Does the word mean the thing?

[Chuck Rightmire]

In the beginning reads the Gospel of John was the Word. And in Genesis we read that God created light and animals and humans apparently just by saying the word, although he did use clay in the making of humans, according to one version. The magic we hear bruited about as in the Harry Potter and other fantasies uses the word to mean the thing. But it seems to me that the word is but our definition of the thing and things can go by many definitions. Am I working in the right direction here?:huh:

[Thomas II]

In the beginning reads the Gospel of John was the Word. And in Genesis we read that God created light and animals and humans apparently just by saying the word, although he did use clay in the making of humans, according to one version. The magic we hear bruited about as in the Harry Potter and other fantasies uses the word to mean the thing. But it seems to me that the word is but our definition of the thing and things can go by many definitions. Am I working in the right direction here?:huh:

The only meaning I find in this opening is "In the beginning there was vibration", as in "the first expression of life is vibration". Basically, "string theory".
http://superstringtheory.com/basics/basic4.html

The clay reference means that we originate from the earth. The same elements found in earth are in us,which means we EVOLVED from those fundamental elements,which is the meaning of "grow and multiply"!
And where it says in Genesis 1 "The Spirit of God moved over the face of the waters" means that "electricity moved over the surface of that primordial soup". How? Have you ever seen a storm moving over the ocean, with all the lightning and thunder? That's how. It is a "jump start".

[premjan]

In Hindi the same word can be used for "word" and "sound" (shabd).

[kennethamy]

In the beginning reads the Gospel of John was the Word. And in Genesis we read that God created light and animals and humans apparently just by saying the word, although he did use clay in the making of humans, according to one version. The magic we hear bruited about as in the Harry Potter and other fantasies uses the word to mean the thing. But it seems to me that the word is but our definition of the thing and things can go by many definitions. Am I working in the right direction here?:huh:

All words have meaning, otherwise they would not be words in a language at all.
But the word, "the" doesn't mean a thing; there are no the's in the world, and the word, "although" does not mean a thing, since there are no although's running about in the world.

There are many senses of the term "meaning" , but the two most important linguistic senses are what the philosopher, Frege, called, sense and reference.

The sense of the term, "king" is something like "reigning male monarch of a country". It is what we sometimes call the "dictionary sense", or the definition. But the reference of the term, "king" would be, for example, George the third of England, Louis the fourteenth of France, Olaf of Norway, and so on. Namely the set of individuals who fall under the sense or the definition of the term. Some words have sense, but no referents. For instance the term "unicorn" has a sense, (mythical equine white and with magical powers) but of course, since there are no unicorns, it has no reference. No "thing" to which it refers. Of course, sense determines reference. So that two terms which have the same sense (are, we say, "synonymous") must have the same reference. For example, the terms, "bachelor" and the term "unmarried male" are synonyms, and therefore have the same class of individuals as referents. But reference does not determine sense, for terms may have the same referents, but different senses. For example, it is a biological fact that all creatures with a heart are creature with a kidney, and conversely. So the class of all creatures with a heart is identical with the class of all creatures with a kidney. But, of course, the terms "all creatures with a heart" and "all creatures with a kidney" are not synonymous. So those two terms have different senses, but they refer to the same individuals.

[premjan]

sense = class, reference = object.

[kennethamy]

sense = class, reference = object.

Depends on your ontology. But better, "sense" = the properties in virtue of which members of a class (if any) belong to the class. "Reference" =the members of the class (if any there are). Often the first is called the "intension" (with an 's') and the latter is called, the "extension". So two classes which have the same intension must have the same extension, but not conversely.

[Chuck Rightmire]

Ah, but the word "unicorn" has a referent, although it only appears in fantasy and myth. It may not be real, but when we see that word, if we have a knowledge of English, we may in our minds be able to see the image of a horse with a horn in its forehead. In this case, the word may have to stand for the thing since the thing does not exist. So, is the word always separate from the thing? Or does it carry the thing in its letters?

[comiezapr]

In the beginning reads the Gospel of John was the Word. And in Genesis we read that God created light and animals and humans apparently just by saying the word, although he did use clay in the making of humans, according to one version. The magic we hear bruited about as in the Harry Potter and other fantasies uses the word to mean the thing. But it seems to me that the word is but our definition of the thing and things can go by many definitions. Am I working in the right direction here?:huh:

Good question. It depends on the word, and the subject matter you want to delve into is the theory of proper names (google rigid designators).

For example: comiezapr designates me. There is no possible way for the thing designated by comiezapr to mean the same thing and NOT designate me. I would think that, in your sense of means, that comiezapr means ME.

On the other hand: the person that wrote this post describes me. There IS a possibility that the person that wrote this post is NOT me. I would think that in your sense of defines, "the person that wrote this post" defines me.

Coincidently, all proper names, like comiezapr, designate. There is serious hand up with religions, and biblically true christianity especially, to be preoccupied with the "proper" proper name of a thing. If they were to have the wrong name they would be praying, or worshipping the wrong thing!

[comiezapr]

sense = class, reference = object.

I suppose that this is refering to sense and referance as it was used in early twentieth century philosophy. The sense of a term was not, in any way, a class. The sense of a term was in Freges mind what the word meant. The referance of the word was the object that the word denoted.

Perhaps classes came up here because of the classical sense/referance distinction examples. Normally philosophers would get across the idea of sense and referance by using properties as the example (it was a good choice). The sense of the word "red" for example, was the color red, while its referance was the set (or class) of objects that were red.

Edit: ken was exactly correct, but not general enough. While ken made it seem as though only predicates had senses and referants, singular terms do as well.

By serendipity my first post here used that sense and referance distinction with regards to singular terms (though in disguise)! The sense of a singular term is a description of that item, while the referance of a singular term is the item itself. Using a proper name is the only method by which to use a singular term referentially.

[kennethamy]

Good question. It depends on the word, and the subject matter you want to delve into is the theory of proper names (google rigid designators).

For example: comiezapr designates me. There is no possible way for the thing designated by comiezapr to mean the same thing and NOT designate me. I would think that, in your sense of means, that comiezapr means ME.

On the other hand: the person that wrote this post describes me. There IS a possibility that the person that wrote this post is NOT me. I would think that in your sense of defines, "the person that wrote this post" defines me.

Coincidently, all proper names, like comiezapr, designate. There is serious hand up with religions, and biblically true christianity especially, to be preoccupied with the "proper" proper name of a thing. If they were to have the wrong name they would be praying, or worshipping the wrong thing!

It would make your post a lot easier to read if you employed the convention of putting quotes around terms you are mentioning, but not using. I still think it is important to make the distinction between sense and reference so that people do not confuse the conditions of designation, with what is being designated (if anything). Why do you think that all proper names designate? "Santa Claus" doesn't.

But is "God" a proper name? (I don't even know if it is a Christian name). I suppose there is an important distinction between "God" and "god", though. But then, is "God" a rigid designator?

[comiezapr]

It would make your post a lot easier to read if you employed the convention of putting quotes around terms you are mentioning, but not using. I still think it is important to make the distinction between sense and reference so that people do not confuse the conditions of designation, with what is being designated (if anything). Why do you think that all proper names designate? "Santa Claus" doesn't.

But is "God" a proper name? (I don't even know if it is a Christian name). I suppose there is an important distinction between "God" and "god", though. But then, is "God" a rigid designator?

Ya, i usually do use that convention, but since the OP didnt seem to be to technically oriented i dropped it for readability; i try, though usually unsucsesfully, to axomadate my writing style to my intended audience.

I think all proper names designate because, while clearly there isnt something physically out there to designate, like the case of Santa Clause, there still is something to designate. Ill take David Lewis' line on this response: "Santa Clause" designates an uninstatiated essense; the name designates something that is in another possible world, though fails to be in the actual world. Alternativly, you could take Alvin Plantigna's response and say that "Santa Clause" refers to a charachter in an abstract book about Santa.

