Pascal's Wager

Hi all

my name is Matthias, I am 31/m and moved from Zurich to Boston in Fall 1999. I am working as a Post-Doc at the Lab for Computer Science at MIT. I grew up in a evangelical family and was a strong believer until about a year ago when I could not suppress my doubts any longer and began to read sceptical literature (especially Dan Barkers Losing Faith in Faith).
It was hard for me to realize, that the faith that gave me hope and meaning in life was not more than a myth and not more God-inspired than any other religion!

I have had lots of discussions with my Christian friends and the more I investigated the case, the clearer it became. I am not an atheist, I still think that there is too much complexity in nature to be the effect of mutation and selection. I would rather say I am an agnostic and an objectivist (since reading Ayn Rands Atlas Shrugged :-)

Now my point: I have heard one Christian argument over and over again. I have seen it in the last statement of Geisler in the Geisler - Till debate, I have seen it in William Craigs "Resonable Faith" Chapter
"The absurdity of life without God" and I have seen it in different variations of Pascals Wager.

Pascal says: "If the chances are 50:50 you should choose to believe in God, because he gives you hope ...."

Geisler says: "And if Jesus is the son of God, then there are great benefits for you personally. For one, it means that there is hope for you beyond the grave."

I haven't seen any sceptical texts about this issue. I think these statement can be turned into the most powerful arguments against the Christian faith in the following sense:

How overwhelming the evidence needs to be that people give up hope in eternal life, meaning, the warm feelings and the shelter in church and choose the the cold fact, that we don't know anything about God! If there was the slightest hope, that I could talk to God somewhere, I would walk 100 Miles on my knees, just to be able to talk to him! Even if the chances were 1:99 in Pascals Wager with only 1 percent hope for the Bible to be true, I would choose to go back and have a personal relationship with my creator!

Christians always blame non-believers that they are too proud to accept Jesus in their lifes. Why should anybody refuse to get in contact with his Creator? Why should I choose to live without God? The fact that non-believers reject the hope that the Christian God could give them is very strong
evidence, that there is overwhelming evidence against it. I had nothing to gain and everything to lose (faith, lots of Christian friends, ...) but I chose to open my eyes and look at reality because truth is more
important to me than anything I have lost. In the Matrix, Morphius said to Neo "all I can offer you is the truth, nothing more" and then Neo lost his beautiful - but fake - world and woke up in a sad place, but he
knew it was the true world.

Matthias

[Richard Carrier]

An argument to which the Christians respond "No, the atheist rejects Pascal's Wager because (a) he is in denial, (b) hasn't heard it, (c) doesn't understand its implications, or (d) secretly believes in God anyway." But despite these circumlocutions, you are right.

[lazcatluc]

Richard Carrier structures this article in 4 arguments. I will try to show that argument 1 is flawed, arguments 2 and 3 are unsound and argument 4 is useless.

Argument 1:

Richard Carrier:

if they have a significant and trustworthy concern for doing right and avoiding wrong, it follows necessarily that they must have a significant and trustworthy concern for knowing right and wrong. Since this knowledge requires knowledge about many fundamental facts of the universe (such as whether there is a god), it follows necessarily that such people must have a significant and trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing, and confirming that their beliefs about such things are probably correct



I don't think this is right. I am a mathematician (well, a student actually). I've studied Pythagora's Theorem quite a few years ago. I've studied it's proof, understood it, and I've never wondered if that theorem is true or false again. I've used it a lot, sure, but, since I am convinced that it is true, I never lose any sleep over it. This makes me a good mathematician not a bad one. A bad mathematician would be one who would lose sleep over this, since he would have less time to take care of other issues which may require his attention. Also, a theist who is sure that God exists just as I am sure of Pythagora's Theorem should spend no time "seeking out, testing and confirming" his beliefs. That would not make him a better man. There’s one thing to claim that one should keep an open mind and quite another that one should "seek out, test and confirm". So, in my opinion, argument 1 fails to show that "theists and nontheists who devote their lives to examining the facts and determining whether they are right" are better than the ones who don’t.

Argument 2:

What we have here is the author’s assumption that a human who went to heaven will behave in a similar way (or, at least, almost similar) as one who is still living on Earth. Based on this claim we can conclude that, given sufficient time, people will, eventually, do something wrong. I have 2 objections:
1. It is not clear that the claim is justified. After all, once one is in heaven it seems likely that his moral attitude will be completely different. Maybe he will refuse to do anything wrong for all eternity because of the fact that he is much closer to God and God’s obvious presence will prevent him from doing something wrong. There are people who have changed dramatically after having a near-death experience. They became much "better" people without even going to heaven. We can only imagine what will be the effect on one’s mind once one is in heaven.

2. Let us assume the claim is justified. Basically, it means that we will have free will in heaven too. It seems very likely, however, that the "chance" that one will do wrong will decrease with the time one spends in heaven (being close to God and all the other "good" people should have some effect). So, it is possible to have the following situation: in the first year one has 10% chance on doing something wrong. In the second year the chance is 1%, the third year 0.1% etc. Given an eternity, that person will have just a little above 11% chance of doing wrong. So it seems that all God has to do is to know who will do wrong and who will not (which can’t be too hard since he is omniscient).

Because of 1 and 2, I must conclude that argument 2 is unsound.

Argument 3:
The author claims that, since God wants something that is evil than God is evil too. But this a rather simplistic conclusion. I think that the correct conclusion should be: God is evil or God has a greater good in mind when he appears to want something evil. The author makes no effort whatsoever to prove that God doesn’t have any greater good in mind so I think argument 3 is unsound or, at least incomplete. Either way, argument 3 is not conclusive.

Argument 4:

Argument 4 is relies heavily on argument 3 so, we could reject it immediately. However, I will accept argument 3 for the moment in order to show that argument 4 cannot convince anybody.

Argument 4 states that God shows himself to us as being "Bad" in order to make us choose between morality and salvation. Of course, the ones that will reject God and, with him, salvation by choosing to stay moral will be the ones who will get to heaven after all. God’s "disguise" is necessary because, if he were to show himself from the beginning, a lot of people would become "good" just to go to heaven and that’s not God’s plan. Therefore it is better to be a nontheist even if God exists.
Argument 4 alone cannot convince anybody. The moment a theist would become nontheist because of argument 4 will be the moment argument 4 will become false because that theist became a nontheist thinking that if there is a God he has a better chance of going to heaven if he is a nontheist. But this kind of thinking is exactly the kind of thinking that God wants to prevent (according to argument 4). So, I would change the conclusion a little: It is better to be a nontheist even if there is a God but only if you are a nontheist for other reasons than simply what is written in the article "The end of Pascal's Wager: Only atheists go to heaven". If you have no other reasons than it is morally better to stay a theist.


Catalin Lazar,
Bucharest
Romania

[Richard Carrier]

Thank you Catalin Lazar for your thoughtful critique. There were two reasons I published the essay in question. The first was that many people from around the country begged me to. An early draft of it actually ended up being circulated far wider than I intended--it was even printed in a newsletter for the Ventura freethought community, originally without my knowledge. So many people came up to me at the recent Godless March in D.C. to persuade me to make it universally available, and I felt obliged to them. But the second reason I published it was because I couldn't figure out what was wrong with it, if anything was, so I wanted to see if anyone else could challenge it, perhaps seeing some flaw I missed. Hence the first sentence was deliberate: "The following argument could be taken as tongue-in-cheek, if it didn't seem so evidently true." Maybe it is just tongue-in-cheek. I sure thought it was when I wrote it, but then I looked at it and I haven't seen its flaw yet.

Consequently, critiques like yours are most welcome to me, especially when they are carefully reasoned, as yours is. Even if there happen to be no overt flaws in my essay, I am still interested in wording it better so as to limit misunderstanding of its arguments (although not so much as to make it obtusely boring).

So let's see if you've found what I was looking for.

