Dubiety

[kennethamy]

What is a person who puts a heavy vase of flowers on a large table doing when that person still says, "I doubt that there is a table in front of me"? How can that person be doubting there is a table (and vase) in front of him? Is he referring to some sensation he has (like an irritation)? How does he know that sensation (if that is what he is referring to) should be called "doubting"? Wouldn't doubting there is a table and a vase while placing the vase on the table be as peculiar as saying to someone who is entering your apartment, "Welcome." and then kicking him down the stairs?

Charles Peirce wrote, "Some people think that doubting is as easy as lying".

[Penumbrae]

It is because of these kinds of objections ("I refute Berkeley thus!") that philosophers have devised the distinction between methodological and practical doubt. The latter refers, of course, to the kinds of doubts encountered not just in everyday life, but those that make sense in a context-dependent way. The former allows for anything to be in principle doubted to winnow away what is necessary and what is not in matters of epistemology, metaphysics and so on. What we can doubt if only in principle is thereby suspect and cannot qualify for "certain" knowledge/ontology/etc.

It's a modern conceit, but one that's generated a great deal of smoke if not fire; certainly a far cry from Pyrrhus's skepticism that was generated more as a matter of self-discipline, not as an epistemological exercise.

One is reminded of Heidegger's remark in Sein und Zeit that contrary to Kant, the great scandal of modern philosophy is not that a definitive proof of the external world had not yet been generated but that such a proof was considered to be needed at all.

[kennethamy]

It is because of these kinds of objections ("I refute Berkeley thus!") that philosophers have devised the distinction between methodological and practical doubt. The latter refers, of course, to the kinds of doubts encountered not just in everyday life, but those that make sense in a context-dependent way. The former allows for anything to be in principle doubted to winnow away what is necessary and what is not in matters of epistemology, metaphysics and so on. What we can doubt if only in principle is thereby suspect and cannot qualify for "certain" knowledge/ontology/etc.

It's a modern conceit, but one that's generated a great deal of smoke if not fire; certainly a far cry from Pyrrhus's skepticism that was generated more as a matter of self-discipline, not as an epistemological exercise.

One is reminded of Heidegger's remark in Sein und Zeit that contrary to Kant, the great scandal of modern philosophy is not that a definitive proof of the external world had not yet been generated but that such a proof was considered to be needed at all.

Now I think that is the first thing Heidegger has written that I actually understand, and even agree with.

Not "philosophers", but Descartes, and he also called it "hyperbolic doubt", and "metaphysical doubt". But I don't see that saying it is a different (or special) kind of doubt helps much in answering the question, what makes it doubt at all. A metaphysical question should still be a question, just as a theological belief should still be-a belief. Why is the person in my example doubting there is a table and a vase? Just because he sincerely tells us he is? Is doubting as disconnected from doing as that would imply, so that you can be doubting that something is true and, for all the world, act exactly as someone who believes it is true would act?

[fast]

What is a person who puts a heavy vase of flowers on a large table doing when that person still says, "I doubt that there is a table in front of me"? Physically, they are doing just that; they are putting one thing on another thing, yet mentally, their run amuck philosophizing has led them to preposterously believe that what they think is there isn't really there, so we have to ask ourselves, what's going on--why are they even attempting to do with something what they themselves doubt is even there?

But first, is there really doubt at all? Yes. The doubt stems from faulty analyzing the situation. So, how then can they reconcile their behavior with their doubt?

They say to themselves that there really is no table because microscopically, all that really exists is matter in motion, but what they fail to realize is that the term table refers to certain patterns of matter in motion. It would be like a child mistakenly saying that there really is no baseball field for all that really is here are grass, dirt, and base plates.

Back to doubt. What precisely would such a person doubt? They don’t doubt that there’s something there, but they doubt that what’s there is what we call it. There is a disassociation happening between the term and the object that the term refers to.

Signed, a mass of cells

[kennethamy]

Physically, they are doing just that; they are putting one thing on another thing, yet mentally, their run amuck philosophizing has led them to preposterously believe that what they think is there isn't really there, so we have to ask ourselves, what's going on--

But that's just the issue. Does that person believe the table and vase aren't there? Why do you say so?

[Penumbrae]

Now I think that is the first thing Heidegger has written that I actually understand, and even agree with.

Even though Heidegger and I diverge in too many ways to count, I still insist that his early work is lucid and provocative to the same degree that his later (post-"Kehre") works are frustrating, irritating and silly. His discussion of the relevance of the question of being in the "Introduction" to Sein und Zeit is quite convincing that the meaning of "being" is not so easily brushed off or waved away. But this is entirely off-topic. My apologies.

Not "philosophers", but Descartes, and he also called it "hyperbolic doubt", and "metaphysical doubt".

Well, I didn't want to point fingers... :) Seriously, though, others after Descartes readily adopted the distinction and things haven't been the same since; I suppose that it was in this sense I made the generalization.

