Atheism, Agnosticsm, Freethought, Humanism, Naturalism, Secularism, etc.

"Theism" is a very real and HUMAN idea, one need not subscribe to church dogma to appreciate its expression in the art, literature, and philosophy of Western Civilization. I get the uneasy feeling that you would happly throw a brick through the stained glass windows of Notre Dame cathedral because you can't see beyond it's christian theme for what it is, a beautiful & sublime work of human expression. Is that how "secularism" is defined by you guys? Sounds more like nihilism to me.

[Richard Carrier]

Christianity as an ideology is usually much more like pop art: worth little more than the sequined shirt it is sewn on. Cathedrals are magnificent and practical works of mastery over nature. In contrast, The Trinity, for example, is a useless, ridiculous and confused idea cloaked in the jargon of high theology in a desperate attempt to make it seem like the sublime and brilliant thought produced by pagan philosophers. Few theologians have produced any really impressive literary masterpieces (the vast majority of so-called "Christian" literature, music and art is really among the worst, sappy tripe us humans have embarassed ourselves with), and those few works that win such merit still retain them even in the eyes of unbelievers. Milton comes to mind; but even the Christians admire the pagan religious epics of Virgil and Homer, so the feeling is mutual.

Moreover, virtually no theology is really useful to the human race, in comparison with philosophy, which does not insult its audience with pretences to infallibility, revelation, or absolute certainty (much less threats of eternal damnation or constant charges of blasphemy and shouts of "Infidel!"). Compare the Tao Te Ching with the Bible and you will see what I mean: if not for their religious zeal, hardly a soul would have bothered preserving the latter (it is mostly an arduous, boring, and obtuse work of absurd length and little utility), but the former has been preserved and admired by millions who don't even believe it anymore. But in all honesty I admire the genius of some of the Biblical writers, even some later theologians, but they often either lose in aesthetics what they take up in dishonesty, or else they fail to match in greatness the productions of pagan and secular thinkers.

Incidentally, we oppose nihilism here. We advocate having a philosophy, but one based on evidence and reason, not abandoning all self-examination or exploration of existence, a philosophy that is useful for the human race and relates to what really exists. In particular, we stress metaphysical naturalism, but there are many other secular philosophies out there. See our Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/naturalism/) and Materialism (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/materialism/) sections, as well as our Secular Humanism (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/secularhumanism/) section, and our About (http://www.infidels.org/infidels/) page.

Just wanted to say it's nice to see you're requesting a paper(s) arguing for metaphysical naturalism being more true than false, since it's rather odd a site that holds it maintains the view that metaphysical naturalism is the best current view is surprisingly vacant when it comes to articles on just that--metaphysical naturalism. Hopefully we'll start seeing papers arguing for just that, not just arguing against religion and for atheism/agnostism/nontheism/etc., since that is supposed to be what this site attempts to justify.
Take care.
Christopher

[-DM-]

Thank you for your feedback. We could use some good papers arguing for metaphysical naturalism, that's true. The Secular Web is not exactly vacant when it comes to such articles, however. The following are recommended:

A Defense of Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/thesis.html) by Keith Augustine

At the Intersection of "Metaphysical Naturalism" and "Intelligent Design" (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/bill_schultz/crsc.html) by Bill Schultz

Methodological Naturalism and the Supernatural (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/ntse.html) by Mark I. Vuletic

The Empirical Case for Metaphysical Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/infidels/newsletter/1999/march.html#Naturalism) by Jeffery Jay Lowder

--Don--

[truthsword]

Insofar as this forum promotes a form of religious dogma, it is no more secular than any other religious website.

Herein lies shrouded doctrine in the guise of the word "secular." Take this
preachful gem:

"Our goal is to defend and promote metaphysical naturalism, the view that our world is all there is, a closed system in no need of an explanation and sufficient unto itself."

Of particular interest is the "in no need
of an explanation." Sounds rather like
God doesn't it? In fact, who is to
say there is no need of explanation?
Such conjecture is merely OPINION, yet when
presented as rock-solid fact, it becomes
dogma, just as in any other religion.

Many phenomena cry out for explanation,
and it is too early in the game to
pronounce that "our world" (whatever that
means) is all there is. Quantum mechanics
bottoms out in an utterly confounding paradox. If you don't know about it,
read up. Consciousness is so far from
being touched by science that it is
currently only argued over by philosophers.
And if you don't think that consciousness matters, consider the fact that your ONLY access to "our world" is through your conscious experience.
That is not to say that it MAY be
analyzed through scientific means in some
future year, but currently, the jury
is very much out. Even the fundamental
physical laws of the universe itself, where do THEY come from?

Certainly one can preach that these monumental puzzles are "in no need of an explanation," but saying so is sheer
dogma. Many educated readers intuit a dire need for explanation.

As long as the fundamental puzzles remain
unanswered, the assertion that the world
is "a closed system" remains only an assertion, which we thus may dub a BELIEF.
It is true, and easily acknowledged, that
the system may indeed turn out to be closed, but with numerous open questions at the most fundamental levels it is just as likely that it will not be closed after all. Indeed, "our world" may interact with other semi-closed metaphysical systems at low levels.

I am not launching into a defense of dualism. I am only alerting the religious zealots of this forum to their own zealotry in pronouncing the truth before it has been verified. Indeed, this forum is a form of sophisticated, cliquish, modern religious dogma. It is the "in-crowd" of enlightened wanna-be's for the modern age. However, just like all in-crowds before it, it is promoting a view that boils down to no more than its own fervency.

A truly enlightened view admits that things may turn out far more complicated than we wish they would. A truly enlightened view acknowledges that it is too early to pat ourselves on the back and pronounce that
the cries for explanation have already been extinguished. The crisis of the unknown is as daunting as ever, and only the brave among the enlightened shall ever admit this.

For the rest, there is the modern God, naturalism. But tread carefully lest we
find that our world is but a narrow slice of
the the clockwork of reality.

===truthsword==>>>>>

[Richard Carrier]

Originally posted by truthsword: Insofar as this forum promotes a form of religious dogma, it is no more secular than any other religious website.

Oh no! Someone had better tell Pat Robertson that Secular Humanists don't exist! He keeps on talking about them. Indeed, J.P. Moreland wrote an entire book about secularism. You should drop him a line to let him know there he was wasting his time.

Or, maybe you can just actually speak English like the rest of us:

"sec-u-lar . adj. 1. of or pertaining to worldly things or to things not regarded as sacred; temporal."

In the context in which the words "secularism" or "secular humanism" are appropriate, this is the definition that is set by that context. To wit:

"sec-u-lar-ism . n. 1. secular spirit or tendency, esp. a system of political or social philosophy that rejects all forms of religious faith and worship."

Bitching about it won't change the fact that this is how the English speaking world has conventionally defined these words in these contexts.

Herein lies shrouded doctrine in the guise of the word "secular." Take this preachful gem:

"Our goal is to defend and promote metaphysical naturalism, the view that our world is all there is, a closed system in no need of an explanation and sufficient unto itself."

Of particular interest is the "in no need of an explanation." Sounds rather like God doesn't it?

Indeed, it sounds rather like God except that it totally excludes God. Duh.

You remind me of Edina Monsoon in Absolutely Fabulous: after her mom said being locked in a room was rather like the War, she yelled, "Oh yeah, rather like the war, without the bombs, the blackouts, the rationing, in other words just like the war only without the war!"

Sometimes people astonish me with their strange rants. "Atheism is a religious opinion." Are we supposed to be surprised by this revelation? I would have thought it was obvious. It certainly has been obvious for the rest of us for ages. When did you join us?

In fact, who is to say there is no need of explanation?

Who is to say there isn't? That's the point. When there is no reason to think there is an X, there is no reason to think there is an X. QED. This is the proper response: basic logic.

Such conjecture is merely OPINION, yet when presented as rock-solid fact, it becomes dogma, just as in any other religion.

Actually, it would be dogmatic opinion to assert there needed to be an explanation, for there would be nothing on which to base this statement. Since "there needs to be an explanation" is baseless, "there is no need of explanation" is the default conclusion: reason leaves us with nothing else. That is not dogma, but logic. There is a difference between an assertion that is dogmatic and an assertion that is the open-minded conclusion from an examination of evidence and argument. The sooner you learn the difference the better off you will be in the world.

You should actually explore what metaphysical naturalism is and why it differs from dogmatism. In particular, you need to read our essays in Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/naturalism/), especially Methodological Naturalism and the Supernatural (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/ntse.html) and A Defense of Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/thesis.html). You will then find that we do not promote metaphysical naturalism as a dogma, but as a rational conclusion you yourself can reach by examining the reasoning and the evidence independently.

In contrast, a dogma is 'a system of principles or tenets...authoratatively put forth.' In other words, the Southern Baptist declaration that woman is subordinate to man is a dogma: it is not regarded as arguable and is not really supported with evidence (except through two other dogmas: the Bible is True and the Southern Baptist Council's Interpretation of the Bible is Correct). In other words, it's true because they said so. End of story. That is a dogma. In contrast, the most honest version of the Evangelical declaration that Jesus Rose Bodily from the Grave is not a dogma, because it is claimed to be supported by adequate evidence that does not presume any other dogmas (like the inerrancy of the Bible). We argue that the evidence does not support this conclusion, and in response some (not all) Evangelicals backtrack from 'argument' to 'dogma' by simply declaring 'The Bible is Inerrant' and 'Faith Trumps Reason' and there is no room to argue: believe it or be damned, you were warned, etc. Hence the difference between an argued position and a dogma.

Many phenomena cry out for explanation, and it is too early in the game to pronounce that "our world" (whatever that means) is all there is.

I would say to the contrary, there is no reason to declare that there is anything more. Of course, metaphysical naturalism allows alternative universes that are not connected with this one and alternative dimensions that are a part of this universe: the word 'sole' is not in the position statement. But until we see evidence of 'more to this' we will not believe there is. That is our position, it is well argued throughout our website, it is not assumed to be true nor is it held to be beyond all dispute or question, but it is reasonable and we promote it because we believe it is the most reasonable conclusion from what we do know.

Quantum mechanics bottoms out in an utterly confounding paradox.

Not really. Plenty of theories unconfound all the phenomena of QM, and it remains only to find out which is correct. For example, see Victor Stenger's Timeless Reality (http://www.secweb.org/bookstore/bookdetail.asp?BookID=652) (2000).

Consciousness is so far from being touched by science that it is currently only argued over by philosophers.

How have you missed the huge array of actual scientific research projects delving directly into the matter? There is no truth to what you say here: science has its hands deep inside this issue and is taking it on full-time and in full force. Indeed, the philosophers are being left in the dust now. See Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262523027/InternetInfidelsA/) (2001) by Baars and Newman.

But the presence of the unexplained has no bearing on the general conclusion that what is to be explained will have a natural explanation: for that is a conclusion justified by a very strong inference from the evidence, and not a mere assertion (and thus not a dogma). See, besides the above essays on naturalism, my own Prima Facie Presumptions vs. The Lessons of History (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/indef/3a.html#history).

