Is freewill possible?

[skepticgirl]

Given what we know of science, is it possible for freewill to exist? Quantum physics seems to allow randomness, but that doesn't equal freewill. If we are the sum of the interactions of the brain, does it mean that freewill is just an illusion or is there a way to reconcile the two?

[Kemono]

Given what we know of science, is it possible for freewill to exist?

To me the problem seems to be that the words free will do not mean anything coherent. If there was a decent definition, the question of whether we actually have it or not would probably not be all that hard to answer.

[trip]

Being the 'sum of the interactions of our brains' doesn't exclude freewill from existence. About the definition thing. How about "the ability to make decisions and take actions that aren't inevitably determined by physical causes."

[untermensche]

Free will means that there is a thing beyond the chain of cause and effect, that is a cause unto itself, a first cause unto itself.

Science knows of no such entity.

[Karen M]

Are you asking if free will is technically possible or realistically possible? A non-physical explanation for choice is about as possible as God(s).

[trip]

What about the big bang? There are theories that it happened out of nothing.

And a explanation of freewill doesn't have to be non-physical.

[Jet Black]

What about the big bang? There are theories that it happened out of nothing.


no, not really. There are hypotheses, but not theories. the scientific and vernacular definitions are somewhat different. and even those hypotheses are more subtle than "happened out of nothing"

[skepticgirl]

By free will I mean our conscious minds being able to make choices that are determined by the mind not the deterministic/random motions of the components of the brain.


Is it possible for a universe that is deterministic or random as in quantum mechanics? to give rise to something like our consciousness that in turn can be free and itself affect the motions of particles

[Hoodoo Ulove]

By free will I mean our conscious minds being able to make choices that are determined by the mind not the deterministic/random motions of the components of the brain.You here assume that the mind is something separate from the actions of the brain. Why?Is it possible for a universe that is deterministic or random as in quantum mechanics? to give rise to something like our consciousness that in turn can be free and itself affect the motions of particlesPeople denying free will say that althought we evidently can (often) do what we want, we are not free because we do not control what we want, that is we cannot want to want what we do not want. But even if we had that freedom, could we want to want to want what we do not want? Why would we want (to want to want . . .) to do that? The concept of free will is incoherent.

[Karen M]

Free will is possible but unprovable. Of course, the same can be said about Determinism.

I personally think it is a bit silly to assume we are so special that our brains react differently to physics than other things do. Sure, quantum mechanics allows for multiple possibilities from the same cause rather than just one, but there is still a cause to all these possibilities. And, whichever of these possibilities actually occurs will still go on to be a cause for something else. Quantum mechanics means we can’t predict which random caused event will occur, but I'm not sure whether it opens the door to uncaused events of themselves.

[skepticgirl]

You here assume that the mind is something separate from the actions of the brain. Why?

I didn't intend it to come off that way. I am assuming the mind is not separate from the actions of the brain, but I am asking whether it can be created by the actions of the brain and be able to itself affect the structure of the brain.

Is it possible for the brain to give rise to the mind which becomes a force in its own right rather than being completely controlled by the brain?

Is there any way determinism and randomness can be reconciled with freedom of persons who are the product of brains to choose?

[Odin2006]

The notion of free will as used by Western philosophers stems from the theology of the Abrahamic religions; "God created Man with free will and he can choose to be saved or damned blah blah blah" and all that. Attempts to defend the notion of Free Will are the result of that underlying Abrahamic cultural bias. In contrast, the Indo-European pagan societies of pre-Christian Europe had quite deterministic worldviews.

[DBT]

Free will is possible but unprovable. Of course, the same can be said about Determinism.


If Determinism is defined as events determined by a chain of prior occurrences, then surely that is to some degree provable?

[kennethamy]

If Determinism is defined as events determined by a chain of prior occurrences, then surely that is to some degree provable?

I think you mean, it is highly plausible, and I think you are right. There is no good reason to think that human actions are exempt from causal explanation. Why should we accept plausibility everywhere else, and not here?

But, of course, ordinarily, no one but philosophers mean by "freewill" "uncaused". Rather, it means "uncaused in certain ways". For instance, my action is free if it has not been compelled (caused by compulsion) or caused by hypnosis; or the result of an addiction. To say that I have done something of my own free will is not to deny that my action has been caused, but rather, as I just said, to deny that my action has been cause in certain ways that we can label, "compelled". All cases of being compelled are cases of being caused, but not all cases of being caused are cases of being compelled. To suppose that just because the all cases of causation are cases of compulsion, just because all cases of compulsion are cases of causation, is to commit the fallacy of conversion (like inferring that because all apples are fruit, that all fruits are apples).

Therefore, we can often prove that our action has not been compelled, even if we cannot prove that our action has not been caused. And therefore, we can prove that we acted of our own free will.

[open-ended answer]

Free will as a concept need not (should not) be attributed to human beings alone.

The dynamic nature of our experience neccessiates such a concept and any system of rules, moral and legal conduct, right and wrong and the like presuppose some kind of "ability" to chose to be rationally justifiable. From the physical cause-effect we have "agent x shot agent y with a pistol, the bullet entered the brain and terminated brain and other biological activity." In this case, people don't kill people, bullets do. Conscious agents however find a moral law that asks for, nags at or even demands some reaction for the action, from personal agent to personal agent- this can be justice or revenge, a primary psychological need of psyche(s) to create and/or maintain "evenness" and equality where it seems lacking. If we can't prove a mechanism for why this is would be or how it could be then it would not disprove the apparent process or phenomenon (the appearence of choice and freedom) but should rather draw to question the methods used.

But to end the digression, the concept of free-will is not a religious invention but a concept interpretted from a basic intuitional sense of human experience. (Consequently it should be noted that those who made "free will" the great centerpost of their beliefs were strong atheist xistentialist philosophers like Nietzche and Sartre). Also, it seems as apparent that animals and lesser life forms show some kind of free will.

Free-will only has effect as an intuition in the present movement towards the future, not the present moment towards the past. This is where the dynamic possibility of today, as an entity that knows distinction from the rest of existentence, crystalised into a final, solidified "statue", a static product called history.

If "free-will" is an illusion it is one a society cannot afford to live without, even if it begs a gnawing and annoying question.

[RexT]

Given what we know of science, is it possible for freewill to exist? Quantum physics seems to allow randomness, but that doesn't equal freewill. If we are the sum of the interactions of the brain, does it mean that freewill is just an illusion or is there a way to reconcile the two?

