The differing meanings of "exists".

[TheMathGuy]

I think I'm beginning to understand a large part of the difficulty with the question of "Does God exist?" Personally I think the question is unanswerable because it is given no context. Is there an "individual" of some sort controlling the universe who can be swayed to act in our favor by our obedience and who has given us infallible instructions in the form of the Christian Bible? I highly doubt it! Is there a such thing as "good" or "love"? Certainly yes! But in the context of being a physicist these ideas are not necessary. Then comes the question of whether formal logic or mathematical constructs "exist". Does a circle exist? I doubt that we are going to find any physical object which has the form of a perfect circle, and even if we did the object itself would still not be the circle. Yet it makes perfect sense to talk about circles within the context of planar geometry. Does formal logic have any causal effect on the universe? From the perspective of a physicist, the answer would appear to be "no". However, I think it's entirely valid for me to say "Logic compels me to do such and such." or "I did X because it was the logical thing to do." Does that mean logic, as opposed to causal material laws, is actually what resulted in my doing of X? I don't think it's an either/or scenario. Both are merely different ways of describing the same thing, neither more nor less valid than the other. Of course, the notion of logic dictating that you do a certain things only applies to us conscious beings who have some comprehension of abstract, formal logic. How is it that mere material beings have an understanding of formal logic, an immaterial thing? Why do we humans experience being? The very notion of answering such questions with a physical explanation is absurd. It is our physical existence that enables us to comprehend logic and yet it is logic that enables us to comprehend our physical existence.

That's why I think it's not so much the existence of "God" that matters, but rather what is supposed to be meant by "God". What concept are we humans trying to capture with this word? Are we just trying to describe some sort of anthropomorphic "father" figure, (in which case I would argue we should dispense with it) or is this meant to refer to an idea that transcends physical reality, as some theologians have suggested? If any of you have read Bishop John Shelby Spong's books, such as "Rescuing the Bible from Fundamentalism" or "Why Christianity Must Change or Die", I think they paint a good picture of the idea I'm attempting to stab at. Any thoughts?

[blip]

From "Awareness" by Anthony DeMello

Everyone asks me about what will happen when they finally arrive. Is this just curiosity? We're always asking how would this fit into that system, or whether this would make sense in that context, or what it will feel like when we get there. Get started and you will know; it cannot be described. It is said widely in the East, "Those who know, do not say; those who say, do not know". It cannot be said; only the opposite can be said.

The guru cannot give you the truth. Truth cannot be put into words, into a formula. That isn't the truth. That isn't reality. Reality cannot be put into a formula. The guru can only point out your errors. When you drop your errors, you will know the truth. And even then you cannot say. This is common teaching among the great Catholic mystics. The great Thomas Aquinas, toward the end of his life, wouldn't write and wouldn't talk; he had seen. I had thought he kept that famous silence of his for only a couple of months, but it went on for years.

He realized he had made a fool of himself, and he said so explicitly. It's as if you had never tasted a green mango and you ask me, "What does it taste like"? I'd say to you, "Sour", but in giving you a word, I've put you off the track. Try to understand that. Most people aren't very wise; they seize upon the word - upon the words of scripture, for example - and they get it all wrong. "Sour", I say, and you ask, "Sour like vinegar, sour like a lemon"?

No, not sour like a lemon, but sour like a mango. "But I never tasted one", you say. Too bad! But you go ahead and write a doctoral thesis on it. You wouldn't have if you had tasted it. You really wouldn't. You'd have written a doctoral thesis on other things, but not on mangoes. And the day you finally taste a green mango, you say, "God, I made a fool of myself. I shouldn't have written that thesis". That's exactly what Thomas Aquinas did.

A great German philosopher and theologian wrote a whole book specifically on the silence of St. Thomas. He simply went silent. Wouldn't talk. In the prologue of his Summa Theologica, which was the summary of all his theology, he says, "About God, we cannot say what He is but rather what He is not. And so we cannot speak about how He is but rather how He is not". And in his famous commentary on Boethius' De Sancta Trinitate he says there are three ways of knowing God (1) in the creation, (2) in God's actions through history, and (3) in the highest form of the knowledge of God - to know God tamquam ignotum (to know God as the unknown).

The highest form of talking about the Trinity is to know that one does not know. Now, this is not an Oriental Zen master speaking. This is a canonized saint of the Roman Catholic Church, the prince of theologians for centuries. To know God as unknown. In another place St. Thomas even says as unknowable. Reality, God, divinity, truth, love are unknowable; that means they cannot be comprehended by the thinking mind. That would set at rest so many questions people have because we're always living under the illusion that we know. We don't. We cannot know.

What is scripture, then? It's a hint, a clue, not a description. The fanaticism of one sincere believer who thinks he knows causes more evil than the united efforts of two hundred rogues. It's terrifying to see what sincere believers will do because they think they know. Wouldn't it be wonderful if we had a world where everybody said, "We don't know"? One big barrier dropped. Wouldn't that be marvelous?

A man born blind comes to me and asks, "What is this thing called green"? How does one describe the color green to someone who was born blind? One uses analogies. So I say, "The color green is something like soft music". "Oh", he says, "like soft music". "Yes", I say, "soothing and soft music". So a second blind man comes to me and asks, "What is the color green"? I tell him it's something like soft satin, very soft and soothing to the touch. So the next day I notice that the two blind men are bashing each other over the head with bottles.

One is saying, "It's soft like music"; the other is saying, "It's soft like satin". And on it goes. Neither of them knows what they're talking about, because if they did, they'd shut up. It's as bad as that. It's even worse, because one day, say, you give sight to this blind man, and he's sitting there in the garden and he's looking all around him, and you say to him, "Well, now you know what the color green is". And he answers, "That's true. I heard some of it this morning!"

The fact is that you're surrounded by God and you don't see God, because you "know" about God. The final barrier to the vision of God is your God concept. You miss God because you think you know. That's the terrible thing about religion. That's what the gospels were saying, that religious people "knew", so they got rid of Jesus. The highest knowledge of God is to know God as unknowable. There is far too much God talk; the world is sick of it.

There is too little awareness, too little love, too little happiness, but let's not use those words either. There's too little dropping of illusions, dropping of errors, dropping of attachments and cruelty, too little awareness. That's what the world is suffering from, not from a lack of religion. Religion is supposed to be about a lack of awareness, of waking up. Look what we've degenerated into.

Come to my country and see them killing one another over religion. You'll find it everywhere. "The one who knows, does not say; the one who says, does not know". All revelations, however divine, are never any more than a finger pointing to the moon. As we say in the East, "When the sage points to the moon, all the idiot sees is the finger". Jean Guiton, a very pious and orthodox French writer, adds a terrifying comment "We often use the finger to gouge eyes out". Isn't that terrible? Awareness, awareness, awareness! In awareness is healing; in awareness is truth; in awareness is salvation; in awareness is spirituality; in awareness is growth; in awareness is love; in awareness is awakening. Awareness.

I need to talk about words and concepts because I must explain to you why it is, when we look at a tree, we really don't see. We think we do, but we don't. When we look at a person, we really don't see that person, we only think we do. What we're seeing is something that we fixed in our mind. We get an impression and we hold on to that impression, and we keep looking at a person through that impression.

And we do this with almost everything. If you understand that, you will understand the loveliness and beauty of being aware of everything around you. Because reality is there; "God", whatever that is, is there. It's all there. The poor little fish in the ocean says, "Excuse me, I'm looking for the ocean. Can you tell me where I can find it"? Pathetic, isn't it? If we would just open our eyes and see, then we would understand.

[Starlock]

The question of existence is tied with how and who defines reality. What is the nature of reality? What is real and what is not real? There are many different ways to classify reality and depending on which one you use you'll get different conclusions.

[Witt]

TheMathGuy:
The differing meanings of "exists".

For me there is only one definition of 'exists'.

x exists =df EF(Fx).

That is to say, God exists iff there is at least one confirmable property that God has.
But, since God is a described entity ..the x such that Fx, Gx, Hx, etc,
we must be able to affirm that such a description has reference.

Can you describe/define God such that it does have a reference.
I don't think so.

Nontheless, if you can provide 'one' property that God has, then you have proof that 'God exists'.

God exists, is shown to be false if the description/definition of God is contradictory!

The notions of absolute or perfect seem to me useless.

[Karen M]

The definition of God has become so distorted that the only real requirements seem to be self-awareness, a hand in the creation of humanity, and complete unprovability.

[kennethamy]

I think I'm beginning to understand a large part of the difficulty with the question of "Does God exist?" Personally I think the question is unanswerable because it is given no context. Is there an "individual" of some sort controlling the universe who can be swayed to act in our favor by our obedience and who has given us infallible instructions in the form of the Christian Bible? I highly doubt it! Is there a such thing as "good" or "love"? Certainly yes! But in the context of being a physicist these ideas are not necessary. Then comes the question of whether formal logic or mathematical constructs "exist". Does a circle exist? I doubt that we are going to find any physical object which has the form of a perfect circle, and even if we did the object itself would still not be the circle. Yet it makes perfect sense to talk about circles within the context of planar geometry. Does formal logic have any causal effect on the universe? From the perspective of a physicist, the answer would appear to be "no". However, I think it's entirely valid for me to say "Logic compels me to do such and such." or "I did X because it was the logical thing to do." Does that mean logic, as opposed to causal material laws, is actually what resulted in my doing of X? I don't think it's an either/or scenario. Both are merely different ways of describing the same thing, neither more nor less valid than the other. Of course, the notion of logic dictating that you do a certain things only applies to us conscious beings who have some comprehension of abstract, formal logic. How is it that mere material beings have an understanding of formal logic, an immaterial thing? Why do we humans experience being? The very notion of answering such questions with a physical explanation is absurd. It is our physical existence that enables us to comprehend logic and yet it is logic that enables us to comprehend our physical existence.

That's why I think it's not so much the existence of "God" that matters, but rather what is supposed to be meant by "God". What concept are we humans trying to capture with this word? Are we just trying to describe some sort of anthropomorphic "father" figure, (in which case I would argue we should dispense with it) or is this meant to refer to an idea that transcends physical reality, as some theologians have suggested? If any of you have read Bishop John Shelby Spong's books, such as "Rescuing the Bible from Fundamentalism" or "Why Christianity Must Change or Die", I think they paint a good picture of the idea I'm attempting to stab at. Any thoughts?

