Consciousness and evolutionary fitness

[Kosh3]

I am doubtful, and it is questionable, as to whether consciousness could possibly offer an evolutionary advantage.

It seems plausible that, functionally speaking, you could have a brain that possessed no consciousness which performed functionally equivalently to a brain with consciousness, given a deterministic universe.

Taking a deterministic account of reality, consciousness itself is a kind of subjective representation of the underlying neural activity that unfolds according to determined patterns. But all that could happen without any kind of subjective representation at all, to the same resulting behaviour.

Admitting this, does consciousness then become a kind of evolutionary fluke that offers no fitness advangate itself? much in the same way as some think the aesthetics of music is simply a kind of fluke that has no evolutionary advantage offerable - but resulted simply from the way our brains are wired?

edit:

It seems that, unless it can be said that consciousness itself is more than simply subjective representations of neural activity, and in fact offers some computational power itself over and above what neurons can possibly offer, such that it does so independently from the computational power of neurons (which is a strong claim - since computation would more regularly seem to have everything to do with physical properties, not subjective phenomena), then it seems that, given determinism, consciousness must be considered evolutionarily superfluous.

Agree/disagree?

[mattikake]

Clearly consciousness has an evolutionary advantage because it exists now. :p

Is consciousness the driving factor in a feeling of self and a creation of the self? The self would have a major survival advantage when fearing death - running away from danger.

An ant has no consciousness. Yet ant civilisations are successful. Hasn't the ant now been classed as the most successful life form on the planet, by a numbers rating?

[Magic Primate]

Perhaps consciousness is not something in addition to the 'computational power' of the brain, but rather just is those processes.

[Preno]

Um, consciousness is a quality the brain (or other similar organ) of a certain species might or might not have. It's essentially a psychological concept. "Philosophical consciousness" (whatever your working definition of that might be) is of course utterly irrelevant to evolution. Consciousness is not something that might or might not be induced by a brain, consciousness is one of the properties (or rather, capabilities) of the brain.

Damasio's book The Feeling of What Happens is a pretty good one if you want some basic neuro/psychological insight into this area. He claims "[core] consciousness occurs when the brain's representation devices generate an imaged, nonverrbal account of how the organism's own state is affected by the organism's processing of an object[...]". Which basically means that consciousness arises when a neural representation of the object-organism relationship is created. The evolutionary advantage of this should be quite apparent.

[untermensche]

I am doubtful, and it is questionable, as to whether consciousness could possibly offer an evolutionary advantage.

There is not this general thing called consciousness that animals have.

There are only specific consciousnesses, and they all help the organism meet it's survival needs. Which makes them all a survival advantage.

Nothing will remain of an organism that is a detriment to survival, that hurts it's survival changes. Over time such a trait will disappear, because the organisms with it will be slowly weeded out by those with survival advantages. What remains remains because it gives a survival advantage.

Now human consciousness is not fully the product of biological evolution, it is also the product of human cultural evolution. So it is very possible that some cultural evolutionary traits of the human consciousness are not a survival advantage.

[mirage]

Perhaps consciousness is not something in addition to the 'computational power' of the brain, but rather just is those processes.

Snap! (as usual).


The view that "consciousness" is some kind of property in a third person description is not really tenable.

The most elegant and economic view is that it is a first person property and simply isn't there in the third person scientific description. I.e. there is formally no difference between a brain "with" consciousness and a brain with the same physical activity "without" consciousness.

Consciousness is "what it is like" to be that brain. In other words the consciuousness and the brain activity is identified through a perspective difference. An analogy to this is the inside view of a perfectly spherical surfact (i.e. a smooth surface in all directions looking outwards) and an outside view (i.e. a traditional picture of a sphere) can be identified as the same thing despite their utterly different apearances. The difference is not attributed to the sphere as a property, but to the perspective of the description.

[Preno]

The most elegant and economic view is that it is a first person property and simply isn't there in the third person scientific description. I.e. there is formally no difference between a brain "with" consciousness and a brain with the same physical activity "without" consciousness.What do you mean, there is "formally no difference"? What kind of "informal difference" is there, then? Consciousness is not something a particular brain in a particular state might or might not have - whether a particular brain is in a conscious state is simply an observable property of that brain.

If there isn't a third person scientific description, then how come psychology is so successful when dealing with "third persons"? A stone is not conscious, that's a simple fact. You need not "be a stone" in order to realize this.

If you think that it is "not tenable" for me to claim that you are conscious - well, I think precisely the opposite is true. It's not tenable for me to claim that you are not conscious (or OK, you might be some sort of computer program - let's say it's not tenable for me to claim my parents are not conscious).
Now human consciousness is not fully the product of biological evolution, it is also the product of human cultural evolution. So it is very possible that some cultural evolutionary traits of the human consciousness are not a survival advantage.Isn't consciousness a prerequisite for having access to culture? How can human consciousness be a product of cultural evolution, then, unless you extensively generalize the notion of consciousness?

[dug_down_deep]

Consciousness is "what it is like" to be that brain. In other words the consciuousness and the brain activity is identified through a perspective difference.
I don't think I agree with that. "What it is like" is simply the result of the consciousness process, not the substance of it. It's more than perspective, I'm sure. Can't we observe changes in the electrical activity of the brain when consciousness appears? (When we wake up, for example.)