From another thread (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=174610)that I started on this same subject, "I would define free will as, unimpeded volition, acting without cost or restriction, freedom from the law of cause and effect."

Clearly, no such situation is possible for physical beings. We do have volition of the type that, we can choose from available options, for example, between lemon pie or chocolate cake, but even this is driven by our innate proclivities, which we cannot choose to have or not have, at least in most cases.

Unless you prefer to conflate free will with volition, which I do not, for there is a difference in the two concepts of will, I would say that volition is all we have. Free will could only be possible if we could choose without any consequence or duress, and clearly such is not the case in this world, whether it is determinate or not.

Rex

[DBT]

For what its worth, my view on the free will issue is identical. :thumbs:

[skepticgirl]

From another thread (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=174610)that I started on this same subject, "I would define free will as, unimpeded volition, acting without cost or restriction, freedom from the law of cause and effect."

Clearly, no such situation is possible for physical beings. We do have volition of the type that, we can choose from available options, for example, between lemon pie or chocolate cake, but even this is driven by our innate proclivities, which we cannot choose to have or not have, at least in most cases.

Unless you prefer to conflate free will with volition, which I do not, for there is a difference in the two concepts of will, I would say that volition is all we have. Free will could only be possible if we could choose without any consequence or duress, and clearly such is not the case in this world, whether it is determinate or not.

Rex

So you think we actively choose between lemon pie and chocolate cake, or does the brain choose for us with us having the illusion of making the choice?

[RexT]

So you think we actively choose between lemon pie and chocolate cake, or does the brain choose for us with us having the illusion of making the choice?
I do not know what does the choosing, but a choice is made and that is not an illusion. By asking what does the choosing, you ask what is the mind, which is a separate yet related question from free will.

Rex

[kennethamy]

From another thread (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=174610)that I started on this same subject, "I would define free will as, unimpeded volition, acting without cost or restriction, freedom from the law of cause and effect."

Clearly, no such situation is possible for physical beings. We do have volition of the type that, we can choose from available options, for example, between lemon pie or chocolate cake, but even this is driven by our innate proclivities, which we cannot choose to have or not have, at least in most cases.

Unless you prefer to conflate free will with volition, which I do not, for there is a difference in the two concepts of will, I would say that volition is all we have. Free will could only be possible if we could choose without any consequence or duress, and clearly such is not the case in this world, whether it is determinate or not.

Rex

Suppose I defined a tall person as someone who is at least more than 9 feet tall, and concluded that there were no tall people, not even basketball players. Would that prove that there were no tall people? Or might someone wonder about my definition of "tall person"?

I don't know whether I am conflating free will with volition, but why is it wrong to think that when I want to stay at a party, and I am not drunk, or hypnotized, nor under the influence of a drug, and when no one is making me stay:I am just having a good time: why would it be wrong to describe me as staying at the party of my own free will? Just because I want to stay, and there are causes of my wanting to stay, such as liking the company of the people at the party?

If someone asks me, am I staying of my own free will, I would suppose he was suggesting that in some way, I did not want to stay, but I was under some kind of compulsion to stay, and if I replied, "Yes", I would be rebutting that suggestion. Isn't that true?

[DBT]

So you think we actively choose between lemon pie and chocolate cake, or does the brain choose for us with us having the illusion of making the choice?

But what determines that so called choice between lemon pie and chocolate cake?
Personally, it is chocolate cake over lemon pie every time, but if I do decide to try lemon pie, is that a free choice, or is it also determined in some way?

[skepticgirl]

I do not know what does the choosing, but a choice is made and that is not an illusion. By asking what does the choosing, you ask what is the mind, which is a separate yet related question from free will.

Rex

I'm pretty confused by all the definitions. That a choice is made is clear, but my point is whether we as sentient beings have any control over this choice or is it 100% the result of functions of brain components.

Maybe a better example is a criminal who robbed someone. We put him in jail for it, but can he say "there was nothing I could do, not like "I" (i.e. the sentience) can control the particles in my brain that make me do everything I do"

[kennethamy]

But what determines that so called choice between lemon pie and chocolate cake?
Personally, it is chocolate cake over lemon pie every time, but if I do decide to try lemon pie, is that a free choice, or is it also determined in some way?

Obviously, a determinist will tell us that all choices are determined, but what implication that would have for freedom of the will is another issue. There is an argument that goes this way:

A: You are going to choose chocolate pie.
B. Yes, I was going to, but now that you said I was, I will choose lemon pie, just to prove I have free will.
A. Wrong, because I already knew that if I said you were going to choose chocolate pie, that you would then choose lemon pie, and so, I knew you were going to choose lemon pie. So you are wrong.
B. But, you are wrong, because I already knew that you were going to think all that, so to refute you, I am going to choose chocolate pie after all.

and into the night.

Was A determined to choose whatever pie (and God only knows which one) he finally chose?

[GenesisNemesis]

Free Will is a stupid idea. What's the point of Free Will if God is the ultimate being? Why's there a Hell, anyways?

[kennethamy]

I'm pretty confused by all the definitions. That a choice is made is clear, but my point is whether we as sentient beings have any control over this choice or is it 100% the result of functions of brain components.

Maybe a better example is a criminal who robbed someone. We put him in jail for it, but can he say "there was nothing I could do, not like "I" (i.e. the sentience) can control the particles in my brain that make me do everything I do"

How come that when I choose whatever I choose, and it is because of the "function of brain components" that isn't exactly what it means for me to "control" or "make" the choice? Similarly who or what is the "I" or "me" or, even more puzzlingly, the "sentience" which is being made to do everything done? Why am I just not identical with my central nervous system? I never got the idea that I am a little fellow sitting up in the middle of my head, being buffeted around by a bunch of nerves. I think that is a very peculiar picture of myself, and I wonder why you think it is an accurate picture of yourself.

[RexT]

I'm pretty confused by all the definitions. That a choice is made is clear, but my point is whether we as sentient beings have any control over this choice or is it 100% the result of functions of brain components.
Again, you are asking what is mind. Roughly, Comprehension => Mind => {algorithm} + {data} + {language} + {viewpoint}. In this model, the brain is a complex algorithm that processes data and language is comprehended by the mind. The mind is not any single thing, but all these things working in unison. The point is that the brain is not the only component of mind and no one knows where volition fits into the mind. All we know is that the mind is capable of volition.

