Knowledge of knowledge

[Kosh3]

Are either of these possible?

--Knowledge of our knowledge
--Knowledge of what is knowledge

I.e. can we have knowledge of what we know, and can we know what is knowledge.

The first would seem to imply certainty about our beliefs, while the second would seem to be circular. Or is this wrong?

[kennethamy]

Are either of these possible?

--Knowledge of our knowledge
--Knowledge of what is knowledge

I.e. can we have knowledge of what we know, and can we know what is knowledge.

The first would seem to imply certainty about our beliefs, while the second would seem to be circular. Or is this wrong?

I am not sure what you are asking. Are you asking whether we can know that we know? And whether we can know what knowledge is?

As for the second, one standard answer to the question is, yes, knowledge is true, justified, belief. (This has fairly recently come under question, but it was the answer given by Plato).

As for the first, that is harder. Usually, what knowing that I know really comes to is that I feel certain, or I strongly believe that I know some proposition is true. For instance, "Do you know that you know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, or are you just guessing?" "Yes, I'm sure that I know it, because I looked it up in the latest issue of The World Book of Facts, and then, to make really sure, I looked it up in Hammond's World Atlas."

But, and this is not really on point, but it often comes up when your question is raised: you do not have to know that you know in order to know. In fact, it is the other way: you have to know (first) in order to know that you know.

[Kosh3]

As for the second, one standard answer to the question is, yes, knowledge is true, justified, belief. (This has fairly recently come under question, but it was the answer given by Plato).

Putting aside Gettier objections, TJB would seem to be the widespread conception of knowledge. But if knowledge of what knowledge is is circular (by presupposing the very thing in examination, perhaps), does it even make sense to talk about 'what knowledge is'? (another question would be, do we, or can we, have TJB about TJB). If it is in error, is a significant part of epistemology ultimately wrong-headed in its search for an account of knowledge?

As for the first, that is harder. Usually, what knowing that I know really comes to is that I feel certain, or I strongly believe that I know some proposition is true. For instance, "Do you know that you know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, or are you just guessing?" "Yes, I'm sure that I know it, because I looked it up in the latest issue of The World Book of Facts, and then, to make really sure, I looked it up in Hammond's World Atlas."

Surely the books could be wrong (that is, that it is at least logically possible that they could be wrong). In which case, it would seem that certainty here isn't a literal certainty.

[kennethamy]

Putting aside Gettier objections, TJB would seem to be the widespread conception of knowledge. But if knowledge of what knowledge is is circular (by presupposing the very thing in examination, perhaps), does it even make sense to talk about 'what knowledge is'? (another question would be, do we, or can we, have TJB about TJB). If it is in error, is a significant proportion of epistemology ultimately wrong-headed in their search for an account of knowledge?



Surely the books could be wrong (that is, that it is at least logically possible that they could be wrong). In which case, it would seem that certainty here isn't a literal certainty.

Why would knowing you know be circular? If knowledge is TJB, then knowing you know would be, TJB that you have TJB. But, as I pointed out, that is not what we ordinarily mean when we say we know that we know. We ordinarily mean that we strongly believe we know, or are strongly confident that we know.

The books could be mistaken, and so could we. That is why I used the term, "feel certain". Another term for, "strongly believe I know" or, "strongly confident I know".

I don't see why it would be wrong-headed to try to understand what is means to say that "A knows that p". It must mean something.

[Kosh3]

Why would knowing you know be circular? If knowledge is TJB, then knowing you know would be, TJB that you have TJB. But, as I pointed out, that is not what we ordinarily mean when we say we know that we know. We ordinarily mean that we strongly believe we know, or are strongly confident that we know.

It wouldn't be circular; I didn't say knowledge of common items of knowledge was circular, I said that implied certainty. What I suggested was circular was knowledge of 'knowledge' (i.e. what constitutes knowledge, not particular items of knowledge). I thought I was fairly clear on this point.

The books could be mistaken, and so could we. That is why I used the term, "feel certain". Another term for, "strongly believe I know" or, "strongly confident I know".

This addresses nothing raised, however. This is not the kind of certainty being referred to.

[kennethamy]

It wouldn't be circular; I didn't say knowledge of common items of knowledge was circular, I said that implied certainty. What I suggested was circular was knowledge of 'knowledge' (i.e. what constitutes knowledge, not particular items of knowledge). I thought I was fairly clear on this point.



This addresses nothing raised, however. This is not the kind of certainty being referred to.

Why can't I have TJB (if that is knowing) that knowledge is TJB? (If that is what you are driving at).

Yes, I know that is not the kind of certainty you were talking about. What I wrote was that was the kind of certainty people seem to mean when they say that they know that they know. They do not seem to mean, by that, that they are infallibly certain.

[Kosh3]

Why can't I have TJB (if that is knowing) that knowledge is TJB? (If that is what you are driving at).

Well, does that not presuppose the case of the very thing under examination? That is, do you not presuppose knowledge as being some thing in particular in order to arrive at knowledge as some thing in particular?

