The idea of an all powerful god and free will are contradictory

[scisyhp]

Just a thought I had, but;

An all knowing god would know of every event that can ever occur when he created everything, so every event would be predetermined. To say otherwise would contradict the idea of god becouse it implys a limit of knowledge.

Becouse every event is predetermined, a human would never have a "choice" as to what would happen to them becouse their path was predetermined, choice would merely be an illusion, it would not exist.

The idea of an all powerfull, all knowing god, defeats the idea of free will.

[Merzbow42]

Even worse for the religionists is that this line of argument can also be used to show that the concept of a tri-omni God is self-contradictory:

1. An all-powerful God by definition has no limits on what he can do.
2. But an all-knowing God knows all the occurs in the future, which includes everything that God himself will do.
3. Therefore God cannot be both all-knowing and all-powerful because perfect knowledge of his own future actions necessarily limit them.

Also see:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_theism

[seebs]

This argument is intuitively powerful, but is in fact a post hoc fallacy. It relies on the assumption that, if two events are correlated, the later event is caused by the former event.

In short, preknowledge is not determination any more than it violates free will that no man can do anything contrary to what is written in an accurate biography written after his death.

[moonwatcher]

This argument is intuitively powerful, but is in fact a post hoc fallacy. It relies on the assumption that, if two events are correlated, the later event is caused by the former event.

In short, preknowledge is not determination any more than it violates free will that no man can do anything contrary to what is written in an accurate biography written after his death.


True, the argument isnt valid. Imagine that we could go back in time. We arrive the day before Abraham Lincoln was shot. Does our knowledge of what will happen to him imply that he or his shooter have no free will?

No, no more than my knowledge right now of what Lincoln and his shooter did implies they lacked free will.

The argument is invalid because it assumes that God is imbedded in the present just as we are. But if one assumes that God is beyond time as we know it then from his point of view all of human history is in the past.

In other words, he wouldn't be predicting what we are doing. From his point of view, he's simply remembering it.

Of course, this is all hypothetical to me since I'm an atheist.....but I think its as important to point out flawed atheistic arguments as it is to point out flawed theistic arguments.

[aa5874]

This argument is intuitively powerful, but is in fact a post hoc fallacy. It relies on the assumption that, if two events are correlated, the later event is caused by the former event.

In short, preknowledge is not determination any more than it violates free will that no man can do anything contrary to what is written in an accurate biography written after his death.

It is your argument that is flawed. It has been already demonstrated in the Bible, especially in the book called Exodus, with regards to Pharoah, that God can control the mental and physical faculties , the free will, of a person.

Supernatural beings can possess human beings and take control of their mental and physical faculties, their freewill, and cause them to behave as though mentally ill or exihibit uncontrollable characteristics.

The Bible has already stated clearly that God can send evil spirits into a person's body and then punish that person without mercy for carrying out evil acts of the evil ghost.

Now if Gods exist and can perform as advertised in the Bible, then no-one may know whether or not his will is free, since Gods can control your will with or without notice.

So, if Gods exist, then I may be demon possessed right now and I have no way of knowning because it is Gods will for me to go to Hell.

[seebs]

It is your argument that is flawed. It has been already demonstrated in the Bible, especially in the book called Exodus, with regards to Pharoah, that God can control the mental and physical faculties , the free will, of a person.

So?

I am not arguing whether or not God could in theory exercise such control. I'm just arguing that foreknowledge doesn't zap free will.

Now if Gods exist and can perform as advertised in the Bible, then no-one may know whether or not his will is free, since Gods can control your will with or without notice.

So, if Gods exist, then I may be demon possessed right now and I have no way of knowning because it is Gods will for me to go to Hell.

This is true.

But it doesn't prove the claim under discussion, which is that free will cannot coexist with an all-knowing God.

It is true that I can control my cat's movement to a very great degree; this does not mean that, at every instant, the cat moves precisely as I determine. It's just not relevant.

[DBT]

So?

I am not arguing whether or not God could in theory exercise such control. I'm just arguing that foreknowledge doesn't zap free will.

If free will is defined as the ability to choose, how can an omniscient being choose to change when he already knows in advance everything that will transpire?
The future to such a being can only be as static to 'Him' as the past is to us.

P1 - Choice implies an element of uncertainty.
P2 - The need to choose implies incomplete knowledge.
P3 - A God, defined as being omniscient, has perfect knowledge and
complete certainty of all future decisions.