Even the fundamental physical laws of the universe itself, where do THEY come from?

Personally, I believe they are what must necessarily be, have always been, and could never be otherwise. But that's just my opinion. As metaphysical naturalists, we believe that the explanation, whatever it is, will only be found by science, and it will be a natural one: for all other proven explanations throughout all history have been so, there is no reason to suspect this to be different here, and thus it is reasonable to conclude so. And at any rate, this is just what we argue for, not what we assume or declare without argument. See, for example, our Physics and Religion (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/science/physics/) section.

Certainly one can preach that these monumental puzzles are "in no need of an explanation," but saying so is sheer dogma. Many educated readers intuit a dire need for explanation.

Actually, you have tripped yourself up here. You were talking about a statement we made about the whole, then you rambled on about parts of the whole, and now declare you have made a point about the whole. You have not. You are only talking about the parts, and we never said the parts lacked explanation. Let's talk instead about what we actually said: the whole is in no need of explanation.

Either there is an infinite series of explanations or there is something that has no explanation. This is not an assertion or dogma, but a logical fact: it is necessarily the one or the other. If there is an infinite series of explanations, then there is no ultimate explanation (by definition: for an ultimate explanation entails a finite series). If there is no ultimate explanation, then 'there is no need of an explanation' is true by default. If there is a finite series, then there is something that 'is in no need of an explanation' (by definition: for if the explanations must end, something must be left unexplained), and therefore 'there is no need of an explanation' is true by default. In other words, there is no possible state of affairs in which 'there is no need of an explanation' is not true: it is always true. This is logically, necessarily the case.

Where we differ from other worldviews is simply that we stop the chain where the evidence stops: the universe. There is no basis for adding anything more. No evidence, no rationale. Therefore, it is most reasonable to infer that if there are infinite explanations, then they are all natural (by the logical, evidential inference from all previous discoveries), and if there is something that stands in no need of an explanation, the universe is that something (by the logical, evidential inference from the fact that it is the whole of what we have ever observed). The arguments continue along these lines, but you will find our case made in the essays I directed you to before. Again, we argue it, we do not simply declare it true without argument.

As long as the fundamental puzzles remain unanswered, the assertion that the world is "a closed system" remains only an assertion, which we thus may dub a BELIEF.

Hold the presses! You mean atheists actually believe some things!? Oh wait...we all knew that already. Where have you been? Of course, as I've proved, we do not 'assert' our worldview: we argue for it. Big difference. Learn it. Live it.

It is true, and easily acknowledged, that the system may indeed turn out to be closed, but with numerous open questions at the most fundamental levels it is just as likely that it will not be closed after all. Indeed, "our world" may interact with other semi-closed metaphysical systems at low levels.

And monkeys might fly out of my butt, too. But should I be buying cages and nets just in case? Or is it simply reasonable to conclude, from evidence and reason, that no monkeys will be forthcoming? Once again: there is a big difference between a dogma and a reasoned conclusion from evidence.

I am not launching into a defense of dualism. I am only alerting the religious zealots of this forum to their own zealotry in pronouncing the truth before it has been verified.

Just for the record, I don't mind being called a zealot. I am indeed zealous for my beliefs: because I have seen all the evidence and worked through all the logic and I see that it is in fact true, it is in fact good, and would in fact help the world if everyone saw and understood the same.

And whether you want to dub secularism a 'religion' is up to you--it is entirely dependent on what is meant by 'religion' in any particular case. I certainly call it a religious belief, since it is about the subject matter traditionally addressed by religion, and it is precisely a religious freedom that I am exercising when I advocate it. But being religious does not make it inappropriate to call it secular: for as Webster's says, ours is 'a system of political or social philosophy that rejects all forms of religious faith and worship' and which is 'pertaining to worldly things or to things not regarded as sacred," i.e. our philosophy is concerned with the world and regards nothing as holy. Likewise, atheism is a religious belief, but is still atheism because it entails the rejection of certain (if not all) other religious beliefs, and is thus distinct from 'religion' in one valid and popular sense, and thus it still makes sense for Pat Robertson and J.P. Moreland and you and me to distinguish atheists from the religious. Once again, bitching about the complexities of the English language will not get you anywhere.

Indeed, this forum is a form of sophisticated, cliquish, modern religious dogma.

Replace 'dogma' with 'argument' or 'philosophy' or 'debate,' etc., and you will be right on the money. Indeed, 'dogma' is incompatible with 'argument' and 'debate' -- these are opposite fields of thought. Yet you find the latter here. Most people appreciate the difference.

A truly enlightened view admits that things may turn out far more complicated than we wish they would.

And had you actually read our papers on naturalism, you would find that we do accept that anything is possible. But that something is possible does not make it reasonable, nor does it mean we cannot claim to know some things simply because it is 'possible' that all we know is wrong. It is possible you are a fruit bat. Deny it all you will, it won't make any difference: for it will always remain possible. Does that mean you should be criticised for claiming to be a human, simply because you aren't sure you're not a fruit bat? Obviously not. So join the rest of us reasonable people and get the idea. It's a really groovy idea to get.

Be well.

[John Woodside]

Dear Secular Web,

Love your web site. I am not trying to be overly negative-- but I suggest removing the word "metaphysical" from the front page of your web site...

Most atheists / agnostics / freethinkers (I would hope...) do not subscribe to any supernatural concepts or abstractions of any type. The term "metaphysical" is closely related to mysticism and other undesirable ideas.

Would it be possible to simply state that your goal is to defend naturalism?

Sincerely,

John Woodside

[Bill]

Dear John:

I do understand that the word "metaphysics" does have some connotations of, and references to, a particular "New Age" religious cult.

However, the word also describes one of the most fundamental areas of philosophical inquiry. Anybody with even a basic introduction to the topic of philosophy ought to be familiar with this alternative use of the word "metaphysics."

Furthermore, the word "metaphysical" is required in order to distinguish what we defend from other sorts of "naturalism." For instance, science is predicated upon methodological naturalism, as distinguished from metaphysical naturalism. (And yes, there are other forums of "naturalism," in art, literature, and other fields of activity.)

If there is a problem here, it is the fact that the religious cult of "metaphysics" has appropriated the venerable old word for its own use, and it is rather them to whom you ought to be complaining. Thanks for your compliments. They are always appreciated!

== Bill

[Richard Carrier]

I sure hope the masses aren't becoming so ignorant of our philosophical heritage that they are now reducing one of the three primary branches of philosophy to little more than woowoo mysticism! Say it isn't so!

Philosophy, for two thousand years and going strong, has always been divided into three major divisions: epistemology (how we know), ethics (how we act), and metaphysics (what there is). Typically, ontology (the study of Being qua Being) is shelved under metaphysics, or sometimes distinguished (much like politics is sometimes shelved under ethics, sometimes given as its own category). Them's the vocabulary.

In philosophical language, naturalism has two varieties: methodological and metaphysical. The former is compatible with theism and other forms of supernaturalism, as well as radical skepticism (e.g. antirealism--many naturalists are antirealists; we are not--not even remotely). See our library on "<a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/naturalism/index.shtml" target="_blank">Naturalism</a>" where a lot of these issues are explored.

"Metaphysical Naturalism" is not our invention. The term had long been in use as a blanket term for a philosophical position, and is employed in serious philosophical scholarship. It asserts that we believe that nature is all that exists--and that is a metaphysical position. You can look up metaphysics in the philosophy metadictionary we link to in "<a href="http://www.infidels.org/desk.shtml" target="_blank">Reference Desk</a>" (accessed from the main <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/index.shtml" target="_blank">Library page</a>).

[Hunter Green]

It seems to me that atheism, despite the supposed theories of secular humanism and naturalism and the such, does not offer any real viable alternative to religion or the concept of God/gods/deities/enlightened teachers. It is an absence, a lack and so why bother to "promote" it? This question is in direct reference to the quasi mission statement posted on the homepage which claims that "Our goal is to defend and promote a nontheistic worldview...etc". Why "promote"?
Just Wondering

[-DM-]

Thanks for asking. The About Us (http://www.infidels.org/infidels/index.shtml) page and the FAQ (http://www.infidels.org/infidels/faq.shtml) page, both linked from the Home (http://www.infidels.org/index.shtml) page, answer that question fairly well.

Regards,
-DM-

[TheFool]

Regarding _Defining Our Mission_ (2002) by Richard Carrier, as well as Keith Augustine's defense of "metaphysical naturalism":

The entire project of this web archive is undermined by the inability to state the metaphysical position which the linked articles are supposed to defend. No respectable definition of metaphysical naturalism is offered. It is stated that the metaphysical claim is that "nature is all there is." This is meaningless until some positive definition of "nature" is proposed. But none is offered. And the reason for this is not difficult to surmise. Every time a definition is offered, it is found to exclude something that the naturalist wants to keep. For example, it has been proposed that the natural is what is located in space and time. But then spacetime itself is excluded (among other things). Or it is proposed that the natural is what is detectable by scientific instruments. But then unobservable fundamental particles that find their place in respectable physical theories are excluded. Worse, the "natural" is sometimes defined in terms of the "material" or the "physical." The problem of definition is just pushed off, and the material and the physical are found to be no less difficult to define (in such a way that nothing is left out of the ontology that the naturalist does not want to leave out).

It soon becomes clear that "naturalism" is not a positive metaphysical position, but an ad hoc, reactionary position. It is the view that anything may exist, as long as it is not God or an angel or a human soul or anything else that strikes us as too similar to one of these verboten entities. I suggest that it would be much more honest for this web forum to acknowledge that the project is not motivated by the immense plausibility of some positive metaphysical position, but by an incredulity about the existence of certain kinds of entities (which, by the way, do not share any ontological features which justify their being lumped in the same metaphysical category).

An important question that now arises is this: if this web forum is devoted to the rejection of God, angels, human souls, ghosts, and all manner of other spooky stuff, is "the dignity of humanity" (to which Carrier claims the organization is committed) really non-spooky enough for the tastes the Internet Infidels membership? On which criterion for what counts as natural does "the dignity of humanity" count as natural? I think it will once again be seen that the category of the natural is ad hoc. There is no recipe by reference to which the metaphysical naturalists affiliated with this forum sort ontological elements into the categories of acceptable and unacceptable. Rather it is decided beforehand which elements to countenance and which not to countenance, and then attempts are made to construct definitions which keep the elements which have been accepted and dispense with those which have previously been rejected. Again, I do not think it should be pretended that the motivation is the immense plausibility of some metaphysical principle. If it were, I should very much like to know what that principle is…

[-DM-]

[Thank you for your feedback regarding Defining Our Mission (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/mission.shtml) by Richard Carrier (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/index.shtml) and A Defense of Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/thesis.html) by Keith augustine (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/index.shtml). E-mail notification has been sent to the Carrier and Augustine, as well as to Jeffery J. Lowder (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/jeff_lowder/index.shtml), author of The Empirical Case for Metaphysical Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/infidels/newsletter/1999/march.html#Naturalism). Although there are no guarantees, you might want to check back from time to time for a further response following this post. -DM-]

[Alf]

I am none of the people mentioned but let me try to make an initial stab at this.

