Facts of the Future?

[mirage]

In an existence of God (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=174954) thread about the LPOE, bd (you know the one. he comes from king) referred me to an old thread about future realism in response to my suggesting that if you insist on a plurality of possible futures, there can be no fact of the matter about which will turn out. (I don't have a problem about facts of the matter for the future in general, just if you insist on all these possible worlds).

In the old thread he quoted Schwartz showing some problems for the alternative, i.e. regarding facts about the future only "becoming true" along with the events they describe. I don't think they have much force, so I'll go through the quote:

How might one try to rebut the premises of Aristotle's argument?

Proposal One: One might argue that propositions are not true in advance of the events described. Propositions 'become' true when the events described occur.

First objection to Proposal One: (i) Sirhan Sirhan killed Robert F. Kennedy. But when did it 'become true' that Sirhan Sirhan killed Kennedy? At the moment of his pulling the trigger? But the bullet was not yet lodged in Kennedy's body. At the time of the bullet's entering Kennedy's body? But Kennedy did not die immediately. He was rushed to a hospital when he died some hours later. At the moment of Kennedy's death? But at that moment Sirhan Sirhan was in the custody of police in a building remote from the hospital where Kennedy was. (This conundrum is the handiwork of Judith Jarvis Thomson. ) The point is that although it is clearly true that Sirhan Sirhan killed Kennedy, it is problematic to pin down an exact time (or even a candidate for the exact time) when Sirhan killed Kennedy and, by extension, when it 'became true' that Sirhan killed Kennedy. (ii) When did Germany lose World War II? When the Allies' invasion force landed on the beaches of Normandy? When British scientists and engineers invented and were able to use radar against the German Luftwaffe? When Alan Turing and his team broke the German secret code? When …?

The issues in the preceding paragraph strongly suggest that it will prove problematic in the extreme to try to put precise times on the (supposed) occurrence of a proposition's 'becoming true'.
This is not relevant. It doesn't matter if they have a precise time. If they reference an "event" or period without a well defined time boundary, the point at which they become true is precisely the point at which you have enough information to consider it true. I.e. the point at which you would decide the proposition true. Clearly this will vary from person to person, and even within one person from time to time.

We need only say that WW2 was won at some point between A and B, without specifying it precisely. It has still "become true".

Moreover, this vagueness is still a problem if you consider propositions eternally true. Was WW2 won? Yes, certainly. Was it won in sometime? Yes. When was it won? Er...it was won over a period. OK, what period? Er....When is someone correct for a goody to say "the war has been won now"?

This particular problem of reference does not impact the argument either way.

Moreover, propositions are supposed to be abstract entities, entities which do not exist in space and time;Hang on. We are not talking about propositions. We are talking about truth values. The one does not have to be part of the other.

but if they do not exist in time, how can their properties change – from being neither true nor false to being true (or to being false as the case may be) – at some particular time?1. Why the hell shouldn't they. Just because it disagrees with Frege's scheme (or whoever)?

2. It seems pretty absurd to me to consider a truth value as an intrinsic property of a proposition. It makes much more sense to consider the truth a relation between the proposition and the "truth maker" state of affairs. (I'm just going with a correspondence type theory of truth for simplicity here. In a working theory, like coherentism, it would be a relational property between the propositions and the total evidence or other beliefs.) If it is a relation between proposition and truth maker, then with a multiplicity of future possible worlds you have a multiple relation.

Second objection to Proposal One: We do, in a great many cases, routinely ascribe truth to propositions about future events. (iii) Each year the Children's Hospital in Vancouver has a lottery in which the grand prize is a new 'prestige home'. Persons buy tickets on the firm belief that some winning ticket will be drawn.Bzzzt! A belief is not a fact of the matter. No ticket might be drawn.

If the Hospital deliberately failed to draw a ticket, on the scheduled date, from the pool of purchased tickets, all those who had purchased a ticket could rightly claim that the hospital had been lying, i.e. had been asserting false propositions. The ticket-holders had all assumed that the proposition "Some winning ticket will be drawn on the scheduled date" was true, weeks before the scheduled date.But they don't need to assume it is true of false. They just need to believe it will happen. Yes, we can rephrase that "believe that it is true that it will happen" but this is a really very superficial objection.

[ (iv) It is true today that there will a US presidential election in 2048. And (v) it is demonstrably true now that there will be a total solar eclipse, over parts of Libya and Turkey, on 30 April 2060.No it isn't. Not with mathematical certainty, and the truth is always true, not just most of the time.

