Does Occam's Razor refute solipsism?

[Dante Alighieri]

I, a philosophical neophyte, have been wondering about this as of late. Given the idea of solipsism, would not Occam's Razor necessarily regard it as superfluous? Or am I wrong?

[His Noodly Appendage]

No, because the applicability of the razor is just a figment of your imagination...

[Guttersnipe]

I, a philosophical neophyte, have been wondering about this as of late. Given the idea of solipsism, would not Occam's Razor necessarily regard it as superfluous? Or am I wrong?
Occam's razor is for ridding explanations of unnecessary complexity -- e.g. 'superfluous entities'. Solipsists have an ontological committment to only one entity. Cartesian Cogito style arguments would negate the likelihood of any further simplicity ;) .

[fromdownunder]

Only I exist. Occam's Razor is the simplest explanation for this.

Norm

[Guttersnipe]

Ah but solipsism isn't as explanatorily proficient as realism. Thus other minds aren't superfluous.

[mirage]

Only I exist. Occam's Razor is the simplest explanation for this.

Norm

It isn't. Because if a solipsistic "you" exists, it has all the complexity that you would usually attribute to the universe. Only you have to hallucinate it instead of experience it.

Solipsism is nearly identical in complexity to something like ontological realism, except that it makes a meaningless claim about the "nature" of everything. It says everything is "mental". What is that supposed to mean?

I know what a doggy is. One was pointed out to me long ago. I know what material things are too. They are things like the doggy and other stuff pointed out to me as a child.

Now what the hell does it mean to say all these things are actually part of my mind and not material? I can't understand that. They obviously are material, since they are the very objects I learnt the meaning of the term "material" from.

Solipsism (in common with all claims about the nature of everything) has a real problem demonstrating that its extra claims mean anything at all. Claims of no consequence are just the sort that the razor lops off.

[fromdownunder]

mirage, I think a "true" solipsist, if such an animal existed, would not find your argument compelling, because he/she is irrational from the start.

A counter by the "One True Solipsist" :-) could be "everything is this complex, because I want it to be - it makes "things" more interesting.

I know it does not make sense, but then, neither does the concept. And I do not believe all the rational arguments in the world would convince a true solipsist of the truth. It simply becomes unfalsifiable as a principle to anybody who could possibly believe in it.

And, of course, to those who don't (all of us?) it is only an interesting, and sometimes entertaining, if ultimately futile intellectual discussion.

Norm

[Foobear]

I, a philosophical neophyte, have been wondering about this as of late. Given the idea of solipsism, would not Occam's Razor necessarily regard it as superfluous? Or am I wrong?

No, because Occam's Razor doesn't prove anything, and it's a mistake to use it in proofs. It's a guideline, not a rule, though many people make that mistake.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

mirage, I think a "true" solipsist, if such an animal existed, would not find your argument compelling, because he/she is irrational from the start.The solipsist may not be rational, but he is rationalistic.

[mirage]

mirage, I think a "true" solipsist, if such an animal existed, would not find your argument compelling, because he/she is irrational from the start.Well whether a true solipsist is irrational or not, or finds an argument compelling or not hardly affects the validity of any criticism.

[mirage]

No, because Occam's Razor doesn't prove anything, and it's a mistake to use it in proofs. It's a guideline, not a rule, though many people make that mistake.

So of course you will be able to give at least one clear example where an indisputably less parsimonious account of all the evidence is also somehow the more rational one.

[untermensche]

So of course you will be able to give at least one clear example where an indisputably less parsimonious account of all the evidence is also somehow the more rational one.
But we have no way to compare the parsimony of the solipsist view, with another view.

How difficult is it to create a universe?

More difficult than making a universe in one brain?

[marzipan]

Solipsism is nearly identical in complexity to something like ontological realism, except that it makes a meaningless claim about the "nature" of everything. It says everything is "mental". What is that supposed to mean?

I know what a doggy is. One was pointed out to me long ago. I know what material things are too. They are things like the doggy and other stuff pointed out to me as a child.