I think you are saying that it isn't that there are different meanings of "exist" for there aren't any. See Witt's post. It is that there are different meanings of the word "God". The mealy-mouthed cliche' that we all believe in the same God is patently false. Moslems do not believe in the same God as Christians. And Jews do not believe in the same God as do Christians or Moslems (and so on). But when a Jew, or a Moslem, or a Christian believes that God exists, he surely believes the same thing about his God (or rather his concept of God) as do the others. Namely that the concept has a referent.

[Witt]

I think you are saying that it isn't that there are different meanings of "exist" for there aren't any. See Witt's post. It is that there are different meanings of the word "God". The mealy-mouthed cliche' that we all believe in the same God is patently false. Moslems do not believe in the same God as Christians. And Jews do not believe in the same God as do Christians or Moslems (and so on). But when a Jew, or a Moslem, or a Christian believes that God exists, he surely believes the same thing about his God (or rather his concept of God) as do the others. Namely that the concept has a referent.

Yes, it is nice to be able to agree with you, for a change.

All of the ontological proofs of the existence of God, depend on a description/definition that may or may not have sense.

Anslem's proof fails because 'the x such that x has all perfections' has no referrent!

[kennethamy]

Anslem's proof fails because 'the x such that x has all perfections' has no referrent!

Well, there is a problem of sense here too. And, wouldn't you want to say that Anselm's proof fails not because 'the x such that x has all perfections' has no referent, since to say that it fails it just to say that it fails to prove that, 'the x such that x has all perfections' has a referent? So to say that it fails because. 'the x such that x has all perfections' has no referent is only to say that it fails because it fails. Clearly, there is no proof of what is false.

[Witt]

Well, there is a problem of sense here too. And, wouldn't you want to say that Anselm's proof fails not because 'the x such that x has all perfections' has no referent, since to say that it fails it just to say that it fails to prove that, 'the x such that x has all perfections' has a referent? So to say that it fails because. 'the x such that x has all perfections' has no referent is only to say that it fails because it fails. Clearly, there is no proof of what is false.


Your gibberish is not worthy of remark.

[kennethamy]

Your gibberish is not worthy of remark.

You, in effect, informed me that Anselm's proof is no good because its conclusion is false. (the term "perfect being" has no referent). You need not have informed me of that. I would have supposed that any argument which has a false conclusion, would not be a sound argument. But thank you for reminding me of that.

[Zap]

in order for something to exist, it must take us spatial coordinates in space. even thoughts that might apparently seem like abstract immaterial existences to someone are still based on something existing in the physical world - neurons firing (each thought has a corresponding activity in the brain).

so even apparent immaterial abstractions are only illusions if one think they actually exist... it is the physical process - the brains physical activity -- is its absolute necessary condition to be able to exist. in order for something to exist, it must take up spatial coordinates, otherwise you have nothing. It's as simple as that.

[open-ended answer]

in order for something to exist, it must take us spatial coordinates in space. even thoughts that might apparently seem like abstract immaterial existences to someone are still based on something existing in the physical world - neurons firing (each thought has a corresponding activity in the brain).

so even apparent immaterial abstractions are only illusions if one think they actually exist... it is the physical process - the brains physical activity -- is its absolute necessary condition to be able to exist. in order for something to exist, it must take up spatial coordinates, otherwise you have nothing. It's as simple as that.

Everything we see, hear, smell, experience etc. (the submissive perceiving "I") correlates to specific brain activity, which is as much related to particular patterns of activity as to spatial points of the brain.

The understanding of the relationships between "objects" of phenomenal experience(the grasping of the interpretting "I") also correlates to brain activity.

So say you experience a dog bighting you, and I perceive a dog bighting you, so that we both conclude that such an event "happened" (in the physical world taking up space-time). This is based on the foundational assumption of an objective reality- interestingly the only reality the self experiences as such is it's own subjective experience ground through analytic filters.

Subsequently we do not find actual red lines between bordering countries when we cross them as we see on the map: these differitiations symbolised on the map are imposed by human beings in agreement with each other- they are not intrinsic to "reality." "Country" exists to the countrymen but not to the owl or eagle that fly between them without a thought.

A neurologist studying brain patterns also produces brain patterns... but the two are not the same.

The bighting dog and the brain patterns correlating to the experience (both from participant and observer) are in relation but distinct.

So as for notions of love and country, I'd conclude that the "experience" of them and the specific brain activity relating to them are not identical, only related.

[untermensche]

For a human to say something exists there must be a way for a human sense to detect it.

Or now, a human technological extension of their senses.

But if something cannot be apprehended by a human sense, or human technological sense enhancement, then it could still very well exist.

Our understanding of existence is limited by our senses.

[TruthPrevails]

That's why I think it's not so much the existence of "God" that matters, but rather what is supposed to be meant by "God". Agree with you on the first part, but what is that, that is driving most humans to be so sure or certain that God exists.

It is the fear and psychological pains arising out of uncertainty. Humans have been programmed for certainty to facilitate survival and preservation of the specie.

The 'mother' of all fear for the majority of human, manifest from the uncertainty arising from the questions of mortality. Uncertainties on this issue, create tremenduous psychological pains and anxieties.

To soothe these pains, the hardwired certainty-program jumped in to fill it with the existence of the called the God-of-the-Gap. For the majority, once they believe in the existence of the God-of-the-Gap, the related psychological pains vanish. It is basically this 'panado-effect' or opium that the majority cling to the existence of god. It is just something practical regardless whether it is real or not.

We also deal with the concept of existence in other aspects of our existence, sensual or otherwise. Some insist on objective existence. Whatever the 'existence' it is merely a practical concept, albeit in a different degree from that of the god concept.

Whatever the concept of existence we intersubjectively agree upon for practical reason in this point in time, we should not be obstinate or carve such relative understanding in stone tablets. We should philosophize and stretch our understand of 'existence' or any other concepts where possible. That would include my views above which is open for critique.

[kennethamy]

Agree with you on the first part, but what is that, that is driving most humans to be so sure or certain that God exists.

It is the fear and psychological pains arising out of uncertainty. Humans have been programmed for certainty to facilitate survival and preservation of the specie.

The 'mother' of all fear for the majority of human, manifest from the uncertainty arising from the questions of mortality. Uncertainties on this issue, create tremenduous psychological pains and anxieties.

To soothe these pains, the hardwired certainty-program jumped in to fill it with the existence of the called the God-of-the-Gap. For the majority, once they believe in the existence of the God-of-the-Gap, the related psychological pains vanish. It is basically this 'panado-effect' or opium that the majority cling to the existence of god. It is just something practical regardless whether it is real or not.

We also deal with the concept of existence in other aspects of our existence, sensual or otherwise. Some insist on objective existence. Whatever the 'existence' it is merely a practical concept, albeit in a different degree from that of the god concept.

Whatever the concept of existence we intersubjectively agree upon for practical reason in this point in time, we should not be obstinate or carve such relative understanding in stone tablets. We should philosophize and stretch our understand of 'existence' or any other concepts where possible. That would include my views above which is open for critique.

The psychological effect of believing that God exists (or doesn't exist) on this or that person is one thing. The philosophical issue, what are we saying when we say the God exists or does not exist, is a different issue. Philosophy is not psychology. People who talk of "senses of existence" or who talk about how things exist "in different ways" owe us some explanation of what they are saying.

Thomas Aquinas was very specific when he insisted the the term "exists" has a unitary meaning, and that if God exists, God exists in exactly the same "sense" or "way" that a table exists, because as soon as you say something like, "Yes, God exists, but God does not exist the way a table exists", you are well on your way to saying, that God does not exist at all. Just as there is something that is infinite in length, it still must be at least one inch long since if it isn't at least one inch long it cannot be longer than one inch; so, if God exists, then God must exist at least in the way a table exists (whatever that means) since if God does not exist in at least the way a table exists, then God does not exist at all.

[blip]

Thomas Aquinas was very specific when he insisted the the term "exists" has a unitary meaning, and that if God exists, God exists in exactly the same "sense" or "way" that a table exists,

After Aquinas supposedly experienced God, he invalidated all his past writings and refused to speak or write about God anymore, after devoting his life to that endevour. There are simply some things that can never be adequately put into words, and this is the conclusion that Aquinas eventually came to. Every word about God is more of a distortion rather than a description. That's what that whole DeMello chapter above was saying. In another book he says this clever little ditty. An elephant has a better chance of fitting into the swimming trunks of a rat than God does of fitting into our concepts.

[blip]

What if the table is a cell in God's body? Would you say that God and the table exist in the same way? I wouldn't.

[kennethamy]

What if the table is a cell in God's body? Would you say that God and the table exist in the same way? I wouldn't.

I think that when we say that a cell exists (in whatever body), and when we say the body exists, it is clear that we are using "exists" univocally. What is the argument that we are not?

I have no idea what it would mean for a table to be a cell in God's body. I didn't think that God is supposed to have a body in the first place, because God is supposed to be a spirit, but then, I am no expert on the anatomy of God. (If God has a body, does he have a colon, do you think? If not, then how does he----never mind, I won't go there.

[kennethamy]

After Aquinas supposedly experienced God, he invalidated all his past writings and refused to speak or write about God anymore, after devoting his life to that endevour. There are simply some things that can never be adequately put into words, and this is the conclusion that Aquinas eventually came to. Every word about God is more of a distortion rather than a description. That's what that whole DeMello chapter above was saying. In another book he says this clever little ditty. An elephant has a better chance of fitting into the swimming trunks of a rat than God does of fitting into our concepts.

Even if that is true, and it is news to me, what am I supposed to infer from that? That Aquinas no longer believed that "exists" is univocal? Why, for heaven's sake? And suppose he changed his mind. So what? Can't he have been right before when he held that "exists" is univocal when applied to God and to created things, and wrong when he changed his mind? What counts is his argument for his view. The argument still seems to be a sound argument, so if he did change his mind, he was wrong.

