I think therefore I am is selfishness

[PJPSYCO]

I finished reading Discourse on Method and Meditations in First Philosophy by Rene Descartes in a double reader (from herein referred to as discourse and meditation respectively), and I was very philosophically unsatisfied. I think that I need to discuss the texts to get something out of them.

I'll start with discourse as meditation is a response to it, and discourse contains the famous "I think therefore I am" line (from what I can tell most quoted without read). I thought it interesting to start a book with the sugestion that one would reject everything then build back up, but keep so much baggage. He talks about knocking things down like a house, but he seems to keep everything but the furniture and drapes. He keeps his foundational beliefs in Christianity. Which of course invalidates any claim to prove a god as it was assumed. He gets to thinking therefore he is but this is mearly because he has not only rejected the ideas of others, but others overall. This makes the idea, "I think therefore I am", as a self centering idea. Then he goes further to point out how if he self centers it shows that his selfish ideals are all true. Its like his problem with the universe was that everyone got to pick the drapes and he found them distasteful. So, he decides to burn the drapes and put new ones up more to his liking.

As a double reader it doesn't stop. So, on to meditations which is presented as a response to discourse according to the preface. He starts with a clear fallacy in suggesting that atheists are either stupid and/or evil (I found this statement unnecessary, but expected nothing less after discourse), and suggests that this time he is going to prove there is a god again. He actually starts off good, but when he gets to having to deal with other people again, he goes downhill. He gets to the universal definition among people ideal, but decides that it would be to hard!?!!?! I began flabbergasting at this point, how rejecting a philosophy because one finds it daunting is anywhere near reasonable is beyond me. I kept reading his book (I don’t like to critique things I am not familiar with). He could at least have tried something new in return. Nope, back to discourse with the self centered ideal. I am truth. I am life. I am morals. I am God, or at least aspire to be God as not to blaspheme (knowing deep down inside that I am God and his perfection). If I were talking to him at this time I would have said “What makes altruism so God damn hard?" (I’m sorry, Descartes damn hard?). He never really did get to that (back to the to hard part I suspect). It is just more of “I am the truth, the life, the way”. Finishing on any deviations to said internal perfection is the person not being selfish enough.

I am left totally unsatisfied. This book set makes me think the idea of masturbating making one sick and blind can apply quite readily to mental masturbation. I think the only good thing that comes out of this experience would be that I know what "I think therefore I am" actually means, and reject it outright as philosophically unsophisticated drivel. It was nice of him to totally support my idea that ones god is the personification of ones selfishness. That was totally confirmed in these books.

I have not read Descartes on geometry yet, so I will reserve judgement on his mental capabilities but this is a poor start. Heck with his constant reference to a triangles angles being 180 degrees as a trivial fact and not a consequence that any figure whose line segments all connect to each other and endpoints are all on a circle has a sum of 180n-360 degrees (where n is the number of sides) slightly worries me at what I might see there, but I will reserve my judgement. Descartes seems to be a slightly more sophisticated Pascal.

I do wonder what other people think of the discourse and meditations as they are highly praised (or at least highly repeated).

[Hugh Nose]

So, on to meditations which is presented as a response to discourse according to the preface. He starts with a clear fallacy in suggesting that atheists are either stupid and/or evil (I found this statement unnecessary, but expected nothing less after discourse), and suggests that this time he is going to prove there is a god again. He actually starts off good, but when he gets to having to deal with other people again, he goes downhill. He gets to the universal definition among people ideal, but decides that it would be to hard!?!!?! I began flabbergasting at this point, how rejecting a philosophy because one finds it daunting is anywhere near reasonable is beyond me. I kept reading his book (I don’t like to critique things I am not familiar with). He could at least have tried something new in return. Nope, back to discourse with the self centered ideal. I am truth. I am life. I am morals. I am God, or at least aspire to be God as not to blaspheme (knowing deep down inside that I am God and his perfection). If I were talking to him at this time I would have said “What makes altruism so God damn hard?" (I’m sorry, Descartes damn hard?). He never really did get to that (back to the to hard part I suspect). It is just more of “I am the truth, the life, the way”. Finishing on any deviations to said internal perfection is the person not being selfish enough. (the various emphases are mine- HN) It would be helpful if you would explain in a focused way, where you see Descartes "saying" the things you attribute to him. It has been some time since I spent any time on the "Meditations", but I don't recognize the Descartes I am familiar with in any of the things you attribute to him (Descartes in the "Meditations").

Hugh Nose

[Dr. Retard]

Yeah, I'm also not recognizing these claims in the Meditations (and I've read it pretty carefully pretty recently). I've never read the Discourse, but I hear it starts out with an ontological proof of God's existence (similar to the one in the 5th Meditation). In which case Descartes isn't starting off by assuming that God exists (much less that Christianity is true), but starting off with a proof of God's existence.

