Free will -- a beginners look [Archive I]

dongiovanni1976x

September 8, 2006, 11:17 AM

Why would someone even think that his or her future has already been determined anyway?
You are right to assume that the to assume that there is a difference but there are more than two positions on this subject. Determinists can be either hard or soft and indeterminists can be compatiblists or incompatibalists. But without getting into all of that let me address the question you asked about why anyone think their future has already been determined.

It is not so much that a person believes that some “being” or another has mapped out everything that each person will do, as much as it is that a (HARD) determinist believes that since every event has a prior cause and every prior cause has a cause that precedes it then everything I choose to do as a human being, even if it “feels” like I made the choice, I was really reacting to some prior event that “caused” me to act in such a way.

Science is in the business of making predictions and then testing those predictions with experiments that are set up in such a way that the variables are as similar as can be so that any differing results in the outcomes of these experiment can be attributable to whatever variable was not “constant”. The problem with scientifically predicting human behavior is that it is impossible to set up every single variable exactly the same and ask a person to choose between Coke or Pepsi and hope to get the same results each time. As a result the field of neuroscience and predicting human behavior is still in its infancy.

The evidence for indeterminism is that the same individual can make different choices under “similar” circumstances and there is a subjective bias towards believing that we have control over our conscious actions.

The evidence for determinism is the physical and social sciences have made successful predictions of human actions, the subjective feeling of freedom has been demonstrated to be illusory under hypnosis and EEG’s can detect brain activity 500 milliseconds prior to an action whereas conscious decisions for such an action are detected at a quarter of a second before the act- hence the feeling of choice occurs AFTER the action is set in place).

The best way to see the logic behind determinism is to look at Leplace’s Demon. Leplace suggested that if we imagine a being with unlimited knowledge (i.e. it knew the location, movement, trajectory, mass etc of every atom in existence at any given moment) and that this being had an unlimited ability to compute all this information, then it could predict exactly what would happen and what has happened in both direction of time (past and present) by calculating accordingly. This demon could analyze every neural connection in your brain, every memory and thought you have ever accumulated and everything you have and will encounter and induce your thoughts and actions in precise detail- thus, though you “feel” as though you are making choices, you are really reacting to a complex array of environmental and biological forces not under your control.

Philo_66

September 8, 2006, 02:14 PM

I’m new to the “Free will” and “determinism” debate. In fact, I’m so new to it that I don’t even know if they mean the same thing or not. At first glance, I would think that I have free will (am free to decide what I will) and thus believe that I determine my fate by my actions. Does this mean that I believe in free will? What does this infer that I believe in regards to determinism? That I believe in or not believe in determinism? I’m guessing that I believe in indeterminism since I believe that what I will do is not determined by some mystical force, but I just want to make sure that I am saying it correctly, for it could be that it means something else.

Here’s what I think: though I believe that whatever will happen will happen, I do not believe that what will happen has already been determined. In other words, either I will (or will not) do tomorrow what it is I will (or will not) do, but what I will (or will not) do tomorrow has not been dictated by an invisible force.

Why would someone even think that his or her future has already been determined anyway?
'Free will' and 'determinism' are actually more or less opposites. I think the term 'determinism' originally was taken to simply imply 'no free will'. The idea is quite literally that choices are not made by us, but rather are made for us, ie, are 'determined' by laws of nature. I have encountered one person on a website who held to this belief and was trying to develop a philosophy based on it. (The only person I know of.) IMO, though, this approach is way too simplistic. Most people, even those who consider themselves determinists, do not take quite that 'hard' of a position.

'Incompatiblism' implies belief that determinism and free will cannot be compatible. There are two variations on this. One is the belief that free will is 'libertarian' or 'contra-causal' in that it defies cause and effect. 'Libertarianists' deny determinism (especially when 'determinism' is considered in its original meaning.) The other variation is the belief that since determinism is true, there cannot be free will ('hard' determinism).

'Compatabilism' implies belief that determinism and free will can be compatible. This is sometimes called 'soft' determinism.

The inevitable problem is this. If everything is determined for us, then how do we justify morality? It's a pretty fascinating paradox. My answer is simple. If we make no choices, then nothing is wrong, not even the 'unjustified morality' we impose on one another. Ok, so my answer isn't so simple. What I mean is that I can simply dismiss the idea that we make no choices. I could be wrong, but if I am wrong there are no moral implications, so there's no point in worrying about it.

I would recommend Daniel Dennett's "Elbow Room" as a good book. It's relatively short and Dennett addresses the issues pretty well I think.

Phil

Philo_66

September 8, 2006, 02:29 PM

The best way to see the logic behind determinism is to look at Leplace’s Demon. Leplace suggested that if we imagine a being with unlimited knowledge (i.e. it knew the location, movement, trajectory, mass etc of every atom in existence at any given moment) and that this being had an unlimited ability to compute all this information, then it could predict exactly what would happen and what has happened in both direction of time (past and present) by calculating accordingly. This demon could analyze every neural connection in your brain, every memory and thought you have ever accumulated and everything you have and will encounter and induce your thoughts and actions in precise detail- thus, though you “feel” as though you are making choices, you are really reacting to a complex array of environmental and biological forces not under your control.

Leplace's Demon is a pure hypothetical. Pure hypotheticals are always true so you can claim anything. The reason is because the premise is false, thus regardless of the conclusion, the statement remains true. ("If <false premise>, then <anything you like>" is always a true statement.) The demon is a false premise because no such demon could exist.

The closest thing to such a demon is the universe itself which is constantly calculating it's next moves. And the universe does not give up its secrets without the passage of time. We can only partially predict the future as we can only partially abstract and understand the universe.

Determinism is unprovable.

Phil

dongiovanni1976x

September 8, 2006, 03:57 PM

Leplace's Demon is a pure hypothetical. Pure hypotheticals are always true so you can claim anything. The reason is because the premise is false, thus regardless of the conclusion, the statement remains true. ("If <false premise>, then <anything you like>" is always a true statement.)

Validity has to do with an arguments form whereas soundness has to do with the truth or falsity of the premises posited in the argument itself. You cannot make a conditional argument (i.e. an IF/THEN) about "anything" and conclude unequivocably that it will be valid prima facie, whereas Leplace's Demon argument itself is a valid argument- i.e. meaning its form. The soundness of the argument is in quetion because we have no proof of such a demon- so in this since you are correct. Although some people do in fact beleive that there is such a being (usually called God, Yahweh or Allah or what have you) but I am not debating the existence of this being...but merely demonstrating that: given what we know about physics the only escape clause for an indeterminist is an appeal to the randomness of Quantum Mechanics by asserting that we do not know the cause of every effect (if for no other reason than by examining something we affect the cause in which we are inquiring into...Whereas the field of neuroscience is encroaching further and further into derailing the idea of free will each and everyday.

trip

September 8, 2006, 04:54 PM

Philo_66

September 8, 2006, 05:22 PM

Validity has to do with an arguments form whereas soundness has to do with the truth or falsity of the premises posited in the argument itself. You cannot make a conditional argument (i.e. an IF/THEN) about "anything" and conclude unequivocably that it will be valid prima facie, whereas Leplace's Demon argument itself is a valid argument- i.e. meaning its form. The soundness of the argument is in quetion because we have no proof of such a demon- so in this since you are correct. Although some people do in fact beleive that there is such a being (usually called God, Yahweh or Allah or what have you) but I am not debating the existence of this being...

You're missing an important point here. The point is that we have absolutely no way to verify it's validity and that's why you can claim it's valid, because no one can prove you wrong. I'm just saying, sure, it's valid--but it's useless. It demonstrates nothing.

but merely demonstrating that: given what we know about physics the only escape clause for an indeterminist is an appeal to the randomness of Quantum Mechanics by asserting that we do not know the cause of every effect (if for no other reason than by examining something we affect the cause in which we are inquiring into...
You mean the only 'escape clause' you can think of. There may be others we have not yet thought of. But notice I did not claim that QM proves indeterminism. I claimed determinism (and hence indeterminism) is unprovable.

Whereas the field of neuroscience is encroaching further and further into derailing the idea of free will each and everyday.
Neuroscience will add to the understanding, sure. It won't prove or disprove determinism. Not until we get that demon that can analyze every neuron in our brains, and do so in real time as the neurons are constantly reconfiguring themselves into new patterns. Then we could see if we can 'fool' the demon and prove free will. I think the lack of sound logic will leave the problem unsolved.

Phil

kennethamy

September 8, 2006, 05:24 PM

Here’s what I think: though I believe that whatever will happen will happen, I do not believe that what will happen has already been determined. In other words, either I will (or will not) do tomorrow what it is I will (or will not) do, but what I will (or will not) do tomorrow has not been dictated by an invisible force.

Why would someone even think that his or her future has already been determined anyway?

But everyone believes that whatever will happen will happen. Or should, since that is a tautology, like every dog is a dog, or every salamander is a salamander. Who doesn't believe that?

But not everyone believes that whatever will happen will inevitably happen, and that no one can possibly do anything about it. In fact, I believe that it is false that whatever happens will inevitably happen whatever anyone does. For instance, suppose my college instructor informs me at the start of the term that my grade depends on my turning in a term paper, and that unless I turn in a term paper, I will fail. No excuses accepted.

But, I (like you) say to myself, "whatever will happen will happen" so, I will either pass this course or I will fail this course. Therefore, what is the point of bothering to write and to hand in a term paper, since it will make no difference what I do.

My mistake is to infer from the trivial truism, whatever will happen will happen, which I like you believe is true without doubt, that whatever will happen will inevitably happen (meaning that what I do will have no effect on what happens) So, making this mistake, I do not turn in my term paper, and guess what. I fail the course. Surprise!?

But from reading what you say, I don't know whether you agree or not. You say, on the one hand, that you believe that whatever will happen will happen, but that you do not believe that the future is determined.

