metaphysical naturalism?

[angela2]

Yesterday one of the mods wrote that the philosophy of this site is metaphysical naturalism. Can someone recommend an accurate site where I could read about it?

Last night I read how some atheists hate Christianity and want to wipe it out. I wonder, Is hatred a principle of this philosophy?

[post tenebras lux]

Hi angela2, you could always start with the wiki entry -> metaphysical_naturalism. Metaphysical naturalism is any worldview in which nature is all there is and nothing supernatural exists.

[angela2]

Hi angela2, you could always start with the wiki entry -> metaphysical_naturalism.
I looked at the wiki entry. It doesn't seem to be very even-handed. Anybody who can write off Plantinga in a few sentences is demonstrating that they brought presuppositions to the discussion.

[David B]

Yesterday one of the mods wrote that the philosophy of this site is metaphysical naturalism. Can someone recommend an accurate site where I could read about it?

Well, there's this one

http://www.infidels.org/

Last night I read how some atheists hate Christianity and want to wipe it out. I wonder, Is hatred a principle of this philosophy?

Where was that?

I don't think that it is just christianity that some of us hate - we are equal opportunity haters, including mormonism, Islam....but that is a little ongue in cheek.

More seriously, in my view, it is the terrible things that the worst aspects of the various religions do that are hateable.

The damage to families - which you may know is very scriptural. And the hurt and damage to individuals that follow from that.

The contempt for values like life and personal freedom that those who have killed in the name of anti abortionism.

The mindnumbingly stupid things that some believers think, and their contempt for the genuine search for understanding of life, the universe, and everything that science, more or less well, provides.

Of course, one can argue with some justice that some secular ideologies have the same effect - Leninism and fascism, for example.

To which I would respond that many forms of religion (not all) are subsets of ideologies, and ideologies are best avoided.

Let's see if I can come up quickly with a few examples.

This for a start - a collection of communications to an ex mormon website.

Lots of mail from people of faith. I find it very sad that people are driven by faith to think like this.

http://www.exmormon.org/lovemor14.htm

Then you might look at juxtaposing the views of this site which is critical of the poplar and powerful (especially in India) guru Sai Baba

http://www.saiguru.net/english/news/index.htm

with the official site of him, and ponder the harm that faith can do

http://www.srisathyasai.org.in/

And also, if you think a little hyperbole in talking about what people dislike is a specifically naturalistic trait, you might look at this. Lots of hate in here.

http://www.fstdt.com/

while also taking note of the mindnumbingly stupid things that faith leads lots of people to say.

Personally, I'm morally outraged by a lot of the things I find on these links - to the point where I feel that those not so marally outraged are morally lacking in some way.

David B (sees nothing in naturalism against hating the hateful)

[mirage]

I looked at the wiki entry. It doesn't seem to be very even-handed. Anybody who can write off Plantinga in a few sentences is demonstrating that they brought presuppositions to the discussion.

I don't think so. It is pretty easy really. Just point out that he hasn't presented a well defined argument.

I wouldn't both with learning much about metaphysical naturalism. The distinction between natural and supernatural cannot be made intelligible.


It boils down to a non-rigorously defined rejection of superstitions.

[post tenebras lux]

I looked at the wiki entry. It doesn't seem to be very even-handed. Anybody who can write off Plantinga in a few sentences is demonstrating that they brought presuppositions to the discussion.You mean this:Evolutionary argument against naturalism
Finally, the most recent argument to be proposed is that of Alvin Plantinga, who claims that naturalism assumes evolution by natural selection, but evolution by natural selection may be more likely to generate unreliable faculties than reliable ones, yet unreliable faculties will lead us to false beliefs more frequently than not, and therefore if naturalism is true we have no reason to trust our belief that naturalism is true. Naturalists respond that none of the premises in this argument have any basis in fact. First, they reason, evolution by natural selection clearly tends to improve cognitive faculties over time, not the other way around. There is no scientific evidence that warrants believing it will generate hopelessly unreliable faculties. Second, unreliable faculties do not entail unreliable beliefs, because learned behavior can correct for and thus eliminate errors produced by such faculties, and it is clear humans have in fact discovered and developed exactly such behavioral tools, which, like any other technology, greatly enhance our ability to discover the facts of the world we inhabit. For more discussion of these and other problems, see Rea on Plantinga (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/rea.shtml#Plantinga), as well as Argument from the Reliability of Our Rational Faculties (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/reppert.shtml#afrf) and We Should Attack Rocks? (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/reppert.shtml#we).:huh:
I see nothing wrong with that, care to point out where the problems are?

Interesting to note that the three linkies are all back to infidels.org, but there's nothing to stop a Plantinga supporter from adding their own thoughts.

Then again, given Alvin's generally low reputation here, you could always start a new thread to explain what Plantinga is actually arguing in his various essays.

[angela2]

I don't think so. It is pretty easy really. Just point out that he hasn't presented a well defined argument.
Ever read any Plantinga?
I wouldn't both with learning much about metaphysical naturalism. The distinction between natural and supernatural cannot be made intelligible.
I don't understand. If that is true, why would it be the foundational philosopy of this board?
It boils down to a non-rigorously defined rejection of superstitions.
I don't understand what that means. How does one determine a superstition? and what is 'a non-rigorously defined rejection?'

[Alethias]

Hi Angela! I might be the mod you mentioned. :)

Here (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/naturalism/) is a list of links from infidels.org that you might be interested in.

If you are curious about the point or intent of this website, of those I would strongly recommend
Defining Our Mission (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/mission.html), by Richard Carrier
A Defense of Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/thesis.html), by Keith Augustine, and
The Empirical Case for Metaphysical Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/infidels/newsletter/1999/march.html#Naturalism), by Jeffery Jay LowderAll three of those individuals have had or currently have crucial roles in defining what this website is all about.

Another website that has a huge amount of resources on the topic of metaphysical or philosophical naturalism is Naturalism.org (http://naturalism.org/), by Tom Clark. It is, in my personal opinion, an extraordinary collection of materials on the subject.

Alethias

[angela2]

Hi Angela! I might be the mod you mentioned. :)

Thanks. I think you were that mod. I appreciate the references. :)

[mirage]

Ever read any Plantinga?Yep, bits. I struggle because he makes so many horrible errors and equivocations per page that I can't stand it for long.

I don't understand. If that is true, why would it be the foundational philosopy of this board?Because everyone thinks they understand it so in practice it does a reasonable job of labelling the predominant belief set.

That doesn't mean it really makes any sense when looked at in depth.

I don't understand what that means. How does one determine a superstition? and what is 'a non-rigorously defined rejection?'
By checking a dictionary. Clearly it is a subjective term, but then I did say the whole thing wasn't well defined. The type of people who assert metaphysical naturalism usually regard religion as superstition.

A non rigorously defined rejection is a statement of rejection where the terms are not rigorously defined.

[Alethias]

As an easily accessible explanation, I like one of the summaries on Naturalism.org (http://naturalism.org/descriptions.htm):
Naturalism, in essence, is simply the idea that human beings are completely included in the natural world: there’s nothing supernatural about us. Naturalism is based on science as the best, most reliable means for discovering what exists. Science shows that each and every aspect of a human being comes from and is completely connected to the natural world, and is understandable in terms of those connections.

The naturalist view of ourselves is of course very different from traditional religious or supernatural understandings, and it has profound implications. We don’t have souls that continue after death. Instead, we are fully physical creatures, fully caused to be who we are. We don’t have free will in the sense of being able to choose or decide without being fully caused in our choices or decisions. Instead, as individuals we are part of the natural unfolding of the universe in all its amazing complexity.
This seems pretty clear to me.

[mirage]

As an easily accessible explanation, I like one of the summaries on Naturalism.org (http://naturalism.org/descriptions.htm):
Naturalism, in essence, is simply the idea that human beings are completely included in the natural world: there’s nothing supernatural about us.
What's the natural world as distinct from the supernatural one?

[seebs]

I would agree that the quoted argument against naturalism is weak, but I don't know how accurate it is. If it's an accurate quote, it is indeed a crappy argument.

I think there are three very different belief systems all going under the name "metaphysical naturalism". They are distinguished in their hypothetical response to consistent evidence of, say, ghosts:

1. Declare that ghosts, having been observed, are therefore natural. This reduces MN to a tautology and makes it uninformative; it is no longer a statement that characterizes any distinction from other belief systems, and no longer provides a basis for rejection of "supernaturalist" claims, as all such claims could just as well be true-but-natural.
2. Reject the observations as obviously inconsistent with the nature of the world. This makes MN a meaningful statement, but also an article of blind faith.
3. Acknowledge them as evidence that MN was wrong.

I think all three exist, and they tend to be hard to tell apart; in particular, it's very hard sometimes to tell whether the absolute assertion that there must be a natural explanation form something is a result of a denial of something or an attempt to declare it natural.

[David B]

What's the natural world as distinct from the supernatural one?

That there is compelling evidence that the natural world exists is one distinction.

David B

[RPS]

Ever read any Plantinga?Yep, bits. I struggle because he makes so many horrible errors and equivocations per page that I can't stand it for long.Basically, this claim amounts to Plantinga is a boob and a charleton. If that's so, why do you think a major university gave him a chair? Moreover, whenever I have asked professional philosophers who are atheists about Plantinga, each and every time the answer expresses admiration for his intellect and arguments, even when the questioned professor profoundly disagrees with Plantinga. Why do you think that's so? I might consider it a sampling error except I don't see Plantinga trashed so utterly in print. Maybe you're just smarter than everybody else?

[Alethias]

What's the natural world as distinct from the supernatural one?The natural world is the world that exists.

I don't think the supernatural can be precisely defined, simply because it is purported to exist by those with religious beliefs to support the structure of the beliefs, but there is no external evidence of that existence. I think the supernatural is the realm of platonic forms (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_forms) given religious context.

