An argument for Freewill from Qualia.

[trip]

The argument made against freewill could also be made against qualia, yet we accept qualia as a fact of reality. We do this because qualia is directly experienced by us, just as freewill is. Yet nobody speaks of "the illusion of qualia," yet they do this with the concept of freewill. What exactly is the difference between the two conclusions that justifies this? If our direct experience of Qualia is enough to conclude it's reality, why not our direct experience of freewill? Why does nobody say "the illusion of Qualia?"

Other than our expericence, nowhere in the universe can we ever say "that is qualia." For all we know, scientifically, everybody but ourselves are zombies. If Maxwell's Demon, with perfect knowledge of every atom in the universe, it's position and trajectory at a specific point in time, can predict the exact deterministic result at any later point in time, does he know as a result of solely this knowledge alone what the expericence of red is? If he knows the exact material reality of ammonia, does he know what ammonia smells like to a human nose? If not, that means that there is knowledge in the universe that is not purely physical, or else the Demon would possess it.

So if qualia is unattainable through a purely physical description, yet we accept it because we personally experience it, why not make the same argument for freewill? Just replace the term "Qualia" for "Freewill." What makes one argument acceptable, yet the other unacceptable?

The mind is what the brain does. Qualia is what the mind does. Freewill is what Qualia does?

[Preno]

Yet nobody speaks of "the illusion of qualia," yet they do this with the concept of freewill.Actually, a lot of people claim that qualia are illusory. Perhaps even most of those that claim that free will is illusory.

Grammatical note: 'qualia' is plural, the singular would be 'quale'.

[trip]

What would be the argument for "qualia are illusory?" I suppose it'd be the same as the argument against freewill, but our experience of red and the smell of ammonia would seem a little hard to argue away.

[Kosh3]

I don't know what it would be for "qualia" to be "illusory". Qualia are not things in the world anyway, but mental constructs. If they can be illusory, then so can thoughts. But then, I don't know what it would be for a thought to be illusory either.

[David B]

I don't think that there is much doubt that qualia are mental constructs.

But then, there doesn't seem to me much doubt that if qualia were grossly misleading in a survival/reproduction context, then they could never have arison.

Qualia are cranes, not skyhooks.

when talking about free will, I'm again influenced by Dennett, and reject any sort of idea of absolute freedom in favour of the idea of degrees of freedom.

David B

[untermensche]

....We do this because qualia is directly experienced by us, just as freewill is....
Is freewill really experienced?

Do we freely choose the foods we like, or do we just like certain foods?

Do we freely choose the people we like, or do we just like certain people?

[trip]

Is freewill really experienced?

Do we freely choose the foods we like, or do we just like certain foods?

Do we freely choose the people we like, or do we just like certain people?

The way we think about the future and it's possibilities, the past and our regrets, our laws, our language, all assume freewill, whether or not it's real. We naturally assume freewill exists in the way we perceive and think about reality, determinism is the result of a logical argument.

The reason we think this way is because we do experience the reality/illusion of freewill. Why couldn't it have happened differently? What do I want to do tommorrow, next year? Where will we go for lunch? We are either really making decisions, or have the convincing illusion that we are making decisions, but either way we are experiencing 'freewill.'

[EPresence]

The way we think about the future and it's possibilities, the past and our regrets, our laws, our language, all assume freewill, whether or not it's real. We naturally assume freewill exists in the way we perceive and think about reality, determinism is the result of a logical argument.

The reason we think this way is because we do experience the reality/illusion of freewill. Why couldn't it have happened differently? What do I want to do tommorrow, next year? Where will we go for lunch? We are either really making decisions, or have the convincing illusion that we are making decisions, but either way we are experiencing 'freewill.'
I agree. I think we do experience the feeling of free will in the process of making a decision - for in that span of time allowed for making the actual decision, there must be freedom to explore some possible outcomes. So even a deterministic Universe must wait for a human decision... and that human knows it. Therein lies the feeling of free will, even if the ultimate decision is 100% predictable given the same circumstances. Unless of course, the human is trying to be unpredictable using a quantum probablistic mechanism.

SC

[Kingreaper]

The argument made against freewill could also be made against qualia, yet we accept qualia as a fact of reality. We do this because qualia is directly experienced by us, just as freewill is. Yet nobody speaks of "the illusion of qualia," yet they do this with the concept of freewill. What exactly is the difference between the two conclusions that justifies this? If our direct experience of Qualia is enough to conclude it's reality, why not our direct experience of freewill? Why does nobody say "the illusion of Qualia?"

Other than our expericence, nowhere in the universe can we ever say "that is qualia." For all we know, scientifically, everybody but ourselves are zombies. If Maxwell's Demon, with perfect knowledge of every atom in the universe, it's position and trajectory at a specific point in time, can predict the exact deterministic result at any later point in time, does he know as a result of solely this knowledge alone what the expericence of red is? If he knows the exact material reality of ammonia, does he know what ammonia smells like to a human nose? If not, that means that there is knowledge in the universe that is not purely physical, or else the Demon would possess it.
Why? He merely knows the location of every particle, he does not know anything about their structures and the patterns therein. Give someone knowledge of every atom on Earth and they will completely lack the ability to even find life, let alone find humans, let alone understand the human mind.

Knowing somethings most basic levels does not mean understanding its emergent complexities.

[trip]

Well, the argument against freewill uses this determinist model as it's premise. Since everything, at this purely physical level, is determined, everything is determined, because the purely physical is everything, ultimately.

You point out that the demon would know very little about reality even with perfect physical knowldege. Exactly. So why does the argument against freewill, based on the physical reality of the universe, abolish our experience of freewill to the point where most people talk about the 'illusion of freewill,' yet this same argument doesn't abolish our experience of qualia?

[Penumbrae]

What may be illuminating, if not determinant, would be to supply contrastive examples for both. In the examples of qualia, we can certainly experience (or imagine) the palpable absence of a particular quale, but I don't think we have anything analogous in the case of "free will." How would an "unfree will" appear? Can we even imagine what it would be like to have an "unfree will?"

Granted, we might be said to experience what it is like to undergo something contrary to one's will, or not in alignment with one's will, but can we say that we have ever experienced willing that we could characterize as "unfree?" And if not, by what rights can we call our experience of "free will" to be "free?"

[Kingreaper]

Well, the argument against freewill uses this determinist model as it's premise. Since everything, at this purely physical level, is determined, everything is determined, because the purely physical is everything, ultimately.

You point out that the demon would know very little about reality even with perfect physical knowldege. Exactly. So why does the argument against freewill, based on the physical reality of the universe, abolish our experience of freewill to the point where most people talk about the 'illusion of freewill,' yet this same argument doesn't abolish our experience of qualia?

Qualia can be explained as an emergent: deterministic events can result in emergent qualia.

Non-determinstic freewill cannot be an emergent: Deterministic events cannot produce non-determistic emergents.

[trip]

What about our experience of flinching when an object flys towards our face, as opposed to deciding where to go for dinner? Would the first be an example of 'unfree will' as opposed to 'freewill?'