I think that some people believe that the future is determined by the past because they believe that everything that happens at some one moment in time, (T1) is completely the effect of a chain of causes extending into the past, so that, as the French mathematician and astronomer, Pierre La Place, wrote:

"We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes."

trip

September 8, 2006, 05:25 PM

I think you mean we have no way to verify its soundness. It's validity could be easily proven.

kennethamy

September 8, 2006, 05:30 PM

Sorry for talking about La Place as if I hadn't read the rest of the thread. I hadn't. Laziness on my part. Still, I presented the passage from La Place, and maybe that's a contribution.

fast

September 8, 2006, 06:23 PM

But from reading what you say, I don't know whether you agree or not. You say, on the one hand, that you believe that whatever will happen will happen, but that you do not believe that the future is determined.When I say that I agree that whatever will happen will happen, I’m trying to make the point that I’m not denying the fact that it has to be true since it’s a tautology. The proposition “everything that will happen will happen” is true, and I want you and everyone else to know that I too believe that the proposition is true.

kennethamy]But everyone believes that whatever will happen will happen. Or should, since that is a tautology, like every dog is a dog, or every salamander is a salamander. Who doesn't believe that? I don’t know who doesn’t believe it, but if it’s the case that someone does, I do not agree with him.

But not everyone believes that whatever will happen will inevitably happen, and that no one can possibly do anything about it. In fact, I believe that it is false that whatever happens will inevitably happen whatever anyone does. For instance, suppose my college instructor informs me at the start of the term that my grade depends on my turning in a term paper, and that unless I turn in a term paper, I will fail. No excuses accepted. I do believe, however, that whatever will happen will inevitably happen, but I believe this because I think they mean the same thing. To me, what you just said is no different than saying, “whatever will inevitably happen will inevitably happen”—just another tautology.

Of course, it seems to me that you want me to take “will happen” to mean something other than “will inevitably happen”. Despite the fact that I think they mean the same thing, I do understand the distinction that you’re trying to make.

But, I (like you) say to myself, "whatever will happen will happen" so, I will either pass this course or I will fail this course. Therefore, what is the point of bothering to write and to hand in a term paper, since it will make no difference what I do. I don’t infer the “therefore” part.

Yes, I may say to myself “whatever will happen will happen”, and yes, I will either pass or fail the course, but I believe that I better bother writing the paper to hand in, for if I don’t, I will fail; failing will not change the fact, however, that whatever will have happened will have happened.

I believe in cause and effect, but I think the cause of my writing the paper is not a predestined event—it’s volitional. I had the choice to write the paper. There was no cause and effect that saw to it that I would write it—at least not in the same way as dropping a ball in the water will cause ripples. I understand that a decision by faculty to impose certain requirements would effect future students, but I don’t think that students will therefore and for certain write them—people have the choice, and some won’t write ‘em—perhaps that’s what you meant by “inevitably”.

My mistake is to infer from the trivial truism, whatever will happen will happen, which I like you believe is true without doubt, that whatever will happen will inevitably happen (meaning that what I do will have no effect on what happens) So, making this mistake, I do not turn in my term paper, and guess what. I fail the course. Surprise!? You’re throwing me a little bit with the “Trivial truism” part, but I think I know what you’re saying. A tautology is true, and since it’s true by definition, it’s therefore trivially true and thus a trivial truism. I think I got that right.

You admit that it’s a mistake to infer from the tautology, “whatever will happen” to “I don’t have worry about writing and handing in a paper”, and I’m glad you do; I agree that it’s a mistake. In fact, that’s what I meant when I said earlier that I don’t infer the therefore.

I think that some people believe that the future is determined by the past because they believe that everything that happens at some one moment in time, (T1) is completely the effect of a chain of causes extending into the past, so that, as the French mathematician and astronomer, Pierre La Place, wrote:That’s silly.

What may I ask are the terms to describe the different positions? Which do you identify with, for example? And Pierre? I ask in terms of free will and determinism. I think “free will” seems pretty self explanatory. Since I believe that I affect my destiny, then I believe in free will—I hope that’s correct. In terms of determinism, I’m not so sure which way to properly say it.

Kingreaper

September 8, 2006, 06:35 PM

There are three main types of free will

Non-fatalistic free will: Your decisions are not determined by a fate (or omnipotent omniscient deity, the two are essentially identical) Almost everyone accepts this

Non-controled free will: Your decisions are your decisions. You will never choose something you would never choose. this is an odd one, and seems to be only used for obsfucation in debates.

Non-deterministic, non-random free will: Your decisions couldn't be predicted even if someone knew everything about you, and everything about your environment. But your decisions still aren't random. As far as I can tell this one doesn't even make sense.

There's also a rarely used form I call "Soul-based free will" this says that if you knew everything about the physical world and every person in it (even their souls) before a person is conceived, you cannot predict their future actions, as their soul is a determining factor, but determinism still applies.

sweetiepie

September 8, 2006, 06:40 PM

Ahh, my neophyte, fast. It's so nice to discourse with a simpleton from time to time.
First and foremost, forget the words "free will". It's undefined rubbish.

Determism is what we're really interested in, that's the word that has a definition, that's what you have to believe or not believe in. Let the person who listens to you decide whether or not you believe in the bs known as 'free will'.

Now that takes care of the first half of your beginner woes. On to the next bit.
I determine my fate by my actions. What does this infer that I believe in regards to determinism? That I believe in or not believe in determinism?
Determinism says your actions have a cause. In this case you are ascribing yourself as the cause of your actions. Determinism is cool with that.

Here’s what I think: though I believe that whatever will happen will happen, I do not believe that what will happen has already been determined.
Determinism is 'whatever will happen will happen', so the above statement suggests that you, young padawan, need to reread teh definition of determinism.

In other words, either I will (or will not) do tomorrow what it is I will (or will not) do, but what I will (or will not) do tomorrow has not been dictated by an invisible force.
The forces determinism considers are plainly visible. Cause and effect.

Why would someone even think that his or her future has already been determined anyway?
Because, my newbish friend, people are painfully predictable.

Kingreaper

September 8, 2006, 06:45 PM

The inevitable problem is this. If everything is determined for us, then how do we justify morality? It's a pretty fascinating paradox. My answer is simple. If we make no choices, then nothing is wrong, not even the 'unjustified morality' we impose on one another. Ok, so my answer isn't so simple. What I mean is that I can simply dismiss the idea that we make no choices. I could be wrong, but if I am wrong there are no moral implications, so there's no point in worrying about it.

Justifying morality is no different with or without free will. It's not really possible to justify your primary moral principles (if it is possible, they aren't your primary principles, what you justify them with is closer, generally the primary principle is to increase happiness and decrease suffering,, especialy in the self.)

The thing that you seem to be referring to is The Immorality of Deterministic Punishment argument. I deal with that thusly:

If determinism is true, then the existence of punishments can serve to deter crime in the future (as the future actions of people are determined by the present state of the world) and thus serves to decrease suffering in the long run; if it is not true then punishment doesn't serve to deter crime because the future actions are not dependent on the present world. Also, if determinism is true, then a person who commits a crime wil likely do so because they are the sort of person likely to commit crimes (and some would say thus deserve to be punished) whereas if freewill is non-deterministic then they did it because they did. Not because they desired to (that is a cause, causes don't matter in non-determinist free-will) just because they did, why then should they be punished?

Kingreaper

September 8, 2006, 06:50 PM

Kingreaper

September 8, 2006, 06:57 PM

But not everyone believes that whatever will happen will inevitably happen, and that no one can possibly do anything about it. In fact, I believe that it is false that whatever happens will inevitably happen whatever anyone does.
Even a determinist doesn't need to believe that. Only a fatalist does.

For a determinist the solution is that it will happen, because there is only one set of things that people will do, not that it would still happen if they acted differently.
For instance, suppose my college instructor informs me at the start of the term that my grade depends on my turning in a term paper, and that unless I turn in a term paper, I will fail. No excuses accepted.

But, I (like you) say to myself, "whatever will happen will happen" so, I will either pass this course or I will fail this course. Therefore, what is the point of bothering to write and to hand in a term paper, since it will make no difference what I do.
In fact what you do will be the cause of what happens (unlike in a non-deterministic realm in which case whether you were passed or failed wouold be undetermined, due entirely to the professor's free will) The fact that what you do is in turn caused by your beliefs and environment doesn't affect that what you do has effects.

My mistake is to infer from the trivial truism, whatever will happen will happen, which I like you believe is true without doubt, that whatever will happen will inevitably happen (meaning that what I do will have no effect on what happens) So, making this mistake, I do not turn in my term paper, and guess what. I fail the course. Surprise!?
No, for we are in a deterministic realm. Were our realm non-deterministic it would be a surprise, as the Professor's decision whether to pass you or not would be free, and unconstrained by whether or not he had recieved a paper from you.

Philo_66

September 8, 2006, 07:03 PM

I think you mean we have no way to verify its soundness. It's validity could be easily proven.

Wouldn't valid imply that the conclusion must follow if the premise is true? I'm saying that there's no way to prove that because the premise is never true. IOW, I meant what I said. We can't prove it's validity. (Instead of saying "Sure it's valid, but it's useless", I should have said "Even if it's valid, it's useless".)

And it does seem important to me because accepting this 'definition' of determinism is not demonstrated.

Phil

open-ended answer

September 8, 2006, 07:41 PM

The main reason for the schism between the opposing views of "free-will"(s) and _determinism(s) is our starting view of ourselves and our relation to the rest of existence.

The one view is to see ourselves as merely a part of the universe and merely unfolding and acting to all it's laws according to the laws of action-reaction. The problem with this is firstly the question of infinite regress vs. initial action- in this case either all actions are also reactions to previous actions or there is an initial "action" that is not a reaction. The initial "action" then defies the law that all actions are reactions- there is no way to substantiate such a determinism, because it only begs the question... if all things are determined, what determines them, and then what determines that? What is the final answer...

The concept of free will draws attack because it is impossible to understand it's mechanism. It also draws a close proximity to other manifests of the human psyche and causes friction, dilemnas between various commanders. There is our conflicting desires (to satiate a physical appetite, fulfill a moral duty, "save face" and make a good name for ourselves, etc.) which beg a decision from the mind- even if we stand and do nothing it is still a choice to do that, but it is certainly not a conscious choice to get involved in this situation in the first place. If our wills are free at all they are still bounded by the world around us, as our power does not suffice accomplish and experience the life we really want. Que sera, sera... this applies to the world outside our own power and will, not to us. In this view the outer existence of things and our own lives and wills is painfully distinguished.

Kingreaper

September 8, 2006, 07:52 PM

The main reason for the schism between the opposing views of "free-will"(s) and _determinism(s) is our starting view of ourselves and our relation to the rest of existence.