[kennethamy]

I finished reading Discourse on Method and Meditations in First Philosophy by Rene Descartes in a double reader (from herein referred to as discourse and meditation respectively), and I was very philosophically unsatisfied. I think that I need to discuss the texts to get something out of them.

I'll start with discourse as meditation is a response to it, and discourse contains the famous "I think therefore I am" line (from what I can tell most quoted without read). I thought it interesting to start a book with the sugestion that one would reject everything then build back up, but keep so much baggage. He talks about knocking things down like a house, but he seems to keep everything but the furniture and drapes. He keeps his "foundational beliefs in Christianity. Which of course invalidates any claim to prove a god as it was assumed. He gets to thinking therefore he is but this is mearly because he has not only rejected the ideas of others, but others overall. This makes the idea, "I think therefore I am", as a self centering idea. Then he goes further to point out how if he self centers it shows that his selfish ideals are all true. Its like his problem with the universe was that everyone got to pick the drapes and he found them distasteful. So, he decides to burn the drapes and put new ones up more to his liking.

As a double reader it doesn't stop. So, on to meditations which is presented as a response to discourse according to the preface. He starts with a clear fallacy in suggesting that atheists are either stupid and/or evil (I found this statement unnecessary, but expected nothing less after discourse), and suggests that this time he is going to prove there is a god again. He actually starts off good, but when he gets to having to deal with other people again, he goes downhill. He gets to the universal definition among people ideal, but decides that it would be to hard!?!!?! I began flabbergasting at this point, how rejecting a philosophy because one finds it daunting is anywhere near reasonable is beyond me. I kept reading his book (I don’t like to critique things I am not familiar with). He could at least have tried something new in return. Nope, back to discourse with the self centered ideal.
If I were talking to him at this time I would have said “What makes altruism so God damn hard?" (I’m sorry, Descartes damn hard?). He never really did get to that (back to the to hard part I suspect). It is just more of “I am the truth, the life, the way”. Finishing on any deviations to said internal perfection is the person not being selfish enough.

I am left totally unsatisfied. This book set makes me think the idea of masturbating making one sick and blind can apply quite readily to mental masturbation. I think the only good thing that comes out of this experience would be that I know what "I think therefore I am" actually means, and reject it outright as philosophically unsophisticated drivel. It was nice of him to totally support my idea that ones god is the personification of ones selfishness. That was totally confirmed in these books.

I have not read Descartes on geometry yet, so I will reserve judgement on his mental capabilities but this is a poor start. Heck with his constant reference to a triangles angles being 180 degrees as a trivial fact and not a consequence that any figure whose line segments all connect to each other and endpoints are all on a circle has a sum of 180n-360 degrees (where n is the number of sides) slightly worries me at what I might see there, but I will reserve my judgement. Descartes seems to be a slightly more sophisticated Pascal.

I do wonder what other people think of the discourse and meditations as they are highly praised (or at least highly repeated).

Are you sure it was the Meditations you read, and not something out of a comic book?

And where are the passages where Descartes says anything like,

"I am truth. I am life. I am morals. I am God, or at least aspire to be God as not to blaspheme (knowing deep down inside that I am God and his perfection)." ?

That sounds like something right out of the Gospels. Are you sure you are not confusing the Meditations with the New Testament?

You cannot find such a thing as "He gets to the universal definition among people ideal, but decides that it would be to hard!?!!?! " But I have no idea what it even means.

I have read the Meditations a number of times, and what you describe bears no resemblance to what it says. In the first Meditation, Descartes introduces his idea of universal doubt and then argues forcefully that since everything he thinks he knows is based on sense-knowledge, and sense-knowledge is unreliable he is justified in doubting what ever he has thought he knew. In the second Meditation, he argues that if he can discover something it is impossible for him to doubt, something indubitable, he will have discovered a certainty, and using that certainty as a foundation, he can being to rebuild knowledge from the ground up, as a system of belief which, since they are founded on a certainty, and deduced from that certainty by an unimpeachable method, will themselves, express certainties. That indubitable truth is that he exists, and he argues that it is an indubitable truth because for each person, including Descartes, in is order to doubt that he exists, he must exist. So that doubting that one exists is self-refuting, since no person can doubt he exists without having to exist in order to doubt he exists. What is "drivel" about that I cannot see. But instead of your calling it drivel, which is just abuse and is a lot of heat, but no light, why don't you formulate an objection to Descartes, "Cogito" to show why you believe it is wrong? His argument is that for each of us, we cannot doubt that we exist, for doubting we exist would be self-refuting since in order to doubt we exist, we would have to exist. Instead of abusing the argument, why don't you give an argument to show it is wrong-if you can.

The Meditations and The Discourse, are two of the greatest works in Western Philosophy, and in Western literature. I don't think you have any of an idea what Descartes is saying in them.