The reason that i believe "Santa Clause" has a referance is because theres sentences that clearly use "Santa Clause" referentially. Take for example: "Its possible that Santa wore a blue outfit last year" or "its possible that Santa moved to the south pole." The trouble is that there isnt anything that is ESSENTIAL about Santa, and so its odd to have proper name correspond to him (proper names are usually taken to correspond in a 1-1 fashion with essences).

God is definetly a rigid designator. Athiest or not, when you say stuff about God you are saying stuff about something. For example when i say "God doesnt exist" i am saying that that thing, "God" does not freakin exist. I am not covertly saying something like "I do not believe the things that a typical christian does". That paraphrase is to speak with the vulgar.

Both you and I do not mean that we have different beliefs from Santa Clause believers when we say "Santa Clause doesnt exist"; we mean Santa Clause doesnt freakin exist!

Edit: to curtail a long and pointless discussion about modal realism and such, lets just avoid that topic and assume that theres some mechanism to describe possibilities.

[kennethamy]

I think all proper names designate because, while clearly there isnt something physically out there to designate, like the case of Santa Clause, there still is something to designate. Ill take David Lewis' line on this response: "Santa Clause" designates an uninstatiated essense;
The reason that i believe "Santa Clause" has a referance is because theres sentences that clearly use "Santa Clause" referentially. Take for example: "Its possible that Santa wore a blue outfit last year" or "its possible that Santa moved to the south pole." The trouble is that there isnt anything that is ESSENTIAL about Santa, and so its odd to have proper name correspond to him (proper names are usually taken to correspond in a 1-1 fashion with essences).



"Santa Claus lives at the North Pole and loves deer meat", uses "Santa Claus" referentially. That statement is just false. (I am not sure even what it means to use a proper name "referentially". But you can certainly use a proper name referentially, and that name fail to refer. As in the case of "Santa Claus" since, (I am sorry to break it to you) there ain't no Santa Claus. "Santa Claus" does not have a referent (not reference) although "Santa Claus" is used referentially (I guess). I never heard tha proper names correspond to essences. (In fact, I did not know there were essences until you told me there were).

Why do all proper names have to designate? Did Lewis think that was also true of "The Easter Bunny". What a peculiar theory. It is very much the kind of thing Meinong said in the 19th century. Only he told us that "The Golden Mountain" did not exactly exist but it subsisted and that was damn well good enough for us. (I think he thought it was an essence too). Bertrand Russell said of him and those who thought like him, that they "lacked a robust sense of reality".

The Medievals used to talk about the fallacy of, unum nomen, unum nominatum ("a name therefore, a thing"). For every name there is a thing, and, if you don't find the thing, well, you make it up. The question is, as they saw, why insist on that theory that if there is a proper name, there is something the name refers to.

Wittgenstein (and Frege and Russell) gave the answer I think to why there is that insistence on an obviously false view. It is the confusion of meaning and reference, and the belief that the meaning of a term is its reference, so that if there is no reference, the term has no meaning. So, on the assumption that meaning =reference, and noticing that "Santa Claus" or "Easter Bunny" has meaning (they are not nonsense syllables) the inference drawn is that they also must have referents, which if there are none, they just invent them.

[comiezapr]

"Santa Claus lives at the North Pole and loves deer meat", uses "Santa Claus" referentially. That statement is just false. (I am not sure even what it means to use a proper name "referentially". But you can certainly use a proper name referentially, and that name fail to refer. As in the case of "Santa Claus" since, (I am sorry to break it to you) there ain't no Santa Claus. "Santa Claus" does not have a referent (not reference) although "Santa Claus" is used referentially (I guess). I never heard tha proper names correspond to essences. (In fact, I did not know there were essences until you told me there were).

Why do all proper names have to designate? Did Lewis think that was also true of "The Easter Bunny". What a peculiar theory. It is very much the kind of thing Meinong said in the 19th century. Only he told us that "The Golden Mountain" did not exactly exist but it subsisted and that was damn well good enough for us. (I think he thought it was an essence too). Bertrand Russell said of him and those who thought like him, that they "lacked a robust sense of reality".

The Medievals used to talk about the fallacy of, unum nomen, unum nominatum ("a name therefore, a thing"). For every name there is a thing, and, if you don't find the thing, well, you make it up. The question is, as they saw, why insist on that theory that if there is a proper name, there is something the name refers to.

Wittgenstein (and Frege and Russell) gave the answer I think to why there is that insistence on an obviously false view. It is the confusion of meaning and reference, and the belief that the meaning of a term is its reference, so that if there is no reference, the term has no meaning. So, on the assumption that meaning =reference, and noticing that "Santa Claus" or "Easter Bunny" has meaning (they are not nonsense syllables) the inference drawn is that they also must have referents, which if there are none, they just invent them.

Wittgenstein, Frege and Russel are a bit antiquated. I assume you adhere to Russels theory of descriptions, in which case proper names are analyzed as descriptions. If this is the case then you should not cede that "Santa Clause", or ANY OTHER PROPER NAME is ever used referentially. With the theory of descriptions you cannot refer! (You should review the begining of your post!) The proper name is "analyzed away" never to return to discourse. (I dont see how anyone could have accepted this analysis when it flys in the face of common sense. When i say "I went to the store" am i saying how two descriptions are coextensive in the world? Hell no! im saying I, me, went to the store!)

There are terrible problems with this analysis, but i wont get into them. Ill merely state clearly that i think the analysis is wrong: it is WRONG.

There are terms in the language that designate. When a term designates, what it means IS what it designates. Proper names serve this function. Furthermore, the meaning of these desginators doesnt change upon empirical investigation; how the world is has no bearing on what my words mean. Put it all together...

Proper names desginate.
A term that designates means what it designates. (This is what i means for a term to designate)
Meaning doesnt change acording to how the world is.

The conclusion is that proper names designate something independent of whether there is something in the actual world.

I was building to unactual objects in a completly different route than Meinong. While he used arguments from predication (if i can predicate something of it, then it exists, even if the predicate is non-existance) i was using an argument from semantics, as i have outlined.

Edit: Properly, Frege and Russel were saying that meaning and referance werent synonymous with regards to the terms of thier logical systems. This is quite correct. The identification of meaning with referance comes with, because it is necessary for, modal logic. Modal logic being a much, MUCH closer aproxamation to natual language, is the reason that so many of the things that Frege, Russel, Wittgenstein and Quine say are so antiquated; thier philosophy is based on purely extensional languages with quantification. Its as if we listened to the alchemists using cauldrons and furnaces when we have chemists with mass spectrometers and NMR; the philosophers of 50-60 years ago didnt have the analytic tools that were precipitated in the "modal" movement (and also the work of Autin/Grice/Searle and speech acts.)

[kennethamy]

Wittgenstein, Frege and Russel are a bit antiquated. I assume you adhere to Russels theory of descriptions, in which case proper names are analyzed as descriptions. If this is the case then you should not cede that "Santa Clause", or ANY OTHER PROPER NAME is ever used referentially. With the theory of descriptions you cannot refer! (You should review the begining of your post!) The proper name is "analyzed away" never to return to discourse. (I dont see how anyone could have accepted this analysis when it flys in the face of common sense. When i say "I went to the store" am i saying how two descriptions are coextensive in the world? Hell no! im saying I, me, went to the store!)

There are terrible problems with this analysis, but i wont get into them. Ill merely state clearly that i think the analysis is wrong: it is WRONG.

There are terms in the language that designate. When a term designates, what it means IS what it designates. Proper names serve this function. Furthermore, the meaning of these desginators doesnt change upon empirical investigation; how the world is has no bearing on what my words mean. Put it all together...

Proper names desginate.
A term that designates means what it designates. (This is what i means for a term to designate)
Meaning doesnt change acording to how the world is.

The conclusion is that proper names designate something independent of whether there is something in the actual world.

I was building to unactual objects in a completly different route than Meinong. While he used arguments from predication (if i can predicate something of it, then it exists, even if the predicate is non-existance) i was using an argument from semantics, as i have outlined.