Argument 1:

First, you present a purported counterexample to my argument that those who "have a significant and trustworthy concern for doing right and avoiding wrong" will "have a significant and trustworthy concern for knowing right and wrong" and therefore for knowing whether God exists or not. If that counterexample is genuine, then it would reduce my first argument from a necessary to a probable relationship (since it would take much more evidence to eliminate the probable relationship as well).

That might be correct, but I am not convinced your counterexample is either relevant or genuine. Essentially, you propose an analogy between your attitude regarding the truth of the Pythagorean Theorem and the truth of the proposition "God exists." But whereas "God exists" is a keystone proposition for comprehending moral truth (it is essential to knowing whether you are doing right or wrong), the Pythagorean Theorem is not. Thus, the analogy is falsely applied here and therefore, it seems to me, irrelevant.

However, even granting that your analogy remains relevant, it would actually support my argument. That is, it is an example of its truth, not a counterexample. Regarding the Pythagorean Theorem you said you "studied it's proof" and "understood it." Thus, you have shown, exactly as my argument predicts, a "significant and trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing, and confirming" that "your beliefs about such things are probably correct." In this case, you know why your belief is correct, you have seen all the relevant evidence, and it is undeniable to you that it is correct, given the correctness of that evidence. Moreover, you know that the proof is universally conceded to be correct by all experts--such that if thousands of expert mathematicians were still on record as doubting the correctness of the proof, you would act differently regarding it than you have. This is especially important, since all arguments for God are of this latter nature, and not like the Theorem of Pythagoras at all.

So let's carry out your analogy. If it were the case that a theist had done as much, and seen a flawless deductive proof acknowledged worldwide as correct, and understood that proof and why it was correct, then he would indeed belong to one of the two groups my argument identifies as moral: in this case, "intellectually committed but critical theists." I do not doubt the existence of such people, and my argument does not deny they exist. Instead, my essay goes on to present evidence that "intellectually committed but critical nontheists" are just as reasonable, if not more so, based on the actual evidence available for God's existence (or rather, the lack of that evidence). So your analogy does not affect the rest of the essay: it does not challenge my observation that moral people meet their epistemic duties regarding the discovery of the truth. To the contrary, it confirms that observation.

More to the point, if it really were the case that a theist had done as much as you have regarding the Pythagorean Theorem, and had actually discovered a proof of God's existence as sound and as universally recognized as the proof for the Pythagorean Theorem, then my argument would indeed be moot, for there would no longer be any rationale for betting on the existence of God: his existence would be demonstrable to every rational being, and there would soon be no atheists left in the world. So if there is such an argument, as your analogy requires there to be, then yes, my argument is unsound. But until you can present such an example, your analogy cannot affect my argument, because it assumes what is contrary to fact. And, of course, if you presented me with an argument for God's existence as sound and acknowledged as the proof of the Pythagorean Theorem, then I would cease being an atheist anyway.

In summary: you have not presented any counterexample to my first argument.

Argument 2:

Second, you give two challenges to my second argument.

(a) You claim that my argument "assumes" that "a human who went to heaven will behave in a similar way (or, at least, almost similar) as one who is still living on Earth." That isn't quite correct. What is moral in each place may be different, but a person who is genuinely moral on earth will probably be moral in heaven. At least, if heaven exists for the very purpose of housing the moral, then it would not be designed in any way that would turn moral into immoral people. On the other hand, a person who is not genuinely moral might act more moral in heaven but they would not be genuinely moral. That explains the position I present in my essay.

However, I understand the import of your argument to be that God might choose even immoral people to go to heaven on the expectation that heaven will make them moral. If that is the case, however, then it cannot be the case that our existence on earth is a test, and therefore my second argument is indeed false. But I already acknowledge that in my introduction, where I say "to escape the logic of it requires theists to commit to abandoning several of their cherished assumptions about God or Heaven," one of those cherished assumptions being that earthly misery and divine silence are a test. I suspect that to abandon that assumption would leave theists with no plausible explanation of evil or divine hiddenness, but that's another story. At any rate, my essay does not claim to defeat those who hold to such a belief.

Also, my introduction says "we do not know whose assumptions are correct, and we therefore cannot exclude the assumptions on which this argument is based." In other words, even a theist who believes that our existence on earth is not in any way a test cannot be sure he is right. He certainly has no undogmatic evidence to back up his denial of that possibility, whereas that possibility explains a great deal about the world and is thus, as my conclusion states, "probably a better explanation of all the available evidence than any contrary theology." Therefore, atheism might still be the better bet. And, as I say, "by Argument to the Best Explanation" atheism probably is a good bet. A theist can't claim to know otherwise.

If heaven reforms the immoral, then life on earth cannot be a moral test. But the mere possibility that life on earth is not a moral test is irrelevant. My essay argues that it still probably is a moral test (if god exists). And if god exists, it seems apparent that he has arranged things deliberately so that his existence would have no evidence and would even contradict evidence (e.g. gratuitous misery, etc.), and such a deliberate deception begs explanation, an explanation my argument provides. That is all my essay states, and you have not offered any proof to the contrary. All you offer is a mere possibility, which my essay already admits is open to the theist--and even then, it does not affect the Argument to the Best Explanation that draws the conclusion.

In summary: You have not challenged the actual argument of my essay, which is that life on earth is probably a test. And if that is true, then it is not true that heaven reforms. Therefore your argument is moot.

(b) You then argue that "it seems that all God has to do is to know who will do wrong and who will not (which can't be too hard since he is omniscient)." I explicitly exclude this possibility as improbable, given that it would leave no explanation for why god made this world at all, much less the way it is, and then has us live brief lives here. As my essay states "God could and would, out of his compassion and perfect efficiency, simply select candidates at birth and dispense with any actual life in this world" if it were the case, as you allege, that God knows everything. In other words, my essay argues that if God exists, then the Best Explanation of the actual world we live in is that it is a test because God is not completely all-knowing--for if he was, this world, as we observe it to be, would probably not exist. That is what my essay argues, and you have not addressed that argument. You merely repeat an argument my essay already explicitly rebuts.

You conclude, nevertheless, that it is unsound for me to argue that this world is probably a test and that we cannot know it is not. I do not see how you can say this is unsound. (a) You have offered nothing against the probability argument, i.e. the Argument to the Best Explanation. Mere possibilities do not touch this. Mere possibilities would undermine arguments from necessity like my first argument above, true, but my second argument is not such an argument, but an argument to probability. (b) Nor have you offered anything against the fact that we cannot know my theology is correct or incorrect and therefore even if we reject the "cherished assumptions" on which it is based and which I say a theist can escape my argument by rejecting, such a theist still cannot claim to know whether atheists won't get into heaven, because my scenario still could be true. Of course, my essay actually argues it is probably true--and again, you say nothing to undermine that probability--but even if that is not correct and my scenario remains possibly true, it still serves to rebut some forms of Pascal's Wager.

In summary: You have not challenged any of the evidence or argument in my essay that my theology is probably true (or more probably true than alternatives). You merely present two possibilities, one my essay already acknowledges, and one my essay already rebuts.

Argument 3:

Third, you say I claim that if "God wants something that is evil then God is evil too." I don't actually make that claim. Whether it is true or not is irrelevant to my essay's third argument, which is again an argument to probability, not necessity. In fact, my essay claims just what you do when you say "God is evil or God has a greater good in mind when he appears to want something evil." For my essay identifies that greater good, and argues that this is the most plausible explanation of the facts and is therefore probably true. I don't have to show anything more than that to grant my argument as formally sound, since the burden is on the claimant, and I am not the one claiming there are better explanations than mine.