Q. How do you define something that doesn't exist?
A. However the hell you want :) If the definition doesn't have to tie to reality, you can define it in whatever way you desire to meet the needs of the moment. This is the inherent difficulty a naturalist has in defining a word such as supernatural. Something is not properly defined unless the definition clearly distinguishes it from those things which it is not. I don't think it's possible to give a proper definition for someting like the supernatural, which is really just an arbitrary construct necessitated by the beliefs of certain religions.

Alethias

[Philo_66]

As an easily accessible explanation, I like one of the summaries on Naturalism.org (http://naturalism.org/descriptions.htm):
Naturalism, in essence, is simply the idea that human beings are completely included in the natural world: there’s nothing supernatural about us. Naturalism is based on science as the best, most reliable means for discovering what exists. Science shows that each and every aspect of a human being comes from and is completely connected to the natural world, and is understandable in terms of those connections.

The naturalist view of ourselves is of course very different from traditional religious or supernatural understandings, and it has profound implications. We don’t have souls that continue after death. Instead, we are fully physical creatures, fully caused to be who we are. We don’t have free will in the sense of being able to choose or decide without being fully caused in our choices or decisions. Instead, as individuals we are part of the natural unfolding of the universe in all its amazing complexity.
This seems pretty clear to me.

And the explanation is pure bullcrap. Science does not show all those things. Science only explains what it explains in naturalistic terms. But what else could it do? My point, in case I'm not being clear, is that the metaphysical conclusion of Naturalism is not the result of scientific method.

Phil

[uberhobo]

I would agree that the quoted argument against naturalism is weak, but I don't know how accurate it is. If it's an accurate quote, it is indeed a crappy argument.

I think there are three very different belief systems all going under the name "metaphysical naturalism". They are distinguished in their hypothetical response to consistent evidence of, say, ghosts:

1. Declare that ghosts, having been observed, are therefore natural. This reduces MN to a tautology and makes it uninformative; it is no longer a statement that characterizes any distinction from other belief systems, and no longer provides a basis for rejection of "supernaturalist" claims, as all such claims could just as well be true-but-natural.
2. Reject the observations as obviously inconsistent with the nature of the world. This makes MN a meaningful statement, but also an article of blind faith.
3. Acknowledge them as evidence that MN was wrong.

I think all three exist, and they tend to be hard to tell apart; in particular, it's very hard sometimes to tell whether the absolute assertion that there must be a natural explanation form something is a result of a denial of something or an attempt to declare it natural.

I see a fourth option that you seem to have missed:

4. Look at how the observations were made, see that they were sloppy and plagued with confirmation bias and determine that they're full of crap. Do this enough times and you're justified at defaulting to response #2 unless there is some extraordinarily compelling evidence.
There is nothing about the existence of ghosts that makes them a priori supernatural, it's just that the people who claim their existence have consistently turned out to be full of crap, either knowingly or unknowingly.

Like others have said above, there isn't really a definition of "supernatural" within the framework of metaphysical naturalism that makes any sense. If ghosts existed and we could study them, they would be, by definition, natural.

[Philo_66]

Yesterday one of the mods wrote that the philosophy of this site is metaphysical naturalism. Can someone recommend an accurate site where I could read about it?

Good luck on this one. You can find lots of sites and books on the subject. An example might be Richard Carrier's "Sense And Goodness Without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism". But keep in mind that what the book really describes is a philosophy that is consistent with the concept of metaphysical naturalism. There could be many others.

The only thing that metaphysical naturalism implies is that there is no supernaturalism. It's often argued to be more than that, but everything else that I see claimed as an implication of metaphysical naturalism could be implied by something else. IOW, that makes these claims not specifically pecular to metaphysical naturalsim, which means the value of the thesis is pretty limited. On the other hand, it also make it 'fit' with so many things, which gives the appearance of being useful--such is the nature of tautologies.

Phil

[angela2]

Good luck on this one. You can find lots of sites and books on the subject. An example might be Richard Carrier's "Sense And Goodness Without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism". But keep in mind that what the book really describes is a philosophy that is consistent with the concept of metaphysical naturalism. There could be many others.

The only thing that metaphysical naturalism implies is that there is no supernaturalism. It's often argued to be more than that, but everything else that I see claimed as an implication of metaphysical naturalism could be implied by something else. IOW, that makes these claims not specifically pecular to metaphysical naturalsim, which means the value of the thesis is pretty limited. On the other hand, it also make it 'fit' with so many things, which gives the appearance of being useful--such is the nature of tautologies.
Thanks for your input.

Angela

[angela2]

Basically, this claim amounts to Plantinga is a boob and a charleton. If that's so, why do you think a major university gave him a chair? Moreover, whenever I have asked professional philosophers who are atheists about Plantinga, each and every time the answer expresses admiration for his intellect and arguments, even when the questioned professor profoundly disagrees with Plantinga. Why do you think that's so? I might consider it a sampling error except I don't see Plantinga trashed so utterly in print. Maybe you're just smarter than everybody else?
Thanks. I never imagined I or anyone else would need to defend Plantiga as a first-rate thinker.

[angela2]

A non rigorously defined rejection is a statement of rejection where the terms are not rigorously defined.
I understand the meaning of the words, thank you, but I can't imagine how such a definition would be useful.

[angela2]

Like others have said above, there isn't really a definition of "supernatural" within the framework of metaphysical naturalism that makes any sense. If ghosts existed and we could study them, they would be, by definition, natural.
Are abstract terms such as justice, love, and truth included in that which is natural or they excluded because they are not empirical data?

[fatpie42]

I don't really know why anyone would be interested in calling their position metaphysical naturalism. I don't believe in life after death, not because of any assertion of the non-existence of spirits but simply because it doesn't make any sense with the evidence we have. I don't believe in ghosts, not because ghosts are 'unnatural' phenomena (whatever 'unnatural' would mean) but because there simply isn't sufficient evidence to show they exist.

The position of naturalism suggests a pre-existing bias. Why be biased when a balanced view can come to exactly the same practical conclusions?

[David B]

I understand the meaning of the words, thank you, but I can't imagine how such a definition would be useful.

Well, let's have a look at the word 'adult', for example/

It can be arbitrarily defined, as, say 21st birthday, but different countries have different arbitrary definitions.

I don't think anyone could define 'adult' well enough to point to a month, leave alone a day or a minute, where someone achieves adulthood.

Nonetheless, some people are clearly children and some clearly adult. Would you suggest that the term 'adult' is not useful?

David B

[Autonemesis]

Basically, this claim amounts to Plantinga is a boob and a charleton. If that's so, why do you think a major university gave him a chair?

University of Notre Dame is a Catholic university.

The university president is responsible for the overall administration of the university and is ultimately responsible for the hiring of faculty and staff. The president must always be a priest and a member of the Indiana Province of the Congregation of Holy Cross.

Plantinga was hired by a Catholic priest.

[fatpie42]

Basically, this claim amounts to Plantinga is a boob and a charleton. If that's so, why do you think a major university gave him a chair? Moreover, whenever I have asked professional philosophers who are atheists about Plantinga, each and every time the answer expresses admiration for his intellect and arguments, even when the questioned professor profoundly disagrees with Plantinga. Why do you think that's so? I might consider it a sampling error except I don't see Plantinga trashed so utterly in print. Maybe you're just smarter than everybody else?

I've seen an awful lot of arguments against the plausibility of reformed epistemology. These arguments tend to suggest that the whole approach of such a position is flawed. Obviously there are plenty of people who would disagree with such views, but I would agree that reformed epistemology is a bit of a dodgy loophole. This is not an unacademic position to take.

As for why he was given a position at a university, a similar question might be asked about Swinburne. Swinburne's view of theology is almost universally disputed amongst theologians, yet he was the head of theology in Oxford. How would he get such a position? Well the fact was that he pursued a certain line of argument in a way others did not, and became very well-noticed as a result. Certainly his idea of heaven and his examples to explain the rationality of Christian ideas seems heavily biased towards his own lifestyle to the point where it seems like the best way to become suited to heaven is to become an Oxford professor, but that is not enough to stop him getting a respected position. Rejecting Swinburne is a fairly common acitivity in the philosophy of religion. What is more important, however, is HOW you reject Swinburne. The same is true of Plantinga. Plantinga makes some of the most interesting mistakes.

[post tenebras lux]

Basically, this claim amounts to Plantinga is a boob and a charleton. If that's so, why do you think a major university gave him a chair? Moreover, whenever I have asked professional philosophers who are atheists about Plantinga, each and every time the answer expresses admiration for his intellect and arguments, even when the questioned professor profoundly disagrees with Plantinga. Why do you think that's so? I might consider it a sampling error except I don't see Plantinga trashed so utterly in print. Maybe you're just smarter than everybody else?If some poster was to post up a (linked) paragraph or two of Plantinga, would you be able to explain what he meant?

Do you understand Plantinga's logic, RPS?

[uberhobo]

Are abstract terms such as justice, love, and truth included in that which is natural or they excluded because they are not empirical data?

If you define the terms in a way that lends itself to being able to say, without ambiguity, "That is love," or "That isn't justice," then they would fall under naturalism. You can certainly come up with definitions of abstract terms that allow you to say something concrete about them.

The problem arises when one uses "abstract" to mean "ill-defined." One does not imply the other. It may be pleasant to keep some concepts in the realm of amorphous mystical ambiguity, but that doesn't mean that they should stay there, if any should at all.

[mirage]

Thanks. I never imagined I or anyone else would need to defend Plantiga as a first-rate thinker.

You are new here.

It also seems you don't see what the value of a rigorously defined definition is. I'll explain: it let's people get a solid idea of what the word means and demonstrates that the idea can make sense at all. It avoids confusion. It clarifies.

[mirage]

That there is compelling evidence that the natural world exists is one distinction.

David B

Well, yes...sort of but it doesn't work as a definition.

But metaphysical naturalism is the a priori belief that the supernatural does not exist, regardless of evidence.

But what is it?

[angela2]

If you define the terms in a way that lends itself to being able to say, without ambiguity, "That is love," or "That isn't justice," then they would fall under naturalism. You can certainly come up with definitions of abstract terms that allow you to say something concrete about them.