Well, "antiquated" doesn't mean "wrong", at least not yet. Russell never said that proper names do not refer, and he did not analyze them away. He held that proper names were description in disguise except for "logically proper names, "this" and "that" which could not but refer. In fact that is why he distinguished between ordinary proper names that could fail to refer and logically proper names which could not fail to refer.

"I" is not a proper name, it is a personal pronoun, last time I looked. To say that what a proper name means is what it designates (refers to) seems to me just to go backwards, since it leads to just what Wittgenstein warned against. Namely, confusing reference with meaning, and then arguing that since "Santa Claus" had meaning it must have a referent, and then making up the referent. This view not only sins against commonsense, but it sins against Occam's Razor. Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. Must we have little essences running about the place. Let alone a Santa Claus essence which you, yourself, admit, does not exist. What the hell do we need "unactual objects for". It is exactly that kind of thing which gives philosophy and undeservedly bad name. (Let alone raising the question whether "unactual objects" exist. It is just warmed-over Meinong, so far as I can tell put into the spiffy new language of Kripke and Lewis. Metaphysics for the sake of metaphysics. I think that Marx (maybe it was Engels) said, "History repeats itself, only the first time it is tragedy, but the second time, it is farce".

[comiezapr]

Well, "antiquated" doesn't mean "wrong", at least not yet. Russell never said that proper names do not refer, and he did not analyze them away. He held that proper names were description in disguise except for "logically proper names, "this" and "that" which could not but refer. In fact that is why he distinguished between ordinary proper names that could fail to refer and logically proper names which could not fail to refer.

"I" is not a proper name, it is a personal pronoun, last time I looked. To say that what a proper name means is what it designates (refers to) seems to me just to go backwards, since it leads to just what Wittgenstein warned against. Namely, confusing reference with meaning, and then arguing that since "Santa Claus" had meaning it must have a referent, and then making up the referent. This view not only sins against commonsense, but it sins against Occam's Razor. Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. Must we have little essences running about the place. Let alone a Santa Claus essence which you, yourself, admit, does not exist. What the hell do we need "unactual objects for". It is exactly that kind of thing which gives philosophy and undeservedly bad name. (Let alone raising the question whether "unactual objects" exist. It is just warmed-over Meinong, so far as I can tell put into the spiffy new language of Kripke and Lewis. Metaphysics for the sake of metaphysics. I think that Marx (maybe it was Engels) said, "History repeats itself, only the first time it is tragedy, but the second time, it is farce".

Well, i hate metaphysics, but i love language; I dont see how to seperate the two though.

I is a personal pronoun, but whatever.

I was definetly off about Russel and Frege, as youve pointed out; they were not saying

that meaning and referance werent synonymous with regards to the terms of thier logical systems.

It was exactly the opposite.

Russel said logically proper names refer because the domain of quantification was explicit; there was a set of objects set aside just so that logically proper names could refer. And, ironically, this was so that the terms in quantificational logic would mean something. I mean, imagine it otherwise ...

Lxy will be the relation x loves y (in the spirit or Russel)
a refers to nothing

Ex Lxa

This sentence means what exactly? There exists an x that loves (insert blank)? There exists an x that loves no one seems reasonable, but wrong ...

Ex~Ey Lxy

is the proper analysis of "there exists an x that loves no one" and we cant have two analysis of the same thing. Really, i have no idea what a term would mean that didnt refer to something unless it were a description.

The whole point of making an artificial domain of objects for logically proper names to refer to was to make sure they meant something, to make sure the whole thing made sense. This, if anything, would boulster the idea that proper names (since they are not descriptions in disguise) do mean what they refer to, not the opposite.

Im not a Wittgenstein buff so i wont atribute anything to him. Referance and meaning SHOULD be seperated because they are distinct things (that is, distinct concepts). Im definetly not confusing the two, since im keeping them conceptually distinct (though both rather unexamined). I am saying, rather, that the two are identical in the situation of rigid designators, of which proper names happen to be a subset. Wittgenstein, i would imagine, would be silent with respect to this or use some mechanism akin to the theory of descriptions which is incorrect.

I cant see how anyones intuition could lead them to believe that "comiezapr" means something other than what it refers to, me. But if its admitted that proper names mean what they refer to then the argument is in place that there are things that arent actual.

Meinongs argument is definetly not related to the one i set forth since his makes use of the word "exist" within his deduction, as well as the mechanics of predication while i use neither. It really doesnt come to the same conclusion either, since it doesnt create some paradoxical objects that exist but dont exist, it just says that there are objects that arent in the actual world. What they are, or where they are is debatable. Im a minority opinion with respect to my beliefs, which is modal realism. Historical ersatzism, a form of the abstract book theory, is what prevails currently.

Ochamz razor is crap. The number of entities isnt a good judgement of a theory at all. How do you even count entities? Theres what level of aleph number of particles in a theory that doesnt include unactual objects. How many more levels of aleph do i add on? Sounds like an unanswerable question to me. But really, the number of entities isnt the determining factor in judging theories, its how well the theory acords with its subject matter. In the case of the semantics of natural language all we have to go on (because all we are investigating) are the intuitions we have with respect to the meanings of words. We go where that investigation leads us.

[kennethamy]

Well, i hate metaphysics, but i love language; I dont see how to seperate the two though.

I is a personal pronoun, but whatever.

I was definetly off about Russel and Frege, as youve pointed out; they were not saying



It was exactly the opposite.

Russel said logically proper names refer because the domain of quantification was explicit; there was a set of objects set aside just so that logically proper names could refer. And, ironically, this was so that the terms in quantificational logic would mean something. I mean, imagine it otherwise ...

Lxy will be the relation x loves y (in the spirit or Russel)
a refers to nothing

Ex Lxa

This sentence means what exactly? There exists an x that loves (insert blank)? There exists an x that loves no one seems reasonable, but wrong ...

Ex~Ey Lxy

is the proper analysis of "there exists an x that loves no one" and we cant have two analysis of the same thing. Really, i have no idea what a term would mean that didnt refer to something unless it were a description.

The whole point of making an artificial domain of objects for logically proper names to refer to was to make sure they meant something, to make sure the whole thing made sense. This, if anything, would boulster the idea that proper names (since they are not descriptions in disguise) do mean what they refer to, not the opposite.

Im not a Wittgenstein buff so i wont atribute anything to him. Referance and meaning SHOULD be seperated because they are distinct things (that is, distinct concepts). Im definetly not confusing the two, since im keeping them conceptually distinct (though both rather unexamined). I am saying, rather, that the two are identical in the situation of rigid designators, of which proper names happen to be a subset. Wittgenstein, i would imagine, would be silent with respect to this or use some mechanism akin to the theory of descriptions which is incorrect.

I cant see how anyones intuition could lead them to believe that "comiezapr" means something other than what it refers to, me. But if its admitted that proper names mean what they refer to then the argument is in place that there are things that arent actual.

Meinongs argument is definetly not related to the one i set forth since his makes use of the word "exist" within his deduction, as well as the mechanics of predication while i use neither. It really doesnt come to the same conclusion either, since it doesnt create some paradoxical objects that exist but dont exist, it just says that there are objects that arent in the actual world. What they are, or where they are is debatable. Im a minority opinion with respect to my beliefs, which is modal realism. Historical ersatzism, a form of the abstract book theory, is what prevails currently.

Ochamz razor is crap. The number of entities isnt a good judgement of a theory at all. How do you even count entities? Theres what level of aleph number of particles in a theory that doesnt include unactual objects. How many more levels of aleph do i add on? Sounds like an unanswerable question to me. But really, the number of entities isnt the determining factor in judging theories, its how well the theory acords with its subject matter. In the case of the semantics of natural language all we have to go on (because all we are investigating) are the intuitions we have with respect to the meanings of words. We go where that investigation leads us.