[RexT]

Can you describe/define God such that it does have a reference.
I don't think so.

Nontheless, if you can provide 'one' property that God has, then you have proof that 'God exists'.
Yeah, existence, awareness and comprehension, these are three referents. Thus, god exists.

Rex

[RexT]

in order for something to exist, it must take us spatial coordinates in space. even thoughts that might apparently seem like abstract immaterial existences to someone are still based on something existing in the physical world - neurons firing (each thought has a corresponding activity in the brain).

so even apparent immaterial abstractions are only illusions if one think they actually exist... it is the physical process - the brains physical activity -- is its absolute necessary condition to be able to exist. in order for something to exist, it must take up spatial coordinates, otherwise you have nothing. It's as simple as that.
To state that for a thing to exist, it must have spatial coordinates is a perfect truth. Yet, what are the spatial coordinates of the space in which things exist? Does space not exist? Of course it must exist whether things are present or not, since things do not create space. Space was even prior to things, for how could a thing, which as you say, exists if and only if it has spatial coordinates, exist before there was a space to exist in?

Rex

[kennethamy]

Yeah, existence, awareness and comprehension, these are three referents. Thus, god exists.

Rex

If existence were part of the description, then you would be right. But, of course, to describe God in such a way so that the term "God" as a referent, and then, to make existence part of the description is obviously circular. It would be exactly as if you were asked to describe God so as to make Him colored red, and you were to say that part of His description was that he was colored red.

It cannot be a part of the description of something that it it has a referent, since for something to exist is exactly for its description to have a referent. So that by making it a part of the description of something that it has a referent is simply to assume that it exists. That is what it means for X to exist: that the description of X has a referent. Therefore, you are simply saying that the description of God has a referent because- the description of God has a referent. Which is, of course, true. As true as saying of a dog that it is a dog because it is...a dog. True, but hardly enlightening. That is cannot be a part of the description of something that it exists is exactly what Kant and Hume meant when they pointed out that existence is not a property of anything.

[kennethamy]

To state that for a thing to exist, it must have spatial coordinates is a perfect truth. before there was a space to exist in?

Rex

The number three does not have spatial coordinates, but the number three exists. The concept of a poached egg does not have spatial coordinates (although poached eggs do) Yet, the concept of a poached egg exists.

[RexT]

If existence were part of the description, then you would be right. But, of course, to describe God in such a way so that the term "God" as a referent, and thenk, to make existence part of the description is obviously circular. It would be exactly as if you were asked to describe God so as to make Him colored red, and you were to say that part of His description was that he was colored red.

It cannot be a part of the description of something that it it has a referent, since for something to exist is exactly for its description to have a referent. So that by making it a part of the description of something that it has a referent is simply to assume that it exists. That is what it means for X to exist: that the description of X has a referent. Therefore, you are simply saying that the description of God has a referent because- the description of God has a referent. Which is, of course, true. As true as saying of a dog that it is a dog because it is...a dog. True, but hardly enlightening. That is cannot be a part of the description of something that it exists is exactly what Kant and Hume meant when they pointed out that existence is not a property of anything.
Exactly, god is not a property of anything, hardly worth mentioning except that so many attempt to define god as a property of things. As for as being circular, everything that is eternal is circular, such as, well, circles, which refers only to circles. Existence is also circular, it has no external referent.

How about the other referents I mentioned, awareness and comprehension? These too are circular, refering only to themselves, as there is nothing external to them. Yet, should we attempt to define some thing, we invarriably do so through awareness and comprehension of them. Therefore, these are all circular, self-referent and external to things. Things are thus internal to existence, awareness, and comprehension.

God is existence, awareness and comprehension, which is to say, that which is external to things and that things refer to. Thus, if anything exists and is comprehended, it is proof of god. For comprehension cannot itself be comprehended, existence is not said to exist and awareness is not aware of itself. These are as end points that need no further explanation. If you exist, no further explanation is needed nor can it be given, your existence is self-explanatory; if you are aware, you do not need to explain it, awareness too is self-explanatory, and the same for comprehension, and might as well include your example of red. Red is self-explanatory.

Therefore, it is not that I give these referents to include in the definition of god, for they are god and need no further explanation. God is self-explanatory and therefore, it makes no sense to further explain the explanation. I gave these referents because they are undeniable and they explain everything. To know god is exactly like it is to know red. Of course, the blind cannot see red either.

Rex

[kennethamy]

Exactly, god is not a property of anything, hardly worth mentioning except that so many attempt to define god as a property of things. As for as being circular, everything that is eternal is circular, such as, well, circles, which refers only to circles. Existence is also circular, it has no external referent.

How about the other referents I mentioned, awareness and comprehension? These too are circular, refering only to themselves, as there is nothing external to them. Yet, should we attempt to define some thing, we invarriably do so through awareness and comprehension of them. Therefore, these are all circular, self-referent and external to things. Things are thus internal to existence, awareness, and comprehension.

God is existence, awareness and comprehension, which is to say, that which is external to things and that things refer to. Thus, if anything exists and is comprehended, it is proof of god. For comprehension cannot itself be comprehended, existence is not said to exist and awareness is not aware of itself. These are as end points that need no further explanation. If you exist, no further explanation is needed nor can it be given, your existence is self-explanatory; if you are aware, you do not need to explain it, awareness too is self-explanatory, and the same for comprehension, and might as well include your example of red. Red is self-explanatory.

Therefore, it is not that I give these referents to include in the definition of god, for they are god and need no further explanation. God is self-explanatory and therefore, it makes no sense to further explain the explanation. I gave these referents because they are undeniable and they explain everything. To know god is exactly like it is to know red. Of course, the blind cannot see red either.

Rex

I don't think that god is a property of anything. Such a thing never occurred to me. But, if God exists, then the property of being a god would clearly be a property of God, just as being a god would be a property of Zeus, if Zeus existed. Of course, unless something exists, it can have no properties. But how is that relevant? What is relevant is whether defining God as existing proves that God exists. And clearly, it no more does than defining God as having red hair proves that God has red hair.

[RexT]

The number three does not have spatial coordinates, but the number three exists. The concept of a poached egg does not have spatial coordinates (although poached eggs do) Yet, the concept of a poached egg exists.
You are correct in the sense that the number three has no physical correlate, so in what sense do you think it exists? I suppose you will say that it exists as a mental form, an abstraction of some sort, but what is that? Are you trying to give the word "exist" a different meaning than the only one it has?

Well, I should ask you if (3) exists only when someone thinks of it? I started a thread (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=175901)a while back, asking what happens to a thought when no one is thinking it, does it continue to exist? I think the issue remains unresolved, but I tend to believe that things, ideas, concepts, whatever you want to call them, always exist.

Anyway, there is no concept that does not involve space in one way or the other, but if you think otherwise, then by all means, give us your version of (3) that does not involve space in some way.

Rex

[RexT]

I don't think that god is a property of anything. Such a thing never occurred to me. But, if God exists, then the property of being a god would clearly be a property of God, just as being a god would be a property of Zeus, if Zeus existed. Of course, unless something exists, it can have no properties. But how is that relevant? What is relevant is whether defining God as existing proves that God exists. And clearly, it no more does than defining God as having red hair proves that God has red hair.
Yeah, I think that is the point, god cannot be defined, any more than can existence, awareness, comprehension. Yet, these referents cannot be denied. Well, of course, we can define them as concepts, but as you know, being aware is not a concept; it is being aware, existing is not a concept; it is existing, and comprehension is not a concept; it is conprehending. God can also be reduced to a concept, but the concept is not god.

Really, I think the piece by Anthony DeMello, provided by blip says this far better than I.

Rex

[kennethamy]

You are correct in the sense that the number three has no physical correlate, so in what sense do you think it exists? I suppose you will say that it exists as a mental form, an abstraction of some sort, but what is that? Are you trying to give the word "exist" a different meaning than the only one it has?

Well, I should ask you if (3) exists only when someone thinks of it? I started a thread (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=175901)a while back, asking what happens to a thought when no one is thinking it, does it continue to exist? I think the issue remains unresolved, but I tend to believe that things, ideas, concepts, whatever you want to call them, always exist.

Anyway, there is no concept that does not involve space in one way or the other, but if you think otherwise, then by all means, give us your version of (3) that does not involve space in some way.

Rex

No. I don't think that the number three "exists in a mental form" since I don't know what that would mean. But there is clearly the number three, since there are three apples on my table. The number three is not mental, since before there were human beings there were at least three objects in the universe, and there could not have been three objects in the universe unless there was the number three. Bertrand Russell defined "the number three" as a class, the class of all triples (just as the the number two is the class of all doubles). Classes are abstract entities, and so, do not have any spatial coordinates. They do not exist in space or in time (which, by the way, does not mean that they exist in a "different sense" from the sense of "exist" in which a chair exists). So, on Russell's view, the number three is a class, and the members of that class are all the three things in the universe. A "thing" need not be a physical object, nor a mental object, although it may be. For instance, it may be a class of objects, and of course, there are at least three classes of objects: for instance, the class of mammals; the class of invertebrates; and the class of insects.

[RexT]

No. I don't think that the number three "exists in a mental form" since I don't know what that would mean. But there is clearly the number three, since there are three apples on my table. The number three is not mental, since before there were human beings there were at least three objects in the universe, and there could not have been three objects in the universe unless there was the number three. Bertrand Russell defined "the number three" as a class, the class of all triples (just as the the number two is the class of all doubles). Classes are abstract entities, and so, do not have any spatial coordinates. They do not exist in space or in time (which, by the way, does not mean that they exist in a "different sense" from the sense of "exist" in which a chair exists). So, on Russell's view, the number three is a class, and the members of that class are all the three things in the universe. A "thing" need not be a physical object, nor a mental object, although it may be. For instance, it may be a class of objects, and of course, there are at least three classes of objects: for instance, the class of mammals; the class of invertebrates; and the class of insects.
Well, now I know why I will not be reading anything from Russell. Do you really think you have done something by taking one abstraction and placing it into another abstraction? So you say, or Russell said, numbers exist because classes exist? This is meaningless, what makes classes any more real than numbers pray tell? You think that by pointing to 3 apples that means numbers exist? It does not, for where is there any oneness in an apple? You must arbitrarily pick one thing about the apple and ignore the rest of it to get your number. Of course, the one thing you picked would itself be constituted of many lesser things and those of even lesser things, ad infinitum.