As far as having control, mostly we have no real control, our volition is determined by our innate proclivities, which some say can be controled by volition. This is rather circular it is not? Well, there is a simple test to determine if you can control your innate proclivities. Say you loath the taste of liver, I do, and thus never choose it from the lunch menu. If you control your proclivity, then will yourself to adore the taste of liver and start choosing it from then on. Notice that you can choose to eat liver, but whether you will adore it is another matter.

This is a simple example, but you should find that it applies to every aspect of yourself, including, the closes you like, the friends you hang with, the movies you watch and the list goes on. It really does not matter if we pin this down to the brain or if the world is determinate, the result is the same. There is no free will in this world, and as for volition, it seems very limited and controled by a great many factors. none of which involves free will. It is genetics, social and environmental. I am sorry if you were looking for a more hopeful answer.

Yet, there does seem to be a tiny spark of free will, call it intuition, imagination, curiosity, wonder, and it seems to live within us as some agent that feels as though it is being held prisoner. Sometimes when we dream, we are free and do have free will, just as I have previously defined it. Oh, but that is only in dreams, right.

Rex

[MisterChase]

I'm pretty confused by all the definitions. That a choice is made is clear, but my point is whether we as sentient beings have any control over this choice or is it 100% the result of functions of brain components.

Maybe a better example is a criminal who robbed someone. We put him in jail for it, but can he say "there was nothing I could do, not like "I" (i.e. the sentience) can control the particles in my brain that make me do everything I do"


Well, let's really think about this. Could all the things we've done, really been the blind results of atomical dances in the cerebrum? We are all bodies without a mind? Sounds rather silly, when you think about it, doesn't it?

It is, however, easy to mistake corellations for causations - but suffice it to say, correllation does not equal causation. Glandular squirtings, MR-conditionings and chemical movements in the brain are all akin to the machinistic movements we see in engines - but they are being controlled by a purposeful force, not some random, blind dynamo. This is why we are able to walk in a straight line, as well as drive in a straight line.

It is only by the intellect, i.e., the rational faculty, i.e., the mind, that we can have volitional, productive actions.
But the concept of the "mind" often scares the reductive [or eliminative] materialist because it implies that our consciousness is some mystical, other-worldly thing that operates outside of the brain. But we need not fall into this sophomoric mind/body dichotomy if we recognize that the mind is what the brain does. We are our brain! This is contrary to the position held by many mystic-minded folks who epouse the notion that we "interact" with our brains. But for something to interact with another thing, implies that it must be seperate from that thing.

They imply that our consciousness "interacts" with our brain - but this is a false dichotomy. There is no more "interaction" between our consciousness and brain than there is between hearing and ears, or between vision and the eyes. We are integrated, systematic organisms! We have consciousness because we have sensory organs. For instance, I am conscious of my music because I have ears; I am conscious of my computer because I have eyes, I am conscious of how my shirt feels because I have skin. It's not that our sensory organs are required for consciousness to "interact" with our brain, they're required for consciousness to exist.

And because we have a process [e.g., consciousness] of percieving that which exists, we are able to have volition, or free-will as some people say.

But they say free-will, I say "self-determining system".

[fromdownunder]

As somebody who does not accept free will, I will simply make the point that since I do not really know what I am going to do next anyway, it does not particularly matter whether what I do next is based on my life of experiences (i.e., inevitable because of what has gone before) or not.

I do not personally know what the future holds, so it is just as much of an adventure whether what I do next is "free" or determined , since much of what is sometimes described as "free will" comes from the sub-concious anyway.

Norm

[Cheerful Charlie]

Given what we know of science, is it possible for freewill to exist? Quantum physics seems to allow randomness, but that doesn't equal freewill. If we are the sum of the interactions of the brain, does it mean that freewill is just an illusion or is there a way to reconcile the two?

It depends on what you mean by free will.


Google Laplace's demon.
If the word is determinate, if from state S1 of the universe we can calulate s2 in the
future, Laplaces demon knows the future and fee will is impossible.
Determinate here is opposite of free will. If the universe is determinate,
and god can be a Laplacian demon, we have no free will.

This came out of the rebirth of atomism. Long ago, atomist Epicurus was disturbed by
ideas that the Universe, being made of atoms mechanicall rebounding off each other implied a determinate Universe.
He declared that atoms from time swerved randomly. This broke up strict
Laplacian determinism and kapt free will alive. He was derided for his
obvious ad hocism by others, mainly Stoics.

But quantum physics does come to Epicurus's rescue. Things do swerve in a fashion.

You can take a cylinder of gas and calculate pressure and temperature and know
exactly what your collection of atoms are doing.
You cannot say what an individual atom will be doing 24 hours from now.
Its determinate but not really to us. Maybe to a demon?

Quantum effects likewise allow a determinate word of laws of phsyics and
chemistry we can use, but destroys strict detemination, its literally impossible
even in theory to know the exact nature of the universe at state S2.
Nor is it a case of hiddeen varuiabe we just do not know like our cylinder of gas.

The disproval of the Bell inequaiity theorum shows no hidden
variables exist.

So all these quantum effects give us an Epicurus swerve that break hard
determination.
The butterfly effect takes care of the rest.

We can have laws that tell us how a galaxy forms and acts,
but not which star will form wih a planet that will have
intelligent life an a man named John Smith living at
1456 South Main in Houston, Texas.

That level of determinancy is forever broken.

Laplaces's demon is dead.
Epicurus would dance a happy jig if he knew.

We will have things limiting our free will, being born in America
tends one to being a Chrsitian in Saudi Arabia, a moslem.

But that is a different level and in a sense lessor level that, the hard
determination of Laplacian demons.

And quantum physics does no help here.

Once over the Laplacian demon hump for me, its all downhill.

Millions went to Cathoic school and became Catholics, I went and was an
atheist at age 5 and stayed one, go figure. But I do know I have free will
in that larger sense of Epiqurus's swerving atoms/quantum physics.

Cheerful Charlie

[cpollett]

Hey skepticgirl,

There seem to be lots of free will threads on these boards.
Slightly over a year ago I took a stab at definition of weak
free http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=2473213#post2473213 which I was reasonably happy with.
In my view when you use the term free-will you need to say what choices were free with respect to what group of agents. Weak Free will exists because even agents with very limited computational resources are able to be unpredicatable to agents who are computationally much stronger.

[kennethamy]

Well, let's really think about this. Could all the things we've done, really been the blind results of atomical dances in the cerebrum? We are all bodies without a mind? Sounds rather silly, when you think about it, doesn't it?

.

Sounds rather like another argument I have heard:

Think about it, could life have really evolved from blind matter. Mustn't there have been some spirit which infused life into matter?