If someone can present me with another explanation for the facts of the world (such as divine hiddenness and apparently gratuitous evils), one that actually excludes mine, but that is better than mine (more probable or evidenced or plausible, whatever), then they would have undermined, or at least rebutted, my third argument. But you presented no such argument. Thus, by Argument to the Best Explanation, my third argument is probably correct, just as my essay states. Indeed, even if someone were to present such a "better explanation" they might only succeed in reducing my overall case from that of probability to possibility, and again the theist would be in a position of not knowing whether my theology is correct, and so atheists might get into heaven after all. This might not then serve to rebut all forms of Pascal, but you haven't even gotten that far.

In summary: My essay already employs your own reasoning here, by providing a better explanation for God's apparent evil than the "explanation" that he is evil.

Argument 4:

You claim that my fourth argument "cannot convince anybody." I am not sure what that is supposed to mean. Do you mean as a matter of fact it will convince no one? If so, then you have not met the burden of defending that claim, which is ultimately empirical, not logical. You cannot claim to know what effect my argument will have on all future readers. Moreover, even if it is true that my argument will convince no one, this does not mean it is wrong. For instance, it might be the case that every believer is irrational and thus no rational argument will convince them. So I don't see much point in arguing that a correct argument won't convince people--that says a lot about people, but not much about my argument.

Nevertheless, I can see the point in discussing the utility of an argument, insofar as it affects strategies regarding how we will persuade each other (i.e. whether anyone should bother to refer believers to my argument or not). However, this encompasses a far wider range of ends than you seem aware of. For instance, it may be that my argument won't convert a believer but that it will be fairly successful at making many believers concede that atheists are reasonable and good people who might get into heaven anyway. In fact, I think that is one of its greatest utilities.

Likewise, it may be that my argument will help convert believers in conjunction with several other arguments, and thus it has utility in a combined approach toward persuasion. Or it may be that my argument stops some gaps in various attempts by theists to retreat from atheist arguments, thereby serving a vital rear guard defense. In other words, a theist who relies on "the world is a test" defense to resist arguments for atheism, will then be forced to address my argument, and will thus be forced onto the horns of a dilemma. My essay may prove very useful in that regard. Finally, if my argument is correct, it will have utility in amusing or reassuring atheists. And so on.

However, your actual rebuttal to my fourth argument amounts to an accusation of vicious circularity. Namely, that if someone becomes a nontheist solely because of my argument, then they are not the committed nontheist god should be looking for. However, this is not what my fourth argument contends, nor is it the object of my essay.

(a) My fourth argument contends only that as a matter of fact nontheists will probably go to heaven. It does not matter if this argument never actually turns anyone to nontheism. Per above, that would not make my argument false or useless--and, indeed, even by your own reasoning, it would actually serve to confirm it is correct.

On the other hand, if my argument is taken as part of an entire quest for the truth, an intellectually committed but critical person can indeed be persuaded by my fourth argument (i.e. as part of a complete case) for the very moral reasons it alleges. For I do not claim good people do not want to go to heaven, only that good people are not good for that reason. In particular, when my essay concludes "you should be a nontheist" this must be taken by the reader as saying, just as the essay's argument says, that "you should undertake a significant and trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing, and confirming that your beliefs about such things are probably correct" which, as my essay predicts, will lead you to recognize "that the evidence strongly implies that God must be evil or not exist." It therefore can lead someone to atheism even if he has no motive to get into heaven. For example, my argument can morally reform a theist by challenging him to put aside his desires and fears and instead look at the facts and come to a morally courageous conclusion, just as my essay predicts is the purpose of the universe (if god exists).

(b) Even so, as my introduction states, the object of my essay is only to present "a successful rebuttal to any form of Pascal's Wager, by demonstrating that unbelief might still be the safest bet." So the object of my essay is not to convert believers. Indeed, it is not even an argument for atheism as such, but a rebuttal (not a refutation, incidentally, just a rebuttal) to one common argument for belief in God. This greatly limits the stated application of my argument.

First, my essay does not claim to build a positive argument for atheism, but only a defense for atheism against one argument for theism.

Second, my essay does not defend atheism against all arguments for theism, but only one, and is therefore only relevant to theists who credit that argument to begin with.

Regarding the first point, by arriving at a contrary conclusion than every form of Pascal's Wager, my argument rebuts all forms of Pascal's Wager by argumentum ad contrarium. That is the essay's stated purpose. Regarding the second point, if a theist already acknowledges that Pascal's Wager is to be rejected, then my essay doesn't have a whole lot to say to him--except, as noted above, to either compel him to take certain theological positions (e.g. to deny that life on earth is a test) or to see atheists in a better light as more reasonable than previously thought. And so on. On the other hand, if a theist regards Pascal's Wager as valid, then he is already accepting certain assumptions (e.g. that there is no decisive evidence of God's existence--for if there were, there would be no need for a wager). Anyone who reads my argument must place it in that context, since the essay places itself in that context (per my introductory paragraph).

So, when you say my fourth argument "alone cannot convince anybody," I completely agree. For my essay does not rest on its internal arguments, nor does it say it aims to convert. For instance, it absolutely depends on observers recognizing that the "evidence strongly implies that God must be evil or not exist" which requires, exactly as my essay says, "a significant and trustworthy concern" for getting at the truth--and that means an examination of evidence far beyond that presented in my essay (which I state is offered only "for example"). Since my essay requires recognizing this fact, and recognizing this fact requires a sincere and morally courageous concern for the truth, and a sincere and morally courageous concern for the truth requires a genuinely moral motivation, my fourth argument is not undermined by your concerns--for it can only succeed when my first argument is vindicated by the reader's morally courageous pursuit of the truth.

At any rate, you propose rewording the conclusion to "It is better to be a nontheist even if there is a God but only if you are a nontheist for other reasons than simply what is written" in this essay. But "simply what is written in this essay" already includes the argument that only genuinely moral people get into heaven and that one must examine the facts that lead to the conclusion "that a god must either be evil or not exist." So technically the essay already addresses your concerns. However, I agree the essay would be better without its last sentence altogether ("Therefore, even if God exists, you should be a nontheist. Q.E.D."), since that is neither the essay's actual argument nor necessary to the essay's argument. So in light of this, I intend to have it changed to: "Since this conclusion contradicts the conclusion of every form of Pascal's Wager, it follows that Pascal's Wager cannot assure anyone of God's existence or that belief in God will be the best bet." This actually would serve to head off many other misunderstandings of my essay by other critics.

Again, thank you for your thoughful critique. It gave me the opportunity to more deeply explore this issue and, perhaps, explain myself better.

[lazcatluc]

Hello Mr. Carrier and thank you for your reply. It made me realize that I had many misconceptions regarding what were you trying to accomplish in your essay. It came as a surprise to me the fact that you agreed that your conclusion ("Therefore, even if God doesn’t exist you should be a nontheist") was not the essay’s argument since it was mainly that conclusion that made me send my feedback in the first place! However, I still believe that a strong case could be raised against you regarding argument 1 (especially your claim that "people must have a significant and trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing, and confirming that their beliefs about such things are probably correct") and argument 4.

Argument 1:

You said, your reply, that my analogy wasn’t correct because the Pythagorean Theorem is not a "keystone proposition for understanding moral truth" whereas the existence of God is. Also you claim that my analogy actually supports your claim because I really did show a "trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing and confirming" when I studied and understood the proof of the Theorem. First I would like to say that I disagree with your claim that the Pythagorean Theorem is not a "keystone proposition for understanding moral truth". In my opinion, the Pythagorean Theorem is a keystone for understanding math and math is a keystone for understanding the world. Understanding the world (or, at least trying to) is exactly what you define as "moral" in your argument 1. I also disagree with your second objection. I don’t think I showed a "trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing and confirming" but, rather, a "one-time trustworthy concern for seeking out, testing and confirming".
However, I would like to present a better counter-example to your claim: every person I know, theist or nontheist, believes that what they see/hear/smell/taste/touch is, usually, what there is. They don’t believe the world is an illusion. As far as I understand, metaphysical naturalists also agree with this. However, there is no proof for that claim. And not only that, but I think there is no "trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing and confirming" that this claim is valid (except maybe from people with severe paranoia). We just assume that what we see is what there is. I don’t think this assumption makes us less moral. In conclusion, I think that your claim is false and argument 1 is not sound.