Yes, I know that is not the kind of certainty you were talking about. What I wrote was that was the kind of certainty people seem to mean when they say that they know that they know. They do not seem to mean, by that, that they are infallibly certain.

Oh, I agree that this is the way in which 'certainty' is used, but knowledge of what we know would imply a stronger sense of certainty than this - that is, the impossibility of error.

[kennethamy]

Well, does that not presuppose the case of the very thing under examination? That is, do you not presuppose knowledge as being some thing in particular in order to arrive at knowledge as some thing in particular?



Oh, I agree that this is the way in which 'certainty' is used, but knowledge of what we know would imply a stronger sense of certainty than this - that is, the impossibility of error.

Yes. I am assuming that knowing is TJB (for the sake of this argument) and then, concluding that knowing I know would be having TJB that TJB. Just as, for instance, let's assume that believing that p, means, accepting the p is true. Then, if I believed that I believe that p, that would mean that I accepted as true, that I accepted as true that p.

Perhaps it is true that KK would imply C. But I don't know of any argument for that.

[Kosh3]

Yes. I am assuming that knowing is TJB (for the sake of this argument) and then, concluding that knowing I know would be having TJB that TJB. Just as, for instance, let's assume that believing that p, means, accepting the p is true. Then, if I believed that I believe that p, that would mean that I accepted as true, that I accepted as true that p.

Things are not problematic in the example you give. I hope however that it is evident that it is problematic in the first. One can have beliefs about ones beliefs easily enough, but knowledge of what knowledge is would seem to presuppose a specific conception of knowledge for there to be knowledge of that conception of knowledge in the first place (thats a horrific sentence, I know, but it seems to approximate what I am trying to get at). Or would it?

[kennethamy]

Things are not problematic in the example you give. I hope however that it is evident that it is problematic in the first. One can have beliefs about ones beliefs easily enough, but knowledge of what knowledge is would seem to presuppose a specific conception of knowledge for there to be knowledge of that conception of knowledge in the first place (thats a horrific sentence, I know, but it seems to approximate what I am trying to get at). Or would it?

Why would the one not be circular, and the other circular? After all, there is a specific conception of belief also presupposed in my example.

[Kosh3]

Why would the one not be circular, and the other circular? After all, there is a specific conception of belief also presupposed in my example.

Well, if you changed it to belief in what belief is (as a category of things), from belief in some particular belief in question, then I might be more inclined to agree with you there.

[kennethamy]

Well, if you changed it to belief in what belief is (as a category of things), from belief in some particular belief in question, then I might be more inclined to agree with you there.

I thought I had done that. I mean that is what I was originally talking about.

I wrote:

"Just as, for instance, let's assume that believing that p, means, accepting the p is true. Then, if I believed that I believe that p, that would mean that I accepted as true, that I accepted as true that p."

I also thought I was not talking about any particular bit of knowledge, but about knowing that one knew in general.

I don't know why you thought I was talking about particular beliefs or, for that matter, particular knowings.

Was there a particular belief, or a particular knowing I mentioned? What were they?

[Kosh3]

I don't know why you thought I was talking about particular beliefs or, for that matter, particular knowings.

"Just as, for instance, let's assume that believing that p, means, accepting the p is true. Then, if I believed that I believe that p, that would mean that I accepted as true, that I accepted as true that p."

This is belief about your belief in p, not specifically belief about your belief in what belief is. Or so I assumed; that p was some undefined particular thing (like it could have been that "Quito is the capital of Ecuador") rather than belief as a category. Nothing about 'p' would indicate (to me) that you were referring specifically to belief as a category.

[kennethamy]

This is belief about your belief in p, not specifically belief about your belief in what belief is. Or so I assumed; that p was some undefined particular thing (like it could have been that "Quito is the capital of Ecuador") rather than belief as a category.

Doesn't matter what p is.

I am talking about my belief that I believe whatever, just as I was talking about my knowing that I know whatever. I still don't understand why you thought differently. But it doesn't matter.

[Kosh3]

I am talking about my belief that I believe whatever, just as I was talking about my knowing that I know whatever. I still don't understand why you thought differently. But it doesn't matter.

Remember that it is not knowledge of various things we know that causes issues of circularity - it is (or would be) knowledge of what knowledge as a category is that potentially causes circularity. As you say, you are talking about "belief that I believe whatever" - which is identical not to the latter but the former problem outlined there.

We need to talk about belief in what belief is - not belief in a (or any particular) belief.

[kennethamy]

Remember that it is not knowledge of various things we know that causes issues of circularity - it is (or would be) knowledge of what knowledge as a category is that potentially causes circularity. As you say, you are talking about "belief that I believe whatever" - which is identical not to the latter but the former problem outlined there.

We need to talk about belief in what belief is.

That seems to be the same thing. But, fine, let's word it your way. Let's say that knowledge is TJB. Why can't I TJB that knowledge is TJB? (Like, let's say that belief is the acceptance of a proposition as true, and I accept the proposition that belief is the acceptance of a proposition as true, is true).

[Kosh3]

That seems to be the same thing. But, fine, let's word it your way. Let's say that knowledge is TJB. Why can't I TJB that knowledge is TJB? (Like, let's say that belief is the acceptance of a proposition as true, and I accept the proposition that belief is the acceptance of a proposition as true, is true).