Such arguments have a name: they are called, arguments from counter-evidential intuitions. All about us we see life, and all the evidence we have is exactly that it evolved from matter. Yet, the intuition expressed in that argument is that it could not have done so.

Similarly, with your argument: All the evidence we have goes to show that exactly what you say could not be true, and it is silly to think it is true, is, in fact true. Another counter-evidential intuition!

By the way, no one says we don't have minds. They say that we don't have what you happen to think of as a mind. It is your theory of what a mind is, that they reject, not minds.

[skepticgirl]

How come that when I choose whatever I choose, and it is because of the "function of brain components" that isn't exactly what it means for me to "control" or "make" the choice? Similarly who or what is the "I" or "me" or, even more puzzlingly, the "sentience" which is being made to do everything done? Why am I just not identical with my central nervous system? I never got the idea that I am a little fellow sitting up in the middle of my head, being buffeted around by a bunch of nerves. I think that is a very peculiar picture of myself, and I wonder why you think it is an accurate picture of yourself.

Hmm good question.

I guess I think I am the sentience, I can't say I am the brain. I don't know how consciousness comes about so I am whatever is created by the operations of the brain? The "I" is not material, what is it anyway.

[Kemono]

By free will I mean our conscious minds being able to make choices that are determined by the mind not the deterministic/random motions of the components of the brain.

This dichotomy goes away if we accept that the mind is the workings of the brain, or to be more precise a subset of the workings of the brain.

Is it possible for a universe that is deterministic or random as in quantum mechanics? to give rise to something like our consciousness that in turn can be free and itself affect the motions of particles

If "free" in this context means "not completely reducible to physical events", then the answer is no.

Let me present my position on the freedom question so you can decide if you agree.

Suppose that a hundred years in the future, a designer of robots at Honda retires and moves to Hawaii. Unfortunately for the remaining employees, she forgets to clean her office! On her desk, a rectangular object the size of a chess board is found. It is clearly one of her designs, but no documentation can be found.

The task of finding out what this object does falls to the new guy in the robotics department (somehow these things always do). He switches the device on... and two sets of virtual chess pieces appear. It is a chess playing machine.

He opens the device up and rigs it so that he can follow its inner workings. It becomes immediately obvious that the device is exceedingly complex.

He then starts to play chess with the device. It is not an altogether unpleasant task, as the device actually engages its opponent in conversation and seems to have a pretty advanced sense of humour. It also plays chess quite well.

While the game continues, the young man records all internal activity in the device using his monitoring equipment. There is clearly nothing magical about the device; everything works according to well established laws of computing. Still, it is so tremendously complex that trying to predict its actions by watching its internal data flows seems impossible.

Still, the machine's actions are not wholly unpredictable. If one makes the assumption that it is trying to win a game of chess, one can make a whole lot of sense of its activities.

Now we can return to the issue of freedom. My position is that we are free in the same sense as the chess playing machine is free (i.e. difficult to predict without resorting to teleology), and not free in the same sense as the chess playing machine is not free (i.e. subject to the laws of causation).

I'm pretty confused by all the definitions. That a choice is made is clear, but my point is whether we as sentient beings have any control over this choice or is it 100% the result of functions of brain components.

Because we are those functions of brain components, there is no contradiction between the two.

Maybe a better example is a criminal who robbed someone. We put him in jail for it, but can he say "there was nothing I could do, not like "I" (i.e. the sentience) can control the particles in my brain that make me do everything I do"

Penalizing a transgression is a good idea because a credible threat of sanctions makes people less likely to commit the act. Our intuitions about culpability seem to have a lot to do with the consideration, "can this kind of act be deterred by a penalty?" They are therefore not altogether bad intuitions.

[skepticgirl]

Things people wrote are making me think of identifying "me" with the processes of the brain. But how can I? The brain is made up of nerve cells, neurotransmitters, myelin and possibly others I don't know about. Nerve cells fire, neurotransmitters carry the message to the next nerve cell and so on.

Somehow this whole system gives rise to me, a thinking being that can actually learn about all these things. I don't know. It just seems so weird. I am not arguing for the supernatural here, but please help me understand this!!!

[MisterChase]

Skepticgirl, perhaps an analogy will help: Think of our vision, for instance. Our vision cannot be observed extrospectively, cannot be handled or put in a test tube. Yet, surely you wouldn't deny the existence of your vision.
Our vision is the process that our ocular organs go through. Likewise, our mind is the process our brains go through.

[kennethamy]

Hmm good question.

I guess I think I am the sentience, I can't say I am the brain. I don't know how consciousness comes about so I am whatever is created by the operations of the brain? The "I" is not material, what is it anyway.

Why do you think there is some entity called an "I" which is different from you? Why can't it just be skepticgirl? The person who is now reading this post. If you say, "I had Cheerios this morning" are you tempted to ask, "who is this I who had Cheerios this morning"? And if some member of your family asks, "Who had the last of the Cheerios this morning" and you reply, "I did" are you puzzled about who (what?) the I is who had the last of the Cheerios. Is the person who asked? Anyway, what makes you ask "what" is this I who had Cheerios?" Shouldn't the question be, "Who is this I who had Cheerios?"

What I am suggesting is that you examine your question, "what is it (the I)anyway?" What are you assuming by asking that question? That the "I" is the name of some entity different from the person, skepticgirl? But where did that assumption come from?

[kennethamy]

Things people wrote are making me think of identifying "me" with the processes of the brain. But how can I? The brain is made up of nerve cells, neurotransmitters, myelin and possibly others I don't know about. Nerve cells fire, neurotransmitters carry the message to the next nerve cell and so on.

Somehow this whole system gives rise to me, a thinking being that can actually learn about all these things. I don't know. It just seems so weird. I am not arguing for the supernatural here, but please help me understand this!!!

Suppose that some chemist says, "water is a compound of two elements, hydrogen and oxygen". Would you reply, "How can that be? When I talk about water, I am talking about a clear, tasteless, odorless, liquid. I know nothing about things like elements and how they compound"? And then you might add, "supposedly, these chemical elements or hydrogen and oxygen somehow give rise to this substance which I drink and wash with, and cook with. It just seems so weird. I am not arguing for the supernatural here, but please help be understand this!!!"

