Alvin Plantinga's review of Dawkins' God Delusion

[Dog Sneeze]

I was asked (by Daniel R?) to start a new thread on this subject (so forgive me if this has been addressed already). Here is a link to Alving Plantinga's review of Richard Dawkins' book The God Delusion.

http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2007/002/1.21.html

The person who suggested I post the thread wondered how anyone could possibly take Alvin Plantinga seriously. The review is probably not his finest work (it contains a few ad-hominems and a questionably terse version of his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism or http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/naturalism_defeated.pdf). But he is of course taken seriously. He was a Guggenheim Fellow, National Endowment for Humanities Fellow, and President of the American Philosophical Society, and twice featured in Time magazine for.

Thanks for your thoughtful critiques.

[untermensche]

His argument that god is not complex is very weak.

A thing must be more complex than the thing it creates. It is impossible for something to create something more complex than itself.

Therefore god, if it was the creator of the universe, must be more complex than the universe it created.

Or better, the universe must be less complex than the thing that created it.

[Ishmael]

We had a thread on this a while back... it was just as boring as this is starting to out to be.

I know that Plantinga is respected as a philosopher but I have no idea why... imo he uses technical, philosophical concepts to perform a kind of reserection on medieval philosophy wherein GOD was an assumed constant.

I think he is a dope to be honest.

[luvluv]

A thing must be more complex than the thing it creates. It is impossible for something to create something more complex than itself.

Can you prove this? I don't see any reason to think it's true.

[untermensche]

Can you prove this? I don't see any reason to think it's true.
Hard to prove a negative.

Can you suggest a counter example?

[luvluv]

Hard to prove a negative.

Okay, then how about an argument? Saying it's impossible seems like a huge hurdle to leap. The claim that it's possible makes just as much sense to me.

Can you suggest a counter example?

The laws of nature are simple, and on atheism, the laws of nature plus the initial conditions designed human beings, who are pretty complicated.

I'm just saying I see no reason to believe that human beings couldn't one day build something more complicated than human beings. I certainly don't think such a thing is impossible.

[untermensche]

Okay, then how about an argument? Saying it's impossible seems like a huge hurdle to leap. The claim that it's possible makes just as much sense to me.

The laws of nature are simple, and on atheism, the laws of nature plus the initial conditions designed human beings, who are pretty complicated.

I'm just saying I see no reason to believe that human beings couldn't one day build something more complicated than human beings. I certainly don't think such a thing is impossible.
The laws of nature are how humans reduce nature to try to understand it. And they are not simple.

And nature is far more complex than the human understanding of it.

[cognac]

The laws of nature are how humans reduce nature to try to understand it. And they are not simple.

And nature is far more complex than the human understanding of it.

How do you account for Wolfram's cellular automata?

On the frontier of complexity science since he was a boy, Wolfram is a champion of cellular automata--256 "programs" governed by simple nonmathematical rules. He points out that even the most complex equations fail to accurately model biological systems, but the simplest cellular automata can produce results straight out of nature--tree branches, stream eddies, and leopard spots, for instance. The graphics in A New Kind of Science show striking resemblance to the patterns we see in nature every day.

From the Amazon book description of A New Kind of Science A New Kind of Science (http://www.amazon.com/New-Kind-Science-Stephen-Wolfram/dp/1579550088/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/104-1030402-8621544?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1178754701&sr=8-1)

[luvluv]

The laws of nature are how humans reduce nature to try to understand it. And they are not simple.

And nature is far more complex than the human understanding of it.

This means nothing to me, and certainly doesn't amount to an argument establishing the impossibility you assert.

The problem with this kind of objection to the teleological argument is that it goes against the principles of science. If you were right, and it's impossible that X can be explained via a mechanism less complex than X, then it would seem that scientists would always try to explain X by appealing to something more complicated than X. But science proceeds on precisely the opposite assumption, that X should always be explained via laws that are simpler than X. So why does this general scientific practice become impossible when God is the explanation? If you had an antecedent reason for supposing God to be complex, that's one thing. But it assuming that all explanations of X must be more complex than X seems to prove way too much (or way too little).

[comiezapr]

I was asked (by Daniel R?) to start a new thread on this subject (so forgive me if this has been addressed already). Here is a link to Alving Plantinga's review of Richard Dawkins' book The God Delusion.

http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2007/002/1.21.html

The person who suggested I post the thread wondered how anyone could possibly take Alvin Plantinga seriously. The review is probably not his finest work (it contains a few ad-hominems and a questionably terse version of his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism or http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/naturalism_defeated.pdf). But he is of course taken seriously. He was a Guggenheim Fellow, National Endowment for Humanities Fellow, and President of the American Philosophical Society, and twice featured in Time magazine for.

Thanks for your thoughtful critiques.

Plantigna should stick to philosophy, which he is absolutly fantastic at while Dawkins should stick to biology, which he is good at. Dawkins is really just a good writer and popularizer.

[Gooch's dad]

I have to agree with luvluv on this, and Wolfram's cellular automata are a great example. Simple rules plus reproduction gives you immensely complex patterns, which was Wolfram's main point in his immensely overweight book.

Where Plantinga does make an error, OTOH, is in claiming that his god must be simple. We do know that information processing requires a complex negentropic system to actually *do* the information processing. To claim otherwise would be to claim a violation of thermodynamics.

The Christian God, by being omnipotent, must be complex simply by the requirements of information processing. And on that point, Plantinga fails utterly.

[Pragmatista]

What's complexity, and how is it quantified? Is there a conservation law that prevents complexity from increasing in a closed system?

Lacking a definition, I wonder if complexity is psychological, in the sense that our ability to understand something does reduce its complexity.

[comiezapr]

What's complexity, and how is it quantified? Is there a conservation law that prevents complexity from increasing in a closed system?

Lacking a definition, I wonder if complexity is psychological, in the sense that our ability to understand something does reduce its complexity.

Complexisty doesnt lack a definition nor does it lack quantification; take one of the types of complexity from computational theory and have a blast.

[Dante Alighieri]

Unless I'm mistaken, the weakest part of Plantinga's critique was here:
But concede for the moment that indeed there are many universes and that it is likely that some are fine-tuned and life-friendly. That still leaves Dawkins with the following problem: even if it's likely that some universes should be fine-tuned, it is still improbable that this universe should be fine-tuned. Name our universe alpha: the odds that alpha should be fine-tuned are exceedingly, astronomically low, even if it's likely that some universe or other is fine-tuned.

Plantinga is responding to Dawkin's critique of the fine-tuning argument. Plantinga's reply falls short because it confuses a priori probability with a posteriori probability. I will provide an example:
Suppose that there is a lottery and the results will soon be announced. The chances of anyone winning is one in a million. Now, a few minutes later, the results are announced. The winning combination is 21423. You argue that it is monumentally improbable that such a specific combination could have been reached and thus, the lottery was rigged. Alas, the corporation behind the lottery is sued.
Do you see the problem? Some outcome must occur, but no one knows which specific one will occur. After some outcome does occur, one cannot calculate a priori probability for it since that sequence was not specified in advance. It's a posteriori probability is 1.

This, in my opinion, was Plantinga's weakest point.

[Garrett]

Chaos and Complexity (http://complexity.orcon.net.nz/intro.html)

Chaos Theory looks at how very simple things can generate very complex outcomes that could not be predicted by just looking at the parts by themselves.

Complexity Theory looks at how complex systems can generate simple outcomes. Consider the billions of cells that make up a person and yet they all manage to work together in such a way that the body works as a single unit.

[untermensche]

This means nothing to me, and certainly doesn't amount to an argument establishing the impossibility you assert.

The problem with this kind of objection to the teleological argument is that it goes against the principles of science. If you were right, and it's impossible that X can be explained via a mechanism less complex than X, then it would seem that scientists would always try to explain X by appealing to something more complicated than X. But science proceeds on precisely the opposite assumption, that X should always be explained via laws that are simpler than X. So why does this general scientific practice become impossible when God is the explanation? If you had an antecedent reason for supposing God to be complex, that's one thing. But it assuming that all explanations of X must be more complex than X seems to prove way too much (or way too little).
Science does not deal with the creation of the universe.

Science, as I said, deals in the reduction of the universe to the human. Mainly to human constructed mathematics within human constructed models.

Science and the universe are not close to the same thing. Explaining how something works is not creating it.

But to speak universes into existence would require being more complex than the universe, otherwise you wouldn't know how to do it. You wouldn't know how the parts fit together.

[chieftain]

Hi, Dog Sneeze. I am Daniel R on Yahoo Answers - thanks for coming here.

My main objection to Plantinga is over what's regarded as his main contribution to the field: the "Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism". From the Dawkins review (http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2007/002/1.21.html):

Like most naturalists, Dawkins is a materialist about human beings: human persons are material objects; they are not immaterial selves or souls or substances joined to a body, and they don't contain any immaterial substance as a part. From this point of view, our beliefs would be dependent on neurophysiology, and (no doubt) a belief would just be a neurological structure of some complex kind. Now the neurophysiology on which our beliefs depend will doubtless be adaptive; but why think for a moment that the beliefs dependent on or caused by that neurophysiology will be mostly true? Why think our cognitive faculties are reliable?

From a theistic point of view, we'd expect that our cognitive faculties would be (for the most part, and given certain qualifications and caveats) reliable. God has created us in his image, and an important part of our image bearing is our resembling him in being able to form true beliefs and achieve knowledge. But from a naturalist point of view the thought that our cognitive faculties are reliable (produce a preponderance of true beliefs) would be at best a naïve hope. The naturalist can be reasonably sure that the neurophysiology underlying belief formation is adaptive, but nothing follows about the truth of the beliefs depending on that neurophysiology. In fact he'd have to hold that it is unlikely, given unguided evolution, that our cognitive faculties are reliable.

To summarise: evolution might provide 'adaptive' beliefs, but there's no reason to suppose that these arguments are 'true'. The counter to this is so obvious that I can't believe he can't see it, but goes as follows:

1. Plantinga presupposes that there is a 'true' world accessible to our senses.
2. He asserts that there is no necessary link between our beliefs about this world and its true nature, as long as our beliefs are 'adaptive'.
3. This implies there is a distinction between 'true' and 'adaptive'. But how can this be the case? It is more 'adaptive' for me to believe that there really is a tiger behind a bush, and that therefore I should run away, than to form a wrong belief that there is no tiger.
4. He asserts that the majority of sets of adaptive beliefs will not be 'true'. However, on the whole our beliefs form part of a coherent world picture. It seems much more unlikely that there are a greater number of world pictures that are both coherent and adaptive, in that they will cause me to correctly run away from a tiger but not from food, than the single case of the true picture of reality.