But I don't see that saying it is a different (or special) kind of doubt helps much in answering the question, what makes it doubt at all. A metaphysical question should still be a question, just as a theological belief should still be-a belief. Why is the person in my example doubting there is a table and a vase? Just because he sincerely tells us he is? Is doubting as disconnected from doing as that would imply, so that you can be doubting that something is true and, for all the world, act exactly as someone who believes it is true would act?

Indeed. What is the status of "I can doubt x" for any x? The scaffolding upon which the propositions of methodogical doubts are hung require that it be built on thin air. That is to say, the intelligibility of such doubts require so much inventive and imaginitive consideration that once one attempts to bring the results of such doubting back into usable discourse everything has gone off-kilter.

"A friend and I are sitting in a garden; he is repeatedly saying, 'I know that's a tree. I know that's a tree.' Someone walks up and I say, 'He is not demented [geistesgestört], we are only philosophizing." --Wittgenstein, On Certainty

I am in particular thinking of Descartes's evil demon (and it's modern-day "brain in a vat") as well as Hume's "yawning abyss." If the only criterion for intelligibility is imaginability (and only in a very attenuated imaginability) methodological doubt gains a ready foothold. We can, in some sense, imagine that sometimes opening one's front door leads to a yawning abyss, but can we imagine a world where such could occur? And what does this say about the extent of using this kind of imagining?

[fast]

But that's just the issue.I thought that I was clear in my last post. I'll try again.

Does that person believe the table and vase aren't there? Yes. The person believes that the table and vase aren't there.

Why do you say so?Because of her reasoning.

She believes that something is there though; Therefore, her actions are explainable and thus not a mystery. She believes that she is putting something on something, but she doesn't necessarily believe (and thus doubtful) that there's really a table or vase.

What does she think it is then? I covered that in my last post as well.

If my clarity is still on the dark side of the barn, just let me know; I’ll go at it again.

[kennethamy]

I thought that I was clear in my last post. I'll try again.

Yes. The person believes that the table and vase aren't there.

Because of her reasoning.



Sorry. Still don't get it. How does the reasoning show doubt of the existence of a table and vase? What reasoning, anyway?

[kennethamy]

Even though Heidegger and I diverge in too many ways to count, I still insist that his early work is lucid and provocative to the same degree that his later (post-"Kehre") works are frustrating, irritating and silly. His discussion of the relevance of the question of being in the "Introduction" to Sein und Zeit is quite convincing that the meaning of "being" is not so easily brushed off or waved away. But this is entirely off-topic. My apologies.



Well, I didn't want to point fingers... :) Seriously, though, others after Descartes readily adopted the distinction and things haven't been the same since; I suppose that it was in this sense I made the generalization.



Indeed. What is the status of "I can doubt x" for any x? The scaffolding upon which the propositions of methodogical doubts are hung require that it be built on thin air. That is to say, the intelligibility of such doubts require so much inventive and imaginitive consideration that once one attempts to bring the results of such doubting back into usable discourse everything has gone off-kilter.



I am in particular thinking of Descartes's evil demon (and it's modern-day "brain in a vat") as well as Hume's "yawning abyss." If the only criterion for intelligibility is imaginability (and only in a very attenuated imaginability) methodological doubt gains a ready foothold. We can, in some sense, imagine that sometimes opening one's front door leads to a yawning abyss, but can we imagine a world where such could occur? And what does this say about the extent of using this kind of imagining?

But, to quote Wittgenstein, "Back to the rough ground!" When Othello doubts that Desdemona is faithful, he has reasons (or at least causes) and he behaves in certain ways. There is some connection between what he claims about his state of mind, and what he does (I am not saying that the former is reducible to the latter). But the fellow I am talking about, who places the vase (he says he doubts exists) firmly on the table (he says he doubts exists) makes me wonder whether he knows what the word "doubt" means. We aren't tempted to correct him (that's not "doubting" that's "believing") because we believe he is a fluent English speaker, and because he is philosophizing. But is the latter a good reason (not, of course, for not correcting him!) but for us to think that his use of the word "doubt" has anything much to do with the term "doubt" as used in English?

[Penumbrae]

But, to quote Wittgenstein, "Back to the rough ground!" When Othello doubts that Desdemona is faithful, he has reasons (or at least causes) and he behaves in certain ways. There is some connection between what he claims about his state of mind, and what he does (I am not saying that the former is reducible to the latter). But the fellow I am talking about, who places the vase (he says he doubts exists) firmly on the table (he says he doubts exists) makes me wonder whether he knows what the word "doubt" means. We aren't tempted to correct him (that's not "doubting" that's "believing") because we believe he is a fluent English speaker, and because he is philosophizing. But is the latter a good reason (not, of course, for not correcting him!) but for us to think that his use of the word "doubt" has anything much to do with the term "doubt" as used in English?