The one view is to see ourselves as merely a part of the universe and merely unfolding and acting to all it's laws according to the laws of action-reaction. The problem with this is firstly the question of infinite regress vs. initial action- in this case either all actions are also reactions to previous actions or there is an initial "action" that is not a reaction. The initial "action" then defies the law that all actions are reactions- there is no way to substantiate such a determinism, because it only begs the question... if all things are determined, what determines them, and then what determines that? What is the final answer... If there is a final answer then it itself poses a question.

Thus there can be no final answer.

This is also true with non-deterministic worlds, but in a lot more fragmented a way.

The concept of free will draws attack because it is impossible to understand it's mechanism. It also draws a close proximity to other manifests of the human psyche and causes friction, dilemnas between various commanders. There is our conflicting desires (to satiate a physical appetite, fulfill a moral duty, "save face" and make a good name for ourselves, etc.) which beg a decision from the mind- even if we stand and do nothing it is still a choice to do that, but it is certainly not a conscious choice to get involved in this situation in the first place. If our wills are free at all they are still bounded by the world around us, as our power does not suffice accomplish and experience the life we really want. Que sera, sera... this applies to the world outside our own power and will, not to us. In this view the outer existence of things and our own lives and wills is painfully distinguished.

But the fact that the desires are determined by the world leads to it being the case that if the decision is determined by the desires, it is determined by the world, and if it is not determined by the desires, then free will means being incapable of doing what you want, the precise opposite of what it is claimed to mean.

fast

September 8, 2006, 08:23 PM

Ahh, my neophyte, fast. It's so nice to discourse with a simpleton from time to time. [...] Now that takes care of the first half of your beginner woes. [...] Determinism is 'whatever will happen will happen', so the above statement suggests that you, young padawan, need to reread teh definition of determinism. [...] Because, my newbish friend, people are painfully predictable. :blush: I think you like me :love:

I would have said that I think you must like me, but Ken is really picky with that word. Why must it be that you would come to like me he would ask?

Anyhoots, I think you're either trying to get back at me for being pretentious in the past, or you just have a liking for my incredible and envious improvements. Either way, it’s all in good fun.

Gotta admit though--I've been improving, though not with false dichotomies as you just witnessed. I'm still not as clear as I need to be, but I have the wherewithal to know that I need to be, and I'm getting better. Are you getting better?

I still pout with frustration like so many others do when they get caught up in their own contradictions, but I do it much less often now. Do you ever walk away with a frown after being called on an absurd remark that you may have made? Or, do you learn from it?

I don't always use good arguments to back up what I say, but then again, at least that's an improvement from when I didn't use any at all. How often would you say that you even try? I haven’t quite gotten it all together yet as to what I’m supposed to be doing, but I know that I need to give good solid reasons to think the things I do if I’m going to use them in an argument.

I used to think that certain things were true (when in fact they were not true), but instead of holding onto those things like a spoiled brat, I let go and became better for it. Have you changed your mind on any positions lately? Or, have you gotten it all figured out?

Though I may scramble to hold my own in an argument, I do walk away with a different point of view; I try to keep an open mind, but not so open that I allow the sensible things that I have learned to leave me. What have you improved on? Just not that much room for improvement for the non-simpleton’s?

Let's see, what else; oh yes, I use spell check a lot--might wanna try it. :)

kennethamy

September 8, 2006, 11:07 PM

Even a determinist doesn't need to believe that. Only a fatalist does.

For a determinist the solution is that it will happen, because there is only one set of things that people will do, not that it would still happen if they acted differently.
In fact what you do will be the cause of what happens (unlike in a non-deterministic realm in which case whether you were passed or failed wouold be undetermined, due entirely to the professor's free will) The fact that what you do is in turn caused by your beliefs and environment doesn't affect that what you do has effects.

No, for we are in a deterministic realm. Were our realm non-deterministic it would be a surprise, as the Professor's decision whether to pass you or not would be free, and unconstrained by whether or not he had recieved a paper from you.

I agree with the spirit (if not the letter) of your post. We need to distinguish carefully between determinism and fatalism. Fatalism is the view that whatever happen will inevitably happen whatever anyone does. And that is clearly false, as my term paper example shows. Determinism is the view that every event has a cause which is sufficient to bring about that event, but that, unlike, fatalism, what we do will be part of the cause of what happens (at least sometimes). In fact, if determinism is true, then fatalism is false, since fatalism denies that what human beings do makes any difference to what will happen. So fatalism and determinism are incompatible views.

sweetiepie

September 9, 2006, 10:34 AM

Of course I like you, but I miss your pretentiousness. What do we, as philosophers have, besides pretentiousness? It is our best rhetoric. It is our authority. Do you think Plato is still talked about today because he was humble? Do you think Confuscious became The eastern philosopher by admitting he was wrong? Have you read any Poststructuralism? Postmodernism? No, because it is not written to be understood by small minds.

I don't play this game to lose. I know that if I show any sign of weakness, if I bend at all, then it's over. So, no, I haven't noticed my false dichotomies, because I never make any. I never walk away with a frown because I never make any absurd remarks. And I never learn anything, because I already know it all.

I do improve though. I become stronger. I sharpen my mind on the arguments of my foes. I polish my rhetoric until I can make people understand how I am right.

And I do open my mind. Not to things I could be wrong about (because I am never wrong about anything) but to things I could be right about. I can't say I've gotten any better but I hope, at least, I still have a few more new ideas in me.

Philosophy is a show of feathers. The one who learns is the one who has lost. And I fear maybe you have lost-- or worse: slowed.

With kindest regards, I am and remain,

Sweet

PS: Spell check? Sweetiepies have no need for spell check. Everyone knows what we are saying whether we spell it right or ont.

Philo_66

September 9, 2006, 11:01 AM

Justifying morality is no different with or without free will.
Really depends on what we mean by 'morality' and 'free will', don't you think?

It's not really possible to justify your primary moral principles (if it is possible, they aren't your primary principles, what you justify them with is closer, generally the primary principle is to increase happiness and decrease suffering,, especialy in the self.)
I'm not sure what you're saying here. Are the 'primary moral principles' justified by the pleasure-pain principle (PPP)? Or are you just saying that PPP is the primary moral principle?

Whatever the primary moral principles are, do you think one can change his/her primary moral principles? Are they absolute, objective, universal? Or are they subjective and possible vary from individual to individual?

The thing that you seem to be referring to is The Immorality of Deterministic Punishment argument. I deal with that thusly:
I haven't seen that title before, but I think we're talking about the same thing.

If determinism is true, then the existence of punishments can serve to deter crime in the future (as the future actions of people are determined by the present state of the world) and thus serves to decrease suffering in the long run; if it is not true then punishment doesn't serve to deter crime because the future actions are not dependent on the present world. Also, if determinism is true, then a person who commits a crime wil likely do so because they are the sort of person likely to commit crimes (and some would say thus deserve to be punished) whereas if freewill is non-deterministic then they did it because they did. Not because they desired to (that is a cause, causes don't matter in non-determinist free-will) just because they did, why then should they be punished?
I was following until that last statement "why then should they be punished?" This looks like you might be arguing that punishment is not justified.

The fact that punishment can serve to reduce crime seems a valid justification for punishment. A hard deterministic might argue that that is fine, as long as it's not 'retributive' punishment. IOW, we may be justified in producing better outcomes, but we are not justified in a 'moral condemnation' of anyone because, after all, they only did what was determined--they could not do otherwise.

Two problems remain, however. One, if indeed no one can ever do other then what the past and present conditions determine, what makes anyone think they can change that? Two, how do we justify wanting this better outcome in the first place?

IMO punishment is justified. I agree basically with the argument you are making (if I understand it as an argument justifying punishment). I also think improvements to our justice system can be made if we understood its intentions more as 'crime prevention' and less as 'justice'.

Still, to understand this system requires us to see ourselves as 'agents' that 'make choices' (ie, we need to assume 'intention'). It remains a mystery where intention comes from. The only thing that makes sense to me is to say that it is a useful mental abstraction and that it is not provable nor disprovable.

Phil

sweetiepie

September 9, 2006, 11:18 AM

I thought you were just posing new to start an interesting thread but now I'm less sure. If you want, I can give you a run down of all the right answers and what each answer implies.
:)

Philo_66

September 9, 2006, 11:20 AM

The demon's simulation would BE the universe, or rather another instance of the universe. That is the point of the thought experiment is it not?
Yeah, that pretty much sums up the problem with it. 'Universe' implies everything, so the demon would have to be a part of everything. But how can something that is only a part of everything effectly be everything?

It might seem nit-picking on my part to be so critical of what we all understand is just a hypothetical, but my criticism has a deeper intention to it. I'm trying to point out that the way we envision this notion of 'determinism' is itself flawed. Things that cannot be defined in verifiable ways are necessarily vague. They are vague because we do not have real empirical things we can relate them to. (If we did we could verify them.)

As is the law of non-contradiction. We use it because any other option is absurd, not because it is proven.
Good point. It's an abstraction we find useful within a philosophical system we use.

Phil

kennethamy

September 9, 2006, 12:56 PM

When I say that I agree that whatever will happen will happen, I’m trying to make the point that I’m not denying the fact that it has to be true since it’s a tautology. The proposition “everything that will happen will happen” is true, and I want you and everyone else to know that I too believe that the proposition is true.

I don’t know who doesn’t believe it, but if it’s the case that someone does, I do not agree with him.

I do believe, however, that whatever will happen will inevitably happen, but I believe this because I think they mean the same thing. To me, what you just said is no different than saying, “whatever will inevitably happen will inevitably happen”—just another tautology.

Of course, it seems to me that you want me to take “will happen” to mean something other than “will inevitably happen”. Despite the fact that I think they mean the same thing, I do understand the distinction that you’re trying to make.

I don’t infer the “therefore” part.

Yes, I may say to myself “whatever will happen will happen”, and yes, I will either pass or fail the course, but I believe that I better bother writing the paper to hand in, for if I don’t, I will fail; failing will not change the fact, however, that whatever will have happened will have happened.

I believe in cause and effect, but I think the cause of my writing the paper is not a predestined event—it’s volitional. I had the choice to write the paper. There was no cause and effect that saw to it that I would write it—at least not in the same way as dropping a ball in the water will cause ripples. I understand that a decision by faculty to impose certain requirements would effect future students, but I don’t think that students will therefore and for certain write them—people have the choice, and some won’t write ‘em—perhaps that’s what you meant by “inevitably”.