I don't understand much of what you say here, but I still do not understand why anyone would want to insist that "Santa Claus' refers to an "unactual object" and not simply, fails to refer. Except, maybe as a joke. But why should we populate the world with unactual as well as actual, objects, is something I cannot see. What could be the motivation for this: what problems of philosophy could such a view solve, is beyond me. I can only repeat that "Santa Claus", although a referring term (unlike the term, "although" which is not a referring term) fails to refer. In other words, nothing instantiates the properties associated with the idea or concept of Santa Claus. Why say, or believe, anything else I cannot understand. The only motivation I can think of is that fallacy I already mentions, "one name, therefore, one thing".

I rather like Occam's Razor. I am offended by the bloated universe you, and apparently, Lewis think is there. If Occam's Razor is good enough for science, it should be good enough for philosophy. It seems to me that the burden of proof is on those who like bloated theories for their own sake.

[comiezapr]

I don't understand much of what you say here, but I still do not understand why anyone would want to insist that "Santa Claus' refers to an "unactual object" and not simply, fails to refer. Except, maybe as a joke. But why should we populate the world with unactual as well as actual, objects, is something I cannot see. What could be the motivation for this: what problems of philosophy could such a view solve, is beyond me. I can only repeat that "Santa Claus", although a referring term (unlike the term, "although" which is not a referring term) fails to refer. In other words, nothing instantiates the properties associated with the idea or concept of Santa Claus. Why say, or believe, anything else I cannot understand. The only motivation I can think of is that fallacy I already mentions, "one name, therefore, one thing".

I rather like Occam's Razor. I am offended by the bloated universe you, and apparently, Lewis think is there. If Occam's Razor is good enough for science, it should be good enough for philosophy. It seems to me that the burden of proof is on those who like bloated theories for their own sake.

Ochams Razor, as far as i can tell, doesnt fit into science or any other domain of inquiry. You postulate the amount of objects you need in order to get the theoretical job done, and then postulate no more. I dont think anyone has ever decided between two theories based on the number of objects it postulates. Really, if Ochams Razor was legitimant then the best theory of all would be "theres stuff". It postulates 1 objects with one property, existance.

The reason that i say "Santa Clause" refers to an object is because i take that referant to be the meaning of "Santa Clause". I dont know of any alternative to this theory of meaning that doesnt get into trouble rapidly. Perhaps you can espouse what you think "Santa Clause" means.

What i was saying with respect to Russel was that his logically proper names meant what they refered to, much as i say proper names in natural language mean what they refer to. The difference between me and Russel is that he thought natural language doesnt contain logically proper names, while i clearly do.

[Chuck Rightmire]

I would suggest, in response to my own question, that words are not what they refer to. In other words, a noun names a person, place, or thing but is not in itself a person place or thing. So Santa Claus has a referent, even if it does not exist. It refers to something that is in folklore, but not in reality (except for an editorial writer answering Virginia). Verbs are also referents. Not to persons, places or things, but to actions. To run describes an action but is not in itself the action. You can type "to run" all day long but you won't get out of breath unless you've been holding your breath while you were typing. Over the last century, it seems to me, a great deal of argumentation went into the question of meaning, concluding that language has no meaning. I disagree. But the meaning is in what the language refers to and not inherent in the language.:Cheeky:

[kennethamy]

I would suggest, in response to my own question, that words are not what they refer to. In other words, a noun names a person, place, or thing but is not in itself a person place or thing. So Santa Claus has a referent, even if it does not exist. It refers to something that is in folklore, but not in reality (except for an editorial writer answering Virginia). Verbs are also referents. Not to persons, places or things, but to actions. To run describes an action but is not in itself the action. You can type "to run" all day long but you won't get out of breath unless you've been holding your breath while you were typing. Over the last century, it seems to me, a great deal of argumentation went into the question of meaning, concluding that language has no meaning. I disagree. But the meaning is in what the language refers to and not inherent in the language.:Cheeky:

I suppose you can use the term "refer" in so vague and broad a way, that all words have referent. So, the term "the" has a referent (you make it up); and the term, "whatever" has a referent, you make it up; and the term, "therefore" has a referent (you make it up). The term "Santa Clause" does not refer to "something in folklore". not at least the jolly old elf who brings presents that my little niece, Amy believes in. When she shyly asks, "Do you think that Santa Claus will visit on Christmas Eve?" I doubt very much that she is talking about a folklore character. She is talking about a jolly old elf, who is nice to good children, and who, I am afraid, does not exist.

If meaning were what language refers to, then unless the term, "however" or the term, "in so far as" referred to something, it would have no meaning. So, if you think that term, "in so far as" must refer to something to have meaning, why not tell me what "in so far as" refers to?

If a scientist postulates an entity, and calls that entity "X" (say "phlogiston"
and it turns out that, in fact, there is no such thing as phlogiston, (Which was defined as, a substance without color, odor, taste, or weight that is liberated in burning. Once burned, the "dephlogisticated" substance was held to be in its "true" form, the calx) does that mean that the term "phlogiston" is meaningless? Or does that just mean that there was nothing that had the properties that phlogiston was suppose to have? And, if there is no Santa Claus, does that mean the the term, "Santa Claus" is meaningless, or does that just mean that nothing has the properties of being a jolly old elf, who brings Christmas presents to good little girls and boys? I suggest that is is the latter. (Just what do you think people like me mean when we deny there is a Santa Claus, anyway? Do you think we are just saying that the term, "Santa Claus" is meaningless? I don't think so.) And if you are right, then a person who is an atheist and denies that God exists, must be saying that the word "God" is meaningless (since, according to you he is denying that the meaning of the word "God" exists) And, according to you, the agnostic, is saying not that he does not know whether or not there is a God, but, rather, he is saying that he does not know whether the word "God" has any meaning or not. Is that what you think the atheist and the agnostic are saying?

[Garrett]

Chuck Rightmire
I would suggest, in response to my own question, that words are not what they refer to.
I think you've got it. Words refer to some sort of concept or idea which is expressed as a definition. In the case of a noun, the word refers to a concept which refers to the person, place or thing. Words are about meanings; some meanings are about people, places, or things.

[comiezapr]

I would suggest, in response to my own question, that words are not what they refer to. In other words, a noun names a person, place, or thing but is not in itself a person place or thing. So Santa Claus has a referent, even if it does not exist. It refers to something that is in folklore, but not in reality (except for an editorial writer answering Virginia). Verbs are also referents. Not to persons, places or things, but to actions. To run describes an action but is not in itself the action. You can type "to run" all day long but you won't get out of breath unless you've been holding your breath while you were typing. Over the last century, it seems to me, a great deal of argumentation went into the question of meaning, concluding that language has no meaning. I disagree. But the meaning is in what the language refers to and not inherent in the language.:Cheeky:

Im pretty much in agrement with this, but would phrase it differently: a word means what it refers to.

[comiezapr]

If meaning were what language refers to, then unless the term, "however" or the term, "in so far as" referred to something, it would have no meaning. So, if you think that term, "in so far as" must refer to something to have meaning, why not tell me what "in so far as" refers to?

Now this is just ludicrous. Different words mean different things and not because they refer to different things. Phrases like "in so far as" and "however" are clearly not phrases that mean what they refer to. Both of these phrases are connectives that have an associated conversational implicature:

"However" is logically equivalent to "and" but with the conversational implicature that what follows "however" and what preceeds "however" are contrasting in some respect.

"in so far as" is trickier and ill stay silent about it.

The point is obvious though, not all words mean something BY refering to something and can be analyzed in a different manner.

But what about "Santa Clause"? I already asked, how do you analyze the meaning of "Santa Clause" without saying that it means what it refers to: Santa. It seems as though youve hinted at what you take to be the meaning of terms like "Santa Clause" :

If a scientist postulates an entity, and calls that entity "X" (say "phlogiston") and it turns out that, in fact, there is no such thing as phlogiston, (Which was defined as, a substance without color, odor, taste, or weight that is liberated in burning. Once burned, the "dephlogisticated" substance was held to be in its "true" form, the calx) does that mean that the term "phlogiston" is meaningless? Or does that just mean that there was nothing that had the properties that phlogiston was suppose to have? And, if there is no Santa Claus, does that mean the the term, "Santa Claus" is meaningless, or does that just mean that nothing has the properties of being a jolly old elf, who brings Christmas presents to good little girls and boys? I suggest that is is the latter.