Is there only one class of things or many? Of course there are many, which means that classes, one of which is supposed to cantain numbers, is itself defined by numbers, the number of classes. Now, tell me again about circularity. Classes refer to numbers and numbers refer to classes.

Rex

[kennethamy]

Well, now I know why I will not be reading anything from Russell. Do you really think you have done something by taking one abstraction and placing it into another abstraction? So you say, or Russell said, numbers exist because classes exist? This is meaningless, what makes classes any more real than numbers pray tell? You think that by pointing to 3 apples that means numbers exist? It does not, for where is there any oneness in an apple? You must arbitrarily pick one thing about the apple and ignore the rest of it to get your number. Of course, the one thing you picked would itself be constituted of many lesser things and those of even lesser things, ad infinitum.

Is there only one class of things or many? Of course there are many, which means that classes, one of which is supposed to cantain numbers, is itself defined by numbers, the number of classes. Now, tell me again about being circular. Classes refer to numbers and numbers refer to classes.

Rex


I don't think there is anything wrong in talking about abstractions if an abstraction is what you are talking about. What makes you think that only concrete objects like chairs and tables exist? Or, rather, have you an argument for that view. I hope it is not merely a prejudice.

What is real is what is not imaginary (in some broad sense). Now, it does not seem to me that classes of things are imaginary. Biologists certainly talk about (say) the class of mammals, and mathematicians talk about the class of real numbers, and there is no reason that I know of, to think that such classes are imaginary. If you have such a reason, let me know about it.

Classes do not refer to numbers, and neither do numbers refer to classes. I never said any such thing. What I said is that we can define numbers as classes which have as their members, numbers, just as we can define mammals as classes which have as their members, mammals. Clearly, there are individual mammals, like dogs, and whales. But if we want to talk about those individuals collectively in terms of what it is that they have in common, and in virtue of which they are mammals, we talk of the class to which they all belong. Now, do classes exist over and above their members is an interesting question (discussed for a long time in philosophy as the controversy between nominalism and realism). But, it is not something that is to be decided simply by calling classes "abstractions". So, they are abstractions. What reason have you for thinking that abstractions are not real?

[RexT]

I don't think there is anything wrong in talking about abstractions if an abstraction is what you are talking about. What makes you think that only concrete objects like chairs and tables exist? Or, rather, have you an argument for that view. I hope it is not merely a prejudice.

What is real is what is not imaginary (in some broad sense). Now, it does not seem to me that classes of things are imaginary. Biologists certainly talk about (say) the class of mammals, and mathematicians talk about the class of real numbers, and there is no reason that I know of, to think that such classes are imaginary. If you have such a reason, let me know about it.

Classes do not refer to numbers, and neither do numbers refer to classes. I never said any such thing. What I said is that we can define numbers as classes which have as their members, numbers, just as we can define mammals as classes which have as their members, mammals. Clearly, there are individual mammals, like dogs, and whales. But if we want to talk about those individuals collectively in terms of what it is that they have in common, and in virtue of which they are mammals, we talk of the class to which they all belong. Now, do classes exist over and above their members is an interesting question (discussed for a long time in philosophy as the controversy between nominalism and realism). But, it is not something that is to be decided simply by calling classes "abstractions". So, they are abstractions. What reason have you for thinking that abstractions are not real?
Well, it seems that we are not too far apart on these concepts, but you never answered my challenge, which I think is relevent to getting back on track. I will quote it again.

"there is no concept that does not involve space in one way or the other, but if you think otherwise, then by all means, give us your version of [the number] (3) that does not involve space in some way."

Care to enlighten me?

Rex

[kennethamy]

Well, it seems that we are not too far apart on these concepts, but you never answered my challenge, which I think is relevent to getting back on track. I will quote it again.

"there is no concept that does not involve space in one way or the other, but if you think otherwise, then by all means, give us your version of [the number] (3) that does not involve space in some way."

Care to enlighten me?

Rex

"Involve" is such a blessedly vague term, that anything I say might be construed to "involve" anything you care to name.

And, I am not sure whether you are asking whether the concept "involves" space, or what the concept refers to, "involves" space.

But the concept of the number three does not involve space, since no concepts are spatial. Concepts are in no place. And, as I pointed out, the referent of the concept of the number three, namely, the number three, is not in space. Numbers are no place. But, if you don't like that example, consider the concept of the Constitution of the United States. As I said, the concept of the Constitution of the United States is not spatial because no concepts are spatial. (Where would they be?) But, how about the Constitution of the United States itself, the referent of the concept of the Constitution? Where is that. Well there is the original of the Constitution in the Smithsonian (I believe, or is it the Library of Congress? I have to look that up). But that is not the Constitution of The United States, for if what is in the Smithsonian (Library of Congress?) were destroyed, the Constitution of the United States would not be destroyed. It would still be the supreme law of the land.

So, neither the concept of the Constitution of the United States, nor the Constitution of the United States "involve" space (whatever that means).

[RexT]

"Involve" is such a blessedly vague term, that anything I say might be construed to "involve" anything you care to name.

And, I am not sure whether you are asking whether the concept "involves" space, or what the concept refers to, "involves" space.

But the concept of the number three does not involve space, since no concepts are spatial. Concepts are in no place. And, as I pointed out, the referent of the concept of the number three, namely, the number three, is not in space. Numbers are no place. But, if you don't like that example, consider the concept of the Constitution of the United States. As I said, the concept of the Constitution of the United States is not spatial because no concepts are spatial. (Where would they be?) But, how about the Constitution of the United States itself, the referent of the concept of the Constitution? Where is that. Well there is the original of the Constitution in the Smithsonian (I believe, or is it the Library of Congress? I have to look that up). But that is not the Constitution of The United States, for if what is in the Smithsonian (Library of Congress?) were destroyed, the Constitution of the United States would not be destroyed. It would still be the supreme law of the land.

So, neither the concept of the Constitution of the United States, nor the Constitution of the United States "involve" space (whatever that means).
No need to complicate things with constitutions and such, just provide us an understanding of the number 3 without making any reference to space. Of course, I already know that it cannot be done, but since you insist that concepts are not in space, I want you to illustrate that. Once you realize that you have taken an unsupportable position, you should do the right thing and concede. Then, I can get on with my original postulate.

Rex

[kennethamy]

No need to complicate things with constitutions and such, just provide us an understanding of the number 3 without making any reference to space. Of course, I already know that it cannot be done, but since you insist that concepts are not in space, I want you to illustrate that. Once you realize that you have taken an unsupportable position, you should do the right thing and concede. Then, I can get on with my original postulate.

Rex

I already did. The number three is identical with the class of all triples. Of course you have to know something about the theory of classes to grasp that. I can give you the definition of the number three that involves no reference to space, but, of course, I cannot give you the understanding of that. And you have already said you refuse to read Russell.

I am sure you know the famous story of the theologians who refused to look through Galileo's telescope at the moons of Jupiter because they already "knew" that whatever they saw through the instrument would be an illusion. They "knew" that because they already had been taught that the celestial bodies, except for Earth, could have no moons.

There is a name the Catholics have for that kind of attitude. It is called, "invincible ignorance".

[RexT]

I already did. The number three is identical with the class of all triples.
Ok, let us skip the rest of your smokescreen, what we have left is the above statement. Do you really think you have given me any understanding of numbers by telling me about classes? Try again, this fails completely. You might as well explain red to a blind person by telling him about love.

Rex

[kennethamy]

Ok, let us skip the rest of your smokescreen, what we have left is the above statement. Do you really think you have given me any understanding of numbers by telling me about classes? Try again, this fails completely. You might as well explain red to a blind person by telling him about love.

Rex

No, I don't think I have given you any understanding of numbers by telling you about classes. And, I have already explained why that is true. See my earlier post.

But how is that relevant to whether numbers can be explained as members of classes? I wouldn't expect that I could make someone who knew no chemistry understand why water freezes when its temperature is lowered to 0 degrees centigrade. But how would it follow that the explanation in terms of the effect lowering the temperature has on molecules would not provide the correct explanation of why the water freezes. It wouldn't. What makes you think that the scope of your ability to understand is identical with the scope of correct explanations?

.

[RexT]

No, I don't think I have given you any understanding of numbers by telling you about classes. And, I have already explained why that is true. See my earlier post.

But how is that relevant to whether numbers can be explained as members of classes? I wouldn't expect that I could make someone who knew no chemistry understand why water freezes when its temperature is lowered to 0 degrees centigrade. But how would it follow that the explanation in terms of the effect lowering the temperature has on molecules would not provide the correct explanation of why the water freezes. It wouldn't. What makes you think that the scope of your ability to understand is identical with the scope of correct explanations?

.
The scope of my understanding is big enough to know when someone is avoiding the challenge I submitted by questioning the scope of my understanding. Here is the problem with the attempts you have made so far. You say that classes can contain numbers, so there is no need to point to space to understand numbers, we only have to understand classes. Yet, in order to understand classes, we must point to space. Thus, you have not met the challenge, merely shifted it to another concept, classes, which is dodging the issue. Very well, then explain classes without referring to space.

Rex

[kennethamy]

The scope of my understanding is big enough to know when someone is avoiding the challenge I submitted by questioning the scope of my understanding. Here is the problem with the attempts you have made so far. You say that classes can contain numbers, so there is no need to point to space to understand numbers, we only have to understand classes. Yet, in order to understand classes, we must point to space. Thus, you have not met the challenge, merely shifted it to another concept, classes, which is dodging the issue. Very well, then explain classes without referring to space.

Rex

"Yet, in order to understand classes, we must point to space."

Why is that?

[RexT]

"Yet, in order to understand classes, we must point to space."

Why is that?
Can you give examples of classes that do not require pointing to things in space? The best examples I can think of would be emotions as one class of feelings and thoughts as another class of feelings, yet these do not seem to apply to non-spatial beings; thus, they exist in space and eventually, we must reference space to complete our understanding of feelings. If however, you can provide examples of classes that do not eventually reference space, just provide them and we can stop this dancing about.