You’re throwing me a little bit with the “Trivial truism” part, but I think I know what you’re saying. A tautology is true, and since it’s true by definition, it’s therefore trivially true and thus a trivial truism. I think I got that right.

You admit that it’s a mistake to infer from the tautology, “whatever will happen” to “I don’t have worry about writing and handing in a paper”, and I’m glad you do; I agree that it’s a mistake. In fact, that’s what I meant when I said earlier that I don’t infer the therefore.

That’s silly.

What may I ask are the terms to describe the different positions? Which do you identify with, for example? And Pierre? I ask in terms of free will and determinism. I think “free will” seems pretty self explanatory. Since I believe that I affect my destiny, then I believe in free will—I hope that’s correct. In terms of determinism, I’m not so sure which way to properly say it.

Why do you think that the sentences, "Whatever will happen, will happen" and "whatever will inevitably happen will happen" mean the same thing? They are different sentences. The first is tautologically true, and the second, which says that whatever will happen, will happen irrespective of what anyone tries to do about it, not only obviously does not mean the same thing, since it says something different, but also, it seems to be false. So if one sentence expresses a truth, and the other, a falsity, how could they possibly mean the same thing?

Clearly, it is false that if I have a letter that I want to send somewhere, it is false that if it is going to get to the place I intend it for, it will make a difference whether I put it into the post box with a stamp, or whether I just let it lie on my desk.

If it is the latter, then of course, what ever happens (namely that the letter doesn't get to the receiver) will happen (namely the letter does not get to the receiver). So that's true.

But if it is the former, then do you think that it is true that whatever I do, whether or not I actually post the letter, makes no difference to whether the letter gets to where I'd like it to go? So that whatever happens (whatever I do about posting the letter) if it is equally likely that it will get to its destination? In other words, what I do has nothing to do with whether the letter gets to its destination? I don't think you believe that, do you?

The fact that you think that what you do will affect your destiny does not show you believe in free will. It just shows that you do not believe in fatalism. But there are those who do not believe in fatalism, but yet, do not believe in free will. And the reason they will give for that is that even if what you do affects the outcome of what happens in the future, what you do, is itself the effect of antecedent causes, and since you had no control over those antecedent causes, you have no control over their effect, which is what you did, so even if what you did made a difference to what happened, nevertheless, it was not up to you what you did, since the causes of what you did, were not up to you. So, although, such people are not fatalists, since they believe that your actions make a difference to what will happen, they are also determinists, because they believe that every event has a cause, and that cause is sufficient for that event to happen, and that, since your actions are also an event like any other, they too have causes (which themselves have causes, and so on) so that what action you do or decided to do, was already determined, and it was not up to you whether you would act in the way you acted. To put it a little differently, they think that you could not have done anything different from what you did do, and since, to have free will is to be able to do something different from what you did do, you did not do what you did freely.

Kingreaper

September 9, 2006, 04:57 PM

Really depends on what we mean by 'morality' and 'free will', don't you think?Well, I suppose Fatalism would require the "I don't have a choice" discussion, but even then that shouldn't affect your morality

I'm not sure what you're saying here. Are the 'primary moral principles' justified by the pleasure-pain principle (PPP)? Or are you just saying that PPP is the primary moral principle?
If a principle is justified, then it is not primary. The primary principles are the axioms of your morality. In most cases the axiom appears to be increasing happiness/decreasing suffering, although some people actually seem to take "Obeying X's wishes" as their axiom

Whatever the primary moral principles are, do you think one can change his/her primary moral principles? Are they absolute, objective, universal? Or are they subjective and possible vary from individual to individual?
That the axiom of morality is what you call the PPP seems to be less common than the axiom of non-contradiction in logic, but not by all that much.

They can vary, and it's not really possivble to objectively prove that you should have one of them, which is why they're axioms, but most humans tend to have the same one in any case.

I haven't seen that title before, but I think we're talking about the same thing.
I've never seen a title for it, but I just made one up

I was following until that last statement "why then should they be punished?" This looks like you might be arguing that punishment is not justified.

The fact that punishment can serve to reduce crime seems a valid justification for punishment.
I was referring to the "freewilled" situation. You cannot use deterrants if someone's behaviour is not caused by their environment and personality. And you cannot punish someone for something who they are didn't cause.

A hard deterministic might argue that that is fine, as long as it's not 'retributive' punishment. IOW, we may be justified in producing better outcomes, but we are not justified in a 'moral condemnation' of anyone because, after all, they only did what was determined--they could not do otherwise.
Of course. Of course they could also believe that moral condemnation was right in itself (this being the most common secondary moral axiom I have come across)

Two problems remain, however. One, if indeed no one can ever do other then what the past and present conditions determine, what makes anyone think they can change that? Why do they need to think they can change it? Their actions ar4e part of the chain, what they do will have an effect. Sure, they do it for reasons, but doing something without reasons (free will) seems worse, and somehow, less free.

Two, how do we justify wanting this better outcome in the first place?
You cannot justify wants except from other wants. With this one you justify it with your want to obey your morality, and your morality's requirement of improving happiness and decreasing suffering.

IMO punishment is justified. I agree basically with the argument you are making (if I understand it as an argument justifying punishment). I also think improvements to our justice system can be made if we understood its intentions more as 'crime prevention' and less as 'justice'.
That is how I too feel. Although at times the secondary axiom does kick in.

Still, to understand this system requires us to see ourselves as 'agents' that 'make choices' (ie, we need to assume 'intention'). It remains a mystery where intention comes from. The only thing that makes sense to me is to say that it is a useful mental abstraction and that it is not provable nor disprovable.
Yes, an abstraction is probably the best word, I guess. We do make choices, but we make these choices based on how the world is, including ourselves, and nothing else.

Much like how a computer AI will make choices, they are based on the world it finds itself in, but they are still choices.

In the circumstances I wonder what you'd think of the Desert Island Murderer: A decent challenge for a moral system based around the PPP rather than the punishment axiom:

A man, who lives on a deserted island no-one will ever encounter, is planning to kill his wife because she nags him. Should you threaten to punish him if he does?

He does so, should you punish him?

If yes then no, is your threat not meaningless if he can see that you're simply bluffing?

Kingreaper

September 9, 2006, 05:02 PM

Yeah, that pretty much sums up the problem with it. 'Universe' implies everything, so the demon would have to be a part of everything. But how can something that is only a part of everything effectly be everything? Implies, but no longer truly means. The best current phrase for everything is Omniverse. A universe has become a more limited unit, just as a world has, but Omniverse by it's very composition resists that fate.

The demon simulates the universe (the physical realm around us in 3d space, up to any edges that may concievably exist, but are highly dubious) but is not part of it.

It might seem nit-picking on my part to be so critical of what we all understand is just a hypothetical, but my criticism has a deeper intention to it. I'm trying to point out that the way we envision this notion of 'determinism' is itself flawed. Things that cannot be defined in verifiable ways are necessarily vague. They are vague because we do not have real empirical things we can relate them to. (If we did we could verify them.)
Of course, but determinism applies to everythiing, rather than free-will whihc applies to nothing, which is why free-will is so much less understandable, determinism is meaningless because it's lack is inconcievable, free-will is meaningless because it itself is inconcievable.

fast

September 10, 2006, 12:26 PM

Why do you think that the sentences, "Whatever will happen, will happen" and "whatever will inevitably happen will happen" mean the same thing? They are different sentences. The first is tautologically true, and the second, which says that whatever will happen, will happen irrespective of what anyone tries to do about it, not only obviously does not mean the same thing, since it says something different, but also, it seems to be false. So if one sentence expresses a truth, and the other, a falsity, how could they possibly mean the same thing?
I wasn't realizing that "inevitability" brought the additional meaning that you say it does. I think now that I was wrong.

I was thinking that to say of something that it will happen is to say that it's bound to happen, yes, but I was not thinking that to say of something that it will inevitably happen is to say that it will happen no matter what. Moreover, I wasn't thinking that "inevitability" really added all that much to the meaning of the sentence--not much beyond redundancy that is, but like I said, I think now that I was wrong.

I simply figured that a person who says, "It will inevitably happen" just meant "it will happen". After all, is it not obvious that we affect our future by the things we do? Of course we're more apt to pass a test if we study for such a test.

Another thing too (while we're at it): the comment "what ever will happen will happen no matter what" doesn't sound quite like it's a statement conveying that I cannot effect my future (but then again, perhaps I'm wrong about that too). The comment "what ever will happen will happen no matter what" sounds true if you think about it in a particular way. Perhaps I ought to quit thinking about it in the particular way that I do:

We have already said that it's true that whatever will happen will happen, so I think that no matter what, the statement, "whatever will happen, will happen" is true, but what I mean by that isn't what you mean by that: for example, If I study, I may pass, if I study, I may not pass, if I don't study, I may pass, and lastly, if I don't study, I may not pass, so whatever happens (whether I study or not), what will happen will happen (I may pass or not); however, that's not to say that I don't think that If I study that I don’t' stand a much better chance of passing. In fact, I do think that if I study that I am more apt to pass.

The fact that you think that what you do will affect your destiny does not show you believe in free will. Hmmm. Ok.

It just shows that you do not believe in fatalism. That's a good thing, I think.

But there are those who do not believe in fatalism, but yet, do not believe in free will. Hmmm, again.

And the reason they will give for that is that even if what you do affects the outcome of what happens in the future, what you do, is itself the effect of antecedent causes, and since you had no control over those antecedent causes, you have no control over their effect, which is what you did, so even if what you did made a difference to what happened, nevertheless, it was not up to you what you did, since the causes of what you did, were not up to you. Oh come on! What kind of shit is that?

You don’t buy into that do you?

So, although, such people are not fatalists, since they believe that your actions make a difference to what will happen, they are also determinists, because they believe that every event has a cause, and that cause is sufficient for that event to happen, and that, since your actions are also an event like any other, they too have causes (which themselves have causes, and so on) so that what action you do or decided to do, was already determined, and it was not up to you whether you would act in the way you acted. I believe in cause and effect, but I don’t believe that my future decisions are like a set of dominoes lying in wait of falling over. People have control over their decisions, and though there may be some influence, it’s the individual who has the control over whether they act or not.