You are suggesting that a term like "santa clause" is really a description in disguise:

Santa Clause =df: a thing that is a man, jolly, wears a read suit, lives in the north pole, comes down chimneys, is the subject of folk lore, etc.

This is BLATANTLY false. Ya, it works fine when you have a purely extensional language, like logic with quantifiers, but when you add any kind of intensional operators everything breaks down. Ill paint my picture with use of the operator "necessarily".

1) Necessarily A is A.

This is obviously true. By necessity anything is identical with itself.

2) Necessarily a thing that is a man, jolly, wears a read suit, lives in the north pole, comes down chimneys, is the subject of folk lore, etc. is a thing that is a man, jolly, wears a read suit, lives in the north pole, comes down chimneys, is the subject of folk lore, etc.

This is clearly an instance of 1.

3) Necessarily Santa Clause is a thing that is a man, jolly, wears a read suit, lives in the north pole, comes down chimneys, is the subject of folk lore, etc.

3 is clearly false! I dont care what you say about Santa, he isnt necessairly all of those things. He could have been thinner. He could wear a blue suit. Its just ludicrous to think that Santa has all of the properties he has necessarily! What if we made a trip to the north pole and found a man that owned a toy factory, had flying reindeer, but wore a purple robe and pimp hat and looked like the spitting image of Denzel Washington. Would we conclude that Santa doesnt exist? HELL NO!

And even if you do want to bit the bullet on the Santa Clause example, an example with a real person would make you cringe. For example, i would necessarily have all the properties i have right now; if i werent typing this post right now, i wouldnt be identical with the person i am! How rediculous!

Theres no way adhering to the general theory that names are really just descirptions of ANY sort either; they cant be a single description, they cant be a cluster of descriptions, they just cant be descriptions. The properties we use to identify various objects in our world just arent had necessarily by those objects. This theory of meaning is just BLATANTLY false.

To answer your question:

(Just what do you think people like me mean when we deny there is a Santa Claus, anyway? Do you think we are just saying that the term, "Santa Claus" is meaningless? I don't think so.) And if you are right, then a person who is an atheist and denies that God exists, must be saying that the word "God" is meaningless (since, according to you he is denying that the meaning of the word "God" exists) And, according to you, the agnostic, is saying not that he does not know whether or not there is a God, but, rather, he is saying that he does not know whether the word "God" has any meaning or not. Is that what you think the atheist and the agnostic are saying?

When people deny that there is a Santa Clause what they are doing is saying that the referant of the term isnt in the actual world. It could be, like Chuck suggested, in a story book. Or it could be, as i would hold, in another possible world. I dont see any problem with saying that the referant of a term isnt in the actual world.

And no, this is not to say that the word "Santa Clause" is meaningless if there isnt anything in the actual world for the term to refer to. There is still a referant of the word "Santa Clause", but the referant isnt in the actual world. The Santa athiest is not debating over the semantics of the term "Santa Clause" but actually conveying something he believes: he believes that the referant of the word "Santa Clause" isnt among us in the world we live in.

As a final rejoinder: no one is asking you to believe in objects that exist but arent in the actual world. What i am asking you to do is to cede my SEMANTICAL point. The METAPHYSICS of the situation is completly undetermined by the semantical nature of "Santa Clause". For example you can say that the referant of "Santa Clause" is located in storys, and is an abstract object of an unknown sort that is akin to a charachter in a story.

To restate my semantical point: proper names (and natural kinds) mean what they refer to. Really, please just read "Naming and Necessity" and we can get on with our lives. It isnt even long, like 100 pages.

[WarrenandTrumbull]

All words have meaning, otherwise they would not be words in a language at all.
But the word, "the" doesn't mean a thing; there are no the's in the world, and the word, "although" does not mean a thing, since there are no although's running about in the world.


obvi because "The" occurs only in relation to a referent. In the same way that "The" only occurs in relation to an external referent all language is is essentially an empty signifier. For instance what is signified by "Santa Clause" is always changing, it could mean a black santa or a white santa ect. there an infinite of possible meanings to "santa clause" that cannot be accounted for....... I'm not sure your theory deal with the empty nature of the sign....

[comiezapr]

obvi because "The" occurs only in relation to a referent. In the same way that "The" only occurs in relation to an external referent all language is is essentially an empty signifier. For instance what is signified by "Santa Clause" is always changing, it could mean a black santa or a white santa ect. there an infinite of possible meanings to "santa clause" that cannot be accounted for....... I'm not sure your theory deal with the empty nature of the sign....

This isnt relevant.

Edit: Sorry to be harsh, but if youre into the semiotic tradition at least know where to place your knowledge. Semiotics can deal with the analysis of signs and how they signify various things. We arent talking about this at all. Were talking about the meaning of words, semantics, not the nature of words as signs, semiotics.

[WarrenandTrumbull]

This isnt relevant.

Edit: Sorry to be harsh, but if youre into the semiotic tradition at least know where to place your knowledge. Semiotics can deal with the analysis of signs and how they signify various things. We arent talking about this at all. Were talking about the meaning of words, semantics, not the nature of words as signs, semiotics.

It points to the problem witht he central premise of this conversation- ie that you can know what qualities santa has in the real or in others' conception of the real because of the empty nature of language. your talk of semantics is literally irrelevant.

[Chuck Rightmire]

Somehow, what I am hearing here is the, in my opinion, false concept that words that do not refer to real things are empty words. And no, the word God is not an empty word (name) any more than Santa Claus is an empty name (word). Words do not have to refer to real objects to have meaning in the culture in which they are commonly used. Indeed, God has so many different meanings in a multiplicity of cultures that to say it has no meaning is to delude yourself. The common four letter words that were jerked out of the back rooms in the 1960s had meaning. They were vulgarities or blasphemies but they weren't the thing itself but they contained the meaning of the thing, which was why they had been considered to be things we didn't say. I once complained about a three page essay to the editor of a college professor type publication that what the writer had said could be contained in three paragraphs. He said to me that it was the style that was important, not the content. I disagreed and still do. The content is all that we have in language which is why we need to keep our referents plain and to realize that language is not the thing but only a referent to it. And "in so far as" has tons of content as a referent to certain conditions and limitations. However, I usually don't use it myself. It's usually easier to say something like "that being said..."

[kennethamy]

Somehow, what I am hearing here is the, in my opinion, false concept that words that do not refer to real things are empty words. And no, the word God is not an empty word (name) any more than Santa Claus is an empty name (word). Words do not have to refer to real objects to have meaning in the culture in which they are commonly used. Indeed, God has so many different meanings in a multiplicity of cultures that to say it has no meaning is to delude yourself. The common four letter words that were jerked out of the back rooms in the 1960s had meaning. They were vulgarities or blasphemies but they weren't the thing itself but they contained the meaning of the thing, which was why they had been considered to be things we didn't say. I once complained about a three page essay to the editor of a college professor type publication that what the writer had said could be contained in three paragraphs. He said to me that it was the style that was important, not the content. I disagreed and still do. The content is all that we have in language which is why we need to keep our referents plain and to realize that language is not the thing but only a referent to it. And "in so far as" has tons of content as a referent to certain conditions and limitations. However, I usually don't use it myself. It's usually easier to say something like "that being said..."