Third objection to Proposal One: To argue that propositions about the future acquire a truth-value only when the described event occurs (i.e. in the future) will entail abandoning the logical law (/principle) of the excluded middle: propositions about the future will not, then, have truth-values now, i.e. prior to the occurrence of the predicted event.
Question begging, but quite hard to diagnose in yourself, to be fair to Schwartz.

If there is a multiplicity of possible futures, then there is no particular "the" future. The law of the excluded middle is no more violated than if I say "The" Frenchman is an onion seller.

Adopting Proposal One would require our creating a far more complicated logic. This is not to say that this proposed solution is completely without merit; but it is to say that we ought to try to find some other solution before resorting to such a major revision of logic.No, the reasoning there is all wrong.

The simple way to keep facts about the future, which I use every day, is to use an eternal block universe view like physicists often talk about. (The determinate language already assumes this anyway after all.) There are not a multiplicity of possible futures, except in our predictive world models. I.e. the indeterminateness and randomness are epistemic. (which is all they can be demonstrated to be anyway.)

No problems with that whatsoever. In fact, since the only type of randomness we can distinguish is epistemic, it is actually meaningless to say that the world is "really" deterministic or indeterministic. These distinctions are without observational consequence. They are not thought through. They are without meaning.

[Witt]

There cannot be facts of the future!!

[untermensche]

But when did it 'become true' that Sirhan Sirhan killed Kennedy?
The moment Kennedy died.

[RexT]

The moment Kennedy died.
Yet, how would you define or pinpoint the moment of death?

Rex

[untermensche]

Yet, how would you define or pinpoint the moment of death?

Rex
When cell three in quadrant two of the hypocampus orders it.

But perhaps there is always one moment of no return.

[RexT]

When cell three in quadrant two of the hypocampus orders it.

But perhaps there is always one moment of no return.
That sounds rather mystical.

Rex

[untermensche]

That sounds rather mystical.

Rex
If you stand on a cliff and ever so slowly lean forward, there would eventually be a moment of no return.

It sounds physical to me.

[mirage]

The point is that if the precise time of an event is ill defined, yet it is agreed it occurred within some rough period, then the truth of a proposition about that event may also come into being within that period, but with an ill defined time.

All the point demonstrates is that we have ill defined events. Clearly the truth of an ill defined proposition depends on how it is interpreted. And that is true whether truth values are eternal or temporal.

[RexT]

The point is that if the precise time of an event is ill defined, yet it is agreed it occurred within some rough period, then the truth of a proposition about that event may also come into being within that period, but with an ill defined time.

All the point demonstrates is that we have ill defined events. Clearly the truth of an ill defined proposition depends on how it is interpreted. And that is true whether truth values are eternal or temporal.
Physics is equally ill defined, as you put it, since it is impossible to define the exact location and energy of a particle at the same moment. But then, it sould be no surprise that moments too would be defined within some probability range. As with physics, it presents no practical problem, for the range is imperceptible.

Rex

[Breath]

The ontological status of future is that it is possible. In the absence of a realised possibility there is no fact. A future fact is a contradiction in terms.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

(iv) It is true today that there will a US presidential election in 2048.No it isn't. Not with mathematical certainty, and the truth is always true, not just most of the time.It is probably true, but not certainly true. But it is certainly either true or false. If it is true, it is true now.

[Breath]

It is probably true, but not certainly true. But it is certainly either true or false. If it is true, it is true now.

If in 2046 the moon impacts the Earth, it will be neither true or false that there will be presidential elections in the USA in 2048.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

If in 2046 the moon impacts the Earth, it will be neither true or false that there will be presidential elections in the USA in 2048.Not false? Can you explain? Next thing you'll be telling me that it is neither true of false that the present king of France is bald.

[Berthold]

Not false? Can you explain? Next thing you'll be telling me that it is neither true of false that the present king of France is bald.
(my emphasis)
That, indeed, looks a bit difficult to solve.

[untermensche]

Not false? Can you explain? Next thing you'll be telling me that it is neither true of false that the present king of France is bald.
If we have this logic to lead the topic:
Proposal One: One might argue that propositions are not true in advance of the events described. Propositions 'become' true when the events described occur.

If a true proposition is not really a true proposition, then a false one cannot really be false.

And the future is not really the future?

[Preno]

I'd say a proposition p of the form "X will happen at a certain [specified or unspecified] time in the future" is true if and only if it is not possible that X will not happen at a certain [specified or unspecified] time in the future.

[untermensche]

I'd say a proposition p of the form "X will happen at a certain [specified or unspecified] time in the future" is true if and only if it is not possible that X will not happen at a certain [specified or unspecified] time in the future.
If I say; When I drop this pen, it will fall to the floor, and it does. What is the proposition?