[trip]

Qualia can be explained as an emergent: deterministic events can result in emergent qualia.

Non-determinstic freewill cannot be an emergent: Deterministic events cannot produce non-determistic emergents.

Can a purely physical reality produce a non-physical, emergent truth? If the demon doesn't know what ammonia smells like, then it can.

So can a purely deterministic reality produce a non-determinist, emergent event? If you say no, why the two different conclusions?

[kennethamy]

What may be illuminating, if not determinant, would be to supply contrastive examples for both. In the examples of qualia, we can certainly experience (or imagine) the palpable absence of a particular quale, but I don't think we have anything analogous in the case of "free will." How would an "unfree will" appear? Can we even imagine what it would be like to have an "unfree will?"

Granted, we might be said to experience what it is like to undergo something contrary to one's will, or not in alignment with one's will, but can we say that we have ever experienced willing that we could characterize as "unfree?" And if not, by what rights can we call our experience of "free will" to be "free?"

Well, I can certainly imagine what it is like to have "unfree will". In fact, I have had "unfree will". My mother used to force me to eat broccoli and cauliflower, and you have no idea how much I did not want to eat those two vegetables. I think you must be talking about the alleged feeling of my action or choice being uncaused and I agree that I have no idea what that feeling is supposed to be like because I am pretty sure there is no such feeling. But that is surely not what is meant by "feeling unfree". That's easy. It is feeling compelled to do something you don't want to do, or not to do something you want to do.

[Kingreaper]

What about our experience of flinching when an object flys towards our face, as opposed to deciding where to go for dinner? Would the first be an example of 'unfree will' as opposed to 'freewill?'

You do not will yourself to flinch do you?

It is an unfree action, not an unfree will.

An unfree will is things like the desire to eat, you have a will to eat even though you didn't choose to.

Unfortunately, freewill only comes if you freely choose what to will, and to do that you must freely will to choose what to will...

An infinite regression is required, and those aren't things you want to stick in in some random place.

[Kingreaper]

Can a purely physical reality produce a non-physical, emergent truth? If the demon doesn't know what ammonia smells like, then it can.Emergents are patterns, patterns exist within the substrate of physical reality, what makess up an instantiation is physical, but the pattern itself is not.


So can a purely deterministic reality produce a non-determinist, emergent event? If you say no, why the two different conclusions?
No

Patterns (which are not exactly physical) can exist in physical substrates, sure. But can determism produce non-determinism? Can you give a reason why it could? The situations are not analagous, one doesn't imply the other.

If you can predict the positioni of every particle, and then look at it to see the emergents, then you can see how all the emergents will change deterministicly, thus emergents in a deterministic realm must be determistic.

They can however be stochastic, unpredictable on their own level, but not non-deterministic.

[trip]

Is someone who's fasting making a infinite regression in order to carry out their will to not eat?

If a monk is doused with gasoline and set ablaze, you could say he has the desire to scream and try to put out the flames, yet he simply sits quietly and burns to death. Is this a act of freewill?

[kennethamy]

You do not will yourself to flinch do you?

It is an unfree action, not an unfree will.



Why is that? Do you want not to flinch? That kind of flinching is what we call "involuntary" (like the eye-blink reflex). It is neither a free nor an unfree action since it is not an action at all, any more than slipping on ice and falling is an action. It is a "reflex action" which is not an action, but a reaction.

[Kingreaper]

Is someone who's fasting making a infinite regression in order to carry out their will to not eat?No, they haved an instinctual urge (will) to eat, but are surpressing it due to a higher level urge (will) to make a statement

If a monk is doused with gasoline and set ablaze, you could say he has the desire to scream and try to put out the flames, yet he simply sits quietly and burns to death. Is this a act of freewill?

See above. It is an act of will, to call it freewill requires a different definition fo free will.

[Kingreaper]

Why is that? Do you want not to flinch? That kind of flinching is what we call "involuntary" (like the eye-blink reflex). It is neither a free nor an unfree action since it is not an action at all, any more than slipping on ice and falling is an action. It is a "reflex action" which is not an action, but a reaction.

A reflex action is still an action. When you slip and fall do you put out your arm to catch yourself? Or is this something which just happens rather than an action?

Just because you make an action on instinct (or even on reflex) doesn't make it a non-action.

[Penumbrae]

Well, I can certainly imagine what it is like to have "unfree will". In fact, I have had "unfree will". My mother used to force me to eat broccoli and cauliflower, and you have no idea how much I did not want to eat those two vegetables. I think you must be talking about the alleged feeling of my action or choice being uncaused and I agree that I have no idea what that feeling is supposed to be like because I am pretty sure there is no such feeling. But that is surely not what is meant by "feeling unfree". That's easy. It is feeling compelled to do something you don't want to do, or not to do something you want to do.

Well, what you're talking about there is what I referred to as experiencing something being contrary or not in alignment with one's will. But is the will itself unfree? You can decide not to eat the vile broccoli/cauliflower concoction, but you are unable to carry out your decision. Does this affect the quality (specifically, the "freedom") of the decision? I certainly don't want to say that will is free iff one can also carry out one's will--I'm just wondering how one would distinguish a "free" will from another ("unfree," I suppose) kind of will.

[trip]

Emergents are patterns, patterns exist within the substrate of physical reality, what makess up an instantiation is physical, but the pattern itself is not.

Patterns (which are not exactly physical) can exist in physical substrates, sure. But can determism produce non-determinism? Can you give a reason why it could? The situations are not analagous, one doesn't imply the other.

If you can predict the positioni of every particle, and then look at it to see the emergents, then you can see how all the emergents will change deterministicly, thus emergents in a deterministic realm must be determistic.

The universe is purely physical. Yet patterns can create truths that are not purely physical, qualia. We accept qualia as real, and that statements such as "My experience of red is x (x being the specific way we percieve 'red')" as true. This is a truth that cannot be gotten from any physical description of reality. After all, we can't ultimately prove that anybody besides ourselves even experience qualia. So in a universe that is purely physical, there are non-physical facts we personally experience.

If I changed your argument to this:
"If you can predict the positioni of every particle, and then look at it to see the emergents, then you can see how all the emergents [are] physical, thus emergents in a physical realm must be physical."
you can see that it is false, because there are emergents (qualia) that are non-physical.

So a purely physical universe can produce a non-physical emergent, qualia. Why then can't a purely deterministic universe produce a non-determinist emergent, freewill?

We accept qualia because of our personal experience, and the fact that reality is purely physical doesn't deter us. We reject freewill despite our personal experience, and the fact that the universe is purely physical deters us.

I'm not saying I outright believe any of this, I'd just like a clear, concise explanation of why we accept the one and reject the other. Sorry if I'm coming off like the proverbial 'gadfly' in the process, but I'd like to see a argument that expilcitly details our split in conclusions.

edit: I noticed on reading the altered version of your argument that it might be begging the question.
1. If you can predict the positioni of every particle, and then look at it to see the emergents
2. then you can see how all the emergents will change deterministicly
3. thus emergents in a deterministic realm must be determistic.