C1 - An omniscient God cannot have free will.

[seebs]

If free will is defined as the ability to choose, how can an omniscient being choose to change when he already knows in advance everything that will transpire?

The mistake here is the assumption that a free choice must be a change from some other choice that was already made.

It's not so. The knowledge comes from the free choices, not the other way around.

P1 - Choice implies an element of uncertainty.

I don't think I agree with the conflation of "uncertainty" and "freedom" here.

If a biographer writes down the events of my life after they happen, my choices are not constrained by the book, even though it is impossible for me to act in a way that will not turn out to be what is is the book.

Moving the book earlier doesn't change this. Our assumptions about causality have already been broken by the assertion that foreknowledge is possible; we can't keep using them in the same hypothetical.

[DBT]

The mistake here is the assumption that a free choice must be a change from some other choice that was already made.

It's not so. The knowledge comes from the free choices, not the other way around.

But the question is, at what point does an omniscient, eternally existing Being, make any choice that is not already known from eternity?
That Being presumably has no beginning, a point where all the choices that will ever be made, are made. Even so, that point would still not be a single instance of free will as even that 'choice' would also have been eternally known.
Perhaps an eternal, omniscient God can only exist in a some kind of stasis.



I don't think I agree with the conflation of "uncertainty" and "freedom" here.

If a biographer writes down the events of my life after they happen, my choices are not constrained by the book, even though it is impossible for me to act in a way that will not turn out to be what is is the book.

Moving the book earlier doesn't change this. Our assumptions about causality have already been broken by the assertion that foreknowledge is possible; we can't keep using them in the same hypothetical.

I meant that the very need to make a choice between two options implies a lack of knowledge.
We do not have sufficient knowledge to determine the correct choice, or the best course of action to take, therefore we are presented with the dilemma of having to choose on the basis of insufficient information. None of this applies to a state of omniscience.

[LoungeHead]

This argument is intuitively powerful, but is in fact a post hoc fallacy. It relies on the assumption that, if two events are correlated, the later event is caused by the former event.
I dont thinks so. An all knowing god is inconsistent with freewill even in a non-deterministic system, such as that described by Chaos Theory. The only way two events cannot be correlated, in deteminstic or non-deterministic systems, is if a rock, for example, can randomly change, without governing principles, into a chicken, then into uzi, and a number of other unrelated things over a sequence of time. The first events would have no correlation with the second. These sort of events, fortunately, are only possible in our imaginations. Just like God incidently.

[Stumpjumper]

I dont thinks so. An all knowing god is inconsistent with freewill even in a non-deterministic system, such as that described by Chaos Theory. The only way two events cannot be correlated, in deteminstic or non-deterministic systems, is if a rock, for example, can randomly change, without governing principles, into a chicken, then into uzi, and a number of other unrelated things over a sequence of time. The first events would have no correlation with the second. These sort of events, fortunately, are only possible in our imaginations. Just like God incidently.


Your argument does not compute. :p

Free will simply means that one has the ability to choose a or ~a. It does not require that all of our actions are free from outside influence only that they are not pre-determined...

Also, a Christian would also say that God is active and Providential in the world so actually outside influence and governing principles is to be expected...

[chasborne]

I don't want to sound contrary, by why must omniscience include what will happen or not in the future?
How can one's not knowing the unknowable limit them to being less than all-knowing? (This reminds me of the argument:"can God make a rock so big he can't move it?") It is nonsensical and fruitless. (Can you think of something that is unthinkable?) By definition these arguments fail.

[seebs]

But the question is, at what point does an omniscient, eternally existing Being, make any choice that is not already known from eternity?

What does "already known" have to do with anything?

At what point can I make any choice that will not eventually be known by an honest and exceptionally nosy biographer?

That a choice is known does not mean that it is not free.

I meant that the very need to make a choice between two options implies a lack of knowledge.
We do not have sufficient knowledge to determine the correct choice, or the best course of action to take, therefore we are presented with the dilemma of having to choose on the basis of insufficient information. None of this applies to a state of omniscience.

I don't think I agree, because choice still applies to the question of which outcomes we would prefer, even if we know all the possible ones.

[seebs]

I don't want to sound contrary, by why must omniscience include what will happen or not in the future?
How can one's not knowing the unknowable limit them to being less than all-knowing? (This reminds me of the argument:"can God make a rock so big he can't move it?") It is nonsensical and fruitless. (Can you think of something that is unthinkable?) By definition these arguments fail.