[mirage]

I don't think I agree with that. "What it is like" is simply the result of the consciousness process, not the substance of it. It's more than perspective, I'm sure. Can't we observe changes in the electrical activity of the brain when consciousness appears? (When we wake up, for example.)

Yep, but how does that change the argument? I didn't say it was anything to do with substance.

Obviuosly the brain activity has to exist for it to exist, in either the third or the first person.

If it exists, then it exists (third person) and I feel conscious (first person).

If it doesn't, then neither.

[untermensche]

Isn't consciousness a prerequisite for having access to culture? How can human consciousness be a product of cultural evolution, then, unless you extensively generalize the notion of consciousness?

Which came first, humans, or this language we use, which is imbedded in our consciousness, and now a vital part of it?

What we call thoughts are use of this language.

The first humans thought without much language, but not the same way as a human with an extensive language thinks. This cultural advancement, not genetic advancement, changes consciousness.

Language is not something we have because we are humans. Language is something we have because we are humans AND we had exposure to a language.

[mirage]

What do you mean, there is "formally no difference"? What kind of "informal difference" is there, then?There is a difference in the language, and often in people's mental pictures.

Consciousness is not something a particular brain in a particular state might or might not have - whether a particular brain is in a conscious state is simply an observable property of that brain.No it isn't. It is only observable in the first person. We can of course note the correspondance of certain states (in the scientific description) of our own brain and our first person experience, and then label those states "conscious", but that is shorthand for "associated with the first person property of consciousness".

If there isn't a third person scientific description, then how come psychology is so successful when dealing with "third persons"?
Eh? The scientific description is exclusively third person.

We must link our first person experience with its predictions ourselves.

A stone is not conscious, that's a simple fact. You need not "be a stone" in order to realize this.No, it is not a simple fact, and this sort of blunt "common sense" is not helpful in a discussion of the counterintuitive. Quite why you choose such a charicatured straw man of my position, I'm not sure though.

Is a pencil and paper calculation of the same brain activity that you regard as conscious itself conscious? A giant dust cloud that by chance produces an analogy of those physical processes? Just what is it about a physical process that qualifies it as processing information? Or as representing? Isn't that an intentional term?

If you think that it is "not tenable" for me to claim that you are conscious - well, I think precisely the opposite is true. It's not tenable for me to claim that you are not conscious (or OK, you might be some sort of computer program - let's say it's not tenable for me to claim my parents are not conscious).I am disputing only that this assertion, which I agree with, represents a third person description property. I think it is short hand for "brain activity that is conscious in the first person."

That is what I meant by "formally". In everyday language clearly "a brain is conscious", but it is rather loose langauge that doesn't clarify.

Isn't consciousness a prerequisite for having access to culture?Nope. A p-zombie could be an artist. The whole point is that "consciousness" as a third person property makes no observational predictions.

It is causally inert. Many people have tried to find an observational consequence. They always turn out to be rather confused about the whole thing.

How can human consciousness be a product of cultural evolution, then, unless you extensively generalize the notion of consciousness?The associated brain activity can be a product of cultural evolution, but consciousness as distinct from the brain activity I identify it with is causally inert and so can't be the product of selection (and hence evolution) of any kind.

[Preno]

Which came first, humans, or this language we use, which is imbedded in our consciousness, and now a vital part of it?

What we call thoughts are use of this language.Not necessarily (unless the word "thoughts" was just recently redefined without anyone notifying me).
The first humans thought without much language, but not the same way as a human with an extensive language thinks. This cultural advancement, not genetic advancement, changes consciousness.Well, you still need to be conscious first if you want to have access to this cultural advancement that is language. Of course, high levels of human consciousness are affected by culture. In the context of this thread, however, we are talking about how the fact that an organism is conscious or not influences its evolutionary fitness (that is, we are talking about "core consciousness" here).

[Preno]

There is a difference in the language, and often in people's mental pictures.So you're saying 'There is a difference in the language, and often in people's mental pictures between a brain "with" consciousness and a brain with the same physical activity "without" consciousness'. Pardon me, but just what exactly does that mean?
No it isn't. It is only observable in the first person. We can of course note the correspondance of certain states (in the scientific description) of our own brain and our first person experience, and then label those states "conscious", but that is shorthand for "associated with the first person property of consciousness".Well, what's wrong with that? I cannot look inside your body to see whether you have a heart, a liver and a stomach, but it seems quite reasonable to assume that you do. Likewise, if you behave like you're conscious, it seems quite reasonable to assume that you are.
Eh? The scientific description is exclusively third person.

We must link our first person experience with its predictions ourselves.Of course it is exclusively third person. How does that answer the question, i.e., how do you explain that psychology makes so successful predictions if other people are not conscious?
No, it is not a simple fact, and this sort of blunt "common sense" is not helpful in a discussion of the counterintuitive. Quite why you choose such a charicatured straw man of my position, I'm not sure though.Actually, I think this sort of blunt "common sense" is necessary in a discussion of philosophy. Btw, what is the difference between my strawman and your claims?
Is a pencil and paper calculation of the same brain activity that you regard as conscious itself conscious? A giant dust cloud that by chance produces an analogy of those physical processes? Just what is it about a physical process that qualifies it as processing information? Or as representing? Isn't that an intentional term?An interesting question, but I don't think you have a much better answer than I do. I'd say that processing information means the manipulation of representations of facts. That a screwdriver doesn't represent the proposition 2+2=4 is quite apparent, just like it is quite apparent that "2+2=4" does. What exactly is the nature of this representation is a more difficult question, of course.
I am disputing only that this assertion, which I agree with, represents a third person description property. I think it is short hand for "brain activity that is conscious in the first person."