I think starting with what we can detect by scientific means is a good start. Of course, that leave us to define what we mean by "detect by scienttific means" and the danger of circularity is great here. However, as an initial start it should work well - we may refine it later.

You say that "unobservable" particles are excluded. That depends on how exactly you define "detect by scientific means". One can argue that since a physical model and theory is derived from experiments - i.e. detected features of the nature, they are indirectly detectable even if unobservable if the theory leaves it more reasonable to suppose they exist than that they do not. If you can mathematically and for symmertry reasons say that since a detectable observable particle X exist, then so too must a particle Y exist even if we cannot observe it, then one can argue that within the framework of that model - as long as it stands unchanted, we have reason to believe that the particle Y exist and as such it has been "detected" albeit theoretically and not in experiment. It is therefore a particle that we cannot say exist for sure but it is a particle that we can say exist provided the current theory is correct.

So, I would argue that your definition of "nature" to be whatever we can observe scientifically or which we have reason to believe exist based on other observables.

Sounds like a good step.

A catch here might be that a theist may then attempt to argue that if so then God is in nature also since he thinks he has "reason to believe" that God exist.

The problem here is that when you in science say you have reason to believe something it is based on coherent models and not on some interpretation of ancient texts which the believers cannot agree among themselves how to interpret. Nor it is based on supposing that something exist which is logically and empirically inconsistent with the observable world. True, a particle might only be deduced mathematically but it is exactly of consistency reasons we suppose it exist. The hypothetical God exist in the mind of the believer no matter how inconsistent that hypothesis is with anything else the believer might believe.

So when I say "reason to believe" I do not mean it in any religious sense.

I am sure that the other people notified here will also come up with their suggestions of how to define nature and whatever it is I am sure it is not an ad hoc definition such as you are alluring to. True, God, ghosts, demons and soul etc might not exist in nature but it is not because we define nature in such a way as to exclude them.

If you can scientifically prove that the mind can exist without a body - i.e. a soul, then a soul would fit right there in nature along with electrons and photons and you and me. The problem is that, as far as I know, no theist has ever been able to show that, nor has they ever been able to define what it is meant with a self without a body.

For example, if someone came up with a computer and it could remember everything which I remembered up until a certain time, it had AI that could exactly duplicate what I meant and what my opinions was at that same time, would it then be "me" at that time in any sense of the word? I am sure that most theists and soul believers has never thought about that question and I am also pretty sure that most of them will say "no, it is not you, it is a computer with AI that act like you and appear to remember what you remembered". So again, what _is_ this thing "soul" or "self"? Until you can properly define what it is, I see no reason to include it within the natural realm.

Alf

[AdamAppleby]

It is a bit ironic that Alf states in the beginning of his post he cannot define precisely what it means to "detect by scientific means", yet in his last paragraph he states since someone can't define what they mean by "self", he is justified in excluding it from the natural realm. The internal contradiction here is obviously that if "detect by scientific means" entails, at the very least, being able to define what it is we seek to "detect", then we are incapable of detecting detection by scientific means until we know what it means, which it seems Alf doesn't. Also, the scientific method relies on entities existing in nature to carry it out, and thus we are putting the cart before the horse.

Further, being able to detect something through scientific means would leave out a lot of what is considered "nature". There are no scientific means to know what I am thinking at a certain time of the day, but it would be odd to state that my thought at a certain time isn't part of nature. There are many others, particularly dealing with subjective states, and it would be rather dogmatic, IMO, to state that "since my theory might explain this later, it's ok to include it".

The question has been asked in the past how one can justify such a position as metaphysical naturalism, define nature, etc. If I remember correctly, Lowder, Carrier, Augustine, etc., never gave a convincing reply.

[PoodleLovinPessimist]

Perhaps one might define Metaphysical Naturalism as the position that anything not knowable or definable by naturalistic means, directly or indirectly through perception and natural (human) reason is not knowable or definable at all.

Metaphysical Naturalism is a position, not a truth; Every metaphysical system is hard (if not impossible) to prove without circularity because a metaphysical system specifies what "proof" means (as well as "true", "know", "exist", "good" and (sometimes) "beauty").

[kaugust]

Regarding _Defining Our Mission_ (2002) by Richard Carrier, as well as Keith Augustine's defense of "metaphysical naturalism":

The entire project of this web archive is undermined by the inability to state the metaphysical position which the linked articles are supposed to defend. No respectable definition of metaphysical naturalism is offered.

The claim that we offer no definition of naturalism is patently false. We even offer a definition of metaphysical naturalism by a respectable contemporary philosopher (who is agnostic about whether metaphysical naturalism is true) prominently on our front page. The front page reads:

In the words of Paul Draper, naturalism is "the hypothesis that the physical universe is a 'closed system' in the sense that nothing that is neither a part nor a product of it can affect it. So naturalism entails the nonexistence of all supernatural beings, including the theistic God."

The first sentence provides a definition of metaphysical naturalism. The second sentence notes an implication of that position.

At the time of writing my masters thesis I was unaware of Draper's definition of naturalism. Nevertheless, I independently came to define naturalism in exactly the same way that he does. As early as the second paragraph of Ch. 1 (in the section titled "What is Naturalism?," mind you), I write:

"[N]aturalism at least entails that nature is a closed system containing only natural causes and their effects. Fundamentally, naturalism is a metaphysical position about what sorts of causal relations exist--it is the position that every caused event within the natural world has a natural cause.... [thereby] denying that supernatural causation exists.... [N]aturalism is the position that everything that exists within nature is itself natural and is solely influenced by natural causes."

Though you might think that this definition is not "respectable," you offer no reasons for thinking so. So it is up to you to provide grounds for taking that view, grounds which are absent from your original message.

Of course the meanings of the various terms (like "nature" or "natural") used in that definition in turn need to be spelled out. But I go to great lengths to try to consider every possible angle in how "natural" should be defined. Indeed, the section titled "What is Naturalism" is only six paragraphs long; the rest of the first (and longest) part of the paper deals with what the category "natural" encompasses and how to draw the natural-supernatural distinction, both in theory (providing a concept of the natural as a metaphysical category) and in practice (allowing the identification of a potentially supernatural event and thus making naturalism a falsifiable empirical hypothesis).

So it is false to say that no respectable definition of metaphysical naturalism is provided on our site.

It is stated that the metaphysical claim is that “nature is all there is.� This is meaningless until some positive definition of “nature� is proposed. But none is offered.

First of all, early on in the paper I consider and reject the definition of naturalism as the position that nature is all there is. Instead I adopt a broader definition which allows the possibility that a nonnatural Platonic realm of abstract objects (like numbers) exists. Richard Carrier adopts the narrower definition that nature is all there is--a specific version of naturalism that may or may not be true. My definition is broader in that it is consistent with Richard's version without committing one to it. That is, it encompasses both naturalists who believe that nature is all there is and naturalists who believe in a nonnatural Platonic realm.

You are right that either definition of naturalism would be vacuous if terms like "nature" or "natural" were not defined. But I consider every possible definition of "natural" I can imagine and ultimately settle on a definition used throughout the paper and reiterated in the conclusion. Though I do not specifically define "nature," that is only because--as I use the terms--"nature" and "natural" are almost interchangible. For instance, if pressed I would define nature as "the entirety of natural things." But since that leans so heavily on how "natural" is defined, the definition of "nature" is fairly insignificant--what matters is whether my concept of naturalism offers a definition of "natural." Since I go to great pains to determine how "natural" should be defined in the first part of the paper, I clearly present a meaningful version of metaphysical naturalism. In the paper I even deride what I regard as "trivial" versions of naturalism as completely uninformative.

Moreover, my discussion of the possibility of nonnatural realms (before I set out to determine what the natural encompasses) already points to an implicit distinction between "nature" and "nonnature" (for lack of a better word), though I don't explicitly put it that way. Even very early in the paper I note that terms like "natural" need to be defined when I say: "Which aspects of reality are nonnatural in this sense will vary with the different definitions of nature or natural being used." (emphasis added)

Every time a definition is offered, it is found to exclude something that the naturalist wants to keep.

Some definitions exclude things from the metaphysical category "natural" that should be regarded as natural, but I reject those definitions (e.g., that natural = physical). But I ultimately do find a definition of "natural" (conveyed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) which does not exclude anything that this naturalist (at least) would count as natural.

For example, it has been proposed that the natural is what is located in space and time.

In the section of Ch. 1 titled "The Meaning of 'Nature' or 'Natural' (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/thesis.html#natural)" I consider and reject this definition of "natural" because some things (like quantum foam) might be physical even though they are not spatiotemporal, and surely everything that is physical is a part of nature.

But then spacetime itself is excluded (among other things).

Spacetime is clearly physical--it is part of physical theories, for instance. And the physical is a subset of the natural. There may be nonphysical qualia (e.g., the experience of being in pain may be something "over and above" neural firings rather than simply being identical to them) which are also encompassed by the natural. So not everything that is natural is necessarily physical; but everything that is physical is natural. This is why I opted to defend naturalism rather than a more narrow physicalism or materialism.

Or it is proposed that the natural is what is detectable by scientific instruments.

I also reject a definition of "natural" similar to this in the same section where I reject the spatiotemporal criterion.

But then unobservable fundamental particles that find their place in respectable physical theories are excluded.

Only if you define "detectable" in a much narrower sense than most scientists define it. Quarks are not detectable to the naked eye, but (under certain conditions in particle accelerators) they are detectable by particle physicists' standards. In any case, I do not adopt this definition of natural.

Worse, the “natural� is sometimes defined in terms of the “material� or the “physical.� The problem of definition is just pushed off, and the material and the physical are found to be no less difficult to define (in such a way that nothing is left out of the ontology that the naturalist does not want to leave out).

I agree; but I go into great detail about both (1) the undesirability of defining the natural as simply the physical and (2) the difficulty of defining the physical itself. I even ultimately bump up against (2) in my final definition of the natural. However, I think it's important to note that at some point you are going to have to accept fundamental levels of existence that cannot be reduced in terms of something else, and the physical may very well be one of those fundamental levels of existence. Nevertheless, it is still important to understand the metaphysical relationship between the natural and the physical--e.g., that the physical is encompassed by, but does not exhaust, the natural, and concomitantly that a metaphysical naturalist's ontology may include physical things, nonphysical natural things (like qualia or experiences), and even nonnatural things which do not intervene in the physical world--and possibly even nonnatural things which do intervene in the physical world but which are not intelligent minds or agents. I do not go as far as the last option, however, and do not know any metaphysical naturalist who does; but it is possible to adopt such a version of metaphysical naturalism if you're willing to reject the causal closure of the physical. (If this is not straightforward supernaturalism, however, it teeters very close to it in denying that nature is a closed system.)

It soon becomes clear that “naturalism� is not a positive metaphysical position, but an ad hoc, reactionary position.