#2 "all the emergents will change deterministicly" is another way of saying "emergents are deterimistic," no? So it reads:

1. If you have perfect physical knowledge and then look to see the emergents
2. you'll see all the emergents are deterministic
3. therefore all the emergents are deterministic.

What argument can you provide to prove that a deterministic reality entails deterministic emergents? After all, a physical reality doesn't entail solely physical emergents (qualia).

[kennethamy]

A reflex action is still an action. When you slip and fall do you put out your arm to catch yourself? Or is this something which just happens rather than an action?

Just because you make an action on instinct (or even on reflex) doesn't make it a non-action.

I don't think we are really disagreeing. The defensive reflex you are talking about is just as much (or just as little) an action as is the eye-blink reflex. And action is something (I suppose) you can decide to do, or decide not to do. It is "up to you" whether you do it or not. Now, eye-blink and defensive behaviors (to use a neutral term) are both in the same boat. But they are different from putting out your hand to shake someone's hand, or blinking your eyes because the opthamologists asks you to do it. As long as you see the difference between the two kinds of behavior [involuntary (or maybe better, "non-voluntary" since involuntary implies some kind of compulsion) and voluntary] I don' t mind whether you call both "actions" or not. But most people would say that behavior isn't necessarily an action.

[Oxymoron]

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm

[trendkill]

So if qualia is unattainable through a purely physical description, yet we accept it because we personally experience it, why not make the same argument for freewill? Just replace the term "Qualia" for "Freewill." What makes one argument acceptable, yet the other unacceptable?
Well, I don't hear that argument against free will much, and I think it's pretty lame. I argue against free will (which I personally do not experience the illusion of, btw), on the grounds that it has no coherent definition. That sort of argument doesn't apply to qualia; "qualia" is a very simple concept with no inherent contradictions.

Yet patterns can create truths that are not purely physical, qualia.No, it does not follow that because physical descriptions can't capture qualia, that qualia are therefore nonphysical. Qualia are by definition that which can't be captured by a description: they are direct experience. While qualia may be nonphysical, no conclusion that they must be is logically warranted.

[kennethamy]

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm

Thanks.

[sweetiepie]

The reason we think this way is because we do experience the reality/illusion of freewill. Why couldn't it have happened differently? What do I want to do tommorrow, next year? Where will we go for lunch? We are either really making decisions, or have the convincing illusion that we are making decisions, but either way we are experiencing 'freewill.'

But we really are making decisions.

Free will doesn't impede our decision making process at all. We really are deciding what we will do for lunch. If we didn't make such decisions then we'd be missing out on lunch. When I sit down to decide what I'm going to eat, I am well aware that my decision will be guided by- well- by me.

It seems most of the reason people believe in 'free will' is that they think it has something to do with a freedom to decide.

I like the argument anyway, it's pretty original, but you should know that those of us who don't beleive in free will don't experience it.

[kennethamy]

But we really are making decisions.

Free will doesn't impede our decision making process at all. We really are deciding what we will do for lunch. If we didn't make such decisions then we'd be missing out on lunch. When I sit down to decide what I'm going to eat, I am well aware that my decision will be guided by- well- by me.

It seems most of the reason people believe in 'free will' is that they think it has something to do with a freedom to decide.

I like the argument anyway, it's pretty original, but you should know that those of us who don't beleive in free will don't experience it.

Now that's interesting that if you don't believe in free will, then you don't experience it. Would experiencing free will get you to believe it? Perhaps you'd like to say what it would feel like to "experience free will" (something I understand you don't experience, but you must know what it would be like to experience it if you have decided you don't experience it. Right?) Now, I think that I experience free will when I want to do something and I am not prevented from doing it. And I think that is what most people who thought about it outside a philosophy classroom would say. If I wanted to eat a piece of apple pie, and no one did anything to stop me, I suppose that if someone asked me, had I just experienced free will, I might say I had.

But you have made it clear that's not at all what you have in mind. You think that to experience free will would be to experience making a causeless decision, or doing a causeless action.

But, I ask you again: if you don't know what it would be like to experience free will, then how do you know you haven't done so?

[sweetiepie]

Now that's interesting that if you don't believe in free will, then you don't experience it. Would experiencing free will get you to believe it? Perhaps you'd like to say what it would feel like to "experience free will" (something I understand you don't experience, but you must know what it would be like to experience it if you have decided you don't experience it. Right?) Now, I think that I experience free will when I want to do something and I am not prevented from doing it. And I think that is what most people who thought about it outside a philosophy classroom would say. If I wanted to eat a piece of apple pie, and no one did anything to stop me, I suppose that if someone asked me, had I just experienced free will, I might say I had.

But you have made it clear that's not at all what you have in mind. You think that to experience free will would be to experience making a causeless decision, or doing a causeless action.

But, I ask you again: if you don't know what it would be like to experience free will, then how do you know you haven't done so?

I suppose my statement was a little misleading. I simply meant that those of us who believe in a determined universe don't refer to that as an experience of 'free will' (which the creator of this thread is using as the philisophical equivalent of an uncaused action).

The feeling the thread starter is referring to as an experience of indeterminism is only an experience of choosing freely, which is something that we all believe in.

[kennethamy]

I suppose my statement was a little misleading. I simply meant that those of us who believe in a determined universe don't refer to that as an experience of 'free will' (which the creator of this thread is using as the philisophical equivalent of an uncaused action).

The feeling the thread starter is referring to as an experience of indeterminism is only an experience of choosing freely, which is something that we all believe in.

As I wrote, when I want to do something, and I am not prevented from doing it, is what I call acting freely.

The phrase, "I have experienced something" ordinarily means something like, "I have done that something" or "something has happened to me". For instance, to say that I have experienced using a computer is not to say that literally I have had some unique kind of feeling or sensation. All it means is that I have used a computer. I am not talking about any mental happenings going on. If a prospective employers asks you whether you have had any computer experience, he doesn't expect you to describe your mental states, does he. He just wants to know whether you have used computers. In the same way, to ask me whether I have had the experience of free will seems to me just to ask whether I have ever wanted to do something, and was not prevented from doing it. Is is not a question about whether I have had some special sensation or experience which I call, "the experience of free-will". As most have here admitted, they have no idea what such a sensation or feeling is supposed to be like. And, of course, since some people on this thread seem to think that to have free will is to act causelessly, I can understand that. What would the feeling of acting causelessly be? Feeling dizzy? What sort of feeling would the feeling of acting causelessly feel like? It sounds like nonsense to me.

[sweetiepie]

As I wrote, when I want to do something, and I am not prevented from doing it, is what I call acting freely.