This is another interesting line that eventually generally produces Open Theism. I have never found any actual problems with Open Theism, although I have no strong opinion on the issue.

[sensiblesue]

I have heard Christians argue that God was justified in killing infants as alleged in the Old Testament because he had perfect foreknowledge of their destinies and knew they would become wicked. I'm scratching my head a bit trying to reconcile that argument with the argument that foreknowledge on God's part doesn't preclude free will because he is outside time and only remembering.

[Merzbow42]

This is another interesting line that eventually generally produces Open Theism. I have never found any actual problems with Open Theism, although I have no strong opinion on the issue.

I was going to ask if you were an open theist or not. Personally I see OT as the only theology compatible with the concept of a 'good' Christian God. The argument by classical theists that we can be considered free and thus morally responsible for our actions to a God that nevertheless has deliberately predetermined all our actions has always struck me as ridiculous.

[Decypher]

Just a thought I had, but;

An all knowing god would know of every event that can ever occur when he created everything, so every event would be predetermined. To say otherwise would contradict the idea of god becouse it implys a limit of knowledge.

Becouse every event is predetermined, a human would never have a "choice" as to what would happen to them becouse their path was predetermined, choice would merely be an illusion, it would not exist.

The idea of an all powerfull, all knowing god, defeats the idea of free will.

Even if this were correct, the more loony Christians wouldn't care anyway. I have even seen them deny that God has any choice.

[sharon45]

Just a thought I had, but;

An all knowing god would know of every event that can ever occur when he created everything, so every event would be predetermined. To say otherwise would contradict the idea of god becouse it implys a limit of knowledge.

Becouse every event is predetermined, a human would never have a "choice" as to what would happen to them becouse their path was predetermined, choice would merely be an illusion, it would not exist.

The idea of an all powerfull, all knowing god, defeats the idea of free will.We would normally have to be like a program or god would not be in control and then be subject to making mistakes...which are already demonstrated in the bible. Some examples being Genesis 6:5-7, 1 Samuel 15:10-11, 1 Samuel 15:35, and Matthew 3:16-17.

[aa5874]

This is true.

But it doesn't prove the claim under discussion, which is that free will cannot coexist with an all-knowing God.

It is true that I can control my cat's movement to a very great degree; this does not mean that, at every instant, the cat moves precisely as I determine. It's just not relevant.

If Gods exist, then no-one can know for sure if his free will is co-existing with an all knowing, all powerful God .That is, your response to me or vice versa, can be controlled by some God, without our knowledge. We appear to be in control of our mental and physical faculties, but we are actually controlled by some God.

[seebs]

If Gods exist, then no-one can know for sure if his free will is co-existing with an all knowing, all powerful God .That is, your response to me or vice versa, can be controlled by some God, without our knowledge. We appear to be in control of our mental and physical faculties, but we are actually controlled by some God.

So? The claim was that it could be proven that free will can't coexist with omniscience. That claim's dead.

I think it's utterly trivial to observe that a lack of free will could theoretically coexist with omniscience, and not of much interest.

[LoungeHead]

Your argument does not compute. :p

Free will simply means that one has the ability to choose a or ~a. It does not require that all of our actions are free from outside influence only that they are not pre-determined...
Free-will is the ability to choose to do a conditioned behaviour [a] or to do an alternative behaviour [b, c, d... etc]. Every instance where you do not choose to do an alternative behaviour, is every instance you choose to do a conditioned behaviour. Thus it's not a matter of choosing between a or ~a.

The alternative behaviour is influenced both by external influence and previous conditioned behaviour. But. your choice to perform an alternative behaviour correlates with what you were previously been doing. Your decision to choose an alternative is not random, but the outcomes can be.

That is my objection to seebs statement "It relies on the assumption that, if two events are correlated, the later event is caused by the former event." The only way an event or outcome can occur, is through the process of what has previously occurred. Even if you disagree with linear causality, the fact is each instance is an outcome of a previous instant.

Also, if our free-will ability was simply a matter of choosing a or ~a, then ~a is not a choice, because we are always doing ~a, when we are not doing anything else. The reason my argument did not compute for you, is because you have a different definition of free-will. :p
Also, a Christian would also say that God is active and Providential in the world so actually outside influence and governing principles is to be expected...
Yeah, I imagine a Xian would claim Supermonkey is the active ingredient in the butterfly effect. But how would that work in terms of activity of the mind in neuroscience. Doesn't my phsiological state influence my choices also? And if so, is God fucking with my mind as well as the world?