Many positions on what exists can be cast in negative terms insofar as they put conditions on what sorts of things can exist. Monotheism holds that gods other than Yahweh (or Allah or whomever) do not exist. Idealism holds that physical object do not exist. Eliminativism holds that mental states do not exist. Soft determinism holds that libertarian free will does not exist. Nominalism holds that universals do not exist. Aristotelian realism holds that Platonic universals don't exist. And so on. The fact that these positions can be stated negatively does not detract from their viability. Some are viable and some are not--even though all of them are "negative" theses.

I agree that metaphysical naturalism is similarly a negative position. Positively-phrased versions of naturalism can be rendered negatively as such:

'Only nature exists' = Nothing exists outside of nature
'The natural world is all there is' = There is no nonnatural world
'All causes are natural causes' = There are no nonnatural causes

'The natural world is a closed system' = There are no nonnatural
influences on the natural world

The first two statements are identical, leaving us with three different versions of naturalism (there is a very subtle difference between the last and second last, which I mention in passing in my paper). The last definition is the form of metaphysical naturalism I adopt. That these are negative theses, however, does not detract from their viability; it simply makes them harder to confirm because then you have to prove a negative (outside of logic and mathematics).

But that difficulty about what we can know does not indicate whether such theses about reality are true or false. The view that fairy godparents do not exist is negative, but nevertheless quite probably true.

It is the view that anything may exist, as long as it is not God or an angel or a human soul or anything else that strikes us as too similar to one of these verboten entities.

That is true insofar as these entities are said to exist outside of nature and cause events within nature (on my definition of naturalism). Even the broader version which denies that nature is a closed system by allowing violations of causal closure would render these entities as unreal insofar as they are agents that exist outside of nature and cause events within nature. I think it's pretty clear that anything broader than that could not be called metaphysical naturalism.

I suggest that it would be much more honest for this web forum to acknowledge that the project is not motivated by the immense plausibility of some positive metaphysical position, but by an incredulity about the existence of certain kinds of entities

These two things are not mutually exclusive. It is "the immense plausibility" of metaphysical naturalism which yields our "incredulity about the existence of certain kinds of entities." (Whether naturalism is a positive or negative position is irrelevant.) As J.J.C. Smart says, "plausibility in the light of total science is the best touchstone of metaphysical truth."

(which, by the way, do not share any ontological features which justify their being lumped in the same metaphysical category).

That is not true. Conceptually, there is just as legitimate a philosophical distinction between natural and nonnatural as there is between physical and nonphysical, concrete and abstract, appearance and reality, fact and value, free and determined, knowledge and belief, and so on.

Frankly, you should be praising me for attempting to draw out the ontological distinction between the natural and the nonnatural; as the citations in my paper demonstrate, to my knowledge not one other philosopher has ever tried to do so before. As far as I know, I am the first person to even try to systematically spell out what the category "natural" is meant to encompass and draw out the natural-supernatural distinction. Believe me, I tried to find publications which already addressed this but couldn't find any. So I had no choice but to take on the task alone. I think I deserve credit for at least trying (unlike everyone else) even if you find my ultimate criteria for categorizing something as natural or nonnatural deficient for whatever reason.

is “the dignity of humanity� (to which Carrier claims the organization is committed) really non-spooky enough for the tastes the Internet Infidels membership?

For the most part, I'll leave the question about the dignity of humanity to Richard Carrier since I do not believe that moral categories refer to any objective features of the world. But I'd like you to note that, believe it or not, since I am willing to entertain the possible existence of nonnatural abstract objects, there is nothing particularly "spooky" about moral obligations to me. My disbelief in such categories stems not so much from their ontological "queerness" (in Mackie's sense) but from an inability to identify their truthmakers--that is, what allegedly makes a moral claim true. I know what makes "The Earth is 93 million miles from the Sun" true--physical distance. I know what makes "2+2=4" true--logical necessity. I have no idea what is supposed to make "Inflicting unnecessary suffering is wrong" true (or conversely, what is supposed to make "Inflicting unnecessary suffering is good" false).

I think it will once again be seen that the category of the natural is ad hoc.

I dispute this in my paper. See my discussion of Hepburn and especially Spiegelberg in the section of Ch. 1 titled "The Natural-Supernatural Distinction (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/thesis.html#distinction)."

There is no recipe by reference to which the metaphysical naturalists affiliated with this forum sort ontological elements into the categories of acceptable and unacceptable.

Sure there is. I offer one such recipe in my paper. The unacceptable entities in my naturalistic ontology are all (1) nonphysical; (2) not supervenient upon anything physical; (3) nonspatiotemporal; (4) scientifically inexplicable in principle; (5) failing to behave according with laws of nature; and (6) the cause of events in the natural world.

Rather it is decided beforehand which elements to countenance and which not to countenance, and then attempts are made to construct definitions which keep the elements which have been accepted and dispense with those which have previously been rejected.

You are correct that what to countenance as acceptable or unacceptable is incorporated into one's definitions of their position first, as it is in any metaphysical position which restricts what can exist (e.g., idealism). What you're missing is that the difference between metaphysical naturalism and, say, monotheism is that the grounds for countenancing certain things as acceptable or unacceptable on naturalism are empirical. The reasons that people accept monotheism are belief in revelation, adherence to tradition, a desire to fulfill certain psychological needs, pressure to conform, historical accident that one was raised in a monotheistic rather than polytheistic or animistic culture, etc.

When it really comes down to it, the grounds I have for rejecting the supernatural are identical to the grounds I have for rejecting the existence of time-traveling cyborgs, vampires, werewolves, and the gods hovering above Mount Olympus--lack of evidence.

Again, I do not think it should be pretended that the motivation is the immense plausibility of some metaphysical principle. If it were, I should very much like to know what that principle is

You're right--my metaphysical naturalism is not motivated by any metaphysical principle. Rather, it is motivated by empirical evidence. Again, I follow Smart: "plausibility in the light of total science is the best touchstone of metaphysical truth." See Ch. 2 of my paper--"An Empirical Case for Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/thesis.html#two)"--and Jeff Lowder's "The Empirical Case for Metaphysical Naturalism (http://www.infidels.org/infidels/newsletter/1999/march.html#Naturalism)."

Notice that the form of what I call the "more practical lack of evidence argument" would apply to naturalistically acceptable entities as well--such as unicorns, leprachauns, centaurs, and so on. So my reasons for accepting naturalism, at least, do not hinge on anything to do with how one defines the natural. It's just that the empirical evidence happens to make naturalism very probable. If it did not--if there really were uncontroversial evidence for what I call a "likely candidate for a supernatural event"--then naturalism would be falsified. But there happens to be no clear-cut evidence for the supernatural in the real world. And the best explanation for that lack of evidence, IMO, is that we live in a naturalistic universe. See the comments in the conclusion (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/thesis.html#conclusion) of my paper, particularly those by Ernst Nagel.

The question has been asked in the past how one can justify such a position as metaphysical naturalism, define nature, etc. If I remember correctly, Lowder, Carrier, Augustine, etc., never gave a convincing reply.

My "convincing reply" to this question is my masters thesis. One only needs to look at its table of contents to see that I explicitly address precisely these questions. If you do not find it convincing then you should explain exactly what it is that you find unconvincing about my defense of naturalism.

[Alf]

AdamAppleby said:

It is a bit ironic that Alf states in the beginning of his post he cannot define precisely what it means to "detect by scientific means", yet in his last paragraph he states since someone can't define what they mean by "self", he is justified in excluding it from the natural realm. The internal contradiction here is obviously that if "detect by scientific means" entails, at the very least, being able to define what it is we seek to "detect", then we are incapable of detecting detection by scientific means until we know what it means, which it seems Alf doesn't. Also, the scientific method relies on entities existing in nature to carry it out, and thus we are putting the cart before the horse.

I say:

First off, could you point out where I make such a claim? Where do I say "detect by scientific means cannot be defined"? I cannot remember I ever wrote such a thing and I cannot find it anywhere.

I might have said at one time that I will not pretend to know all the answers and I might not be able to define it exactly. However, there is absolutely no contradiction between stating a personal limit and say that this is part of nature even if I cannot define it properly per se and saying that another thing is not part of nature because nobody so far has managed to define it.

So where is this contradiction and irony you are speaking of?

Also, your argument appear to be that since we have to trust our senses in order to trust our measuring we cannot claim that what we measure out there is real.

Ok, if you want to lapse into solipsism, be my guest, but count me out of it. Since we under normal circumstances are not drugged or hallucinating and we detect a coherent consistent world out there, there is no reason to doubt our senses in the first place. It is a far cry from saying "I can see a bus there, therefore I should not cross the street right now" and saying "Oh, there must be ghosts in the world since it requires faith to believe that bus exist, so I might as well have faith that ghosts exist as well".

If you cannot see the fundamental difference in those two statements then you have a problem.

Who is putting the cart in front of the horse?

Also, what are you talking about leaving out? What you are thinking right now is "thoughts". They are detected through scientific means, we even have branches of science that investigate various aspects of thoughts, the "self" and other related things.

If "thoughts" exist it is no great leap of faith to assume you also have thoughts right now. It _is_ a great leap of faith to say that thoughts can exist without a body and that a soul exist. All that we know about thoughts so far attaches them to a brain or something functionally equivalent so a thought existing by itself without a body thinking it, is to my knowledge impossible.

Alf

[AdamAppleby]

In response to Alf's recent post, his original post stated:

"I think starting with what we can detect by scientific means is a good start. Of course, that leave us to define what we mean by "detect by scienttific means" and the danger of circularity is great here."

He then goes on to argue, without ever defining what it means to say "detect by scientific means", as if "detect by scientific means" is a good place to start and we can proceed from there. (As a side note, I have no qualms with this position overall.)

Alf then goes on to write:

"So again, what _is_ this thing "soul" or "self"? Until you can properly define what it is, I see no reason to include it within the natural realm."

This is an obvious contradiction. It makes no sense to state that because someone can't define something it should be excluded from the natural realm while at the same time holding it's OK for you to believe something that can't be defined that is included in the natural realm. Whether there is a personal limitation on being able to define terms, it is unfair and inconsistent to expect others to follow strict defining guidelines while those same guidelines don't apply to you.

Alf goes on to say things in his most recent post that I'm not even sure what they mean or are in reference to.

He then writes:

"Also, what are you talking about leaving out? What you are thinking right now is "thoughts". They are detected through scientific means, we even have branches of science that investigate various aspects of thoughts, the "self" and other related things."

What I was talking about leaving out are things that cannot be detect by scientific means. There is no branch of science that can detect where a thought is taking place. Besides that, there is no branch of science that can detect what I am thinking at any particular time. By your definition of what to include in the natural realm (that which science can detect), it would follow you can't make the claim me having a thought "I want a sandwich" at 1:00pm on October 12, 2003 is part of the natural realm, since there is no way to detect that particular thought.