I am not a philosopher so may not have structured the above argument correctly, but I hope you can see the point. Basically, this assertion seems foolish on the face of it. My belief that there is a tiger behind that bush is only adaptive if it is in fact true, otherwise I will waste energy running away when I could be eating or performing a constructive task.

There are other arguments in Plantinga's piece which are equally obviously wrong, but I think that will do to start with.

[Dr. Retard]

I just want to point out that (I'm pretty sure) Plantinga's reputation doesn't have too much to do with his evolutionary argument against naturalism. I think it's his stuff on the metaphysics of modality, and his proper function account of warrant, and sure, his free will defense. Probably some other stuff I'm not remembering right now.

[chieftain]

I just want to point out that (I'm pretty sure) Plantinga's reputation doesn't have too much to do with his evolutionary argument against naturalism. I think it's his stuff on the metaphysics of modality, and his proper function account of warrant, and sure, his free will defense. Probably some other stuff I'm not remembering right now.

Well, Wikipedia (not always trustworthy to be sure, but still) gives the EAAN as one of the top five things that P is known for.

And, to be honest, I don't have much more respect for the modal thing - I presume you're referring to his restatement of the ontological argument in modal logic. There's still a whole range of problems with it.

In particular, the statement (again from Wikipedia, sorry) "Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified" which depends on the definition of maximal greatness as having maximal excellence in all possible worlds, maximal excellence in a world in turn being defined as "omnipotence, omniscience and wholly good" in that world. I'm sorry, but whatever logic you use, maximal excellence as defined here is self-contradictory, and therefore it is not possible that it is exemplified.

I understand that his point is not that this argument proves God, but that it proves that belief in God is rational. But it doesn't: not until one can define "maximal excellence" in a way that is itself rational, ie without self-contradiction. All Plantinga has done is to move the invalid argument one step further up the chain. (It's possible that he does define it in more detail than referenced in Wikipedia or the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy article linked from there - in which case, can someone better read than me post it?)

Plus, of course, as Dawkins points out so well, this argument is pointless in as much as it could equally well be applied to smelliness. Really, the ontological argument doesn't help the theist.

[chieftain]

Unless I'm mistaken, the weakest part of Plantinga's critique was here:
But concede for the moment that indeed there are many universes and that it is likely that some are fine-tuned and life-friendly. That still leaves Dawkins with the following problem: even if it's likely that some universes should be fine-tuned, it is still improbable that this universe should be fine-tuned. Name our universe alpha: the odds that alpha should be fine-tuned are exceedingly, astronomically low, even if it's likely that some universe or other is fine-tuned.


To paraphrase Charles Babbage: I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such an argument.

It's such a massive misunderstanding of probability that I really cannot understand how Plantinga could make it, let alone publish it.

[Simen]

Hi, Dog Sneeze. I am Daniel R on Yahoo Answers - thanks for coming here.

My main objection to Plantinga is over what's regarded as his main contribution to the field: the "Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism". From the Dawkins review (http://www.christianitytoday.com/bc/2007/002/1.21.html):



To summarise: evolution might provide 'adaptive' beliefs, but there's no reason to suppose that these arguments are 'true'. The counter to this is so obvious that I can't believe he can't see it, but goes as follows:

1. Plantinga presupposes that there is a 'true' world accessible to our senses.
2. He asserts that there is no necessary link between our beliefs about this world and its true nature, as long as our beliefs are 'adaptive'.
3. This implies there is a distinction between 'true' and 'adaptive'. But how can this be the case? It is more 'adaptive' for me to believe that there really is a tiger behind a bush, and that therefore I should run away, than to form a wrong belief that there is no tiger.
4. He asserts that the majority of sets of adaptive beliefs will not be 'true'. However, on the whole our beliefs form part of a coherent world picture. It seems much more unlikely that there are a greater number of world pictures that are both coherent and adaptive, in that they will cause me to correctly run away from a tiger but not from food, than the single case of the true picture of reality.

I am not a philosopher so may not have structured the above argument correctly, but I hope you can see the point. Basically, this assertion seems foolish on the face of it. My belief that there is a tiger behind that bush is only adaptive if it is in fact true, otherwise I will waste energy running away when I could be eating or performing a constructive task.

There are other arguments in Plantinga's piece which are equally obviously wrong, but I think that will do to start with.

An even easier way to disprove his argument is to ask, "How do you know that a god would give you reliable cognitive facilities?" Of course, if you believe that false beliefs have some adaptive advantage, and you believe that God is good, then it is only logical that he gives you these false beliefs in order to gain the advantages.

[Kronocide]

Alvin Plantinga is respected because there are lots of people out there who believe in God.

Dawkins seems to have chosen God as his sworn enemy. (Let's hope for Dawkins' sake God doesn't return the compliment.)

Yeah, I can see Dawkins shake in his boots at that thought. Woooo....

[luvluv]

We do know that information processing requires a complex negentropic system to actually *do* the information processing. To claim otherwise would be to claim a violation of thermodynamics.

Why would that be a problem for God? He's not restricted by any natural laws.

[luvluv]

Science does not deal with the creation of the universe.

Science, as I said, deals in the reduction of the universe to the human. Mainly to human constructed mathematics within human constructed models.

Science and the universe are not close to the same thing. Explaining how something works is not creating it.

None of this effects the point. If X must be caused by things more complicated than X, then science as it is currently pursued, with its adherance to the principle of parsimony, should be completely unsuccesful. It ain't.

But to speak universes into existence would require being more complex than the universe, otherwise you wouldn't know how to do it. You wouldn't know how the parts fit together.

I disagree. I think whatever creates the universe must be capable of producing the complexity of the universe. That doesn't mean it has to be more complex than the universe.

[luvluv]

Do you see the problem? Some outcome must occur, but no one knows which specific one will occur. After some outcome does occur, one cannot calculate a priori probability for it since that sequence was not specified in advance.

Isn't the sequence specified by the universe being life-permitting, given the life-permitting ranges are so narrow?

[untermensche]

I disagree. I think whatever creates the universe must be capable of producing the complexity of the universe. That doesn't mean it has to be more complex than the universe.
And what observation would you base this on?

Where have you seen something more complex created by something less complex?

[luvluv]

And what observation would you base this on?

Where have you seen something more complex created by something less complex?

I've already answered this. Evolution, whether biological or stellar or whatever. The big bang just produced hydrogen and helium. Those elements plus the laws of nature have bequeathed us stars, trees, human beings, etc.

It seems to me that non-theistic ontologies more or less take it as axiomatic that all complex somethings were created by less complex somethings.

Beyond that, if claims in this area are observation-based, then your claim that it is "impossible" that something less complex create something more complex needs to be withdrawn.

[untermensche]

I've already answered this. Evolution, whether biological or stellar or whatever. The big bang just produced hydrogen and helium. Those elements plus the laws of nature have bequeathed us stars, trees, human beings, etc.

It seems to me that non-theistic ontologies more or less take it as axiomatic that all complex somethings were created by less complex somethings.

Beyond that, if claims in this area are observation-based, then your claim that it is "impossible" that something less complex create something more complex needs to be withdrawn.
None of these are creation events.

We are talking about the relationship of complexity to creation, not the changing complexity of what exists.

Again, what evidence do you have concerning the complexity of entities that can create universes?

But you do have valid points.

I suppose it is possible to build into a system a way in which it's complexity increases by itself, and it could theoretically grow more complex than the creator, but the creator being less complex would not understand the system or be able to control it.

[cognac]

None of these are creation events.

We are talking about the relationship of complexity to creation, not the changing complexity of what exists.

Again, what evidence do you have concerning the complexity of entities that can create universes?


I don't really mean to step in here, but I don't understand how we can even speak of "creation events" as observable phenomena which we can apply any of our rules to. We do not know if what is true of things within the system apply to the system as a whole.

[untermensche]

I don't really mean to step in here, but I don't understand how we can even speak of "creation events" as observable phenomena which we can apply any of our rules to. We do not know if what is true of things within the system apply to the system as a whole.
We can't.

At least in terms of matter and energy.

We can look at human creation events, like art and technology.

[Dante Alighieri]

Well, Wikipedia (not always trustworthy to be sure, but still) gives the EAAN as one of the top five things that P is known for.

And, to be honest, I don't have much more respect for the modal thing - I presume you're referring to his restatement of the ontological argument in modal logic. There's still a whole range of problems with it.

In particular, the statement (again from Wikipedia, sorry) "Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified" which depends on the definition of maximal greatness as having maximal excellence in all possible worlds, maximal excellence in a world in turn being defined as "omnipotence, omniscience and wholly good" in that world. I'm sorry, but whatever logic you use, maximal excellence as defined here is self-contradictory, and therefore it is not possible that it is exemplified.

I understand that his point is not that this argument proves God, but that it proves that belief in God is rational. But it doesn't: not until one can define "maximal excellence" in a way that is itself rational, ie without self-contradiction. All Plantinga has done is to move the invalid argument one step further up the chain. (It's possible that he does define it in more detail than referenced in Wikipedia or the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy article linked from there - in which case, can someone better read than me post it?)

Plus, of course, as Dawkins points out so well, this argument is pointless in as much as it could equally well be applied to smelliness. Really, the ontological argument doesn't help the theist.

Maximal excellence does not include smelliness. Plantinga's definition itself points this out. You really do not want to employ Dawkins' objections against the ontological argument. Given my admitted ignorance on the modal ontological argument, I personally sometimes see the argument as defining God into existence, since "possibly necessarily" is the same as stating "necessarily" and "actually." There appears to be no reason as to why a person should accept the premise that it is possibly necessarily that a being has maximal excellence.

"Possibly necessarily" implies "necessarily." Unless I am severely mistaken, if it is necessary, then there is some type of contradiction in its negation. For example, the negation of all bachelors are unmarried (i.e. it is false that all bachelors are unmarried) leads to a contradiction. Where is such a contradiction with the negation of a being with maximal greatness?

What am I missing here about Plantinga's ontological argument?