The phrase, "I have experienced something" ordinarily means something like, "I have done that something" or "something has happened to me". For instance, to say that I have experienced using a computer is not to say that literally I have had some unique kind of feeling or sensation. All it means is that I have used a computer. I am not talking about any mental happenings going on. If a prospective employers asks you whether you have had any computer experience, he doesn't expect you to describe your mental states, does he. He just wants to know whether you have used computers. In the same way, to ask me whether I have had the experience of free will seems to me just to ask whether I have ever wanted to do something, and was not prevented from doing it. Is is not a question about whether I have had some special sensation or experience which I call, "the experience of free-will". As most have here admitted, they have no idea what such a sensation or feeling is supposed to be like. And, of course, since some people on this thread seem to think that to have free will is to act causelessly, I can understand that. What would the feeling of acting causelessly be? Feeling dizzy? What sort of feeling would the feeling of acting causelessly feel like? It sounds like nonsense to me.
just what i've been trying (and repeatedly failing) to say.

[kennethamy]

just what i've been trying (and repeatedly failing) to say.

I just want to add that Sartre seems really to have thought that we have what is sometimes called "metaphysical freedom" (and not just that we can sometimes do what we want to do, which is just ordinary (sensible?) freedom). That is, that we sometimes can act contra-causally. And, furthermore, Sartre really did think that there is a kind of feeling or sensation that occurs when we do that. I am not much of a Sartrean scholar, but I think that in some places, he described that feeling as a feeling of "anguish". Apparently he got that from Kierkegaard who described the apprehension of freedom (and let's remember that what is meant by freedom is acting contra-causally, and not what is ordinarily meant by it) as "anguish". Now, I am not sure just what sort of feeling "anguish" is supposed to be, but it seems to be most unpleasant. So, if when any of you act or choose, and you feel anguished, that's it!

[trip]

which the creator of this thread is using as the philisophical equivalent of an uncaused action

I never said 'uncaused action,' mentioned the phrase 'uncaused' or anything like it. The references to what it might feel like to 'experience' freewill were explicitly stated by me to be things like feeling regret at past actions and planning for future decisions.

You're projecting some other argument you've probably come across onto me, but I never said anything like the above.

[kennethamy]

I never said 'uncaused action,' mentioned the phrase 'uncaused' or anything like it. The references to what it might feel like to 'experience' freewill were explicitly stated by me to be things like feeling regret at past actions and planning for future decisions.

You're projecting some other argument you've probably come across onto me, but I never said anything like the above.

Isn't it true that when you say that if an action or a choice is free you mean that the action or the choice is not determined by anything, and specifically, not determined by any previous causes? So that undetermined really means uncaused?

If you don't believe in metaphysical freewill; if you think that's an illusion, then don't you have to think that feelings or regret, or planning for future decisions are only manifestations of that illusion? So when you feel regret, you cannot be having the feeling of freewill since, according to you, there is no freewill. Isn't that right?

[EPresence]

If you don't believe in metaphysical freewill; if you think that's an illusion, then don't you have to think that feelings or regret, or planning for future decisions are only manifestations of that illusion? So when you feel regret, you cannot be having the feeling of freewill since, according to you, there is no freewill. Isn't that right?

Though I'm not Trip, I'd answer that actual free will and a feeling of free will are independent of each other. The act of making a decision that doesn't follow from any cause is an arbitrary decision... not a decision free from any and all causal dependencies. That would be totally free will. Like others have said (basically), the will is free to the degree it is controlled from inside vs. outside factors. So free will need not be totally free will. Now the feeling we could make any choice, at any moment, is a feeling of not being forced to do anything. In an manner of speaking, we know that the Universe waits upon our decision... and we could do something totally arbitrary. Thus combining with quantum reality to create an even less deterministic world, but still a world constrained by a range of possibilities. In other words, I have a feeling of totally free will while making some decisions, while I know the outcome is predictable to some degree (barring a completely arbitrary decision). I think free will is as simple as that. In summary, the feeling of totally free will acompanies (spelling?) the exploration of possible options before a decision is actually made. That's my 2-cents :D

Edit: Actually a decision free from any and all causal dependencies would be a totally arbitrary decision. But to associate this with free will would be equating "free" with "arbitrary." Hey, maybe one's ability to make a completely arbitrary decision is totally free will. But who would want that? You could make the arbitrary decision to jump off a cliff.

SC

[trip]

Isn't it true that when you say that if an action or a choice is free you mean that the action or the choice is not determined by anything, and specifically, not determined by any previous causes? So that undetermined really means uncaused?

No. An act of freewill under this argument is a emergent property. So it can have causes which themselves are emergent properties, such as concepts, ideas, desires, which all influence the act. But they don't determine, inevitably, what the act will be, the way a billiard ball is determined when it is struck. An act of freewill, under this argument, can be the result of some previous cause, without it being determined mechanically by the previous cause the way all matter at the physical level is determined mechanically and inevitably by previous causes.

Let's take a look at how the material universe works as far as cause and effect go. If you have a collision between two atoms, the subsequent trajectories are inevitable; it couldn't have happened any other way given the exact circumstances of the initial event.

Now obviously we are ultimately nothing but atoms, including our brains, the chemical reactions in our brains, electrical impulses, etc. All of these things are purely physical, not alive or concious, and act exactly like our first two atoms. They are all determined, inevitably, by purely physical factors.

But if you look at the first collision of those two atoms, you notice that no action is taking place, just a reaction. The atoms do what they must, and fly off to their next inevitable collision, and on and on. The atoms in our brains are no different. It's chaos really, with no rhyme or reason, it just is.

But since there is no rhyme or reason at this atomic level, and the brain itself, the chemical reactions, the electical impulses (our thoughts) are all composed of such atoms, at what point does this change as you go to more abstract 'meta-levels.' (Sorry for the made up word) If the chain is linear from the chaotic atoms to the matter they are a part of, shouldn't the chemical reactions themselves, the electrical impulses themselves be changing from state to inevitable state purely chaotically? How do the purely by chance behavior of the atoms result in "I think I'd like to go get some chicken today"? If our thoughts are electrical impulses/chemical reactions, which are only changing how they must change from state to state, how does any coherent thought or behavior result?

This is where the whole emergent properties thing comes in. Just as qualia result from a purely physical universe, freewill results from a purely deterministic universe.

I say freewill exists because we have the sense of making decisions. That is freewill. We make decisions regardless of what the atomic state of things in our brains are at that exact moment, or what the state of the universe was a million years ago. We make decisions based on whether we'd like chicken today or not, and nothing else. We've evolved to the point where we've escaped the rest of the universes restrictions. Just as nowhere else in the universe do we see conciousness (yet), nowhere else do we see freewill. Yet we don't doubt we are concious. I'm not saying conciousness or freewill are supernatural at all, just that they are absolutely unique in the universe, while still being naturalistic.

Again, this is all just an enjoyable bs session for me, so it's not like I've really given this much thought, but I think it's roughly where my thoughts are taking me in regards to freewill lately.