You would be right in wondering this. However, we can flesh out the use of doubt in each case by referring (or describing, or characterizing) the context(s) in which they occur. In the case of philosophizing the intent is clearly that methodological doubt has a particular purpose--that being to discover what we can "truly know" or what "really is" or...etc. independent of any other context--yet the context in which it occurs rarely comes up.

Like Montaigne before him, Descartes's Meditations is fueled by (a) the "new science" that renders the sensible world epiphenomenal (Galileo's description of atoms as having no color, flavor, scent, etc.), (b) cultural/poltical upheavals within Europe (the Protestant Reformation, erosion of absolute monarchies) as well as Europe's collision with global exploration and (c) the economic emergence of mercantile capitalism as a "third force" against both the state and religious authority, giving rise to an increasingly autonomous middle-class.

(I should note that unlike Descartes, Montaigne is more satisfied with the questioning rather than the possible answers)

I'm outlining all this because I want to say: Look how much one must gather together to render Cartesian-style methodological doubts as a "meaningful" use! It's not exactly, as Wittgenstein might say, a wheel spinning independently of the machine, but the wheel does less work than intended. Philosophy does not emerge from a vacuum, but neither is it entirely swallowed up by its historical-social context. There is always a critical moment within any philosophizing, an unconcealment (if you will) of something inadequate and unspoken in the "present state of affairs" but such latent content does not necessarily arise from its manifest content.

The "doubt" in epistemology quite evidently is dirempt of the "everyday" use (I am reticent to use this term because "doubt" in its perfectly instrumental use can occur in situations that are not "everyday"--i.e., in science) of "doubt." But just as "essence" does not mean the same thing in aesthetics as it does in metaphysics (Adorno's point, not mine), it would be a mistake to think that simply nothing is going on or being done. The question would be, then, whether its epistemological use rises to an adequate critical function in whichever particular case under consideration one chooses.

[Yes, I know: I need an editor.]

[kennethamy]

You would be right in wondering this. However, we can flesh out the use of doubt in each case by referring (or describing, or characterizing) the context(s) in which they occur. In the case of philosophizing the intent is clearly that methodological doubt has a particular purpose--that being to discover what we can "truly know" or what "really is" or...etc. independent of any other context--yet the context in which it occurs rarely comes up.

Like Montaigne before him, Descartes's Meditations is fueled by (a) the "new science" that renders the sensible world epiphenomenal (Galileo's description of atoms as having no color, flavor, scent, etc.), (b) cultural/poltical upheavals within Europe (the Protestant Reformation, erosion of absolute monarchies) as well as Europe's collision with global exploration and (c) the economic emergence of mercantile capitalism as a "third force" against both the state and religious authority, giving rise to an increasingly autonomous middle-class.

(I should note that unlike Descartes, Montaigne is more satisfied with the questioning rather than the possible answers)

I'm outlining all this because I want to say: Look how much one must gather together to render Cartesian-style methodological doubts as a "meaningful" use! It's not exactly, as Wittgenstein might say, a wheel spinning independently of the machine, but the wheel does less work than intended. Philosophy does not emerge from a vacuum, but neither is it entirely swallowed up by its historical-social context. There is always a critical moment within any philosophizing, an unconcealment (if you will) of something inadequate and unspoken in the "present state of affairs" but such latent content does not necessarily arise from its manifest content.

The "doubt" in epistemology quite evidently is dirempt of the "everyday" use (I am reticent to use this term because "doubt" in its perfectly instrumental use can occur in situations that are not "everyday"--i.e., in science) of "doubt." But just as "essence" does not mean the same thing in aesthetics as it does in metaphysics (Adorno's point, not mine), it would be a mistake to think that simply nothing is going on or being done. The question would be, then, whether its epistemological use rises to an adequate critical function in whichever particular case under consideration one chooses.

[Yes, I know: I need an editor.]

Of course methodological doubt has a central place in Descartes, and is used to 'discover what we can "truly know" or what "really is" '. But that does not answer the question: what, if any, is its connection with the term "doubt"? Peirce tells us we should not " pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our heart". But is Descartes doubting, other than just saying he doubts? One reason Peirce gives for saying that Descartes' doubting is: "sham doubt" or "paper doubt" or "pretend doubt" is that Descartes gives no "positive reason" for doubting. If I (really) doubt there is a table, it must be as a consequence of some positive reason to do so. Does Descartes have some positive reason to doubt there is a table in front of him. His reason seems to be that he might be mistaken (undergoing an illusion of some kind). That's true. He might be mistaken. But is the fact that if I believe there is a table, I might be mistaken, a positive reason for doubting there is a table. Is the fact that I might be mistaken any reason to think that I am mistaken, and therefore, reason to doubt that there is a table? If I have reason to think that I [I]amI] mistaken in believing there is a table, then I certainly do have a reason to doubt there is a table. For instance, if I have some reason to think there is an illusionist in the vicinity. Here, we could say that we [I]may[I] be mistaken as distinguished from saying that we might be mistaken. The use of the word "may" rather than "might" points to some evidence that we are mistaken. Evidence, as contrasted with the mere possibility of mistake which is not evidence, but only points to the fact that there is an abstract possibility that what we believe is not true, but not what is called a "real possibility". Peirce seems to be arguing that for a doubt to be a real doubt, there has to be a real possibility that what is believed to be true is not true.