The problem arises when one uses "abstract" to mean "ill-defined." One does not imply the other. It may be pleasant to keep some concepts in the realm of amorphous mystical ambiguity, but that doesn't mean that they should stay there, if any should at all.
So are you saying that abstract terms must be 'observable?' What would be an acceptable definition of justice? When I was in school there was a much talked about book, Whose Justice?

[mirage]

Basically, this claim amounts to Plantinga is a boob and a charleton.
Not at all. I don't think there is deception or pretence and I don't think he is completely stupid. He is probably quite bright in a certain way.

I just think he puts his intellectual energy into twisting himself into circles and hiding the inconsistency with quite phenomenal amounts of obscurantism and equivocation. He is probably convinced of his own arguments though.

If that's so, why do you think a major university gave him a chair? How should I know? He meets a market demand for theological justification and people that appoint just sometimes aren't that good at very abstract analytic thought either, or don't care all that much about the validity of his arguments as long as he keeps pulling in the money and generating debate and interest.

Moreover, whenever I have asked professional philosophers who are atheists about Plantinga, each and every time the answer expresses admiration for his intellect and arguments, even when the questioned professor profoundly disagrees with Plantinga.Not my experience at all.
Why do you think that's so? I might consider it a sampling error except I don't see Plantinga trashed so utterly in print. Maybe you're just smarter than everybody else?
Irrelevant. He has no decent arguments or if he does, his style is so appallingly unclear that not even his supporters can outline them. And in case you haven't quite worked out the difference, you have to be somewhat politer in the academic press than you do on internet debating boards. For example, you can only really say that a given presentation doesn't work, not that the entire idea is bollocks and that the person who suggested it sucks at thinking clearly.

I realise that you like to indulge in arguments from authority, not apparently having sufficient grasp of the detail to defend the arguments directly, but until I see the slightest evidence that I have misunderstood the crucial errors and equivocation in his arguments, I dont' see what is unreasonable about me trusting my own reason over them.

[mirage]

The same is true of Plantinga. Plantinga makes some of the most interesting mistakes.

Yeah, that's why we love him so much really. He certainly forces you to be quite clear in your own thinking and arguments. Equivocation spotting is hard work and he's very good at equivocation.

[uberhobo]

So are you saying that abstract terms must be 'observable?' What would be an acceptable definition of justice? When I was in school there was a much talked about book, Whose Justice?

I'm afraid that I don't have the background to give you a good definition of Justice, but I see what you're getting at.

If you want to call justice a feeling, and nothing more, then that's fine. But it's hard to have a meaningful discussion about it if you define it as "the feeling I get when something is just."

I'm not sure how to classify terms such as love, truth, and justice, because they all appear to be nouns that were created from adjectives used to describe actions (like they do in the business world). You can certainly describe an action as being brave, but does that mean that bravery is a thing in and of itself? I'm not sure that such a transition is warranted. There are a class of actions that we have drawn a box around and called them just, but I don't think that means there is a thing in and of itself called justice. That's only a few steps away from the ancient idea of making gods for all the abstractions.

[dug_down_deep]

Thanks. I never imagined I or anyone else would need to defend Plantiga as a first-rate thinker.
Excuse me for being so bold as to be prescriptive, but...

You should try never to place anyone above skeptical doubt, and you should consider the reasoned doubts with an open mind.

Be skeptical of everyone.

[angela2]

You can certainly describe an action as being brave, but does that mean that bravery is a thing in and of itself?
Very interesting. So this system denies the existence of or cannot account for such terms.

[ModernHeretic]

Would it be reasonable to define naturalism as the belief that things are governed by natural laws? If you take this definition, then anything that is NOT governed by natural laws would be considered 'supernatural'.

I don't know if this is a commonly used definition, but it seems to me to be a non-arbitrary way of defining what exactly is natural and what is supernatural.

It seems to me that the only things that would NOT be governed by natural laws would be the natural laws themselves, which could be considered metaphysical, in the sense that they apply to physical things.


As for truth, justice, and love, it seems to me that these are all concepts, and concepts are things that exist in people's brains in the form of electrochemical activity. In any case, they could in some sense be considered physical things according to a materialist worldview (note that materialism is different from naturalism, although many naturalists may also be materialists, and vice versa).

Love could also be considered an action, as it can be used as a verb, or it could be considered an emotion, which is a physical process.

[Vitalstatistix]

Very interesting. So this system denies the existence of or cannot account for such terms.Because bravery obviously belongs to the supernatural realm.

I love this forum.

[David B]

Well, yes...sort of but it doesn't work as a definition.

But metaphysical naturalism is the a priori belief that the supernatural does not exist, regardless of evidence.

But what is it?

Not in my view.

I see metaphysical naturalism as following from a posteriori induction, whereby claims of the supernatural have often been shown to be the result of fraud or error, often are consistent, short of actual demonstration, of fraud or arror, and have never once stood up to sceptical analysis.

David B

[mirage]

Not in my view.

I see metaphysical naturalism as following from a posteriori induction, whereby claims of the supernatural have often been shown to be the result of fraud or error, often are consistent, short of actual demonstration, of fraud or arror, and have never once stood up to sceptical analysis.

David B

But I still don't know what the supernatural is. Claims like ghosts are just claims without good evidence. What makes them supernatural?

[Autonemesis]

Are abstract terms such as justice, love, and truth included in that which is natural or they excluded because they are not empirical data?

Color is the subjective experience of the neurological stimulus that results from the physical reaction between photons and certain chemicals in the retina of the eye. Yet color is also an abstract concept with no physical existence in the natural world. Which one you mean depends on context.

When you ask "What is justice" are you asking about the abstract concept, or are you asking what must be done so that justice is served? If the latter, then justice is the physical arrangement of persons and things that satisfies the ethical concept of justice. So justice does have physical reality in that respect, in the same way color has physical reality. When photons and retinal dyes interact in a certain combination, our sense of redness is stimulated. When persons and things are arranged in a certain combination, our sense of justice is stimulated.

[David B]

But I still don't know what the supernatural is. Claims like ghosts are just claims without good evidence. What makes them supernatural?

Very hard to define something both vague as a concept and seemingly non existent in the real world.

How about 'supernatural claims are claims without good evidence that strongly appear to be inconsistent with the natural world as we know it'?

Clairvoyance, ghosts, souls, telekinosis...seem to me to fit that.

David B

[dug_down_deep]

But I still don't know what the supernatural is. Claims like ghosts are just claims without good evidence. What makes them supernatural?
They're spooky.

[Vitalstatistix]

You guys need to watch that you don't confuse naturalism & materialism. Check out this (http://www.freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html) article

I'm also linking to the google cache (http://64.233.187.104/search?q=cache:jcXs6bPkyOcJ:www.freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html+site:freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1&client=firefox-a) since the page seems to be down.

[mirage]

Would it be reasonable to define naturalism as the belief that things are governed by natural laws? If you take this definition, then anything that is NOT governed by natural laws would be considered 'supernatural'. That's not a bad line of attack.

However it is difficult to define what natural law is. Scientists these days don't really treat "laws" as prescriptive or proscriptive, but as descriptive.

It isn't that the law governs the world, but that the law describes the world.

The problem with defining the supernatural in terms of a violation of this law is that if there is a violation of a descriptive law, then it is just that the law is wrong.

How are we to distinguish between a previously unknown natural process that requires a reassessment of our scientific theory, and a supernatural process?

[EarlOfLade]

Well, yes...sort of but it doesn't work as a definition.

But metaphysical naturalism is the a priori belief that the supernatural does not exist, regardless of evidence.

But what is it?
What evidence is it you are talking about?

Please explain.

[mirage]

[QUOTE=David B;3772989]Very hard to define something both vague as a concept and seemingly non existent in the real world.

How about 'supernatural claims are claims without good evidence that strongly appear to be inconsistent with the natural world as we know it'?[/qutoe]I think that does a good job of describing the sort of claims to which we apply the word, but it doesn't strictly distinguish between natural or supernatural, since a claim contrary to existing understanding of natural law might be true, even if it currently lacks evidence.

If we later find good evidence does it "convert" to being natural.

The thing I am trying to get at is that although there may be a rough epistemic category to do with types of claim, that doesn't entail a meaningful ontological category.

[mirage]

What evidence is it you are talking about?

Please explain.

I just meant regardless of any evidence we might have, either way. The metaphysical naturalist generally says that the supernatural doesn't exist, so any evidence must be otherwise explainable.

[mirage]

They're spooky.

:D Yes, that's what it amounts to I think. And it has the advantage of conciseness.

[benjdm]

I looked at the wiki entry. It doesn't seem to be very even-handed.
I thought it sums up metaphysical naturalism fairly well.
Anybody who can write off Plantinga in a few sentences is demonstrating that they brought presuppositions to the discussion.
As the wikipedia entry is a summary, it will only alot a few sentences to any of the pro / con arguments. That said, I do think Plantinga can be dismissed in a few sentences.

[David B]

[QUOTE=David B;3772989]Very hard to define something both vague as a concept and seemingly non existent in the real world.

How about 'supernatural claims are claims without good evidence that strongly appear to be inconsistent with the natural world as we know it'?[/qutoe]I think that does a good job of describing the sort of claims to which we apply the word, but it doesn't strictly distinguish between natural or supernatural, since a claim contrary to existing understanding of natural law might be true, even if it currently lacks evidence.

If we later find good evidence does it "convert" to being natural.

The thing I am trying to get at is that although there may be a rough epistemic category to do with types of claim, that doesn't entail a meaningful ontological category.


Yes. If it became apparent that something like Dowsing worked, under controlled conditions checked by an expert conjurer, for instance, then that would make it natural, and one would have to seek a way to find a naturalistic mechanism for it.

I'm trying to think of claims that have been rejected by science, and later brought into the natural world, and not coming up with much. the movement of the continents, and rocks falling out of the sky are all I come up with off the top of my head.