Since Keith already responded to the original post, there is no point in me writing again on the feedback forum. In reply to Keith's comment, he simply holds views that metaphysical naturalists are forced to take now: (1) redefining "metaphysical naturalism" in a way that leaves it open to other things existing outside of nature and (2) redefining "nature" in a way that allows the person to avoid all of the many problems with metaphysical naturalism. Metaphysical naturalism is a position that makes a blanket statement that can only be backed up by evidence to the best possible explanation. This site originally had on it's main page that it was dedicated to metaphysical naturalism, a position that nature is all there is. That is no longer there (or at least the wording) because proving that is easier said than done.

[Jim Lazarus]

Just want to applaud Mr. Augustine for his post. Cleared up a few things I hadn't thought about before.

Thanks.

- Laz

[kaugust]

In reply to Keith's comment, he simply holds views that metaphysical naturalists are forced to take now: (1) redefining "metaphysical naturalism" in a way that leaves it open to other things existing outside of nature and (2) redefining "nature" in a way that allows the person to avoid all of the many problems with metaphysical naturalism.

If the willingness to consider alternatives to strict materialism shows anything, it shows that metaphysical naturalists are open-minded about ontology. While I'd very much like to think that "everything is physical" is true--there's a simplicity about that position that's very appealing--I'm willing to acknowledge that despite that simplicity there are grounds for questioning it. Nonreductive materialism or property dualism may be required to account for the mental. Platonic abstract objects may be required to account for logical necessity. And so on. It seems odd for you to complain that I am allowing too much into my naturalistic ontology. If there are grounds for thinking that something nonnatural exists, why would I dismiss them by characterizing naturalism in such a way that they are excluded merely by an arbitrary definitional fiat? All that I argue is that--whether or not you think nonphysical qualia exist, or whether or not you think Platonic numbers exist, your grounds for taking a position on those issues should be based on considerations in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of mathematics, respectively, not simply because you don't like the idea of nonphysical or nonnatural things. Perhaps you dislike my vision of metaphysical naturalism because it doesn't aid your polemics against nonbelievers. Don't expect me to apologize simply because I've preempted supernaturalists from attacking red herrings--positions that naturalists don't have to be committed to--in order to distract their audiences from the real issue. The real issue between naturalists and supernaturalists is not whether abstract objects exist, or qualia exist, or whether the Big Bang requires a cause of some sort. The real issue is whether there is any clear-cut evidence for the supernatural. Since there is not, supernaturalists attempt to distract their supporters from that fact by attacking some straw-man naturalism, e.g., naturalized epistemology, conflating that totally different position with metaphysical naturalism, and then declaring metaphysical naturalism dead (I have Naturalism: A Critical Analysis by Craig and Moreland in mind here--see a critical review by Graham Oppy (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/graham_oppy/naturalism.html) for instances of this).

Doesn't it strike you as a little odd that the Red Sea never parts in front of CNN cameras? Or that instead of capturing full-figured apparitions, ghost hunters only capture "orbs" which look remarkably like dust particles illuminated by the infrared lights their videocameras shine on the walls? Why don't we see footage of levitating tables in broad daylight?

Metaphysical naturalism is a position that makes a blanket statement that can only be backed up by evidence to the best possible explanation.

And you think this is a deficiency? Would you talk about the General Theory of Relativity like this? It's almost like you're saying: "All the evidence points to metaphysical naturalism being true, but that's all it has going for it." What more do you want? What more could any metaphysical position ask for than having solid scientific evidence backing it up?

This site originally had on it's main page that it was dedicated to metaphysical naturalism, a position that nature is all there is. That is no longer there (or at least the wording) because proving that is easier said than done.

That's not true. The site did originally have that language on our main page, but not for the reason you suggest. The reason that "nature is all there is" was used was because Richard Carrier wrote that language, and that language reflects his version of naturalism. That this excluded some naturalists was Richard's oversight. The language was changed because several people who definitely are metaphysical naturalists in a significant, meaningful sense (i.e., are naturalists as I define the term) do not subscribe to (either reductive or nonreductive) materialism. One well-known example is Bertrand Russell, who rejected the existence of the supernatural and was a Platonist about abstract objects. Russell even explained why he rejected materialism. But he did not believe in supernatural entities either. Doesn't that make him a metaphysical naturalist?

Even W.V.O. Quine held the position that, minimally, sets have to be construed in a Platonic way. But that has absolutely nothing to do with whether events in the natural world have supernatural causes. That is the issue--that is something that there would be evidence for if supernaturalism were true. So where is that evidence? Why is the evidence for the supernatural eternally ambiguous? Why isn't there any clear evidence for the supernatural? Why is the evidence always shoddy or otherwise questionable, if the supernatural is real?

That's the question that opponents of naturalism don't want to deal with. And they don't want to deal with it because they know there is no good answer from a standpoint which rejects naturalism.

[Edited at the request of the author only to fix a couple of typos. -DM-]

[ATGuminski]

It is a good thing that TheFool has challenged self-professed metaphysical naturalists to adequately define their terms. Although I appreciate and agree, to some extent, with some of the responses to his remarks, I should like to submit the following as one answer to TheFool..

1.The term metaphysical naturalism is a generic term embracing a number of sharply differing schools of thought. So what constitutes mere metaphysical naturalism will pertain to relatively few characteristics. I suspect (subject to correction) that TheFool is a Christian. And so it would on another occasion not be out of place to inquire of him/her as to what is mere Christianity, thereby requiring a definition which would survive criticism. But being a mere Christian pertains to relatively few beliefs common to persons having very sharply differing views on numerous philosophical, theological, moral, and other issues. Because the term metaphysical naturalist is generic; just as Christian is generic, it may well be the case that an adherent of one school of metaphysical naturalism may find himself/herself more in agreement with some Christians upon some fundamental philosophical issues than with some metaphysical naturalists belonging to yet another school. Just because I am a metaphysical naturalist, I do not regard myself as belonging to something like a political party or as a fan rooting for some hometown ball team. It is not enough to just argue for metaphysical naturalism in the generic sense. It is more important to advocate a specific version of the metaphysical naturalism because it is true, or as more probable than not. I believe, however,that some versions of the same are false--for example, any version which includes the proposition that affirms the causal inefficacy of mental states or events. However, an assertion that a specific version of metaphysical naturalism is false does not entail that metaphysical naturalism is false when the term is understood in a generic sense; just as the assertion that a particular theological system of Christianity is false does not entail the falsehood of mere Christianity.

2. The term metaphysical naturalism should be useful and thus used such that it is not treated synonmymously with more-or-less closely related notions. If we have two somewhat similar terms, they should pertain to two different but somewhat similar notions; rather than have the two terms pertain to only one notion. Thus it is not desirable to define the term so that it is virtually synonymous with physicalism (here understood as meaning that the only concrete entities that exist are physical or supervenient upon the physical). Thus I am quite willing to say that all physicalists (as so defined) are metaphysical naturalists, but not that all metaphysical naturalists are physicalists. Somewhat similarly, there are metaphysical naturalists who hold that abstract entities (such as numbers, sets, propositions, points) are not real and who insist that such denial is partly constitutive of what is metaphysical naturalism. In this connection I fully agree with Keith Augustine that metaphysical naturalism should be understood as being consistent with either the affirmation or the denial of Platonic realism. Metaphysical naturalism should be understood as pertaining only to the domain of what are commonly called concrete substances, and their properties and relations—and therefore pertaining to any real or supposed natural or supernatural substance (e.g., dogs, cats, humans, stars, atoms, and to God, angels, ghosts, human souls). Of course, the ontological status of abstact entities is very interesting, but when people ordinarily talk about natural and supernatural beings they are not talking about abstract entities. So I think it is best to respect popular usage.

3. So I think the term metaphysical naturalism should be so used as to encompass atheism (here understood as meaning the affirmation that God (suitably defined) does not exist or that his existence is more improbable than not). But not all atheists are metaphysical naturalists—since some atheists might very well believe that there are temporally finite disembodied minds or spirits each with superhuman but nevertheless finite powers. Unfortunately, there is a tendency among some atheists (just as there is among theists) to define potentially useful terms so that the definition of some general term, such as metaphysical naturalist, is so narrow that it pertains only to those sharing the same views as the proponent of the definition.

4. Here I must notice how clever is TheFool. In denigrating metaphysical naturalism, TheFool criticizes it as being "an ad hoc, reactionary position." He/she goes on to say: "It is the view that anything may exist, as long as it is not God or an angel or a human soul or anythig else that strikes as as too similar to one of these verboten entities." But, interestingly, he explains parenthetically that these entities "do not share any ontological features which justify their being lumped in the same metaphysical category." Similarly, he refers to the "rejection of God, angels, human souls, ghosts, and all manner of other spooky stuff." TheFool, cunning polemicist that he/she is, provides a clue as to his/her dialetical strategy by the declaration that the enumerated entities (including human souls) "do not share any ontological features which justify being lumped in the same metaphysical category." Well now--God, angels, and ghosts certainly can be legitimately lumped in the same metaphysical category—they are all disembodied concrete beings. But what about human souls? Here I take TheFool to use "human soul" to refer to that supposed immaterial substance or substantive component of the human which has mental powers (conceptualiizing, imagining, perceiving, reasoning, remembering, and so forth). Let us suppose that A believes that human souls (in the above sense) exist. Does so affirming necessarily make A not a metaphysical naturalist? Let us suppose that his/her belief that human souls exist is quite erroneous. Yet, I do not think that he is necessarily not a metaphysical naturalist. Alas! Perhaps I may disclose myself to many readers as being altogether too simple. However, I simply deny that to affirm the existence of human souls per se operates to expel oneself from the honorable company of metaphysical naturalists.

5.Surely, human reasoning, conceptualizing, perceiving, reasoning, and the like are within the natural domain. Therefore, such activities are not within the "spooky" domain. Let us assume arguendo that such mental powers by humans requires the existence of a functioning immaterial substance, i.e., the human soul. So understood, the human soul is a natural entity animating the human body; it is an embodied soul. If the soul survives the death of the person, it is a disembodied spirit and belongs to that domain which TheFool so irreverently characterizes as spooky. But here we must be careful.The person who denies the existence of disembodied minds or spirits (including God, angels, and ghosts) but affirms the existence of human souls must necessarily conclude that the human soul never exists except insofar as it is embodied. Quite typically, he will believe that the human soul is temporally finite, the natural product or emergent of natural processes pertaining to the human body—the soul ceasing to exist not later than the death of the living organism which, one can say, animates it. Conceivably, however, the person in question might believe in human reincarnation involving the succession of embodiments by one soul without any temporal lapse. But this opinion, although consistent with mere metaphysical naturalism, is certainly considered as false.by most metaphysical naturalists in this country.

6. Although I think some forms of substance-dualism are consistent with metaphysical naturalism, I hold that it is more probable that the human soul should instead be conceived as being those relevant parts of the living human body which when suitably configued has such mental powers as are characterized as human. Humans can be said, in that case, to have natural souls—just as is the case with supposed emergent nonphysical entities which depend for their existence upon that of a suitably configured human body. So TheFool is quite right in saying that human souls are to be considered as ontologically quite different from God, angels, and ghosts—provided he is referring to only embodied human souls. But perhaps we are referring to a borderline case when we speak of an embodied human soul which has been created by God (or some other supernatural spirit) and endowed with immorality despite the death of organism which it (is said to) animate.