In any case, Reformed epistemology, the modal ontological argument, and the free will defense are what got Plantinga's reputation. As for his EAAN, I think Plantinga should stick more to epistemology, logic, and the like.


To paraphrase Charles Babbage: I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such an argument.

It's such a massive misunderstanding of probability that I really cannot understand how Plantinga could make it, let alone publish it.

I admit that I'm surprised that such a fallacy would be committed by Plantinga. In recent memory (i.e. what I've read recently) William Lane Craig made the same mistake with regards to miracles.

[Dog Sneeze]

1. Plantinga presupposes that there is a 'true' world accessible to our senses.
2. He asserts that there is no necessary link between our beliefs about this world and its true nature, as long as our beliefs are 'adaptive'.
3. This implies there is a distinction between 'true' and 'adaptive'. But how can this be the case? It is more 'adaptive' for me to believe that there really is a tiger behind a bush, and that therefore I should run away, than to form a wrong belief that there is no tiger.
4. He asserts that the majority of sets of adaptive beliefs will not be 'true'. However, on the whole our beliefs form part of a coherent world picture. It seems much more unlikely that there are a greater number of world pictures that are both coherent and adaptive, in that they will cause me to correctly run away from a tiger but not from food, than the single case of the true picture of reality.

I am not a philosopher so may not have structured the above argument correctly, but I hope you can see the point. Basically, this assertion seems foolish on the face of it. My belief that there is a tiger behind that bush is only adaptive if it is in fact true, otherwise I will waste energy running away when I could be eating or performing a constructive task.

There are other arguments in Plantinga's piece which are equally obviously wrong, but I think that will do to start with.

Hi Chieftain:

I said in the opening post that the review included a "questionably terse" version of his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. You have identified why it remains unpersuasive. He did not include what is likely the most important part, which is the argument why beliefs need not necessarily be true to be adaptive. This is covered in the second link I provided (which I see isn't working), an essay of his called Naturalism Defeated. While I don't think you restated his argument correctly, I do agree with your general reservations. If you are interested in the extended version, try here:

http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/naturalism_defeated.pdf


Here is a snippet:

Patricia Churchland insists that the most important thing about the human brain is that it has evolved; this means, she says, that its principal function is to enable the organism to move appropriately: Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.

What Churchland means, I think, is that evolution is interested (so to speak) only in adaptive behavior, not in true belief. Natural selection doesn't care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave. It selects for certain kinds of behavior, those that enhance fitness, which is a measure of the chances that one's genes are widely represented in the next and subsequent generations. It doesn't select for belief, except insofar as the latter is appropriately related to behavior. But then the fact that we have evolved guarantees at most that we behave in certain ways--ways that contribute to our (or our ancestors') surviving and reproducing in the environment in which we have developed. Churchland's claim, I think, is best understood as the suggestion that the objective probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given naturalism and given that we have been cobbled together by the processes to which contemporary evolutionary theory calls our attention, is low. Of course she doesn't explicitly mention naturalism, but it certainly seems that she is taking it for granted.

[luvluv]

I suppose it is possible to build into a system a way in which it's complexity increases by itself, and it could theoretically grow more complex than the creator, but the creator being less complex would not understand the system or be able to control it.

I still don't see that an entity needs to be as complex as x in order to understand x's complexity.

I guess we need to define complexity and simplicity and then ask ourselves whether an omniscient entity could be simple. Or maybe, are the kinds of simplicity an omniscient being could have the relevant kinds of simplicity for explanation.

[untermensche]

I still don't see that an entity needs to be as complex as x in order to understand x's complexity.

I guess we need to define complexity and simplicity and then ask ourselves whether an omniscient entity could be simple. Or maybe, are the kinds of simplicity an omniscient being could have the relevant kinds of simplicity for explanation.
The only scientist I know of that has looked at complexity is Wolfram, and he looks at emergent complexity, and his conclusion is that simple rules can cause complex systems to arise.

But again this has nothing to do with creation of universes.

And since we have no evidence of an entity that could create universes, ultimately your side will prevail in this.

We can ultimate make no statements about the complexity of an entity that can create universes, since we have no evidence to examine to determine complexity.

We cannot say the entity is simple and cannot say the entity is complex.

[SophistiCat]

This paper addresses Plantinaga's anti-evolutionary argument: Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism (http://fitelson.org/plant.pdf) (Fitelson and Sober, 1997). I haven't read the works that this paper critiques, so I'll withhold final judgment. But unless the authors misrepresent Plantinga, it appears that he is making schoolboy errors in probability (like confusing marginal probability with prior probability), among other things.

[Antiplastic]

You only need to know one thing about the EAAN: Plantinga argues that you are exactly as likely to beat someone in a game of online chess if you believe that you are actually playing minesweeper, as you are if you are a competent chess player who truthfully believes you are playing chess.

It's literally that stupid.

[SophistiCat]

Unless I'm mistaken, the weakest part of Plantinga's critique was here:
But concede for the moment that indeed there are many universes and that it is likely that some are fine-tuned and life-friendly. That still leaves Dawkins with the following problem: even if it's likely that some universes should be fine-tuned, it is still improbable that this universe should be fine-tuned. Name our universe alpha: the odds that alpha should be fine-tuned are exceedingly, astronomically low, even if it's likely that some universe or other is fine-tuned.

Plantinga is not the first to attempt this argument. It is pretty inane on its surface. Even though the "odds" are "exceedingly, astronomically low", that in itself is not surprising, nor warrants rejection of "naturalism". We can only find ourselves in a life-permitting universe (arguably so: there are some nuances), so the fact that we are in a life-permitting universe is not surprising. As for the fact that this universe (i.e. this spacetime region) is life-supporting, it is not surprising either, because there is nothing special (that we know of) about this particular location.

A more thorough critique of this argument (attributed to Roger White and Phil Dowe) is given by Nick Bostrom in Fine-Tuning Arguments in Cosmology (http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/fine-tuning.pdf), among others.

[Alethias]

It seems to me that non-theistic ontologies more or less take it as axiomatic that all complex somethings were created by less complex somethings.

Beyond that, if claims in this area are observation-based, then your claim that it is "impossible" that something less complex create something more complex needs to be withdrawn.My non-theistic ontology doesn't assume any form of creation whether by a more or a less-complex something.

I accept creation when I see it. My watch was created by a more-complex-something. Pikes Peak, which I can see just by stepping outside, developed into what it is as a result of long-term changing dynamics and forces. There is no creation assumed; it came into being as a result of long-term dynamic processes.

On the other hand, it seems to me that your particular approach here imposes a creationist axiom on non-theistic ontology, and unjustifiably so.

Alethias

[Dog Sneeze]

This paper addresses Plantinaga's anti-evolutionary argument: Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism (http://fitelson.org/plant.pdf) (Fitelson and Sober, 1997).

This link is not working for me. Is there another way to access it?

[Dante Alighieri]

This link is not working for me. Is there another way to access it?

View it as HTML:

Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism (http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:G0ymT-gvpPsJ:fitelson.org/plant.pdf+Plantinga%E2%80%99s+Probability+Arguments+Against+Evolutionary+Naturalism&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=firefox-a)

[Dog Sneeze]

You only need to know one thing about the EAAN: Plantinga argues that you are exactly as likely to beat someone in a game of online chess if you believe that you are actually playing minesweeper, as you are if you are a competent chess player who truthfully believes you are playing chess.

It's literally that stupid.

It is more accurate to summarize Plantinga as saying you are as likely to beat someone in a game of online chess if you believe you are actually playing minesweeper (and have adapted patterns or behaviors such that if applied to chess are very successful), as you are if you are a competent chess player who believes you are playing chess.

I don't see what is stupid about this.

[SophistiCat]

I have to agree with luvluv on this, and Wolfram's cellular automata are a great example. Simple rules plus reproduction gives you immensely complex patterns, which was Wolfram's main point in his immensely overweight book.

If complexity is measured in algorithmic information (as good a measure as any), the patterns produced by, e.g. cellular automata, are not complex by your own admission: they can't be more complex than the algorithms that produced them, and if you consider those algorithms simple, then so are the corresponding patterns.

[SophistiCat]

This link is not working for me. Is there another way to access it?

It's in PDF format. You need Adobe Acrobat to view it.

[Garrett]

untermensche
Where have you seen something more complex created by something less complex?
Fractal images (http://www.softsource.com/fractal.html).

[untermensche]

Fractal images (http://www.softsource.com/fractal.html).
Those images are more complex than the human brain?

[Pragmatista]

Complexisty doesnt lack a definition nor does it lack quantification; take one of the types of complexity from computational theory and have a blast.
Stolen from Wikipedia:

As a branch of the theory of computation in computer science, computational complexity theory describes the scalability of algorithms, and the inherent difficulty in providing scalable algorithms for specific computational problems. That is, the theory answers the question, "As the size of the input to an algorithm increases, how do the running time and memory requirements of the algorithm change?" The theory places practical limits on what computers can accomplish.

Any analogues in physics? Any empirical progress? Admittedly, when I was in grad school, chaos theory was a big thing, but had not produced any interesting empirical results yet. And I have not followed it since then.

[Dr. Retard]

Well, Wikipedia (not always trustworthy to be sure, but still) gives the EAAN as one of the top five things that P is known for.

And, to be honest, I don't have much more respect for the modal thing - I presume you're referring to his restatement of the ontological argument in modal logic. There's still a whole range of problems with it.

No, I mean like The Nature of Necessity and stuff like that. Back in the day, I think it was like Plantinga, David Lewis, Kripke, Ruth Barcan Marcus (maybe others?) who were working on modal metaphysics (the ontological status of possible worlds and transworld identity and de re necessity and whatever else those people do). So I'm not talking about the modal ontological argument (though people still talk about that in philosophy of religion, of course).

[~M~]

And what observation would you base this on?

Where have you seen something more complex created by something less complex?



He said that it needs not to be something more complex. From this, it does not follow that it then must be less complex. think about it.

[luvluv]

Those images are more complex than the human brain?