A true proposition, a false proposition?

Is there really a doubt?

[David B]

There cannot be facts of the future!!

Will that be a fact tomorrow?

David B

[Preno]

If I say; When I drop this pen, it will fall to the floor, and it does. What is the proposition?

A true proposition, a false proposition?

Is there really a doubt?True, under any sensible understanding of truth. It's not really a statement about the future (at least not a pure statement about the future), it's a future conditional. Your conditional is equivalent to saying "When I drop this pen, it falls down". I'm not quite sure whether it's a good idea to count it as a statement about the future. Be that as it may, the proposition is true.

A true "pure" future statement might be something like "tomorrow, no human [born on Earth] will visit the Andromeda galaxy".

(Btw, you are reading into what I say again - I haven't said nor implied that there must be a doubt about future statements)

[Edit]Of course, it is imaginable that someone will discover a faster-than-light spacecraft and go to the Andromeda galaxy tomorrow. But at any rate, it makes as much sense to say that "tomorrow, no human will visit the Andromeda galaxy" is true as it does to say that "no object may go faster than the speed of light" is true. And since the latter statement is not usually seen as problematic with respect to truth-aptness, I don't see why the former should be.

[untermensche]

True, under any sensible understanding of truth. It's not really a statement about the future (at least not a pure statement about the future), it's a future conditional. Your conditional is equivalent to saying "When I drop this pen, it falls down". I'm not quite sure whether it's a good idea to count it as a statement about the future. Be that as it may, the proposition is true.

A true "pure" future statement might be something like "tomorrow, no human [born on Earth] will visit the Andromeda galaxy".

(Btw, you are reading into what I say again - I haven't said nor implied that there must be a doubt about future statements)
Please explain this difference between pure and conditional statements about the future.

Which ones are not conditional?

[Preno]

Please explain this difference between pure and conditional statements about the future?

Which ones are not conditional?Those that are not of the form "if p then q".

[Preno]

There are propositions about the future that are consequences of "timeless" propositions (of the order of "the speed of light is ...km/s" or "iron conducts electricity"). Your example with the pen or my example with Andromeda are among them. One cannot doubt those future propositions without doubting the "timeless" propositions or some past propositions. And if we cannot say that "water freezes in normal conditions at 0 degrees" is true, then we must have an odd concept of truth.

[untermensche]

Those that are not of the form "if p then q".
A true "pure" future statement might be something like "tomorrow, no human [born on Earth] will visit the Andromeda galaxy".

If no human visits the Andromeda galaxy, then no human will visit the Andromeda galaxy.

Is that not a proper presentation of your proposition.

[Preno]

If no human visits the Andromeda galaxy, then no human will visit the Andromeda galaxy.

Is that not a proper presentation of your proposition.Huh? When did I say or imply that "if not human visits the Andromeda galaxy tomorrow, then no human will visit the Andromeda galaxy tomorrow"? I said that the proposition "tomorrow, no human [born on Earth] will visit the Andromeda galaxy" is true (because "no object can go faster than the speed of light" is true and "the Andromeda galaxy is more than 2 million light years away from Earth" is true).

[untermensche]

Huh? When did I say or imply that "if not human visits the Andromeda galaxy tomorrow, then no human will visit the Andromeda galaxy tomorrow"? I said that the proposition "tomorrow, no human [born on Earth] will visit the Andromeda galaxy" is true (because "no object can go faster than the speed of light" is true and "the Andromeda galaxy is more than 2 million light years away from Earth" is true).
Isn't buried within your declarative then:

If no human can travel faster than the speed of light tomorrow, then none will travel to the Andromeda galaxy.

My point is, I think any statement of the future has to be contingent in some way.

[Preno]

Isn't buried within your declarative then:

If no human can travel faster than the speed of light tomorrow, then none will travel to the Andromeda galaxy.

My point is, I think any statement of the future has to be contingent in some way.Yes, it is buried in it. However, since it is true that "no human can travel faster than the speed of light", it is also true that "no human will travel faster than the speed of light tomorrow". My example of a future proposition is contigent exactly in the same way that "it is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light" is, and it seems that the same kinds of objections that apply to "it is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light" apply to statements "in normal conditions, water freezes at 0 degrees". It is, of course, it some meaning of the word, "possible" that tomorrow, the speed of light will increase 10 thousand times - in the same meaning that "possible" has in the statement "it is possible that in three seconds from posting this, a gigantic triceratops will appear from the middle of nowhere and eat me". That is, it is imaginable, of course, but I don't see much point in extending the meaning of the word possible to include these cases. Possibility is usually thought to be bound by physical laws.
(Note that it is also "possible" that everybody's memories have been implanted artificially by an alien race and that Kennedy was never assassinated - however, it is useless to consider this as a "possibility". The same method could be used to doubt every statement. If we are to construct a sensible notion of truth, we need to exclude such "imaginable" but "wildly improbable" scenarios.)