Nothing that generally fits into a not precisely defined, but broadly supernatural heading, though. Not clairvoyance, channelling, TK, homeopathy, palmistry...

One or two things have gone the other way. That is to say from within the remit of science to discarded on closer examination. Phrenology, for instance.

David B

[Vitalstatistix]

That's not a bad line of attack.

However it is difficult to define what natural law is. Scientists these days don't really treat "laws" as prescriptive or proscriptive, but as descriptive.

It isn't that the law governs the world, but that the law describes the world.

The problem with defining the supernatural in terms of a violation of this law is that if there is a violation of a descriptive law, then it is just that the law is wrong.

How are we to distinguish between a previously unknown natural process that requires a reassessment of our scientific theory, and a supernatural process?It's a definition. It's defined as being beyond natural laws & processes. Unable to be understood using reason/evidence. Instead of asking us to reason through it, get angela to make sense of it for you. It's up to her to demonstrate that it exists. I'm perfectly happy to define supernaturalism as belief in superstition.

[ModernHeretic]

That's not a bad line of attack.

However it is difficult to define what natural law is. Scientists these days don't really treat "laws" as prescriptive or proscriptive, but as descriptive.

It isn't that the law governs the world, but that the law describes the world.

The problem with defining the supernatural in terms of a violation of this law is that if there is a violation of a descriptive law, then it is just that the law is wrong.

How are we to distinguish between a previously unknown natural process that requires a reassessment of our scientific theory, and a supernatural process?

Well, I think the distiction is that something that can be considered natural should be capable of being described according to some sort of natural law (or theory), and wouldn't be something that you had to say was simply 'a mystery', in the way that many theists say that God is a mystery.

By a law, I mean that it's behavior should follow some sort of observable pattern, even if that pattern is seemingly random.


According to metaphysical naturalism, any observable phenomenon must be considered natural, so that when you refer to the supernatural you're really talking about things which are not observable in any way, shape, or form.

So, things that cannot be observed such as gods, demons, witches, etc. must be considered 'supernatural'. Since such things cannot be observed, we have no evidence of them, and so it seems likely that they don't actually exist.

These things could perhaps be considered concepts in the same way that things like justice and truth, but not real things that actually exist outside of people's brains.

[dug_down_deep]

The singularity that triggered the Big Bang is supernatural.

It doesn't follow the laws of nature. It's a mystery. It doesn't follow a pattern. It's not observable.

And most importantly...it's creepy when you really think about it.

[angela2]

These things could perhaps be considered concepts in the same way that things like justice and truth, but not real things that actually exist outside of people's brains.
So you're saying that things like justice, truth, tolerance, bravery, ect. don't exist outside the brain. So your definition of real is 'that which exists outside people's brains?'

What do others mean by the word, "real?"

[show_no_mercy]

So you're saying that things like justice, truth, tolerance, bravery, ect. don't exist outside the brain.

Are you saying that they exist somewhere? Can I go to Wal-Mart and buy some Justice?

I think we need to differentiate between words that are used to describe certain sociological phenomenae (love) and physical objects (this computer).

[mirage]

It's a definition. It's defined as being beyond natural laws & processes. Unable to be understood using reason/evidence. Instead of asking us to reason through it, get angela to make sense of it for you. It's up to her to demonstrate that it exists. I'm perfectly happy to define supernaturalism as belief in superstition.

I'm not demanding that you produce a coherent definition of the supernatural. I don't think there is one, so it would be a little unreasonable for me to do that.

The problem with things not following causal laws or not explainable, is that this is what randomness means, indeterminism and that doesn't really capture what people tend to mean by the supernatural.

In practice, the supernatural is actually a primitive attempt at an explanation, at understanding. It is only when you point out that the claim doesn't make any sense and there is no solid evidence that the old "unexplainable with mere science" line is trotted out!

[Autonemesis]

The singularity that triggered the Big Bang is supernatural.

No, its existence is implied by modern physics.

It doesn't follow the laws of nature.

The laws of nature are descriptive, not proscriptive. That something doesn't follow the laws of nature implies that the laws of nature need to be revised. Learning how they need to be revised is a top area of research in physics today. One of the contending revisions to the laws of nature is called Grand Unification Theory, which attempts to unite the force of gravity with the three other forces into a single underlying force and theory.

It's a mystery. It doesn't follow a pattern. It's not observable.

None of those things are true.

[mirage]

Well, I think the distiction is that something that can be considered natural should be capable of being described according to some sort of natural law (or theory), and wouldn't be something that you had to say was simply 'a mystery', in the way that many theists say that God is a mystery.

By a law, I mean that it's behavior should follow some sort of observable pattern, even if that pattern is seemingly random. A random pattern. I'm not sure those are compatible.

According to metaphysical naturalism, any observable phenomenon must be considered natural, so that when you refer to the supernatural you're really talking about things which are not observable in any way, shape, or form.

So, things that cannot be observed such as gods, demons, witches, etc. must be considered 'supernatural'. There is no stipulation that they can't be observed though. A demon could pop in for tea.

Since such things cannot be observed, we have no evidence of them, and so it seems likely that they don't actually exist. But what are they?

You have said that they are characterised by a lack of observable pattern, but if they were to be observed I imagine there would be quite a bit of pattern to a demon.

[David B]

So you're saying that things like justice, truth, tolerance, bravery, ect. don't exist outside the brain. So your definition of real is 'that which exists outside people's brains?'

What do others mean by the word, "real?"

Good question, angela, and one that has made me think.

And I think that 'real' is one of those fuzzy concepts that is used differently in different contexts.

Lke real numbers and unreal numbers. You are not, I think, going to find any mumber, real or otherwise, that is real in quite the same sense as I can find the keyboard in front of me as I type.

I think we could agree that languages are real. Languages exist, though it hard to see how they exist outside of peoples brains.

Justice, truth, tolerance, bravery seem to me to be meaningful concepts, though they are not real in the same sense as my keyboard is real.

'God', 'clairvoyance', 'poltergeists' 'astrology', 'the supernatural', 'leprechauns' ....are also meaningful concepts, but it's hard for me to see any sense in which they exist outside human brains. You might it hard to see any external reality to some of these yourself.

So what is the difference between your list and mine?

It's clear to me that there is a difference, but finding a precise form of words that could explain this is not something I'm finding easy.

But I'll do what I can.

If you look at my list, they are the sort of concept that one can view in naturalistic terms, as arising by evolutionary means in a social species that develops language, but which don't actually require an external, objective reality to be symbiotic with humanity.

If we look at your list, they can also be viewed in naturalistic terms as concepts which could arise in a language using species, but God does require to have some sort of external reality for the concept to be of great value. To emphasise my point, in contrast to justice. There doesn't have to be some justice somehow 'out there' for justice to be real. But for 'God' there does. Clairvoyance has to work for clairvoyance to be real, while 'bravery' can be an abstract concept and still be real. Poltergeists have to really be able to throw things around rooms to be considered real, while tolerance just has to describe some human behaviours and/or philosophical stances be real.

In the hope that you get my drift, I won't go through the whole lot.

Doing the best I can, off the top of my head.

David B

[seebs]

I see a fourth option that you seem to have missed:

4. Look at how the observations were made, see that they were sloppy and plagued with confirmation bias and determine that they're full of crap. Do this enough times and you're justified at defaulting to response #2 unless there is some extraordinarily compelling evidence.
There is nothing about the existence of ghosts that makes them a priori supernatural, it's just that the people who claim their existence have consistently turned out to be full of crap, either knowingly or unknowingly.

Like others have said above, there isn't really a definition of "supernatural" within the framework of metaphysical naturalism that makes any sense. If ghosts existed and we could study them, they would be, by definition, natural.

This last sentence is my Option #1. This variant on MN is a pure tautology. It tells me nothing; if you define "natural" as meaning "having existence", the statement "only natural things exist" tells me nothing.

[seebs]

I think it's interesting to compare notes on supernatural realism, moral realism, and mathematical realism. I tend to think of numbers as being "real". (Please, no puns!) I don't think they're the same kinds of things as physical objects, but so what? I have no reason to require that all things be in the same category.

[mirage]

I think it's interesting to compare notes on supernatural realism, moral realism, and mathematical realism. I tend to think of numbers as being "real". (Please, no puns!) I don't think they're the same kinds of things as physical objects, but so what? I have no reason to require that all things be in the same category.

It's all the mathematical blood you inherited.

The thing with number realism is that I don't really know what real is supposed to mean in that context. If it means have all the properties numbers have, well then I can hardly disagree.

[angela2]

Hi David,

Thanks for your thought.
If we look at your list, they can also be viewed in naturalistic terms as concepts which could arise in a language using species,
I can agree with that.
but God does require to have some sort of external reality for the concept to be of great value.,
I also agree with that.

Where I begin to have a problem is how we decide what external reality is. Clearly there may be material realities that have yet to be perceived. For example, did quarks become real only when they were perceived/observed?

This does not seem to me to be the same question as whether the cat is dead or alive.

So what sort of external reality does God need to have to be real? Are we chasing our tails? Are we saying that external reality is that which is real without ever talking about the limits to our perception? Suppose I redefine external reality to include God. How can that logically or philosophically be challenged?

[seebs]

It's all the mathematical blood you inherited.

The thing with number realism is that I don't really know what real is supposed to mean in that context. If it means have all the properties numbers have, well then I can hardly disagree.

What I mean by it is that I don't think we invent most mathematics; I think we discover it.

There's a sort of fuzzy boundary between inventing and discovering. Did we invent or discover the steam engine? I think maybe we invented it. Did we invent or discover the expansion water undergoes when it becomes steam? I think we discovered it.

Some mathematical work is invention, but it is invention layered on top of things which were there before we thought about them.

[Vitalstatistix]

What I mean by it is that I don't think we invent most mathematics; I think we discover it.

There's a sort of fuzzy boundary between inventing and discovering. Did we invent or discover the steam engine? I think maybe we invented it. Did we invent or discover the expansion water undergoes when it becomes steam? I think we discovered it.