Rex

[TheMathGuy]

in order for something to exist, it must take us spatial coordinates in space. even thoughts that might apparently seem like abstract immaterial existences to someone are still based on something existing in the physical world - neurons firing (each thought has a corresponding activity in the brain).

so even apparent immaterial abstractions are only illusions if one think they actually exist... it is the physical process - the brains physical activity -- is its absolute necessary condition to be able to exist. in order for something to exist, it must take up spatial coordinates, otherwise you have nothing. It's as simple as that.

Do "spatial coordinates" exist?

[TheMathGuy]

in order for something to exist, it must take us spatial coordinates in space. even thoughts that might apparently seem like abstract immaterial existences to someone are still based on something existing in the physical world - neurons firing (each thought has a corresponding activity in the brain).

so even apparent immaterial abstractions are only illusions if one think they actually exist... it is the physical process - the brains physical activity -- is its absolute necessary condition to be able to exist. in order for something to exist, it must take up spatial coordinates, otherwise you have nothing. It's as simple as that.

Part of the problem I have with your definition of "exists" is that it depends upon a particular understanding of the universe. The concepts of position, space, and time are merely constructs that science has found useful in describing the universe we experience. Quantum waveforms do not have a position in space and so by your criterion they don't exist. Energy has no spatial coordinates and so by your criterion it doesn't exist. Causation has no physical coordinates and hence does not exist. We might one day discover that there really isn't such a thing as space or position in the sense we percieve it, just as there are no "particles". If that's the case, then under your definition we will have just discovered that nothing exists!

[kennethamy]

Can you give examples of classes that do not require pointing to things in space? The best examples I can think of would be emotions as one class of feelings and thoughts as another class of feelings, yet these do not seem to apply to non-spatial beings; thus, they exist in space and eventually, we must reference space to complete our understanding of feelings. If however, you can provide examples of classes that do not eventually reference space, just provide them and we can stop this dancing about.

Rex

Sure, the class of natural numbers: the null class: the class of all classes; shall I go on?

I did not know that feelings and thoughts are in space. If they are, you should be able to say where in space they are. Where are they?

[Witt]

Sure, the class of natural numbers: the null class: the class of all classes; shall I go on?

I did not know that feelings and thoughts are in space. If they are, you should be able to say where in space they are. Where are they?

I agree. While it is true that mind does require brain, it is not the case that mind is an empirical function of brain.

Mind is what brain does.
There cannot be mind without brain, can there?
i.e. there cannot be things like:numbers, language, logic, etc.. before mind.
i.e. there cannot be things that have eternal truth!
There are no propositions that are true 'always'.

Even, 2+2=4, has no sense at all, if there are no minds.


Properties of mind are analogous to the story as opposed the the printed prose (story).

There cannot be spacial or temporal qualites of logical concepts, out side of the mindful essence.

[RexT]

Sure, the class of natural numbers: the null class: the class of all classes; shall I go on?

I did not know that feelings and thoughts are in space. If they are, you should be able to say where in space they are. Where are they?
Have you forgotten that this started with your claim that numbers make no reference to space? Then, you attempted to show this true by the introduction of classes. Thus, I asked you to provide a discription of classes without reference to space and now, you do this by reverting back to numbers. It is as I said, a circular proposition, and you managed to describe the concept of neither numbers nor classes. Since you cannot support your claim, it has to be taken as such, and unless and until you do offer support, your claim remains baseless. Yet, it remains as I stated, that nothing can exist that does not reference space in some way.

As to feelings and thoughts, they occur within the context of a sentient being, and surely you would not doubt that such beings refer to space. What are feelings and thoughts but awareness and comprehension of the things that are percieved in space.

It may be difficult for you to accept, but I was actually hoping you could offer an example of somthing that could be comprehended without reference to space. Since you have not, it is just as well, for I have enough confidence in your intelligence to take that as an indication that my original premise was right. If you cannot meet the challenge, then you must eventually concede to join me and together we will have set this premise as a tautology. We will establish that to exist is always in some way or the other a reference to space. However, if you continue to imagine it as false, the challenge remains open.

Rex

[RexT]

I agree. While it is true that mind does require brain, it is not the case that mind is an empirical function of brain.

Mind is what brain does.
There cannot be mind without brain, can there?
i.e. there cannot be things like:numbers, language, logic, etc.. before mind.
i.e. there cannot be things that have eternal truth!
There are no propositions that are true 'always'.

Even, 2+2=4, has no sense at all, if there are no minds.


Properties of mind are analogous to the story as opposed the the printed prose (story).

There cannot be spacial or temporal qualites of logical concepts, out side of the mindful essence.
And yet by your own words you have given this explanation as that which the brain does, ergo, you have made reference to space. Try this again without the reference to space and see if it makes any sense. Remember that the OP is about "exist", and it does not matter what anyone says about it, they will invariably, eventually refer to space.

Rex

[trip]

By using the whole 'it exists in the mind' thing you're getting dangersously close to solipsism. So even if there were something that could exist without reference to space, you would deny it since we would concieve of it in the mind. What about something (whatever) that exists without reference to space, and which we are unaware of? Did cause and effect exist before there were minds to think about it?

[Witt]

And yet by your own words you have given this explanation as that which the brain does, ergo, you have made reference to space. Try this again without the reference to space and see if it makes any sense.

It cannot make sense to talk about things that do not have spacial and temporal qualities.

What is it that has never been?

There are no numbers at all, if there are no minds!

Even numbers exist, iff, there are minds.

E!x =df EF(Fx).


Remember that the OP is about "exist", and it does not matter what anyone says about it, they will invariably, eventually refer to space.

Rex

Most definitely wrong, IMO.

What space is it that 'truth' requires??

Do you have Cartesian coordinates here???
Obviously not.

[kennethamy]

Have you forgotten that this started with your claim that numbers make no reference to space? Then, you attempted to show this true by the introduction of classes. Thus, I asked you to provide a discription of classes without reference to space and now, you do this by reverting back to numbers. It is as I said, a circular proposition, and you managed to describe the concept of neither numbers nor classes. Since you cannot support your claim, it has to be taken as such, and unless and until you do offer support, your claim remains baseless. Yet, it remains as I stated, that nothing can exist that does not reference space in some way.

As to feelings and thoughts, they occur within the context of a sentient being, and surely you would not doubt that such beings refer to space. What are feelings and thoughts but awareness and comprehension of the things that are percieved in space.

It may be difficult for you to accept, but I was actually hoping you could offer an example of somthing that could be comprehended without reference to space. Since you have not, it is just as well, for I have enough confidence in your intelligence to take that as an indication that my original premise was right. If you cannot meet the challenge, then you must eventually concede to join me and together we will have set this premise as a tautology. We will establish that to exist is always in some way or the other a reference to space. However, if you continue to imagine it as false, the challenge remains open.

Rex


Classes have no spatial properties. If a class had a spatial property it would make sense to ask where a class was. But does it make sense to ask where the class of natural numbers is? It does not. Therefore, classes have no spatial properties.

Again, there are particular mammals, like elephants and tigers. Particular mammals are in space. But then, there is the class of mammals. Where is the class of mammals? Nowhere. Therefore, the class of mammals has no spatial properties.

As for feeling and thoughts, although "sentient beings" have location, the feelings and thoughts have no location. Where is the feeling of happiness? Where is the thought that Quito is the capital of Ecuador? Have you any answers to those questions?

[RexT]

By using the whole 'it exists in the mind' thing you're getting dangersously close to solipsism. So even if there were something that could exist without reference to space, you would deny it since we would concieve of it in the mind. What about something (whatever) that exists without reference to space, and which we are unaware of? Did cause and effect exist before there were minds to think about it?
Sure, many things exist without our knowing of them, but if and when we know about them, they too will necessarily refer to space, else it would not be a thing. Even when we invent things that we know do not exist, like unicorns, the idea itself remains a reference to some spacial thing.

Rex

[kennethamy]

Sure, many things exist without our knowing of them, but if and when we know about them, they too will necessarily refer to space, else it would not be a thing. Even when we invent things that we know do not exist, like unicorns, the idea itself remains a reference to some spacial thing.

Rex

Do you think that my idea of the square root of 9 refers to some spatial thing? Or my idea of a quadratic equation? How about my idea of knowledge?

[RexT]

It cannot make sense to talk about things that do not have spacial and temporal qualities.
Then we agree, yes?:)
What is it that has never been?
The future I suppose has never been, it is forever, so long as there is time, the potential of a present moment, but I am sure this is not what you meant.

There are no numbers at all, if there are no minds!

Even numbers exist, iff, there are minds.

Yeah, and odd numbers the same.:cool: Just having some fun.
Most definitely wrong, IMO.
So now you have changed your mind and no longer agree, what happened?:confused:
What space is it that 'truth' requires??
Truth does not exist, surely you must know this. For whatever truth-likeness you might accept, or reject, there must be some proposition that your acceptance or rejection is directed at, and this proposition must traverse some interval of time, and time is always without exception a reference to space.
Do you have Cartesian coordinates here???
Obviously not.
You should reconsider, for truth can be ploted on a graph, as a sine wave indicating the probability of truth or using vectors to pinpoint it if you think in concrete terms, or it can be set into a truth table, having a position relative to the other elements of logic. If truth or anything else were of a non-spatial nature, as you suggest, it would clearly be impossible to plot and clearly it is not impossible. I could describe truth in other spatial terms if you like, but these should be enough for now.

Rex

[RexT]

Classes have no spatial properties. If a class had a spatial property it would make sense to ask where a class was. But does it make sense to ask where the class of natural numbers is? It does not. Therefore, classes have no spatial properties.

Again, there are particular mammals, like elephants and tigers. Particular mammals are in space. But then, there is the class of mammals. Where is the class of mammals? Nowhere. Therefore, the class of mammals has no spatial properties.
This would come as a shock to you, but classes do not exist. They are mental constructs that are placed arbitrarily to separate one thing from another, like state lines for example. State lines do not exist either, but are arbitrarily placed for the practical purpose of allocating land. Nevertheless, would you argue that state lines do not refer to spatial coordinates?