That is what I meant by "formally". In everyday language clearly "a brain is conscious", but it is rather loose langauge that doesn't clarify.OK, you can restrict the notion of consciousness only to yourself if you want. Why the hell would you want to do that? In fact, I don't think it's even possible to actually doubt that others are conscious - a theory of mind is present in every socialized human without some sort of neurological damage. See the other thread about doubting the existence of tables.
Nope. A p-zombie could be an artist. The whole point is that "consciousness" as a third person property makes no observational predictions.

It is causally inert. Many people have tried to find an observational consequence. They always turn out to be rather confused about the whole thing.P-zombies, are quite frankly, one of the most idiotic concepts of modern philosophy (or pop-philosophy, more like). If something behaves it every possible way as if it were conscious, then it is conscious. This outrageous principle is called Occam's Razor.

That "consciousness as a third person property makes no observational predictions" is utterly absurd - if someone is unconscious, the observable prediction is that he cannot speak, for example. If someone is conscious, the observable prediction is that he will scream when you burn his arm with a lighter. :huh:
The associated brain activity can be a product of cultural evolution, but consciousness as distinct from the brain activity I identify it with is causally inert and so can't be the product of selection (and hence evolution) of any kind.Uh, consciousness is just a high-level description of the brain activity. Just like a table is just a high-level description of a certain cluster of atoms. No need to go all metaphysical with consciousness.

[dug_down_deep]

Yep, but how does that change the argument? I didn't say it was anything to do with substance.

Obviuosly the brain activity has to exist for it to exist, in either the third or the first person.

If it exists, then it exists (third person) and I feel conscious (first person).

If it doesn't, then neither.
Well, OK. But then I wonder what you mean by this:
The view that "consciousness" is some kind of property in a third person description is not really tenable.
How is it not a property, when it can be observed by watching the activity of the brain? Seems like a pretty tenable view to me.

[untermensche]

Not necessarily (unless the word "thoughts" was just recently redefined without anyone notifying me).
Well, you still need to be conscious first if you want to have access to this cultural advancement that is language. Of course, high levels of human consciousness are affected by culture. In the context of this thread, however, we are talking about how the fact that an organism is conscious or not influences its evolutionary fitness (that is, we are talking about "core consciousness" here).
Do you think with language?

If you have no evolved language, do you think the same way?

Does potential to learn language help if there is no language to learn?

[David B]

Can you tell the difference between an unconscious pre-speech infant and a conscious one?

David B (suggests that if your answer to this is 'no', then elementary first aid training might help)

[Preno]

Do you think with language?Usually.
If you have no evolved language, do you think the same way?No.
Does potential to learn language help if there is no language to learn?No.

[mirage]

Well, OK. But then I wonder what you mean by this:

How is it not a property, when it can be observed by watching the activity of the brain? Seems like a pretty tenable view to me.
It can't be directly observed as it is defined. That's the problem a lot of people have "you can't see love under a microscope" etc.

You can reductively identify the two terms across the perspective difference but I'm not sure that the first person one should be used as a third person one, particularly when the identification is in dispute.

In other words although they may share a reference or extension (point to the same thing), their senses differ (they point from different places), so I would prefer to use each one in its appropriate tense.

It's a bit like saying that the "next week" I talked about a while ago has the same referent as "last week" I talked about today. But even so, it is confusing if I use the terms interchangably out of their temporal context.

Having said all that, I don't have a huge objection to saying you could see "consciousness" on a scanner. It doesn't quite seem to be using language well though.

[Cosmo]

Um, consciousness is a quality the brain (or other similar organ) of a certain species might or might not have. It's essentially a psychological concept. "Philosophical consciousness" (whatever your working definition of that might be) is of course utterly irrelevant to evolution. Consciousness is not something that might or might not be induced by a brain, consciousness is one of the properties (or rather, capabilities) of the brain.

Um, this is a philosophy forum. Whether you call something a psychological concept or not doesn't really change things. Philosophy involves examining concepts. I suppose this is something you want to do and that you are well aware of.

Damasio's book The Feeling of What Happens is a pretty good one if you want some basic neuro/psychological insight into this area. He claims "[core] consciousness occurs when the brain's representation devices generate an imaged, nonverrbal account of how the organism's own state is affected by the organism's processing of an object[...]". Which basically means that consciousness arises when a neural representation of the object-organism relationship is created. The evolutionary advantage of this should be quite apparent.

From what you say here he is not saying what consciousness is. He is giving some of the prerequisites for it to arise. As per the OP you could have what he says is happening without consciousness- a la Terminator. Consciousness may well be excess baggage that came along with the evolution of brains.

[Preno]

Um, this is a philosophy forum. Whether you call something a psychological concept or not doesn't really change things. Philosophy involves examining concepts. I suppose this is something you want to do and that you are well aware of.Yes, philosophy involves examining concepts - from a very general perspective. If you want to study consciousness in more detail, you need to have recourse to psychology.