[fast]

Sorry. Still don't get it. How does the reasoning show doubt of the existence of a table and vase? What reasoning, anyway?
I wasn't trying to substantiate that there was never truly doubt. I had a reason to suspect that maybe there was no doubt, but after reviewing the problem, it was clear, or so I thought, that there really was doubt, so my task was to answer your question of what he was doing.

If I believe that what's before me is a log (and nothing but a log) yet you call it a table (because it can be used as a table), then do I necessarily believe that what's before me is a table? No, so just because I go to put something on this log while doubting that it's a table is not unusual.

In your case, there really is a table, but he doubts that it's a table, but his actions are not that he doesn't believe something is there--it's just that what he believes is there really isn't a table. Like I said before, there's a disassociation happening between the term and the object it refers to.

[Penumbrae]

I think that probably what's happening in the conversation between us (kennethamy, fast and myself) is that we are providing specific examples against what might be called global doubt (if it is doubt, which we all seem to doubt). That is, "methodological" doubt is by design meant to replace "I doubt that x" with not just any x but every x. It would appear that this is the source of Peirce's (and other pragmatists') objections to the use of such methods as being in any way philosophically informative, interesting or illuminating. Not only must doubt--"real" or practical doubt--have some determinate content but also have sufficient justification for its application. To doubt that there is a table before me I must (a) know what a table is as well as its associated properties but also (b) have some reason to undermine the judgment that what is before me is, in fact, a table. One could imagine in this case a sculpture designed to countermand one's expectations of a table or even a holographic projection, but in both instances one would have had to encounter some kind of breakdown of expectation, i.e., attempting to place something on top of it but failing for one reason or another.

Where methodological doubt would seem to gain traction is that if one can doubt (or imagine doubting) in this instance then one must be able to doubt every instance of it under threat of "uncertainty." But as Wittgenstein demonstrates in On Certainty, "certainty" is more an epistemological attitude than it is a quality of any given proposition or set of propositions of knowledge.

I think that what I was trying (and failing miserably) to convey in my last post is that the concern about global certainty and its concommitant global doubt arises out of something other than "what we can be said to know with certainty."

[mirage]

Now I think that is the first thing Heidegger has written that I actually understand, and even agree with.

Not "philosophers", but Descartes, and he also called it "hyperbolic doubt", and "metaphysical doubt". But I don't see that saying it is a different (or special) kind of doubt helps much in answering the question, what makes it doubt at all. A metaphysical question should still be a question, just as a theological belief should still be-a belief. Why is the person in my example doubting there is a table and a vase?
They are doubting that they jtb know there is a table and vase, in the context of a silly theory of truth like correspondance.

And that doubt is not only reasonable, but there are in fact no arguments to suggest that it is even likely there is a table and vase.

Of course they are not doubting that there is a phenomenal table and vase, or that there are inductive arguments that their experiences will continue to reflect the properties they associate with the words "table" and "vase".

The thing that conflicts with common sense here is not their doubt, but the theory of truth and knowledge that defines states of affairs in a way that cannot contact our experience.

If you choose a sensible description of your reality which is after all entirely experience based, and define objects with respect to experience (N.B. with respect to, not identical with) then doubting things existence in this context amounts to admitting the possibility of illusion.

This is not a problem for an inductive world model grounded in experience, because there is a lot of inductive reasurance that illusion is unlikely. The same is not true of a correspondance based world model, since the doubt may be extended to all experience (since truth is not defined in terms of experience at all).

I don't like Pierce's point of view, since it amounts to hand waving as far as I can see. And I think it is much more interesting to analyse the context and background assumptions of such doubt, as I have tried to do above.

[mirage]

I think that what I was trying (and failing miserably) to convey in my last post is that the concern about global certainty and its concommitant global doubt arises out of something other than "what we can be said to know with certainty."

It arises entirely from conceiving of truth as something logically independent from the whole of experience. I.e. from bloating your ontology with noumena.

[kennethamy]

It arises entirely from conceiving of truth as something logically independent from the whole of experience. I.e. from bloating your ontology with noumena.

I don't know about you, but I believe there are true propositions, and that, furthermore, I can know some of them. And, at the same time, I disbelieve (to put it mildly) in the "Noumenon". I am not sure what you mean by saying that truth is logically (yet!) independent from the whole of experience, but if you mean that I cannot tell that it is true that Quito is the capital of Ecuador by looking it up in reliable sources like Hammond's World Atlas, I have no idea why you would believe such a thing. People do that sort of thing all the time.