No one, I think, is saying that words which fail to refer are "empty words" is that means they are without meaning (but I really don't know what you mean by that phrase). As I pointed out a number of times, there are words that do not even pretend to refer to anything, like, "although", or like, "the" but those are certainly perfectly good English words, and, of course, they have meanings which you can look up in the dictionary. And then there are words that do pretend to refer (as I have pointed out several times) like "Santa Claus" and "fairy", and "mermaid", but which do not succeed in referring, because there are no such things (referents). But, again, they are perfectly good English words, and they have meanings which you can look up in a dictionary. So, to say that word that fails to refer to anything is an "empty word" seems to me wrong, unless I do not understand what you mean by "empty word". So, I certainly agree with you that words do not have to refer, or have a referent, "to have meaning in the culture in which they are commonly used", as you wrote. In fact, that is exactly why I say that words like "unicorn" or "mermaid" do, in fact, have a meaning, although they do not have a referent, and why I not only say, but I insist that the meaning of a word is not its referent, since it can have a meaning without having a referent. (There is, it is true, one poster who thinks that the meaning of a word is its referent, and I think that your complaints should be addressed to him).

As for the word, "God", I agree with you that it has a meaning, its traditional meaning in our culture is something like, "Supreme Being, creator of the universe, omnipotent, omniscient, all-just, all-good, holy" and so on. And believers, atheists, and agnostics all agree on that meaning (more or less). They all agree that the term, "God" has a meaning.

But, they disagree in that believers think that the word also has a referent: the atheist thinks that the word does not have a referent; and the agnostic does not know whether the word "God" has a referent or not. So all three agree that "God" has a meaning, and mostly agree on what that meaning is. But they disagree as to whether the word, "God" has a referent. Isn't that how you see it too?

[Chuck Rightmire]

Yes. I think we agree, but are not communicating. I guess what I'm generally saying is that many people seem to think the word is the thing, as the early folk used to think that knowing the "real name" of a god gave them power over it. What I suggest, and I think you might agree from your post, is that the name is not the thing, nor does it create what it refers to whether that is a real or an unreal referent.

[kennethamy]

Yes. I think we agree, but are not communicating. I guess what I'm generally saying is that many people seem to think the word is the thing, as the early folk used to think that knowing the "real name" of a god gave them power over it. What I suggest, and I think you might agree from your post, is that the name is not the thing, nor does it create what it refers to whether that is a real or an unreal referent.

I wonder how we could agree without communicating. Of course names are not things. It is a primitive idea that the word somehow contains the essence or the soul of the thing, so that to utter the word is somehow to invoke the thing. Some languages insist on giving two names to new borns; one, the name by which he is generally known, and the second, his real secret name, which is known only by immediate members of the family, and is used in important ceremonies. It was thought that if enemies knew the real secret name, they could do the person who carried the name, harm. This superstition actually has a more modern version when some people who should know better, think that somehow calling something by a different name, makes it into something different. There is a famous story about Lincoln that illustrates this: Lincoln once asked his son, Tod, this question: "If the tail of a dog were called a leg, how many legs would a dog have?" Tod replies, "Five legs" and Lincoln wisely said, "Wrong. Calling a dog's tail a leg, doesn't make it a leg. The dog still has only 4 legs."

[comiezapr]

It points to the problem witht he central premise of this conversation- ie that you can know what qualities santa has in the real or in others' conception of the real because of the empty nature of language. your talk of semantics is literally irrelevant.

I think what you are saying is this:

"You talk about semantics as if you understood either how language works or how the world, and the objects within it behave. But you dont understand how language works, or how the world is. This would make everything you talk about total nonsense."

This, of course, is rediculous. Me and ken, really the only people in any kind of argument here, dont care about how language works or how the world is. What were doing is assuming that language works in some way or other, and that the world is structured some way or other and get on with our lives. As the debate has unfolded we havent had issue with these ground rule assumptions and so it would seem that we share a rather similar view of the subject matter.

Saying that we havent analyzed what these beliefs are in no way effects the argument we are having. It is, in fact, an entirely seperate argument.

[comiezapr]

As for the word, "God", I agree with you that it has a meaning, its traditional meaning in our culture is something like, "Supreme Being, creator of the universe, omnipotent, omniscient, all-just, all-good, holy" and so on. And believers, atheists, and agnostics all agree on that meaning (more or less). They all agree that the term, "God" has a meaning.

But, they disagree in that believers think that the word also has a referent: the atheist thinks that the word does not have a referent; and the agnostic does not know whether the word "God" has a referent or not. So all three agree that "God" has a meaning, and mostly agree on what that meaning is. But they disagree as to whether the word, "God" has a referent. Isn't that how you see it too?

Im going to flesh out an example that shows how rediculous this theory of meaning is, but with the use of another intentional operator: belief.

Me and you are walking down the street together and happen to see my friend Bob. I point to some man in front of the grocery store and say "that over there is Bob". Then, because you are so observant you say "Bob is wearing loafers". Acording to your theory of meaning, "Bob" can mean one of two things. It can either mean what i know about Bob, that he is a theif that lives on Pine street, or what you know about Bob, that he is a man thats infront of the grocery store.

If "Bob" were to mean what i know about Bob then when you utter "Bob is wearing loafers" you are saying "The theif that lives on Pine street is wearing loafers." But clearly this is rediculous, you have no such knowledge since you do not know that Bob is a theif that lives on pine street. The more plausible scenario is that "Bob" mean what you know about Bob, that he is a man in front of the grocery store and that what you say is "The man in front of the grocery store is wearing loafers." This seems alright, for now.

But lets suppose that after this encounter with Bob we dont see each other for a few years. I move away, to a new city, while you stay put. You meet Bob again in front of the grocery store and get to talking. You go get coffee with him, go to his house (that is now located on Myrtle street since he moved) and visit his job at the warehouse (since he gave up the life of crime).

Then i come back to visit you. Since so much time has passed we completly forget our first encounter with Bob. We get to talking and Bob comes up in conversation: I say "I saw Bob today" and you reply "Ya, i saw him too." What could be happening here? Well, acording to you "Bob" must mean something about Bob, but what? Is it what i know about Bob, that he is a theif that lives on Pine street, or what you know about Bob, that he is a warehouse manager that lives on Myrtle street?

Its rediculous to say that "Bob" in both of our sentences mean the same thing since if that were the case one of us would know the meaning of a word by, apparently, magical means. However its equally rediculous to suppose that "Bob" in both of our sentences mean different things, since we clearly understand each other and are talking about one and the same person.

The solution is simple: "Bob" means Bob, that person out in the world that we refer to when we use "Bob". This is also the most obvious and intuitive answer to the question "what does Bob mean?"

I know that youre fond of something akin to philosophy of the common man, not over philosophizing about various subjects. But it seems to me that in this situation the one over philosophizing is YOU. If i were to ask someone what "Bob" meant they would say it means Bob, not some set of properties had by Bob, or some descriptions of Bob, just plain Bob.

I dont see how you can possibly accept your naive theory of the meaning of proper names especially without any sort of response to my prior, and this, post.

[kennethamy]

Im going to flesh out an example that shows how rediculous this theory of meaning is, but with the use of another intentional operator: belief.

Me and you are walking down the street together and happen to see my friend Bob. I point to some man in front of the grocery store and say "that over there is Bob". Then, because you are so observant you say "Bob is wearing loafers". Acording to your theory of meaning, "Bob" can mean one of two things. It can either mean what i know about Bob, that he is a theif that lives on Pine street, or what you know about Bob, that he is a man thats infront of the grocery store.

If "Bob" were to mean what i know about Bob then when you utter "Bob is wearing loafers" you are saying "The theif that lives on Pine street is wearing loafers." But clearly this is rediculous, you have no such knowledge since you do not know that Bob is a theif that lives on pine street. The more plausible scenario is that "Bob" mean what you know about Bob, that he is a man in front of the grocery store and that what you say is "The man in front of the grocery store is wearing loafers." This seems alright, for now.

But lets suppose that after this encounter with Bob we dont see each other for a few years. I move away, to a new city, while you stay put. You meet Bob again in front of the grocery store and get to talking. You go get coffee with him, go to his house (that is now located on Myrtle street since he moved) and visit his job at the warehouse (since he gave up the life of crime).