The philosophical question is whether other people can be conscious. The self-apparent answer is yes, because in every way they behave as if they are. Other aspects of this question are basically psychological.
From what you say here he is not saying what consciousness is. He is giving some of the prerequisites for it to arise. As per the OP you could have what he says is happening without consciousness- a la Terminator. Consciousness may well be excess baggage that came along with the evolution of brains.Actually, yes, he is saying what consciousness is (he calls this basic consciousness "core consciousness"). Borrow the book if you want.

Btw, I'm not aware that Terminator was unconscious. He certainly didn't behave like that.

[untermensche]

Usually.
No.
No.
Then you agree, language changes consciousness.

So it is some non-genetic element, that changes consciousness.

There is no gene to create English.

[Cosmo]

Yes, philosophy involves examining concepts - from a very general perspective. If you want to study consciousness in more detail, you need to have recourse to psychology.

And when you study the psychological concept you also look at its underpinnings-back to philosophy. Anyway, this isn't, imo, very important to the OP.


The philosophical question is whether other people can be conscious. The self-apparent answer is yes, because in every way they behave as if they are.

The OP is asking whether consciousness is superflous or whether it confers some evolutionary advantage.

Other aspects of this question are basically psychological.

This has been visited.

Actually, yes, he is saying what consciousness is (he calls this basic consciousness "core consciousness"). Borrow the book if you want.

Perhaps he is but I'm going off your rendition. You used the following words in relation to consciousness: occurs and arises. These words do not suggest identification with the mechanisms described as consciousness.

Notwithstanding, you've now identified consciousness ( core consciousness)as " the brain's representation devices generate an imaged, nonverrbal account of how the organism's own state is affected by the organism's processing of an object[...]"

So if a I have a a computer program react to different representations on a television set, is that consciousness?

Btw, I'm not aware that Terminator was unconscious. He certainly didn't behave like that

A computer program in a robot can cause behaviour. It doesn't necessarily imply consciousness.

[dug_down_deep]

There is no gene to create English.
The capacity for language simply means that a language will arise. (If you think otherwise, give me a real-world example.) If the capacity is genetic, then the language comes about as the result of genetic code.

Genes lead to Capacity leads to Language. Therefore, Genes lead to Language.

[Jet Black]

I am doubtful, and it is questionable, as to whether consciousness could possibly offer an evolutionary advantage.

It seems plausible that, functionally speaking, you could have a brain that possessed no consciousness which performed functionally equivalently to a brain with consciousness, given a deterministic universe.

Taking a deterministic account of reality, consciousness itself is a kind of subjective representation of the underlying neural activity that unfolds according to determined patterns. But all that could happen without any kind of subjective representation at all, to the same resulting behaviour.

Admitting this, does consciousness then become a kind of evolutionary fluke that offers no fitness advangate itself? much in the same way as some think the aesthetics of music is simply a kind of fluke that has no evolutionary advantage offerable - but resulted simply from the way our brains are wired?

edit:

It seems that, unless it can be said that consciousness itself is more than simply subjective representations of neural activity, and in fact offers some computational power itself over and above what neurons can possibly offer, such that it does so independently from the computational power of neurons (which is a strong claim - since computation would more regularly seem to have everything to do with physical properties, not subjective phenomena), then it seems that, given determinism, consciousness must be considered evolutionarily superfluous.

Agree/disagree?

I would suspect that consciousness is an inevitable property of anything that exibits the complexity to appear conscious. If it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, so to speak.

[dug_down_deep]

Having said all that, I don't have a huge objection to saying you could see "consciousness" on a scanner. It doesn't quite seem to be using language well though.
My main objection is that we are treating consciousness as a ghost in the machine. People get freaked out about describing consciousness objectively, but if they saw that all objectivity is subject to the filters of consciousness anyway, then they'd realize that everything feels like something, even looking in a microscope.

There are multiple ways of describing anything. And back to the OP...consciousness is no less a substantive part of the biological being than unconsciousness. So if you grant the latter a role in evolution, you should certainly grant the former the same.

[Cosmo]

The capacity for language simply means that a language will arise. (If you think otherwise, give me a real-world example.) If the capacity is genetic, then the language comes about as the result of genetic code.

Genes lead to Capacity leads to Language. Therefore, Genes lead to Language.

Dug_down_deep,

I think you're veering off at a tangent from the OP.

I also think you've missed Untermensche's point. He's not denying that a capacity to have language is created by genes. He's addressing the specific language that is aquired, which is contingent. A speaker of English may have different thinking to a person that speaks Inuit even though both have the underlying genes to create a lingual capacity.Also, if you were raised in a closet and missed a critical window in developement, regardless of your capacity to language, you will not have very much by the way of thinking.

[Cosmo]

There are multiple ways of describing anything. And back to the OP...consciousness is no less a substantive part of the biological being than unconsciousness. So if you grant the latter a role in evolution, you should certainly grant the former the same.


If you are meaning by unconsciousness the processes that we are not aware of and consciousness as something we are aware of then by asserting the importance of unconsciousness in no way demonstrates ipso facto the importance of consciousness. From an epiphenomenalist standpoint, consciousness is just the steam generated by the engine. It's some after the fact dross.