The concept of classes, as with math too, is immensely useful, for the very fact that they describe boundaries that separate objects, things, or ideas. Now, the very concept of a boundary is purely a spatial concept. It does not matter if space is actual or mental, for such is indeterminate and irrelevant, what matters is that space provides the ability to comprehend or contain whatever is determined by its boundary.
As for feeling and thoughts, although "sentient beings" have location, the feelings and thoughts have no location. Where is the feeling of happiness? Where is the thought that Quito is the capital of Ecuador? Have you any answers to those questions?
I would say that the feeling of happiness is never far away from the porson being happy. Of course, some people think that happiness is located at Disney World.

Seriously, holding that thoughts are the activity of the brain, you might locate them somewhere inside the head area of the body, possibly very near the neurons. Of course, if you would venture to suggest that thoughts are incorporeal, the darn things could be anywhere and everywhere there is space. You will need to be specific about what a thought is before I can answer this question.

Rex

[kennethamy]

Then we agree, yes?:)

The future I suppose has never been, it is forever, so long as there is time, the potential of a present moment, but I am sure this is not what you meant.

Yeah, and odd numbers the same.:cool: Just having some fun.

So now you have changed your mind and no longer agree, what happened?:confused:

Truth does not exist, surely you must know this. For whatever truth-likeness you might accept, or reject, there must be some proposition that your acceptance or rejection is directed at, and this proposition must traverse some interval of time, and time is always without exception a reference to space.
Do you have Cartesian coordinates here???
Obviously not.
You should reconsider, for truth can be ploted on a graph, as a sine wave indicating the probability of truth or using vectors to pinpoint it if you think in concrete terms, or it can be set into a truth table, having a position relative to the other elements of logic. If truth or anything else were of a non-spatial nature, as you suggest, it would clearly be impossible to plot and clearly it is not impossible. I could describe truth in other spatial terms if you like, but these should be enough for now.

Rex[/QUOTE]

Now Rex, you were the one who in the earlier post informed us that, "even when we invent things that we know do not exist, like unicorns, the idea itself remains a reference to some spacial thing." So what sort of reply is it to say that truth is not spatial since in does not exist? I thought that the fact that something does not exist does not matter because even if it doesn't exist, "the idea itself remains a reference to some spacial thing" (sic!) So now, agreeing that truth is like unicorn, how does the idea (of truth) itself "remain a reference to some spacial thing" (whatever that might mean)? You really have to remember what you wrote in earlier posts so you can at least be consistent. Which makes me wonder, how consistency is spatial, or if there is not consistency (as there often is not in your case) how the idea of consistency, to use your words, "remains a reference to some spatial thing"?

Why do you have this fixation that whatever exists must exist in space? Especially when it is clearly not true.

[RexT]

Now Rex, you were the one who in the earlier post informed us that, "even when we invent things that we know do not exist, like unicorns, the idea itself remains a reference to some spacial thing." So what sort of reply is it to say that truth is not spatial since in does not exist? I thought that the fact that something does not exist does not matter because even if it doesn't exist, "the idea itself remains a reference to some spacial thing" (sic!) So now, agreeing that truth is like unicorn, how does the idea (of truth) itself "remain a reference to some spacial thing" (whatever that might mean)? You really have to remember what you wrote in earlier posts so you can at least be consistent. Which makes me wonder, how consistency is spatial, or if there is not consistency (as there often is not in your case) how the idea of consistency, to use your words, "remains a reference to some spatial thing"?

Why do you have this fixation that whatever exists must exist in space? Especially when it is clearly not true.
I see, since you could not meet my challenge, and your diversions have failed, you resort to distortions and opinions. This is beginning to feel more like a game of trickery than a discussion between intellectuals.

I do not mind if someone points out a flaw in my argument, but when someone twists what I have said into something else, I have no respect for that. You lose this debate, not for any respectable reason like making an honest mistake, but you lose because you have become incoherent.

Rex

[kennethamy]

I see, since you could not meet my challenge, and your diversions have failed, you resort to distortions and opinions. This is beginning to feel more like a game of trickery than a discussion between intellectuals.

I do not mind if someone points out a flaw in my argument, but when someone twists what I have said into something else, I have no respect for that. You lose this debate, not for any respectable reason like making an honest mistake, but you lose because you have become incoherent.

Rex


Sure, Sure. And those were your words, not mine. And if you are inconsistent, so what?

But how about answering the question, is consistency (which exists despite you) spatial? Or is the idea of consistency (which is different) spatial. If you say it is, then you have to say where, in space it is. Can you? Or, consider the following argument:

All men are mortal
Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Is that argument in space? I am not, of course talking about particular instances of that argument, but of the argument itself.

You dismissed my example of The Constitution of the United States. You never said why you dismissed it, you just dismissed it. So, let me ask you again: where in space is the Constitution of the United States? Are you going to dismiss that question again without saying why. or have you a reply?

[spindozes]

If everything we can see, think of, imagine or dream exists because it refers to space, then what does "Non-existence" mean?

[RexT]

If everything we can see, think of, imagine or dream exists because it refers to space, then what does "Non-existence" mean?
Nonexistence is the space that everything refers to.

Space is nothing or no-thing, in which things exist and to which they refer.

By the way, I just noticed that you are new to IIDB, welcome!

Rex

[Cacofonix]

For you to assert anything exists you must exist. And (it is not provable but commonly intuited) you must be conscious of existing in order to ask these questions or to program machines to ask them for you. Beyond that, when you ask the question, is this electron spin up or down, Nature/Reality call it what you like - even binary one bit randomness - will make 'the choice'. If you try to call this God, Ok but you are severely restricting the notion. Does the moon exist when you are not looking at it? This is not a fruitful question to 'Bohr' anyone with!

[Cacofonix]

Then again, to C G Young, God exists, but as an archetype. So does Athena or maybe Charlie Brown

He/She is certainly a literary figure within the realm of Human emotion and(temporary) meaning (temporary meaning while one is alive and in that universe of discourse).

[RexT]

Then again, to C G Young, God exists, but as an archetype. So does Athena or maybe Charlie Brown

He/She is certainly a literary figure within the realm of Human emotion and(temporary) meaning (temporary meaning while one is alive and in that universe of discourse).
Of course, if god represents archetypes then we would all agree that such notions exist just as you said, temporarily in the mind of someone thinking about them. Yet, so easy an answer does not explain how these same archetypes keep appearing throughout history and throughout every developed culture. One might think that archetypes exist always and merely lie in wait for some culture to develop that they can present themsleves to and be manifest through again and again.

Yes, god would be like that too, existing always and appearing or manifesting when and where the opportunity arose. Still, these are the seeds of myths, and perhaps culture itself, which might not develop at all if not for the reappearence of archetypes. To exist is always temporary, but existence itself is eternal, and what is this existence itself that manifests through archetypes, which in turn maneifests through culture which manifests through the mind of individuals that are finally nothing but eternal space, nothing but god.

Rex

[kennethamy]

If everything we can see, think of, imagine or dream exists because it refers to space, then what does "Non-existence" mean?

And, by the way, what does "refers to space" mean? "In space"?

[RexT]

And, by the way, what does "refers to space" mean? "In space"?
It does not simply mean "in space", it means that its existence relies on space as its foundation, and that is has spatial features. All things refer to space and none are exclusive of space, as though they might somehow exist anyway without space. To exist is to pass through time, and time refers to the motion of space; it refers to the shape of space; it refers to the feel of space.

Rex

[kennethamy]

It does not simply mean "in space", it means that its existence relies on space as its foundation, and that is has spatial features. All things refer to space and none are exclusive of space, as though they might somehow exist anyway without space. To exist is to pass through time, and time refers to the motion of space; it refers to the shape of space; it refers to the feel of space.

Rex

How does the number three rely on space "as its foundation" (what does that mean?) and how has the number three spatial features? And, by the way, how do you tell?

I suppose this sort of thing is what makes some people dismiss philosophy as a mere stringing together of words which, at the end, does not mean anything. Can you present any reasons for asserting what you do? Suppose someone were simply to deny what you assert. How would you persuade them you are right?

[Guttersnipe]

The number three does not have spatial coordinates, but the number three exists. The concept of a poached egg does not have spatial coordinates (although poached eggs do) Yet, the concept of a poached egg exists.
You are drawing the classical distinction between abstract objects and concrete objects. I personally believe that abstract objects reduce to concrete things (usually mental processes). Symbols (e.g. numbers and letters) represent objective things -- either natural patterns, certain noises, etc. But they are contrained too either mental processes (like memory) or inscriptions on paper, monitors, etc.

[kennethamy]

You are drawing the classical distinction between abstract objects and concrete objects. I personally believe that abstract objects reduce to concrete things (usually mental processes). Symbols (e.g. numbers and letters) represent objective things -- either natural patterns, certain noises, etc. But they are contrained too either mental processes (like memory) or inscriptions on paper, monitors, etc.

I would have no idea what an argument to that effect would even look like. But one thing is clear: there were at least three stars before there were any people, and there were no minds before there were any people, so the number three could not possibly be a "mental process" (whatever that might be).

[Guttersnipe]

I would have no idea what an argument to that effect would even look like. But one thing is clear: there were at least three stars before there were any people, and there were no minds before there were any people, so the number three could not possibly be a "mental process" (whatever that might be).
The number 3 is a symbol that we created. It represents an objective pattern, that certainly predates humanity.

[RexT]

How does the number three rely on space "as its foundation" (what does that mean?) and how has the number three spatial features? And, by the way, how do you tell?

I suppose this sort of thing is what makes some people dismiss philosophy as a mere stringing together of words which, at the end, does not mean anything. Can you present any reasons for asserting what you do? Suppose someone were simply to deny what you assert. How would you persuade them you are right?
Ok, you have asked four questions, which I can present an answer to and one opinion that I would not be interested in addressing, except to say that your opinion is noted.

First, how is the number three founded on space. Easy enough, three is not merely a word or symbol having no referent; it symbolizes first, the concept of a thing(s) or class of things that has property or properties that can be identified, and second, the concept that such thing(s) can have multiple copies of itself, specifically in this case, three copies, or that three unique things or classes of things can be identified.