[kennethamy]

Though I'm not Trip, I'd answer that actual free will and a feeling of free will are independent of each other. The act of making a decision that doesn't follow from any cause is an arbitrary decision... not a decision free from any and all causal dependencies. That would be totally free will. Like others have said (basically), the will is free to the degree it is controlled from inside vs. outside factors. So free will need not be totally free will. Now the feeling we could make any choice, at any moment, is a feeling of not being forced to do anything. In an manner of speaking, we know that the Universe waits upon our decision... and we could do something totally arbitrary. Thus combining with quantum reality to create an even less deterministic world, but still a world constrained by a range of possibilities. In other words, I have a feeling of totally free will while making some decisions, while I know the outcome is predictable to some degree (barring a completely arbitrary decision). I think free will is as simple as that. In summary, the feeling of totally free will acompanies (spelling?) the exploration of possible options before a decision is actually made. That's my 2-cents :D

Edit: Actually a decision free from any and all causal dependencies would be a totally arbitrary decision. But to associate this with free will would be equating "free" with "arbitrary." Hey, maybe one's ability to make a completely arbitrary decision is totally free will. But who would want that? You could make the arbitrary decision to jump off a cliff.

SC


Wouldn't an arbitrary decision be one for which you had no reasons? For instance, I could make an arbitrary decision by deciding on a toss of a coin. But that would not mean that my decision was not causally determined, would it? It would be causally determined by way the coin fell, and, of course, by my decision to make my choice on the basis. So, "arbitrary decision" need not mean, "causally undetermined decision". I think that those who believe that they can have freewill and who mean by freewill undetermined by any causes are fooling themselves. They may, indeed, make the decision arbitrarily, in the sense that they have no reasons for their decision. But how would that show that the decision was undetermined by antecedent causes? Sartre was under the impression that one could show one's freewill simply by doing an acte gratuit a gratuitous act, or what we might call an impulsive act. Thus, young French existentialists, just after World War II would seek to show their freedom by flouting all conventions, and urinating in public. But no "hard determinist" (someone who believes all our actions are determined, and that if they are, then there is no "freewill") would accept that as a manifestation of "freewill" in the metaphysical sense of "freewill" which means, "uncaused". He would say that pissing in public was as determined as any other act; determined by the wish to flout convention. The feeling of "anguish" that Sartre thought was the feeling of freewill, would then just be the feeling of anguish about the prospect of being arrested for being a public nuisance.

The problem, it seems to me, is not the association of "free" with "arbitrary". The problem, I think, is the association of "free" with "uncaused".

[kennethamy]

No. An act of freewill under this argument is a emergent property. So it can have causes which themselves are emergent properties, such as concepts, ideas, desires, which all influence the act. But they don't determine, inevitably, what the act will be, the way a billiard ball is determined when it is struck. An act of freewill, under this argument, can be the result of some previous cause, without it being determined mechanically by the previous cause the way all matter at the physical level is determined mechanically and inevitably by previous causes.



That's a heavy load of....well, let's just adhere to the rules of the forum and call it a heavy load of metaphysical baggage. All this talk about "emergent properties", and the implication that concepts, or ideas, or desires, are "emergent" by which, I suppose, you mean that they have no antecendent causes, is, at best, mere (and I emphasize "mere") speculation, if indeed it has any clear meaning at all. The idea that desires, of all things, have no causal history, would, I think, be considered, to put it mildly, implausible by most psychologists. That I prefer (and I assume that a preference is a kind of desire) blondes rather than brunettes is pretty clearly not an "emergent" property of mine.

"Emergent" is just a fancy term for another, slightly less fancy term, undetermined. You seem to want to have it both ways. That my actions and choices are determined, but that's all right, and I have free will, because what determines my actions are "emergent" properties. And these just pop up out of no where.

Of course, there is another problem. If my desire for money leads me to commit a bank robbery, it will not, I think, be a defence that this desire just "emerged". Or, if it is a defence, it will be an insanity defence. The issue of freewill is partly important because of its connection with moral responsibility. We think that people are morally responsible for their actions when they act "of their own freewill". But they cannot be responsible for their actions if the motives on which they acted just popped up out of the blue. And that's what an "emergent" desire sounds like. (And, by the way, the same is true of ideas or concepts. Do you think that if someone is a Jihadist, and a suicide-bomber, that idea just "emerged" out of the blue?)

[trip]

Def: Emergence is the process of complex pattern formation from simpler rules.

So you're whole response having to do with the 'just emerged out of nowhere' thing is invalid. Read the definition and try again.

I don't mean at all that they have no causes. Stop trying to box me into this whole 'no causes' thing so you're so hung up on.

Also, if you're going to be condescending, at least know what it is you're even responding too. At best, your repsonse was merely (and I stress merely) made in ignorance.

[Penumbrae]

Now, I think that I experience free will when I want to do something and I am not prevented from doing it. And I think that is what most people who thought about it outside a philosophy classroom would say. If I wanted to eat a piece of apple pie, and no one did anything to stop me, I suppose that if someone asked me, had I just experienced free will, I might say I had.

Do you really mean to say this? Is it not the case that one can freely decide to murder someone yet be thwarted in one's efforts? Do you want to assert that it's only a free decision if and only if they are not prevented from carrying out that decision? Even in nonphilosophical contexts we recognize that an attempted murder is as morally condemnable (perhaps equally so) as a successful murder. If there is such a thing as "free will" it seems to me that whether one is capable of carrying out one's will is irrelevant to the freedom of that will. Perhaps I'm mischaracterizing what you're saying here, and if so please correct me.

[sweetiepie]

I don't mean at all that they have no causes. Stop trying to box me into this whole 'no causes' thing so you're so hung up on.
Stop avoiding boxes, and make up your mind about what you're trying to argue. Or at least, distinguish your thoughts in such a way that we can actually reply to them.
Since you can't actually name any causes for how we think full thoughts- here are some examples.

Thoughts emerge from brains that build themselves specifically to DNA. Brains are not just mushy atoms shoved together. They are carefully constructed computers.

DNA, likewise, did not come out of nowhere, it took millions and millions of years following your definition of emergence. That is-- millions and millions of years of years of cause and effect.

[mirage]

The universe is purely physical. Yet patterns can create truths that are not purely physical, qualia.
Nope, they can't.

Qualia are terms of first person description. "The physical universe" and the knoweldge of Maxwell's demon, are third person descriptions.

Now some people, for example me, think it sensible to identify brain processes and qualia across this perspective shift. Some don't.

However, most of the problem here results from equivocating descriptive perspectives. Qualia are not necessarily non physical things. They are first person things.

We accept qualia as real,Only in the first (or second) person description.

What this has to do with libertarian free will I'm not sure. The only alternative to deterministic decision making is stochastic decision making, which isn't compatible with what we usually mean by "will". So LFW is bollocks.

Further, I don't know what you mean by the assertion that we all assume we have free will (and I presume you mean libertarian). I don't. (In fact, you don't either.) I only assume I have the ability to make a decision based on the evidence and my desires at the time.

[kennethamy]

Def: Emergence is the process of complex pattern formation from simpler rules.

So you're whole response having to do with the 'just emerged out of nowhere' thing is invalid. Read the definition and try again.