Some mathematical work is invention, but it is invention layered on top of things which were there before we thought about them.Here we go again. Quoting Yahzi, "He bought that dog from Plato. That dog didn't hunt then, and it ain't about to start now, but dang, it sure is a pretty dog."

One of these days, seebs, you'll have to explain to me why bad ideas like you so much.

[David B]

Hi David,

Thanks for your thought.

No prob

I can agree with that.

Good

I also agree with that.

Where I begin to have a problem is how we decide what external reality is.

It's a difficult problem for me, too. I particularly struggle about the reality of maths. But I really don't see a good way to justify a god who intervenes in the world for good into a reasonable view of reality

Clearly there may be material realities that have yet to be perceived.[quote]

There may well be. But would they be out of kilter with what we already know about? I think not, most of the time at least. The Newtonian view of the laws of motion, for instance, is not inconsistent with Einsteinian view - it is just a special case.[quote]

For example, did quarks become real only when they were perceived/observed?[quote]

Quarks have neither been perceived or observed. Not as those terms have been generally understood, anyway. Whether they are real or not - in the sense of my keyboard being real - is still up for grabs. I my understanding of quarks is correct, they are described by mathematical abstractions that are consistent with the world as we see it.

[quote]This does not seem to me to be the same question as whether the cat is dead or alive.

I presume you are talking about Schrodingers cat. I agree - not quite the same question.

So what sort of external reality does God need to have to be real?

That seems to me to depend on what attributes are attributed to what sort of god. For example, the sort of god who is active in the world for good should be consistent with the world we see. In my mind , there is no evidence of such a god.

Are we chasing our tails? Are we saying that external reality is that which is real without ever talking about the limits to our perception?

I take the view that solipsism is silly, and hence take the view that there is an external reality out there. Which is viewed through our evolved sences, and processed with our evolved brain. And evolution is a harsh school. Being able to see things that exist outside ourselves reasonably accurately would seem to be a plus in a universe in which evolution has emerged.

There are things that evolution has not fitted us to see, though, like ultra violet radiation, infra red, gamma, etc. but w have tools that thell us about them. Evolved beings have found a way of observing things beyond their evolved senses! Wow! Somehow, though, supernatural things, like heaven, hell, god, leprechauns continue to evade science.

Telling??!!

Suppose I redefine external reality to include God. How can that logically or philosophically be challenged?

Suppose I redefine external reality to include the Flying Spaghetti Monster. How can that logically or philosophically be challenged?

David B

[fatpie42]

Are we chasing our tails? Are we saying that external reality is that which is real without ever talking about the limits to our perception?
I take the view that solipsism is silly, and hence take the view that there is an external reality out there.

Er... I think you've missed the point there. The point is that what we mean by 'real' has to be in certain context. Real presumably is meant mean "exists externally to our minds", however we never come across anything externally to our minds. Any concept we have is linked with our culture, our beliefs, our language, our prejudices, our methods of perception.... This is not solipsism, but rather the recognition that our perception always exists in a certain context. When I say that a hallucination wasn't real, I am referring to a certain context in which something did not portray to me the kinds of features which I expect of something in order to describe it as 'real'. For example, I might reach for what appear to be my keys in the morning and find that my hand meets with nothing at all, thus allowing me to realise that I had only hallucinated that my keys were there when in fact I would later discover them somewhere else. Our understanding of real and unreal never leaves the context of being humans perceiving the world in a certain way. How could it?

This is not solipsism. This is just common sense.

The issue is that when we refer to 'God' being 'real', the context is very different. How could we reach out and discover that God wasn't there? If someone says 'God is found either in the Church of in a bottle of whiskey' are they really saying that God is found spatially in these places, or are they expressing a deeper conviction about life?

Hope I'm not missing the point too. I was basing this on ideas I found in the writings of D.Z. Phillips.

[FatherMithras]

Justice, love, etc are not things, they are ideas, or constructs of the human mind that simply describe certain qualities or actions. In order to measure and examine them, you must oprationally define your construst, Ie give observable, measurable things through which you can observe them. For love you could observe heart palpitations, amount of "affection" shown (which would likewise have to be operationally defined), among other things. But to claim love is a "thing" is to go into a realm I don't understand. Love is a CONCEPT. If there were no life, then "love" would not exist. It is not a physical, tangible, etc quality, merely an idea.

[FatherMithras]

So what sort of external reality does God need to have to be real?
He would simply have to give a positive piece of evidence for himself. Reversing the laws of thermodynamics would be a good way to show he existed, or he could pop up and do miracles. Since none of this has ever been verified or seen, I don't see it happening, but if it did we could define God as a part of reality.

[angela2]

Justice, love, etc are not things, they are ideas, or constructs of the human mind that simply describe certain qualities or actions.
We're not saying they are things, but we are saying they are real.
In order to measure and examine them, you must oprationally define your construst, Ie give observable, measurable things through which you can observe them. For love you could observe heart palpitations, amount of "affection" shown (which would likewise have to be operationally defined), among other things.
Wouldn't that tell me as much if not more about my operational definition as it would about the thing I was defining?
But to claim love is a "thing" is to go into a realm I don't understand. Love is a CONCEPT. If there were no life, then "love" would not exist.
If there were no life, lots of things wouldn't exist including fatpie's car keys.
It is not a physical, tangible, etc quality, merely an idea.
I understand that you think that something can be real only if it is perceptible by the senses. I don't accept materialism because I think it is far to limited to encompass reality, even reality sans God.

BTW It's lovely to hear you contributing to the conversation. Thank you.

[mirage]

What I mean by it is that I don't think we invent most mathematics; I think we discover it.

There's a sort of fuzzy boundary between inventing and discovering. Did we invent or discover the steam engine? I think maybe we invented it. Did we invent or discover the expansion water undergoes when it becomes steam? I think we discovered it.

Some mathematical work is invention, but it is invention layered on top of things which were there before we thought about them.

I don't see a difference between the steam engine and the maths. It was always true that this physics and the arrangement of the engine entails (or entails the very high likelihood of) its behaviour and potential use.

If the whole thing were a physics sim on a computer done in numbers, it would be mathematics.

I know what you mean by discover, as in discover relationships and consequences we hadn't anticipated, however I think we do this with any activity. It is inevitable we "disover" such necessary consequences since our cognition is limited and cannot see them all immediately.

Of course we get much more choice in the structures of entailment we can explore in mathematics since it doesn't have to describe our experience as the mathematical models of science do. However, I don't see a huge difference. It isn't outrageous to suggest that the behaviour of mathematical entailment has something to do with the behaviour of the world our mind is part of. And vice versa of course.

I do object to the position that 2+2=4 in any world regardless of physics. That is an assertion entirely without context and therefore without meaning.

[angela2]

Er... I think you've missed the point there. The point is that what we mean by 'real' has to be in certain context. Real presumably is meant mean "exists externally to our minds", however we never come across anything externally to our minds. Any concept we have is linked with our culture, our beliefs, our language, our prejudices, our methods of perception.... This is not solipsism, but rather the recognition that our perception always exists in a certain context.
I agree. But now I must ask you if we are speaking of our perceptions in context or our interpretation of our perceptions given the context ... or are they identical?

IOW is what is real that upon which we all agree? Until, of course, we all agree on something else.
Since we no longer agree that the sun revolves around the earth, that is not a description of reality. Was it ever a description of reality? IOW is our epistemology at any given time just reality as interpreted by the ruling paradigm, a paradigm waiting for a different paradigm which will subvert it?

David,

I agree that there is reality apart from our minds/thinking, but two questions: do we have access to reality without an interpretive framework and is that reality interpreted with sequential paradigms?

For example, Thanks for getting me straight on quarks. Your explanation seems to say that we think they exist because the evidence of their existence is consistent with our paradigm. Is that a possible interpretation?

[post tenebras lux]

But to claim love is a "thing" is to go into a realm I don't understand. Love is a CONCEPT. If there were no life, then "love" would not exist.
If there were no life, lots of things wouldn't exist including fatpie's car keys.
But if all life ceased, fatpie's car keys would continue to exist until they corroded away. However, if all life ceased, then love too would cease to exist.

No life, no love.

[benjdm]

If there were no life, lots of things wouldn't exist including fatpie's car keys.
All of the molecules that make up fatpie's car keys would exist regardless of whether life existed or not. The molecules would not be oriented the same way, of course.
I understand that you think that something can be real only if it is perceptible by the senses. I don't accept materialism because I think it is far to limited to encompass reality, even reality sans God.
If it is imperceptible to senses - if it does not interact with the natural universe - then we have no way of saying anything about it. Anything could be possible. It is impossible to learn anything about the parts of reality that do not interact with our natural universe.

[dug_down_deep]

Well, I think the distiction is that something that can be considered natural should be capable of being described according to some sort of natural law (or theory), and wouldn't be something that you had to say was simply 'a mystery', in the way that many theists say that God is a mystery.

By a law, I mean that it's behavior should follow some sort of observable pattern, even if that pattern is seemingly random.


According to metaphysical naturalism, any observable phenomenon must be considered natural, so that when you refer to the supernatural you're really talking about things which are not observable in any way, shape, or form.
The singularity that triggered the Big Bang is supernatural.

It doesn't follow the laws of nature. It's a mystery. It doesn't follow a pattern. It's not observable.

And most importantly...it's creepy when you really think about it.

No, its existence is implied by modern physics.

The laws of nature are descriptive, not proscriptive. That something doesn't follow the laws of nature implies that the laws of nature need to be revised. Learning how they need to be revised is a top area of research in physics today. One of the contending revisions to the laws of nature is called Grand Unification Theory, which attempts to unite the force of gravity with the three other forces into a single underlying force and theory.

None of those things are true.
Those things fit the definition in the post I was replying to. (Sorry, I should have quoted MH.)

[angela2]

It is impossible to learn anything about the parts of reality that do not interact with our natural universe.
Agreed.

[Philo_66]

Well, yes...sort of but it doesn't work as a definition.

But metaphysical naturalism is the a priori belief that the supernatural does not exist, regardless of evidence.