7. If I have a natural soul, whether or not an emergent immaterial substance or component, nevertheless I am surely not doing anything supernatural when I decide to move my hands, or to take a walk, or to study French. But were I to have additionally the power to walk on water, or to raise the dead to life, or to change water into wine (now that's a merry thought), then I would at least suspect that I have supernatural powers. I would at least suspect that I could not do any of these things without having powers which have been miraculously given me by God or some other powerful disembodied spirit. In some other cases, the ostensibly supernatural powers in question might be exercised by a human who is also the incarnation of God or some other disembodied being. But metaphysical supernaturalism precludes the existence of God or any other disembodied spirit or mind. Hence the human soul is not a creation by, or involves the incarnation, of God or some other spiritual being with superhuman powers. In any event, the metaphysical naturalist is not lumping together concrete entities of ontologically different natures when he groups God, angels, and disembodied human souls in the same category.

8. Now I am surely a metaphysical naturalist in that I believe that the existence of God or any other disembodied spirit or mind is more antecendently improbable than not, and that such improbability has not been discharged or overriden by any evidences to the contrary. I believe that it is more antecedently probable than not that the human mind is the human body insofar when suitably configured to allow having those characteristically human mental powers. Most emphatically, I reject all forms of epiphenomenalism (the doctrine that mental states or events lack any causal efficacy and are simply supervenient upon physical states or events). But, again, an episphenomenalist may nevertheless still be a mere metaphysical naturalist (as I believe the term should be used); just as a person may nevertheless be a mere Christian although he believes that all unbaptized persons should be consigned to Hell and that all obstinate heretics and apostates be delivered to the secular arm for punishment.

9. Why should it be problematical that I, rejecting as more antecdently improbable than not the existence of all disembodied spirits or minds, should be considered a metaphysical naturalist? But being an advocate of a specific version of metaphysical naturalism does not make me feel I have any duty of quasi-party loyalty to fellow metaphysical naturalists with whom I profoundly disagree upon some fundamental issues. Here I what to express my complaint that all too frequently it is claimed that metaphysical naturalists are mostly physicalist or epiphenomenalist, or that being a substance-dualist or nonepiphenomenalist property-dualist places one on or beyond the outer fringes of metaphysical naturalism. But I think that the overwelming majority of people who reject as at least antecendently more improbable than not the existence of God and any other disembodied mind or spirit also reject epiphenomenalism-whether or not any are substance dualists. So TheFool, in my opinion, is wise insofar as he/she implicitly condemns all those schools of metaphysical naturalism which affirm what I hold to be patently false: that mental states or events lack their own causal efficacy. Metaphysical naturalists should bear in mind that to reject the physical closure principle (i.e., all physical events have only physical causes if any) does not entail rejection of the natural closure principle (i.e., all natural events have only natural causes if any). Thus I conclude that the term metaphysical naturalist is more useful than otherwise if it encompasses any person who rejects the existence of God, angels, and disembodied minds; but encompasses those who hold to some substance-dualist theory of an emergent mind that is the product of natural processes as well as those who maintain that the human mind is the suitably configured body such that has mental powers..But I do not begrudge the label of being a metaphysical naturalist to those persons who are epiphenomenalists.

10. To be sure opinions differ but it is better to consider metaphysical naturalism not as one more allegedly properly basic belief albeit one open to defeaters. To paraphrase C.D. Broad's remarks (made in another context): "There is then, in my view, no possibility of first deciding between alternative metaphysical systems on general grounds and then taking the system which we have accepted as a fixed datum from which to estimate the antecedent probability of surival [for example, or of substance-dualism, epiphenomenalist property-dualist, or of the existence of the God of traditional monotheism]" The Mind and its Place in Nature, p. 520 (bracketed matter added). If it were the case that disembodied minds or spirits exist and this could be shown to be probable using, for example, standard inference-to-best-explanation methodology, I would not claim that disembodied minds or spirits are therefore part of the natural world. Rather I would cease to consider myself as a metaphysical naturalist—although I would remain an atheist. usage of terms.

11. So this leaves one chief remaining issue as to which TheFool thinks he/she has a polemical advantage. In the last paragraph of his/her submission, TheFool discusses whether so-called metaphysical naturalists can plausibly speak of the dignity of humanity. As to ethical and metaethical issues there are metaphysical naturalists and there are metaphysical naturalists—just as there are Christians and there are Christians. Mere metaphysical naturalism entails neither the acceptance nor the affirmation of humanist principles; although a specific version of naturalism may do so. But similarly mere Christianity entails neither the acceptance nor the affirmation of humanist principles –since, for example, historically adherence to orthodox Christianity was thought by many to be fully consistent with the institution of African slavery, or with religious persecution. The point though is that humanism is consistent with some versions of metaphysical naturalism; just as it is with some versions of Christianity. Suffice it to say that since humans are natural beings then whatever dignity each human has is necessarily natural in terms of its foundation and origin. To fully discuss these issues would unduly lengthen this paper. So I invite the interested reader to access my paper "The Moral Argument for God's Existence, the Natural Moral Law, and Conservative Metaphysical Naturalism" (together with a response thereto by James A. Cook and my reply) by going to www.theologyforum.net (click on media and then papers). .

12..So why are we, metaphysical naturalists belonging as we do to different schools, committed to the fostering of the Secular Web? Virtually all of us surely have some commitments in common in addition to our mere metaphysical naturalism. But the most relevant is that we think that the Secular Web constitutes a very convenient forum for the fruitful exchange of views among ourselves and with others interested in dialogue with us. We are moved to engage in this intellectual enterprise for reasons somewhat similar to those who choose to be members of the Society of Christian Philosophers--that association which publishes that excellent scholarly journal Faith and Philosophy and which sponsors regional philosophical conferences. Yet I notice that the Society of Christian Philospher describes itself as "broadly ecumenical in composition with respect to Christian denomination, theological perspective, and philosophical orientation." Moreover, the society stipulates: "Membership is open to any person who classifies himself/herself as both a philosopher and a Christian." This latitudarian usage is not intended to minimize significant differences of opinion among self-professed Christian philosophers. It is intended to facilitate intellectual discourse among themselves—and with others not self-professed Christians. Similar considerations apply mutatis mutandis (similar changes having been made) to self-professed metaphysical naturalists.

12. It is fortunate that Keith Augustine, Richard Carrier, and Jeffrey Jay Lowder, not to speak of others, have so ably undertaken the task of defining metaphysical naturalism with greater precision. Although TheFool has improvidently chosen an unfortunate and inaccurate user name—he/she has nevertheless commendably stimulated self-professed metaphysical naturalists to carefully examine or re-examine the issues pertaining to the definition of the term metaphysical naturalism. But in doing so we should do our best to avoid conforming to that very natural tendency, as David Hume put it, "for men to embrace those principles, by which they find they can best defend their doctrines." (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part I.) On the other hand, we should not despair in failing to formulate definitions to our complete satisfaction because as James Madison so aptly explained: "no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas." (The Federalist, no. 37.)

[Alf]

In response to Alf's recent post, his original post stated:

Adam Appleby said:

"I think starting with what we can detect by scientific means is a good start. Of course, that leave us to define what we mean by "detect by scienttific means" and the danger of circularity is great here."

He then goes on to argue, without ever defining what it means to say "detect by scientific means", as if "detect by scientific means" is a good place to start and we can proceed from there. (As a side note, I have no qualms with this position overall.)

I say:

I left it out precisely because different people may have different definitions about what exactly that entails and I believe other people here most likely have thought about these issues more than I have and probably have better definitions than I can come up with.

That does not mean that the concept itself cannot be defined. On the contrary, one MUST have some idea of what it means in order to talk about these issues and I believe that people who has thought about these issues at greater length than I can provide a very complete and accurate definition of exactly what "detect by scientifc means" means.

Yes, I do have some idea of what such a definittion must contain but I don't consider myself an expert in this field and most likely my definition will be somewhat incomplete and will not take everything into account. Seeing as you are very intent upon attacking any "hole" you might find in any such definition I figured it was best left out since any such attack is ultimately irrelevant. Again, to repeat myself, that does not mean that it cannot be defined, just that I did not define it in that posting. Keep this in mind when we go through the next part.

I said:

"So again, what _is_ this thing "soul" or "self"? Until you can properly define what it is, I see no reason to include it within the natural realm."

Adam then says:

This is an obvious contradiction. It makes no sense to state that because someone can't define something it should be excluded from the natural realm while at the same time holding it's OK for you to believe something that can't be defined that is included in the natural realm. Whether there is a personal limitation on being able to define terms, it is unfair and inconsistent to expect others to follow strict defining guidelines while those same guidelines don't apply to you.

I say:

No it is NOT a contradiction. I did not define "detect by scientific means" but it CAN be defined and it HAS BEEN defined by other people than me. The problem with "soul" or "self" is not that I cannot define it. The problem is that NOBODY can define those terms in such a way that it can be tested for by rational means.

You are comparing apples and oranges here and there is no contradiction in these two cases. Far from being "obvious contradiction" it is quite legitimate.

Give me a definition of "God" that I can verify or disprove and I can either now or maybe someone else in some future time when we have developed means to actually perform that test verify or disprove that your God exist. The problem is that - as far as I know - no christian person will ever give you such a definition of God. They say he is undetectable, or that he can only be detected by those who believe, that he is "outside" of the unvierse and at the same time omnipresent everywhere in the universe. These are all meaningless statements which is essentially claiming that gibbledy-gook exis, can you disprove that Gibbledy-gook exist? You cannot, because I never provided any definition of the term and unlike the "detect by scientific means" the Gibbledy-gook is not a meaningful term unless I provide an explicit definition of it. Detect by scientific means does have a meaning partly because even though I haven't yet provided a definition of it, it is reasonable to assume that other people can and partly because most of us does have some idea of what it means even if we haven't yet personally seen such an explicit definition provided to us - we intuitively have an idea. Of course, knowing things by intuition doesn't give you high confidence, some people think they "know" what "God" means through intuition so at some point you have to get down to the nitty gritty and ask what _is_ that explicit definition. A logician or philosopher might provide such a definition for "detect by scientific means", it is at the heart of modern science. Such a definition can then be "tested" and verified by realizing that all scientific discoveries found through application of it provide a coherent and consistent world view. A theologician might give you a definition of "God" but it won't be coherent, he will then explain those inconsistencies by appealing to "mysterious ways" and other mumbo-jumbo but the end result is that you cannot provide a proper definition of God that is coherent and consistent. The best evidence for this is that there are so many different sects of christian religion while there are no division among scientists, there are no different factions of scientists into those who believe in evolution and those who doesn't, those who doesn't believe in evolution are all creationists and do so for religious and not scientific reasons.

Adam say:

Alf goes on to say things in his most recent post that I'm not even sure what they mean or are in reference to.

I said:

"Also, what are you talking about leaving out? What you are thinking right now is "thoughts". They are detected through scientific means, we even have branches of science that investigate various aspects of thoughts, the "self" and other related things."