Argument 4:

I claimed that your argument cannot convince anybody and I do mean that as a matter of fact. I will try to prove this referring to the only relevant case: there is a God (if there is no God than both your argument and Pascal’s Wager are useless). So let us assume there is a God and what you claim is true: God uses a very elaborate disguise in order to prevent us from knowing what he really expects from us in order to separate those who are truly worthy from those who are just opportunists. But, if your argument is really true, than surely God, who goes to so much trouble hiding himself from us would not let you reveal his true purpose to the world (after all, if people become nontheists because of your essay or in conjunction with other arguments or if your essay makes it easier on nontheists to remain nontheists that, somehow, you managed to trick God’s plan)… unless, of course, your argument would not convince anybody. So, in my opinion there are three possibilities:
1. There is no God (in which case it doesn’t really matter if you’re a theist or a nontheist)
2. There is a God and he is exactly the way you describe him to be (in which case he would make sure nobody would believe you)
3. There is a God and your argument is false.
If you think there can be other ways I would really appreciate it if you would let me know.

Thank you for your time and patience,
Best regards,
Catalin Lazar

[PassingFair]

Did Pascal factor other religions into his "equation"? Christianity may have the largest number of adherents, but all other religions plus the seculars dwarf that number. Would he have had to adhere to all of them to ensure his everlasting ever?

[Richard Carrier]

I still don't see a problem that needs fixing. In detail:

Originally posted by lazcatluc
First I would like to say that I disagree with your claim that the Pythagorean Theorem is not a "keystone proposition for understanding moral truth". In my opinion, the Pythagorean Theorem is a keystone for understanding math and math is a keystone for understanding the world. Understanding the world (or, at least trying to) is exactly what you define as "moral" in your argument 1.

You are correct, but you are getting off the path of the original essay. A fact that is relevant is not necessarily a keystone fact. Whether God exists or not would entail massive readjustments in any moral system (unless, e.g., God just happens to agree with us 100% on all moral issues, which seems improbable, especially given our degree of ignorance and fallibility). In contrast, whether the Pythagorean Theorem is true or not would have virtually no effect on any moral system.

Moreover, whereas the existence of God affects ethical philosophy at its core metaethical level (affecting what we even understand moral values to mean, as well as our motives for obeying them, and methods for discovering them, and so on), the truth of the Pythagorean Theorem has no such effects. It would, at best, affect some few and obscure applications of a moral value system, but not the metaethical foundations of that system. Thus, as I said before, your analogy remains falsely applied here.

I also disagree with your second objection. I don't think I showed a "trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing and confirming" but, rather, a "one-time trustworthy concern for seeking out, testing and confirming".

This is a misunderstanding of interpretation. You mistook my generalization across categories as a categorical prescription for particular cases. When I say "always" I mean there is no particular proposition whose truth we don't investigate to reasonable lengths, thus we are "always" seeking truth. I do not mean we always investigate every particular proposition repeatedly. Since that would be an absurd prescription beyond any human ability to carry out, it never occurred to me that someone would read my words as advocating it.

Since my first argument is, and I quote, "[God] will probably select from only those who made a significant and responsible effort to discover the truth," your objection, based on a radical and implausible reading of my words following this statement, is inapplicable to my argument as actually presented in the essay. You made a significant and responsible effort to discover the truth of the Pythagorean Theorem. (What else I said in my reply above about this effort only reinforces this point.)

This is all the clearer in the essay itself, since the observation I present as confirmation is that people who do not fulfill that obligation are "less likely ever to discover and commit to true beliefs about right and wrong." Thus, since that is what is actually essential to the success of my argument within my essay's super-argument, that is all that really matters here. You can debate what epistemological commitments and habits are required to ensure someone is likely "to discover and commit to true beliefs about right and wrong" but that has no effect on my argument--wherever you end up, you still end up confirming my first argument.

For example, you cannot deny that there is some epistemological system of duties and habits that leads to a truth-finding personality vs. a truth-missing one. My essay does not commit to any such system and thus any such system will do. Hence, all that is required for my first argument to be sound is (a) that there be some such system and (b) that the question of God's existence becomes unavoidably prominent when such a system is embraced.

Since the key premise of Argument 1 is the probable divine quest for moral persons, it further follows that only epistemological systems driven (at least in part) by a motive to know right from wrong are relevant. But still, (a) there is certainly some such system and (b) the God question is undeniably prominent in such a system (given the keystone role of that question in the very metaethical foundations of any moral belief system, as noted above).


However, I would like to present a better counter-example to your claim: every person I know, theist or nontheist, believes that what they see/hear/smell/taste/touch is, usually, what there is. They don't believe the world is an illusion. As far as I understand, metaphysical naturalists also agree with this. However, there is no proof for that claim.

There is some proof, actually, but we need not go into positivistic and scientific refutations of solipsism here (I have a book in review for publication that goes into this in detail). What matters is whether this conclusion (to trust externalism over solipsism as the best explanation of human experience) confirms or violates what is essential to Argument 1, i.e. whether this counts as making "a significant and responsible effort to discover the truth" or not, or whether the epistemological habits that lead to this conclusion today are "less likely ever to discover and commit [us] to true beliefs about right and wrong."

I see no relevance of your new example to either concern. We do not just "assume" externalism: rather, it is a conclusion arrived at after a lifetime of experience and variant attempts at explanation. I agree we have an epistemic duty to consider the possibility of solipsism and to explore the basis of our acceptance of externalism instead. To my knowledge, all my naturalist colleagues have met that duty: we have all explored and studied the issue to the extent possible. That we "could be wrong" is not relevant: we still have met "a significant and responsible effort to discover the truth" (indeed, we can't explore the matter any further--and there can never be a duty to do the impossible) and our methods at arriving at and committing to externalism do not make us "less likely ever to discover and commit to true beliefs about right and wrong." That is why your example is irrelevant to my first argument.

I also doubt your solipsism example is comparable to the question of God's existence: e.g. in terms of epistemic accessibility, and in terms relevant to deciding moral and metaethical questions, these two questions are much too categorically different to sustain an analogy in the context of Argument 1.

Even you imply agreement:

I don't think this assumption [of externalism over solipsism] makes us less moral.

Then how does it have anything to do with Argument 1? Since denying the existence of an evident God, or asserting the existence of a non-evident God, can both lead to serious moral error, clearly this question is important to Argument 1 in a way the externalism/solipsism debate is not, as you yourself just confessed.

And even if the externalism/solipsism debate entailed radically different moral systems (it is not certain they would--as noted by Conceptualists, Positivists, and Buddhists), the relative empirical inaccessibility of the question puts it well outside the context of Argument 1. For instance, if God existed but was as empirically inaccessible as the externalism/solipsism issue, this would entail certain things about God and God's plan that would actually support my essay's overall argument (especially per its last two paragraphs).

[Of course, I am ignoring the most obvious objection to your example: if externalism is false, then God does not exist, and this whole debate over Pascal and counter-Pascal is moot anyway, per discussion below.]

Argument 4: I claimed that your argument cannot convince anybody and I do mean that as a matter of fact. I will try to prove this referring to the only relevant case: there is a God (if there is no God than both your argument and Pascal's Wager are useless).

Not exactly. The dichotomy itself makes the wager useless. The wager is based on ignorance. Thus, no argument based on the premise of knowledge of God's existence or nonexistence can have any bearing on Pascal, or my counter-Pascal. That is the point I was trying to make in my reply above. I will reiterate it here.