But what is it?

Not in my view.

I see metaphysical naturalism as following from a posteriori induction, whereby claims of the supernatural have often been shown to be the result of fraud or error, often are consistent, short of actual demonstration, of fraud or arror, and have never once stood up to sceptical analysis.

David BAll you can claim is that you have evidence of fraud or error in such cases of supernatural claims. And we don't use induction for that part. It's deduction. We say "if there is evidence of fraud or error, then this or that claim is not valid. There is evidence of fraud or error, therefore this or that claim is not valid." (Of course there might be both evidence of fraud or error and real supernatualism, but I think it's reasonable not to dismiss the claim once fraud or error is found, at least for the sake of discussion.)

Your 'a posteriori induction' is simply a non sequitur. Karl Popper showed that induction is a myth. The only way that the process we call induction works at all is if the proposition is subjected to refutation. Since metaphysical naturalism is not falsifiable, it is clearly not subject to refutation. It is not the conclusion of scientific method. Claiming or suggesting that it is is fraud or error.


Phil

[David B]

So all you can claim is that you have evidence of fraud or error in such cases of supernatural claims. And we don't use induction for that part. It's deduction. We say "if there is evidence of fraud or error, then this or that claim is not valid. There is evidence of fraud or error, therefore this or that claim is not valid." (Of course there might be both evidence of fraud or error and real supernatualism, but I think it's reasonable not to dismiss the claim once fraud or error is found, at least for the sake of discussion.)

Your 'a posteriori induction' is simply a non sequitur. Karl Popper showed that induction is a myth. The only way that the process we call induction works at all is if the proposition is subjected to refutation. Since metaphysical naturalism is not falsifiable, it is clearly not subject to refutation. It is not the conclusion of scientific method. Claiming or suggesting that it is is fraud or error.


Phil

How did Popper show that induction is a myth? Perhaps I'm using the word in some non technical sense, but in the sense I was using it, I don't mean to imply that induction gives a formal proof. Just, often, a very good guide, a reaonable ground for belief.

Logically, you are right, the existence of fraud or error does not discount supernaturalism per se. Logically Uri Geller could bend spoons supernaturally. But since he don't, and there is no good evidence for anything else supernaturally really working, why take this seriously?

Naturalism could be falsified - just one example of an aputed limb growing back as the result of prayer would do it, one example of someone coming back to life after rigor mortis had set in, one example of someone ascending to heaven.

David B

[Vitalstatistix]

The singularity that triggered the Big Bang is supernatural.

It doesn't follow the laws of nature. It's a mystery. It doesn't follow a pattern. It's not observable.

And most importantly...it's creepy when you really think about it.Unfortunately defining it that way doesn't make it so. I recommend writing that up, maybe providing some of that tiresome "evidence" stuff & getting a nobel for your troubles.

[Philo_66]

How did Popper show that induction is a myth? Perhaps I'm using the word in some non technical sense, but in the sense I was using it, I don't mean to imply that induction gives a formal proof. Just, often, a very good guide, a reaonable ground for belief.
That's what is myth. The idea that it is a reasonable ground for belief. We simply make conjectures when we attempt to generalize or abstract reality. Those conjectures mean nothing until they have been demonstrated to be true. And we don't use a positive approach to demonstrating them true. We only accept something as true as long as it has not been disproven. The process only works to the extent that the conjecture is indeed subjected to possible refutation.

Logically, you are right, the existence of fraud or error does not discount supernaturalism per se. Logically Uri Geller could bend spoons supernaturally. But since he don't, and there is no good evidence for anything else supernaturally really working, why take this seriously?
Well, gee, if logically I'm right, then what's there to debate?

As for taking spoon bending seriously, I don't. I see no good reason to.

Naturalism could be falsified - just one example of an aputed limb growing back as the result of prayer would do it, one example of someone coming back to life after rigor mortis had set in, one example of someone ascending to heaven.
As far as I am concerned, there is no good reason to believe these things are true. But, assuming we accept this as 'proof' (which is a little shakey as I'll explain in a moment), all we've done is shown that these forms of 'supernaturalism' aren't true. But what if I (or someone else) says supernaturalism simply doesn't work that way? Let's say for example that QM indeterminism is 'supernatural'. How could we prove this wrong when we cannot prove what the causes are? As far as I know, the universe is entirely supernatural. If it were true, how could we tell that reality from a 'natural' reality? I don't see that we could and that is why 'naturalism' fails as a definition.

Also, not proving 'X' (supernaturalism in this case) does not prove 'not X.' That may seem nit-picking. However, what naturalism attempts to do is extremely broad. It must follow logical rules to the nit as it attempts to include every nit that is. Or, stated in a different way, until every nit is shown to be 'natural', it is an a priori assumption. Worse yet, I don't see how you can show anything to be 'natural' until you have a working definition. 'Not supernatural' doesn't cut it until you have a working definition of 'supernatural.' It seems to me the definitions rely on one another--they are circular and tautological.

Phil

[Nice Squirrel]

All of the molecules that make up fatpie's car keys would exist regardless of whether life existed or not. The molecules would not be oriented the same way, of course.

Prove it.

[Nice Squirrel]

Naturalism could be falsified - just one example of an aputed limb growing back as the result of prayer would do it, one example of someone coming back to life after rigor mortis had set in, one example of someone ascending to heaven.

David B


See Voodoo for examples of this belief and read The Serpent and the Rainbow for more information on how at least one drug company was so intrigued by such stories that they sent researchers to Haiti to find a new powerful aneasthetic.

Bwahahahaha....

Seriously read the book....

[Vitalstatistix]

It is impossible to learn anything about the parts of reality that do not interact with our natural universe.Agreed.Yeah like you could have disagreed. It's a tautology so it doesn't say anything about reality. Remember that bit about unfalsifiability?

[Vitalstatistix]

Prove it.You keep failing the baseball bat test but maybe you'll pass this one. I recommend putting a gun to your head & proving to us that fatpie's keys will still be around whether you exist or not.

[David B]

Those conjectures mean nothing until they have been demonstrated to be true.

If on takes a strong enough definition of 'demonstrated to be true', then, as I see it, one can never demonstrate to be true conjectures like 'if I sit on that chair it will support my weight, as it did yesterday and the day before'.

Nonetheless, such conjectures do not mean nothing to me - they are good enough for me to sit down with confidence.

I don't see how you can show anything to be 'natural' until you have a working definition. 'Not supernatural' doesn't cut it until you have a working definition of 'supernatural.' It seems to me the definitions rely on one another--they are circular and tautological.

You don't think a fuzzy definition emerging from citing examples of what can be considered natural, and what supernatural will hack it?

After all, lots of concepts are very hard to define precisely, but are still meaningful, IMV. Concepts like 'Adult', 'Sane', 'Species'.

I've long taken the view that things can be defined fuzzily, but still be meaningful. Is this unreasonable?

David B

[mirage]

All you can claim is that you have evidence of fraud or error in such cases of supernatural claims. And we don't use induction for that part. It's deduction. Nope, it's inductive inference.

The presence of evidence best interpreted as fraud is not logically incompatible with a lack of fraud.

Your 'a posteriori induction' is simply a non sequitur. Karl Popper showed that induction is a myth.

Nope, he not only failed, but he failed quite embarrassingly in that regard, at least with the benefit of hindsight. I you want to understand induction, he is not the man.

If you want an example, he suggested using theories that had survived rigorous attempts at falsification above ones that had not. Unfortunately the only reasonable way to favour such theories is inductively, i.e. "they have stood up to many test in the past so they are more likely to in the future." Without an inductive step there is not point testing any hypotheses. This is widely recognised as a fundamental flaw of his thinking he had eliminated the need for induction. A pretty damn obvious flaw if you are remotely used to spotting inductive assumptions.

In fact induction is required for any empirical knowledge. All deduction can do is tell you what the certain implications are of true statements. Not if empirical statements are in fact true.

[Nice Squirrel]

You keep failing the baseball bat test but maybe you'll pass this one. I recommend putting a gun to your head & proving to us that fatpie's keys will still be around whether you exist or not.

This is not in anyway an answer to my challenge of another poster and is a complete derail and non-sequitor. Please control yourself.

[benjdm]

Prove it.
For them not to exist, the conservation of energy would have to be violated. I cannot 'prove' the conservation of energy cannot be violated, of course; but it about as reliable a piece of scientific knowledge as we have. I am quite comfortable considering the law of the conservation of energy as something that I know.

[benjdm]

Yeah like you could have disagreed. It's a tautology so it doesn't say anything about reality. Remember that bit about unfalsifiability?
But there are plenty who disagree. They posit a God who does not currently interact whatsoever with our universe - a purely supernatural God - and then tell me what they 'know' about it. Angela could have disagreed and had plenty of company.

[fatpie42]

He would simply have to give a positive piece of evidence for himself. Reversing the laws of thermodynamics would be a good way to show he existed, or he could pop up and do miracles. Since none of this has ever been verified or seen, I don't see it happening, but if it did we could define God as a part of reality.

You are not explaining how we can show that God is 'real', you are explaining how we can show that God is an 'external object'. No one ever claimed that God was an 'object' external or otherwise, so you are completely wasting your time.

Of course there are some out there who will refer to God as a 'substance', a 'being', an 'entity', etc. However, there are a large numbers of, often very orthodox, thinkers who maintain that God cannot be thought of in this way (other than symbolically) because of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (i.e. God is not part of his creation and therefore cannot be the same kind of thing as a substance, etc.)

[fatpie42]

Love is a CONCEPT. If there were no life, then "love" would not exist. It is not a physical, tangible, etc quality, merely an idea.

Would you not accept that some people can be in love without recognising it? Are you saying that if no one recognised that a couple were in love, it would not be true? Love is not simply 'within the head', but is rather an attitude expressed in a variety of physical ways (hugs, kisses, acts of kindness, etc.). Certainly there would be no love without life, but that is no less obvious that there would no new man-made buildings being constructed without life. Without life, you can have none of the products of life. What love would there be without life? Can two stones love one another? (We could get into a debate about whether robots could come to love one another, but let's put that issue aside for now...)