[mirage]

I think we can simplify this down to considering just the truth values of contingent propositions.

So if you consider it impossible that physics change tomorrow, then statements about c would not be contingent, but whether an atom decays might be.

[untermensche]

Yes, it is buried in it. However, since it is true that "no human can travel faster than the speed of light", it is also true that "no human will travel faster than the speed of light tomorrow". My example of a future proposition is contigent exactly in the same way that "it is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light" is, and it seems that the same kinds of objections that apply to "it is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light" apply to statements "in normal conditions, water freezes at 0 degrees". It is, of course, it some meaning of the word, "possible" that tomorrow, the speed of light will increase 10 thousand times - in the same meaning that "possible" has in the statement "it is possible that in three seconds from posting this, a gigantic triceratops will appear from the middle of nowhere and eat me". That is, it is imaginable, of course, but I don't see much point in extending the meaning of the word possible to include these cases. Possibility is usually thought to be bound by physical laws.
(Note that it is also "possible" that everybody's memories have been implanted artificially by an alien race and that Kennedy was never assassinated - however, it is useless to consider this as a "possibility". The same method could be used to doubt every statement. If we are to construct a sensible notion of truth, we need to exclude such "imaginable" but "wildly improbable" scenarios.)
It is not absolute truth that a human cannot travel faster than the speed of light.

Wormholes.

[David B]

Isn't buried within your declarative then:

If no human can travel faster than the speed of light tomorrow, then none will travel to the Andromeda galaxy.

My point is, I think any statement of the future has to be contingent in some way.

Well of course most statements of the future have to be contingent in some way. Most of them will be contingent on Yellowstone becoming a supervolcano tomorrow, as well as contingent on a gamma ray burst event happening astronomically close to us, and not kicking in tomorrow.

What about the statement about the future 'oblivion looms, for the mental construct that is David B'.

What is that contingent on?

That doesn't involve special pleading.

David B

[untermensche]

What about the statement about the future 'oblivion looms, for the mental construct that is David B'.

What is that contingent on?

Oblivion?

Are you certain?

[David B]

Oblivion?

Are you certain?

Everything points that way.

Any claim to the contrary seems to me an extraordinary claim.

Good rule of thumb - extraordinary claims demand extraordinary proof.

Got any?

David B

[untermensche]

Everything points that way.

Any claim to the contrary seems to me an extraordinary claim.

Good rule of thumb - extraordinary claims demand extraordinary proof.

Got any?

David B
It is unlikely because it has been proven that what you are is the activity of your brain?

[David B]

It is unlikely because it has been proven that what you are is the activity of your brain?

Proven? No.

Lots of things pointing that way?

Yes!

David B

[untermensche]

Proven? No.

Lots of things pointing that way?

Yes!

David B
Lots of things pointing?

What things?

[Preno]

It is not absolute truth that a human cannot travel faster than the speed of light.

Wormholes.First, wormholes are science fiction. Second, wormholes do not allow you to travel faster than the speed of light (although they may allow you to get to the Andromeda galaxy, so perhaps I should say "tomorrow, no human will travel faster than the speed of light" instead, fi you want to consider wormholes).

[untermensche]

First, wormholes are science fiction. Second, wormholes do not allow you to travel faster than the speed of light (although they may allow you to get to the Andromeda galaxy, so perhaps I should say "tomorrow, no human will travel faster than the speed of light" instead, fi you want to consider wormholes).
They would move faster than the speed of light with a wormhole.

You would get to a place faster than light would get there.

That is faster.

[Preno]

They would move faster than the speed of light with a wormhole.

You would get to a place faster than light would get there.

That is faster.To move faster than light means that your speed is greater than c.

And anyway, light going through the wormhole would get there before you.

[untermensche]

No, it isn't. To move faster than light means that your speed is greater than c. It does not necessarily mean "to get to a place faster than light would get there" (and anyway, light going through the wormhole would get there before you).
So if I get to a destination faster than some light gets there, I have not traveled faster than some light?

[Breath]

Not false? Can you explain? Next thing you'll be telling me that it is neither true of false that the present king of France is bald.

In classical logic, for laws of bivalence, excluded middle or non-contradiction to apply, you need to have a proposition to apply them to.

I would argue that propositions that are meaningless are not propositions.

"There is a present king of France" is meaningful, and a proposition.
"The present king of France is X" is not meaningful for any X.