So let us assume there is a God and what you claim is true:

We are disallowed from doing this in my argument. My essay argues from the central underlying premise of Pascal: that we do not know, and thus cannot assume that God exists. Thus, the moment you start talking about "assuming" he exists you are outside the relevant context of my argument, which is a rebuttal to Pascal. That is, if we are entitled to assume God exists, then we don't need Pascal. Likewise if we are entitled to assume God does not exist. See the point?

God uses a very elaborate disguise in order to prevent us from knowing what he really expects from us in order to separate those who are truly worthy from those who are just opportunists. But, if your argument is really true, than surely God, who goes to so much trouble hiding himself from us would not let you reveal his true purpose to the world

He could not stop me--for such an effort would provide evidence of his existence. This world must operate exactly as if there is no god, which includes letting people expose his plan 'by accident'. For in fact I am not really exposing anything. God did not talk to me and tell me his plan, and I can't prove it is his plan. I am just hypothesizing. That fits exactly the very plan I describe: atheism must be reasonable, and no argument for belief in god's existence can ultimately be successful, including Pascal.

Thus, my argument, which has no confirmation from God, remains uncertain. That's the point. It also successfully undermines Pascal. That is also the point. Thus, God can have no interest in stopping me. My essay's argument, just like Pascal, still rests on the basis of ignorance, just as God would want, and it still makes atheism reasonable, without positively refuting theism, just as God would want.

After all, if people become nontheists because of your essay or in conjunction with other arguments or if your essay makes it easier on nontheists to remain nontheists that, somehow, you managed to trick God's plan

Not really. Since God's plan (in my argument) is to identify people who genuinely commit to moral truth, and only such people would be persuaded by my argument (since it rests on certain moral assumptions about God, heaven, etc.), my argument does not thwart God's plan.

Moreover, note Argument 3: "If presented with strong evidence that a god must either be evil or not exist, a genuinely good person will not believe in such a god, or if believing, will not give assent to such a god (as by worship or other assertions of approval, since the good do not approve of evil)."

Will my essay, if persuasive, undermine this expectation? No. The whole point is for God to identify people who choose evil faith over moral good (I emphasize this again and again in arguments 3 and 4 with numerous examples). There would not be any assent to evil in being persuaded by my argument--to the contrary, that would entail an assent to a genuine moral plan, and it would maintain an atheist's moral objection to theism, exactly the thing God wants to see.

What I think you were trying to get at originally was the hypothesis that people who are bad will, upon reading my argument, pretend to be atheists to get into heaven. That is, in fact, the only way my argument could ever undermine God's plan (per the opening sentences of Argument 1). But do you honestly see that as a likely occurrence?

Personally, I doubt anyone will pretend to be an atheist on reading my argument. But even if some strange fellow should do so, not only would he would be an extreme statistical rarity, but it would be a near statistical impossibility for him to do this and maintain the appearance throughout his life of being an "intellectually committed but critical nontheist," the only kind of nontheist my argument says will be selected for heaven.

So when you say the possibilities are limited to no god, god but I'm wrong, and "There is a God and he is exactly the way you describe him to be (in which case he would make sure nobody would believe you)" you seem to have forgotten the ultimate premise and conclusion of the argument, which happens to be that God is looking for "intellectually committed but critical nontheists" to populate heaven. Given that, why would God stop you from believing me when I say you should be "an intellectually committed but critical nontheist"? Isn't that the very thing he wants?

That is why the only way I can see your objection to Argument 4 as having any relevance is if my argument threatens to "confuse" God by creating people who only appear to be "intellectually committed but critical nontheists" but who are really believers pretending to be serious atheists to get into heaven. But that seems so immensely improbable I don't see how the objection can carry any weight (all the more so if God can read our minds). And since God cannot interfere in earthly affairs without risking giving away the game, the objection that he would do so cannot follow from my argument at all, and thus cannot serve to undermine it anyway.

This has all been useful though. I am working on crafting all this material for an appendix to my Pascal paper. If you would like to be credited by name as my interlocutor who brought up these issues, please email me with whatever information you would consent to my making public in that published appendix. My address is rcarrier@infidels.org (mailto:rcarrier@infidels.org). Thank you for raising stimulating issues!

[pmurray]

The matter is made more complicated in that not only is belief an econimic decision, but people often make poor economic decisions. I'm thinking in particular of "throwing good money after bad". Not everyone becomes an infidel when there's aenough evidence to contradict their beliefs. People continue to belive in Scientology (for instance) even after they have been told about the spaceships, because they dare not admot to temselves that they have just wasted several years beliving a lie.

[Racknar]

Blaise Pascal made this same, tiresome argument a couple hundred years ago. The problems with this "argument" for a belief in god are legion. Nothing you stated appears to be new or origional, just a restatement of what Pascal said. Do a search on "Pascal's Wager" and see just how origional your argument is and how inadequate it is at answering the problems already identified with this line of reasoning. Calling this a reason based on "economics" doesn't change anything in a substantive way.

Mike

[Mike Drake]

Logan's piece is fundamentally flawed. Yes: Weight the items on Pascal's menu in a certain way and most people will make a choice that is rational given that weighting.

But that can't be the relevant issue. To see why, select an ontological postulate other than gods. Take Santa Claus. Assume belief in Santa entails no cost. Suppose then that there is a one in a million chance that there is a Santa Claus who knows who's been naughty and who's been nice, and who witholds gifts from the former while showering them upon the latter. The net expected value of belief is obviously positive. Ergo, it is rational to believe in Santa, given the stated probabilities. Q.E.D.

But of course this can't be right, and so we see that the threshold factual question should be: Is the weighting provided rational? (We might also ask the related question: Does the menu contain all relevant ontological contestants?) I don't see that Logan's argument speaks to this issue at all.

I am inclined to agree with Logan that there's no changing anyone's mind on these issues. But the indefatigable perseverance of religious belief has far less to do with a rational economics and far more to do with a more-or-less discrete irrationality. (I discuss this briefly in my blog here (http://strangedoctrines.blogspot.com/2003_09_01_strangedoctrines_archive.html#106356875791016144).)

[rlogan]

The problem here is that we cannot observe the afterlife, whereas every year we get to observe Christmas. Santa is empirically falsified.

I think there is another comment on the thread regarding Pascal's wager and that I've said nothing original. Didn't see that until now. So I will address it here.

Thank you for your comment, too. I see so much literature there that the odds of me saying something completely new are close to zero. Happy to state flatly "I'm probably saying nothing new".

The differential risk aversions may have been talked about.
The concept of "sincere" and "insincere" components may have been talked about. The idea of unique probabilities and evaluations of outcomes appears to have been talked about. I was going to put in the idea of "present value" and discounting, but I do not think it helps the layman. Perhaps someone's done that, too.

I certainly do not, as Pascal insists, claim that you "must" wager for God.

I do not know if anyone has directly called preachers insurance salesmen, but it sure is a descriptive layman's term, and I hint very strongly at disingenuousness of the salesmen.

It may be too that someone has talked about competition among the salesmen - "good day sir, I see you are considering insurance. Might I suggest the Islamic company? Partial pay-out in virgins..."

Someone may have said that, too.

Thanks again for your comments.

[Mike Drake]

Originally posted by rlogan
The problem here is that we cannot observe the afterlife, whereas every year we get to observe Christmas. Santa is empirically falsified.

But you weren't merely arguing that it is rational to believe in an afterlife. You were arguing that it is rational to believe in some god or another. But gods of the standard myths are arguably as empirically falsified as Santa.

(Besides which, the rationality of Santa-belief can be purchased with an ad hoc hypothesis that he holds all the presents in trust until the good little girls and boys reach heaven.)