To put it a little differently, they think that you could not have done anything different from what you did do, and since, to have free will is to be able to do something different from what you did do, you did not do what you did freely.

Based on every thing that I’ve said, what is your assessment of my stance? Both in terms of what I both believe and not believe? Um, neverminding that little bit about how to interpret the term “inevitable”, that is.

For example, it seems (though I could be wrong) but it seems that I believe in free will and do not believe in both fatalism and determinism, yet I do believe in cause and effect. Is there anything contradictory in believing in cause and effect while maintaining a stance of free will? Do you have an objection to free will?

sweetiepie

September 10, 2006, 01:06 PM

I wasn't realizing that "inevitability" brought the additional meaning that you say it does. I think now that I was wrong.

I agree with Fast on this one. There are 2 statements-- "X will happen" and "X might happen". Kenn here is saying X will happen is equivalent to X might happen, which is just goofy.
"X will happen implies inevitability", and thus the statement "X will inevitably happen" is redundant, and rather than saying anythign about the state of the universe, is a means of showing confidence. Much like "I am absolutely positively f-ing sure that X" is equivalent to "X"

anyway.
I believe in cause and effect, but I don’t believe that my future decisions are like a set of dominoes lying in wait of falling over. People have control over their decisions, and though there may be some influence, it’s the individual who has the control over whether they act or not.

Yes, you have control over your decisions. The question is whether or not your control is predictable, that is, whether or not the individual is predictable. If there is always an answer the question "why did you do that?", then you probably believe in determinism.

The better you know somebody, the more predictable they become. If I know you like cheesecake more than crab-apples, and I offer you cheesecake and crab-apples, then I can predict your choice.

I think that pretty much everyone is a determinist, it's just that they shy away from the word because they have these silly notions of prophets and gypsies and gods predicting the future: when really it's just a matter of knowing how someone thinks, and being able to predict their actions based on what they think.

Philo_66

September 10, 2006, 01:57 PM

Well, I suppose Fatalism would require the "I don't have a choice" discussion, but even then that shouldn't affect your morality
We must be missing each other here. I can't see how it wouldn't affect your morality.

If a principle is justified, then it is not primary. The primary principles are the axioms of your morality. In most cases the axiom appears to be increasing happiness/decreasing suffering, although some people actually seem to take "Obeying X's wishes" as their axiom
Which would mean they are following a principle other than increasing happiness/decreasing suffering.

That the axiom of morality is what you call the PPP seems to be less common than the axiom of non-contradiction in logic, but not by all that much.
Perhaps when considered globally. I don't know. I'm pretty sure, though, that I see most people very committed to the axiom of non-contradiction, at least when discussing on a conscious level why they do things and how the rationalize. I'm not much of a fan of PPP or "increasing happiness/decreasing suffering" theory. No doubt it's a large part of our moral reasoning. I'm just not convinced it's the primary axiom in most cases. What else is there you ask? Well, there's the simple 'do good' axiom. Yes it's tautological, but so isn't the axiom of non-contradiction. Somehow we find it meaningful and useful, though.

They can vary, and it's not really possivble to objectively prove that you should have one of them, which is why they're axioms, but most humans tend to have the same one in any case.
They are 'axioms' for at least one other reason. True, they cannot be proven (or at least we don't know how to prove them) AND something else--that something else is, at a minimum, the fact that people do believe in them. It might be a 'good' thing to believe in them, and it might not be. Of course, if we could prove what it 'good', we wouldn't be having this discussion right now about axioms.

I was referring to the "freewilled" situation. You cannot use deterrants if someone's behaviour is not caused by their environment and personality. And you cannot punish someone for something who they are didn't cause.
Ok, I think I see what you mean. They might not be the ultimate cause but they are at least a proximate cause.

Of course. Of course they could also believe that moral condemnation was right in itself (this being the most common secondary moral axiom I have come across)
Apparently by 'secondary' you mean based upon the 'primary' axiom of increasing happiness/decreasing suffering. How do you know which is primary and which is secondary? It might, in your mind, seem more logical that one would follow from the other, but I think it could be considered just as logical the other way around.

Why do they need to think they can change it? Their actions ar4e part of the chain, what they do will have an effect. Sure, they do it for reasons, but doing something without reasons (free will) seems worse, and somehow, less free.
Not less free, but less of what we want... IOW, it's not an issue of freedom but an issue of whether or not we actually have 'will'.

You cannot justify wants except from other wants. With this one you justify it with your want to obey your morality, and your morality's requirement of improving happiness and decreasing suffering.
Assuming that is my morality's requirements... Like you said, thought, our wants justify our wants. Nothing 'outside' the system validates it.

In the circumstances I wonder what you'd think of the Desert Island Murderer: A decent challenge for a moral system based around the PPP rather than the punishment axiom:

A man, who lives on a deserted island no-one will ever encounter, is planning to kill his wife because she nags him. Should you threaten to punish him if he does?

He does so, should you punish him?

If yes then no, is your threat not meaningless if he can see that you're simply bluffing?
Sorry, I don't understand the scenario. I assume the man is living with his wife on this deserted island and I have no means of contacting him. How can I threaten to punish him?

Phil

Philo_66

September 10, 2006, 02:04 PM

Implies, but no longer truly means. The best current phrase for everything is Omniverse. A universe has become a more limited unit, just as a world has, but Omniverse by it's very composition resists that fate.

The demon simulates the universe (the physical realm around us in 3d space, up to any edges that may concievably exist, but are highly dubious) but is not part of it.
I think you're playing tricks with words here. Assuming a multiple-universe omniverse, how do we know one 'universe' doesn't affect another 'universe'? And if it doesn't then how could the demon, outside of a certain universe, know anything about that universe (ie, how could it's knowledge be affected)?

Of course, but determinism applies to everythiing, rather than free-will whihc applies to nothing, which is why free-will is so much less understandable, determinism is meaningless because it's lack is inconcievable, free-will is meaningless because it itself is inconcievable.
When I say "free will" it's not meaningless. I'm talking about the ability of an agent to make choices. You must be referring to the contradictory idea that attempts to define 'free will' in such a way that no 'will' actually exists. It seems to me a rather useless thing to try to define and understand.

Phil

Kingreaper

September 10, 2006, 04:14 PM

Perhaps when considered globally. I don't know. I'm pretty sure, though, that I see most people very committed to the axiom of non-contradiction, at least when discussing on a conscious level why they do things and how the rationalize. I'm not much of a fan of PPP or "increasing happiness/decreasing suffering" theory. No doubt it's a large part of our moral reasoning. I'm just not convinced it's the primary axiom in most cases. What else is there you ask? Well, there's the simple 'do good' axiom. Yes it's tautological, but so isn't the axiom of non-contradiction. Somehow we find it meaningful and useful, though.
But then your definition of good becomes circular, and your morality arbitrary, other axioms seem required

They are 'axioms' for at least one other reason. True, they cannot be proven (or at least we don't know how to prove them) AND something else--that something else is, at a minimum, the fact that people do believe in them. It might be a 'good' thing to believe in them, and it might not be. Of course, if we could prove what it 'good', we wouldn't be having this discussion right now about axioms.

Of course
Ok, I think I see what you mean. They might not be the ultimate cause but they are at least a proximate cause.

Apparently by 'secondary' you mean based upon the 'primary' axiom of increasing happiness/decreasing suffering. How do you know which is primary and which is secondary? It might, in your mind, seem more logical that one would follow from the other, but I think it could be considered just as logical the other way around.
Ah, no, I used it their to mean a second, less important axiom, I should have realised that given my previous statements it would e confusing

Of course, in some people it's their primary, most important, moral axiom. And in some people it's completely supressed.

Not less free, but less of what we want... IOW, it's not an issue of freedom but an issue of whether or not we actually have 'will'.

Assuming that is my morality's requirements... Like you said, thought, our wants justify our wants. Nothing 'outside' the system validates it.
yeah, sorry I thought you'd been agreeing with the principle when you mentioned it earlier.

Sorry, I don't understand the scenario. I assume the man is living with his wife on this deserted island and I have no means of contacting him. How can I threaten to punish him?

Phil
Ah, yes, the scenario is meant to be that only YOU have access to the island, with him and his wife on it, not that no-one does.

fast

September 10, 2006, 05:31 PM

I agree with Fast on this one.
But, to agree with what I had originally said is not to agree with my new position; therefore, you do not agree with me but instead agree with what I previously held; hence, you disagree with me. <he, or me in third person, appreciates the geasture though>

Who would I be without an example? We will die, and it's inevitable that we will die, so that is such a case that what will happen will not only happen but will inevitably happen as well (it’s going to happen no matter what we do); however, there are circumstances where what will happen will not happen because it's inevitable that it must happen. For example, I may eat steak tonight, but then again I may eat a salad. Though whatever will happen will happen, it’s not inevitable that I will do one as opposed to the other. Additionally, there is no cause and effect related set of events that has already transpired that will ensure that I will eat one or the other.

There are 2 statements-- "X will happen" and "X might happen". Kenn here is saying X will happen is equivalent to X might happen, which is just goofy.But dear mistake maker, he is not saying that at all;-)

"X will happen implies inevitability", Does it? Why will it have been inevitable that I had steak if it so happens that I have steak? There is something that I could have done to avoid having steak—like changing my mind, for example. Therefore, it is not true to say of what will happen that it is inevitable that it will happen.

and thus the statement "X will inevitably happen" is redundant, and rather than saying anythign about the state of the universe, is a means of showing confidence. Much like "I am absolutely positively f-ing sure that X" is equivalent to "X"

anyway.You are wrong, but feel reassured that it’s not because it was inevitable that you would be. For example, if you had thought a little harder before disagreeing with what I think, then you would have been right.

Yes, you have control over your decisions. The question is whether or not your control is predictable, that is, whether or not the individual is predictable. To a certain extent, yes, a person can be predictable, but only to a certain degree. I can’t predict whether an unborn child is going to prefer chocolate over strawberries, for example. I don’t think that if we could isolate every conceivable variable that we could predict such a thing.

If there is always an answer the question "why did you do that?", then you probably believe in determinism. I don’t think that’s exactly what Ken was conveying, for it would seem that that would hold if you had free will too.

There’s a cause and effect break down happening that differentiates determinism from free will. (I think).