A well-written computer program flags input errors before it attempts to resolve what is unresolvable. Shit in => Shit out is a useful adage outside of programming as well.

[Breath]

Will that be a fact tomorrow?

David B

In the absence of tomorrow, it is a moot point whether there will be facts.

[Preno]

So if I get to a destination faster than some light gets there, I have not traveled faster than some light?Certainly not if the light goes the longer way. No matter how you phrase it, it's not true. Say you want to get from A to B and you compete with a runner. If the runner runs around the 5 kms in 16 minutes and you, taking a shortcut (say, jumping over a wall), go at a leasurely speed of only 1 km in 15 minutes and you get there first, it would be absurd to say that your speed was greater than the speed of the runner. It wasn't, you just went the shorter way.

[untermensche]

Certainly not if the light goes the longer way. No matter how you phrase it, it's not true. Say you want to get from A to B and you compete with a runner. If the runner runs around the 5 kms in 16 minutes and you, taking a shortcut (say, jumping over a wall), go at a leasurely speed of only 1 km in 15 minutes and you get there first, it would be absurd to say that your speed was greater than the speed of the runner. It wasn't, you just went the shorter way.
I do not have a greater velocity than light, but I can travel to destinations faster than light with my secret backdoor wormhole.

So traveling to destinations faster than light is in effect being faster than light.

If light and me were in a race, I would win. I would get the gold medal. I would have the world record.

[David B]

Lots of things pointing?

What things?

Things that would be a derail of this thread.

Want to start a new one?

David B

[Preno]

I do not have a greater velocity than light, but I can travel to destinations faster than light with my secret backdoor wormhole.

So traveling to destinations faster than light is in effect being faster than light.

If light and me were in a race, I would win. I would get the gold medal. I would have the world record.Stop abusing words. Even when you go through a wormhole, your speed will not be higher than c. End of argument (because there is nothing to argue about).

[untermensche]

Things that would be a derail of this thread.

Want to start a new one?

David B
No need. Personally I think that within the Theory of Evolution is enough evidence that nothing besides the materials available on the earth were used to construct all life. No "magic" substances are needed, to include them would be a violation of parsimony.

I was just wondering if you had some other argument or approach.

I still think your statement is contingent on humans having absolute knowledge though.

[untermensche]

Stop abusing words. Even when you go through a wormhole, your speed will not be higher than c. End of argument (because there is nothing to argue about).
I would still get there faster than light.

So your statement about the future is contingent on me not taking my worm hole.

[Preno]

I would still get there faster than light.

So your statement about the future is contingent on me not taking my worm hole.Yes, except my statement was "tomorrow, no human being will go faster than the speed of light". Speed is the derivation of position with respect to time.

If you want to play semantics, I think I have you beaten.

[untermensche]

Yes, except my statement was "tomorrow, no human being will go faster than the speed of light". Speed is the derivation of position with respect to time.

If you want to play semantics, I think I have you beaten.
This of course is contingent on whether or not it is really true that nothing can go beyond the speed of light.

Are you saying it is true beyond any doubt?

[untermensche]

Ultimately every future event is contingent on their being a future.

Every single bit of the universe could suddenly vanish the next moment.

Some say the universe just happened.

If so, it can just unhappen.

[Preno]

This of course is contingent on whether or not it is really true that nothing can go beyond the speed of light.Well, of course. That's what I was claiming from the start, so we could have saved ourselves this useless excursion into the matter of wormholes.

Let me quote myself:
My example of a future proposition is contigent exactly in the same way that "it is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light" is, and it seems that the same kinds of objections that apply to "it is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light" apply to statements "in normal conditions, water freezes at 0 degrees". It is, of course, it some meaning of the word, "possible" that tomorrow, the speed of light will increase 10 thousand times - in the same meaning that "possible" has in the statement "it is possible that in three seconds from posting this, a gigantic triceratops will appear from the middle of nowhere and eat me". That is, it is imaginable, of course, but I don't see much point in extending the meaning of the word possible to include these cases. Possibility is usually thought to be bound by physical laws.
(Note that it is also "possible" that everybody's memories have been implanted artificially by an alien race and that Kennedy was never assassinated - however, it is useless to consider this as a "possibility". The same method could be used to doubt every statement. If we are to construct a sensible notion of truth, we need to exclude such "imaginable" but "wildly improbable" scenarios.)If you consider everything that is imaginable as 'possible', then the same criticism can be applied to every non-analytical proposition.

[untermensche]

Well, of course. That's what I was claiming from the start, so we could have saved ourselves this useless excursion into the matter of wormholes.