[Philo_66]

But, of course, ordinarily, no one but philosophers mean by "freewill" "uncaused". Rather, it means "uncaused in certain ways". For instance, my action is free if it has not been compelled (caused by compulsion) or caused by hypnosis; or the result of an addiction. To say that I have done something of my own free will is not to deny that my action has been caused, but rather, as I just said, to deny that my action has been cause in certain ways that we can label, "compelled". All cases of being compelled are cases of being caused, but not all cases of being caused are cases of being compelled. To suppose that just because the all cases of causation are cases of compulsion, just because all cases of compulsion are cases of causation, is to commit the fallacy of conversion (like inferring that because all apples are fruit, that all fruits are apples).

Therefore, we can often prove that our action has not been compelled, even if we cannot prove that our action has not been caused. And therefore, we can prove that we acted of our own free will.

Good points. The fact is we do use the term 'free will' very coherently all the time.

What's important is to understand what we mean by 'free'. We say, for example "free falling object." But obviously we don't mean free from all forces or it wouldn't be falling.

Same is true for 'free will.' Obviously we don't mean free from all causes or it wouldn't be 'will'.

Only bonehead philosophers would pose the problem so impractically, with no thought for the practical. And defining 'free will' as something that is entirely free of all things is logically incoherent.

Phil

[kennethamy]

Good points. The fact is we do use the term 'free will' very coherently all the time.

What's important is to understand what we mean by 'free'. We say, for example "free falling object." But obviously we don't mean free from all forces or it wouldn't be falling.

Same is true for 'free will.' Obviously we don't mean free from all causes or it wouldn't be 'will'.

Only bonehead philosophers would pose the problem so impractically, with no thought for the practical. And defining 'free will' as something that is entirely free of all things is logically incoherent.

Phil


I was only pointing out that what people on this board seem to be talking about when they talk about whether we have free will is quite different from what is ordinarily meant by free will in ordinary life. What philosophers are talking about is often called "metaphysical freedom" and is about whether there is any way in which human freedom can be reconciled with universal causation. As a rule, the answer is, no, because most people think that free action is just incompatible with our actions having causes which determine them. Once we put the question in that way, then what Hume says about something else (not freewill) namely, "some people think there is a problem when there is only a difficulty" applies here. What Hume meant was that if it is true that free will and determinism are incompatible, then there is no problem of free will, but only the difficulty that you cannot have both, and if determinism is true, then there is no free will. No problem, only the difficulty that there is no free will. Just as there is no problem in how to make a square into a circle. You can't. Period. But if you would have liked to do that, for some reason, then, that is certainly (at least for you) a difficulty.

On the other hand, if we turn from metaphysical freedom to ordinary freedom, there is more to talk about. Since, for instance, we can inquire into the question, what sorts of causal factors limit our freedom to choose or act (given that they do not all do so) and what are the consequences for morality and human responsibility.

[TheMathGuy]

I think kennethamy's point about universal causation being incompatible with metaphysical free will is correct. However as a mathematician I find myself asking precisely what is meant by universal causation. Presumably this would mean that the "state" of the universe could somehow be reduced to a data string and there would exist of some universal set of formulas which when given this data string for a particular "snapshot" of the universe would then correctly output the "states" of the universe at all future times.

Already I see a problem here. While quantum physics does give us a good reason to believe that mass, energy, position, etc. exist in integer multiples of some fundamental "quantum unit", the idea of taking a "snapshot" of the universe at a given point in time becomes problematic, since relativity says that "time" is not an absolute. So there might not be a such thing as a "snapshot" of the universe at a given time.

More problems arise when we consider the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. It seems there is a fundamental limit to how much of the state of the universe can possibly be measured, and so even if there were such a universal set of formulas it would not seem possible to actually use them to make perfect predictions.

Finally, we must remember that the notion of causality is just as much a human mental construct as the notion of time, or the notion of free will. In Top Ten Ways to Destroy the Earth (http://www.livescience.com/technology/10ways_destroyearth-10.html), one of the methods listed is "total existence failure", which means that all the matter comprising the earth could spontaneously cease to exist. Improbable? Yes! But not forbidden by the current laws of physics. Quantum physics allows that matter could spontaneously come into existence or spontaneously cease to exist. At the quantum level, our human notion of "causality" becomes very shaky indeed!

Hence the metaphysical question of "free will" is not nearly so simple as one might naively suppose! From a pragmatic standpoint, I think the real question is one of understanding what effects are likely achievable by us and using this knowledge to make informed choices, since the ultimate nature of what we like to call "free will" appears to be beyond our ability to know. So long as we cannot predict the future with certainty it would seem prudent to suppose that we are required to make choices and hence to think carefully about what choices we will make.

[RexT]

Hmm good question.

I guess I think I am the sentience, I can't say I am the brain. I don't know how consciousness comes about so I am whatever is created by the operations of the brain? The "I" is not material, what is it anyway.
The "I" is a viewpoint. Something cannot be seen unless it is seen from a viewpoint. The self is that which is seen. Of course, this applies the other senses too.

The viewpoint provides a sense of there being two things that exist, self and other. You see yourself and you see other, but then there is also the I that sees, which cannot see itself. I cannot see I, for when I attempts to see I, I see only self, which consists of innumerable parts. No one of these parts is I, nor is the sum total I. The I cannot be found by any means, so some just toss it aside as a collective I and the single I becomes nonexistent.

It is all philosophical interpretation, which you can subscribe to if you want or you can reject it on the grounds that it does not square with your experience of I.

My personal philosophy is that you are whatever you say you are. There is understanding among humans, I would never doubt that, but I have yet to meet a concept that I could not parse into oblivion or build into a grand theory. What this means to me is that concepts are like sculptor's clay, they can be used in any way I choose to use them, for good or ill, or just for having fun; for science or for art. In this sense, I have the freedom to create or destroy, as I will, and the more understanding I have in this world, the more free will I have to control it.

Anyway, the point is that you can accept or reject the ideas of others, about "I" or anything else, or you can just wait until you have the right experiences so that you do not need to accept or reject the ideas of others; you can create your own ideas. For what has more value to you, the ideas that others have sculpted or your own unique works. I will always choose the latter, no matter the cost. For once you can create your own ideas, you then have the power and knowledge to judge the ideas of others. This, to me, is necessary if there is to be any true sense of free will as it pertains to me.

Rex

[kennethamy]

Hence the metaphysical question of "free will" is not nearly so simple as one might naively suppose! From a pragmatic standpoint, I think the real question is one of understanding what effects are likely achievable by us and using this knowledge to make informed choices, since the ultimate nature of what we like to call "free will" appears to be beyond our ability to know. So long as we cannot predict the future with certainty it would seem prudent to suppose that we are required to make choices and hence to think carefully about what choices we will make.