Well, I was referring to your posting where you said something to the effect that only material objects exist in the physical world and so "detect by scientific" means is somehow limited only to material things. This is not at all true. "Interaction" and "organization" are not material concepts, nor are "thoughts" or "Ideas". Yet, they play a key role in many scientific studies and are as such detectable through scientific means.

Adam say:

What I was talking about leaving out are things that cannot be detect by scientific means. There is no branch of science that can detect where a thought is taking place. Besides

I say:

This is patently false. Try to argue with a neuro scientist about this issue. Thoughts are at the msot basic level signals and electro-chemical activities in your brain. Your brain is a huge and advanced pattern recognition machine and it can form brain patterns that is "thoughts" based from sensory inputs and memory and process those at different levels in various parts of the brain and thus produce different levels of abstraction and thoughts.

Your thoughts are taking place in your brain.

Adam say:

that, there is no branch of science that can detect what I am thinking at any particular time.

I say:

Yeah, I know the telephathy deptartment is largely lacking in the science department. Is that a problem with science or a problem with telepathy? Why is science's inability to know what you are thinking at any particular time a problem for science? It doesn't mean that those thoughts do not exist. If science can detect that elecrons exist in the lab it doesn't mean that there are no electrons outside the lab. If science can to a large degree describe how neurons operate and form thoughts, do we have to know your exact thoughts right now in order to assume you have any? I would say that judging from what you are typing I can say that most likely you were thinking what you wrote at the moment you wrote it, so I can actually say that most likely you were thinking about thoughts and your own thoughts in particular when you were typing that statement. It doesn't mean I have telepathic abilities though. However, none of this proves that god exist. We can assume that your thoughts exist at any particular time because we can detect other people have thoughts at other times. However, the problem with God or soul is that they are ALWAYS elusive and avoid detection.

Adam say:

By your definition of what to include in the natural realm (that which science can detect), it would follow you can't make the claim me having a thought "I want a sandwich" at 1:00pm on October 12, 2003 is part of the natural realm, since there is no way to detect that particular thought.

No, it is quite possible that it wasn't detected through scientif means that you thought that thought. However, it was potentially detectable. We could have put you in some aparatus and seen how various parts of your brain flutter with activity and other parts remain silent at the momnent you thought that thought. The fact that no scietntist actually did that is alrgely irrelevant.

So assuming you thoght that you want a sandwich is largely acceptable. It is also likely to believe since such a thought is rather mundane and the consequence of accepting it even if wrong is minimal.

However, accepting that there is a God is a different matter. NOBODY ANYWHERE has EVER been able to detect any trace of God in a scientific manner. Worse, the consequence of accepting a particular God belief claim if wrong is far more serious. If we, for the sake of argument, accept that it is possible there is a god, then the chance of us accepting the wrong god based on this argument is overwhelming. Against your single claim of God, there are a zillion other god beliefs out there and so chances are that most likely you are wrong since they are all just as likely - they all have exactly NIL evidence in their favor. The safest path is therefore to not believe any of them until some evidence is presented.

Also, I left out a definition of "detect by scientific means" exactly because - in my view - it also includes some non-material things that aren't immediately detectable but which are inferred from other things detected. For example if we use a machine to measure electorns, you can argue that we cannot see the electons but knowing how that apparatus works and the measurment result we have good reason to think that they exist anyway.

Also, thoughts can be detected by measuring brain activity while a person work on specific tasks. True, we cannot see "I want a sandwich" but an expert could probably read that you were thinking of food and you wanted something to eat. The fact that some signals from your brain to various body organs that stimulate hunger etc would indicate that.

Soul, God and self on the other hand is not only "not yet detected" but they are UNDETECTABLE and that is the problem at heart which I feel you have problems to grasp. There is a distinction between things we have not detected right now because we didn't bother to measure or because we currently lack the equipment to measure and things that are in principle not detectable.

I guess it is because you don't recognize that difference that you see what I wrote as a contradiction when it really isn't.

Alf

[Kal Larmi]

By 'naturalism' I mean the hypothesis that the physical universe is a 'closed system' in the sense that nothing that is neither part nor a product of it can affect it. So naturalism entails the nonexistence of all supernatural beings, including the theistic God."
-- Paul Draper, "Evolution and the Problem of Evil" in Philosophy of Religion (ed. Louis Pojman, Wadsworth, 1997), pp. 219-220.

When I taught "Systems Theory" in Univ., College, and Comm. College
my students after a few weeks would not pay attention to such drivel. A person who spoke from a position that needed , like a hand wound clock, to be ultimately wound up again and again buy nothing but hand power; while tending to entrophy, would not get the time of day. Christianity is an "Open System" end of discussion. The discussion is "Closed Systems vrs "Open Systems".
It seems that notrhing in your closed system "can effect you".
You pick the wrong people to debate with try a system theorist.

[Alf]

By 'naturalism' I mean the hypothesis that the physical universe is a 'closed system' in the sense that nothing that is neither part nor a product of it can affect it. So naturalism entails the nonexistence of all supernatural beings, including the theistic God."
-- Paul Draper, "Evolution and the Problem of Evil" in Philosophy of Religion (ed. Louis Pojman, Wadsworth, 1997), pp. 219-220.

When I taught "Systems Theory" in Univ., College, and Comm. College
my students after a few weeks would not pay attention to such drivel. A person who spoke from a position that needed , like a hand wound clock, to be ultimately wound up again and again buy nothing but hand power; while tending to entrophy, would not get the time of day. Christianity is an "Open System" end of discussion. The discussion is "Closed Systems vrs "Open Systems".
It seems that notrhing in your closed system "can effect you".
You pick the wrong people to debate with try a system theorist.

Err... are you attacking his definition of "naturalism"? I am afraid you lost me there, what exactly are you trying to say?

a) This is wrong definition of "naturalism".

Well, I guess you are wrong, I think the above definition of "naturalism" is perhaps not perfect but suitable in the context it was used and I don't know off hand how to improve it significantly.

b) This definition of "naturalism" entails a world view not accepted by christians since they view the world as an "open system".

Well, fine, christians are not naturalists. what else is new?

c) This definition of "naturalism" is not meaningful since the world isn't a closed system.

Well, it is obviously meaningful to Paul Draper. Just because christians are not naturalists and thus do not agree that the world is a closed system doesn't mean it is meaningless to everyone else.

Also, your reference to entrophy puzzles me. I guess there is more or less unviersal agreement among scientists that the entrophy of the universe is steadily increasing as the second law of thermodynamics dictates for a closed system and the unvierse is as such compatible with a closed system per this law. For example most scientists today agree that the sun will last around 4-5 billion more years before it explodes, this is a consequence of the same law and similarly the universe as a whole will get colder and colder so to speak. Believe it or not but we are winding down and to my knowledge there is no God out there winding us up.

I really don't get what you were trying to say.

Care to clarity?

Alf

[lippard]

By 'naturalism' I mean the hypothesis that the physical universe is a 'closed system' in the sense that nothing that is neither part nor a product of it can affect it. So naturalism entails the nonexistence of all supernatural beings, including the theistic God."
-- Paul Draper, "Evolution and the Problem of Evil" in Philosophy of Religion (ed. Louis Pojman, Wadsworth, 1997), pp. 219-220.

When I taught "Systems Theory" in Univ., College, and Comm. College
my students after a few weeks would not pay attention to such drivel. A person who spoke from a position that needed , like a hand wound clock, to be ultimately wound up again and again buy nothing but hand power; while tending to entrophy, would not get the time of day. Christianity is an "Open System" end of discussion. The discussion is "Closed Systems vrs "Open Systems".
It seems that notrhing in your closed system "can effect you".
You pick the wrong people to debate with try a system theorist.

I find this feedback quite opaque.

Who speaks from a position that needs to "be ultimately wound up again and again by nothing but hand power"? I don't think that's true of theism or atheism.

In what sense is Christianity an open system, rather than a larger closed system with God and other supernatural creatures as additional entities within it? Aren't all open systems merely subsets of larger closed systems?

You suggest that we debate with a system theorist--can you point to any work by a system theorist that addresses the subject of naturalism vs. supernaturalism or theism vs. atheism?

[-DM-]

For more on this subject, see also On Behalf of the Fool (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=103396).

-Don-

[kaugust]

Although I found much of value in Arnie's contribution to this thread, there are three points that I find particularly noteworthy in his post. The first point was the analogy with Christianity to emphasize the diversity of metaphysical naturalists:

The term metaphysical naturalism is a generic term embracing a number of sharply differing schools of thought. So what constitutes mere metaphysical naturalism will pertain to relatively few characteristics.... Because the term metaphysical naturalist is generic; just as Christian is generic, it may well be the case that an adherent of one school of metaphysical naturalism may find himself/herself more in agreement with some Christians upon some fundamental philosophical issues than with some metaphysical naturalists belonging to yet another school.... [A]n assertion that a specific version of metaphysical naturalism is false does not entail that metaphysical naturalism is false when the term is understood in a generic sense; just as the assertion that a particular theological system of Christianity is false does not entail the falsehood of mere Christianity.

I never really thought about metaphysical naturalists differing as widely as Christian sects like Lutheranism, Methodism, Catholicism, and so on. But, when I think about it, we probably differ even more widely insofar as there is no doctrinal standard binding us together toward some core naturalism (as there is in Christianity and other religions). That was definitely an angle I'd never considered before. But when I think about it, we could differ philosophically as much as we could politically. Evan Fales is an interesting example of an atypical metaphysical naturalist--he's both a Platonic realist and believes in libertarian free will. Most naturalists are probably either Aristotelian realists or nominalists regarding universals and soft determinists regarding free will.

Metaphysical naturalists should bear in mind that to reject the physical closure principle (i.e., all physical events have only physical causes if any) does not entail rejection of the natural closure principle (i.e., all natural events have only natural causes if any).

I'm not entirely convinced about the causal closure of the natural being a sufficient replacement for the causal closure of the physical. I think it is a reasonable variation of metaphysical naturalism--it fits Draper's definition, for instance. So I'm not opposed to it in principle.

I guess there could be natural nonphysical causes; but then the issue becomes whether we have any empirical grounds for believing in the nonphysical causes--that is, physical events whose causes must be nonphysical. I think it would be an uphill battle trying to show that the evidence necessitates the view that the causal closure of the physical is, as a matter of fact, violated.

But an even greater concern to me is that the reference to the natural begins to look hopelessly circular in one's concept of naturalism--with the latter being something like "nothing outside of nature can affect anything inside of nature." But then how do you justify saying that X is outside of nature and Y is not, without some idea of the natural meaning "being physical or supervenient upon the physical?" It is this idea that leads me to categorize Platonic numbers, for instance, as nonnatural. In the review by Graham Oppy that I linked in my second message in this thread, Oppy uses a spatiotemporal criterion (although broadly--I brought up quantum foam to him and he seemed to want to define spatiotemporal in a way that would encompass it). You'll note that "being in space and time" is very close to "being physical," even while they are distinct. So I'm not sure how else natural could be defined other than "being physical or supervenient upon the physical." I suggest "behaving in accordance with laws of nature," but "laws of nature" seem to govern what is physical (via laws of physics) and even what is supervenient upon the physical (via psychophysical laws--those notorious "nomological danglers"). So I still don't quite see a viable definition of "natural" which makes no reference at all to the physical. But perhaps that's simply because I'm being unimaginative.