Eh, all my enthusiasm for the topic from yesterday has been sapped dry. The idea was that if you have (or claim to have) knowledge of knowledge, you may be implicitly presupposing some specific conception of knowledge prior to your having determined the category of knowledge as anything at all - and hence that argumentatively some particularly conception of knowledge (as TJB, for instance) is useless. I was hoping for philosophical challenges. One might be that descriptively this is fine, so long as no prescriptive element enters (actually that sort of agrees with it). This would fit to an intuitive model - that each of us has some basic idea about what knowledge is, or allow for the definition of knowledge to be set purely axiomatically. In the case of Gettier examples, it would seem more that we follow our intuitions on the matter.

[kennethamy]

Eh, all my enthusiasm for the topic from yesterday has been sapped dry. The idea was that if you have (or claim to have) knowledge of knowledge, you may be implicitly presupposing some specific conception of knowledge prior to your having determined the category of knowledge as anything at all - and hence that argumentatively some particularly conception of knowledge (as TJB, for instance) is useless. I was hoping for philosophical challenges. One might be that descriptively this is fine, so long as no prescriptive element enters (actually that sort of agrees with it). This would fit to an intuitive model - that each of us has some basic idea about what knowledge is, or allow for the definition of knowledge to be set purely axiomatically. In the case of Gettier examples, it would seem more that we follow our intuitions on the matter.

I think that we not only begin with the assumption that we know things, but that is not merely an assumption. We do know things. The task then is to discover some theory (although that word may be too grand) which allows us to understand what it is to know what we believe we do know. TJB s one such theory. We then have to test that theory by inferring consequences from it, and then determine whether those consequences are true. If they turn out not to be true, then we either have to scrap the theory, or we have to revise the theory in order to accommodate the consequences. Gettier counter-examples seem to require at least revision in the TJB theory if not scrapping it. (Or, of course, we may also argue that the alleged counter-examples are fake). And so, we test the theory by the consequences, and adjust the theory in the light of those consequences, in the hope of eventually arriving at a satisfactory theory. I think that the philosopher, John Rawls, called that kind of procedure (in a different context) "reflective equilibrium".

[David B]

Are either of these possible?

--Knowledge of our knowledge
--Knowledge of what is knowledge

I.e. can we have knowledge of what we know, and can we know what is knowledge.

The first would seem to imply certainty about our beliefs, while the second would seem to be circular. Or is this wrong?

Three letters.

GEB

David B

[kennethamy]

Three letters.

GEB

David B

I expect you think that someone knows what you are trying to say. Why are you so arch?

[Kosh3]

I think that we not only begin with the assumption that we know things, but that is not merely an assumption. We do know things. The task then is to discover some theory (although that word may be too grand) which allows us to understand what it is to know what we believe we do know. TJB s one such theory. We then have to test that theory by inferring consequences from it, and then determine whether those consequences are true. If they turn out not to be true, then we either have to scrap the theory, or we have to revise the theory in order to accommodate the consequences. Gettier counter-examples seem to require at least revision in the TJB theory if not scrapping it. (Or, of course, we may also argue that the alleged counter-examples are fake). And so, we test the theory by the consequences, and adjust the theory in the light of those consequences, in the hope of eventually arriving at a satisfactory theory. I think that the philosopher, John Rawls, called that kind of procedure (in a different context) "reflective equilibrium".

I think we are even forced, given commitments to certain rational principles, to say that we know things. Because if we say we do not know anything, do we then know that we know nothing? It is the well known reply to philosophical skeptics (of course if you abandon the law of non contradiction the problem dissolves). An interesting consequence though, if what I was getting at is true, is that knowledge (in terms of what it is in itself) cannot be rationally determined. It must be most fundamentally set or defined outside of rationality, because our thinking uses its concept already in order to cognize at all. Rationality plays a part of course, but not in any complete way. Hence an account of knowledge can only be descriptive, not prescriptive. This in itself raises ever more questions however: can intuitions be considered 'knowledge'? And if so, are then intuitions about what knowledge is knowledge of knowledge?

[David B]

I expect you think that someone knows what you are trying to say. Why are you so arch?

I put it down to it being late at night over here, with the bottle nearly empty.

But OK

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GEB

David B

ETA in particular I was thinking about the jinns who had to keep pushing questions upstairs.

Going back to the OP

Knowledge of what is knowledge

I saw that as leading to the sort of infinite regress that Hofstadters Jinns represent.

That sort of stuff happens after a bottle of wine and a joint

[kennethamy]

I think we are even forced, given commitments to certain rational principles, to say that we know things. Because if we say we do not know anything, do we then know that we know nothing? It is the well known reply to philosophical skeptics (of course if you abandon the law of non contradiction the problem dissolves). An interesting consequence though, if what I was getting at is true, is that knowledge (in terms of what it is in itself) cannot be rationally determined. It must be most fundamentally set or defined outside of rationality, because our thinking uses its concept already in order to cognize at all. Rationality plays a part of course, but not in any complete way. Hence an account of knowledge can only be descriptive, not prescriptive. This in itself raises ever more questions however: can intuitions be considered 'knowledge'? And if so, are then intuitions about what knowledge is knowledge of knowledge?