Now what the hell does it mean to say all these things are actually part of my mind and not material? I can't understand that. They obviously are material, since they are the very objects I learnt the meaning of the term "material" from.
You seem confused as to the nature of material objects. It is one thing see something, and another to know it isnt an hallucination or some other vision emanating from the mind. You may even know what the things that you see are called, but this does not mean they exist anywhere but in the mind. Hallucinations may even appear real to other senses such as taste and touch. Merely because you believe something exists outside your mind, doesnt make it true

[mirage]

You seem confused as to the nature of material objects.Nope, I think I have a pretty good grip, thank you.

It is one thing see something, and another to know it isnt an hallucination or some other vision emanating from the mind. You may even know what the things that you see are called, but this does not mean they exist anywhere but in the mind.
Of course not. I never suggested that it did (assuming for a moment that it is a meaningful assertion).

However, "material objects" are the (stable, coherent) things I see and touch. Whether they exist within the mind or not. This is by virtue of how I learnt and understand the term, i.e. how it means more than "ectoplasm".

They are distinct as a category from the crazy things I see when I take loads of "recreational drugs." I call these hallucinations. (Or my friends, sometimes. I am particularly fond of Elephant man and pinko.)

Now, solipsism is saying that both these categories are subsets of a larger category that it vacuously (and meaninglessly, i.e. without ostensive grounding) calls mental.

Whether it is right or wrong, the distinct subsets still exist as epistemic categories, and we might as well use the normal names for them. We would just have mental "material" things and mental mental things.

The problem with saying that the two sets of a distinction are "really" just in one of those categories is when the distinction is made by constrast between the sets.

For example, if I learn goobles as one kind of thing, and greebles as everything that isn't a gooble, how can you meaningfully assert that everything is really a gooble? It just doesn't make sense in terms of the definitions. Whatever properties make a gooble a gooble define the term. And greebles by definition lack those properties. So what does it mean to say that they are all "really" goobles?

I learnt material as those solid, stable coherent objects I see routinely. That's what the term means, because that is how it is defined in practice. (It also has scientific senses that are defined in terms of experience, but by more convoluted means.)

An mental objects are ones that amongst other things lack these properties. So what does everything is mental actuall mean? Nothing that I can understand. I can't be shown what it means. That is to say the assertion is not grounded in ostensive reference.

Hallucinations may even appear real to other senses such as taste and touch. Merely because you believe something exists outside your mind, doesnt make it trueYes indeed. You will come to learn that if you think a statement of the obvious contradicts my points, the most likely explanation is that you have misunderstood the points.

[Foobear]

So of course you will be able to give at least one clear example where an indisputably less parsimonious account of all the evidence is also somehow the more rational one. Sure, as soon as you give me an example of any case that is indisputably less parsimonious that doesn't involve simply paring away irrelevant causes (such as relativity being a better explanation than relativity+aether). I'm sure you could come up with something arguably better, but indisputably? Only in cases where Explanation A is better than Explanation A+B.

This question is in fact one of the reasons why I have come to dislike the razor so much. People think that because they can assert that "The World Exists!" is somehow (and indefinably somehow) simpler than "I am a brain in a vat!" that it must therefore be true.

Bad, bad.

I think I'll coin a term: Fallacy by Razor.

[wiploc]

I, a philosophical neophyte, have been wondering about this as of late. Given the idea of solipsism, would not Occam's Razor necessarily regard it as superfluous? Or am I wrong?

Nothing refutes solipsism. It just isn't interesting or useful.

crc

[sweetiepie]

solipsism is fun, but alas, the external universe is built on a few (arguably) simple laws. the internal universe is made by cutting a very specific chunk out of the external universe, a chunk which includes all those laws.

[Foobear]

Nothing refutes solipsism. It just isn't interesting or useful.

crc Pragmatism refutes it as much as anything: Since there's no evidence for it, why worry about it? We should carry on as if it were false until such time as we have evidence it may be true (such if we see people in shiny black leather doing wirefu against shapeshifting cops).

[mirage]

Sure, as soon as you give me an example of any case that is indisputably less parsimonious that doesn't involve simply paring away irrelevant causes (such as relativity being a better explanation than relativity+aether). I'm sure you could come up with something arguably better, but indisputably? Only in cases where Explanation A is better than Explanation A+B.I'm glad that you are clearly stating here that it is not the principle you object to but rather the difficulty of objectively estimating parsimony in most cases. Good.