Then i come back to visit you. Since so much time has passed we completly forget our first encounter with Bob. We get to talking and Bob comes up in conversation: I say "I saw Bob today" and you reply "Ya, i saw him too." What could be happening here? Well, acording to you "Bob" must mean something about Bob, but what? Is it what i know about Bob, that he is a theif that lives on Pine street, or what you know about Bob, that he is a warehouse manager that lives on Myrtle street?

Its rediculous to say that "Bob" in both of our sentences mean the same thing since if that were the case one of us would know the meaning of a word by, apparently, magical means. However its equally rediculous to suppose that "Bob" in both of our sentences mean different things, since we clearly understand each other and are talking about one and the same person.

The solution is simple: "Bob" means Bob, that person out in the world that we refer to when we use "Bob". This is also the most obvious and intuitive answer to the question "what does Bob mean?"

I know that youre fond of something akin to philosophy of the common man, not over philosophizing about various subjects. But it seems to me that in this situation the one over philosophizing is YOU. If i were to ask someone what "Bob" meant they would say it means Bob, not some set of properties had by Bob, or some descriptions of Bob, just plain Bob.

I dont see how you can possibly accept your naive theory of the meaning of proper names.

I think that if you asked someone who was meant by "Bob", in the usual context, they would point to Bob (if they could). But I think they would be flummoxed by the question, "what does Bob mean?" I suppose that the best they could say would be, "What does Bob mean by what? Was Bob doing something strange?" But if you were to ask maybe the question you may have in mind, "What does "Bob" mean" then might reply something like, "Well, "Bob" is a proper name, and I am not sure that proper names have meaning at all, because they are just labels". There has been, perhaps you know, considerable controversy about the meaning of proper names. But, it is true that Russell held that proper names are really disguised descriptions, so that the application of proper names were a function of those descriptions.

But, don't you believe, as I do, that the atheist, the agnostic, and the believer all agree (for the most part) that the term "God" means the same thing, and disagree as to whether the term has a referent, or whether it can be known whether it has a referent? If not, how else would you characterize that difference among them?

[comiezapr]

But, don't you believe, as I do, that the atheist, the agnostic, and the believer all agree (for the most part) that the term "God" means the same thing, and disagree as to whether the term has a referent, or whether it can be known whether it has a referent? If not, how else would you characterize that difference among them?

I already explained exactly what the difference between an athiest and a believer is and it has nothing to do with WHETHER the term "God" has a referant:

The athiest believes that the referant of the word "God" isnt in the actual world while the believer believes that the referant of the word "God" is in the actual world. This not only fits into the theory of meaning of proper names that i advocate, it is a very natural consequence. The word "God" means the same thing in all of these situations, namely God.

I dont see the problem with what i say. I might say that the referant of "God" isnt in the actual world, but it does not follow that the referant of "God" is in some netherland of subsistance or off in another possible world. Infact, the response is completly silent about the metaphysics of the situation.

What exactly ARE you putting forward as YOUR analysis of proper names? Surely it cant be Russels thesis, since the argument i have presented are completly at odds with his thesis, and you have yet to argue against them. (Or perhaps you are biting the bullets: all things have all of thier properties essentially and proper names mean wholly different things to different people yet they can still communicate.)

Enough or arguing with the perifery of my posts:

I think that if you asked someone who was meant by "Bob", in the usual context, they would point to Bob (if they could). But I think they would be flummoxed by the question, "what does Bob mean?" I suppose that the best they could say would be, "What does Bob mean by what? Was Bob doing something strange?" But if you were to ask maybe the question you may have in mind, "What does "Bob" mean" then might reply something like, "Well, "Bob" is a proper name, and I am not sure that proper names have meaning at all, because they are just labels". There has been, perhaps you know, considerable controversy about the meaning of proper names. But, it is true that Russell held that proper names are really disguised descriptions, so that the application of proper names were a function of those descriptions.

Does it really look like it is central to my thesis or arguments what the response of common people are? Perhaps ill be more precise with what i say: if the common man were asked to respond to the question "what does the word 'Bob' mean when you use it" and given the requisite education about what the question is to mean in a philosophical sense, what would he say? I would surely not think that the first thing to pop into his head would be "Oh, well certianly a bundle of properties, or a bundle of descriptions." But no matter, i dont care. And I think that deliberatly missing what i say, on this point, for the sake of clarity is picking over crumbs when theres a loaf of bread right next to you.

And stop telling me what Russel believes. I KNOW what Russel believes. Do i really sound like a person, after all the posts ive made, that isnt schooled in modern english philosophy? But even more, i dont CARE what Russel says. I care what YOU say.

So say it, what is your analysis of proper names?
You hate evasive posters, but in this scenario you are becoming one.

Edit: It isnt aceptable to end the argument here in a stalemate either. Dialecticly i have advanced a thesis and have yet to see an argument against it, namely the thesis that proper names mean what they refer to. I have also seen the semblance of another thesis that is contrary to this, the theory of descriptions, and have argued against it twice and failed to recieve a response.

[naturalist.atheist]

In the beginning reads the Gospel of John was the Word. And in Genesis we read that God created light and animals and humans apparently just by saying the word, although he did use clay in the making of humans, according to one version. The magic we hear bruited about as in the Harry Potter and other fantasies uses the word to mean the thing. But it seems to me that the word is but our definition of the thing and things can go by many definitions. Am I working in the right direction here?:huh:

It is a reflection of the age in which the story was told. It was an illiterate age. And this thing arriving with scribbling on it and someone reading it was magic. It conjured up a person, perhaps even a dead person, which spoke to them. And people that could read and write or "spell" were conjurers. They could speak the word.

Really not all that different from the current crop of magical thinkers we have that mistake their profound ignorance for profound mystical knowledge.

[kennethamy]

I already explained exactly what the difference between an athiest and a believer is and it has nothing to do with WHETHER the term "God" has a referant:

The athiest believes that the referant of the word "God" isnt in the actual world while the believer believes that the referant of the word "God" is in the actual world. This not only fits into the theory of meaning of proper names that i advocate, it is a very natural consequence. The word "God" means the same thing in all of these situations, namely God.

I dont see the problem with what i say. I might say that the referant of "God" isnt in the actual world, but it does not follow that the referant of "God" is in some netherland of subsistance or off in another possible world. Infact, the response is completly silent about the metaphysics of the situation.

What exactly ARE you putting forward as YOUR analysis of proper names? Surely it cant be Russels thesis, since the argument i have presented are completly at odds with his thesis, and you have yet to argue against them. (Or perhaps you are biting the bullets: all things have all of thier properties essentially and proper names mean wholly different things to different people yet they can still communicate.)

Enough or arguing with the perifery of my posts:



Does it really look like it is central to my thesis or arguments what the response of common people are? Perhaps ill be more precise with what i say: if the common man were asked to respond to the question "what does the word 'Bob' mean when you use it" and given the requisite education about what the question is to mean in a philosophical sense, what would he say? I would surely not think that the first thing to pop into his head would be "Oh, well certianly a bundle of properties, or a bundle of descriptions." But no matter, i dont care. And I think that deliberatly missing what i say, on this point, for the sake of clarity is picking over crumbs when theres a loaf of bread right next to you.

And stop telling me what Russel believes. I KNOW what Russel believes. Do i really sound like a person, after all the posts ive made, that isnt schooled in modern english philosophy? But even more, i dont CARE what Russel says. I care what YOU say.

So say it, what is your analysis of proper names?
You hate evasive posters, but in this scenario you are becoming one.

Edit: It isnt aceptable to end the argument here in a stalemate either. Dialecticly i have advanced a thesis and have yet to see an argument against it, namely the thesis that proper names mean what they refer to. I have also seen the semblance of another thesis that is contrary to this, the theory of descriptions, and have argued against it twice and failed to recieve a response.

I have no analysis of proper names, and I am inclined to accept Russell. I know there are "the man with the martini in his" glass objections, which are, I think, anomalies which can be overcome, although even if they cannot, Russell's theory takes care of so much, we can live with the anomalies. As in the case of scientific theories which invariably have have bits that hang out and cannot be easily shoved back into the theory. We seek the best theory, not a perfect theory. It stands to reason that with a system of data so vast, and so likely to have conflicts, that we have to go along with what is most plausible.

