehelp.html

[kennethamy]

Go to complete incommensurability, where discussion between proponents of two competing paradigms breaks down completely as there is no common ground of understanding between one another, and then go back a step.

Go to pregnancy, where some woman is going to have a baby, and then go back a step. To what? Abortion?

Kuhn keeps telling us things like what an astronomer in one paradigm meant by "the moon" was entirely different from what an astronomer in another paradigm meant by "the moon". The same thing has come up recently about Pluto, and the allegation by neo-Kuhnians, that what astronomers meant by "planet" last month is different from what astronomers meant by "planet" this month. See the thread, "Was Pluto Ever a Planet?"

[comiezapr]

Kuhn isnt irrelevant to philosophers of science. When philosophers of science deal with scientific realism Kuhn, or at least Kuhnian themes, are important. A breif outline of this argument would be... The meaning of a term is determined by the system in which it occurs. Different systems arent comparable semantically and so the terms within them mean different things. Since the terms mean different things in different theories the way the world is cut up and categorized varies depending on theory. Since there is variable categorization and theories are bound to change we can view abstract entities posited by science as unreal or not concrete. This is a Quine-Kuhn argument in impressivly light detail.

I would agree that in issues related to the rationality of science Kuhn's insights are generally neutral. Any insights into how things are arent related to debates about how things ought to be. These issues, thankfully, arent the only issues in the philosophy of science.

Reading this book is pretty important in the philosophy of science because it sort of gets the idea across that science needs to be located before it can be analyzed.

I dont think that that Kuhn can be reduced to just talk in the sociology of science. I dont see why an analysis of a particular institution imediatly results in it being sociological. Kuhn asks a simple question: how does science inquire into the world and progress its knowledge of that world? I dont see this as being an imediate sociological question. I mean really, does Davidson's work on intepretation then count as the sociology of language? Does linguistics turn into sociology? Does epistemology turn into sociology?

Just because stuff is related to human affairs doesnt mean that its dealing with sociological material. Sociology investigates the dynamics of people and thier society. To include things like Linguistics and Kuhn and such into this category is to drain it of any important meaning. Ya, they deal with people in thier own abstract and distant way, but this is hardly important.

Kuhn deals with the history of science and uses examples from history in order to analyze the abstract structure of scientific progress and methods. Looks like epistemology to me. Maybe i draw the line incorrectly, or in a different way than other people would, I dont care.

[comiezapr]

Kuhn keeps telling us things like what an astronomer in one paradigm meant by "the moon" was entirely different from what an astronomer in another paradigm meant by "the moon". The same thing has come up recently about Pluto, and the allegation by neo-Kuhnians, that what astronomers meant by "planet" last month is different from what astronomers meant by "planet" this month. See the thread, "Was Pluto Ever a Planet?"

The pluto example wouldnt be a paradigm shift. This would be a case of a vague term being clarified. Its evident that this isnt a paradigm shift because there was an explicit defition for the term being introduced from within concepts already present in the theory.

Im suprised you dont take paradigm shifts more seriously since, if i remember correctly, youre pretty into Quine. Kuhn is like Quine with a speciality in history instead of mathematics.

Im not sure what partial inconsumerserability would be because i dont think inconsumerserability has been adequatly defined. Ill do my part to analyze it for this thread.

Inconcsumerserable theories are charachterized by a few things:

1) The two theories distinguish between different possibilities.
2) The entities used to describe different possibilities are mereological simples with respect to thier respective theories. (Mereological simple means that it is part of other things but has no parts itself.)
3) The entities used to describe different possibilities are neither mereologial simples nor mereological complexes with respect to the opposing theory.

I think this is at least on the right track. Partial inconsumerserability would either slacken the first or third criteria; the theories distinguish between the same possibilities differently or the theories distinguish between different possibilities in an equivalent way entity wise.

Actually having partial inconsumerserability in science could be acomplished by introducing a new method of combining mereological simples to form merelogical complexes; theres new ways of combining entities which create new entities foriegn to the other theory. There could be new relations defined between the mereological simples while holding those simples fixed. One theory could introduce a new simple that allows that theory to distinguish between more possibilities than the other.

All of these ways, and im sure there are more, of changing and modifying theory would result in partial inconsumerserability. At least, i see no obvious reason against thinking this.

I have to have a rejoinder. Im using some technical aparatus that Kuhn certianly did not use. Kuhn dealt with semantics very broadly and vaguely. Since i absolutly love charachterizing content in terms of possible worlds and the description of those possible worlds i took the natural step and updated Kuhns stuff to state it in a more precise way. David Lewis charachterizes the content of science in terms of possible worlds and i think this would be a natural extension of that project.

[coberst]

Well, does Kuhn think that there is an accumulation of knowledge? After all, it is his view that paradigms are "incommensurable" (his term) which means that there is no way that they can be evaluated against one another.


Normal science is a puzzle-solving enterprise. Normal science is a slow accumulation of knowledge by a methodical step-by-step process undertaken by a group of scientists.

The following quotations I have taken from chapter IV “Normal Science as Puzzle Solving”
of Kuhn’s book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”.:

“Perhaps the most striking feature of the normal research problems we have just encountered is how little they aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal.”

“the man who succeeds proves himself an expert puzzle-solver,”

“puzzles are,..that special category of problems that can test ingenuity or skill in solution”

“though intrinsic value is no criterion for puzzle, the assured existence of a solution is.”

“a paradigm can, or for that matter, even insulate the community from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form,…”

“one of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving.”

“to classify as a puzzle,..there must also be rules that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained.”

[kennethamy]

Normal science is a puzzle-solving enterprise. Normal science is a slow accumulation of knowledge by a methodical step-by-step process undertaken by a group of scientists.

The following quotations I have taken from chapter IV “Normal Science as Puzzle Solving”
of Kuhn’s book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”.:

“Perhaps the most striking feature of the normal research problems we have just encountered is how little they aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal.”

“the man who succeeds proves himself an expert puzzle-solver,”

“puzzles are,..that special category of problems that can test ingenuity or skill in solution”

“though intrinsic value is no criterion for puzzle, the assured existence of a solution is.”

“a paradigm can, or for that matter, even insulate the community from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form,…”

“one of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving.”

“to classify as a puzzle,..there must also be rules that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained.”

Yes. knowledge within the paradigm, but not external to it. Do you (or Kuhn) think that water was ever an element as the Medievals believed it was? I believe we now know that water was never an element, and that those who did "normal science" within the paradigm of the "four elements" fire, water, earth, and air, were ignorant of chemistry. Kuhn would say that when we went to the table of elements, and water (nor the other three) are on it because they are not elements, that there has simply been a "paradigm switch", and of course, the two paradigms, the medieval paradigm, and the modern chemical paradigm, are "incommensurable". Therefore, we have not learned anything new about elements since the medievals, and that our chemical knowledge does not supercede that of the medievals: it's just another paradigm.

By the way, this discussion is really just the same discussion of the earlier thread, "Was Pluto ever a Planet?" from a different angle.