Let me quote myself:
If you consider everything that is imaginable as 'possible', then the same criticism can be applied to every non-analytical proposition.
It is you claiming something impossible.

[Preno]

Namely? :huh:

Please, when claiming I'm wrong, at least try to specify where (if you are reluctant to specify why). Otherwise, there's little point in arguing.

[untermensche]

Namely? :huh:

Please, when claiming I'm wrong, at least try to specify where (if you are reluctant to specify why). Otherwise, there's little point in arguing.
YOU are claiming you know for a fact it will be impossible to travel faster than the speed of light tomorrow.

[Preno]

I am claiming that the statement is no more problematic than the statement "it is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light", which in turn is no more problematic than "under normal conditions, water freezes at 0 degrees". If you find the last statement questionable, then you are bound to found the original statement questionable, too. And if you claim that "everything is possible" and thus the original statement is questionable, you can apply the same argument to statements about the past. However, since I have never noticed you applying that argument to past statements, I assumed that you had no problems with statements like "I ate bread yesterday".

[untermensche]

I am claiming that the statement is no more problematic than the statement "it is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light", which in turn is no more problematic than "under normal conditions, water freezes at 0 degrees". If you find the last statement questionable, then you are bound to found the original statement questionable, too. And if you claim that "everything is possible" and thus the original statement is questionable, you can apply the same argument to statements about the past. However, since I have never noticed you applying that argument to past statements, I assumed that you had no problems with statements like "I ate bread yesterday".
You do not know for a fact that it is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light.

No matter how many times you CLAIM to know it for a fact.

[Preno]

You do not know for a fact that it is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light.

No matter how many times you CLAIM to know it for a fact.Perhaps, but then you do not know whether you ate bread tomorrow.

Such a concept of "knowing" is not even false, it is, simply put, useless/absurd/stupid (whichever you prefer). Of course I don't "know" in your sense of the word, that's self-apparent, however, I know in the sense in which the word is normally used.

By the way, how do you know what argument I was making? Perhaps it was just a hallucination, right? The very fact that you are replying to me implies that you consider certains statements which you do not know (in your sense of the word) are true as true.

[untermensche]

Perhaps, but then you do not know whether you ate bread tomorrow.

Such a concept of "knowing" is not even false, it is, simply put, useless/absurd/stupid (whichever you prefer). Of course I don't "know" in your sense of the word, that's self-apparent, however, I know in the sense in which the word is normally used.

By the way, how do you know what argument I was making? Perhaps it was just a hallucination, right? The very fact that you are replying to me implies that you consider certains statements which you do not know (in your sense of the word) are true as true.
Do you think this somehow is not just a more ellaborate CLAIM?

[Preno]

Do you think this somehow is not just a more ellaborate CLAIM?Yes, I do. Every statement of mine is a claim (whether elaborate or not). The statement "this is not a tyrannosaurus, but my watch" is a claim, too.

[untermensche]

In 1700 a man could, like you, claim it is impossible for men to achieve sustained controlled flight.

The technology didn't exist to break through this apparent impossibility.

But when that more technologically advanced civilization lands on earth tomorrow with their technology that propels them faster than light, and brings us both to the andromeda galaxy in it, won't that be fun?

[Preno]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In 1700 a man could, like you, claim it is impossible for men to achieve sustained controlled flight.

The technology didn't exist to break through this apparent impossibility.

But when that more technologically advanced civilization lands on earth tomorrow with their technology that propels them faster than light, and brings us both to the andromeda galaxy in it, won't that be fun?Yes, that's possible (in some sense of the word). I can imagine a scenario in which tomorrow, an advanced civilization lands on Earth and takes us on a trip to the Andromeda galaxy. I can also imagine that a God exists. However, I consider both of these so wildly improbable that I don't bother considering them at all when I speak of possibility. If you want to, you can, of course, but I think that in order for philosophical discourse to be at least somewhat interesting and relevant, it is better to consider that possibility is in some sense limited - by physical laws, for example.

Notice that in order to be able to make science, you must not only question, but also consider certain statements true. If Newton didn't consider Galileo's transformation true and instead kept questioniong it indefinitely, we would never arrive at the theory of relativity.

[untermensche]

Yes, that's possible (in some sense of the word). I can imagine a scenario in which tomorrow, an advanced civilization lands on Earth and takes us on a trip to the Andromeda galaxy. I can also imagine that a God exists. However, I consider both of these so wildly improbable that I don't bother considering them at all when I speak of possibility. If you want to, you can, of course, but I think that in order for philosophical discourse to be at least somewhat interesting and relevant, it is better to consider that possibility is in some sense limited - by physical laws, for example.