[untermensche]

The capacity for language simply means that a language will arise. (If you think otherwise, give me a real-world example.) If the capacity is genetic, then the language comes about as the result of genetic code.

Genes lead to Capacity leads to Language. Therefore, Genes lead to Language.
But depending on the evolutionary state of that language, different kinds of human consciousnesses will arise.

[dug_down_deep]

If you are meaning by unconsciousness the processes that we are not aware of and consciousness as something we are aware of then by asserting the importance of unconsciousness in no way demonstrates ipso facto the importance of consciousness. From an epiphenomenalist standpoint, consciousness is just the steam generated by the engine. It's some after the fact dross.
OK. We're missing something here.

Consciousness is not just about thinking, or willing action. If I meditate as a Zen Buddhist would, quieting the voice in my head, and willing no voluntary action, but just observing, then I am still conscious. So this observation is consciousness -- you don't need anything else to have consciousness.

And the ipso facto bit comes from the obvious inability to survive without awareness. Which also steers us back to the OP. How could consciousness not be a part of survival?

[dug_down_deep]

Dug_down_deep,

I think you're veering off at a tangent from the OP.

Oh, I'm sure I am, because I've read the thread, and I can't quite figure out how different flavors of consciousness, even if proven as a claim, answers the question of the OP.

I also think you've missed Untermensche's point. He's not denying that a capacity to have language is created by genes. He's addressing the specific language that is aquired, which is contingent. A speaker of English may have different thinking to a person that speaks Inuit even though both have the underlying genes to create a lingual capacity.Also, if you were raised in a closet and missed a critical window in developement, regardless of your capacity to language, you will not have very much by the way of thinking.
I don't think language equates to thinking. And there's no reason to assume that there's not much thinking going on in people who haven't learned the language you're speaking in.

Furthermore, is consciousness really quantifiable?

[Cosmo]

I don't think language equates to thinking. And there's no reason to assume that there's not much thinking going on in people who haven't learned the language you're speaking in.

No, language does not equate to thinking. Language facilitates thinking. The degree of language acquisition does have a significant impact on your ability to think. This is striking in cases where children have missed critical window periods of language acquisition. Their ability to think has been profoundly limited.

Imagine if you had a very poor grasp of language, how on earth will you be able to learn much of anything when everything is taught in language? If you can't little , you're not going to have much to think with or about. It will also be an impediment to how you think, how you communicate and to how you understand. All these would be negatively impacting on your thinking.


Furthermore, is consciousness really quantifiable?

Well, I never made this assertion and I don't think anyone else in this thread did either. However, it depends on how you're using the word 'consciousness' here.

[Preno]

Perhaps he is but I'm going off your rendition. You used the following words in relation to consciousness: occurs and arises. These words do not suggest identification with the mechanisms described as consciousness.

Notwithstanding, you've now identified consciousness ( core consciousness)as " the brain's representation devices generate an imaged, nonverrbal account of how the organism's own state is affected by the organism's processing of an object[...]"

So if a I have a a computer program react to different representations on a television set, is that consciousness?If the reactions are sufficiently complex, I would say yes. Consciousness is basically a sufficiently complex way of behaving and manipulating representations.
A computer program in a robot can cause behaviour. It doesn't necessarily imply consciousness.So what's so special about proteins and lipids that something not made of proteins and lipids cannot exhibit consciousness? I repeat: if something behaves in every way as if it were X [conscious], then it is X [conscious. This shocking principle - which you seem to be denying - is called Occam's Razor.

[mirage]

So you're saying 'There is a difference in the language, and often in people's mental pictures between a brain "with" consciousness and a brain with the same physical activity "without" consciousness'. Pardon me, but just what exactly does that mean?
It means that in the language you just used, and in many people's conception of the problem, there is a difference. If you treat consciousness as a property in a third person description, one brain has it and one lacks it. Obviously I don't think that this is a meaningful difference. Since I think we agree on that, I'm not quite sure why you are choosing to pick on my use of "formally" no difference with quite such interest. I'll retract the formally if you like.

Well, what's wrong with that? Nothing.
I cannot look inside your body to see whether you have a heart, a liver and a stomach, but it seems quite reasonable to assume that you do. Likewise, if you behave like you're conscious, it seems quite reasonable to assume that you are.So you agree with me; consciousness is not directly observed outside the first person. Glad we cleared that up.

Of course it is exclusively third person. How does that answer the question, i.e., how do you explain that psychology makes so successful predictions if other people are not conscious?It was in reply to this:If there isn't a third person scientific description, then how come psychology is so successful when dealing with "third persons"?Your premise "if there isn't a third person scientific description" bore no relation to what I had said. I was correcting your error, so there is no need to say "of course" back to me.

Now, please explain what consequences upon observations, and hence the sucess of psychological theory (which like all science is judged on prediction of observations), a lack of consciousness would have.

Answer: none.

It matters not whether a person is actually conscious or not it they behave identically. The only difference for psychology would be that terms of consciousness used in its models would be instrumentalist rather than realist. I don't think it really mentions consciousness per se anyway. It's mostly concerned with the behavioural effects of cognition, emotion, and that kind of thing.

Actually, I think this sort of blunt "common sense" is necessary in a discussion of philosophy.Well I disagree. Common sense usually means unexamined assumptions. The job of philosophy is mainly to examine such assumptions, particularly when there are problems with the common sense account.