Saying we do not know anything does not commit us to knowing we do not know anything. We can just believe we do not know anything. So, I don't think that is much of reply to skepticism however well known it is. I don't know what it means to be "outside rationality" or understand your argument about why the definition cannot be "rationally determined". Suppose that TJB is true. Well, that is rationally determined. Intuitions cannot be considered knowledge because, as I understand the term, "intuition" intuitions are not justified. They seem to be simply strong beliefs.

[Kosh3]

We can just believe we do not know anything

Do we ever believe knowingly false things though? By believing we do not know anything, the person is surely making a truth claim - something, let us say, that he believes he knows.

I don't know what it means to be "outside rationality" or understand your argument about why the definition cannot be "rationally determined".

Doesn't matter, ignore my musings.

[kennethamy]

Do we ever believe knowingly false things though? By believing we do not know anything, the person is surely making a truth claim - something, let us say, that he believes he knows.



.

If we believe p, then we believe p is true. So, if I do not believe skepticism is true, I will not believe I do not know anything. My point was that if I assert that I do not know anything, that need not imply that I know that proposition is true, it might be that I just believe it is true. I can surely believe I do not know anything without contradiction. My belief will just be false. But I will believe it is true, of course. Are you confusing (perhaps) believing a proposition that is false, with believing a proposition, but believing the proposition is false? The former is something that unfortunately we do often. The latter is something we cannot do.

[Kosh3]

I can surely believe I do not know anything without contradiction. My belief will just be false. But I will believe it is true, of course. Are you confusing (perhaps) believing a proposition that is false, with believing a proposition, but believing the proposition is false? The former is something that unfortunately we do often. The latter is something we cannot do

We can only ever really speak about what we take to be knowledge, not what we actually know in fact (from an objective, gods-eye point of view). In asserting that we know nothing, we are asserting something we believe to be true, and hence something we claim to know. To assert then that we know nothing is to give an example of something we claim to know, and hence indirectly implicitly claim that we can at least know some things. Otherwise we could not even make such a claim. I think we actually agree, but you are focused upon what we know in fact outside of what we claim to know, and I am focused upon what we think we know.

If we know nothing in fact, and we believe we know nothing, then we know something in fact (which is a logical absurdity).
If we know some things in fact, and we believe we know nothing, we are wrong, and hence we know things (whatever they are).

Hence, in either case, we can only ever know something (taking knowledge here as TB rather than TJB, for simplicity).

[kennethamy]

We can only ever really speak about what we take to be knowledge, not what we actually know in fact (from an objective, gods-eye point of view). In asserting that we know nothing, we are asserting something we believe to be true, and hence something we know. To assert then that we know nothing is to give an example of something we claim to know, and hence indirectly implicitly claim that we can at least know some things. Otherwise we could not even make such a claim. I think we actually agree, but you are focused upon what we know in fact outside of what we claim to know, and I am focused upon what we think we know.

If we know nothing in fact, and we believe we know nothing, then we know something in fact (which is a logical absurdity).
If we know some things in fact, and we believe we know nothing, we are wrong, and hence we know things (whatever they are).

Hence, in either case, we can only ever know something (taking knowledge here as TB rather than TJB, for simplicity).

Suppose that what I "take to be knowledge" i.e. what I believe I know, I really do (in fact know). Then, when I say I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, (and it really is the capital) and I have adequate justification, then (pace Gettier) I do know that Quito is the capital. So, sometime when I believe I know (as in this case) I do know. The point is that I can (sincerely) say I know, as long as I believe I know, and if I do know, then my belief that I did know was a true belief. I think you are heading back to I have to know I know in order to know. And that is not only false, it implies a contradiction, since I could not know I know unless I already knew.

But why when I assert I know nothing am I implying I know I know nothing? When I assert that Quito is the capital, must I be implying I know it is? Can't I be implying that I believe it is?

Maybe you have heard of "Moore's Paradox" It is that although it makes no sense to assert, "It is raining, but I do not believe it", it still can be true that it is raining, but I do not believe it. How can it not make sense to assert something that is true. The solution is (I think) that there is a difference between the conditions of assertion of "p", and the truth conditions of "p". It might very well be true that it is raining, but I do not believe it is raining, if the truth conditions of that compound statement are satisfied. But even if the truth-conditions are satisfied, the conditions of assertion may not be satisfies, and one of the conditions of any assertion, is that the assertor believe what he asserts is true.

What this is relevant to is that it may be that the conditions of the truth of "I know that p" may be satisfied (say TJB), but the conditions of asserting that one knows that p, may not be satisfied. So that even if it were true that in order to assert I know that p, I have to know that I know that p (I don't agree that is so) I may know that p, anyway. Since the conditions of knowing that p is true may be satisfied without the conditions of asserting that I know that p, being satisfied.

[comiezapr]

Are either of these possible?