Especially, when the alternative is this counter-intuitive spread of the theory of possible worlds, not taken heuristically, where it is possible that it has some use, but literally as Lewis takes it.

"The athiest believes that the referant of the word "God" isnt in the actual world while the believer believes that the referant of the word "God" is in the actual world. This not only fits into the theory of meaning of proper names that i advocate, it is a very natural consequence. The word "God" means the same thing in all of these situations, namely God."

If that is supposed to me how believers, atheists, (and agnostics? you say nothing about them ) differ, it is so far from psychological reality, that I cannot see anything to be said for it. What makes you think that the atheist believes that "God" has any referent at all, or, in plain English, that there is a God. I am not confident that I know what it means to say that God exists in some possible world, but if that implies that it is possible for God to exist, then I imagine that a atheist would reject that suggestion, for he would mean by that not that "God exists" is not self-contradictory, but that God is a "real possibility." And that is not what he would make of the possible world view.

And, you do not say how an agnostic would fit into your topology. Would it me that the agnostic does not know whether there is a God in this world or in some alternate non-contradictory world?

I find the very idea of possible world semantics so repugnant, and so unnecessary, that it is hard for me to take it seriously. For one thing, it lacks that sense of "robust reality" that led Russell to reject Meinong. And it is just that which puts me off this new Meinongianism warmed over. Russell once said that the test of a philosophical theory lies in the problems it solves. His theory of descriptions, I find, puts into place a number of philosophical problems in a neat way: for instance, the Parmenidian problem of non-existence (how can we speak of what does not exist); negative existentials; the idea of existence in general in a way which makes it clear how existence is not a predicate of objects, and the theory shows the immense usefulness of what Carnap called "the formal mode", and Quine called "semantic ascent". As I have said, Lewisian semantics (as far as I understand it) seems to me retrograde philosophy which revives difficulties already solved. I once tried to read Lewis' book, and I have to say of it that I could not put it down-I had to throw it down!!

[comiezapr]

Im going to take the response a little out of order.

And, you do not say how an agnostic would fit into your topology. Would it me that the agnostic does not know whether there is a God in this world or in some alternate non-contradictory world?

The agnostic would niether believe the truth or the falsity of "The referant of god is in the actual world".

I have no analysis of proper names, and I am inclined to accept Russell. I know there are "the man with the martini in his" glass objections, which are, I think, anomalies which can be overcome, although even if they cannot, Russell's theory takes care of so much, we can live with the anomalies.

What problems, exactly, does it solve? It solves Meinongs problem, but that wasnt a problem to begin with and doesnt need Russels analysis to overcome. (The trick to Meinong's paradox is not to claim that existance isnt a predicate or that proper names are descriptions but to make the distinction between predicative and non predicative predicates as Alvin Plantigna has so clearly shown.) I know of no other problems that it solves. I know of plenty of problems it creates: everything have all of its properties essentially, the crazyness of the analysis of normal conversation involving proper names, and the rather strange position that there arent logically proper names in language and yet there are logically proper names (the constants) in Russels (and everyones) logical systems, which is supposed to be an analytic tool.

Especially, when the alternative is this counter-intuitive spread of the theory of possible worlds, not taken heuristically, where it is possible that it has some use, but literally as Lewis takes it.

This is a bogey. I already stated this twice: YOU CAN ACCEPT MY SEMANTICS WITHOUT ACCEPTING MY METAPHYSICS. They are seperate things. I dont even postulate possible worlds, or anything, when i was doing the two posts that involved arguments against the "property bundle" theory of proper names. I said merely that the referants of the names werent in the actual world. How does this postulate ANYTHING let alone possible worlds? You are, essentially, arguing against my semantics by saying that another one of my beliefs that is wholly seperate from this point is wrong. Its like if i were to say to you "Russels theory of proper names is wrong because you believe that the current president is Bill Clinton." Nonsense!

Ken, common. Youre doing what you hate posters to do, evading the point. My arguments are clearly against a Russelian style analysis of proper names and you have yet to adress them in any way (are they fallicious in some way, or are the conclusions not so bad).

I find the very idea of possible world semantics so repugnant, and so unnecessary, that it is hard for me to take it seriously. For one thing, it lacks that sense of "robust reality" that led Russell to reject Meinong. And it is just that which puts me off this new Meinongianism warmed over. Russell once said that the test of a philosophical theory lies in the problems it solves. His theory of descriptions, I find, puts into place a number of philosophical problems in a neat way: for instance, the Parmenidian problem of non-existence (how can we speak of what does not exist); negative existentials; the idea of existence in general in a way which makes it clear how existence is not a predicate of objects, and the theory shows the immense usefulness of what Carnap called "the formal mode", and Quine called "semantic ascent". As I have said, Lewisian semantics (as far as I understand it) seems to me retrograde philosophy which revives difficulties already solved. I once tried to read Lewis' book, and I have to say of it that I could not put it down-I had to throw it down!!

Im inclined to believe that you dont know what youre talking about (what book did you read, exactly? It couldnt be "On the Plurality of Worlds" since that has NOTHING AT ALL to do with the debate we are currently in. Lewis hasnt written a book about semantics except for counterfactuals, and that is about the semantics of COUNTERFACTUALS and doesnt mention proper names at all.) Possible world semantics is a SEMANTICS, not a metaphysical system. Lewis never created a possible world semantics, he studied S5 modal logic. Kripke is the progenitor of possible world semantics (though Carnap was a clear precursor).

You arent understanding this point: SEMANTICS IS SEPERATE FROM METAPHYSICS. I can tell you how to analyze things, and what words mean, without positing any objects whatsoever. Infact, when i analyze something, or tell you what it means, i am totally silent about what exists; that is the point of semantics.

I also dont know what you mean when you say that Russels theory solves philosophical problems. You need to start reading more modern philosophy. Obviously the problems of a philosophical theory arent going to be pointed out within the age that the philosophical theory is championed: if i were to read a slew of books in the age of Phlogiston would i really be presented with the real arguments against positing this strange thing? Russels theory creates way more problems then it solves: that is to say it creates problems and solves none. Ill make an inventory of problems and if they are solved by the theory of naming put forth by Russel and/or Kripke:

Existance of possible worlds: Russel is silent, Kripke is silent.

Existance of Meinongian objects: Russel avoids the objects, Kripke avoids the objects. (In fact all theories avoid the objects because the argument confuses predicative and non-predicative predicates.)

An object has all of its properties essentially (things couldnt be otherwise than how they are): Russel, himself, doesnt adress this problem because he is blidn to it (it had to wait for another age) and his theory falls victim to it, Kripke avoids it.

A person believes crazy things when he has a proper name in his belief: Russel was blind to this because he was unable to use an intentional logic (there wasnt one around yet) and his theory falls victim, Kripke avoids it.

Conversations have odd analysis: Russel falls vicitim because he was blidn to it, Kripke avoids it.

So now that my inventory is done it seems clear to me that Russel's theory is the loser. What did i miss?

Edit: You do have a final retreat, akin to Quines final retreat. When it was clear to Quine that there were no problems with modal logic (and it did become very clear to Quine that there were no problems with modal logic) he said simply: we should not pay attention to modal logic because it just makes philosophy complicated. I agree that it makes philosophy cmplicated, but how is that a reason to avoid modal logic? With the tools of modal system we can analyze a HELL of alot more philosophically than we can without it. Quine is wrong to say that we shouldnt study modal logic! This argument is akin to saying "we shouldnt study modern thermodynamics because it makes things more complicated tan the simple kinetic theory of gases." Yes, it does, but it also allows us to penetrate our world more deeply.

I think this really IS the argument you want to give. You want to be caught in a time warp of philosophy when it seemed both very penetrating and very simple: the early twentieth century. You just ignore philosophy in the last 60 years because it complicates that simple picture.