BTW... in a non-deterministic system, God is like the guy who trips you up, and results in you smashing your face. It wasn't the tripping that caused the blacks eyes, it was your choice not to stop yourself connecting your face with the ground. :banghead: :frown:

[DBT]

What does "already known" have to do with anything?
That a choice is known does not mean that it is not free.

If God knows all things throughout time then he knows every action you will perform, every decision you will make throughout throughout your life, before you have done them.
You can do nothing other than what God already knows you are going to do.
Do you then have free will? It seems that all our decisions are already determined by factors beyond our control. It would be only from our limited perspective of time that we have the illusiory perception of free will.


At what point can I make any choice that will not eventually be known by an honest and exceptionally nosy biographer?

Putting aside determinism, we do have a certain degree of autonomy to select option A over option B, whether that is free will is debatable. But an omniscient God is the biographer, the author of all possible events. And He Himself is bound by His own choices.


I don't think I agree, because choice still applies to the question of which outcomes we would prefer, even if we know all the possible ones.

Is it really a choice if you already know your every course of action? There is no need to weigh options, all your preferences are known from eternity. Everything has been decided from eternity. All outcomes are known from eternity.

[Merzbow42]

DBT, you need to keep the concepts of omniscience and omnipotence separate. seebs is correct that omniscience alone doesn't preclude free will, but once you throw in omnipotence you reach a contradiction if you continue to believe that God created the universe and that we have free will.

[seebs]

If God knows all things throughout time then he knows every action you will perform, every decision you will make throughout throughout your life, before you have done them.
You can do nothing other than what God already knows you are going to do.

And how is this any different from the situation of a person whose life is chronicled by a perfect biographer after the fact?

That knowledge of an event and the event cannot differ doesn't mean that the event is controlled by the knowledge.

Do you then have free will? It seems that all our decisions are already determined by factors beyond our control. It would be only from our limited perspective of time that we have the illusiory perception of free will.

The key issue here seems to be that foreknowledge implies that the decision is already made.

But in that case, we're not talking about omniscience, but merely about flawless prediction, which is nowhere near as interesting.

Putting aside determinism, we do have a certain degree of autonomy to select option A over option B, whether that is free will is debatable. But an omniscient God is the biographer, the author of all possible events. And He Himself is bound by His own choices.

Well, we are bound by our choices, but that doesn't make them unfree.

Is it really a choice if you already know your every course of action? There is no need to weigh options, all your preferences are known from eternity. Everything has been decided from eternity. All outcomes are known from eternity.

I think this is why it is useful to distinguish between different models of time, and why many theologians argue that God is "outside of time" -- that God's actions are not constrained by the kind of causality we experience.

I would say that it is still a choice, because it was a choice when you made it, even if you knew that beforehand. Knowledge is caused by events, and it is no more informative to assert that the events cannot differ from the knowledge, than to assert that the knowledge cannot differ from the events.

To put it another way: We have a sort of pragmatic model of causality we use in our daily lives that works well enough for us. In this normal model, foreknowledge in the absolute sense is simply not possible except for very predictable things, and even then we are ultimately relying on guesses about induction.

To hypothesize actual and complete foreknowledge, we have to abandon our usual model, because the claim is clearly impossible within this model.

Once we've done that, we no longer have a basis for making our usual claims about chronological order implying causality.

[seebs]

DBT, you need to keep the concepts of omniscience and omnipotence separate. seebs is correct that omniscience alone doesn't preclude free will, but once you throw in omnipotence you reach a contradiction.

I don't see why. Even with omnipotence, all this implies is the ability to influence things. If there is no ability to refrain from doing so, then that's not really very omnipotent.

Edit:

DBT, you need to keep the concepts of omniscience and omnipotence separate. seebs is correct that omniscience alone doesn't preclude free will, but once you throw in omnipotence you reach a contradiction if you continue to believe that God created the universe.

Sorry, didn't see this.

I don't think I agree with this, because I don't think that creating the universe implies absolute and active control over every event in it. It is quite easy to imagine creating a subtly different universe... But I think that some differences cannot be arranged. I do not think there is a universe which is in every respect like this one, except in which my cat weighs one pound less than he does in this one; I do not think there is a universe which is in every respect like this one, except in which I made a single decision differently.