The point is that love is tangible in a way, but that does not mean that we need to indulge in a belief in Plato's forms. We don't need to envisage a place where love exists in order to say that it is expressed in physical, tangible, ways. Love, happiness, guilt, pain, all exist tangibly.

[Nice Squirrel]

For them not to exist, the conservation of energy would have to be violated. I cannot 'prove' the conservation of energy cannot be violated, of course; but it about as reliable a piece of scientific knowledge as we have. I am quite comfortable considering the law of the conservation of energy as something that I know.

Unfortunately we have the problem of sub-atomic particles popping in and out of existence, emergent properties and the effects of the observer upon the observed. Life being an emergent property of the interaction of the matter and energy of the chemical elements, would in fact require a universe with different properties than one we live in. As far as the keys, there is a fair chance that without life those molecules (depending on the alloy and where and when it was produced -- intrusion/extrusion -- not to mention the processing of the alloy by the lower life form known as "human") would not have been created had not life changed the chemical composition of the surface of the planet.

[David B]

Life being an emergent property of the interaction of the matter and energy of the chemical elements, would in fact require a universe with different properties than one we live in

How so?

David B

[Nice Squirrel]

How so?

David B

Life would not be an emergent property and could not react with the universe, thus different universe.

[benjdm]

Life being an emergent property of the interaction of the matter and energy of the chemical elements, would in fact require a universe with different properties than one we live in.
I don't understand this sentence. My concept of life is one that solely involves matter and energy interactions.
As far as the keys, there is a fair chance that without life those molecules (depending on the alloy and where and when it was produced -- intrusion/extrusion -- not to mention the processing of the alloy by the lower life form known as "human") would not have been created had not life changed the chemical composition of the surface of the planet.
An accurate point. I was thinking 'atoms' when I wrote 'molecules' and the two are not interchangeable. Perhaps I should have phrased it more like: The 'frozen energy' (matter) of the keys would still exist regardless of whether any 'frozen energy' was organized as life.'

[Nice Squirrel]

I don't understand this sentence. My concept of life is one that solely involves matter and energy interactions.Life is an emergent property of these interactions. Just like I can have tachonite, oxygen, coke, limestone and manganese and never have steel. They need to be combined through the corerect interaction to produce steel. Life is basically that interaction. (Our current definition of life adds more conditions) Without life many chemical processes that affect our universe would not take place.

An accurate point. I was thinking 'atoms' when I wrote 'molecules' and the two are not interchangeable. Perhaps I should have phrased it more like: The 'frozen energy' (matter) of the keys would still exist regardless of whether any 'frozen energy' was organized as life.'Well we could debate this too since matter and energy are interchangeable, black holes, mini-skirt lenghts, etc.... but I will stick to the relationships and interactions of chemical products and energy.

[Vitalstatistix]

This is not in anyway an answer to my challenge of another poster and is a complete derail and non-sequitor. Please control yourself.You asked (roughly) for evidence that the keys will be around whether life exists or not. I proposed a method of providing such evidence. Do you suddenly have a problem with the scientific method, my dear Squirrel?But there are plenty who disagree. They posit a God who does not currently interact whatsoever with our universe - a purely supernatural God - and then tell me what they 'know' about it. Angela could have disagreed and had plenty of company.well.. that's true. There's truth in numbers, I suppose.

[Nice Squirrel]

You asked (roughly) for evidence that the keys will be around whether life exists or not. I proposed a method of providing such evidence. Do you suddenly have a problem with the scientific method, my dear Squirrel?well.. that's true. There's truth in numbers, I suppose.


So you are advocting that I commit suicide?

[Vitalstatistix]

So you are advocting that I commit suicide?Of course not. I simply pointed out that the nature of your question is such that doing so would put it to rest. The choice is yours & I recommend choosing your research more carefully next time.

[benjdm]

Well we could debate this too since matter and energy are interchangeable
Agreed. I was attempting to keep it in energy terms for that reason.
Without life many chemical processes that affect our universe would not take place.
Hmmm......possibly, possibly not. I don't know how you could test that one. The chemical processes would almost certainly take place in different proportions, at least.

[angela2]

Yeah like you could have disagreed. It's a tautology so it doesn't say anything about reality. Remember that bit about unfalsifiability?
Ah, Jeez. I didn't think anybody would want to follow me there so I never brought it up.

Also Popper's work has been contended.

But I'm glad you got to it.

[Nice Squirrel]

Of course not. I simply pointed out that the nature of your question is such that doing so would put it to rest. The choice is yours & I recommend choosing your research more carefully next time.

So you have nothing to add to the discussion? Nor any relevent argument to put forth concerning my assertions in this thread other than snarky comments? I mean, it isn't really that hard to argue an opposing position on how life affects the universe.

[Vitalstatistix]

So you have nothing to add to the discussion? Nor any relevent argument to put forth concerning my assertions in this thread other than snarky comments? I mean, it isn't really that hard to argue an opposing position on how life affects the universe.When did this qualify as a discussion? Tons of people dying every day & we're supposed to discuss how the keys would change if everyone else died...?

Fine. I'm just wasting time between appointments. If you wish, I'll stop poking the train wreck.Ah, Jeez. I didn't think anybody would want to follow me there so I never brought it up.

Also Popper's work has been contended.

But I'm glad you got to it.Uh ok.

[David B]

Sorry I'm still having difficulty here.

Life being an emergent property of the interaction of the matter and energy of the chemical elements, would in fact require a universe with different properties than one we live in[quote]

Is explained by

[quote=Nice Squirrel]Life would not be an emergent property and could not react with the universe, thus different universe.

:huh: :huh:

David B

[Nice Squirrel]

Sorry I'm still having difficulty here.

[quote=Nice Squirrel]Life being an emergent property of the interaction of the matter and energy of the chemical elements, would in fact require a universe with different properties than one we live in[quote]

Is explained by



:huh: :huh:

David B

Hmm your, not getting it. How to explain while answering phonecalls.

You understand life is basically a complex chemical reation that produces a "self-replicating chemical reaction machine" and that these machine in effect change the evironment in which they live through their interactions with that surrounding environment. (Relationships, which are an emergent property of the physical world.) In order to have a universe without life, the underlying properties that support life would in effect have to be different to prevent life from occuring. The other scenario is a universe that never supports life because conditions are never correct for life to develop. But life does affect the universe, so the universe we live in would be different if there were no life. How different is up to debate and depeds on what we determine to be classified as "life".

[Philo_66]

Those conjectures mean nothing until they have been demonstrated to be true.
If on takes a strong enough definition of 'demonstrated to be true', then, as I see it, one can never demonstrate to be true conjectures like 'if I sit on that chair it will support my weight, as it did yesterday and the day before'.

Nonetheless, such conjectures do not mean nothing to me - they are good enough for me to sit down with confidence.
Nothing is absolute. But, there's a different principle here as well. In your 'safe chair' test, you actually did a specific test to verify a specific hypothesis. Should we thus conclude all chairs or all chair-like objects are safe to sit on? Not until we've tested something of similar structure and composition. You haven't tested all of the universe for 'naturalism'. In fact--you haven't tested any of the universe for 'naturalism'. At best, you've only tested it against certain things you consider to be 'supernaturalism'.

You don't think a fuzzy definition emerging from citing examples of what can be considered natural, and what supernatural will hack it?

After all, lots of concepts are very hard to define precisely, but are still meaningful, IMV. Concepts like 'Adult', 'Sane', 'Species'.

I've long taken the view that things can be defined fuzzily, but still be meaningful. Is this unreasonable?
Consider what I said in the context I said it. I said "those conjectures mean nothing" meaning they have no scientific value. There may be other kinds of meaning that have value--religious meaning for example. Yes, I can accept that Naturalism has religious meaning and that such a meaning has value. But it ain't science.

Phil

[benjdm]

When I am imagining a 'no-life' condition, I am picturing going back in time. Say, 5 billion years ago. The energy embodied in the keys (fatpie's ? I forget now) would still exist regardless of the life on Earth not existing. (Earth wouldn't have formed yet, either.)

Edited to add: For what it's worth, I am using the concept of supernatural as defined in the beginning of the wiki article:
The supernatural (Latin: super- "exceeding" + nature) refers to forces and phenomena which are not observed in nature, and therefore beyond verifiable measurement. If a phenomenon can be demonstrated, it can no longer be considered supernatural.
So I guess I would be in the 'tautology' camp of metaphysical naturalism.

[dug_down_deep]

Unfortunately defining it that way doesn't make it so. I recommend writing that up, maybe providing some of that tiresome "evidence" stuff & getting a nobel for your troubles.
Well, that was helpful. Fortunately, sniping a smart S answer doesn't make it not so either. I recommend writing that up, maybe providing some of that tiresome "content" stuff, and sending it to People magazine, for their fashion review section.

[angela2]

You are not explaining how we can show that God is 'real', you are explaining how we can show that God is an 'external object'. No one ever claimed that God was an 'object' external or otherwise, so you are completely wasting your time.

Of course there are some out there who will refer to God as a 'substance', a 'being', an 'entity', etc. However, there are a large numbers of, often very orthodox, thinkers who maintain that God cannot be thought of in this way (other than symbolically) because of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (i.e. God is not part of his creation and therefore cannot be the same kind of thing as a substance, etc.)
Yup. Words like 'substance' and 'person' are carefully defined so we don't end up positing a God who is just like us only bigger and better. God is sui generis.

[angela2]

As far as the keys, there is a fair chance that without life those molecules (depending on the alloy and where and when it was produced -- intrusion/extrusion -- not to mention the processing of the alloy by the lower life form known as "human") would not have been created had not life changed the chemical composition of the surface of the planet.
At last! Someone who understands me. :D

Of course, the misunderstanding in part is my fault. Wrong verb tense.

[Philo_66]

Nope, it's inductive inference.