--Knowledge of our knowledge
--Knowledge of what is knowledge

I.e. can we have knowledge of what we know, and can we know what is knowledge.

The first would seem to imply certainty about our beliefs, while the second would seem to be circular. Or is this wrong?

First clarification.

1) can we have knowledge of our knowledge means: can we have knowledge about particular bits of knowledge we have.

2) can we have knowledge of the meaning of the word knowledge.

I take this to be what you are asking. Yes to both, ill reason them in reverse.

We can have knowledge of the meaning of the word knowledge because, well, all of the semantic details of anything are plainly open to us (though it takes alot of philosophical analysis to get the meaning down with any kind of precision). Roughly, knowledge is justified true belief.

We can have knowledge of the bits of knowledge we have because the bits of knowledge are in the form of beliefs. I know that the cat is on the mat, and this is because i believe that the cat is on the mat. Because i believe that the cat is on the mat, i can also know that i believe that the cat is on the mat. What, of course, i cannot know is which beliefs of mine ARE knowledge (because i cannot know what is true). So while, yes, i can know about the knowledge i have i only know it by chance; i cant differentiate knowledge from non-knowledge belief.

[kennethamy]

First clarification.

i cannot know is which beliefs of mine ARE knowledge (because i cannot know what is true). So while, yes, i can know about the knowledge i have i only know it by chance; i cant differentiate knowledge from non-knowledge belief.

If "I can't know what is true" and in order to know, I have to know what is true, how can I "have knowledge"? I don't get it.

You think that if I first look it up in the World Book of Facts, and then look it up in Hammond's World Atlas, and even then, since I am a worrier, telephone the Ecuadorean Embassy in Washington, D.C. , and all those sources tell me that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, "by chance"? Goodness, what would it be to know it by design?

[comiezapr]

If "I can't know what is true" and in order to know, I have to know what is true, how can I "have knowledge"? I don't get it.

Thats not what i was trying to convey.

You can have knowledge of knowledge. This is why ...

I assume knowledge is JTB. There is a class of objects in my mind, justified true beliefs, as well as another class of objects, beliefs which either arent true, arent justified or both (ill call these beliefs the other beliefs.) The conjuction of these sets will be just the beliefs i have.

I have beliefs (secondary beliefs) about some of my beliefs, some of the members of the set of beliefs. Some of these beliefs will be justified, and true, and hence knowledge. I can be justified in believing that i have these beliefs, and it can be true that i have these beliefs, hence i can have knowledge of these beliefs. So, in total, i can have knowledge of knowledge.

What i cannot have is knowledge of WHETHER the beliefs that are the object of my (secondary) knowledge are true, so i cannot know whether i know. Put in a different way, i cannot have knowledge about the whether the members of the set "beliefs" are also members of the set "knowledge" or "other beliefs".

You think that if I first look it up in the World Book of Facts, and then look it up in Hammond's World Atlas, and even then, since I am a worrier, telephone the Ecuadorean Embassy in Washington, D.C. , and all those sources tell me that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, "by chance"? Goodness, what would it be to know it by design?

This is an argument against my ability to know whether my beliefs are JUSTIFIED, not TRUE. I didnt say we cant have knowledge about the justification of beliefs, only that we cant know the truth of beliefs. If you want to identify truth with justification ..... i already know you dont want to do that.

[kennethamy]

Thats not what i was trying to convey.

You can have knowledge of knowledge. This is why ...

I assume knowledge is JTB. There is a class of objects in my mind, justified true beliefs, as well as another class of objects, beliefs which either arent true, arent justified or both (ill call these beliefs the other beliefs.) The conjuction of these sets will be just the beliefs i have.

I have beliefs (secondary beliefs) about some of my beliefs, some of the members of the set of beliefs. Some of these beliefs will be justified, and true, and hence knowledge. I can be justified in believing that i have these beliefs, and it can be true that i have these beliefs, hence i can have knowledge of these beliefs. So, in total, i can have knowledge of knowledge.

What i cannot have is knowledge of WHETHER the beliefs that are the object of my (secondary) knowledge are true, so i cannot know whether i know. Put in a different way, i cannot have knowledge about the whether the members of the set "beliefs" are also members of the set "knowledge" or "other beliefs".



This is an argument against my ability to know whether my beliefs are JUSTIFIED, not TRUE. I didnt say we cant have knowledge about the justification of beliefs, only that we cant know the truth of beliefs. If you want to identify truth with justification ..... i already know you dont want to do that.

It is pretty late, so I guess it is my fault, but just on this last point, when you say that we cannot know the truth of beliefs, do you mean that we cannot know our beliefs are true? That's not the case. I know that my belief that Quito is the capital of Ecuador is true.