Btw, what is the difference between my strawman and your claims?Your strawman was that a stone might be conscious. Although there might be a perspective as a stone, or anything for that matter, I don't think it would bear any resemblance to what it is like to be a working brain, and therefore wouldn't have the characteristics we attach to our conception of consciousness. I don't really know where to draw the line though.

An interesting question, but I don't think you have a much better answer than I do.No, I don't, nor did I claim to. I was just demonstrating the matter is not simple.

I'd say that processing information means the manipulation of representations of facts.The problem is that a representation is only a representation relative to a cognitive system. I.e. this is the problem of intentionality. You go round in circles.

That a screwdriver doesn't represent the proposition 2+2=4 is quite apparent, just like it is quite apparent that "2+2=4" does.
Only because a screwdriver actually doesn't represent it in a language we use. Which doesn't get us very far.

My own thinking about intentionality is similar to that about consciousness - it doesn't really have meaning or a place in a third person description. A bit like meaning itself (which is another intentional concept.)

What exactly is the nature of this representation is a more difficult question, of course.
OK, you can restrict the notion of consciousness only to yourself if you want. Why the hell would you want to do that?I don't want to do that. I restrict it to first and second person descriptions. Which means I can imagine what it is like to be someone else, and conscious, naturally.

In fact, I don't think it's even possible to actually doubt that others are conscious - a theory of mind is present in every socialized human without some sort of neurological damage. See the other thread about doubting the existence of tables.Well if you had followed what I was saying, you might realise that I would reject the assertion that others (with similar brain activity) aren't conscious, since I identify normal brain activity with the first and second person term "consciousness".

P-zombies, are quite frankly, one of the most idiotic concepts of modern philosophy (or pop-philosophy, more like). If something behaves it every possible way as if it were conscious, then it is conscious. This outrageous principle is called Occam's Razor.Yep, I agree. Parsimony is what drives the identification of brain activity and consciousness.

However, the concept isn't stupid if it is used to clarify the debate, which is what p-zombies were invoked for in the first place.

That "consciousness as a third person property makes no observational predictions" is utterly absurd - if someone is unconscious, the observable prediction is that he cannot speak, for example. Incorrect. We are considering the difference between the attribution or non attribution of consciousness to identical sets of physical brain states. I.e. p-zombies. Despite the parsimony arguments against them, p-zombies are not logically impossible, and they would certainly be able to speak.

If someone is conscious, the observable prediction is that he will scream when you burn his arm with a lighter. :huh:Nope. That doesn't depend on consciousness either.
Uh, consciousness is just a high-level description of the brain activity. Just like a table is just a high-level description of a certain cluster of atoms. No need to go all metaphysical with consciousness.
There is certainly no need to "go all metaphysical" if you simpy take your or my word for the conclusions. If you are interested in supporting your position, which many find deeply counter intuitive, and refuting others, you will need to.

It's also worth pointing out why people feel consciousness is something special and different to any other physical property. That is because it is a property meaningful in a different epistemic perspective from third person physical descriptions. It is different for this reason, and this is a point which "just brain activity" misses out on.

[Preno]

It means that in the language you just used, and in many people's conception of the problem, there is a difference. If you treat consciousness as a property in a third person description, one brain has it and one lacks it. Obviously I don't think that this is a meaningful difference. Since I think we agree on that, I'm not quite sure why you are choosing to pick on my use of "formally" no difference with quite such interest. I'll retract the formally if you like.I chose to "pick on" it, because I still don't understand the difference between "no difference" and "only formal difference".
So you agree with me; consciousness is not directly observed outside the first person. Glad we cleared that up.No, I don't. In fact, I'm claiming quite the opposite - that consciousness can be determined based on behaviour.
Now, please explain what consequences upon observations, and hence the sucess of psychological theory (which like all science is judged on prediction of observations), a lack of consciousness would have.

Answer: none.

It matters not whether a person is actually conscious or not it they behave identically. The only difference for psychology would be that terms of consciousness used in its models would be instrumentalist rather than realist. I don't think it really mentions consciousness per se anyway. It's mostly concerned with the behavioural effects of cognition, emotion, and that kind of thing.Uh, did you read my last post? I gave you an example. An observable consequences of a lack of consciousness is the inability to speak, for example.
Well I disagree. Common sense usually means unexamined assumptions. The job of philosophy is mainly to examine such assumptions, particularly when there are problems with the common sense account.Yeah, but in order to examine them, they first need to be there, right?
Your strawman was that a stone might be conscious. Although there might be a perspective as a stone, or anything for that matter, I don't think it would bear any resemblance to what it is like to be a working brain, and therefore wouldn't have the characteristics we attach to our conception of consciousness. I don't really know where to draw the line though.

No, I don't, nor did I claim to. I was just demonstrating the matter is not simple.

The problem is that a representation is only a representation relative to a cognitive system. I.e. this is the problem of intentionality. You go round in circles.Well, I can quite definitely say that the stone I'm currently holding in my left hand does not represent anything. Can I not?
I don't want to do that. I restrict it to first and second person descriptions. Which means I can imagine what it is like to be someone else, and conscious, naturally.So where's the problem, then? You can only imagine what it is like to be someone else because that someone else is behaving in a way that indicates that he is conscious.
Well if you had followed what I was saying, you might realise that I would reject the assertion that others (with similar brain activity) aren't conscious, since I identify normal brain activity with the first and second person term "consciousness".What's the difference between "second person consciousness" and "third person consciousness"?
Yep, I agree. Parsimony is what drives the identification of brain activity and consciousness.