Notice that in order to be able to make science, you must not only question, but also consider certain statements true. If Newton didn't consider Galileo's transformation true and instead kept questioniong it indefinitely, we would never arrive at the theory of relativity.
You want to stretch remote possibility into meaning impossibility.

You have no such powers.

[Preno]

You want to stretch remote possibility into meaning impossibility.

You have no such powers.No, I just want to create a useful notion of truth.

[untermensche]

No, I just want to create a useful notion of truth.
But you do it by claiming knowledge you do not have. Like knowledge of what the universe will definitely be like tomorrow.

Which does not make it any less useful.

[Preno]

But you do it by claiming knowledge you do not have. Like knowledge of what the universe will definitely be like tomorrow.

Which does not make it any less useful.If one could not consider statements like "the universe will be like tomorrow" true, one could hardly consider any statement true. It would be impossible to do science, for example, or to make plans for the weekend. Yes, I don't know "definitely" but there are very strong indications. If you want, you can doubt whether there will even be a tomorrow. I find such doubts useless and a concept of truth that incorporates them as equally useless.

That, of course, doesn't mean you aren't free to consider the possibility that before you finish reading this post, a gigantic triceratops will appear in front of you and eat you alive. I choose to ignore such "possibilities".

[untermensche]

If one could not consider statements like "the universe will be like tomorrow" true, one could hardly consider any statement true. It would be impossible to do science, for example, or to make plans for the weekend. Yes, I don't know "definitely" but there are very strong indications. If you want, you can doubt whether there will even be a tomorrow. I find such doubts useless and a concept of truth that incorporates them as equally useless.

That, of course, doesn't mean you aren't free to consider the possibility that before you finish reading this post, a gigantic triceratops will appear in front of you and eat you alive. I choose to ignore such "possibilities".
Ultimately we are dicussing two things.

You are looking for some definition of practical or useful knowledge, which I don't think you have, while I am looking for a defintion of certain knowledge, which is much easier.

[jaboteer]

I am jumping in like this:

Any continuous stream of information predicts a future.

Continuous streams of information advertise a future. What is future? What is continuous? Two small questions that I am currently unqualified to broach.

[Preno]

Ultimately we are dicussing two things.

You are looking for some definition of practical or useful knowledge, which I don't think you have, while I am looking for a defintion of certain knowledge, which is much easier.Yes, we are discussing two things. I am talking about knowledge in the sense in which it is usually used, and you are talking about something like "knowledge beyond doubt" (which is an impossibility, at least according to what seems to be your understanding of "doubt"). In order to be able to live, one needs to assume the truth of certain statements that you exclude from the scope of truth (for example, that I will not be eaten by a tyrannosaurus today or that my address is such and such or that gravity won't suddenly stop working tomorrow).

[sweetiepie]

Moreover, this vagueness is still a problem if you consider propositions eternally true. Was WW2 won? Yes, certainly. Was it won in sometime? Yes. When was it won? Er...it was won over a period. OK, what period? Er....When is someone correct for a goody to say "the war has been won now"?
It sounds fuzzy to me.

if it's true in France that I am in France, then isn't it also true in Spain that I am in France? If it isn't, could we just say, then Isn't it still everywhere true, "it is true that in France that I am in France and false in Spain that I am in France."

If truth to a proposition is not invariant, across all times, places, colors, etc. than there is another proposition, that includes the first, that is.

[untermensche]

Yes, we are discussing two things. I am talking about knowledge in the sense in which it is usually used, and you are talking about something like "knowledge beyond doubt" (which is an impossibility, at least according to what seems to be your understanding of "doubt"). In order to be able to live, one needs to assume the truth of certain statements that you exclude from the scope of truth (for example, that I will not be eaten by a tyrannosaurus today or that my address is such and such or that gravity won't suddenly stop working tomorrow).
Yes, beyond doubt, an impossibility.

And I say this is usefull knowledge.

Especially when dealing with some who claim certain types of knowledge beyond doubt.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

In classical logic, for laws of bivalence, excluded middle or non-contradiction to apply, you need to have a proposition to apply them to.

I would argue that propositions that are meaningless are not propositions.

"There is a present king of France" is meaningful, and a proposition.
"The present king of France is X" is not meaningful for any X.
Per Russell's theory of descriptions, "The present king of France is bald" unpacks, more or less, as two assertions:

There is a present king of France.
He is bald.

Russell says the proposition is false.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_descriptions

I am not so bold as to argue this question one way or another, but I do suggest caution against dogmatic, overconfident assertions.

[Preno]

Yes, beyond doubt, an impossibility.

And I say this is usefull knowledge.