I don't mean at all that they have no causes. Stop trying to box me into this whole 'no causes' thing so you're so hung up on.

Also, if you're going to be condescending, at least know what it is you're even responding too. At best, your repsonse was merely (and I stress merely) made in ignorance.

Condecension, like beauty, is usually in the mind of the beholder.

The notion of emergence is not, to say the least, an uncontroversial idea.

http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:NcTP04nb1gAJ:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence+emergent+properties&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1&ie=UTF-8

It may shatter under the kind of weight you put on it. It seems to me that to try to rest freedom of the will, itself a most obscure notion in the way it is thought about on this board, on the even more obscure notion of emergent properties, is trying to clarify the obscure by the even more obscure. Not something I would recommend.

[EPresence]

The problem, it seems to me, is not the association of "free" with "arbitrary". The problem, I think, is the association of "free" with "uncaused".But do you think a feeling of "uncaused" will cannot exist without the reality of an "uncaused" will? I described how they are independent. Do you still think they are not independent?

It seems to me the problem lies in using the word "free will" to mean "totally free will." I have seen so many arguments propagating on differing conceptions of freedom, relative to the will.

[Cosmo]

The argument made against freewill could also be made against qualia, yet we accept qualia as a fact of reality. We do this because qualia is directly experienced by us, just as freewill is. Yet nobody speaks of "the illusion of qualia," yet they do this with the concept of freewill. What exactly is the difference between the two conclusions that justifies this? If our direct experience of Qualia is enough to conclude it's reality, why not our direct experience of freewill? Why does nobody say "the illusion of Qualia?

1) Free will and qualia aren't ontologically equivalent. So what you say for one, doesn't necessarily follow for the other.

2) One is directly experienced( qualia) as you say BUT the other (free will) is inferred from experience. You don't infer qualia.

[trip]

sweetiepie: I have mentioned several times that I believe there are causes for what we do, such as whether we're hungry or not, or whatever. I've never said anything was completely uncaused, so again, no boxes.

mirage: So qualia, being first person descriptions, don't really exist? Or don't have the same sort of existence something that can be described in third person does? Prove this point.

And saying that I don't experience freewill, well, I do. Saying I don't would be like me saying you all do. Prove I don't.

kenneth: Obscurity isn't a counter-argument. What exactly is wrong with the argument?

Cosmo: They aren't equivalent but the arguments seem equivalent in one important respect which is what I'm getting at: we seem to use a sort of inductive assessment to argue against freewill (the universe is deterministic, therefore...), which doesn't work against, to use a less controversial example, conciousness. We would say "the universe doesn't contain conciousness, except" instead of "therefore." We do this because we directly experience conciousness.

Keep in mind that thinking up a original argument for freewill of all things is not easy, especially if you're making most of it up as you go along, so I would seriously appreciate criticisms and refutations of my points, sans the ad hominem.

[Penumbrae]

And saying that I don't experience freewill, well, I do. Saying I don't would be like me saying you all do. Prove I don't.

You are certainly experiencing something, but by what rights do you call it "free will?" That is to say, can one experientially distinguish between "free will" and...well, whatever would be contrary to that? (Unfree will?) I'm not sure reflexive actions count as contrastive as "the will" doesn't seem to be operating.

We do this because we directly experience conciousness.

Do we "directly experience" it or is it that whatever we call "direct experience" dependent on being conscious? Or is consciousness the very moments of "direct experience" itself? Nagel insisted that we cannot know what it is like to be a bat however (or because) we do know what it is like to be human; my objection to this would be that we don't know what it is like to be human, we know what it is to be human. Along the same lines, we can at least say that we are conscious, but can we also say that we "experience" it? Isn't consciousness the transcendental condition (in the Kantian sense) of any kind of experiencing and hence must be inferred rather than itself experienced?

[Cosmo]

--- They aren't equivalent but the arguments seem equivalent in one important respect which is what I'm getting at: we seem to use a sort of inductive assessment to argue against freewill (the universe is deterministic, therefore...), which doesn't work against, to use a less controversial example, conciousness. We would say "the universe doesn't contain conciousness, except" instead of "therefore." We do this because we directly experience conciousness.

How is consciousness any less or not determined or qualia any less or not determined for that matter? You are making a case for free will being outside of determinism by assuming that consciousness and qualia are not embraced by it. Where's your argument that they are not? You're here trying to make the case to get others to believe you. Make it.

The inductive assessment as you put it is pretty much overwhelming. What evidence in the universe have you got for these magical qualities of consciousness, qualia and free will being outside cause and effect and randomness?

Ok, so you make a decision to do something other than choosing something else? How does that prove this something you call free will operates outside cause and effect and randomness.

You have experienced your process of choosing. The question is whether that process is a result of free will,some algorithm in your brain affected by all your experiences, or some random firing of some neurons. You make an inference. And of course, we judge that against our existing knowledge. In our universe there are cause and effect, and random events.Where in that is the pixie dust of free will? What's this thing that is outside cause and effect and randomness?

You're going to have to work a lot harder than firing off some glib remarks on consciousness and qualia.

[trip]

I never said that conciousness or qualia are outside of determinism. I never said that freewill exists in a vacuum without cause and effect.

I'm saying that the structure is something like this: "X is not seen to exist anywhere we look in the universe, so X does not exist." X being conciousness or qualia, or freewill. Then I go onto say that we use this argument for freewill, but when it comes to qualia or conciousness we say something like: "X is not seen to exist anywhere we look in the universe, except in our case." I'm asking why we believe there is such as thing as conciousness or qualia, yet dismiss freewill.

At no point did I say conciousness or qualia escape determinism (I did say qualia escapes physical 'facts'), and I never said freewill escapes cause and effect.

The question I'm asking is: What leads us to accept the existence of conciousness or qualia in a universe without evidence for either outside or own experience? And what leads us to reject freewill given the same circumstances?

The catch here seems to be whether we actually experience freewill or not.

You're going to have to work a lot harder than firing off some remarks against a strawman.

[mirage]

How about you work a little harder to give us a rigourous definition of the "freewill" you are talking about?

Libertarian freewill escapes cause and effect by definition.

[trip]

I'm not a proponent of libertarian freewill, more of a compatibilist.

[mirage]

I'm not a proponent of libertarian freewill, more of a compatibilist.

So it's compatible. What is it?

What makes it free? It's not free of determination by past states plus any chance effect.

Are you just talking about the everyday ability of people (or monkeys, or wasps, or washing machines) to make decisions?

[trip]

It's not free of influence by past states + chance (and what is 'chance' in a supposedly deterministic universe anyway?).

I'm talking about being able to make decisions that aren't predetermined as if we're all just billiard balls being knocked around through our lives, decisions that could have been made differently.

[Cosmo]

I never said that conciousness or qualia are outside of determinism. I never said that freewill exists in a vacuum without cause and effect.

But you say here in response to Mirage:

I'm talking about being able to make decisions that aren't predetermined as if we're all just billiard balls being knocked around through our lives, decisions that could have been made differently.