We're still not clear on what kind of complexity we're talking about. God is being used to explain the complexity of the universe. What kind of complexity on God's part would invalidate His being the explanation for the complexity of the universe? Ex hypothesi, unlike the universe, God is not mechanistically complex (he is not composed of interacting parts) he is not constitutionally complex (he is not made of diverse elements) he is not numerically complex (he is one entity). The kind of complexity God is alleged to have is representational complexity. Being omniscicent, He has an infinite number of internal representations, or conceptions of reality. You could also make the case that God is qualitatively a complex hypothesis, since He is not the kind of entity we generally appeal to for explanation. But then, the same could be said about the kind of multiverse that could explain the universe's complexity (as opposed to multiverses that could explain quantum measurement or the weakness of gravity).

I think we make a mistake when we attempt to apply simplicicty absolutely. We don't want an absolutely simple explanation we want the simplest explanation that can explain the data. If there is no competing theory for God of adequate explanatory power, God's supposed complexity won't really be a problem. Of course, here the multiverse is also a competing theory. So, assuming the multiverse solution is an explanatory solution (which I personally doubt) the question becomes which is simpler in whatever sense of simplicity is most relevant? And are we capable of assessing which sense of simplicity is most relevant?

Personally, I think if one makes an appeal to an infinity of universes, then theism is hands down the simpler hypothesis. If one appeals to a finite, but incredibly high number of universes, then the question is much more difficult. God is infinitely more complex representationally than any finite multiverse. But the multiverse is equally or more complex in basically every other sense of the word. But then, one can always make the assumption that the Creator is not omniscient, and that perhaps he can represent only as many universes as actually exist in a finite multiverse. Then, again, it's hard to avoid the conclusion that a conscious Creator is more simple.

I guess what I'm saying, and what Plantinga was getting at, is that the whole affair is much more complicated than a philosophical naif like Dawkins might presume.

(And by the way, I don't know how we can be calling Plantinga a boob while not pointing out that Dawkins philosophical arguments are about as rigorous as a pre-schoolers finger-painting.)

[~M~]

Dawkins philosophical arguments are about as rigorous as a pre-schoolers finger-painting.

haha i feel the same

[Janus]

We're still not clear on what kind of complexity we're talking about. God is being used to explain the complexity of the universe. What kind of complexity on God's part would invalidate His being the explanation for the complexity of the universe? Ex hypothesi, unlike the universe, God is not mechanistically complex (he is not composed of interacting parts) he is not constitutionally complex (he is not made of diverse elements) he is not numerically complex (he is one entity). The kind of complexity God is alleged to have is representational complexity. Being omniscicent, He has an infinite number of internal representations, or conceptions of reality.



:eek: That's theology for you. The entire field is about as meaningful as a discussion of Gandalf's magical repertoire.

[Dog Sneeze]

:eek: That's theology for you. The entire field is about as meaningful as a discussion of Gandalf's magical repertoire.

I thought it was very clarifying and helpful. I look forward to more.

[untermensche]

....Ex hypothesi, unlike the universe, God is not mechanistically complex (he is not composed of interacting parts)...
Why would we simply assume this in the complete absence of evidence?

It is a wild, absurd, assumption.

[luvluv]

Why would we simply assume this in the complete absence of evidence?

It is a wild, absurd, assumption.

It's no different than assuming the properties of superstrings in the complete absence of evidence. We make the assumption and see how far it gets us.

But this is what Westerners mean by God. We have to give it some kind of definition or Creationism or ID makes an incomprehensible claim. Why not use the classical definition?

[Janus]

It's no different than assuming the properties of superstrings in the complete absence of evidence. We make the assumption and see how far it gets us.

Oh, come on. If string theory was just an assumption made on a whim, why do you think it's taken so many years to develop it to its current state? It's constrained by the currently available evidence, by mathematical consistency, by Occam's Razor, and it is (or will be) testable, and of course it does some explanatory work.

But this is what Westerners mean by God. We have to give it some kind of definition or Creationism or ID makes an incomprehensible claim. Why not use the classical definition?

Using the classical definition to have a discussion about religious beliefs is one thing, it's quite another to go on a wild spree of utterly baseless, unconstrained speculation about a being that's never been observed directly or indirectly, and that is by definition unlike anything we've ever observed. If you allow yourself to do that, you might as well start babbling about the chemical composition of Peter Pan's fairy dust.

While I think Dawkins' argument isn't strong enough to make a statement about the likelihood of God's existence, I think that if you strip it of that final conclusion ("God almost certainly does not exist") it's a good example of just how far we should allow ourselves to go in our speculation about God. Western theism generally defines god as the intelligent creator of the universe. We don't know anything about the creation of universes, but we do know about minds in general, and so by assuming that God is subject to logic, if we admit that all minds share a certain set of basic properties we can draw some limited conclusions about God. Namely, that He can't be fundamentally simple in the same sense that an electron is fundamentally simple. Minds are complex, by definition, therefore God is not a valid ultimate explanation for complexity.

But then, we already knew that. The supernatural does no explanatory work, by definition. Yee haw.

[chieftain]

It is more accurate to summarize Plantinga as saying you are as likely to beat someone in a game of online chess if you believe you are actually playing minesweeper (and have adapted patterns or behaviors such that if applied to chess are very successful), as you are if you are a competent chess player who believes you are playing chess.

I don't see what is stupid about this.

The stupid part is to assume that there are several - or indeed any - ways of consistently playing minesweeper using behaviours that if applied to chess are successful. This is to be demonstrated, and seems on the face of it to be unlikely.

The most likely way of succeeding at chess is to believe that you are indeed playing chess. The most likely way of producing an adaptive view of the world around you is to form true beliefs about that world.

[Antiplastic]

It is more accurate to summarize Plantinga as saying you are as likely to beat someone in a game of online chess if you believe you are actually playing minesweeper (and have adapted patterns or behaviors such that if applied to chess are very successful), as you are if you are a competent chess player who believes you are playing chess.

I don't see what is stupid about this.

Apples and oranges.

You can compare belief set A with belief set B, and you can compare adaptive belief formation system 1 with adaptive belief formation system 2, but you can't compare A with 2.

There are plenty of classic threads on IIDB about this. This one is probably my favorite. (http://iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=136317&) I would pay special attention to the posts by Jade (who also uses the chess-playing metaphor), Mirage, and Hiero5ant. There's very little I could say that wasn't already said there, and the entire thread makes good reading. It's also an object lesson in how posters trying to use even the "most sophisticated" of creationist arguments like EAAN can still easily have their positions utterly dismantled, humiliatingly, in public.

A great epigram for that thread came from Mirage (where oh where has he been these past few months?):

You can fluke a footrace/tiger match once in a blue moon but are happy coincidences really going to get your genus through the next eon?

[chieftain]

Hi Chieftain:

I said in the opening post that the review included a "questionably terse" version of his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. You have identified why it remains unpersuasive. He did not include what is likely the most important part, which is the argument why beliefs need not necessarily be true to be adaptive. This is covered in the second link I provided (which I see isn't working), an essay of his called Naturalism Defeated. While I don't think you restated his argument correctly, I do agree with your general reservations. If you are interested in the extended version, try here:

http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/naturalism_defeated.pdf


OK, thanks for the link. I don't see where my restatement is wrong. But here are some additional points that come from my skimming of the article.

1. Plantinga quickly dismisses the objection that beliefs are unlikely to be self-consistent, adaptive and yet false. But to me this is the crux of the argument, and he simply does not establish it is possible, let alone likely. He presents anecdotally a few ways in which it is possible to act as though running away from a tiger is good thing even while believing the opposite, but this does not amount to proving the existence of a self-consistent false picture of the world.

2. In sentient animals, to a greater or lesser extent, beliefs affect behaviour. In humans, because we have a greater degree of self-consciousness, this is even more true. Plantinga's summary of semantic epiphenomenalism and the other options is irrelevant: the argument seems to be that beliefs are at best only contingently connected to behaviour, which looks on the face of it to be false.

3. Plantinga takes for granted, but does not establish, that theism necessarily implies that we would form reliable beliefs about the world. I don't see why this would be the case. An all-powerful god would be capable of acting like Maxwell's Demon and presenting us with a completely false picture of the world. In fact he would even be capable of presenting us with evidence that causes us to form false beliefs yet provoked adaptive behaviour. I would go so far as to say that this seems much more likely under theism than under naturalism, where as I have said before it is more likely that adaptive beliefs will be true.

4. His probability calculation is, not to put to fine a point on it, rubbish. It just isn't possible to assign probabilities to whether semantic epiphenomenalism or one of the other arguments is true. Saying as he does that the exact values don't matter as long as the proportions work out is just begging the question.

5. The vast majority of his response to objections concentrates on the concept of 'defeaters'. I don't care much about defeaters, and I don't think that they are central to the argument of whether or not the EAAN is valid.

One thing that kept making me smile is the way Plantinga believes he has discovered important philosophical points - "Now oddly enough, not everyone who has heardthis argument has leapt to embrace it" ... "Given the importance of the notion of defeaters for contemporary, post-classical foundationalist epistemology, it is a bit puzzling that this idea has only recently assumed center stage" ... and so on. Humour, or overblown ego? Not sure.

[Antiplastic]

OK, thanks for the link. I don't see where my restatement is wrong. But here are some additional points that come from my skimming of the article.

1. Plantinga quickly dismisses the objection that beliefs are unlikely to be self-consistent, adaptive and yet false. But to me this is the crux of the argument, and he simply does not establish it is possible, let alone likely. He presents anecdotally a few ways in which it is possible to act as though running away from a tiger is good thing even while believing the opposite, but this does not amount to proving the existence of a self-consistent false picture of the world.

2. In sentient animals, to a greater or lesser extent, beliefs affect behaviour. In humans, because we have a greater degree of self-consciousness, this is even more true. Plantinga's summary of semantic epiphenomenalism and the other options is irrelevant: the argument seems to be that beliefs are at best only contingently connected to behaviour, which looks on the face of it to be false.

3. Plantinga takes for granted, but does not establish, that theism necessarily implies that we would form reliable beliefs about the world. I don't see why this would be the case. An all-powerful god would be capable of acting like Maxwell's Demon and presenting us with a completely false picture of the world. In fact he would even be capable of presenting us with evidence that causes us to form false beliefs yet provoked adaptive behaviour. I would go so far as to say that this seems much more likely under theism than under naturalism, where as I have said before it is more likely that adaptive beliefs will be true.

4. His probability calculation is, not to put to fine a point on it, rubbish. It just isn't possible to assign probabilities to whether semantic epiphenomenalism or one of the other arguments is true. Saying as he does that the exact values don't matter as long as the proportions work out is just begging the question.