This question is in fact one of the reasons why I have come to dislike the razor so much. People think that because they can assert that "The World Exists!" is somehow (and indefinably somehow) simpler than "I am a brain in a vat!" that it must therefore be true.So the misuse and misunderstanding of a principle is a reason for dislike?

You called it "only a guide". Your actual position seems to be that it is an indisputable principle, but of very limited practical use.

This is true, to a large extent. However, it depends if you include the automatic, almost unconscious extremely obvious and clear parsimony judgements that we make every waking minute. You seem to regard obviousness also as grounds for objection. We mustn't forget that there are clear applications of the razor that remain disputed. God not being the least of them.

I think I'll coin a term: Fallacy by Razor.

Fallacy by misuse.

I also have come to dislike the theory of special relativity, which is "only a guide" because of how often I hear people say it means "everything is relative".

[Foobear]

Fallacy by misuse.

I also have come to dislike the theory of special relativity, which is "only a guide" because of how often I hear people say it means "everything is relative". Occam's Razor is only a guide. It never proves something is true, it simply is a guideline to direct our thinking away from wastes of time. It has been used in the past to deny the existence of things that were later found to be true, like meteorites.

As I said, the razor has two distinct uses in practice. The indisputable and obvious form in which we discard aether from the relativity and aether theory, and the incorrect form, in which people assign mystical probabilities to a theory being true looking only at the simplicity of a theory, and not any real life factors.

This question is a more extreme example of the second case. The world existing is less complicated than solipsism, therefore it must be true.

The razor, simply, cannot be used in a proof, and arguments like that set my teeth on edge.

As far as God, all it says is that since the theory of gravity works quite well without God, we don't need God in the theory of gravity. It doesn't disprove his existence, no matter what some people would like to think.

[untermensche]

The world existing is less complicated than solipsism, therefore it must be true.

What is the measurement of complication of each?

[wiploc]

Pragmatism refutes it as much as anything: Since there's no evidence for it, why worry about it?


Like I said, it's boring.



We should carry on as if it were false

There's no way to do that. If solipsism is false, then when you are hungry you should eat; but if solipsism is true, then when you think you are hungry you should think you eat. Same difference.



until such time as we have evidence it may be true


It is not the sort of thing that can have evidence for or against. That's why it's boring and useless.



(such if we see people in shiny black leather doing wirefu against shapeshifting cops).


Cute.

crc

[mirage]

Occam's Razor is only a guide. It never proves something is true, it simply is a guideline to direct our thinking away from wastes of time. It has been used in the past to deny the existence of things that were later found to be true, like meteorites.

As I said, the razor has two distinct uses in practice. The indisputable and obvious form in which we discard aether from the relativity and aether theory, and the incorrect form, in which people assign mystical probabilities to a theory being true looking only at the simplicity of a theory, and not any real life factors.

This question is a more extreme example of the second case. The world existing is less complicated than solipsism, therefore it must be true.

The razor, simply, cannot be used in a proof, and arguments like that set my teeth on edge.

As far as God, all it says is that since the theory of gravity works quite well without God, we don't need God in the theory of gravity. It doesn't disprove his existence, no matter what some people would like to think.
I think you are a little hung up on the concept of proof here.

No one sensible suggests that parsimony proves anything. It is a principle that tells us which hypothesis can be rationally favoured relative to current evidence.

If the evidence changes, then so does the most parsimonious account of it. An example of Occam leading to a hypothesis that later proves false is neither here nor there. That is how it is supposed to work.

Now, in the case of metaphysics we have some special cases. Namely accounts that no amount of extra evidence can affect in principle. This is true for solipism. Any experience we could have is compatible both with it and with its negation. It's what is called a hypothesis without observational consequence. If such a hypothesis can be demonstrated to require more information than an alternative we can confidently discard it. It is rather hard to demonstrate this clearly for solipsism, although I think it is reasonable to say that it predicts everything that non-solipsism does, except it adds an observationally inconsequent claim about the nature of everything. I would slice that off with the razor.

As to God, he is not only not required in the theory of gravity, he is not required in an account of any observations whatsoever, so he is not required in a theory of the world. I.e. the likelihood of his existence can't be rationally supported.

[Foobear]

No one sensible suggests that parsimony proves anything. Yes, exactly.

And yet this is how the razor is used over and over to my great annoyance.