So,you are only paying lip service to cause and effect and still clinging onto magic. What is this magic pixie stuff that gives you the ability to act outside cause and effect or some random firing from your brain stem perhaps?

If you're going to argue that such pixie stuff exists, you've got to make your case for it.

I'm saying that the structure is something like this: "X is not seen to exist anywhere we look in the universe, so X does not exist." X being conciousness or qualia, or freewill. Then I go onto say that we use this argument for freewill, but when it comes to qualia or conciousness we say something like: "X is not seen to exist anywhere we look in the universe, except in our case." I'm asking why we believe there is such as thing as conciousness or qualia, yet dismiss freewill


Excuse me, consciousness and qualia do exist. They result from brain functioning. I have a perception of pain and red and I am aware that I do. This is corroborated by the experience of most people I talk to. And you appear to agree that these are causally determined. When I say that consciousness is causally determined I say that it arises within a system of cause and effect and operates through cause and effect. Where you want to maintain the analogy with qualia and consciousness you would have to say your "free will" is causally determined-an oxymoron that might cause some biblical like reverence in some. Otherwise, for your analogy to succeed the way you want, you will have to show consciousness and qualia are magic pixie stuff.

At no point did I say conciousness or qualia escape determinism (I did say qualia escapes physical 'facts'), and I never said freewill escapes cause and effect.

Well then, you've shot yourself in the backside.

The question I'm asking is: What leads us to accept the existence of conciousness or qualia in a universe without evidence for either outside or own experience? And what leads us to reject freewill given the same circumstances?

As I have just said, qualia and consciousness are corroborated and they are causally determined. So, follow your argument down the yellow brick road and be forced to conclude that if your "free will" exists in the same way as consciousness and qualia, then it is a result of and operates by cause and effect.

The catch here seems to be whether we actually experience freewill or not.

And you have maintained that we do in your opening statements.

You experience your decision making process. How does this necessarily imply "free will"?

You may well be experiencing the functioning of a complex algorithm in your brain influenced by all sorts of inputs within a system of cause and effect. That you might change mind as to how you will choose or act in identical or similar circumstances does not prove free will. Such a change may well be the result of random firings from your brain stem. If you agree that the brain and it's function work within and through cause and effect, how can you insist on free will being totally alien to such?


( SNIP)

[trip]

So,you are only paying lip service to cause and effect and still clinging onto magic. What is this magic pixie stuff that gives you the ability to act outside cause and effect or some random firing from your brain stem perhaps?

Wow, pixie stuff eh? Strawman much? I am not paying lip service to cause and effect, read that quote of mine closely and you can see it's simply a rejection of hard determinism. Are you a proponent of hard determinism, do you actually take that simplistic stance seriously?

As I have just said, qualia and consciousness are corroborated and they are causally determined. So, follow your argument down the yellow brick road and be forced to conclude that if your "free will" exists in the same way as consciousness and qualia, then it is a result of and operates by cause and effect.

You missed the point of the comparison. The point was, clearly, "X doesn't exist in Y, except for our personal experience, therefore X does/doesn't exist." X being conciousness or freewill, Y being the universe. I was comparing the use of this argument when talking about qualia or conciousness and how we use it when talking about freewill, spefically the different conclusions we reach using the same argument structure. As far as freewill being the product of cause and effect, i.e. determinism, I've been arguing that this might be possible the entire time.

You experience your decision making process. How does this necessarily imply "free will"?

You experience conciousness and qualia. How does this necessarily imply the existence of either?

That you might change mind as to how you will choose or act in identical or similar circumstances does not prove free will.

Actually, that would prove freewill. It's weird, you come off like a hard determinist, then you say that we could change our minds in a identical circumstance. I don't even know if I would go that far. How do you think that's possible given your stance?

[spindozes]

We are free to the extent of "we could have done otherwise". Such an analogy cannot be applied to "qualia", which has these qualities due to "epi-phenomena".

[Cosmo]

Wow, pixie stuff eh? Strawman much? I am not paying lip service to cause and effect, read that quote of mine closely and you can see it's simply a rejection of hard determinism. Are you a proponent of hard determinism, do you actually take that simplistic stance seriously?

Gee, I'm asked if I'm a proponent of hard determinism with one question. And convicted of it in the second question. Objection your honour, he's putting words into the mouth of the witness!

Again, no straw man from me. I suggest that it's because you are too attached to your own faulty argument you're giving me as they say, 'the bum steer'. We'll get to the crux further down.

Also note, that apart stating that hard determinism is simplistic and having a chuckle as to why anyone could hold it, prove it and prove that I'm the hard determinist of your imagination.

Please note that you're the one that's come on and mounted some sort of case for free will that seems to dance between and betwixt so it can't get caught out.

You missed the point of the comparison. The point was, clearly, "X doesn't exist in Y, except for our personal experience, therefore X does/doesn't exist." X being conciousness or freewill, Y being the universe. I was comparing the use of this argument when talking about qualia or conciousness and how we use it when talking about freewill, spefically the different conclusions we reach using the same argument structure. As far as freewill being the product of cause and effect, i.e. determinism, I've been arguing that this might be possible the entire time.

Whether you were arguing the possibility or not I'll leave others,and myself, to their own counsel.

I've answered this structure of yours before but I can only conclude that you're missing my points. I'll try again with a different approach.

Firstly, apart from you, who uses this cockeyed argument?

Let me ostensively show you why it is cockeyed. Here we go:

Consciousness and qualia exist in our personal experience and not the universe.

Hogoblins exist in our personal experience and not the universe.

(We say that consciousness and qualia exist so why do we deny Hogoblins?)

Hogoblins exist.

( Now re-read this structure with free will and tell me it isn't cockeyed.)

Can you tell me what is wrong with your argument? If you do see now, then you will conclude that this is a faulty concoction of your own and no one with any basic logic would use it.

You experience conciousness and qualia. How does this necessarily imply the existence of either?

Here you equivocate on "exist". And this is one thing that is wrong in your "structure". You will note that in your argument you said "our experience" . It's a given. The necessary implication according to your "structure" is that they exist in our personal experience.

Actually, that would prove freewill. It's weird, you come off like a hard determinist, then you say that we could change our minds in a identical circumstance. I don't even know if I would go that far. How do you think that's possible given your stance?

Re-read what I said. Why did you chose not to quote me entirely? I suggest that you review this approach.

I said, if you quoted me entirely, that in identical or similar circumstances an algorithm in your brain could choose differently because of a random firing of a neuron. I'll even add some quantum change could have occured. How does such prove free will? It doesn't. What's free about it?

My stance reasonably opposes your idea of free will, it fits in with what we know about the universe, and this refutes your "simplistic and incoherent( pixie stuff?)?" idea of free will. You may conclude, contrary to your straw man accusation and attack based thereon, that I'm not a hard determinist in that I allow for quantum events. Where is the freedom in your brain that is a product of a cause and effect universe with quantum events?

Your argumentation reminds me of the Emperor's new clothes.