To change the circumstances changes much more than just a single thing.

[Merzbow42]

I don't see why. Even with omnipotence, all this implies is the ability to influence things. If there is no ability to refrain from doing so, then that's not really very omnipotent.


Yup, I realized that shortly after I posted and edited the original... I think this is accurate now:


DBT, you need to keep the concepts of omniscience and omnipotence separate. seebs is correct that omniscience alone doesn't preclude free will, but once you throw in omnipotence you reach a contradiction if you continue to believe that God created the universe and that we have free will.


I think the key fact is that by assuming that God created the universe, one can no longer claim he held back his ability to influence things - in fact, he influenced all things to the maximum extent logically possible.

[seebs]

I disagree. Imagine Conway's game of life. Now, who has more control:

1. Someone who can set up the initial state.
2. Someone who on every turn flips any number of bits to achieve precise desired outcomes that are completely inconsistent with previous states.

There's a lot of room for hypothetical outcomes which are not the result of any possible starting state given consistent physics, but which could be brought around through active intervention. Similarly, it is quite possible to imagine an entity which creates free-willed creatures, but then chooses not to overrule their free will.

[DBT]

DBT, you need to keep the concepts of omniscience and omnipotence separate. seebs is correct that omniscience alone doesn't preclude free will, but once you throw in omnipotence you reach a contradiction.

It seems hard to seperate the two in relation to a God that is capable of creating a universe.

Omnipotence also seems to be assumed in regard to the God of the bible...

Job 42:2
I know that thou canst do everything, and that no thought can be withholden from thee.

Luke 1:37
For with God nothing shall be impossible.

Matthew 19:26
But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible; but with God all things are possible.

[Merzbow42]

I disagree. Imagine Conway's game of life. Now, who has more control:

1. Someone who can set up the initial state.
2. Someone who on every turn flips any number of bits to achieve precise desired outcomes that are completely inconsistent with previous states.

There's a lot of room for hypothetical outcomes which are not the result of any possible starting state given consistent physics, but which could be brought around through active intervention. Similarly, it is quite possible to imagine an entity which creates free-willed creatures, but then chooses not to overrule their free will.

If he's omniscient, he knows what his 'free-willed' creatures will do (I don't believe Open Theism is compatible with granting God true omniscience). If he set up the initial state and then didn't touch it, he is morally responsible for all subsequent actions by his creatures. If he set up the initial state and then modified it, he's still responsible for what the modifications entail. So I don't see a way out here.

[seebs]

If he's omniscient, he knows what his 'free-willed' creatures will do (I don't believe Open Theism is compatible with granting God true omniscience).

I don't think it's necessarily incompatible; "omniscience" is not exactly a very well-defined term, and "all-knowing" might imply only "knowing every fact", and future events may not be facts.

The question becomes even worse when you ask about hypotheticals. Can God answer "what would happen if" questions?

If he set up the initial state and then didn't touch it, he is morally responsible for all subsequent actions by his creatures.

I am not sure what this means. If the creatures are free-willed, they have their own choices and accountability, even if God is also responsible for the overall set of events.

Moral culpability is not necessarily an exclusive property; it's quite easy to imagine a thing happening for which no one is responsible, or for which several people are responsible.

If he set up the initial state and then modified it, he's still responsible for what the modifications entail. So I don't see a way out here.

I think the question is whether that kind of responsibility poses problems for free will. I don't think it does.

I can easily imagine circumstances in which someone else sets up events which have particular outcomes, and where I have limited ability to change those outcomes; one of these circumstances is called "my daily life".

Even within this circumstance, I regularly find that I am able to make choices which influence things, and I believe myself responsible for those choices.

If some crazy guy runs a red light, right as I'm about to cross the street, I may be unable to make any choice that will not result in some accident, but might still have a morally significant choice between, say, hitting a group of schoolchildren, or hitting a parked car.

A lot of theologians would argue that judgement is based, not on absolute outcomes, but on which kinds of choices we make from those available to us; this recognizes that some of the starting conditions are entirely beyond our control, without throwing out all hint of moral responsibility for the things we can control.