If it were the case that disembodied minds or spirits exist and this could be shown to be probable using, for example, standard inference-to-best-explanation methodology, I would not claim that disembodied minds or spirits are therefore part of the natural world. Rather I would cease to consider myself as a metaphysical naturalist

I agree wholeheartedly with this statement. Although such a position--that natural disembodied minds exist--is a possible position to take in principle, in practice it is so watered down that I don't think it should be called naturalism anymore. It teeters close to being a trivial version of naturalism insofar as there seems to be nothing that couldn't be deemed natural if disembodied spirits could be considered natural. Then everything could be natural--the term natural would loosely appear applicable to nearly anything. Better to say such disembodied minds would be supernatural and simply reject naturalism than to redefine naturalism beyond all possible recognition.

I'll add one last comment on Arnie's post:

So why are we, metaphysical naturalists belonging as we do to different schools, committed to the fostering of the Secular Web? Virtually all of us surely have some commitments in common in addition to our mere metaphysical naturalism. But the most relevant is that we think that the Secular Web constitutes a very convenient forum for the fruitful exchange of views among ourselves and with others interested in dialogue with us. We are moved to engage in this intellectual enterprise for reasons somewhat similar to those who choose to be members of the Society of Christian Philosophers--that association which publishes that excellent scholarly journal Faith and Philosophy and which sponsors regional philosophical conferences. Yet I notice that the Society of Christian Philospher describes itself as "broadly ecumenical in composition with respect to Christian denomination, theological perspective, and philosophical orientation." Moreover, the society stipulates: "Membership is open to any person who classifies himself/herself as both a philosopher and a Christian." This latitudarian usage is not intended to minimize significant differences of opinion among self-professed Christian philosophers. It is intended to facilitate intellectual discourse among themselves—and with others not self-professed Christians. Similar considerations apply mutatis mutandis (similar changes having been made) to self-professed metaphysical naturalists.

I couldn't have said this better myself. The reason we naturalists come together to support the Secular Web is because it allows us to foster the exploration of new ideas within our general common metaphysical framework.

[ATGuminski]

Keith: Many thanks for your response to my posting. I appreciate your comments and your being so open to the consideration of differing ideas. I am very satisfied to see that we agree on a number of important items; so I will pass on to the more controversial points. You write:

I'm not entirely convinced about the causal closure of the natural
being a sufficient replacement for the causal closure of the physical. I
think it is a reasonable variation of metaphysical naturalism--it fits
Draper's definition, for instance. So I'm not opposed to it in principle.

I'm glad you agree. But then you go on to say:

I guess there could be natural nonphysical causes; but then the issue
becomes whether we have any empirical grounds for believing in the
nonphysical causes--that is, physical events whose causes must be
nonphysical. I think it would be an uphill battle trying to show that the
evidence necessitates the view that the causal closure of the physical
is, as a matter of fact, violated.

The juxtaposition of the two quoted statements shows that, although you adhere to the physical closure principle, you maintain that it is not necessary to do so in order to be a metaphysical naturalist. So in a way my comment about the second quoted passage is in the nature of obiter dicta. To wit: frankly I just do not see what is the difficulty in holding that there are natural nonphysical causes. In my view, my decision to go to the store in order to buy specified groceries is a natural nonphysical state, being a mental state, and it has its own causal efficacy albeit there are physical events or states necessary for the former to obtain. The physical closure principle should, I think, be rejected because it is incompatible with a belief the epistemic basis of which is much more compelling than the principle itself--simply an extremely broad inductive generalization which presupposes that mental states or events are causally inefficacious.

You proceed to say:

But an even greater concern to me is that the reference to the natural begins to look hopelessly circular in one's concept of naturalism—with the latter being something like "nothing outside of nature can affect anything inside of nature." But then how do you justify saying that X is outside of nature and Y is not, without some idea of the natural meaning "being physical or supervenient upon the physical?"....So I'm not sure how else natural could be defined other than "being physical or supervenient upon the physical."

One nexus requisite for asserting that there are natural nonphysical causes is the proposition that any substance or quasi-substance which exists depends for its existence upon the obtaining of a state of affairs of a physical substance or quasi-substance. This nexus could relate, for example, to a substance-dualist theory of mind within the framework of metaphysical naturalism.

Another possible requisite nexus is that natural nonphysical causes are events or states of physical substances or quasi-substancnes. There is no a priori reason why a physical substantive entity may not have both physical and mental properties or changes of such properties This nexux could relate, for example, to an interactionist property-dualist theory of mind. For a very helpful discussion of the possibility of one and the same substance having physical and mental properties, see C. D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, pp. 625-629.

The two foregoing scenarios are not within the context of claiming that something nonphysical supervenes on the physical, particularly if one maintains the physical closure principle. But I submit they are well within the framework of metaphysical naturalism and shoud dispel your objections.

You further say:

Although such a position--that natural disembodied minds exist--is a possible position to take in principle, in practice it is so watered down that I don't think it should be called naturalism anymore. It teeters close to being a trivial version of naturalism insofar as there seems to be nothing that couldn't be deemed natural if disembodied spirits could be considered natural.

As I use the term metaphysical naturalism precludes holding that there are natural disembodied minds (especially if such minds have causal powers with respect to embodied minds and physical objects). But I also think that this is nevertheless very close to the line. A supposedly embodied emergent mind, although nonphysical, depends for its origin and continuation upon the obtaining of a suitably configured biological organism. A so-called natural disembodied mind would be one which comes into being as a result of other natural events or processes (e.g., the death of an organism which "housed" the mind in question), buts it (unlike the embodied mind) has a separate and independent existence--(and which perhaps, let us say, terminates as a result of some natural events or processes). But this entity would be commonly considered a actual or virtual ghost, and ghosts are supernatural beings in popular usage. So I reject the proposition that so-called natural disembodied minds are other than supernatural entities.

[kaugust]

The juxtaposition of the two quoted statements shows that, although you adhere to the physical closure principle, you maintain that it is not necessary to do so in order to be a metaphysical naturalist.

That's a succinct and accurate description of my view. There probably should be some sort of natural causal principle, though, the broadest definition of naturalism allowing such closure to be violated by nonagents notwithstanding.

frankly I just do not see what is the difficulty in holding that there are natural nonphysical causes.... The physical closure principle should, I think, be rejected because it is incompatible with a belief the epistemic basis of which is much more compelling than the principle itself--simply an extremely broad inductive generalization which presupposes that mental states or events are causally inefficacious.

My grounds for resisting a sort if interactionist property dualism are the rather standard grounds philosophers have offered for resisting Cartesian dualism. For instance,

(1) The problem of interaction: If the mind is not a physical thing, how can it affect the physical body? Consider Daniel Dennett's illustration of the problem in Consciousness Explained, pp. 34-35:


[Mental causes] are not physical; they are not light waves or sound waves or cosmic rays or streams of subatomic particles. No physical energy or mass is associated with them. How, then, do they get to make a difference to what happens in the brain cells they must affect, if the mind is to have any influence over the body?....

How can Casper both glide through walls and grab a falling towel? How can mind stuff both elude all physical measurement and control the body? A ghost in the machine is of no help in our theories unless it is a ghost that can move things around... but anything that can move a physical thing is itself a physical thing (pp. 34-35).


(2) The law of conservation of energy: "Energy cannot be created or destroyed." But if a nonphysical mind provides energy to change brain states, it is as if the energy was created from nothing. How plausible is it that this principle is regularly violated in human brains but apparently nowhere else in the universe?

(3) It appears as if the current state of the brain can be entirely explained in terms of its past (physical) states. If the mind is constantly interacting with the brain, why can't we detect that interaction?

One nexus requisite for asserting that there are natural nonphysical causes is the proposition that any substance or quasi-substance which exists depends for its existence upon the obtaining of a state of affairs of a physical substance or quasi-substance. This nexus could relate, for example, to a substance-dualist theory of mind within the framework of metaphysical naturalism.

I'm particularly uncomfortable with trying to subsume substance dualism under the framework of metaphysical naturalism. The reason for this is as follows. Property dualism only implies that one type of thing (substance) exists in nature--matter--which may have both physical and nonphysical properties. On the face of it that isn't problematic to me. But there is a clear sense in which our minds are embodied in the brain if property dualism is true--those nonphysical properties could not survive the destruction of the complex material substance in which they 'inhere'--which for us is the human brain (AI is always a possibility, of course).

Substance dualism implies that there are at least two types of things (substances) in nature--physical matter and nonphysical mental stuff. The problem I have with this is that (1) the grounds for asserting the nonphysicality of the mind (e.g., qualia) only necessitate a dualism of properties, not of substances and (2) substance dualism implies that the mind is completely independent of the body. Properties cannot exist independently of the substances they inhere in, so there is a clear sense in which property dualism cannot allow disembodied minds. But substances exist independently of each other, so the possibility remains that a nonphysical mind substance could indeed survive the destruction of the complex material substance which it merely interacts with, just as a pilot can survive the destruction of his ship. On substance dualism, the mind isn't really embodied in the brain (in the way that Windows is embodied in one's hard drive), but rather is merely imprisoned in the body (to use Plato's description), as if waiting to be released. This would be true even on an emergent substance dualism, which is why supernaturalists like William Hasker concede that the mind is indeed generated by and in some sense dependent upon the brain throughout life, but at the moment of death can somehow become disembodied. See the discussion of emergent substance (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/#5) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Another possible requisite nexus is that natural nonphysical causes are events or states of physical substances or quasi-substancnes. There is no a priori reason why a physical substantive entity may not have both physical and mental properties or changes of such properties

I have no objection to property dualism; I'm just hesitant to accept an interactionist version of it for the 3 reasons cited above. At the same time, though, I'm not happy with reductionist materialism, insofar as I appear to have first-person knowledge of my own nonphysical qualia, or with epiphenomenalism, insofar as it appears that when I say that "I am in pain" (a physical act) the actually (nonphysical) experience of being in pain would have to have some influence on the fact that I say I'm in pain. In other words, it appears that my experience of pain must cause me to say that I'm in pain, which on property dualism would amount to a nonphysical experience (the feeling of being in pain) causing a physical act (speech). But because I see little empirical evidence that the causal closure of the physical is violated (point #3 of my objections), this problem with epiphenomenalism only pushes me back in the direction of reductionist materialism. But the truth is that, as Chalmer so eloquently points out, none of the current options in the philosophy of mind is completely satisfactory, and so the best we can do is tentatively settle on the best one available relative to the rest.

The two foregoing scenarios are not within the context of claiming that something nonphysical supervenes on the physical, particularly if one maintains the physical closure principle. But I submit they are well within the framework of metaphysical naturalism and shoud dispel your objections.

It would seem that even in