[trip]

Consciousness and qualia exist in our personal experience and not the universe.

Hogoblins exist in our personal experience and not the universe.

(We say that consciousness and qualia exist so why do we deny Hogoblins?)

Hogoblins exist.

( Now re-read this structure with free will and tell me it isn't cockeyed.)

We don't experience 'hobgoblins' in our everday experience. Our language, thinking, laws, etc, aren't structured as if 'hobgoblins' are a reality. We talk and behave as if we are truly making decisions though. You have to come up with a stronger strawman than that. How is it that we suppose conciousness is a reality? Direct, personal experience. If you have some other way to prove its, and qualias, existence, present it.

Can you tell me what is wrong with your argument? If you do see now, then you will conclude that this is a faulty concoction of your own and no one with any basic logic would use it.

I don't personally care if my argument is wrong or not (though the version you're displaying isn't mine). You asked me who else presents this argument? Nobody that I'm aware of, but philosophy isn't just about regurgitating books or never attempting an original thought, as ucomfortable as that might make you. I would shocked more than you know if this argument wasn't tore apart on these boards, and I posted it expecting, and since I care about truth, almost hoping, it would be, but trust me, you're not doing that. You either misread my every post or are dogmatically blinded to the point of being unable to percieve what is actually being said. And again with the ad hominem thrown in there at the end. If you possesed basic logic I suppose you would be able to parse the simple point I made with that comparison, but that's clearly not the case.

The necessary implication according to your "structure" is that they exist in our personal experience.

This is really the tact to take if you want to criticize the argument, whether or not freewill is experienced or not, and what the real difference between our direct experience of a real quality such as conciousness as vs. a supposed quality such as freewill exactly is.. But if you want to stick to your false 'hobgoblin' strawman, I suppose you can do that too. It's alot easier isn't it?

Your argumentation reminds me of alot of the ego-driven tripe I see around here, where you project the argument you want to see (when did I say anything about quantam effects creating freewill? Didn't happen) in order to throw your confused, derivative criticisms against it and protect your dogmantic, almost cultish allegiance to some particular school of thought you hold.

If this argument is flawed (and I'm sure it somehow is), fine, let's have at it. But you should have enough sophistication to be able to detach an argument from the person, and attack the argument without the petty ad hominems you insist on. It's a basic tenet of argumentation. I'm just saying that though, I really don't think that that is something that can actually happen in your case.

[trip]

Btw, I can see that this will descend into a cycle of personal insults, post after post, as apparently all message boards do. Nothing worse than internet nerd's little e-egos (I can be just as guilty, not an insult). I'll just preemptively stop that now. From now on I'll post, without reference to the poster, in response to the actual content of the post and nothing more.

[Cosmo]

Trip,

I won't bother quoting your hypocritical and sanctimonious character assassination. The ad hom trail leads back to your poison pen. If you can't stand some heat then don't turn up the temperature.

We don't experience 'hobgoblins' in our everday experience. Our language, thinking, laws, etc, aren't structured as if 'hobgoblins' are a reality. We talk and behave as if we are truly making decisions though. You have to come up with a stronger strawman than that. How is it that we suppose conciousness is a reality? Direct, personal experience. If you have some other way to prove its, and qualias, existence, present it.

Sigh, you looked at the finger rather than where it was pointing to.

That you say A is experienced and it exists, B is experienced and it exists, C is experienced therefore it also exists is logically fallacious.

Secondly, you launched yourself onto the board with the case that free will exists. The onus is on you to prove that it does.

You are going to have to tell us what "free will" is. You've been vague and elusive here. You will note that Mirage pulled you up on this. You haven't yet answered him. If you don't get this off the launch pad there's no point in starting off with it's similarity to consciousness or qualia.

Given that you establish what "free will" is, you are then to show whether the shared characteristic it has with consciousness or qualia necessarily establishes it's existence and whether it in fact shares this characteristic.

Your argument fails in logic and hasn't been established in fact. In fact I pointed out that there appears nothing in what we know to vindicate that it has any reality. What do you want me to say? Yeah, Trip, everything you say is gospel we'll just overlook niceties such as logic and fact.

We don't experience 'hobgoblins' in our everday experience. Our language, thinking, laws, etc, aren't structured as if 'hobgoblins' are a reality. We talk and behave as if we are truly making decisions though. You have to come up with a stronger strawman than that. How is it that we suppose conciousness is a reality? Direct, personal experience. If you have some other way to prove its, and qualias, existence, present it..

I didn't deny consciousness or qualia. And I have already explained what "hogoblins" was about and what you have to do with "free will".

[trip]

Sigh, you looked at the finger rather than where it was pointing to.

That you say A is experienced and it exists, B is experienced and it exists, C is experienced therefore it also exists is logically fallacious.

This is an incorrect characterization of my point.

I say A is directly experienced and we assume its existence, B is directly experienced and we assume its existence, and C is directly experienced yet we disregard this experience when deciding on its existence. I then ask for somebody to point out the exact reason for this difference. If you think that the quoted portion is the argument I'm making, that would be a mistake.

As to the 'finger pointing' (Bruce Lee quote?), I think the hobgoblin analogy missed the similarity between the comparisons I made as opposed to, say, a hallucination or mistaken perception. Conciousness, qualia, and freewill are basically a fundamental filter through which we always perceive the world, whether or not they even exist or are just some kind of illusion. Thus, our thoughts and language assume the existence of freewill irregardless of its actuality. For example, regretting the past and wishing it could have happened otherwise, as if it could have, wondering what we're going to do later today, or next year, ordering something off of a menu even. The history, language, and laws of society assume freewill prima facie, again, regardless of any logical argument that might suggest otherwise. Hobgoblins don't share this 'constant perceptual filter' trait, which is why I said it wasn't an accurate analogy.

Secondly, you launched yourself onto the board with the case that free will exists. The onus is on you to prove that it does.

Not really. I didn't make a case for freewill so much as I asked why we make a distinction between the arguments for qualia and freewill.

You are going to have to tell us what "free will" is.

I'd say that freewill is the ability to make a choice, in a specific circumstance, that could have been otherwise in that same circumstance.

Given that you establish what "free will" is, you are then to show whether the shared characteristic it has with consciousness or qualia necessarily establishes it's existence and whether it in fact shares this characteristic.

The shared characteristic would be the direct experience we have of the three, as a sort of lens we percieve reality through that is constantly with us. If there is any particular angle to take in refuting this argument, it would be whether we do in fact directly experience freewill. I'm saying that we in fact do.

Your argument fails in logic and hasn't been established in fact. In fact I pointed out that there appears nothing in what we know to vindicate that it has any reality. What do you want me to say? Yeah, Trip, everything you say is gospel we'll just overlook niceties such as logic and fact.

I want counter-arguments, not simply opinions. If it fails in logic and fact, point that out and support it with an argument, using logic and fact. I clarified exactly how your hobgoblin example was mistaken. If there is a logical flaw, point it out instead of simply claiming there is sans any argument, logic or facts to back that claim up.