When Descartes claimed to doubt that there is a vase and a table, what he seems to be arguing (at least in the First Meditation) is that Empiricism implies Skepticism; that if you are an Empiricist, then you cannot know for certain (which Descartes equates with knowing) that there is a vase and a table. In fact, as he argues later, we can know for certain that there is a vase and a table (or at least something that appears to us as vases and tables) so that Empiricism must be false. As far as Descartes is concerned, truth is quite accessible, but knowledge of the truth is not accessible by an Empiricist. However, knowledge of the truth is accessible by the Rationalist. (It is important to distinguish between truth and knowledge of the truth. For Descartes, the issue is not truth, but knowledge of the truth).

But all of this is off the track. The issue is that of dubiety, and what Descartes' use of the term "doubt" has to do with doubting.

[dug_down_deep]

What is a person who puts a heavy vase of flowers on a large table doing when that person still says, "I doubt that there is a table in front of me"? How can that person be doubting there is a table (and vase) in front of him? Is he referring to some sensation he has (like an irritation)? How does he know that sensation (if that is what he is referring to) should be called "doubting"? Wouldn't doubting there is a table and a vase while placing the vase on the table be as peculiar as saying to someone who is entering your apartment, "Welcome." and then kicking him down the stairs?
Who has doubted the table is there, and on what grounds? Without that information, we are merely assuming the nature of the doubt, as is evident from the number of types of doubt that are being tossed around in this thread.

Ground us, kennethamy. What specific doubt and doubter has caused you to ask this question? I don't ask for names, just a concrete example.

[mirage]

I don't know about you, but I believe there are true propositions, Me too.

and that, furthermore, I can know some of them.Tick! Me too!

And, at the same time, I disbelieve (to put it mildly) in the "Noumenon". I am not sure what you mean by saying that truth is logically (yet!) independent from the whole of experience, but if you mean that I cannot tell that it is true that Quito is the capital of Ecuador by looking it up in reliable sources like Hammond's World Atlas, I have no idea why you would believe such a thing. People do that sort of thing all the time.
They never find a justification compatible with a correspondance type theory of truth.

I'll just outline this argument one more time in the hope that you might consider it.

1. Correspondance defines truth in terms of correspondance to some "state of affairs".

2. A state of affairs is logically independent from experience.

3. All inductive arguments that use experiential evidence to support a conclusion only support the coherence of the evidence with a model, rather than the relation of all that evidence or model with some state of affairs. For example, looking up Quito only supports the conclusion that "Quito is the capital" is a coherent account of your whole experience. It doesn't support the conclusion for any particular state of affairs that isn't experience. It does'nt support the conclusion that there is a well behaved relation between all of your experience and any state of affairs. Indeed, such a relation is impossible to understand, since we understand and describe relations in terms defined by experience.

4. Given the lack of argument that there is a relation between experience and states of affairs, we cannot be justfied in beliefs about states of affairs, so we lack any jtb knowledge under correspondance.


The only way around this is to deny the lack of dependence between states of affairs and experience. If we define the state of affairs "there is a table" in terms of the way we actually decide the truth of the proposition then we define it solely in terms of experiential consequence. Something like: "there are perceptions linked to the concept "table" and all future perceptions will remain compatible with this concept". (So for example, we will not experience perceptions more compatible with it being a hologram. We will not experience other observers widely disagreeing that it is a table.)

And that's a coherentist theory of truth. Now there is no problem with truth or knowledge.

If you reject this description, then you have functional noumena. The states of affairs somehow "cause" our perceptions, but they are not constructed from them or defined by them.

Now we have two layers of things in our ontology: states of affairs and our world of phenomenal objects. And additionally we have to just assume that one tend to reflect (in a way we can't understand) the other. We can't understand this relation, but we must assume it is meaningful and it exists in order to maintain that beliefs based on one are also beliefs about the other.

But the presence or absence of this relation has no observational consequences. We would act and talk and believe the same whether states of affairs had nothing to do with our experience.

When Descartes claimed to doubt that there is a vase and a table, what he seems to be arguing (at least in the First Meditation) is that Empiricism implies Skepticism; that if you are an Empiricist, then you cannot know for certain (which Descartes equates with knowing) that there is a vase and a table. In fact, as he argues later, we can know for certain that there is a vase and a table (or at least something that appears to us as vases and tables) so that Empiricism must be false. As far as Descartes is concerned, truth is quite accessible, but knowledge of the truth is not accessible by an Empiricist. However, knowledge of the truth is accessible by the Rationalist. (It is important to distinguish between truth and knowledge of the truth. For Descartes, the issue is not truth, but knowledge of the truth). And that's a huge problem for him. There is simply no point in discussing knowledge without a theory of truth, without an account of what propositions mean.