Well, it may be that what you call "the ultimate nature of free will" is unknowable. Or, on the other hand, it may be that there is nothing to know, since free will is not a thing like the element gold, and so, has no "ultimate nature". The term "free will" although not frequently used in ordinary conversation, is sometimes used as for instance when we ask whether Sam married Mabel, "of his own free will". And, by that, we are not talking about looking into any ultimate natures, but simply asking whether Sam wanted to marry Mabel, or whether Mabel's father is standing around with a shotgun to make sure that Sam makes an honest woman of Mabel. To say that Sam married Mabel of his own free will is simply to deny or rebut the suggestion that Sam doesn't want to marry Mabel but is being forced to do so. Not much to do with something called "the ultimate nature" of free will, I would say.

Of course, that's not the kind of "free will" that is being discussed in such solemn tones on this thread. Philosophers have gotten it into their head that although it is true enough that Sam is not being forced to marry Mabel, and he is very glad to marry Mabel (lovely Mabel!) -or at least forced to marry Mabel by Mabel's father and his shotgun, there are more subtle "metaphysical" ways in which Sam, even if he really does want to marry Mabel is still not marrying Mabel of his own free will. And why, you may ask is that? Well, the idea is that Sam's desire to marry Mabel, is itself a product of antecedent causes, all of which were beyond Sam's control, and in this way, although there is no shotgun, Sam is, nevertheless being coerced in some way to marry Mabel. After all, it may be argued, Sam's desire to marry Mabel comes out of his upbringing and who knows what else. It is not without cause, and since it had causes, Sams desire for Mabel was not up to Sam at all. So, Sam, even though, he is delighted that Mabel will have him, is still not marrying Mabel of "his own free will".

Now, I don't know what you think of this argument that even if Sam is in fact marrying Mabel of his own free will, he really is not marrying Mabel of his own free will (if, of course, to use your own words, we know the ultimate nature of free will). I am pretty skeptical of this argument, and therefore, of its conclusion that even if, in the ordinary sense of that term, Sam is marrying of his own "free will", in some deeper (and of course, it goes without saying) "philosophical" sense, he isn't.

[cpollett]

Things people wrote are making me think of identifying "me" with the processes of the brain. But how can I? The brain is made up of nerve cells, neurotransmitters, myelin and possibly others I don't know about. Nerve cells fire, neurotransmitters carry the message to the next nerve cell and so on.

Somehow this whole system gives rise to me, a thinking being that can actually learn about all these things. I don't know. It just seems so weird. I am not arguing for the supernatural here, but please help me understand this!!!

Maybe you should turn your problem around and ask yourself what aspects of you cannot be explained by nerve cells, neurotransmitters, etc. Where do you think tissue ends and the black box that is 'you' begins? Since Descartes people have come up with suggestions and each time they have been shot down by experiment. Studies of people with various kinds of brain damage to me argue strongly for identifying the mind with the brain.

[skepticgirl]

Skepticgirl, perhaps an analogy will help: Think of our vision, for instance. Our vision cannot be observed extrospectively, cannot be handled or put in a test tube. Yet, surely you wouldn't deny the existence of your vision.
Our vision is the process that our ocular organs go through. Likewise, our mind is the process our brains go through.


But isn't vision a part of consciousness? Would I see anything without a mind?

[skepticgirl]

Why do you think there is some entity called an "I" which is different from you? Why can't it just be skepticgirl? The person who is now reading this post. If you say, "I had Cheerios this morning" are you tempted to ask, "who is this I who had Cheerios this morning"? And if some member of your family asks, "Who had the last of the Cheerios this morning" and you reply, "I did" are you puzzled about who (what?) the I is who had the last of the Cheerios. Is the person who asked? Anyway, what makes you ask "what" is this I who had Cheerios?" Shouldn't the question be, "Who is this I who had Cheerios?"

What I am suggesting is that you examine your question, "what is it (the I)anyway?" What are you assuming by asking that question? That the "I" is the name of some entity different from the person, skepticgirl? But where did that assumption come from?


I don't think I'm assuming that, what am I (skepticgirl)? I find it weird that I should arise from the brain, can I be just the sum of all the firings of the neurons? What is consciousness? I just don't understand!

[skepticgirl]

Suppose that some chemist says, "water is a compound of two elements, hydrogen and oxygen". Would you reply, "How can that be? When I talk about water, I am talking about a clear, tasteless, odorless, liquid. I know nothing about things like elements and how they compound"? And then you might add, "supposedly, these chemical elements or hydrogen and oxygen somehow give rise to this substance which I drink and wash with, and cook with. It just seems so weird. I am not arguing for the supernatural here, but please help be understand this!!!"

Hmm, you're right, but still water is made up of matter. I can't pin down my thoughts to neuron firings. Could there be some "consciousness field"???

[skepticgirl]

Maybe you should turn your problem around and ask yourself what aspects of you cannot be explained by nerve cells, neurotransmitters, etc. Where do you think tissue ends and the black box that is 'you' begins? Since Descartes people have come up with suggestions and each time they have been shot down by experiment. Studies of people with various kinds of brain damage to me argue strongly for identifying the mind with the brain.


But there is no scientific explanation/idea/speculation for how consciousness comes about is there? By that I mean the mechanism. A computer can execute a lot of complicated instruction, but there is no self in the computer, why is there a self in us? What is it? How does it get made?

I think those experiments are convincing, but I guess could still be consistent with the existence of something other that uses the brain but isn't equivalent to it. Not that I think such a thing exists, but still.

[DBT]

But there is no scientific explanation/idea/speculation for how consciousness comes about is there? By that I mean the mechanism. A computer can execute a lot of complicated instruction, but there is no self in the computer, why is there a self in us? What is it? How does it get made?


Simple organisms also don't appear to have consiousness as we know it. It probably requires a certain brain capacity for that happen.

[trip]

Suppose that some chemist says, "water is a compound of two elements, hydrogen and oxygen". Would you reply, "How can that be? When I talk about water, I am talking about a clear, tasteless, odorless, liquid. I know nothing about things like elements and how they compound"?

You would be correct in saying that it's a compound of two elements, but you would also be correct in saying it's a clear, tasteless, odorless liquid. There's nothing supernatural about the second explanation. Just because water can be described at the molecular level doesn't invalidate a description of it at larger scales. After all, you could do the exact same thing to hydrogen and oxygen and describe them at the atomic level, or quantam level, then unjustifiably claim the molecular level isn't the 'reality' of what water really is. You would be wrong to do this of course.