However, the concept isn't stupid if it is used to clarify the debate, which is what p-zombies were invoked for in the first place.Well, if you agree, then where's the problem? If someone behaves in every way as if they are conscious, then they are conscious, then they are conscious. You just agreed with me on that.
Incorrect. We are considering the difference between the attribution or non attribution of consciousness to identical sets of physical brain states. I.e. p-zombies. Despite the parsimony arguments against them, p-zombies are not logically impossible, and they would certainly be able to speak.The distinction between p-zombie and non-p-zombie is simply invalid, because it's not based on anything observable. Ergo, the concept of p-zombie is absurd. I can equally well introduce the concept of q-zombie, which in every way is like a human, except that it is quorbupluous. :huh:
There is certainly no need to "go all metaphysical" if you simpy take your or my word for the conclusions. If you are interested in supporting your position, which many find deeply counter intuitive, and refuting others, you will need to.OK. So why do you disagree that consciousness is simply a higher-level description of what happens inside a human brain? It seems quite natural to me.
It's also worth pointing out why people feel consciousness is something special and different to any other physical property. That is because it is a property meaningful in a different epistemic perspective from third person physical descriptions. It is different for this reason, and this is a point which "just brain activity" misses out on.If you say so. You know, my point is that you're "wrong" as in "saying a logical or factual impossibility" but that you're not saying anything relevant. Yes, I can say that two things that are in every aspect the same differ in that one is conscious and the other is not. That, however, begs the question: what the hell is the use of such a concept?

[Cosmo]

If the reactions are sufficiently complex, I would say yes. Consciousness is basically a sufficiently complex way of behaving and manipulating representations.
So what's so special about proteins and lipids that something not made of proteins and lipids cannot exhibit consciousness? I repeat: if something behaves in every way as if it were X [conscious], then it is X [conscious. This shocking principle - which you seem to be denying - is called Occam's Razor.

Firstly, I do not deny the razor. In fact, the last paragraph is entirely of your own imagination and no where in this thread can be attributed to what I've said.You're fighting a straw man here.

I do not deny that consciousness is produced by brain function or that it could possibly be generated by other means. I certainly believe that when the brain dies consciousness dies with it.

You have defined consciousness by the cogs and wheels that produce it. However, my perception of redness although produced by my cogs and wheels cannot be identified with those cogs and wheels. You could step into my brain and see the neurons firing, and neurochemicals seeping into and being reabsorbed from synaptic wells but you will not see my perception of redness. It does not reduce to the cogs and wheels.

[Preno]

No, I won't see your perception of redness, but your perception of redness is fully determined by the physical properties I will see. Again, it's just a higher-level description that isomorphically maps onto a lower-level description. If we agree on that, all is well.

[untermensche]

So you agree with me; consciousness is not directly observed outside the first person. Glad we cleared that up.
This is a limitation of our knowledge, not a technical impossibility.

One day it may be very likely we will be able to say that this 'thing' meets all the requirements to experience consciousness, and therefore, there is no reason to suppose they are not experiencing it.

[dug_down_deep]

No, language does not equate to thinking. Language facilitates thinking. The degree of language acquisition does have a significant impact on your ability to think. This is striking in cases where children have missed critical window periods of language acquisition. Their ability to think has been profoundly limited.

Imagine if you had a very poor grasp of language, how on earth will you be able to learn much of anything when everything is taught in language? If you can't little , you're not going to have much to think with or about. It will also be an impediment to how you think, how you communicate and to how you understand. All these would be negatively impacting on your thinking.
I just don't buy this. You would undoubtedly be culturally handicapped, but there's no reason to believe that you would be thinking less, even if that's possible. How, for example, would someone who didn't know Russian be handicapped cognitively by not knowing Russian?

I am pretty sure (and I suppose this is falsifiable, so I would like to see if anyone's done a study) that a language of some kind would emerge if a child were denied exposure to any widely spoken language. This might be a language with one speaker, if the child were isolated from other children as well.

What I really don't buy is that the "amount" of thinking would be diminished. Probably abstraction would not be as great a part of the thought process (though I don't even know that for sure), but I don't see the reason to believe that cognitive activity would somehow slow down.

Well, I never made this assertion and I don't think anyone else in this thread did either. However, it depends on how you're using the word 'consciousness' here.
I was referring to the phrase "very much thinking" as a quantification. I don't think I'll argue this point, though. There probably is a way of measuring the quantity of brain activity.

[dug_down_deep]

No, I won't see your perception of redness, but your perception of redness is fully determined by the physical properties I will see. Again, it's just a higher-level description that isomorphically maps onto a lower-level description. If we agree on that, all is well.
That's exactly right. No one will ever know what chocolate tastes like to me, but that doesn't make the taste of chocolate something remarkable that cannot be explained "in the third-person".

[Cosmo]

OK. We're missing something here.