I can certainly believe that I know that Quito is the capital, so is it true that I cannot have enough justification for that belief so that I can know that I know that Quito is the capital? That is not obvious to me. I was very careful when I looked it up in the various sources, and verified that those sources were the very latest. And, I (believe it or not) made sure that I was talking to the Embassy and not some counterfeit to fool me. And, moreover, I flew down to the Embassy. So, I not only know that Quito is the capital, I know that I know, that Quito is the capital. Perhaps we seldom, if ever, correctly say we know, we know, but all that proves is that we seldom if ever, go through all that trouble of verifying our justification. But that doesn't mean that we can't do it. It means only that we don't do it because (except perhaps in matters of life or death) we don't think we need to do so. I guess some philosophers might object that we cannot know we know because that would mean we were absolutely certain, and we cannot be absolutely (infallibly) certain. But the first premise of that argument may be false. It may be that we can know we know (in the way I suggested) without that meaning we are absolutely certain.

[comiezapr]

It is pretty late, so I guess it is my fault, but just on this last point, when you say that we cannot know the truth of beliefs, do you mean that we cannot know our beliefs are true? That's not the case. I know that my belief that Quito is the capital of Ecuador is true.

I can certainly believe that I know that Quito is the capital, so is it true that I cannot have enough justification for that belief so that I can know that I know that Quito is the capital? That is not obvious to me. I was very careful when I looked it up in the various sources, and verified that those sources were the very latest. And, I (believe it or not) made sure that I was talking to the Embassy and not some counterfeit to fool me. And, moreover, I flew down to the Embassy. So, I not only know that Quito is the capital, I know that I know, that Quito is the capital. Perhaps we seldom, if ever, correctly say we know, we know, but all that proves is that we seldom if ever, go through all that trouble of verifying our justification. But that doesn't mean that we can't do it. It means only that we don't do it because (except perhaps in matters of life or death) we don't think we need to do so. I guess some philosophers might object that we cannot know we know because that would mean we were absolutely certain, and we cannot be absolutely (infallibly) certain. But the first premise of that argument may be false. It may be that we can know we know (in the way I suggested) without that meaning we are absolutely certain.

The only way you can know something to be true is if truth is an epistemic term (which i dont think), if you can have beliefs that are automatically true (perhaps some, but certianly nothing about Quito), or if what you believe is automatically true (obviously false).

Truth isnt an epistemic term, mostly because it isnt normative. While most people believe that epistemic terms are normative, the epistemic naturalists, like Quine, think otherwise.

I think naturalism is a crock. It wants to say that all of the judging that goes on in anything can be reduced to pure description. "I judge this chair to be red" is really a sentence about complex things going on in my brain. While perhaps the event of "my judging the chair to be red" coincides with complex things going on in my brain, the two things arent identical by necessity and so thier meanings diverge. I think that this is pretty clearly true, but it can be argued against.

Truth isnt epistemic because there isnt a normative component to it. While, yes you can judge things to be true, this is only because beliefs have a normative component (except if youre a naturalist). Quito is the capital of Equador, and thats that. There isnt any judging going on by anything, anywhere, so it isnt normative. If it isnt normative it isnt epistemic.

This argument is weakish because it assumes outright that epistemic terms are normative. Maybe truth is the exception, but i doubt it. Anyway, it doesnt matter. There has to be something to tie down knowledge so that people dont run away into a fantasy world, just something. But, importantly, that something cannot be normative (if everything about knowledge was a judgement then there obviously isnt anything to make it stay still). So something, i dont care what it is, about knowledge cannot be normative. If it aint normative it aint in the head (all you can ever do with respect to the world is judge it to be this way or that).

What i said has qualifications. Promises, for instance, are an exception to alot of this. I can make a promise and by making the promise it is true that there is a promise. At the instant i am making the promise, then, i can know that it is true there is a promise, and so know that i know that there is a promise. This example is tricky buisness and i cant tell whats going on to clearly here.

[kennethamy]

The only way you can know something to be true is if truth is an epistemic term (which i dont think), if you can have beliefs that are automatically true (perhaps some, but certianly nothing about Quito), or if what you believe is automatically true (obviously false).

Truth isnt an epistemic term, mostly because it isnt normative. While most people believe that epistemic terms are normative, the epistemic naturalists, like Quine, think otherwise.

I think naturalism is a crock. It wants to say that all of the judging that goes on in anything can be reduced to pure description. "I judge this chair to be red" is really a sentence about complex things going on in my brain. While perhaps the event of "my judging the chair to be red" coincides with complex things going on in my brain, the two things arent identical by necessity and so thier meanings diverge. I think that this is pretty clearly true, but it can be argued against.

Truth isnt epistemic because there isnt a normative component to it. While, yes you can judge things to be true, this is only because beliefs have a normative component (except if youre a naturalist). Quito is the capital of Equador, and thats that. There isnt any judging going on by anything, anywhere, so it isnt normative. If it isnt normative it isnt epistemic.

This argument is weakish because it assumes outright that epistemic terms are normative. Maybe truth is the exception, but i doubt it. Anyway, it doesnt matter. There has to be something to tie down knowledge so that people dont run away into a fantasy world, just something. But, importantly, that something cannot be normative (if everything about knowledge was a judgement then there obviously isnt anything to make it stay still). So something, i dont care what it is, about knowledge cannot be normative. If it aint normative it aint in the head (all you can ever do with respect to the world is judge it to be this way or that).