The better you know somebody, the more predictable they become. If I know you like cheesecake more than crab-apples, and I offer you cheesecake and crab-apples, then I can predict your choice.

I think that pretty much everyone is a determinist, it's just that they shy away from the word because they have these silly notions of prophets and gypsies and gods predicting the future: when really it's just a matter of knowing how someone thinks, and being able to predict their actions based on what they think.

But, I don’t believe that the current transpiring events of our lives are enough to say that we are living scenes as if from a prerecorded tape. We are writing our own history—our future isn’t fully determinable by isolating all cause and effect variables.

sweetiepie

September 10, 2006, 06:04 PM

For example, I may eat steak tonight, but then again I may eat a salad. Notice your use of the word may. If you said, I "will" eat steak tonight, you are predicting your eating of steak. There's a chance, of course, that it won't happen. But then isn't there a chance you won't ever die? Maybe we should say, I intend to eat steak. Or, looks like I'm gonna be eating steak.

To a certain extent, yes, a person can be predictable, but only to a certain degree. I can’t predict whether an unborn child is going to prefer chocolate over strawberries, for example. I don’t think that if we could isolate every conceivable variable that we could predict such a thing.
I have a hard time imagining how a child could NOT prefer chocolate to strawberries. But, your call.

If you want to figure out more about your exact beliefs then ask: why not? What variables are missing? What isn't written in the DNA or in the environment? Is it that a person, including their brain, is not a collection of matter and energy? Or is it that matter and energy, on some level, can not be predicted?

Also, you might want to ask, what exactly are the limits on a person's predictability? How many decisions, for example, if you knew perfectly the mind of a grown adult, could you predict?

There’s a cause and effect break down happening that differentiates determinism from free will. (I think).

Free will is a terrible term that should be erased from the dictionary.

But what do you mean by cause and effect break down?

...we are living scenes as if from a prerecorded tape. We are writing our own history.
Again, your call. Just as long as you know that the clipped first sentence and the second sentence here are not mutually exclusive.

fast

September 10, 2006, 10:48 PM

There’s a cause and effect break down happening that differentiates determinism from free will. (I think).

Free will is a terrible term that should be erased from the dictionary.

But what do you mean by cause and effect break down?
I have no idea what I mean, and I am thoroughly confused.

I think I’ve pretty much established that I don’t buy into the fatalism stuff, and if What Pierre La Place said is a good synopsis of determinism, then it seems like I don’t buy into that one either. To top it all off, Kennethamy in a response [post 23] to Kingreaper says, “In fact, if determinism is true, then fatalism is false […].”

Fatalism seems to be the same as determinism when viewed in terms of control. What control do I have in regards to my future? It seems that according to fatalism, no matter what I do, what will happen will inevitably happen, and if that’s the case, then I have no control and thus am doomed to whatever fate shall come my way.

Determinism, as cast in a light by Pierre La Place suggests that life is like a movie on a really long VCR tape. He suggests that the transpired events of our lives are already set in motion and thus what will happen –and will inevitably happen, like a set of dominoes waiting to fall.

To me, the statement by Place is extremist in nature. There’s a lot to be appreciated, but the final conclusions extend too far. Again, what Place says is:

"We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes."

The statement purports inevitability. If the wheels are in motion, and if the prediction is destined to happen, then again, just like fatalism, we have no control. I don’t think such a formula (even if possible) would allow for such precision. When I said, “There’s a cause and effect break down happening that differentiates determinism from free will,” I am partly and sorta kinda saying that determinism fails to account for volition. My decisions though effects of internal causes are not inevitable effects. I play a role in my decisions that defeat the implications of the determinist view.

kennethamy

September 10, 2006, 11:04 PM

I have no idea what I mean, and I am thoroughly confused.

I think I’ve pretty much established that I don’t buy into the fatalism stuff, and if What Pierre La Place said is a good synopsis of determinism, then it seems like I don’t buy into that one either. To top it all off, Kennethamy in a response [post 23] to Kingreaper says, “In fact, if determinism is true, then fatalism is false […].”

Fatalism seems to be the same as determinism when viewed in terms of control. .

According to Fatalism, human actions have no effects. It doesn't matter what a person does, the outcome will be the same whether he does it or not.

According to Determinism, human actions are causes just like any other events. Therefore, what happens does depend on what a person does, and it is not true that the outcome will be the same whether or not he does it.

Do you still think that Fatalism and Determinism are the same?

fast

September 10, 2006, 11:38 PM

According to Fatalism, human actions have no effects. It doesn't matter what a person does, the outcome will be the same whether he does it or not.

According to Determinism, human actions are causes just like any other events. Therefore, what happens does depend on what a person does, and it is not true that the outcome will be the same whether or not he does it.

Do you still think that Fatalism and Determinism are the same?

Yes, because you describe determinism as fatalism in disguise.

You say that human actions are causes, but human actions are also effects (according to determinism) to which can be predicted with the magical formula illustrated by Place; thus, we have no control and therefore, what you call human actions are fatalistic according to determinism.

On the other hand, I cannot escape the fact that you are clearly saying that they are different, and to the casual observer, it seems quite obvious that they are different, yet according to fatalism, I’ll pass or fail so why study, and according to determinism, I play a role, but my role has already been determined—so it’s not like I really play a role in the decision as to whether or not I will study.

kennethamy

September 10, 2006, 11:46 PM

Yes, because you describe determinism as fatalism in disguise.

You say that human actions are causes, but human actions are also effects (according to determinism) to which can be predicted with the magical formula illustrated by Place; thus, we have no control and therefore, what you call human actions are fatalistic according to determinism.

On the other hand, I cannot escape the fact that you are clearly saying that they are different, and to the casual observer, it seems quite obvious that they are different, yet according to fatalism, I’ll pass or fail so why study, and according to determinism, I play a role, but my role has already been determined—so it’s not like I really play a role in the decision as to whether or not I will study.

According to Fatalism, what I do does not matter to whether I pass or fail.
According to Determinism, whether I pass or fail depends (at least in part) on what I do.

So they cannot possibly be the same.

It is true that according to Determinism, what I do in turn depends on previous causes, so what I do is determined by those previous causes. But that is another issue. According to Determinism is still matters to what happens what I do, and according to Fatalism is does not matter to what happens what I do. Why does that mean that Determinism is Fatalism "in disguise"? Determinism may (I say "may") imply that what I do is not "up to me". But that has nothing to do with whether what I do effects what happens.

Fatalism can be empirically shown to be false. It is obvious that whether I pass or fail depends on whether I hand in the paper. Whether Determinism can be shown to be true or false is a matter up for grabs.

Philo_66

September 10, 2006, 11:59 PM

But then your definition of good becomes circular,
Hey, you're catching on!

and your morality arbitrary, other axioms seem required
Other axioms...required? An axiom is something we accept without proof. We can accept anything axiomatically. I'm not saying that's wise or the best approach always, but we do have to accept some things axiomatically.

Not sure what 'arbitrary' means in this case. Our morality is as we choose it to be. Is that arbitrary? I don't know.

Ah, no, I used it their to mean a second, less important axiom, I should have realised that given my previous statements it would e confusing

Of course, in some people it's their primary, most important, moral axiom. And in some people it's completely supressed.
Now I'm confused. I thought 'primary' meant having no logical justification and 'secondary' meant based on the 'primary'. But apparently you mean one is more important than the other. But they are both axioms. What, then, determines which is more important? Does the primary axiom define itself as most important? Being they are both axiomatically accepted, one could just as 'logically' define the other as being the most important. Once you get to axiomatic or tautological you've got lot's of logical flexibility. You see, that's the deceiving thing about tautologies. You can make them look logical and be quite convincing. If they are not somehow validated against something outside of the definition itself, pretty much anything goes. Awesome, don't you think? Anyway, I find it pretty fascinating. I'm not saying it's wrong to believe axioms, I'm just saying it's important to recognize them and recognize the implications to our logic.

Ah, yes, the scenario is meant to be that only YOU have access to the island, with him and his wife on it, not that no-one does.
Sorry, it's still a little vague to me. I think the threat of punishment is a deterrent. If the threat is seen as a bluff then it would, it seems, be less effective maybe totally ineffective.

Phil

fast

September 11, 2006, 09:06 AM

According to Determinism, whether I pass or fail depends (at least in part) on what I do.Worded like that, I am more apt to agree with a determinists view, but there are other things you've said about a determinist that makes me not want to agree with them.

So they cannot possibly be the same.I understand now. I don't quite understand the determinists stance quite yet, but I understand enough to see that the determinist and the fatalist are not the same -- the criteria of human action dependency...

It is true that according to Determinism, what I do in turn depends on previous causes, so what I do is determined by those previous causes. But that is another issue. There's something about that I can't quite put my finger on; there's something about that view that I don't like. I don't like the idea that makes me think that my future decisions are destined to be.

According to Determinism is still matters to what happens what I do, and according to Fatalism is does not matter to what happens what I do.The fatalist view is incorrect, and the determinist view is … I'm not sure yet, but as the saying goes, somethin' in the milk ain't clean.

Why does that mean that Determinism is Fatalism "in disguise"? I was noticing a characteristic that is shared amongst them both, but it's not the shared characteristics that differentiate them; instead, it's the differences...my mistake.

Determinism may (I say "may") imply that what I do is not "up to me". But that has nothing to do with whether what I do effects what happens.I understand the second sentence, so I'm with you on that; the first sentence, however, I'm not sure what to make of it. It's like I want to respond, "well then, I guess I may (and I too say, "may") agree with determinism." If it's true that if to hold a determinist view that my future is not "up to me", then it's also true that I do not hold a determinist view. If it's not true, however, that still doesn't mean that I do hold a determinist view.

Fatalism can be empirically shown to be false.Got it.

It is obvious that whether I pass or fail depends on whether I hand in the paper.Why do I all of a sudden want to start thinking of exceptions? :banghead: Why do I do that? <Don't answer that.>

Whether Determinism can be shown to be true or false is a matter up for grabs.Okay, but never mind for a moment about whether it can be shown to be true or false; just because something can't be shown as false for example, that doesn't mean that it makes sense to buy into it. I'm still not sure what a determinist believes yet. Do they believe for example that their future decisions will definitely be the consequences of uncontrollable causes? Or, do they get to play a role, so much so that, they believe that their lives are not like a prerecorded tape?