[Philo_66]

I was only pointing out that what people on this board seem to be talking about when they talk about whether we have free will is quite different from what is ordinarily meant by free will in ordinary life.

I think we're in agreement here. That's more or less what I'm trying to say. But I'm also saying that our 'ordinary life' usage of free will is very meaning, useful, and coherent. There are many good reasons we should continue to use it.

I'm saying this because I have been involved in discussions on other websites where this was a major point. There are those who contend that we should not use the term 'free will' because of it's social and moral implications. A book you might read if you're interested is Owen Flanagan's "The Problem Of The Soul". In his book, Flanagan chastises colleagues for not teaching their students that there is no such thing as free will. But Flanagan is, in my opinion, either downright duplicitous, or very sadly confused. He implies at one point that when people say "free will" they mean "libertarian free will" based on the Cartesian dualism. Later in the book he is adamant that it is only the "perennial philosophers" that have this incoherent definition of free will and that in ordinary usage it only means something like the ability to chose to do what you want. But, then, in spite of this he still insists that the only acceptable definition of free will is the "libertarian free will" definition. He then goes on to do the very thing he admonishes others for doing and "changes the subject" so he can address the issue of reconciling 'free will' concepts with a deterministic view. I agree with this compatibilistic approach, BTW. Flanagan, though, falls on his face trying to argue that there are dire social implications that need to be corrected.

Not sure if all that applies to anyone on this board or not. I'm just offering it to give some background on where I'm coming from. I'd recommend Daniel Dennett's "Elbow Room" as a good book and Flanagan's as an example of poorly constructed counter-point maybe.

Phil

[Philo_66]

The viewpoint provides a sense of there being two things that exist, self and other. You see yourself and you see other, but then there is also the I that sees, which cannot see itself. I cannot see I, for when I attempts to see I, I see only self, which consists of innumerable parts. No one of these parts is I, nor is the sum total I. The I cannot be found by any means, so some just toss it aside as a collective I and the single I becomes nonexistent.
I think this is a very good insight. I'm not sure, though, if "I cannot see I" or if it just requires a very different kind of 'viewpoint' to see 'I'. At any rate, no matter what we are looking at and what 'viewpoint' we use, we are always using some 'viewpoint' and it is necessarily subjective.

IOW, what we see is always with respect to how we see and there is no getting around that. It does seem to me that when I say that, I am at least recognizing that there is an 'I' (call it I-sight :) ). But this 'I-sight' is the only sight we have. We lose sight of the 'I' when we con ourselves into believing that we see objectively (ie, without respect to an 'I'). It's a bit comical really.

This issue is, I think, the underpinning issue of all philosophy. Where does 'desire' come from, or 'intention', or 'will' or 'morality'. These things are only visible when viewed from with 'I-sight'. When you look from a different perspective... poof! they all disappear. I find that absolutely fascinating!

I'm pretty convinced that the issue of free will is not really an issue of 'freedom' but rather an issue of 'will'. What philosophy is really trying to get it's mind around is to explain what in heck 'will' can be assuming determinism (or something like it) to be true.

What I see all the time are people going back and forth from one viewpoint (an objective view) to the other (an 'I'-oriented view), totally unaware that they are doing so. Being quite frank and forthright, it's probably a pretty good bet that just about every post I make on this website has this in mind in some way or another and that what I am really trying to do is make others aware of it. What I see as the main obstacle is an entrenched belief in truth as an absolute. Such truth might exist but even if it does, and even if we possess it, we cannot 'validate' it, as validation, by definition, requires validating against something and with the means and measures at our disposal--all of which are 'I-oriented'.

Phil

[Wabitfwee]

Is it possible for a universe that is deterministic or random as in quantum mechanics? to give rise to something like our consciousness that in turn can be free and itself affect the motions of particles
Nope. 'Course that's no universe I conceive. Awareness is. The future gives rise to the present and the past gives it a bit of durability. We are guiding the sleigh. Some parts of the forest are scary though so I try to drive fast there.

[Philo_66]

So there might not be a such thing as a "snapshot" of the universe at a given time.
I'm pretty sure from our understanding of space-time there isn't. In simple terms--just as nothing exists in zero space, nothing exists in zero time. Everything we know about the universe is dependent upon passage of time. Even if the principles we have don't involve time as a variable, we discover them through processes that involve time.

At the quantum level, our human notion of "causality" becomes very shaky indeed!
Exactly! But as soon as you say QM and free will in the same sentence peple will think you are trying to use QM indeterminism to directly explain free will. Whenever I make this argument, that's the response I get. What most people seem to simply miss is that we really don't know what the hell 'causality' really is and it's a rather curious sort of application of logic to make firm conclusions from such nebulous premises.

Phil

[Philo_66]

But there is no scientific explanation/idea/speculation for how consciousness comes about is there? By that I mean the mechanism. A computer can execute a lot of complicated instruction, but there is no self in the computer, why is there a self in us? What is it? How does it get made?
How do you know there is no 'self' in the computer? What experiment could you do, and what outcome would you expect, that would empirically prove the computer has no 'self'?

IOW, based upon the actions alone and without assuming the computer has no 'self', how could you tell?

Phil

[cpollett]

But there is no scientific explanation/idea/speculation for how consciousness comes about is there? By that I mean the mechanism.
I disagree. There are lots of suggested scientific explanations/ideas/and speculations about where consciousness comes from. You can see some of these in the books of Koch, Ramachandran, D'Amasio, Crick, Hobson, Minsky, Dennett, etc. Since the dictionary definition of consciousness is somewhat imprecise, they might each seek to explain a different aspects of it.


A computer can execute a lot of complicated instruction, but there is no self in the computer, why is there a self in us? What is it? How does it get made?

Actually, computers can execute a small set of simple instructions. Nevertheless, by constructing sequences of these simple instructions cleverly, we can develop quite complicated programs, such as very sophisticated video games.

A computer can be made to simulate a neuron and be made to simulate a group of neurons in concert. We don't yet all of how the brain works, but with time I will imagine we will be better and better able to simulate it.
As an example look at the e-cell (http://www.e-cell.org/software/e-cell-system) project. There are those like Churchland that argue in the style of Pour-El and Richards that there are classical processes which are uncomputable . They say maybe neurons use such a process. To me this is bogus because the source of uncomputabilty is largely from the initial conditions.