5. The vast majority of his response to objections concentrates on the concept of 'defeaters'. I don't care much about defeaters, and I don't think that they are central to the argument of whether or not the EAAN is valid.

One thing that kept making me smile is the way Plantinga believes he has discovered important philosophical points - "Now oddly enough, not everyone who has heardthis argument has leapt to embrace it" ... "Given the importance of the notion of defeaters for contemporary, post-classical foundationalist epistemology, it is a bit puzzling that this idea has only recently assumed center stage" ... and so on. Humour, or overblown ego? Not sure.

Indeed, not for nothing did he earn his place in the Philosophical Lexicon (http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/lexicon/#A) thusly:

alvinize, v. To stimulate protracted discussion by making a bizarre claim. "His contention that natural evil is due to Satanic agency alvinized his listeners."

[Dog Sneeze]

Antiplastic and Chieftain: Thanks for your comments and links. I am wading through them and plan to respond as soon as I can.

[Antiplastic]

Antiplastic and Chieftain: Thanks for your comments and links. I am wading through them and plan to respond as soon as I can.

Or, you just think you're reading them and responding to them, when really you're writing a brilliant dissertation on irregular verb conjugations medieval French. After all, it's equally likely...

[luvluv]

Oh, come on. If string theory was just an assumption made on a whim, why do you think it's taken so many years to develop it to its current state?

I don't understand the question. But it is an historical fact that string theory did start on an assumption made on a whim.

It's constrained by the currently available evidence, by mathematical consistency, by Occam's Razor, and it is (or will be) testable, and of course it does some explanatory work.

Well God as the explanation of the universe is also constrained by the currently available evidence, and Occam's Razor, and it does explanatory work. And string theory isn't testable, as far as I know, and won't be any time soon.

It was not my intention, however, to compare theism and string theory. It was my point that the hypothetico-deductive model is a valid scientific methodolgy. We don't have to experience God before we can define him any more than we have to experience supserstrings before we can define them.

Using the classical definition to have a discussion about religious beliefs is one thing, it's quite another to go on a wild spree of utterly baseless, unconstrained speculation about a being that's never been observed directly or indirectly, and that is by definition unlike anything we've ever observed.

Well, A) all this would apply to superstrings. And B) it's been observed indirectly inasmuch as this universe is supposed to be explained by its effects. This is how all theoritical entities work. We assume that an entity exists that has certain properties and try to make predictions based on those hypothetical properties. In this case, retrodictions are what's at issue, and the competing hypothesis (a multiverse) is just as unobservable. Again, theory choice is about competing hypotheses. Most folks assume that fine-tuning has to be explained, if it is to be explained at all, either by some kind of conscious creator or a multiverse. You are just critiquing the faults of the God hypotehsis without subjecting the multiverse to the same critiques. Even if everything you say is true, it still could be the case that God is the better of the two available hypotheses.

While I think Dawkins' argument isn't strong enough to make a statement about the likelihood of God's existence, I think that if you strip it of that final conclusion ("God almost certainly does not exist") it's a good example of just how far we should allow ourselves to go in our speculation about God. Western theism generally defines god as the intelligent creator of the universe. We don't know anything about the creation of universes, but we do know about minds in general, and so by assuming that God is subject to logic, if we admit that all minds share a certain set of basic properties we can draw some limited conclusions about God. Namely, that He can't be fundamentally simple in the same sense that an electron is fundamentally simple. Minds are complex, by definition, therefore God is not a valid ultimate explanation for complexity.

Let's not be silly. We don't even have an agreed upon definiton of a mind, so how then could we say that minds are complex (or are anything else) by definition? This is a desperate imperialist move on the part of materialists that impresses no one outside of their camp. I see no reason why a mind couldn't be simple. (Maybe I misunderstand, but isn't the point of functionalism that minds can be realized in basically any system? So why couldn't one be realized in a simple system?)

Beyond that, even if God was complex in some sense, he is no more complex than the only other available explanation, the multiverse, which calls for nigh-infinite number of universes, each of which is as complicated as the one we inhabit. There is no law against complex explanations. There is just a heuristic princicple of taking the simplest available adequate explanation. Even if God is complex, that wouldn't rule Him out as the best available adequate explanation.

[SophistiCat]

We're still not clear on what kind of complexity we're talking about. [...]

I think we make a mistake when we attempt to apply simplicicty absolutely. We don't want an absolutely simple explanation we want the simplest explanation that can explain the data.

I don't care how theologians imagine God. They can postulate any fanciful attributes that they like, but what I am concerned with is the complexity of God as an explanation. The least we can ask of an explanation is that it be no more complex than the evidence it is called upon to explain. And on that account the God-explanation fails absolutely. Since postulating God does not by itself explain anything, i.e. it does not allow us to reconstruct any of the observations, the God-explanation must contain within itself all of the raw data that it is supposed to explain.

We start with "The universe is such as it is [insert all the known, unreduced properties of the universe, such as the fundamental equations of physics and their constants and boundary conditions]."

We end with "The universe is such as it is AND God created it such."

Thus, instead of reducing complexity of the evidence, this "explanation" only adds to it. It is completely superfluous.

[luvluv]

I don't care how theologians imagine God. They can postulate any fanciful attributes that they like, but what I am concerned with is the complexity of God as an explanation. The least we can ask of an explanation is that it be no more complex than the evidence it is called upon to explain. And on that account the God-explanation fails absolutely. Since postulating God does not by itself explain anything, i.e. it does not allow us to reconstruct any of the observations, the God-explanation must contain within itself all of the raw data that it is supposed to explain.

The only other available explanation also must contain within itself all of the raw data it is supposed to explain. The multiverse (obviously) contains the universe, and at least an unimaginably high number of other universes, some more complex than this one. The sum of all the complexity of all the universes is obviously orders of magnitude more complex than our one universe.

We start with "The universe is such as it is [insert all the known, unreduced properties of the universe, such as the fundamental equations of physics and their constants and boundary conditions]."

We end with "The universe is such as it is AND God created it such."

Thus, instead of reducing complexity of the evidence, this "explanation" only adds to it. It is completely superfluous.

Okay. Our alternative is:

We start with "The universe is such as it is ."

We end with the universe is such that it is and there are uncountably many other universes.

The moral? Both explanations add to complexity.

But the kicker is there's nothing wrong with that. Dawkins assertion that explanations necessarily must be simpler than that which they explain is utterly groundless. Consider: string theory purports to explain the fundamental properties of fundamental particles by positing one-dimensional strings that vibrate through 12 microscopic dimensions of space.

Here we start with the properties of fundamental particles and end fundamental particles and unfathomably small strings [I]which only have length, vibrating through unfathomably microscopic dimensions. Of course, we've ust added to the complexity of the situation, to say the very least. Does this make superstrings illegitimate, by some necessary logical law of explanation? Obviously not.

What needs to be remembered is that science is a matter of observation, and there are no logical laws of explanation. There is only custom and utility. And the relevant custom here is not "It is impossible that X be explained by something more complex than X". So far as I know, no such custom exists. The custom is rather "We should always work with the simplest adequate hypothesis."

Here are your choices for explaining the universe: no explanation, God, the multiverse. No explanation, obviously, explains nothing. Both God and the multiverse add to the complexity of the situation in different ways. The question of which is more complex in the relevant sense is still open, and the question can't be decided by simply repeating the mantra "God is complex, God is complex".

[SophistiCat]

Beyond that, even if God was complex in some sense, he is no more complex than the only other available explanation, the multiverse, which calls for nigh-infinite number of universes, each of which is as complicated as the one we inhabit.

As Tegmark wrote in Parallel Universes (http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/multiverse.pdf),

[A]n entire ensemble is often much simpler than one of its members. For instance, the algorithmic information content of a generic integer n is of order log2(n) (Chaitin 1987), the number of bits required to write it out in binary. Nonetheless, the set of all integers 1, 2, 3, ... can be generated by quite a trivial computer program, so the algorithmic complexity of the whole set is smaller than that of a generic member. ... Loosely speaking, the apparent information content rises when we restrict our attention to one particular element in an ensemble, thus losing the symmetry and simplicity that was inherent in the totality of all elements taken together. In this sense, the higher level multiverses have less algorithmic complexity.

I am not sure I buy the entirety of his argument though. It seems to me that indexical information (which universe is ours?) still needs to be supplied to make the explanation complete.

[Zebulon]

Well God as the explanation of the universe is also constrained by the currently available evidence, and Occam's Razor, and it does explanatory work.

What currently available evidence, and what explanatory work?

[luvluv]

[A]n entire ensemble is often much simpler than one of its members. For instance, the algorithmic information content of a generic integer n is of order log2(n) (Chaitin 1987), the number of bits required to write it out in binary. Nonetheless, the set of all integers 1, 2, 3, ... can be generated by quite a trivial computer program, so the algorithmic complexity of the whole set is smaller than that of a generic member. ... Loosely speaking, the apparent information content rises when we restrict our attention to one particular element in an ensemble, thus losing the symmetry and simplicity that was inherent in the totality of all elements taken together. In this sense, the higher level multiverses have less algorithmic complexity.

I don' buy it. The member-generating algorithm maybe be simpler than any particular member that is generated, but that is not the same as saying that the entire set of members is less complicated than any particular member.

The crucial disanalogy is that the multiverse hypothesis is not an appeal to a simple universe-generator (that is the theistic hypothesis), it is rather an appeal to uncountably many (in Tegmark's case, an infinite number of) universes.

[Zebulon]

We end with the universe is such that it is and there are uncountably many other universes.

The moral? Both explanations add to complexity.

The difference being that one explanation is natural, and the other is supernatural. One may be testable at some point in the future; the other is inherently untestable.

[Janus]

I don't understand the question. But it is an historical fact that string theory did start on an assumption made on a whim.

And it became more than that because...? Do you think that physicists chose, en masse, to work on string theory because they felt like it, or something?


Well God as the explanation of the universe is also constrained by the currently available evidence

God never has been and never will be constrained by anything. That's what makes it so completely useless as an explanation. We can imagine, for example, that reality might be slightly different, and that, after various experiments, Murray Gell-Mann's concept of quarks would have turned out to be false four decades ago. I imagine that would have had an impact on string theory. What impact would it have made on god as an explanation for the universe? Can you give me an example, just one, of some new evidence or of some change in reality that would have made any impact whatsoever on the god hypothesis?

and Occam's Razor

Seeing as the razor excludes god right at the outset, that's a strange claim. But even if it didn't, how would you determine why a certain god hypothesis is more or less parsimonious than another god hypothesis?

and it does explanatory work.