[Stumpjumper]

Free-will is the ability to choose to do a conditioned behaviour [a] or to do an alternative behaviour [b, c, d... etc]. Every instance where you do not choose to do an alternative behaviour, is every instance you choose to do a conditioned behaviour. Thus it's not a matter of choosing between a or ~a.

Umm. ~a is an alternate behavior of a ;)

The choice between a and ~a is the simplest way to define free will...


The alternative behaviour is influenced both by external influence and previous conditioned behaviour. But. your choice to perform an alternative behaviour correlates with what you were previously been doing. Your decision to choose an alternative is not random, but the outcomes can be.

That is my objection to seebs statement "It relies on the assumption that, if two events are correlated, the later event is caused by the former event." The only way an event or outcome can occur, is through the process of what has previously occurred. Even if you disagree with linear causality, the fact is each instance is an outcome of a previous instant.

I disagree that free will requires randomness. That is the only way that your statement remains valid...

Also, if our free-will ability was simply a matter of choosing a or ~a, then ~a is not a choice, because we are always doing ~a, when we are not doing anything else. The reason my argument did not compute for you, is because you have a different definition of free-will. :p

~a includes any alternative to a...

[Merzbow42]

I don't think it's necessarily incompatible; "omniscience" is not exactly a very well-defined term, and "all-knowing" might imply only "knowing every fact", and future events may not be facts.

The question becomes even worse when you ask about hypotheticals. Can God answer "what would happen if" questions?


Personally, I don't think that the concept of omniscience can be expanded to include, well, not knowing 'everything'. To me, 'everything' certainly does include the future actions of free-willed beings. As I've mentioned before, aside from seeing a moral contradiction here, I see a logical contradiction in the concept of a God that is both omnipotent and omniscience because omniscience necessarily limits God's omnipotence.

[LoungeHead]

Umm. ~a is an alternate behavior of a ;)
Nooooo! ;)

What you mean is a is the alternative behaviour of ~a. Because ~a is not making the choice to do something else, isn't it?
The choice between a and ~a is the simplest way to define free will...
Too simplistic in my opinion. If I agree with you that ~a is the alternative, then ~a = [~b, ~c, ~d... etc]. The simplicity of it denies the complexity of the alternatives. In your version free-will isn't a matter of choice between a range of pathways, instead it is simply the choice to do something different.
I disagree that free will requires randomness. That is the only way that your statement remains valid...
Maybe. But I don't see how pre-determined outcomes can be consistent with the idea of free-will, except on a superficial level. Basically you seem to be claiming your choice to do something else is not a random outcome because we know it will always be something else. This approach fails to engage with specifics of the choice.
~a includes any alternative to a...
Refer to above.

[Stumpjumper]

Nooooo! ;)

What you mean is a is the alternative behaviour of ~a. Because ~a is not making the choice to do something else, isn't it?

Too simplistic in my opinion. If I agree with you that ~a is the alternative, then ~a = [~b, ~c, ~d... etc]. The simplicity of it denies the complexity of the alternatives.

Not sure what you're getting at. There are many alternative behaviors or actions to a...

In your version free-will isn't a matter of choice between a range of pathways, instead it is simply the choice to do something different.

Yes and no. Yes, I don't believe freedom of the will requires that we have an unlimited range of options for every action. It means only that our actions are not predetermined by an outside force and that we (at times) have the choice to do something different...

Maybe. But I don't see how pre-determined outcomes can be consistent with the idea of free-will, except on a superficial level. Basically you seem to be claiming your choice to do something else is not a random outcome because we know it will always be something else. This approach fails to engage with specifics of the choice.

Refer to above.

Some Christians believe in "compatibalist free will"... However, there are a range of positions between determinism and randomness...

Our actions may be influenced by outside forces while not being predetermined. If that is true, are they truly random?

[lokeelou]

Sorry I jumped in late but just dropped by. Assuming that God is all powerful and is rooted in the same time as all humans. The future I'm sure would be seen in possiblities. Everything we do everyday determines a different outcome. We do have free will to make our own choices. So if God does know the future then he knows many "if" futures and not one set future.

[DBT]

Personally, I don't think that the concept of omniscience can be expanded to include, well, not knowing 'everything'. To me, 'everything' certainly does include the future actions of free-willed beings.

Yes - plus I suppose time, being relative, you should not be a limitation to Omniscience.


I see a logical contradiction in the concept of a God that is both omnipotent and omniscience because omniscience necessarily limits God's omnipotence.


Why is that?