Consciousness is not just about thinking, or willing action. If I meditate as a Zen Buddhist would, quieting the voice in my head, and willing no voluntary action, but just observing, then I am still conscious. So this observation is consciousness -- you don't need anything else to have consciousness.

And the ipso facto bit comes from the obvious inability to survive without awareness. Which also steers us back to the OP. How could consciousness not be a part of survival?

How do you know you could not survive without awareness? Is a bacterium aware? Can you conceive of mental activity occuring without being conscious of it? Where do your thoughts come from? Unconscious processes? Can thinking go on without being aware of it?

How can you conclude that consciousness is a part of survival ( which seems to be a cautious, if not meaningless statement. My finger nails are part of survival.Why didn't you say, "necessary for survival"?) over an alternative conclusion that consciousness is some unecessary excess baggage that came along with the evolution of our brains?


I just don't buy this. You would undoubtedly be culturally handicapped, but there's no reason to believe that you would be thinking less, even if that's possible. How, for example, would someone who didn't know Russian be handicapped cognitively by not knowing Russian?

I am pretty sure (and I suppose this is falsifiable, so I would like to see if anyone's done a study) that a language of some kind would emerge if a child were denied exposure to any widely spoken language. This might be a language with one speaker, if the child were isolated from other children as well.

What I really don't buy is that the "amount" of thinking would be diminished. Probably abstraction would not be as great a part of the thought process (though I don't even know that for sure), but I don't see the reason to believe that cognitive activity would somehow slow down

If you re-read the post that you are addressing here, I'm not talking about particular languages but language in general. You learn the categories of thought, logic and ways to think through language. Have you not come across accounts of children being raised by beasts or children being raised in closets? They missed a critical window in acquiring a language and their thought is extremely limited. This is an empirical fact. Not some armchair a priori cogitation.

As to particular languages I would say that differences in how they categorise and describe the world leads to differences in thinking. For example, a person raised in language that doesn't have a concept of linear time isn't going to think about things the same as you.

[Cosmo]

You have defined consciousness by the cogs and wheels that produce it. However, my perception of redness although produced by my cogs and wheels cannot be identified with those cogs and wheels. You could step into my brain and see the neurons firing, and neurochemicals seeping into and being reabsorbed from synaptic wells but you will not see my perception of redness. It does not reduce to the cogs and wheels.


No, I won't see your perception of redness, but your perception of redness is fully determined by the physical properties I will see. Again, it's just a higher-level description that isomorphically maps onto a lower-level description. If we agree on that, all is well.

You could have just said a 1st person description isomorphically maps into a 3rd person description.

Regardless, you're just using different words to say that the cogs and wheels and the light spinning those wheels are identical to the cogs and wheels. I have to disagree. However, again, I do not deny that my perception is produced by these things.

Look at your proposition in terms of colour blind person and one who is not. The perception is not identical to their visual aparatus and what stimulates it.

[dug_down_deep]

How do you know you could not survive without awareness? Is a bacterium aware? Can you conceive of mental activity occuring without being conscious of it? Where do your thoughts come from? Unconscious processes? Can thinking go on without being aware of it?

So awareness is not the consciousness you believe the OP was referring to? It's certainly the minimal component, though I do believe unconscious processes can receive input, and in this way be aware as well. So in short -- point taken.

However. Have unconscious processes ever innovatively solved a problem that wasn't first put to them by conscious thought? Perhaps this is the purpose of consciousness.

If you re-read the post that you are addressing here, I'm not talking about particular languages but language in general. You learn the categories of thought, logic and ways to think through language. Have you not come across accounts of children being raised by beasts or children being raised in closets? They missed a critical window in acquiring a language and their thought is extremely limited. This is an empirical fact. Not some armchair a priori cogitation.
(There's that word fact again.) How do you know their thought is limited? By what measure, independent of the context of the language you are speaking in, or the handful you happen to know?

[Preno]

You could have just said a 1st person description isomorphically maps into a 3rd person description.

Regardless, you're just using different words to say that the cogs and wheels and the light spinning those wheels are identical to the cogs and wheels. I have to disagree. However, again, I do not deny that my perception is produced by these things.

Look at your proposition in terms of colour blind person and one who is not. The perception is not identical to their visual aparatus and what stimulates it.A good example, actually. Their perception is not identical, precisely because their brain processes colour in a different way. Now what the OP was saying is essentially that a person can be colour blind while processing colour the same way normal people do - which is of course absurd.

[Cosmo]

A good example, actually. Their perception is not identical, precisely because their brain processes colour in a different way. Now what the OP was saying is essentially that a person can be colour blind while processing colour the same way normal people do - which is of course absurd.

Yes, perception in both cases is supervenient on the visual aparatus. Change the latter and you change the former. I agree here. However, whatever the perception and it's causes, the perception cannot be identified with the causes. If you agree to supervenience and nothing more, then we see eye to eye.

[Preno]

Yes, perception in both cases is supervenient on the visual aparatus. Change the latter and you change the former. I agree here. However, whatever the perception and it's causes, the perception cannot be identified with the causes. If you agree to supervenience and nothing more, then we see eye to eye.I don't identify the perception with its causes, I'm saying the only difference is in the level of description. Just like when you have a computer, you can either say: "look, the processor sums 1+1" or: "look, there is an electric current going this way in the processor". Both these statements describe the same process.