LOL. If god does explanatory work, what was the point of science all these centuries? If explaining fine-tuning and the origin of the universe by appealing to an unknowable, supernatural entity that "just exists" is OK, why did we bother coming up with all these theories? Why didn't we just say Goddidit and go back to sleep?

And string theory isn't testable, as far as I know, and won't be any time soon.

It is, at the very least, testable in principle. God isn't.

It was not my intention, however, to compare theism and string theory. It was my point that the hypothetico-deductive model is a valid scientific methodolgy. We don't have to experience God before we can define him any more than we have to experience supserstrings before we can define them.

Even if God did any explanatory work, which he doesn't, we wouldn't be warranted in even beginning to imagine what he might be like, for the simple reason that we don't know anything that even begins to resemble something that might vaguely, approximately, be like God.

If the body of scientific knowledge is like a tower, with each new discovery being a new floor, string theory could be represented by the first few planks and nails, the beginning of the topmost floor.
God would be represented by a freaking plane flying a thousand miles above the tower. Nothing we can say about God is based on anything except basic logic.

And B) it's been observed indirectly inasmuch as this universe is supposed to be explained by its effects. This is how all theoritical entities work. We assume that an entity exists that has certain properties and try to make predictions based on those hypothetical properties.

Name one prediction made by the god hypothesis. Just one.

In this case, retrodictions are what's at issue, and the competing hypothesis (a multiverse) is just as unobservable. Again, theory choice is about competing hypotheses. Most folks assume that fine-tuning has to be explained, if it is to be explained at all, either by some kind of conscious creator or a multiverse. You are just critiquing the faults of the God hypotehsis without subjecting the multiverse to the same critiques. Even if everything you say is true, it still could be the case that God is the better of the two available hypotheses.

The multiverse might be implied by the theory of everything, if and when it is discovered, even if the the other universes can never be observed. Explain to me how something similar can be said about god.

The multiverse hypothesis does explanatory work, it doesn't explain complexity by saying it was designed by a complex intelligence (which doesn't explain anything at all), and it doesn't appeal to something utterly unlike anything we know; we know there is at least one universe, all the hypothesis says is that there is more of the same.


Let's not be silly. We don't even have an agreed upon definiton of a mind, so how then could we say that minds are complex (or are anything else) by definition? This is a desperate imperialist move on the part of materialists that impresses no one outside of their camp. I see no reason why a mind couldn't be simple. (Maybe I misunderstand, but isn't the point of functionalism that minds can be realized in basically any system? So why couldn't one be realized in a simple system?)

The point of functionalism (and the point of any theory of mind that doesn't ultimately say "the mind is like, magical, dude!") is that part of what makes a mind what it is is that it can have many states, and it can go from one state to another. That characteristic alone means it's complex. Something else that makes a mind what it is is some kind of data storage, which also implies complexity. I don't really need a solid definition of the mind for this discussion, I only need to show that whatever this definition is, it has to imply complexity to be meaningful.

Another thing: As far as we know, the human mind is the thing with the greatest complexity per unit of volume we know of in the universe. I suppose it could be argued that it might be needlessly complex (so that a simpler mind of equivalent intelligence might be possible), but natural selection, while not perfect, is reasonably efficient, and the mind of god would certainly be much, much more intelligent than the human brain. And yet you want to explain the initial complexity of the universe by using that supreme example of complexity? It seems so incredibly counter-productive to me.

Beyond that, even if God was complex in some sense, he is no more complex than the only other available explanation, the multiverse, which calls for nigh-infinite number of universes, each of which is as complicated as the one we inhabit. There is no law against complex explanations. There is just a heuristic princicple of taking the simplest available adequate explanation. Even if God is complex, that wouldn't rule Him out as the best available adequate explanation.

My main objection to God as an explanation is the same objection that makes us laugh at the so-called Intelligent Design theorists (in the field of biology), and it is the same objection that has kept science alive despite constant attempts by people like you to convince everyone that Goddidit is an adequate explanation: Explaining complexity by saying it was designed by an intelligent entity, and then "explaining" that entity by essentially saying "It's magic!" doesn't explain anything at all. It's a lazy cop-out.

That said, I disagree that the multiverse is such a complex explanation. As I said above, it amounts to "more of the same". If the process of universe-creation were a computer program, the multiverse hypothesis would be a WHILE loop that makes it happen again and again. It doesn't seem complex at all to me. But well, it's not possible to rigorously compare this sort of complexity, if it can even be called that, so I think I'd rather drop this point.

[luvluv]

What currently available evidence, and what explanatory work?

The narrowness of the constraints of the life-permitting variables in any physical universe, and the fact that our universe lies within the confines of those narrow constraints.

[luvluv]

The difference being that one explanation is natural, and the other is supernatural. One may be testable at some point in the future; the other is inherently untestable.

The multiverse is also generally thought to be inherently untestable. At least, a multiverse of sufficient diversity is inherently untestable. By hypothesis, these universes all break our natural laws, as each one has different natural laws (or no laws at all), and there's no way to use any of our laws or entities to test or encounter theirs. For instance, if these diverse universes have photons, these photons might be unrecognizable to us, it being they'll have different fundamental properties and subject to different physical laws.

We could have evidence of other universes that are very simlar to ours (this is the kind of universe that string theory and some interpretations of quantum mechcanics appeal to) but the existence of other universes with nearly identical life-permitting laws and initial conditions obviously won't explain why our universe (or any universe) has life-permitting laws or initial conditions. It would only add to the mystery.

Look, do I think a design argument works? I don't know. Do I think most atheistic responses to the design argument are dumber than a sack of hammers? Absolutely.

[Zebulon]

But to speak universes into existence would require being more complex than the universe, otherwise you wouldn't know how to do it. You wouldn't know how the parts fit together.

Unless "universing" is something the hypothetical god just does, in the same way that we breathe or digest our lunch -- automatically, as a natural process, without thinking about it. Which may get you to a pantheism but not to theism.

[Zebulon]

we know there is at least one universe, all the hypothesis says is that there is more of the same.

Good point. In this instance, the distance from one to many is much less formidable than the distance from zero to one.

[Zebulon]

The narrowness of the constraints of the life-permitting variables in any physical universe

We know the constraints of earthlike life. We have no conception whether or not life may be possible, and what it may be like, in a universe with variables differing from that of our own, so to assert that the constraints are narrow is an unwarranted assumption.

and the fact that our universe lies within the confines of those narrow constraints.

This is the "explanatory work" of the god hypothesis?!?

The probability of our living in a universe which supports life is 1. Tossing a god into the mix adds nothing.

[luvluv]

And it became more than that because...? Do you think that physicists chose, en masse, to work on string theory because they felt like it, or something?

They didn't chose to work on it en masse, so the question is moot. There are many experimental physicists to this day who still think it's psuedo-science. It gradually gained momentum because of it's success in unifying 3 of the fundamental constants. But, again, it is a matter of historical fact that it was based on a whim. Some guy was reading about equations governing the behavior of violin strings, and thought "hey what if there are really small strings governing the properties of fundamental bits of matter". And viola. Granted, if the math didn't work nobody would still be pursuing it. But the point is, contrary to what you insinuate, you don't need to observe or experience an entity before you can hypothesize it and see how far that hypothesis gets you.

God never has been and never will be constrained by anything. That's what makes it so completely useless as an explanation. We can imagine, for example, that reality might be slightly different, and that, after various experiments, Murray Gell-Mann's concept of quarks would have turned out to be false four decades ago. I imagine that would have had an impact on string theory. What impact would it have made on god as an explanation for the universe?

Comparing String Theory to God here is like comparing plate techtonics to molecular biology. God is not competing here with string theory. He is competing with the multiverse. And the multiverse hypothesis, like God, would be immune to such a discovery.

I repeat, for your benefit, the options here are: no explanation, God, or the multiverse. If any weakness you cite in God as an explanation is mirrored by the multiverse, then you've said precisely nothing against the God hypothesis.

Can you give me an example, just one, of some new evidence or of some change in reality that would have made any impact whatsoever on the god hypothesis?

God is much more falsifiable than the competing explanation, the multiverse. The existence of evil, the hiddeness of God, all impact particuclar versions of the God hypothesis. What could have an impact on the multiverse hypothesis? What observation could lead you to conclude that the multiverse doesn't exist?

Until you realize this is not a search for a perfect explanation, but a difficult choice between two very flawed explanations, you're not going to be fully particicpating in this discussion.

Seeing as the razor excludes god right at the outset, that's a strange claim. But even if it didn't, how would you determine why a certain god hypothesis is more or less parsimonious than another god hypothesis?

First, this is a blatant misuse of the razor. The razor excludes explanatorily unnecessary entities. To use the razor to exclude God, you'd have to have a relevantly simpler yet fully adequate alternative. In the case of the universe, you don't have it. You don't get to just say that any theory that adds entities violates Occam's Razor. It doesn't work like that.

Secondly, for the purpose of argument I'm not interested in restricting God hypotheses beyond the generic "God of the philosophers". I see no point in doing otherwise as yet.

LOL. If god does explanatory work, what was the point of science all these centuries? If explaining fine-tuning and the origin of the universe by appealing to an unknowable, supernatural entity that "just exists" is OK, why did we bother coming up with all these theories? Why didn't we just say Goddidit and go back to sleep?

That God does some explanatory work doesn't mean that God does all explanatory work. Arguably, given classical theism, the universe is the level at which God operates primarily. Everywhere else, secondary causes initiated by God at the instantationof the universe govern things locally. It's entirely appropriate that God be invalid as an explanation of any particular phenomenon in the universe, yet perfectly valid as an explanation of the universe. Those are different levels of explanation.

Besides, the same charge could be levelled at the only competing explanation. If the multiverse does explanatory work, why didn't scientist explain everything in the universe by chance and go home to bed?

You just refuse to acknowledge that this is a choice between two existing hypotheses that are both flawed. You think you can point out God's flaws and walk away. That betrays a misunderstanding of the situation here.