Especially when dealing with some who claim certain types of knowledge beyond doubt.How is it useful to consider the possibility that 10 seconds from now I will be eaten by a triceratops? :huh:

[untermensche]

How is it useful to consider the possibility that 10 seconds from now I will be eaten by a triceratops? :huh:
That is not a claim where knowing people do not have absolute knowledge is much help.

But how about this absolute knowledge?

"We are going to bring democracy to Iraq."

[Breath]

Per Russell's theory of descriptions, "The present king of France is bald" unpacks, more or less, as two assertions:

There is a present king of France.
He is bald.

Russell says the proposition is false.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_descriptions

I am not so bold as to argue this question one way or another, but I do suggest caution against dogmatic, overconfident assertions.

Do you think Russell is defining what it should mean to be false, or is he observing what it is to be false? Do you think the law of excluded middle is a definition or an observation?

And in the case of the present king of France, would you say that the present king of France = the present king of France?

[Hoodoo Ulove]

Do you think Russell is defining what it should mean to be false, or is he observing what it is to be false? No and no. I think he takes if for granted that we understand what it means that "there is a present king of France" is false, and I think he's right. Do you think the law of excluded middle is a definition or an observation?An observation about the suppositions underlying propositions.And in the case of the present king of France, would you say that the present king of France = the present king of France?Is this a trick question?

[Breath]

No and no. I think he takes if for granted that we understand what it means that "there is a present king of France" is false, and I think he's right.

I agree with him. But I do not agree with him if he contends that "the present king of France is bald" is false.



would you say that the present king of France = the present king of France

Is this a trick question?

Not in the least. I would love to read your thoughts on the matter.

[Hoodoo Ulove]

Not in the least. I would love to read your thoughts on the matter.Well, it's a damn puzzling question, along the lines of does 1/0=1/0. Dunno.

[kennethamy]

I agree with him. But I do not agree with him if he contends that "the present king of France is bald" is false.



Not in the least. I would love to read your thoughts on the matter.

The present King of France=The Present King of France, implies that there is a present King of France. Therefore, it is false. In Principia Mathematica speak, x=x is another expression for x exists.

Those are PM's thoughts on the matter.

[Preno]

That is not a claim where knowing people do not have absolute knowledge is much help.

But how about this absolute knowledge?

"We are going to bring democracy to Iraq."What about it? I didn't consider any similar statements as true or false.

[untermensche]

What about it? I didn't consider any similar statements as true or false.
I didn't say you did.

I merely said that knowing people do not have absolute knowledge of the future can be useful.

[jaboteer]

How is it useful to consider the possibility that 10 seconds from now I will be eaten by a triceratops? :huh:Where did you learn of this ten second window of opportunity for whatever is a triceratops?

Once the future is not advertised why stress yourself? It may be easier to think some gunman will aim your way within the next month or three, if you are currently absorbed by the stress of living in Montreal...

[jaboteer]

"We are going to bring democracy to Iraq."The future was advertised when the coalition sent two hundred thousand trained killers to recieve flowers and share candy to children. The only thing they (the troops) managed to share was their killer instincts, and look how easily that has now spread across Iraq!

[jaboteer]

...

And in the case of the present king of France, would you say that the present king of France = the present king of France?Sorry to butt in, but was there ever a term invented called schizophrenic logic which describes a full discontinuity like it is a continuous real whole$

[Preno]

I merely said that knowing people do not have absolute knowledge of the future can be useful.Yes, it can be, in some cases.
Where did you learn of this ten second window of opportunity for whatever is a triceratops?What do you mean "where did you learn of it"? I just made it up. Btw, triceratops is a kind of dinosaur.

[jaboteer]

I agree with him. But I do not agree with him if he contends that "the present king of France is bald" is false.
...
I would not call that an autonomous proposition. I might venture a guess that around 1801, such a statement would have brought gusts of laughter from the plebs, perhaps even associating bald with shaved off!

[jaboteer]

What do you mean "where did you learn of it"? I just made it up. Btw, triceratops is a kind of dinosaur.Does that make it an Ad Hominem :D

Ok so triceratops was a real dinosaur, thanks, those pages of history are in other peoples's minds :D :D

[jaboteer]

I didn't say you did.

I merely said that knowing people do not have absolute knowledge of the future can be useful.Assuming nominal understanding and knowledge - how much extension or extrapolation do you use in terming future?

[untermensche]

Assuming nominal understanding and knowledge - how much extension or extrapolation do you use in terming future?
Assuming the remotest possibility of aliens invading tomorrow only requires normal understanding.

[jaboteer]

A fact of the future is: it's impending...