Starting with the basics, we find that counting and identifing a thing requires time, thus we have our first reference to space, since time is always a direct reference to space, namely, the motion of space. Consciousness itself is time-dependent, thus, a spatial correlate. Next, in order that we can count and identify a thing(s) or classes of things, such must exist and have spatial features.

I realize too, that once counting is learned, we can then continue to count imaginary things that do not exist or have any spatial features, such as points or singularities. Nevertheless, the foundation for counting began by our own being in space and perception of things in space.

Space itself cannot be separated such that, here in this place there is space and over there in that place there is no space; it is a continuum. From what I can tell, space is the foundation of anything that exists and anything that is imagined to exist will eventually be seen to have its origin in space, thus, either directly or indirectly it will refer to space.

Yet, what is space? It is nothing or no-thing, the absence of things and separation between things. Space itself does not exist, for it is existence. Yet that which does exist, exists in space; it exists in nothing. That is the reality in which we exist. Our llittle universe exists in and is surrounded by an infinite sea of nothing, of space. We are told that the universe once did not exist, but the infinite sea, it is existence and from it came the universe and all that has existence. Whatever comes from existence will invariably display the characteristics of that from which it came and whatever it may be that exists will refer to its source, for it could not do otherwise.

To exist is to pass through time, and time will end, but existence does not possess itself, it merely is itself. Thus, existence, which is nothing, cannot end, for it did not begin; it is not a thing. Yet, it can and clearly does express itself by way of things, and when things once more nonexistent, what remains but what has always been, nothing. After this universe has returned to its source, and it must return, something else will emerge, what I could not say any more than I could say what my next thought will be.

I do not expect to convince you or anyone of anything I say, but you can study this matter with an open mind and you might convince yourself. For it has always been you that has convinced you. No other person has ever done that for you nor could they.

Rex

[kennethamy]

The number 3 is a symbol that we created. It represents an objective pattern, that certainly predates humanity.

I am afraid that you are confusing the numeral "3" which can be written in a number of ways ("three", "III", "drei", "trois" etc.) with what the numeral refers to, which is, of course, the number three. It is as if you argued that mountains did not exist before human beings existed, because the word, "mountain" did not exist before human beings existed. And that, of course, would be a terrible argument, as I am sure you can see.

[kennethamy]

Ok, you have asked four questions, which I can present an answer to and one opinion that I would not be interested in addressing, except to say that your opinion is noted.

First, how is the number three founded on space. Easy enough, three is not merely a word or symbol having no referent; it symbolizes first, the concept of a thing(s) or class of things that has property or properties that can be identified, and second, the concept that such thing(s) can have multiple copies of itself, specifically in this case, three copies, or that three unique things or classes of things can be identified.

Starting with the basics, we find that counting and identifing a thing requires time, thus we have our first reference to space, since time is always a direct reference to space, namely, the motion of space. Consciousness itself is time-dependent, thus, a spatial correlate. Next, in order that we can count and identify a thing(s) or classes of things, such must exist and have spatial features.

I realize too, that once counting is learned, we can then continue to count imaginary things that do not exist or have any spatial features, such as points or singularities. Nevertheless, the foundation for counting began by our own being in space and perception of things in space.

Space itself cannot be separated such that, here in this place there is space and over there in that place there is no space; it is a continuum. From what I can tell, space is the foundation of anything that exists and anything that is imagined to exist will eventually be seen to have its origin in space, thus, either directly or indirectly it will refer to space.

Yet, what is space? It is nothing or no-thing, the absence of things and separation between things. Space itself does not exist, for it is existence. Yet that which does exist, exists in space; it exists in nothing. That is the reality in which we exist. Our llittle universe exists in and is surrounded by an infinite sea of nothing, of space. We are told that the universe once did not exist, but the infinite sea, it is existence and from it came the universe and all that has existence. Whatever comes from existence will invariably display the characteristics of that from which it came and whatever it may be that exists will refer to its source, for it could not do otherwise.

To exist is to pass through time, and time will end, but existence does not possess itself, it merely is itself. Thus, existence, which is nothing, cannot end, for it did not begin; it is not a thing. Yet, it can and clearly does express itself by way of things, and when things once more nonexistent, what remains but what has always been, nothing. After this universe has returned to its source, and it must return, something else will emerge, what I could not say any more than I could say what my next thought will be.

I do not expect to convince you or anyone of anything I say, but you can study this matter with an open mind and you might convince yourself. For it has always been you that has convinced you. No other person has ever done that for you nor could they.

Rex


It is not a matter of being convinced of the conclusion. It is a matter of whether the argument is sound. You have given some reasons for thinking that the number three (not the numeral, the number) "refers to space". It is hard to evaluate these reasons since I have no clear idea what the phrase, "refers to space" means. It seems to be one of those "accordian" words whose meaning you can stretch or narrow to fit what you are seeking to prove.

I have no idea what you might mean by saying that space is existence. But I don't see what that has to do with your contention. Our universe exists, but it is not space, and if Einstein is right, since space is a part of the universe, the universe does not even exist in space. Space is not a kind of empty container which contains the universe. And space is certainly not nothing, since space exists, and nothing does not exist.

So, you are right to think that I am not persuaded by what there is of argument that you give. And, by the way, if, as you (now) tell us, space does not exist, then how would it be possible for everything that exists to "refer" to space? How could anything refer to what does not exist? Very baffling.

[Guttersnipe]

I am afraid that you are confusing the numeral "3" which can be written in a number of ways ("three", "III", "drei", "trois" etc.) with what the numeral refers to, which is, of course, the number three. It is as if you argued that mountains did not exist before human beings existed, because the word, "mountain" did not exist before human beings existed. And that, of course, would be a terrible argument, as I am sure you can see.
No, that's not what I argued at all. The number '3', or any other symbolic representation thereof, refers to a natural and objective pattern.

I find the idea of abstract objects to be extremely counter-intuitive and incoherent with my other beliefs. (Maybe I just don't like the notion that there are things which exist that have no spatio/temporal location or extension, hence not physical.) What's more, I'm not convinced that positing the existence of a class of non-conrete objects is necessary -- if we can explain our supposed abstract objects by reference to concrete things alone, what need have we of the extra entities?

[kennethamy]

No, that's not what I argued at all. The number '3', or any other symbolic representation thereof, refers to a natural and objective pattern.

I find the idea of abstract objects to be extremely counter-intuitive and incoherent with my other beliefs. (Maybe I just don't like the notion that there are things which exist that have no spatio/temporal location or extension, hence not physical.) What's more, I'm not convinced that positing the existence of a class of non-conrete objects is necessary -- if we can explain our supposed abstract objects by reference to concrete things alone, what need have we of the extra entities?

I don't see how the number three refers to anything at all. It is not a symbol.The numeral "three" of course refers to the number three.

Your revulsion against abstract objects is, as I am sure you recognize, not an argument against the existence of abstract objects. And even your lack of conviction that positing classes (which is, I suppose what you have in mind) is necessary to explain what numbers are, is not much of an argument against either the necessity of doing so, nor their existence, however weak your conviction is. But, I certainly agree that if we can satisfactorily explain something, we do not need a different explanation of that something.

[Guttersnipe]

I don't see how the number three refers to anything at all. It is not a symbol.The numeral "three" of course refers to the number three.

Your revulsion against abstract objects is, as I am sure you recognize, not an argument against the existence of abstract objects. And even your lack of conviction that positing classes (which is, I suppose what you have in mind) is necessary to explain what numbers are, is not much of an argument against either the necessity of doing so, nor their existence, however weak your conviction is. But, I certainly agree that if we can satisfactorily explain something, we do not need a different explanation of that something.
When dealing with something that has neither spatial nor temporal extension, and is causally inert, it can be somewhat difficult to argue against its existence. The best I can do is try to offer an equivalent explanation that does not rely on the extra entities, and then employ a reductionist principle such as Ockham's razor.

[kennethamy]

When dealing with something that has neither spatial nor temporal extension, and is causally inert, it can be somewhat difficult to argue against its existence. The best I can do is try to offer an equivalent explanation that does not rely on the extra entities, and then employ a reductionist principle such as Ockham's razor.

But are you arguing against the existence of the number 3? I thought you were arguing that it was not an abstract entity. Do you have an argument for that?

[Guttersnipe]

But are you arguing against the existence of the number 3? I thought you were arguing that it was not an abstract entity. Do you have an argument for that?
I was saying that its hard to argue against the existence of abstract objects. When I say that apparent abstract things can be explained in terms of concrete things, and that we should employ a principle of economy to remove the extra entities, I'm making an argument against sufficient reason to believe in abstract things.

[kennethamy]

I was saying that its hard to argue against the existence of abstract objects. When I say that apparent abstract things can be explained in terms of concrete things, and that we should employ a principle of economy to remove the extra entities, I'm making an argument against sufficient reason to believe in abstract things.

There is a fallacy called, the fallacy of counter-evidential intuition. Your view (such as it is) is an a good example of it. Here we have prima-facie evidence of abstract entities: classes, numbers, and the like. And your intuition is that there are no abstract objects. You haven't really made any argument at all. You have made an assertion that we have no need to posit abstract entities. But you have not shown why that is so. Quine, for instance, has argued strongly that we need to posit classes. Have you any reason to think that we do not need to posit classes?

[Hoodoo Ulove]

But one thing is clear: there were at least three stars before there were any people, and there were no minds before there were any people, so the number three could not possibly be a "mental process" (whatever that might be).I'm not sure the question of whether there was a number three before there were minds has an answer, but I am pretty sure you haven't demonstrated here that the answer is yes. "There were at least three stars" tells us about the existence of stars, not about the existence of numbers. Just as "there is no milk in the refrigerator" doesn't posit the existence of a thing called "no" in the refrigerator, "there were three stars" does not posit a the existence of a thing called "three" in the pre-human past.

[kennethamy]

I'm not sure the question of whether there was a number three before there were minds has an answer, but I am pretty sure you haven't demonstrated here that the answer is yes. "There were at least three stars" tells us about the existence of stars, not about the existence of numbers. Just as "there is no milk in the refrigerator" doesn't posit the existence of a thing called "no" in the refrigerator, "there were three stars" does not posit a the existence of a thing called "three" in the pre-human past.