His arguments are full of correspondance type assumptions. The coherentist can bypass the whole thing very easily. This is particulary nice, since his argument ultimately fails without the premise that a "clear and distinct" perception guarantees truth, even against the Demon. And then a sort of OA.

Not something many people will want to sign up to.

But all of this is off the track. The issue is that of dubiety, and what Descartes' use of the term "doubt" has to do with doubting.Doubting that he jtb knows the table is there under a correspondance-type conception of truth.

That's the simple answer, I think.

[Cosmo]

Mirage,

I suppose the OP can imply that there are two observers in the room. One, the coherentist, asks of the other how he can doubt the vase and table. The correspondence theorist looks closely at this fellow and says,

"My dear friend, you are having an LSD trip"

Under which truth model do you think the truth of the matter will be resolved? Should the coherentist model that you've described be augmented in some way, or some other model be proffered perhaps?

[Smullyan-esque]

What is a person who puts a heavy vase of flowers on a large table doing when that person still says, "I doubt that there is a table in front of me"? How can that person be doubting there is a table (and vase) in front of him? Is he referring to some sensation he has (like an irritation)? How does he know that sensation (if that is what he is referring to) should be called "doubting"? Wouldn't doubting there is a table and a vase while placing the vase on the table be as peculiar as saying to someone who is entering your apartment, "Welcome." and then kicking him down the stairs?

Charles Peirce wrote, "Some people think that doubting is as easy as lying".

I think you may be suffering from the idea that "doubt" means the same thing as "certainty that is isn't there."

For example: Imagine you have some terminal disease that is very rare. The doctors are trying to treat you, but you tell yourself "I doubt this treatment will work." Because of your doubt, do you refuse the treatment??

The person who says "I doubt that there is a table in front of me" is probably trying to say something along the lines of "I must admit that there is a possibility that this table I see before me does not actually exist." That sort of doubt does not lead a person to ignore physical objects! Everyone who has seen The Matrix should have at least a tiny sliver of doubt about the world we perceive.

[kennethamy]

I think you may be suffering from the idea that "doubt" means the same thing as "certainty that is isn't there."

For example: Imagine you have some terminal disease that is very rare. The doctors are trying to treat you, but you tell yourself "I doubt this treatment will work." Because of your doubt, do you refuse the treatment??

The person who says "I doubt that there is a table in front of me" is probably trying to say something along the lines of "I must admit that there is a possibility that this table I see before me does not actually exist." That sort of doubt does not lead a person to ignore physical objects! Everyone who has seen The Matrix should have at least a tiny sliver of doubt about the world we perceive.


But Peirce's point is that the (mere) possiblity that the table does not exist is no reason to doubt that the table exists. It is not a "positive" reason. the argument:

1. It is possible for that table not to exist.

Therefore, 3. it is reasonable to doubt that table exists.

is not a valid argument since is assumes the premise, 2.If it is possible that A does not exist, then it is reasonable to doubt the existence of A.

And that premise is false. And if that premise is false, and if the argument assumes it (which it does) then the argument is unsound. And if the argument is unsound, then the argument gives us no reason to think that the conclusion.

The issue is whether the fact that it is possible that A does not exist, makes it reasonable to doubt that A exists.

Here is a counter-example. It is possible for me not exist. Therefore, it is reasonable for me to doubt that I exist. The premise is true, but what about the conclusion? It seems to me false. Therefore, the argument is invalid.

Here is another example:

1. It is possible for any human being to be a male or a female.
2. I am a human being.

Therefore, 3. It is reasonable to doubt that I am a male.

I deny that the conclusion is true. It is not possible that I am a female.

But the premises are both true, and, since the conclusion is false.

The point is that the premise that it is possible that some statement is false, is too weak for the conclusion that it is reasonable to doubt that statement is true.



Of course, more has to be said about how we should understand the idea of possibility.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

It is possible for me not exist. . . . It is not possible that I am a female. . . . Of course, more has to be said about how we should understand the idea of possibility.That's for sure. Are you using "possible" in the same way regarding your existence and your gender?

[Smullyan-esque]

But Peirce's point is that the (mere) possiblity that the table does not exist is no reason to doubt that the table exists. It is not a "positive" reason. the argument:

1. It is possible for that table not to exist.

Therefore, 3. it is reasonable to doubt that table exists.

is not a valid argument since is assumes the premise, 2.If it is possible that A does not exist, then it is reasonable to doubt the existence of A.

And that premise is false. And if that premise is false, and if the argument assumes it (which it does) then the argument is unsound. And if the argument is unsound, then the argument gives us no reason to think that the conclusion.

The issue is whether the fact that it is possible that A does not exist, makes it reasonable to doubt that A exists.

Here is a counter-example. It is possible for me not exist. Therefore, it is reasonable for me to doubt that I exist. The premise is true, but what about the conclusion? It seems to me false. Therefore, the argument is invalid.