Oh, btw, how does free will fit into all this?

Laurentius

September 11, 2006, 09:15 AM

The debate goes over the possibility of freedom in free will.

"Freedom is a many-faceted term encompassing the ability to act in all ways which add to that ability. It is oftentimes gauged by the degree of absence of external restraint — or control; the lack of submissiveness and servility as the anti-thesis of freedom."

In a deterministic universe, freedom will come in degrees.

Free will hints at the additional degree(s) of freedom added by the awarness factor in sentient beings' decision making process.

kennethamy

September 11, 2006, 10:01 AM

Oh, btw, how does free will fit into all this?

An action is free if and only if although you did that action, you could have done otherwise.

The fatalist would (I suppose) say that you could not have done otherwise (but I am no sure about that). But in any case, the fatalist would say, it would not matter whether you did do otherwise, since what you do does not affect what happens.

Since fatalism is clearly false, the issue is moot, anyway.

The question is whether determinism is compatible with free will. And it seems to me that even if determinism is true, that I could have done otherwise. At least so we think.

Consider this example:

This morning I did not do two things:

a. I did not take my usual one mile walk.
b. I did not take a 1,000 (that's what I said) mile walk.

Now, consider b first. I not only did not take a 1,000 mile walk, I could not have taken such a walk. It would have been phyisically impossible for me to do it. Even had I chosen to do so, I could not have done it.

Now consider a. I did not take my usual mile walk. But I could have taken that walk, if I had chosen to do it.
How do I know that. Well, I have been taking 1 mile walks, rain or shine, for the last two years, and never had any trouble doing it. And yesterday, and the day before, I took my mile walk, with no difficulty. Nothing, so far as I know, has changed between yesterday and today. Therefore I (fallibly) know that I could have taken my mile walk today, although I did not.

If I am right, then although b. was something I did not do, and I could not have done even if I had chosen to do it, a, on the other hand, was something I could have done, if I had chosen to do it, although like b, I did not do it.

Therefore, I conclude that there was at least one thing I could have done that I did not do.

But according to some Determinists (sometimes called "hard determinists") if I did not do something, that is because I could not have done that thing. But, as we now see, although I did not walk a mile this morning, I could have walked a mile this morning. Therefore, hard determinism must be false, since it implies that if I did not walk a mile this morning, then I could not have walked a mile this morning. But Hard Determinism is the view that if Determinism is true, then free will is false (Determinism is incompatible with free-will). But that implies that if I did not do something, then I could not have done it. And as we have just seen, although I did not walk a mile this morning, I could have walked a mile this morning (as contrasted with the other case). Therefore, Hard Determinism is false, and Determinism, if true, allows for free will.

kennethamy

September 11, 2006, 10:09 AM

In a deterministic universe, freedom will come in degrees.

.

Why?

dongiovanni1976x

September 11, 2006, 11:14 AM

Having perfect physical knowledge of the universe doesn't mean the demon would have all knowledge. If the demon had perfect physical knowledge of a human being, from his atoms to his dna, to the exact biological structure of his brain, would he know what sort of movies that person liked?

To say that the demon would know the result of the universe at any moment supposes an eternally inanimate universe, where there's nothing but billiard balls; nothing but atoms and the vacuum inbetween.

And this is exactly the determinists position. That movie preferences are nothing but a specific set of neural pathways that cause a pleasurable feeling (e.g. dopamine release) when they are activated (accessed, thought of, retrieved; etc).

What other kind of knowledge is there other than physical knowledge?

dongiovanni1976x

September 11, 2006, 11:14 AM

Having perfect physical knowledge of the universe doesn't mean the demon would have all knowledge. If the demon had perfect physical knowledge of a human being, from his atoms to his dna, to the exact biological structure of his brain, would he know what sort of movies that person liked?

To say that the demon would know the result of the universe at any moment supposes an eternally inanimate universe, where there's nothing but billiard balls; nothing but atoms and the vacuum inbetween.

And this is exactly the determinist's position. That movie preferences are nothing but a specific set of neural pathways that cause a pleasurable feeling (e.g. dopamine release) when they are activated (accessed, thought of, retrieved; etc).

What other kind of knowledge is there other than physical knowledge?

kennethamy

September 11, 2006, 11:23 AM

And this is exactly the determinists position. That movie preferences are nothing but a specific set of neural pathways that cause a pleasurable feeling (e.g. dopamine release) when they are activated (accessed, thought of, retrieved; etc).

What other kind of knowledge is there other than physical knowledge?

What I would like to know is what is "physical knowledge"? As contrasted with what? It seems to me that I have, for instance, mental knowledge. For instance, I know that I am happy or sad. And I know that 2+2=4. Is that physical knowledge?

Perhaps you had better explain the term "physical knowledge" since it isn't obvious, at least to me, what it means.

sweetiepie

September 11, 2006, 11:28 AM

Worded like that, I am more apt to agree with a determinists view, but there are other things you've said about a determinist that makes me not want to agree with them.

yay. Good to see you coming around to determinism, and you get extra credit for not simultaneously trying to tackle the sneaky term 'free will'. I mean, I guess tehre's nothing wrong with Kenn's defintion, but people, generally theists, will often bend it to suit their philosophy, and the very nature of the term 'free' pounds into your head the already thoroughly culturally reinforced false dichotomy of fatalism and determinism that you keep bringing up.

Do they believe for example that their future decisions will definitely be the consequences of uncontrollable causes? Or, do they get to play a role, so much so that, they believe that their lives are not like a prerecorded tape? Yes they believe that their decisions are the consequences of uncontrollable causes, although only indirectly.
You have to be very specific on this part. Although in common speech, the mataphors are all used the same way, there are some very important differences between puppets, robots, and pawns; just as there is a very important difference between the gypsy who deals you the death card and the cardiologist who shakes his head at you.

Consider when you first became capable of conscious violition. When was that?
Whatever you were then, we could say, are the initial conditions of you- as something capable of decision making. Up to this point you were only molded, you didn't do any molding.
After this point you make decisions that affect both your environment and yourself. You choose your own future and you affect the futures of those around you. You even choose the way in which you will, in the future, make decisions. This control you have over your environment and over yourself is no illusion. You do play a role. You do shape your future. Your role though, at some point, was shaped, and continues to be shaped even as you shape it.
But, importantly, nobody can make you do what you don't want to do.

Someone, on the other hand, might, if they were smart, guess what you will do. But they still can't make you do anythign you don't want to do. Your fate is decided-- yes-- but not by anybody, and nor-- in general-- is it actually known by anybody.

Unless of course we mix an omniscient creator God into the pot. Then there's some explaining to be done.

kennethamy

September 11, 2006, 11:28 AM

sweetiepie

September 11, 2006, 12:11 PM

[QUOTE=dongiovanni1976x;3745522]And this is exactly the determinist's position. That movie preferences are nothing but a specific set of neural pathways that cause a pleasurable feeling (e.g. dopamine release) when they are activated (accessed, thought of, retrieved; etc).
___________________________________________________
Well, cheese is (certainly) curds and whey with maybe a little salt added, and maybe an enzyme. But it is hardly true that cheese is nothing but curds and whey with maybe a little salt added, and maybe an enzyme. For instance, there is the flavor.

this is a pretty good question. Does the demon need an interpreter? Doesn't the demon already "know" one? can the demon imagines up a cheese chef? and can he imagine the cheese chef tasting the cheese? and can he imagine all the neural processes caused by this tasting? And can the demon use an algorithm of some sort to interpret these processes, and thus know how cheese tastes?
I would like to say that the demon knows how humans would react to what he knows by the fact that he can recreate them and in his recreation imagine what they woudl do with additional human knowledge, but then, is he the interpreter-- or is he using an interpreter within him? and can he understand his own interpreter?

I mean. we're assuming he is a computer, and only has uninterpretted data. he can imagine someone capable of interpretting his data-- and he can imagine soemone capable of interpreting that person-- but-- he's still stuck.

Hoodoo Ulove

September 11, 2006, 12:20 PM

Now consider a. I did not take my usual mile walk. But I could have taken that walk, if I had chosen to do it.

Therefore I (fallibly) know that I could have taken my mile walk today, although I did not.Not really. You have not demonstrated that you could have chosen to take that walk. Perhaps something was different about you today.

kennethamy

September 11, 2006, 12:50 PM

Not really. You have not demonstrated that you could have chosen to take that walk. Perhaps something was different about you today.

Well, yes, of course, that's the next natural question. However, it does not seem to me that anybody (uncorrupted by philosophy) means by, "I could have done otherwise" that he could have done otherwise whether or not he chose to do otherwise. So, the way we ordinarily talk and think about free action is compatible with determinism.We think that we could have done otherwise even if everything else is the same, with the exception that we choose to do something different. (Your other business about maybe something about you is different today is a red herring, since I am supposing that nothing else is relevantly different to my taking a walk except that yesterday I chose to do so, and today, I did not choose to do so). The point is that "soft determinism" or compatibilism does not say that if everything about you, including your choice, were the same, you could have acted otherwise. "Soft Determinists" are, after all, Determinists. And to say that everything (literally) could be the same, and yet you could do otherwise, would be to say that all the causes could be the same, and yet the effect could be different, and that would be to give up Determinism. But Soft Determinists are, as I said, determinists, so they don't want to, and cannot, give up on determinism. What is different is the choice or the desire.

But now, consider: isn't that exactly what we want to say about freedom of the will, and the moral responsibility it entails? Don't we want the kind of freedom of will that indeed makes the agent responsible for his choice?

Now, if you are going to say, "but his choice is also determined, so he isn't even responsible for that, and so, the agent is not responsible for what he does, at all" We have gone (I won't say) progressed to a new stage. And now we have to talk about the notion of causation. and whether causation is really a kind of compulsion or not.

But, I just wanted to argue that it looks very much as if compatibilism between determinism and what we ordinarily mean by acting freely, is true, as long as we remember that ordinary free will is predicated on the belief that it a the agent's choice that is central to whether the person acted freely.

dongiovanni1976x

September 11, 2006, 01:02 PM

What I would like to know is what is "physical knowledge"? As contrasted with what? It seems to me that I have, for instance, mental knowledge. For instance, I know that I am happy or sad. And I know that 2+2=4. Is that physical knowledge?