[John Guidone]

As a matter of opinion,anyone can REJECT the wager,however every skeptic falls miserably short of REFUTING IT because the arguments are forwarded in theoreticals level of philosophy instead of existential. This allows skeptics to switch from false dilemmas, logical fallacies, to pure intellectual dishonesty to make a point. The only way to REFUTE the wager would be to successfully assign equal probability in all cells to the decisions under risk matrix and decision under uncertainty matrix, then identify a sustainable temporal reward that would exceed the reward promised a Theist( in Pascal's belief... Jesus). The Atheist has no eternal reward , so the temporal reward would have to be better than going to heaven for eternity. As soon as a skeptic/athjeist/agnostic can identify what reward that could possibly be, the wager lives on.

Also , which link "proves" God doesn't exist?

[-DM-]

Title of article? Name of author?

Please read or reread the Feedback FAQ (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/announcement.php?s=&forumid=10) and comply with the instructions if you want your Feedback to count.

As a matter of opinion,anyone can REJECT the wager,however every skeptic falls miserably short of REFUTING IT because the arguments are forwarded in theoreticals level of philosophy instead of existential.There is no true refutation or confirmation of such a wager other than the observation of the outcome, which in the case of "Pascal's Wager" will never likely be determined.

This allows skeptics to switch from false dilemmas, logical fallacies, to pure intellectual dishonesty to make a point. The only way to REFUTE the wager would be to successfully assign equal probability in all cells to the decisions under risk matrix and decision under uncertainty matrix, then identify a sustainable temporal reward that would exceed the reward promised a Theist( in Pascal's belief... Jesus). The Atheist has no eternal reward , so the temporal reward would have to be better than going to heaven for eternity. As soon as a skeptic/athjeist/agnostic can identify what reward that could possibly be, the wager lives on.The wager lives on mostly in the minds of Christians who seem not to understand that Pascal's Wager works equally well for belief in any and all god(s) where there is a promised reward for belief and/or a threat for nonbelief. Pascal's Wager argues only for belief in a generic god rather than any specific god. It can be used equally "well," for example, to argue for belief in the "God" of Judaism, the "God" of Christianity, the "God" of Islam, the "God" of Mormonism, etc. Thus, even if you accept the faulty "reasoning" involved, Pascal's's Wager does not indicate which specific religion to follow.

If "God" is vindictive (as most of the so-called revealed religions seem to claim) with regard to belief in the "wrong" "God," then it might be safer to believe in none of them than to chance belief in the wrong one. (It should be noted, here, that Pascal's "God" was that of Jesuit Catholic Christianity rather than the "God" of mainstream Protestant Christianity, and there is to this day a disagreement between some Catholic theologians and some Protestant theologians as to whether the "others" are really Christians, whether they are truly "saved.")

A similar argument could even be used to encourage belief in any of a number of "unseen powers" in order to curry favor with them. That is, a similar argument could be used to encourage belief in magic, for example, in order to prevent earthquakes and tornadoes, or to bring rain and then sunshine for an abundant crop.

Another problem is the unfounded assumption inherent in Pascal's wager that believing in "God" has no different result than not believing in "God" at all if, in fact, there is no "God." If there is no "God," then believing in a "God" disposes one to other beliefs, some of which are possibly quite harmful. Belief in the "God" of Christianity, for example, can lead you to believe that:
You could handle snakes and drink poison without danger of harm (MK 16.17-18)
You do not need to seek medical attention if you pray and lay hands on the sick (MK 16.18, JA 5.14-15)
You should consider castration for the sake of the Kingdom (MT 19.12, RO 8.13)
You should pluck out an eye or cut off a hand (MT 5.29-30, 18.8-9, MK 9.43-47)
You should Give to everyone who asks. Lend to everyone who wants to borrow (MT 5.42, LK 6.30, 35)
You should sell all your possessions and give to the poor, being content only with food and clothing (LK 12.33, 1TI 6.8)
There is no real need to plan for tomorrow (MT 6.25-34, LK 12.22-31)
There is no real need to be concerned about solving the problems of this life inasmuch as everything will be made right in the next life--or if Jesus comes again soon, as he allegedly promised that he would.If the "God" of Christianity is nonexistent, then these beliefs are not likely true.

In summary, Pascal's Wager is not a good bet. It could well turn out, for example, that "God" absolutely HATES Christians for their "faith" in the Bible and Jesus.

Accepting Pascal's Wager as a valid argument for belief in a deity is an act of irrationality, an act of gullibility. In terms of a wager, I'm willing to bet that we would be far better off being agnostic about the supernatural and using our powers of critical reasoning to guide our lives instead of relying on the supernatural.

---

Here's what some others have to say about Pascal's Wager:

Bertrand Russell:
How do you know that there isn't a God who respects sincerity and the weighing of evidence so much that He will punish forever anyone who joins a certain party just to be on the winning side?
John Hick:
Pascal's Wager amounts to a rational form of self-insurance. It assumes that God will be pleased by such a calculating and self-regarding attitude. This assumption seemed profoundly irreligious to many religious believers.
Dan Barker:
Pascal's Wager is not an argument--it's an intimidation. With that kind of thinking, we should simply choose the religion with the worst Hell.
George H. Smith:
You should in all cases wager on reason and accept the logical consequence, which in this case is atheism. If there's no god, you're correct; if there's an indifferent god, you won't suffer; if there's a just god, you have nothing to fear from the honest use of your reason; and if there's an unjust god, you have much to fear but so does the Christian.
Richard Carrier:
You've lost nothing? I cannot be certain of that--insofar as you have cut off entire avenues of life and thought, and devoted substantial portions of your time or money to what may be nothing more than an elaborate placebo, I cannot say from my point of view that you have lost nothing. See Do Religious Life and Critical Thought Need Each Other?. Have we lost anything? I don't see what I am missing. Atheism, and philosophy in general, has changed my life, too, and I am also a happy person and have a great sense of peace. And if there is such a heavenly Jesus, and he does in fact love me, and is in fact all-powerful, then he will have no cause whatsoever to exclude me from an eternity in heaven--a man who loves does not judge the one they love by whether they believe in him. Such a man does not allow those he loves to come to harm, but gives them every gift of happiness. Thus, even if you are right, I have lost nothing.

---

Suggested reading:

The End of Pascal's Wager: Only Nontheists Go to Heaven (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/heaven.html)

Pascal's Wager (God is a safe bet) (http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/arguments.html#pascal)

Pascal's Wager Is A Possible Bet (But Not A Very Good One) (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/graham_oppy/p_wager.html)

On Rescher On Pascal's Wager (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/graham_oppy/rescher.html)

Pascal's Wager Refuted (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/wager.html)

Playing the Odds (http://www.infidels.org/library/magazines/tsr/1991/2/2front91.html)

A refutation of Pascal's wager and why skeptics should be nontheists (http://www.freethoughtfirefighters.org/a_refutation_of_pascals_wager_Massimo_Pigliucci.htm)

[Note: All of the above are found on the Pascal's Wager index page (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theism/wager.html).]

The Rejection of Pascal's Wager (http://www.geocities.com/paulntobin/index.html)

-DM-

[gbiaki]

ref: http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/arguments.html#pascal

I am surprised that the great Blaise Pascal made such a grave error! Here goes:

There are an infinite number of unprovable and un-disprovable propositions e.g. whether or Not god exists or Giant Space Ants for that matter.
It is therefore equally valid to say that it is in one's best interests to beleive everything that is not provable and not disprovable.

God, Giant Space Ants, Flying Spaghetti Monsters, Bibble Blappers, fobble ploppers, ooby goobies, ... infinity. Your gonna be busy worshipping that lot!

[Unregistered102]

There is so much controversy about who Jesus was, if God exists, etc.

I would like to throw it all out. Everyone has an opinion, and everyone can back up an opinion to make it justifiable. Some facts negate other facts. What can be true?

Here is a basic logical argument by Pascal for or against God...it is your choice.