Here is another example:

1. It is possible for any human being to be a male or a female.
2. I am a human being.

Therefore, 3. It is reasonable to doubt that I am a male.

I deny that the conclusion is true. It is not possible that I am a female.

But the premises are both true, and, since the conclusion is false.

The point is that the premise that it is possible that some statement is false, is too weak for the conclusion that it is reasonable to doubt that statement is true.



Of course, more has to be said about how we should understand the idea of possibility.

The word "doubt" is still being mis-interpreted.

The way that word is being used in the original example is as a synonym for "absence of certainty".

In other words, we aren't even using the U.S. justice system "reasonable doubt." We are talking about any logically justifiable doubt at all. Anything with less than 100% certainty therefore falls under the umbrella of "doubt".

Have you never been convinced that something was true, and then later discovered you were wrong? Are you that sure that everything that seems true is true? Even if you are simply a very, very confident person, you are still wrong. Logically valid proofs do not exist for anything. All proofs start with un-provable assumptions of one sort or another.

[kennethamy]

The word "doubt" is still being mis-interpreted.

The way that word is being used in the original example is as a synonym for "absence of certainty".

In other words, we aren't even using the U.S. justice system "reasonable doubt." We are talking about any logically justifiable doubt at all. Anything with less than 100% certainty therefore falls under the umbrella of "doubt".

Have you never been convinced that something was true, and then later discovered you were wrong? Are you that sure that everything that seems true is true? Even if you are simply a very, very confident person, you are still wrong. Logically valid proofs do not exist for anything. All proofs start with un-provable assumptions of one sort or another.

I agree that, for example, it is not a logically necessary truth that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. But what I don't understand is why just because it is not self-contradictory that Quito is not the capital of Ecuador, and that some other city might have been the capital of Ecuador (say, Guayaquil) that consitutes any reason to doubt that Quito is the capital. You mean that unless a what you believe is a necessary truth your doubting it is true is justified? Why?

And sure, I have been persuaded that something is true, and then found out that I was mistaken. So what? How does it follow that because I don't doubt that Quito is the capital, that I am justified in doubting it is? Can the fact that I have been wrong in past be a reason for thinking I am mistaken now? Don't I need something better than that? After all, I have been mistaken in the past about a lot of things, but how does that show that doubting I exist is justified? After all, my reason for believing that I exist is not that I have not made mistakes in the past. So why should it be a reason to to doubt that I exist be that I have made mistakes in the past?

1. I have been mistaken in the past

Therefore, 2. I might be mistaken now. (valid argument)

1. I have been mistaken in the past:

Therefore, 2. I am mistaken now. (Invalid argument).

[mirage]

Mirage,

I suppose the OP can imply that there are two observers in the room. One, the coherentist, asks of the other how he can doubt the vase and table. The correspondence theorist looks closely at this fellow and says,

"My dear friend, you are having an LSD trip"

Under which truth model do you think the truth of the matter will be resolved? Should the coherentist model that you've described be augmented in some way, or some other model be proffered perhaps?

In a way, there isn't all that much functional difference. It's really a dispute over the best labelling scheme. That's what "truth" in metaphysics means IMO.

The coherentist says states of affairs boil down to something abstracted from experience, that our talk of real things can be reduced to talk of experience, past, present and hypothetical.

The correspondance-type chap says states of affairs are not necessarily related to experience, but then must assume that experience is a general guide to states of affairs. (Then some would say they have the problem that we could not understand a relation between experienced objects and something that isn't experience.)

However, both accounts end up "doing" a pretty similar job. Whether we assume a link between experience and states of affairs, or whether we collapse that down by reducing one set of terms to another.

However, it is this assumption, the link between "the Truth" of states of affairs and our perceptions and conceptions, that is the target of Descartes hyperbolic doubt. He wasn't happy with "let's just assume our perception is a guide". He found a bogus God bothering way out but missed the IMH(!)O more elegant solution of realising that are talk about real objects has referents in our cognitive models of experience rather in some other set of objects.

I'm not quite sure what would have to be augmented about the type of coherentism I mentioned. I'm not aware of any real problems with it, though of course that probably says more about my ignorance than about coherentism.

[kennethamy]

In a way, there isn't all that much functional difference. It's really a dispute over the best labelling scheme. That's what "truth" in metaphysics means IMO.

The coherentist says states of affairs boil down to something abstracted from experience, that our talk of real things can be reduced to talk of experience, past, present and hypothetical.

The correspondance-type chap says states of affairs are not necessarily related to experience, but then must assume that experience is a general guide to states of affairs. (Then some would say they have the problem that we could not understand a relation between experienced objects and something that isn't experience.)

However, both accounts end up "doing" a pretty similar job. Whether we assume a link between experience and states of affairs, or whether we collapse that down by reducing one set of terms to another.