Perhaps you had better explain the term "physical knowledge" since it isn't obvious, at least to me, what it means.
I was simply reiterating the adjective that was used. I see it as redundant myself, unless one wanted to distinguish between a physical toyota and a thought of a toyota (i.e. an abstraction from the physical world). But this to me is still redundant because I believe that thoughts themself have exntention and occupy space and thus are physical. No need for this adjective.

dongiovanni1976x

September 11, 2006, 01:09 PM

Well, cheese is (certainly) curds and whey with maybe a little salt added, and maybe an enzyme. But it is hardly true that cheese is nothing but curds and whey with maybe a little salt added, and maybe an enzyme. For instance, there is the flavor.

And the material in its entirety as it is consumed send electro/chemical signals cascading into the taster and create a reaction. This reaction will not be exactly the same in each person but every similar in beings with a similar make up and similar experience. The reaction will cuase a certain release of this or that chemical etc and this is what causes a feeling/sensation etc and what you call taste. All of which is physical and interpretable by a being that knows the spin, velocity etc of every partical in the universe.

Taste can be programmed.

dongiovanni1976x

September 11, 2006, 01:17 PM

(Your other business about maybe something about you is different today is a red herring, since I am supposing that nothing else is relevantly different to my taking a walk except that yesterday I chose to do so, and today, I did not choose to do so).
The atoms that comprised kennethamy at conception certainly are not identiacal to those that comprise kennethamy today. Moreover the skin cells that you lost while reading this means that you are not identical with yourself when you started reading this paragraph. However slight this may be, the argument is not a red herring to suggest that something, (however slight) may have triggered a different response in you on day 2 when you decided about taking a walk. I do not think it is justified to dismiss this objection outright because for a neuron to fire a threshold must be met and it is possible that the threshold of one neuron was not met because you ate less cheese on day two and felt just a bit less like taking a walk or what have you...

sweetiepie

September 11, 2006, 01:29 PM

And the material in its entirety as it is consumed send electro/chemical signals cascading into the taster and create a reaction. This reaction will not be exactly the same in each person but every similar in beings with a similar make up and similar experience. The reaction will cuase a certain release of this or that chemical etc and this is what causes a feeling/sensation etc and what you call taste. All of which is physical and interpretable by a being that knows the spin, velocity etc of every partical in the universe.

Taste can be programmed.
the chemicals are all there to be seen. the algorithms by which the brain interprets the chemicals can be found. together they can be modeled. but is the thing that is experiencing the model tasting or examining taste?

dongiovanni1976x

September 11, 2006, 01:34 PM

the chemicals are all there to be seen. the algorithms by which the brain interprets the chemicals can be found. together they can be modeled. but is the thing that is experiencing the model tasting or examining taste?
I think is it wrong to assume that there is a separate "thing" experiencing anything. The collective result of all the interactions in the brain does not make a new THING anymore than the parts that make up a car are different from the car itself.
The ego (self) we all feel is the result of how we interpret and organize perception itself.

Hoodoo Ulove

September 11, 2006, 01:42 PM

But, I just wanted to argue that it looks very much as if compatibilism between determinism and what we ordinarily mean by acting freely, is true, as long as we remember that ordinary free will is predicated on the belief that it [is]the agent's choice that is central to whether the person acted freely.Agreed. But what we ordinarily mean by free will is not good enough for some. . . . there's something about that view that I don't like. I don't like the idea that makes me think that my future decisions are destined to be.But then, there's a lot of things about this world we don't like, and so what?

fast

September 11, 2006, 01:57 PM

My response needs a lot of work, but I’m sending as is. Perhaps you can elicit the source of my confusion from it.

The question is whether determinism is compatible with free will. Well, in answering that question, it would first be nice to understand exactly what determinism really means; For example, does it mean "Our actions are effects from causes,” (hence, we do not determine effect but rather effects are determined from the causes that precipitated them), or does it instead mean “we determine our actions” (hence, we do determine our fate since we are the determinators). Or, does it mean something else. I cannot seem to distinguish determinism from hard determinism.

In other words, would the determinist say, "of course I believe in determinism, for it's clearly true that I determine my destiny", or would a determinist say, "of course I believe in determinism, for it's clearly false that it's I who determines my destiny".

In the former case, a determinist is saying that he determines, but in the latter case, a determinist is saying that the already transpiring events of the world are the causes that will dictate the predictable effects to come.

If I'm going to use what La Place said as a guide, then it seems that La Place is a hard determinist (a view I disagree with), but if we're going to distinguish a hard determinist from a determinist (which I would suppose includes both hard determinists and not hard determinists (who I'll just call soft determinists)), then what can we possibly say about the other determinists beyond that they are soft determinists?

Perhaps there is compatibility between one who believes in free will and one who believes in soft determinism. I think that we have free will, and I believe in cause and effect to a certain extent--but not to such an extent as does hard determinists.

But, I'm still left wondering a good deal about what it even means to be a soft determinists--especially in how it relates to both a determinist (non descript) and a hard determinist.

And it seems to me that even if determinism is true, that I could have done otherwise. At least so we think.What is determinism?

Consider this example:

This morning I did not do two things:

a. I did not take my usual one mile walk.
b. I did not take a 1,000 (that's what I said) mile walk.

Now, consider b first. I not only did not take a 1,000 mile walk, I could not have taken such a walk. It would have been phyisically impossible for me to do it. Even had I chosen to do so, I could not have done it.

Now consider a. I did not take my usual mile walk. But I could have taken that walk, if I had chosen to do it.
I understand and agree.

How do I know that. Well, I have been taking 1 mile walks, rain or shine, for the last two years, and never had any trouble doing it. And yesterday, and the day before, I took my mile walk, with no difficulty. Nothing, so far as I know, has changed between yesterday and today. Therefore I (fallibly) know that I could have taken my mile walk today, although I did not.
Me playing devil's advocate:

But, if determinism says that x happened therefore y happened, and if y is walking the mile, then there has to be something different that brought about the decision x.

Secondly, what does "Nothing, so far as [you] know" have to do with anything? When I was a lot younger, I was told that what went up came down, and I bounced a ball in the air; then, a seagull caught it in mid flight. I didn't know that would happen, but the sequence of events that had it so that the acts happened as they did were already set in motion. My lack of knowledge of what would happen is independent of the events that led up to the final state of affairs.

If I understand this determinism stuff correctly, then it's a view that says the fate of our destiny is like a set of dominoes lying in wait. In other words, of course you didn't walk the mile this morning, for you made the decision not to, and the reason you made that decision is because that was the decision that would inevitably come about and thus was the effect of an unknown cause, and just because you don't know what the cause was to that effect, that doesn't matter or change anything. <sorta>

If I am right, then although b. was something I did not do, and I could not have done even if I had chosen to do it, a, on the other hand, was something I could have done, if I had chosen to do it, although like b, I did not do it. I understand the distinction that you have made, and I agree with you that you could have walked the mile but I don't see why that's a reason to think determinism is compatible. I see it as a reason not to think hard determinism is compatible. I still have no idea what either determinism is or what soft determinism is.

Therefore, I conclude that there was at least one thing I could have done that I did not do. I agree with your conclusion but not how you arrived at it.

But according to some Determinists (sometimes called "hard determinists") if I did not do something, that is because I could not have done that thing. But, as we now see, although I did not walk a mile this morning, I could have walked a mile this morning.
Why? Because you don't know of what difference there was between yesterday and today? Maybe you just didn't feel like walking this morning, and perhaps that a consequence of unknown factors. <that's the devil's advocate in me again>

Therefore, hard determinism must be false, since it implies that if I did not walk a mile this morning, then I could not have walked a mile this morning. Oof! I agree, yet again with your conclusion, but not with your inference.

But Hard Determinism is the view that if Determinism is true, then free will is false (Determinism is incompatible with free-will). Agreed.

But that implies that if I did not do something, then I could not have done it. And as we have just seen, although I did not walk a mile this morning, I could have walked a mile this morning (as contrasted with the other case). What difference does it make that the roller coasters could have been blue; they're RED! If I go to the theme park, yes, I could have ridden a blue roller coaster (if there were a blue one), but guess what--they're ALL RED!, so though it could have been the case that one could have been blue, none were.

In fact, the reason they are red is because it was the designer’s favorite color. The designers favorite color could have been blue (I suppose you would say), but guess what, it wasn't. There's a reason, I would suppose (perhaps certain events had transpired) that led this person to favor red, so tell me how could the roller coasters have been blue?

By mistake? But no events (causes) were set in motion to allow for that to happen (effects).

Am I just reading into things too much?

fast

September 11, 2006, 02:26 PM

yay. Good to see you coming around to determinism, and you get extra credit for not simultaneously trying to tackle the sneaky term 'free will'. You are unduly influencing me. I like extra credit, so I'm more apt to play favoritism towards it notwithstanding compelling reasoning.

I mean, I guess tehre's nothing wrong with Kenn's defintion, but people, generally theists, will often bend it to suit their philosophy, and the very nature of the term 'free' pounds into your head the already thoroughly culturally reinforced false dichotomy of fatalism and determinism that you keep bringing up.Is fatalism and hard determinism a true dichotomy? It would seem that it is.

Yes they believe that their decisions are the consequences of uncontrollable causes, although only indirectly.
You have to be very specific on this part.Explain, “although only indirectly”.

Although in common speech, the mataphors are all used the same way, there are some very important differences between puppets, robots, and pawns; just as there is a very important difference between the gypsy who deals you the death card and the cardiologist who shakes his head at you.I understand what you’re telling me, but I don’t understand the point. <fast, feeling that I am bordering contradiction?>

Consider when you first became capable of conscious violition. When was that? Whatever you were then, we could say, are the initial conditions of you- as something capable of decision making. Up to this point you were only molded, you didn't do any molding. The hard determinist says, “hogwash”. There was never a time anyone truly made a decision. The hard determinist says that even he could have told you what the so-called decisions would have been met given enough information and know-how.

After this point you make decisions that affect both your environment and yourself. You give me credit, but what choices did I really have in the decisions that I made [so says the devils advocate dwelling within]? I ask this assuming determinism [or is it that I assume hard determinism]? If the transpiring events will lead to an effect, and if the effect is the decisions I will make, then exactly how much of this dichotomy to which you speak is false?

You choose your own future and you affect the futures of those around you. You even