[chasborne]

I think peple like to argue for the sake of arguing and don't care to address obvious solutions.... since open theism is acceptable to resolving this problem, why not debate OP instead of mentally masturbating the a or ~a minutae to death. There is no fruit to the argument of choice vs will vs decision vs options....

[seebs]

Personally, I don't think that the concept of omniscience can be expanded to include, well, not knowing 'everything'. To me, 'everything' certainly does include the future actions of free-willed beings.

What about hypotheticals? What about nonsensicals?

Does on omniscient entity know a finite decimal number precisely equal to the square root of two?

The argument generally made is that "future actions" are not actually things yet, and don't have the kind of coherence it takes to make meaningful questions until they've actually happened.

As I've mentioned before, aside from seeing a moral contradiction here, I see a logical contradiction in the concept of a God that is both omnipotent and omniscience because omniscience necessarily limits God's omnipotence.

I'm not sure why; is this just more of the same "can't do other than X" argumentation? I don't find it any more persuasive for self-knowledge than for other-knowledge, really.

[DBT]

I think peple like to argue for the sake of arguing and don't care to address obvious solutions.... since open theism is acceptable to resolving this problem, why not debate OP instead of mentally masturbating the a or ~a minutae to death. There is no fruit to the argument of choice vs will vs decision vs options....

Are you referring to anyone in particular?

[Merzbow42]

What about hypotheticals? What about nonsensicals?

Does on omniscient entity know a finite decimal number precisely equal to the square root of two?

The argument generally made is that "future actions" are not actually things yet, and don't have the kind of coherence it takes to make meaningful questions until they've actually happened.


Omniscience does not entail knowledge of logical impossibilities. Certainly such a number as you describe is an impossibility. But future events are events that just haven't happened yet. Should knowledge of the future be included under omniscience? I think it depends on if you believe God to be bound by time or not. If he is so bound, then sure, I'll accept the argument that knowledge of the future is an impossibility. But I'm not sure this is a Biblically supportable conception of God.

[chasborne]

Are you referring to anyone in particular?

Mankind in general... why, do you feel indicted? If so, I apologize for your discomfort.

[DBT]

Mankind in general... why, do you feel indicted? If so, I apologize for your discomfort.

No discomfort, your statement wasn't that clear, so could have been interpreted in several different ways - that's why I asked.
Thanks for the clarification.

[RedShark92]

This argument is intuitively powerful, but is in fact a post hoc fallacy. It relies on the assumption that, if two events are correlated, the later event is caused by the former event.

That's true when you're not dealing with a being that is both omniscient and omnipotent who is credited with creating everything.

This being with perfect foreknowledge who also created every facet of the universe, including every piece of matter and energy not to mention every "law" that defines how that matter and energy act can be said to have directly caused all of the events that it foresees.

[RedShark92]

But it doesn't prove the claim under discussion, which is that free will cannot coexist with an all-knowing God.

The claim was actually all-powerful and not all-knowing.

I'd agree with you that free will is not harmed by a being that is simply all-knowing, but a being that is all-knowing, all-powerful and created every aspect of the universe is incompatible with any other being in that universe having free will.

[RedShark92]

I don't think I agree with this, because I don't think that creating the universe implies absolute and active control over every event in it.

Omniscient/Omnipotent god who creates everything doesn't NEED to maintain absolute and active control over every aspect of the universe in order to nullify free will.

It's enough that he had that level of control at the start of things.

While God was creating, he had perfect knowledge of how everything would turn out. He could see the end result of everything he was doing, while he was doing it. He created X knowing that if he created X that way it would then do A, B, and C. He knew that if he created X in Y way instead that it would then do B, C, and D. He created everything while simultaneously knowing how it would all turn out.

It's that combination of creating all and knowing all that eliminates the idea of free will. Either one by itself will not do it.

[RedShark92]

Sorry I jumped in late but just dropped by. Assuming that God is all powerful and is rooted in the same time as all humans. The future I'm sure would be seen in possiblities. Everything we do everyday determines a different outcome. We do have free will to make our own choices. So if God does know the future then he knows many "if" futures and not one set future.

The problem is that his perfect knowledge includes every choice we will make. There are no alternate futures from God's point of view because he knows with perfect accuracy every choice we'll make.

Couple that with designing us from the ground up in such a way that we will make those choices, and you've no longer got free will, even if it appears that you do.