[TheMathGuy]

I would like to add here that just because "ultimate knowledge" is probably not attainable by us, there's no reason not to pursue knowledge as best we can. Suppose for example I was trying to make up my mind as to whether I wanted to buy tickets for the upcoming football game, when someone tells me that the game is sold out. Well, that's very useful information to know! Now that I know a certain option isn't availible to me, I can make a more informed use of my will. An example that raises deeper issues is the following: Suppose a person grows up feeling frustrated because he starts a lot of things but never finishes them. He's easily distracted, loses things, often forgets what people just said to him, and can't seem to stay focused on the things he knows he needs to get done. Let's now suppose this person seeks professional help and is diagnosed with attention deficit disorder. He gains the knowledge that while he thought he had a choice in the matter, he really didn't, and hence his frustration with himself. Moreover he discovers that stimulant medication changes the state of his brain enough so that now he really does have the choice, where before he merely thought he did, but didn't. Incidentally, this person is not so hypothetical, because it is myself. It is also millions of other people. Now imagine what might have happened if AD/HD had never been discovered. Then myself and millions of other people would still be frustrated because they believed they had a choice when they didn't. This then is why I think it is best to take a realistic approach, and not be overly fatalistic nor overly optimistic. Of course, realism requires accurate knowledge, and honesty in admitting that one is uncertain about some things. So while it's fun for me to discuss "free will" in the abstract, metaphysical sense, to be honest I really don't know if the universe is ultimately deterministic or not. For that matter I don't even know if our perceptions of causality, time, space, matter, energy, ect. are universal laws of the universe--in fact it would seem that they are not! If someone insists they know that the universe is ultimately deterministic, I would love to hear them try to explain how they know this fact! The same goes for anyone who would insist they know that the universe is not ultimately deterministic.

[Philo_66]

I disagree. There are lots of suggested scientific explanations/ideas/and speculations about where consciousness comes from. You can see some of these in the books of Koch, Ramachandran, D'Amasio, Crick, Hobson, Minsky, Dennett, etc. Since the dictionary definition of consciousness is somewhat imprecise, they might each seek to explain a different aspects of it.
I read Dennett's "Consciousness Explained". Don't get me wrong, it's a good book, but a better title would be "Consciousness Unexplained" as that's where I think we're really at. It's good though in that it gets you thinking about what our minds can and cannot do and possible ways to explain how consciousness might work.


Actually, computers can execute a small se t of simple instructions. Nevertheless, by constructing sequences of these simple instructions cleverly, we can develop quite complicated programs, such as very sophisticated video games.

A computer can be made to simulate a neuron and be made to simulate a group of neurons in concert. We don't yet all of how the brain works, but with time I will imagine we will be better and better able to simulate it.
As an example look at the e-cell (http://www.e-cell.org/software/e-cell-system) project. There are those like Churchland that argue in the style of Pour-El and Richards that there are classical processes which are uncomputable . They say maybe neurons use such a process. To me this is bogus because the source of uncomputabilty is largely from the initial conditions.
I have a hunch that we will be able to simulate the mind better then we can understand it. I also expect that we're not too far off from some major breakthroughs on this. But maybe not. The real problem just may be economic as well as technical.

The biggest hurdle, I think, is in the hardware. The way computers work is pretty much the opposite of the way the mind works in that computers are typically a single CPU that runs several programs simultaneously. The mind, OTOH, is a highly parallelized computer that emulates a single program we call consciousness. (This is an idea from Dennett and I think he's right.) So to simulate a mind what we need is not a super-complex CPU, but rather 100 billion relatively simple 'neuron emulators' that have the capability of dynamiclly reconfiguring their interconnectedness. But maybe the 'neuron emulator' isn't so simple. Surely if it takes a 3.0 GHz CPU and GB of RAM to do it, it's going to be really, really expensive to gang 100 billion of these together.

And then what would we have? We'd have a machine that works somewhat heuristically, sometimes right, sometimes wrong. It'd think it exists for its own purpose and develop its own interests. It would demand respect, and maybe even get downright ornery. We'd tell it to do the payroll and instead it would surf the internet and play games, maybe IM fellow computers. So why would anyone invest billions of dollars in developing something like that? IOW, what's the big payoff? (Where's the economic incentive?)

Phil

[Philo_66]

I would like to add here that just because "ultimate knowledge" is probably not attainable by us, there's no reason not to pursue knowledge as best we can.
Define "as best we can". What makes one concept 'better' than another? How do we decide the one and only 'best' concept? It's a nice thought but in practice it doesn't work because 'best' is always relative to some intended goal. If e=mc^2 is so damned good, then why isn't it used instead of f=ma for all applications?

The fact is that 'good enough and simple/inexpensive' is often much better than 'highly accurate but difficult and costly.

Phil

[kennethamy]

I would like to add here that just because "ultimate knowledge" is probably not attainable by us, there's no reason not to pursue knowledge as best we can. .

Could you please say how we could tell whether we had reached or not reached, ultimate knowledge? Unless you can then, after all, for all you know, you have already attained ultimate knowledge, and, unfortunately, don't know that you have. What a predicament that would be! It would be like that story of someone looking for happiness, and, what do you know, it was there, all along, in her backyard! The story is, I think, called, "The Bluebird".

[open-ended answer]

Could you please say how we could tell whether we had reached or not reached, ultimate knowledge? Unless you can then, after all, for all you know, you have already attained ultimate knowledge, and, unfortunately, don't know that you have. What a predicament that would be! It would be like that story of someone looking for happiness, and, what do you know, it was there, all along, in her backyard! The story is, I think, called, "The Bluebird".

Wouldn't ultimate knowledge include the knowledge of what ultimate knowledge was? IOW, if you got it you know it.

[kennethamy]

Wouldn't ultimate knowledge include the knowledge of what ultimate knowledge was? IOW, if you got it you know it.

No idea, since I don't know what ultimate knowledge is. Ultimate knowledge of what? Everything? Have you any idea what that means?

[Philo_66]

Wouldn't ultimate knowledge include the knowledge of what ultimate knowledge was? IOW, if you got it you know it.
You mean you've never met anyone who possesses ultimate knowledge and was more than happy to tell you what it is?

[kennethamy]

You mean you've never met anyone who possesses ultimate knowledge and was more than happy to tell you what it is?

I may have, but I doubt it. However, I have (maybe) met those who told me that they thought they had ultimate knowledge of something or other. But I must admit I have never met anyone who told me he thought he had ultimate knowledge of anything. Maybe he knew what sort of look he would get from me, so he did not try it.
How many people have you met who announced that they had ultimate knowledge of anything, let alone, of everything. Anyone?