"If you erroneously believe in God, you lose nothing (assuming that death is the absolute end), whereas if you correctly believe in God, you gain everything (eternal bliss). But if you correctly disbelieve in God, you gain nothing (death ends all), whereas if you erroneously disbelieve in God, you lose everything (eternal damnation)." Blaise Pascal

"If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having, neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is ... you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose then? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager then without hesitation that he is." Blaise Pascal

D~

[Steven Mading]

There is so much controversy about who Jesus was, if God exists, etc.

I would like to throw it all out. Everyone has an opinion, and everyone can back up an opinion to make it justifiable. Some facts negate other facts. What can be true?

Here is a basic logical argument by Pascal for or against God...it is your choice.

(This was followed by the standard Pascal's wager, which there's no point in repeating yet again for the umpteenth time.)

Go here, "Unregistered": http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/, and look at section 5, titled "Objections to Pascal's Wager". This old horse has been beaten over and over and over.

[-DM-]

Go here, "Unregistered": http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/, and look at section 5, titled "Objections to Pascal's Wager". This old horse has been beaten over and over and over.Thanks, Steve. I was going to post a link to the Secular Web Library page on Pascal's Wager, but didn't get around to it--until now. Here it is: Pascal's Wager (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theism/wager.html). There are a number of refutations there.

A few comments, however, for readers who don't want to take the time to read a full article...

There is so much controversy about who Jesus was...Yes, that's true. Part of the reason is that we know very little about the historical Jesus, and the biblical accounts are so inconsistent as to be of very little help.

Some facts negate other facts.In the strict meaning of the word "fact," your assertion is--by definition--untrue. One "quality of being actual" cannot contradict another "quality of being actual."

Here is a basic logical argument by Pascal for or against God...Pascal's Wager, even if it were to be considered a persuasive argument for the existence of a god, would not be an argument for the existence of any specific god--let alone the God of the Bible, the God of Judaism, the God of Christianity, or the God of Islam. In addition, the same kind of argument could be used to encourage belief in any of a number of "unseen powers" in order to curry favor with them. For example, a similar argument could be used to encourage belief in magic, for example, in order to prevent earthquakes and tornadoes, or to bring rain and then sunshine for an abundant crop.

If you erroneously believe in God, you lose nothing....Not true. You stand to lose plenty, including wasted time and effort (and money if you tithe as a Christian). Along the way, many people also lose their ability to reason critically, or never learn to do so. And you might even be one of the unlucky few Christian missionaries who gets eaten by cannibals.

...if you erroneously disbelieve in God, you lose everything (eternal damnation).Only if you happen to be lucky enough to correctly believe in a god whose scheme of things involves eternal damnation for unbelievers. Note: Even some Christian sects do not believe in eternal damnation for unbelievers.

As Richard Carrier puts it: "You've lost nothing? I cannot be certain of that--insofar as you have cut off entire avenues of life and thought, and devoted substantial portions of your time or money to what may be nothing more than an elaborate placebo, I cannot say from my point of view that you have lost nothing. Have we lost anything? I don't see what I am missing. Atheism, and philosophy in general, has changed my life, too, and I am also a happy person and have a great sense of peace. And if there is such a heavenly Jesus, and he does in fact love me, and is in fact all-powerful, then he will have no cause whatsoever to exclude me from an eternity in heaven--a man who loves does not judge the one they love by whether they believe in him. Such a man does not allow those he loves to come to harm, but gives them every gift of happiness. Thus, even if you are right, I have lost nothing."

If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having, neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us.That is only true if this assertion correctly characterizes "God." There are, after all, other conceptions of "God."

If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing.To put it succinctly, Pascal is wrong because, for one thing, he didn't exhaust the possibilities. His argument is not inclusive insofar as the possibilities are concerned.

Another problem is the unfounded assumption inherent in Pascal's wager that believing in "God" has no different result than not believing in "God" at all if, in fact, there is no "God." If there is no "God," then believing in a "God" disposes one to other beliefs, some of which are possibly quite harmful. Belief in the "God" of Christianity, for example, can lead you to believe that:
You could handle snakes and drink poison without danger of harm (MK 16.17-18)
You do not need to seek medical attention if you pray and lay hands on the sick (MK 16.18, JA 5.14-15)
You should consider castration for the sake of the Kingdom (MT 19.12, RO 8.13)
You should pluck out an eye or cut off a hand (MT 5.29-30, 18.8-9, MK 9.43-47)
You should give to everyone who asks. Lend to everyone who wants to borrow (MT 5.42, LK 6.30, 35)
You should sell all your possessions and give to the poor, being content only with food and clothing (LK 12.33, 1TI 6.8)
There is no real need to plan for tomorrow (MT 6.25-34, LK 12.22-31)
There is no real need to be concerned about solving the problems of this life inasmuch as everything will be made right in the next life--or if Jesus comes again soon, as he allegedly promised that he would.If the "God" of Christianity is nonexistent, then these beliefs are not likely true.

In summary, Pascal's Wager is not a good bet. It could well turn out, for example, that "God" absolutely HATES Christians for their "faith" in the Bible and Jesus.

-DM-

[Child of Thorns]

In its favour, eternal damnation and eternal bliss always outweigh any earthly concerns, so the advantages of picking at least one religion however small the chance of eternal bliss or pain is better than not beleiving at all. However, this is flawed:
For one, there are infinity different deities that could theoretically exist. There is just as much reason to beleive in a god that punishes christians and rewards non-beleivers as there is he traditional god. The 50/50 chance is a myth, all possible deities would have to be factored in, and would cancel each other out benefits wise.

Also, it is intellectually dishonest to beleive in something simply because of a reward/punishment system. You wouldn't do this if someone happened to beleive in spirits that punished people for washing their clothes, so why for the christian deity?

[NeheThom]

In its favour, eternal damnation and eternal bliss always outweigh any earthly concerns, so the advantages of picking at least one religion however small the chance of eternal bliss or pain is better than not beleiving at all. However, this is flawed:
For one, there are infinity different deities that could theoretically exist. There is just as much reason to beleive in a god that punishes christians and rewards non-beleivers as there is he traditional god. The 50/50 chance is a myth, all possible deities would have to be factored in, and would cancel each other out benefits wise.
Also, it is intellectually dishonest to beleive in something simply because of a reward/punishment system. You wouldn't do this if someone happened to beleive in spirits that punished people for washing their clothes, so why for the christian deity?

This logic is very flawed, in that it makes for certain that there are other "deities", yet it denies, in it reasoning, the impossibility of ONE DEITY being SUPREME, and all others having to do homage to HIM and Him alone. The one thing that the seems to escape the reasoning skills of the critics of "Pascal's Wager" is that, There are no other "deities" who lay claim to "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth". No others can, nor has ever, nor probably will ever, lay claim to that one statement alone. And it is also for certain that the statement, "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth", cannot and will not be PREDATED.
Also, the statement, in its very claim, must be proven false in order for its verity to be in question; just as we assume "innocence" until proven guilty, so must "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth" be considered totally and without any doubt TRUE. . .simply because there is no one or nothing that can predate the Statement, and therefore having the slightest chance of proving it false.
As far as the so-called "reward/punishment system" is concerned, critics again reason, without having to Whole, as well as the Real and True facts. Here are just a few:
1. Hell (Eternal Damnation) is not a "reward/punishment system", but rather a choice willingly entered into by the participant. According to Scripture (The Bible), Hell was never "prepared" for human occupancy. Ergo, anyone who goes to Hell or Eternally Damned, has WILLINGLY and FREELY Chosen to do so.
2. Were GOD to take you into all of ETERNITY with HIMSELF against your FREEWILL, you'd be the most miserable person in all of Eternity. Because in order for you to reside Eternally (or even Momentarily) with THE GOD of Scripture, your sin has to be dealt with by being taken away. . .as well as the penalty for your sin (DEATH) having been satisfied. This was and IS the Whole purpose of JESUS CHRIST'S Birth, Death, and Resurrection. . .to satisfy the Justice of GOD's Demand regarding Sin (DEATH). And since JESUS CHRIST is THE ONLY ONE to have the Ability to Satisfy THE GOD of Scripture (The Bible), HE IS THE ONLY WAY for any man, woman, boy, or girl, to get to, and reside in THE KINGDOM of THE GOD of Scripture (The Bible), for now, let alone for all Eternity. Ergo, its GOD'S KINGDOM, and you nor I are THE KING.
3. THE GOD of Scripture (The Bible), lays claim to all that we see and understand, as being and/or existing (with Sin, being the only exception). Its all his stuff, by reason of HIS Claim, and the statement, "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth" cannot be predated. Ergo, your rationalizing of "50/50 chance", is not even a 1 in a million shot, when it comes to attempting to debunk "Pascal's Wager".