However, it is this assumption, the link between "the Truth" of states of affairs and our perceptions and conceptions, that is the target of Descartes hyperbolic doubt. He wasn't happy with "let's just assume our perception is a guide". He found a bogus God bothering way out but missed the IMH(!)O more elegant solution of realising that are talk about real objects has referents in our cognitive models of experience rather in some other set of objects.

I'm not quite sure what would have to be augmented about the type of coherentism I mentioned. I'm not aware of any real problems with it, though of course that probably says more about my ignorance than about coherentism.

I am not sure what a coherence theory of truth is. But I would suppose that a necessary condition of coherence is logical consistency.

Now, it is certainly true that if a set of statements are all true, then they must be logically consistent with each other. Truth (as it were) takes care of consistency.
However, the converse is not true. It does not follow that if set of statements are logically consistent, then all those statements are true. A liar who has a good memory, can spin a story of statements, all of which are logically consistent with each other, and all are false. It is for that reason that a witness in a courtroom need not worry about being caught in a contradiction as long as he tells the truth, whereas a liar does have to worry about being caught in a contradiction, which is why a liar needs a good memory.

So, if coherence means no more that consistency, there is no good reason to think that just because a set of propositions is consistent, that the set is comprised of truths.

Truth, in other words, implies consistency, but consistency does not imply truth. Thus we must be saying more when we talk about "coherence" than consistency. The question for the coherentist is: what more?

[mirage]

I am not sure what a coherence theory of truth is. But I would suppose that a necessary condition of coherence is logical consistency.

Now, it is certainly true that if a set of statements are all true, then they must be logically consistent with each other. Truth (as it were) takes care of consistency. Yep. Because we define untruth in terms of logical inconsistency (i.e. inconsistent with a true proposition).

However, the converse is not true. It does not follow that if set of statements are logically consistent, then all those statements are true. Quite true.

A liar who has a good memory, can spin a story of statements, all of which are logically consistent with each other, and all are false. It is for that reason that a witness in a courtroom need not worry about being caught in a contradiction as long as he tells the truth, whereas a liar does have to worry about being caught in a contradiction, which is why a liar needs a good memory.Yep.

So, if coherence means no more that consistency, there is no good reason to think that just because a set of propositions is consistent, that the set is comprised of truths.
You are subtly question begging. You are assuming truth independent of the set of propositions, which is what coherentism denies. Clearly if there is no such truth, then the set can't be false.

But coherentism (at least my view that seems to be closest to coherentism) doesn't define the truth in terms of any set of coherent propositions. (I think the whole talk of propositions is stilted unuseful bollocks anyway. I wish philosophy would start talking more in terms of cognitive science.) The set must be all the "propositions" believed in.

The perjurer can establish his coherent set is a lie because it isn't coherent with other things he believes in. The court can establish it is a lie because it conflicts with other things they find out.

Furthermore, I have sensibly defined truth as a hypothetical proposition that will remain coherent with infinite future evidence.

I don't know if any philosopher has suggested this, but it seems to me to capture exactly our intuitions about truth. That is it logically independent from any finite set of evidence, but that a large set of evidence provides and inductive argument for truth. An inductive argument that may be so strong that we make little distinction between some very firm beliefs and truth in practice.

That our belief in the truth of a proposition may change, but that it always changes either from realising incoherence with present belief, or by conflict with future experience.

Without this adjustment to better fit our intuitions about the word truth, I think coherentism is clearly vulnerable to criticism.

Truth, in other words, implies consistency, but consistency does not imply truth. Thus we must be saying more when we talk about "coherence" than consistency. The question for the coherentist is: what more?I hope I have addressed that a little.

[kennethamy]

You are subtly question begging. You are assuming truth independent of the set of propositions, which is what coherentism denies. Clearly if there is no such truth, then the set can't be false.



"Assuming" is not the word I would use. I would use the term "arguing", and I might add that by accusing me of question-begging, it is you, yourself who is doing the "assuming".

Yes, indeed, in ordinary life, we think that the consistency of a set of statements does not entail that the set is a true set of statements. It seems to me that if you are going to deny that, it is up to you to present the argument. It is usually (I would say "always") true, that when in philosophy, an opposing view is presented, the proponents of the opposing view are assuming that the view they are opposing is false. But that is obvious. What is not obvious is that all cases of doing that are question-begging. Question-begging comes in when the opposing point of view is presented without supporting arguments. It seems obvious that a fairy tale can be consistent and yet false. And, even, if the fairy tale "coheres" with a wider set of statements, it might still be false, so that consistency and truth are logically independent (or to qualify that, although truth implies consistency, consistency does not imply truth). Having said that, I would add that when a set of statements is consistent with a very numerous set of statements, that becomes strong evidence that the original set of statements is true. But that still does not touch the logical point that consistency does not imply truth even if under certain circumstances, it is evidence for truth.

Please note, the very fact that we can discuss how consistency and truth are, and are not logically or evidentially related, as we have been doing, is strong reason to believe that they are two separate ideas.