I can translate, "there is no milk in the refrigerator" as, "It is not the case that there is milk in the refrigerator". And in that way, I can eliminated the term "no". How would you translate "there are three stars" so as to get rid of "three".

[Hoodoo Ulove]

I can translate, "there is no milk in the refrigerator" as, "It is not the case that there is milk in the refrigerator". And in that way, I can eliminated the term "no". How would you translate "there are three stars" so as to get rid of "three".I can't. That doesn't mean that there was a three. We need to use the word "three" (in some language) to count. Was anyone counting before we got here?

My basic objection to your argument is that it just seems to be absurd on the face of it to say that stars cannot exist without abstract objects.

[Guttersnipe]

There is a fallacy called, the fallacy of counter-evidential intuition. Your view (such as it is) is an a good example of it. Here we have prima-facie evidence of abstract entities: classes, numbers, and the like. And your intuition is that there are no abstract objects. You haven't really made any argument at all. You have made an assertion that we have no need to posit abstract entities. But you have not shown why that is so. Quine, for instance, has argued strongly that we need to posit classes. Have you any reason to think that we do not need to posit classes?
I think it is false that there is prima-facie evidence for abstract entities. This is still a matter of contention among philosophers, though most are probably Platonic realists. I was not arguing against abstract objects when I made reference to my intuition on the subject -- which is plainly clear if you read my posts. Thus I'm beginning to wonder if you just like arguing against straw-men, as you seem to be making a habit of it. I plainly said in my previous post that I have only presented an argument against reason to believe in abstract objects, which is quite different from presenting an argument for their non-existence. I was expecting you to challenge my premise that Platonic non-realism is just as explanatorily proficient as Platonic realism, rather than claim that I really didn't present any argument. Oh well. Anyways, here is another argument that I shamelessly pilfered from the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy because I couldn't recall it of the top of my head:

1. Human beings exist entirely within spacetime.
2. If there exist any abstract mathematical objects, then they exist outside of spacetime. Therefore, it seems very plausible that:
3. If there exist any abstract mathematical objects, then human beings could not attain knowledge of them. Therefore,
4. If mathematical platonism is correct, then human beings could not attain mathematical knowledge.
5. Human beings have mathematical knowledge. Therefore,
6. Mathematical platonism is not correct.

[TruthPrevails]

Originally Posted by kennethamy
But one thing is clear: there were at least three stars before there were any people, and there were no minds before there were any people, so the number three could not possibly be a "mental process" (whatever that might be).
Kennethamy, have you tried to find the two cubes in the Necker Cube illusion. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necker_cube Based on your rigid thinking here, it is likely that you will have trouble seeing two cubes. Yes, No?

At what point in time between the Big Bang and now, were there three stars before there were any people?
Numbers are mind-conditioned, they do not exists independently.
No minds then no numbers.
Numbers are only created in the individual human mind and intersubjectively agreed in general by the majority of humans, not anything else.

[RexT]

It is not a matter of being convinced of the conclusion. It is a matter of whether the argument is sound. You have given some reasons for thinking that the number three (not the numeral, the number) "refers to space". It is hard to evaluate these reasons since I have no clear idea what the phrase, "refers to space" means. It seems to be one of those "accordian" words whose meaning you can stretch or narrow to fit what you are seeking to prove.
Actually, it is a matter of both sound argument and being convinced, but let that debate be for another time and place. Yes, I have given reasons, and they are sound. The phrase "refers to space" means exactly what it sounds like it would mean. It means that a comprehensive description of anything will include a spatial reference. In fact, every part of every description is a spatial reference bearing a particular feature of space.
I have no idea what you might mean by saying that space is existence. But I don't see what that has to do with your contention. Our universe exists, but it is not space, and if Einstein is right, since space is a part of the universe, the universe does not even exist in space. Space is not a kind of empty container which contains the universe. And space is certainly not nothing, since space exists, and nothing does not exist.
Existence is not a separate property of things, such as size and weight are separate properties of a thing. LIkewise, every property of a thing has an equal amount of existence; the size property does not exist more than or less than the weight property. What does it mean then to say that a thing exists? It means that it can be identified by its properties and that those properties can be counted and classified. Would this be possible if there were no space? Of course not, but then, it is impossible that there could be no space. Yet, you have it backwards to say that space exists, for space has no properties without the presence of things.

Even the scientific definition of space is "the distance between things". Therefore, space is not a thing; it is no-thing or nothing. Yet, it is within space that things exist and their very existence is apparent by their nagation of space, thus, their direct reference to space.

In an attempt to keep it simple, imagine space as an infinite sea of black and things as specks of white scattered about the sea. Now, think of this as a film, but when we see the negative of this film, we have an infinite see of white with black things scattered about. Suddenly, we have this infinite thing with specks of space or voids scattered about, but our mind does not want to do this, since we will see the infinite white thing as space, and that is exactly what it is. The point is that it is all space, the things included. There is only space and things are the negative of space, yet still space, merely negating space in different ways and giving space different properties. There is only existence either way.
So, you are right to think that I am not persuaded by what there is of argument that you give. And, by the way, if, as you (now) tell us, space does not exist, then how would it be possible for everything that exists to "refer" to space? How could anything refer to what does not exist? Very baffling.
It is all in your mind whether there is a thing or merely empty space, no-thing. What exists is what you see as a thing, discrete and opposed to what you see as space. To exist then means to be contrasted to space, there is no deeper meaning to existence than this, and therefore, it is space that is existence and gives its existence to things, which invariably exist but in space. It is baffling, but so is QM, love, imagination, beauty, inspiration and really, everything else. Reality is baffling and it is wonderful; I would have it no other way. Of course, that does not mean we cannot accept it for what it is though.

Rex

[kennethamy]

I can't. That doesn't mean that there was a three. We need to use the word "three" (in some language) to count. Was anyone counting before we got here?

My basic objection to your argument is that it just seems to be absurd on the face of it to say that stars cannot exist without abstract objects.

How does the fact that we need the word "three" to count, show that there weren't three stars before we counted? Counting isn't a necessary condition for there being the number three, although it is a sufficient condition. If there is counting, then there is three: from which it does not follow that if there is three, then there is counting. I think you are mixing up necessary with sufficient conditions.

What makes you think I believe that stars cannot exist without the number three, or any number? What I said is that you cannot have three stars without the number three. And there certainly were three stars before there were people.

[Chris Porter]

How does the fact that we need the word "three" to count, show that there weren't three stars before we counted? Counting isn't a necessary condition for there being the number three, although it is a sufficient condition. If there is counting, then there is three: from which it does not follow that if there is three, then there is counting. I think you are mixing up necessary with sufficient conditions.

What makes you think I believe that stars cannot exist without the number three, or any number? What I said is that you cannot have three stars without the number three. And there certainly were three stars before there were people.
"Counting isn't a necessary condition for there being the number three, although it is a sufficient condition."
Can you tell me how you define the term 'counting', such that one can have a group of things, know the total number of the group, but not have it be necessary to previously be able to count? I find the sentence very odd, mainly because I think that in order to know what 'three' means, you first have to know how to 'count'. Put more simply, I pack the presupposition of "knowledge of counting" in order to even point at stars, however many, and claim "three" means anything at all.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

How does the fact that we need the word "three" to count, show that there weren't three stars before we counted?I didn't say there was no three before we counted.I'm not sure the question of whether there was a number three before there were minds has an answer, but I am pretty sure you haven't demonstrated here that the answer is yes.Counting isn't a necessary condition for there being the number three, although it is a sufficient condition. If there is counting, then there is three: from which it does not follow that if there is three, then there is counting. I think you are mixing up necessary with sufficient conditions.I am saying that there being a three is not a necessary condition for there being three things. I understand "there were three things" to mean something like "if there were a entity capable of counting, such an entity could have counted to three, counting said things". If you would supply a more rigorous definition I would gratefully entertain it.What makes you think I believe that stars cannot exist without the number three, or any number? What I said is that you cannot have three stars without the number three. And there certainly were three stars before there were people.Unless three is a very special number, if you cannot have three stars without the number three, you cannot have one star without the number one, or any number of stars without the corresponding number. Saying you cannot have any number of stars suggests you cannot have any stars.

[Witt]

I didn't say there was no three before we counted.I am saying that there being a three is not a necessary condition for there being three things. I understand "there were three things" to mean something like "if there were a entity capable of counting, such an entity could have counted to three, counting said things". If you would supply a more rigorous definition I would gratefully entertain it.Unless three is a very special number, if you cannot have three stars without the number three, you cannot have one star without the number one, or any number of stars without the corresponding number. Saying you cannot have any number of stars suggests you cannot have any stars.

It seems clear to me that we can (now) talk about the number of stars that where the case without mind, only as a suposition.

We 'believe' that there where things before mind, but, we cannot know that there where existent things without mind.

It is surely a mater of belif, is'nt it ??

If you do not like my spelling, tough tiity!!

[Hoodoo Ulove]

It seems clear to me that we can (now) talk about the number of stars that where the case without mind, only as a suposition.

We 'believe' that there where things before mind, but, we cannot know that there where existent things without mind.

It is surely a mater of belif, is'nt it ??

If you do not like my spelling, tough tiity!!Depends upon your standards of evidence and justification, I suppose. Yours are a bit rigorous for me.

[kennethamy]

It seems clear to me that we can (now) talk about the number of stars that where the case without mind, only as a suposition.

We 'believe' that there where things before mind, but, we cannot know that there where existent things without mind.

It is surely a mater of belif, is'nt it ??

If you do not like my spelling, tough tiity!!

If you don't know that the Earth existed before there were people, where do you suppose people came from, since they could not have come from Earth (unless you think that Earth and people sort of popped up together at the same time)? Oh yes, let me mention the paleontological and other evidence that the Earth existed before people existed (and therefore, before minds existed). If we don't know that, then we don't know much of anything. Well, maybe that's what you think is true. But that shows more about how you use the word "know" then it shows about what is known.

And no, it is not a matter of belief (not even surely) if you mean only of belief. It is a matter only of belief that the world was created; is is not a matter only of belief that the world is older than human beings. It is a matter of knowledge.