[anthrosciguy]

And it is also for certain that the statement, "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth", cannot and will not be PREDATED.
Also, the statement, in its very claim, must be proven false in order for its verity to be in question; just as we assume "innocence" until proven guilty, so must "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth[SIZE="3"]" be considered totally and without any doubt TRUE. . .simply because there is no one or nothing that can predate the Statement, and therefore having the slightest chance of proving it false.


There are many origin myths, and many predate the Bible; therefore your above statement is wrong. And a false statement does not become true, in a court of law or anywhere else, even if it's the very first ever time the statement has been uttered.

[show_no_mercy]

[COLOR="Navy"][FONT="Times New Roman"]This logic is very flawed, in that it makes for certain that there are other "deities", yet it denies, in it reasoning, the impossibility of ONE DEITY being SUPREME, and all others having to do homage to HIM and Him alone. The one thing that the seems to escape the reasoning skills of the critics of "Pascal's Wager" is that, There are no other "deities" who lay claim to "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth". No others can, nor has ever, nor probably will ever, lay claim to that one statement alone. And it is also for certain that the statement, "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth[SIZE="3"]", cannot and will not be PREDATED.

Q: How do you know your god said this?
A: It's in the bible
Q: How do you know that the bible is the word of god?
A: The bible says it's the word of god, and god wouldn't lie

Perfect logic :rolleyes:

[-DM-]

NeheThom:

There are several serious problems with your "reasoning":

There are no other "deities" who lay claim to "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth". No others can, nor has ever, nor probably will ever, lay claim to that one statement alone. And it is also for certain that the statement, "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth", cannot and will not be PREDATED.You would have to be omniscient in order to be certain that there are no other deities who make this claim, that there are no other deities about whom this claim is made, and that there is any deity at all who actually makes this claim (as opposed to individuals who make this claim about a particular deity).

Further--unless you are referring to this specific wording--you are wrong. As was previously pointed out, there are several creation myths which precede the biblical creation myth, some of which are quite similar to the biblical creation myth.

Also, the statement, in its very claim, must be proven false in order for its verity to be in question; just as we assume "innocence" until proven guilty, so must "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth" be considered totally and without any doubt TRUE. . .simply because there is no one or nothing that can predate the Statement, and therefore having the slightest chance of proving it false.To the contrary, your assertions, which are the positive assertions here, must be proven true--or at least supported with convincing evidence and/or argument--before they can be considered to be of merit. In the absence of such proof, evidence and/or argument, there is little reason, and perhaps even less reason, to believe in the existence of your god--let alone that "he" made any such claims.

Hell (Eternal Damnation) is not a "reward/punishment system", but rather a choice willingly entered into by the participant. According to Scripture (The Bible), Hell was never "prepared" for human occupancy. Ergo, anyone who goes to Hell or Eternally Damned, has WILLINGLY and FREELY Chosen to do so.This assertion indicates a lack of understanding of divergent points of view based on the very same Scripture (the Bible).

Further, there is no reason to accept the authority of the Bible (unless and until you have proven that the Bible should be trusted) whereas there is reason to reject the authority of the Bible given that the Bible is either dubious, erroneous, and/or generally untrustworthy in a good deal of what it purports to be true.

THE GOD of Scripture (The Bible), lays claim to all that we see and understand ...To the contrary, the authors of the Bible make the claim that the god of the Bible makes this claim just as, for example, the authors of the Koran and Hadith make the claim that "God" makes certain claims.

-DM-

[Conservationist]

Christians always blame non-believers that they are too proud to accept Jesus in their lifes. Why should anybody refuse to get in contact with his Creator?

They assume a false dichotomy: that there's either Christianity, or belief in nothing, just like the argument that atheists can't be moral people. Zzzz.

[MRM]

There are no other "[/SIZE]deities" who lay claim to "In the beginning, GOD Created The Heavens and the Earth[SIZE="3"]". No others can, nor has ever, nor probably will ever, lay claim to that one statement alone.

Well - here is an other gods who claims that he created earth and sky ;)

Norse Mythology - Creation

In the beginning there was a giant void or chasm called Ginnungagap. On one side of the void was Niflheim, the land of fog and ice, in the north, and on the other was Muspelheim, the land of fire, to the south. Part of the ice of Niflheim melted, creating the giant Ymir and the cow Audhumla, who nourished him. Audhumla fed by licking the salty ice, and her licking formed the god Buri. Ymir created the first frost giants, a male and a female, from under his left arm.

Odin, the grandson of Buri and the son of Buri's son Bor, killed Ymir, and Ymir's blood drowned all the frost giants except for one, Bergelmir, who fled to continue the race. Odin created the earth from Ymir's body, and Ymir's blood was the sea; his flesh, the earth; his skull, the sky; his bones, the mountains; his hair, the trees.

From Ymir's body grew an ash tree named Yggdrasil, whose branches supported the universe. Yggdrasil had three roots going to each of the three levels of the world. Three springs supplied it with water. One root went into Asgard, the home of the gods, another went to Jotunheim, the land of the giants, and a third went to Niflheim, the primeval land of ice from which Ymir and Audhumla were created. In Jotunheim's spring, Mimir, lay wisdom. Niflheim's spring nourished the adder Nidhogge who gnawed at the roots of Ygdrasil.

Or what about ancient greek creation myth ? In this case, the earth is part of an egg from a big black bird, and humans are created later by Zeus's son Prometheus

In the beginning there was an empty darkness. The only thing in this void was Nyx, a bird with black wings. With the wind she laid a golden egg and for ages she sat upon this egg. Finally life began to stir in the egg and out of it rose Eros, the god of love. One half of the shell rose into the air and became the sky and the other became the Earth. Eros named the sky Uranus and the Earth he named Gaia. Then Eros made them fall in love.

Uranus and Gaia had many children together and eventually they had grandchildren. Some of their children become afraid of the power of their children. Kronus, in an effort to protect himself, swallowed his children when they were still infants. However, his wife Rhea hid their youngest child. She gave him a rock wrapped in swaddling clothes, which he swallowed, thinking it was his son.

Once the child, Zeus, had reached manhood his mother instructed him on how to trick his father to give up his brothers and sisters. Once this was accomplished the children fought a mighty war against their father. After much fighting the younger generation won. With Zeus as their leader, they began to furnish Gaia with life and Uranus with stars.

Soon the Earth lacked only two things: man and animals. Zeus summoned his sons Prometheus (fore-thought) and Epimetheus (after-thought). He told them to go to Earth and create men and animals and give them each a gift.

http://www.cs.williams.edu/~lindsey/myths/myths_16.html

And here is a link to even more ancient creation myths from all over the world - and all of them conflicting with the christian one :p

http://www.magictails.com/creationlinks.html

[angelo atheist]

Hi all. An ancient Chinese myth tells us that everything started in chaos. The universe was like a black egg [a black hole?]. A god named Pan Chu, wielding an axe, breakes the egg and the heavens begin to expand. The lice on Pan Chu evolve into mankind. So much for creation stories. Actually the above myth agrees more with science than the biblical myth. :)

[premjan]

That version may have undergone some massage until it sounds like the modern big bang.
http://www.crystalinks.com/chinacreation.html