What i said has qualifications. Promises, for instance, are an exception to alot of this. I can make a promise and by making the promise it is true that there is a promise. At the instant i am making the promise, then, i can know that it is true there is a promise, and so know that i know that there is a promise. This example is tricky buisness and i cant tell whats going on to clearly here.

Sorry, but I don't see any connection between what you say here, and the post you are supposed to be replying to except in the first paragraph, and I don't understand that first paragraph. Why can't I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador? Especially since I do, in fact know (but am not infallibly certain) it is. But I have to admit that I am having a bit of trouble even understanding that paragraph. (E.G. What is "automatic truth" or a belief that is automatically true. You mention the performative, "I promise" as a belief (sentence?) that is automatically true (do you?) But, as you know, the sentence, "I promise" is neither true nor false. "I promised" said after you say, "I promise" is, of course, true.

[comiezapr]

Triple post

[comiezapr]

Triple post

[comiezapr]

Sorry, but I don't see any connection between what you say here, and the post you are supposed to be replying to except in the first paragraph, and I don't understand that first paragraph. Why can't I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador? Especially since I do, in fact know (but am not infallibly certain) it is. But I have to admit that I am having a bit of trouble even understanding that paragraph. (E.G. What is "automatic truth" or a belief that is automatically true. You mention the performative, "I promise" as a belief (sentence?) that is automatically true (do you?) But, as you know, the sentence, "I promise" is neither true nor false. "I promised" said after you say, "I promise" is, of course, true.

You can know that quito is the capital of equador.

You cannot know that you know that quito is the capital of equador. I thought that you believed otherwise because of this:

I can certainly believe that I know that Quito is the capital, so is it true that I cannot have enough justification for that belief so that I can know that I know that Quito is the capital? That is not obvious to me.

I was proceeding to give an argument against your position; i was arguing that this proposition is true:

You cannot know that you know quito is the capital of equador.

The argument was structured like a reducto. I assumed that it was false (that you could know that you know) and further assumed, because of what you said, that the reason you thought my proposition was false was because you could know that "quito is the capital of equador" was true.

I outlined the three ways that you could know that this was true.

1) truth is an epistemic term (the semantics of truth make it such that truth has to do with our epistemic systems)
2) it was automatically true (by simply forming the belief it becomes true)
3) believing it to be true causes it to be true

I ruled out options 2 and 3 due to absurdity and worked with option 1.

There are two general charachterizations of epistemic terms:

1) the naturalistic view
2) the normative view

I argued against the naturalistic view which left us with the normative view. I then argued that truth wasnt a normative term. Since it wasnt normative it cant be epistemic. Since it cant be epistemic, you cannot know that you know quito is the capital of equador. this completes my argument.

I pointed out my argument was weak because of the final bifurcation where i give the naturalistic and normative views as the only way to charachterize epistemic terms. So i proceed to another argument.

This argument is again about the proposition:

I cannot know that i know that quito is the capiral of equador.

I start by assuming that knowledge is somehow constrained by the world. Since it is constrained by the world, some component of knowledge must be independent of judgements. I fail to state (though it is true) that all beliefs are judgements. It is a supressed premise that knowledge is a type of belief. The combination of a necessarily non-judgemental component to knowledge, an inability to capture anything but judgements within beliefs, and knowledge being a type of belief shows that my proposition is true.

This is the completion of two arguments that show you cannot know that you know quito is the capital of equador.

Edit: oh my god tripple post, really sorry!

[kennethamy]

Sorry, but I don't see any connection between what you say here, and the post you are supposed to be replying to except in the first paragraph, and I don't understand that first paragraph. Why can't I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador? Especially since I do, in fact know (but am not infallibly certain) it is. But I have to admit that I am having a bit of trouble even understanding that paragraph. (E.G. What is "automatic truth" or a belief that is automatically true. You mention the performative, "I promise" as a belief (sentence?) that is automatically true (do you?) But, as you know, the sentence, "I promise" is neither true nor false. "I promised" said after you say, "I promise" is, of course, true.

In your earlier post, you wrote:

"The only way you can know something to be true is if truth is an epistemic term (which i dont think), if you can have beliefs that are automatically true (perhaps some, but certianly nothing about Quito), or if what you believe is automatically true (obviously false)."

You here present what seems to be three separate necessary conditions for know something (a proposition) to is true. You then say in seriatim that each of these necessary conditions for knowing some proposition. I inferred from that (modus tollens) that you thought we could not know any proposition was true. Were have I misunderstood you?

Your abstract argument that I cannot know that I know flies in the face of the example I gave of (what I argue was a case of knowing that one knows), I suggested there that we can know that we know, in under circumstances when we carefully examine and re-examine our justification for a particular proposition in the way I described in my example. And I suggested that, under such circumstances, it would be appropriate to say that one not only knew that (say Quito was the capital) but that one had so diligently examined one's justification that one knew that one knew that proposition was true.
It would seem to me more fruitful, not to say, more to the point, to examine the case I gave for its being true that I know that I know Quito is the capital, rather than arraying some abstract and complex argument against the possibility, an argument which is likely (from its nature) to be indecisive.
I also suggested that much of the objection to the view that one can not know that one knows, is motivated by the belief that knowing one knows implies that one is infallibly certain, and that one cannot be infallibly certain of anything. In reply, I suggested that what I was describing as a case of knowing one knows, did not have the implication that someone who knew that is knew, was infallibly certain the proposition in question was true.