Even if God did any explanatory work, which he doesn't, we wouldn't be warranted in even beginning to imagine what he might be like, for the simple reason that we don't know anything that even begins to resemble something that might vaguely, approximately, be like God.

I can't imagine a superstring. Or the fractional charge of a quark. This objection is flatly worthless. Contemporary science is teeming with unimaginable entities.

Name one prediction made by the god hypothesis. Just one.

Easy. The universe came into existence a finite amount of time ago.

Theists predicted this before it was established.

Now, name a prediction made by the multiverse hypothesis.

The multiverse might be implied by the theory of everything,

I might be 9 feet tall. If a multiverse isn't implied by the fabled theory of everthing (and btw I think the appeal to a TOE ought to be a fallacy) then you're right back where you started. It's just illegitimate to appeal to that now.

The multiverse hypothesis does explanatory work, it doesn't explain complexity by saying it was designed by a complex intelligence (which doesn't explain anything at all), and it doesn't appeal to something utterly unlike anything we know; we know there is at least one universe, all the hypothesis says is that there is more of the same.

If the other universes are just more of the same, the multiverse does no explanatory work. And if the universes are different, and we have no prior way of establishing how different they are, then they are also, potentially, unlike anything we know. Many of them have no fundamental forces, or have wholly different fundamental forces. Many of them have exotic particles that would be indescribable to us.

Realize that appealing to a multiverse is an attempt to explain all of the properties of our universe by probability. Thus, for it to work, for any property our universe has, the multiverse must contain uncountably many universes that lack that property. Thus, those universes could rapidly go beyond our comprehension. One of the things the multiverse must explain, IMO, is why there are physical laws at all. To explain that probalistically, we'd have to imagine a universe out there with no physical laws. We have no idea what such a thing would be like.

The point of functionalism (and the point of any theory of mind that doesn't ultimately say "the mind is like, magical, dude!") is that part of what makes a mind what it is is that it can have many states, and it can go from one state to another. That characteristic alone means it's complex. Something else that makes a mind what it is is some kind of data storage, which also implies complexity. I don't really need a solid definition of the mind for this discussion, I only need to show that whatever this definition is, it has to imply complexity to be meaningful.

Okay, but if you subscribe to a functionalist computational theory of the mind, then you must believe that any computation could be accomplished on even the simplest Touring machine, given enough time. Thus, why couldn't God's mind be the simplest possible Touring machine with infinite time? It would thus be complex, but far less complex than the universe, but with enough time, it would be able to run the program of omnsicience without itself being infinitely complex. If even comprehension is computational, then why couldn't a God with a Touring mind be able to understand the computation it is running, despite the fact that the computation is orders of magnitude more complex than the Touring-mind God has?

I'm not seriously proposing this, I'm just levelling speculation at the charge that it's impossible that someting simple consciously create something more complex. The Touring-Mind example would show, on a computationalist functional picture, that such a thing is not impossible.

If the process of universe-creation were a computer program, the multiverse hypothesis would be a WHILE loop that makes it happen again and again. It doesn't seem complex at all to me. But well, it's not possible to rigorously compare this sort of complexity, if it can even be called that, so I think I'd rather drop this point.

In this case, the explanation wouldn't be the multiverse but a random multiverse generator, which would pick every attribute of any universe completely at random. And if you're going to propose that, why wouldn't it be more parsimonious to propose a non-random, single-universe generator?

[cognac]

And it became more than that because...? Do you think that physicists chose, en masse, to work on string theory because they felt like it, or something?


Amazon book description of Lee Smolin's The Trouble With Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next:

In this groundbreaking book, the renowned theoretical physicist Lee Smolin argues that physics—the basis for all other science—has lost its way. The problem is string theory, an ambitious attempt to formulate "a theory of everything" that explains all the forces and particles of nature and how the universe came to be. With its exotic new particles and parallel universes, string theory has captured the public"s imagination and seduced many physicists. But as Smolin reveals, there"s a deep flaw in the theory: no part of it has been proven, and no one knows how to prove it. As a scientific theory, it has been a colossal failure. And because it has soaked up the lion's share of funding, attracted some of the best minds, and penalized young physicists for pursuing other avenues, it is dragging the rest of physics down with it. With clarity, passion, and authority, Smolin charts the rise and fall of string theory and takes a fascinating look at what will replace it. A group of young theorists has begun to develop exciting new ideas that are, unlike string theory, testable. Smolin tells us who and what to watch for in the coming years and how we can find the next Einstein. This is a wake-up call, and Lee Smolin—a former string theorist himself— is the perfect person to deliver it.

[Ahab]

Easy. The universe came into existence a finite amount of time ago.

Theists predicted this before it was established.



I believe Aristotle was a theist and he thought the universe always existed.

In any case, the vacuity of God as a scientific explanation should be obvious here when one realizes that His existence does not negate the multiverse theory.

[Janus]

:rolleyes:

[luvluv]

I believe Aristotle was a theist and he thought the universe always existed.

Aristotle was technically a Deist. But I take the point. The particular form of theism at issue, though, predicts the universe began a finite time ago.

In any case, the vacuity of God as a scientific explanation should be obvious here when one realizes that His existence does not negate the theory of multiple universes.

The multiverse also doesn't negate the theistic hypothesis. Again, what we have is a tie between the two theories, but per usual, the non-theists only penalize the God theory for faults both theories share. All I see in most of these objections is an unreasoning haste to eliminate God, rather than a dispassionate, intellectually honest willingness to evaluate both options.

[Janus]

They didn't chose to work on it en masse, so the question is moot. There are many experimental physicists to this day who still think it's psuedo-science. It gradually gained momentum because of it's success in unifying 3 of the fundamental constants. But, again, it is a matter of historical fact that it was based on a whim. Some guy was reading about equations governing the behavior of violin strings, and thought "hey what if there are really small strings governing the properties of fundamental bits of matter". And viola. Granted, if the math didn't work nobody would still be pursuing it. But the point is, contrary to what you insinuate, you don't need to observe or experience an entity before you can hypothesize it and see how far that hypothesis gets you.

But you do need some kind of reference point, a way to see if things check out.



God is much more falsifiable than the competing explanation, the multiverse. The existence of evil, the hiddeness of God, all impact particuclar versions of the God hypothesis. What could have an impact on the multiverse hypothesis? What observation could lead you to conclude that the multiverse doesn't exist?

I thought you were talking about the god of the philosophers? That god isn't falsifiable at all. As for what could impact the multiverse hypothesis, not much, and I concede this point. Of course, something could impact the theory that implies the existence of the multiverse. I also seem to recall some physicist saying that it was possible that we would one day discover that the universe couldn't have been any other way.

Until you realize this is not a search for a perfect explanation, but a difficult choice between two very flawed explanations, you're not going to be fully particicpating in this discussion.

Until there is evidence, I don't think we should choose at all. Still, the multiverse beats god hands down.


First, this is a blatant misuse of the razor. The razor excludes explanatorily unnecessary entities. To use the razor to exclude God, you'd have to have a relevantly simpler yet fully adequate alternative. In the case of the universe, you don't have it. You don't get to just say that any theory that adds entities violates Occam's Razor. It doesn't work like that.

Sure we have a simpler alternative. Haven't you seen the Occam's razor gif? It slices, it dices, it removes superfluous supernatural entities. If a complex entity like God can just exist, so can the universe. The universe "just existing" is exactly as adequate as the god hypothesis, but it is obviously simpler.

That God does some explanatory work doesn't mean that God does all explanatory work. Arguably, given classical theism, the universe is the level at which God operates primarily. Everywhere else, secondary causes initiated by God at the instantationof the universe govern things locally. It's entirely appropriate that God be invalid as an explanation of any particular phenomenon in the universe, yet perfectly valid as an explanation of the universe. Those are different levels of explanation.

Hahahaaaa! Come on, be honest. You know you're only saying that because science has explained so much in the 21st century. Had you lived in the 17th you wouldn't have bought your own argument.


Besides, the same charge could be levelled at the only competing explanation. If the multiverse does explanatory work, why didn't scientist explain everything in the universe by chance and go home to bed?

Because chance isn't enough to explain everything there is in the universe, as you very well know. And because the multiverse only operates at what you call a primary level, at the level of the origin of the universe, unlike God who has traditionally operated at every level that hadn't yet been explained.


I can't imagine a superstring. Or the fractional charge of a quark. This objection is flatly worthless. Contemporary science is teeming with unimaginable entities.

This isn't an argument from incredulity. No matter how weird particle physics seem, there's been a smooth transition from well-supported fact to tentative theory. String theory is still about elementary particles and spacetime and things we can treat with an acceptable level of rigor. As your theological theory regarding God's nature demonstrates, god, even the god of the philosophers, isn't like that at all.



Easy. The universe came into existence a finite amount of time ago.

From what I've read, it's not yet established that the universe came into existence. And obviously, nowadays we aren't as naive as Aquinas and we understand that this no more points to God than to any other explanation.

Now, name a prediction made by the multiverse hypothesis.

There is none, but there might be predictions made by a theory which implies a multiverse.

I might be 9 feet tall. If a multiverse isn't implied by the fabled theory of everthing (and btw I think the appeal to a TOE ought to be a fallacy) then you're right back where you started. It's just illegitimate to appeal to that now.

Fair enough, but you have to admit that there is a possibility that the multiverse hypothesis will one day be supported by hard evidence, whereas god could only be supported by... what? Divine revelation?


Realize that appealing to a multiverse is an attempt to explain all of the properties of our universe by probability.

Chance is preferable to magic. We know that chance is an adequate explanation for some things. Magic is a cop-out by definition.

Thus, for it to work, for any property our universe has, the multiverse must contain uncountably many universes that lack that property. Thus, those universes could rapidly go beyond our comprehension. One of the things the multiverse must explain, IMO, is why there are physical laws at all. To explain that probalistically, we'd have to imagine a universe out there with no physical laws. We have no idea what such a thing would be like.

Now this is just speculation on your part.

Okay, but if you subscribe to a functionalist computational theory of the mind, then you must believe that any computation could be accomplished on even the simplest Touring machine, given enough time. Thus, why couldn't God's mind be the simplest possible Touring machine with infinite time? It would thus be complex, but far less complex than the universe, but with enough time, it would be able to run the program of omnsicience without itself being infinitely complex. If even comprehension is computational, then why couldn't a God with a Touring mind be able to understand the computation it is running, despite the fact that the computation is orders of magnitude more complex than the Touring-mind God has?