The presence of evidence best interpreted as fraud is not logically incompatible with a lack of fraud.
For the sake of discussion it seems reasonable to assume at least the givens are correct, wouldn't you agree?

Deduction is certainly used as I explained it. The question is whether or not something purely 'inductive' is being used.

Nope, he not only failed, but he failed quite embarrassingly in that regard, at least with the benefit of hindsight. I you want to understand induction, he is not the man.
Seems obvious, especially when he dismissed it. The question becomes whether or not someone who does have a definition of induction can demonstrate it to be valid.

If you want an example, he suggested using theories that had survived rigorous attempts at falsification above ones that had not. Unfortunately the only reasonable way to favour such theories is inductively, i.e. "they have stood up to many test in the past so they are more likely to in the future."
Agreed. All it really means is that, if we continue to test in the same manner, those same tests will likely stand up. Everytime you introduce a new test, the outcome is unknown. I don't if Popper was aware of that or not, I'd guess he was.

Without an inductive step there is not point testing any hypotheses. This is widely recognised as a fundamental flaw of his thinking he had eliminated the need for induction. A pretty damn obvious flaw if you are remotely used to spotting inductive assumptions.
Where is the 'inductive' step? Induction, as I see it, is the result of a series of 'create and test' steps.

In fact induction is required for any empirical knowledge. All deduction can do is tell you what the certain implications are of true statements. Not if empirical statements are in fact true.
Correct, regarding empirical statements, deduction can only disprove them. (Given: "If A then B." Then if B is false, A is false. If A is true, we can deduce nothing about the truthfullness of A. Likewise if A is false, we can deduce nothing about B.)

Induction seems required only if what you want is absolute empirical knowledge. I don't see how we can have such a thing.

Phil

[Philo_66]

Also Popper's work has been contended.
Whose work worth mentioning hasn't? :)

Phil

[mirage]

For the sake of discussion it seems reasonable to assume at least the givens are correct, wouldn't you agree?

Deduction is certainly used as I explained it. The question is whether or not something purely 'inductive' is being used.Well I hope I'm not misunderstanding you and being too picky, but if you have already assumed that evidence against supernaturalism is "correct", then you have already assumed supernaturalism if false. Any argument based on empirical evidence is always fundamentally inductive.

Seems obvious, especially when he dismissed it. The question becomes whether or not someone who does have a definition of induction can demonstrate it to be valid.I'm not sure it would be my question.

1. What would "valid" mean in this context? Inductive conclusions don't claim to be always true. If you go down the line of probability, i.e. they must be "likely" true, then you find that probability is based on induction.

2. Why should it show it is valid? Deduction hasn't. Some inductive process is fundamental to all cognitive systems we know and deduction pretty much optional, being a special case of inductive rules being considered certain entailments.

Agreed. All it really means is that, if we continue to test in the same manner, those same tests will likely stand up.An inductive conclusion, of course! Other kinds of tests too.
Everytime you introduce a new test, the outcome is unknown. I don't if Popper was aware of that or not, I'd guess he was.No, it seems he just painted himself into a corner because he was so committed to eliminating observationalist-inductivist account of science. His criticisms of that particular view were quite valid, and very very influential (the whole notion of falsification) but that did not mean that induction wasn't still necessary.

Where is the 'inductive' step? Induction, as I see it, is the result of a series of 'create and test' steps.The inductive step is going from past performance to future performance. From successful tests to increased confidence.

Correct, regarding empirical statements, deduction can only disprove them. (Given: "If A then B." Then if B is false, A is false. If A is true, we can deduce nothing about the truthfullness of A. Likewise if A is false, we can deduce nothing about B.)It can't disprove anything but a logical impossibility. Anything else relies on the conditional being true.

Only induction can establish non tautological truths.

Induction seems required only if what you want is absolute empirical knowledge. I don't see how we can have such a thing.I'm not sure what would be meant by absolute in this context. Inductive belief is tentative to a greater or lesser degree depending on the evidence, and is always subject to revision.

[angela2]

Whose work worth mentioning hasn't? :)

Phil
yea, but Kuhn is a favorite of mine. Allow me my prejudices please.:)

This is a GREAT thread, and your contributions have been integral.

[Minnesota Joe]

I don't think so. It is pretty easy really. Just point out that he hasn't presented a well defined argument.

I wouldn't both with learning much about metaphysical naturalism. The distinction between natural and supernatural cannot be made intelligible.


It boils down to a non-rigorously defined rejection of superstitions.

Whoa there! Some people use metaphysical naturalism synonymously with physicalism and it simply not true that physicalism is not rigorously defined! I point you to the positively gads of literature on the matter. Physicalism itself entails the non-existence of snooty type god's and ghoul's that are, well, non-physical or not supervenient on the physical. And one argument for that is the success of methodological naturalism.

Given that, what remains I suppose are physical ghosties of some type (which are not ruled out by physicalism per se.) Now, science could discover such things, but it has not and the evidence suggests otherwise. I'd say we have good reason (a very strong argument) to conclude on the physics, the history of such claims, and on what we know of the mind that there are no such disembodied minds.

Or have you gone strange on me, mirage? Halloween is coming up and all, so I'd like to know if I should brace myself for something spooooky!

:devil2:

More seriously, are you rejecting physicalism here or just expressing irritation with colloquialisms?

[mirage]

Whoa there! Some people use metaphysical naturalism synonymously with physicalism and it simply not true that physicalism is not rigorously defined! I point you to the positively gads of literature on the matter. Physicalism itself entails the non-existence of snooty type god's and ghoul's that are, well, non-physical or not supervenient on the physical. And one argument for that is the success of methodological naturalism.Well I was going for a rather provocative position there!

I don't have any objection to a naturalism that merely rejects the distinction between the supernatural and natural, because it isn't meaningful.

Just the ones that say "the supernatural doesn't exist".

Given that, what remains I suppose are physical ghosties of some type (which are not ruled out by physicalism per se.) Now, science could discover such things, but it has not and the evidence suggests otherwise. I'd say we have good reason (a very strong argument) to conclude on the physics, the history of such claims, and on what we know of the mind that there are no such disembodied minds. Yep, me too!

Or have you gone strange on me, mirage? Halloween is coming up and all, so I'd like to know if I should brace myself for something spooooky! Gone? Gone?

More seriously, are you rejecting physicalism here or just expressing irritation with colloquialisms?No, I'm not really rejecting physicalism.

I sort of do, but it seems I struggle to explain my position because noone seems to either get it or agree with it. I think that the physical can be reduced to a concept that integrates our experience, i.e. reduced to terms of experience in a kind of idealist way. At the same time I think that the mind and experience can be reductively identified with the physical brain in that same physical model of experience. The overall shape of that is in a tv picture-in-picture infinite recursion, where (going in one direction) the physical is a cognitive model which includes a brain, which is the entire mind, which includes the cognitive model which is the physical world, which includes the brain etc. etc. but I don't see a fundamental problem with that. You can go in the other direction too.

I think that idea integrates the good points of both realism/physicalism and idealism whilst at the same time rejecting any sort of assertion about the "nature" of everything, which can't in principle be meaningful, since everything has no context or frame of reference. It sticks to just asserting relations between parts of everything.

But short answer, yes I'm a physicalist for all usual purposes though I don't think the physical can be defined any way other than with reference to experience.

[Philo_66]

Well I hope I'm not misunderstanding you and being too picky, but if you have already assumed that evidence against supernaturalism is "correct", then you have already assumed supernaturalism if false. Any argument based on empirical evidence is always fundamentally inductive.
What I was trying to point out is that the only thing that was 'proven' was that the particular instances of claims of supernaturalism were false. Of course, the evidence used to 'prove' this might indicate something else...

That we use an inductive process I cannot deny. What I'm denying is that induction is performed in a single step.

I'm not sure it would be my question.

1. What would "valid" mean in this context? Inductive conclusions don't claim to be always true. If you go down the line of probability, i.e. they must be "likely" true, then you find that probability is based on induction.
Can you measure that probability? The fact we cannot measure it tells us something about it's nature. It's really not 'probability' as we normally use the word. And then once we find the one case that disproves the theory, what's the probability then?

2. Why should it show it is valid? Deduction hasn't. Some inductive process is fundamental to all cognitive systems we know and deduction pretty much optional, being a special case of inductive rules being considered certain entailments.
Instead of 'valid' how about 'workable?'


An inductive conclusion, of course! Other kinds of tests too.
Touche.

No, it seems he just painted himself into a corner because he was so committed to eliminating observationalist-inductivist account of science. His criticisms of that particular view were quite valid, and very very influential (the whole notion of falsification) but that did not mean that induction wasn't still necessary.

The inductive step is going from past performance to future performance. From successful tests to increased confidence.
How does it do this? I'm saying that it's really a series of 'create and test' steps, none of which, by itself, is an inductive step. That's all. Do you have a different explanation?

It can't disprove anything but a logical impossibility. Anything else relies on the conditional being true.

Not sure what you mean by this. We assume the logic is correlated to the reality we're trying to make sense of. Perhaps that assumption is problematic?

Only induction can establish non tautological truths.
And only provisionally. Which begs the question of what is 'truth' when it can change, no?

I'm not sure what would be meant by absolute in this context. Inductive belief is tentative to a greater or lesser degree depending on the evidence, and is always subject to revision.
Meaning it's not 'absolute'. But I realize 'absolute' is a fuzzy term here. It's unprovable and I don't think we have any capability for it--assuming my fuzzy idea of what it is is anywhere near accurate.

Phil

[mirage]

What I was trying to point out is that the only thing that was 'proven' was that the particular instances of claims of supernaturalism were false. Of course, the evidence used to 'prove' this might indicate something else...

That we use an inductive process I cannot deny. What I'm denying is that induction is performed in a single step.OK.

Can you measure that probability? The fact we cannot measure it tells us something about it's nature. It's really not 'probability' as we normally use the word. And then once we find the one case that disproves the theory, what's the probability then?You can't really measure any probability as it turns out. I know that sounds pretty wrong, but the philosophy of