[Antiplastic]

I call red herring on "naturalism".

Here is an argument.

1) If kennethamy has JTB that p, then kennethamy knows that p.

2) It is true that kennethamy can and does know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador (which commiezapr has said he does not dispute.)

3) kennethamy believes that he knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador (he has sincerely stated this any number of times.)

4) kennethamy is justified in believing that he knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador (it is true, he investigated its truth through reliable means, and 1st-person reports of one's own subjective states are incorrigible.)

5) kennethamy has JTB that he knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador (2,3,4).

C) kennethamy knows that he knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador (1,5).

[comiezapr]

Ya, argument looks good to me. I was taking something like "you cannot know which beliefs are knowledge" to entail "you cannot know that you know that p" which is obviously fallicious.

[Kosh3]

Suppose that what I "take to be knowledge" i.e. what I believe I know, I really do (in fact know). Then, when I say I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, (and it really is the capital) and I have adequate justification, then (pace Gettier) I do know that Quito is the capital. So, sometime when I believe I know (as in this case) I do know. The point is that I can (sincerely) say I know, as long as I believe I know, and if I do know, then my belief that I did know was a true belief. I think you are heading back to I have to know I know in order to know. And that is not only false, it implies a contradiction, since I could not know I know unless I already knew.

Sorry for the delay in replying, real life intervenes constantly. To your post:

Not only am I not heading back to what you suggest, I never suggested this (that one needs to know one knows in order to know) in the first place.

But why when I assert I know nothing am I implying I know I know nothing? When I assert that Quito is the capital, must I be implying I know it is? Can't I be implying that I believe it is?

You are implying that you believe you know nothing, which is all that is required to defeat the position expressed. As a matter of fact, it would be impossible to know this in fact, because it is logically impossible.

Maybe you have heard of "Moore's Paradox" It is that although it makes no sense to assert, "It is raining, but I do not believe it", it still can be true that it is raining, but I do not believe it. How can it not make sense to assert something that is true. The solution is (I think) that there is a difference between the conditions of assertion of "p", and the truth conditions of "p". It might very well be true that it is raining, but I do not believe it is raining, if the truth conditions of that compound statement are satisfied. But even if the truth-conditions are satisfied, the conditions of assertion may not be satisfies, and one of the conditions of any assertion, is that the assertor believe what he asserts is true.

What this is relevant to is that it may be that the conditions of the truth of "I know that p" may be satisfied (say TJB), but the conditions of asserting that one knows that p, may not be satisfied. So that even if it were true that in order to assert I know that p, I have to know that I know that p (I don't agree that is so) I may know that p, anyway. Since the conditions of knowing that p is true may be satisfied without the conditions of asserting that I know that p, being satisfied.

Knowledge of our knowledge (I think) never exists; it implies certainty, and we are less than certain about practically everything.

[kennethamy]

Sorry for the delay in replying, real life intervenes constantly. To your post:

Not only am I not heading back to what you suggest, I never suggested this (that one needs to know one knows in order to know) in the first place.



You are implying that you believe you know nothing, which is all that is required to defeat the position expressed. As a matter of fact, it would be impossible to know this in fact, because it is logically impossible.





Knowledge of our knowledge (I think) never exists; it implies certainty, and we are less than certain about practically everything.

Was I mistaken, or was it you who claimed that someone who stated that he knew nothing was saying something paradoxical because it implied that he knew at least on thing, that he knew nothing. And I pointed out that was false since a person who said he knew nothing need not imply that he knew that he knew nothing, but that he believed he knew nothing? Or was that all a bad dream?

Could you explain to me just why knowing that you know implies that you are certain? I thought I argued in an earlier post that it need not imply that at all.

[Kosh3]

Was I mistaken, or was it you who claimed that someone who stated that he knew nothing was saying something paradoxical because it implied that he knew at least on thing, that he knew nothing. And I pointed out that was false since a person who said he knew nothing need not imply that he knew that he knew nothing, but that he believed he knew nothing? Or was that all a bad dream?

It is impossible for someone who knows nothing (in fact) to know that they know nothing, because then they know something. All a person can ever do is believe that they know nothing (and be wrong about that). But their very belief implies that they think they have knowledge, which is to say, that they contradict themselves.

Could you explain to me just why knowing that you know implies that you are certain? I thought I argued in an earlier post that it need not imply that at all.

Does it not seem that if you did not know that you knew, then it would be possible for you to not know even though you thought you knew. Hence even though you think you know, it is possible to doubt that you do. To me however knowledge of ones knowledge seems to preclude that. If you have knowledge of ones knowledge, you have justification at a higher level for believing that your lower level beliefs are correct - justification other than the justifications of those beliefs themselves.

I suppose it would be possible that ones doubt at the higher level could also trickle down and be also doubt at the lower level as well, but in any case I think that it is something very much like certainty, if not literal certainty.