I'm not seriously proposing this, I'm just levelling speculation at the charge that it's impossible that someting simple consciously create something more complex. The Touring-Mind example would show, on a computationalist functional picture, that such a thing is not impossible.

Yaaay, I've finally gotten to the interesting part.

A Turing-Mind is impossible because a Turing machine is only hardware, it doesn't include the software, whereas our minds and the minds of all animals incorporate the properties of both hardware and software. A Turing machine could only qualify as a mind if it was running a really, really complex program. So I'm afraid that a mind comparable to or greater than that of a human being must be complex.

In this case, the explanation wouldn't be the multiverse but a random multiverse generator, which would pick every attribute of any universe completely at random. And if you're going to propose that, why wouldn't it be more parsimonious to propose a non-random, single-universe generator?

Actually, I was thinking about Paul Davies' hypothesis that the sorting out of physical laws would take place within each universe during inflation, by a sort of simplified process akin to natural selection: The laws would "compete" amongst themselves; the laws which would result in a stable universe would tend to "survive", those that don't, wouldn't. So the universe generator would be non-random and would always produce the same kind of universe, initially... if there is a generator at all, of course.

But anyway, God still has the same problem. The multiverse hypothesis, despite its flaws, has an overwhelming advantage over God: It actually solves the problem of complexity. God only shifts the problem up one level, and then escapes it by saying, "It's magic!".

I'll wait for the evidence, but unless God stops hiding and demonstrates his existence to us beyond all reasonable doubt, I refuse to give such a non-answer any consideration. Cop-outs are for losers.

[Dog Sneeze]

Are we speaking of a Touring Maching or a Turing Machine?

[Janus]

Are we speaking of a Touring Maching or a Turing Machine?


Touring machine. You know, for taking tours.

[SophistiCat]

The only other available explanation also must contain within itself all of the raw data it is supposed to explain. The multiverse (obviously) contains the universe, and at least an unimaginably high number of other universes, some more complex than this one. The sum of all the complexity of all the universes is obviously orders of magnitude more complex than our one universe.

I will recuse myself from discussing multiverses or string theories in any detail, because I don't know enough about the subject to have an informed opinion. No offense, and correct me if I am wrong, but my impression is that you are not talking from position of knowledge either. It should be noted though that just about every cosmological model nowadays posits a multiverse of some sort (more specifically, level II multiverse in Tegmark's terms). Cosmologists that I have spoken to (all two of them) maintain that the motivation for these models is precisely a simpler explanation of the world. Whether they actually deliver on that promise, I cannot judge at this time.

But the kicker is there's nothing wrong with that. Dawkins assertion that explanations necessarily must be simpler than that which they explain is utterly groundless.

Not groundless. What you have otherwise is an obfuscation rather than an explanation.

What needs to be remembered is that science is a matter of observation, and there are no logical laws of explanation. There is only custom and utility. And the relevant custom here is not "It is impossible that X be explained by something more complex than X". So far as I know, no such custom exists. The custom is rather "We should always work with the simplest adequate hypothesis."

Simplicity/parsimony is a thorny subject, but some things are self-evident enough to be accepted as universal rules. For example, if there are two competing explanations for the same data, and one of the explanations is a proper subset of the other, then the latter is preferable to the former. I'll get back to this in a bit.

Here are your choices for explaining the universe: no explanation, God, the multiverse. No explanation, obviously, explains nothing.

But "no explanation" is more than nothing. It is a simple enumeration of everything that we know. Even if we didn't have a single model in place, we would still have our observations. Earlier I contended that

Since postulating God does not by itself explain anything, i.e. it does not allow us to reconstruct any of the observations, the God-explanation must contain within itself all of the raw data that it is supposed to explain.

and you accepted this, a bit too rashly perhaps (some theologians maintain that God is capable of doing explanatory work, after all). Well, here are two competing accounts for the same set of observations:

1. The universe is such as it is. This is an enumeration of all our knowledge of the world, including any reductive models that are already in place (e.g. the Standard Model).

2. The universe is such as it is, and God made it such.

(1) is a proper subset of (2), therefore (1) is preferable as an account of the world. Thus, the God-explanation should be rejected in favour of the null.

[luvluv]

But you do need some kind of reference point, a way to see if things check out.

Which isn't available in either case.

I thought you were talking about the god of the philosophers? That god isn't falsifiable at all.

So, it's your opinion that there are no good arguments against the god of the philosophers? I'm a theist and I even I wouldn't say something like that. Evil, hiddenness, inconsistent attributes: God is much more falsifiable than the multiverse.

I also seem to recall some physicist saying that it was possible that we would one day discover that the universe couldn't have been any other way.

That physicist lies, because this would require that some physical law is logically necessary. And no scientific observation could ever establish logical necessity.

Still, the multiverse beats god hands down.

Ah, the argument from tough talk. An Internet Infidels standby.

Had you lived in the 17th you wouldn't have bought your own argument.

Actually, this is the doctrine of primary and secondary causes, explicated by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica in the 13th century, and advocated by his contemporary Roger Bacon, the Fransiscan Friar who was the first to articulate the scientific method and publically advocate its use. It was later picked up by folks like Newton (though he backslid), Boyle, Kepler, etc. It was basically the worldview of 17th century scientists (most of whom were Christian theists).

The moral being you shouldn't laugh at things you don't know about.

Because chance isn't enough to explain everything there is in the universe, as you very well know. And because the multiverse only operates at what you call a primary level, at the level of the origin of the universe, unlike God who has traditionally operated at every level that hadn't yet been explained.

First, I do not know that chancce isn't enough to explain everything in the universe. If the universe is deterministic, and determined by it's laws and initial conditions, and if those laws and initial conditions are acquirred by chance, then chance is enough to explain everything in the universe by definition. There is nothing that couldn't be explained by appeal to chance.

It's true that many people have applied God to every level of explanation. That's a matter of history and neither here nor there. The relevant point is, the logical situation regarding the multiverse is the same. Regardless of whether anyone has every done it or not (probably they have) it is possible to explain everything in the universe by an appeal to the multiverse. Both explanations can operate at any level.

No matter how weird particle physics seem, there's been a smooth transition from well-supported fact to tentative theory. String theory is still about elementary particles and spacetime and things we can treat with an acceptable level of rigor. As your theological theory regarding God's nature demonstrates, god, even the god of the philosophers, isn't like that at all.

Neither is the multiverse. We can't treat inaccessible universes with laws and initial constants radically different from our own with rigour. Again, God is competing with the multiverse, not with string theory. Nothing you've said so far counts against the God hypothesis at all, because only God and the multiverse have the explanatory power to explain the universe. Thus, if the multiverse shares any particular fault that God posseses in terms of explanation, you haven't touched the God hypothesis. You haven't reduced it's probability an iota.

You really need to internalize this. If you're about to make a complaint against God as an explanation, and you realize the same complaint applies to the multiverse, you might as well keep quiet, because voicing that complaint won't change the logical situation at all. You can't chose the multiverse theory over the theistic theory as a result of failings both theories share.

From what I've read, it's not yet established that the universe came into existence.

Read more.

And obviously, nowadays we aren't as naive as Aquinas and we understand that this no more points to God than to any other explanation.

What other explanation do you have for the emergence of the universe? Besides, that other theories may predict it doesn't mean that theism doesn't. You asked for your prediction, you got one.

I see you neglected to make a prediction on the basis of the multiverse. Hardly surprising, since the multiverse can't generate any, and on this consideration God is obviously the superior theory.

There is none, but there might be predictions made by a theory which implies a multiverse.

I might be 9 ft tall.

So far as I'm aware, there are no theories that imply a multiverse diverse enough to do the job. And there is no conception that such a theory is necessary. This kind of naked speculation can't count in favor of the multiverse theory.

Fair enough, but you have to admit that there is a possibility that the multiverse hypothesis will one day be supported by hard evidence

I don't agree with that at all. There could at best be circumsantial evidence of a multiverse of some kind. Scientists insist that other universes are inaccesible on principle, so what makes them any different from God on this score? What we're talking about here is universes radically different from our own, with physics that are perhaps incommensurable with our physics. From our perspective, these universes might as well be supernatural, as they wouldn't behave according to any physics we'd recognize. On the assumption that we were hewn by evolving in this universe to make discoveries about this universe, I see no reason to believe we could ever have "hard evidence" for universes wholly unlike our own.

Chance is preferable to magic. We know that chance is an adequate explanation for some things. Magic is a cop-out by definition.

You are aware that just your saying something is true by definition doesn't mean it it is?

In this case, an appeal to chance isn't much different than an appeal to magic. All the questions that apply to God apply to the multiverse. Where did it come from? What is the mechanism by which it creates other universes? Did it have a begining? Is it eternal or temporal? Etc. The chance vs magic stuff might work as propaganda, but as rational analysis it adds nothing.

A Touring-Mind is impossible because a Touring machine is only hardware, it doesn't include the software, whereas our minds and the minds of all animals incorporate the properties of both hardware and software. A Touring machine could only qualify as a mind if it was running a really, really complex program. So I'm afraid that a mind comparable to or greater than that of a human being must be complex.

I concede the point. But I remain unconvinced that there is anything like a law of logic or of science that we most always explain the complex in terms of the less complex. And I repeat that the option isn't available to us here, as both options are more complex than the universe.

Actually, I was thinking about Paul Davies' hypothesis that the sorting out of physical laws would take place within each universe during inflation, by a sort of simplified process akin to natural selection: The laws would "compete" amongst themselves; the laws which would result in a stable universe would tend to "survive", those that don't, wouldn't. So the universe generator would be non-random and would always produce the same kind of universe, initially... if there is a generator at all, of course.

The problem here is that inflationary theories implies a finite past number of universes, and doesn't predict anywhere near the number of universes necessary to explain the anthropic coincidences. (Actually there are lots of problems here, but that's the biggest one).

But anyway, God still has the same problem. The multiverse hypothesis, despite its flaws, has an overwhelming advantage over God: It actually solves the problem of complexity. God only shifts the problem up one level, and then escapes it by saying, "It's magic!".

How can the multiverse solve the problem of complexity when the multiverse is complex? Both explanations have magical properties, in that both leave a signficant portion of the "how" unexplained. Chance, in my view, is indistinguishable fr