[kennethamy]

Yeah, I'm also not recognizing these claims in the Meditations (and I've read it pretty carefully pretty recently). I've never read the Discourse, but I hear it starts out with an ontological proof of God's existence (similar to the one in the 5th Meditation). In which case Descartes isn't starting off by assuming that God exists (much less that Christianity is true), but starting off with a proof of God's existence.

The Discourse does not start out with the Ontological Proof. It starts out with an autobiographical narrative of how Descartes came to the stage when he decides to embark on the method of doubt as a way of gaining certain knowledge. The Ontological Argument appears only in Part iv of the Discourse. There are six parts of the Discourse, so it does not appear until 2/3d's of the way into the book. The Cogito Argument, also appears in Part iv.So, what you have heard is wrong.

[kennethamy]

(the various emphases are mine- HN) It would be helpful if you would explain in a focused way, where you see Descartes "saying" the things you attribute to him. It has been some time since I spent any time on the "Meditations", but I don't recognize the Descartes I am familiar with in any of the things you attribute to him (Descartes in the "Meditations").

Hugh Nose

It must have been Descartes' evil twin brother who was invented by the Evil Demon to pretend to be Descartes, and deceive all those innocent, unsuspecting people who were reading Descartes for the first time.

[PJPSYCO]

I am paraphrasing. I also did not bring up the parts I agreed with. I know there are two English versions of Meditations. I was reading a translation from the Latin version, but I don't believe this should cause problems. The French may say something different. Discourse was from the French. I find Meditations is far better than Discourse philosophically.

The Discourse does not start out with the Ontological Proof. It starts out with an autobiographical narrative of how Descartes came to the stage when he decides to embark on the method of doubt as a way of gaining certain knowledge.
And my objection here is was he keeps in. The parts that he does not doubt are anything that agrees with him already. All that he seems to doubt is everyone else who disagrees. It comes off as a sort of half skepticism. I can understand opinions of people who have never read the book. I always say of this text, "often quoted, and not often read" as is my experience with this book.

I will quote my offending statements startion with #1:
clear fallacy in suggesting that atheists are either stupid and/or evil
This whole section is a letter to a school of theology to promote the book, and may only be appended to the reader in the preface. I.e. I was not supposed to see it in context with the text. The statement was that atheists were not well known as intellectuals and tended to be delinquents (I may be slightly paraphrasing the book is not in my hand). So, he did not even need to write the text. I ignored it anyways as it was poor form and prejudice is rarely particularly enlightening philosophically, and let him continue.

Quote 2:
the universal definition among people ideal, but decides that it would be too hard!?!!?! I began flabbergasting at this point, how rejecting a philosophy because one finds it daunting is anywhere near reasonable is beyond me.
The skepticism part was fine. Meditation I was fine.
It was part II when he started to try to define words, and gave up on it as it would require universal definitions, and establish communication that I did not find appealing. The flabbergasting is from the fact that it’s right back to discourse again.
From the book (meditation 2 number 5 in the online version):
What then did I formerly think I was? Undoubtedly I judged that I was a man. But what is a man? Shall I say a rational animal? Assuredly not; for it would be necessary forthwith to inquire into what is meant by animal, and what by rational, and thus, from a single question, I should insensibly glide into others, and these more difficult than the first ; nor do I now possess enough of leisure to warrant me in wasting my time amid subtleties of this sort.
Emphasis mine. I am bothered by this statement. It’s too difficult and a waste of time? Communicating ideas is too hard and lengthy to even be considered?
He is obsessed with trivia (He does a lot of trivia in Discourse as well). Addition problems, two plus two is four, two plus three is five. Geometric problems squares have four sides and the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees. He brings these up in both texts, and asks about their meaning, but never gets to it. The act of establishing definition is a warrant to give up.
I, as opposed to Descartes, don't take statements to be trivial unless they are words that have a universal definition among those participating in the discussion. I break things down into their most simple unarguable terms. From the end of my post:
that any figure whose line segments all connect to each other and endpoints are all on a circle has a sum of 180n-360 degrees (where n is the number of sides)
It’s just how I work. There is no knowledge without understanding.

Further on to the book with Quote 3:
I am truth. I am life. I am morals. I am God, or at least aspire to be God as not to blaspheme (knowing deep down inside that I am God and his perfection).
Again I am paraphrasing effectively meditation 3 to the end in a few simple statements. After deciding again that he is the center of the universe because he can only trust himself. So he is the truth giver, he is his life, he is his morals, he is god but he does not want to blaspheme (29 and 30)
And I ask, from whom could I, in that case, derive my existence? Perhaps from myself, or from my parents, or from some other causes less perfect than God; for anything more perfect, or even equal to God, cannot be thought or imagined. But if I [were independent of every other existence, and] were myself the author of my being, I should doubt of nothing, I should desire nothing, and, in fine, no perfection would be awanting to me; for I should have bestowed upon myself every perfection of which I possess the idea, and I should thus be God. And it must not be imagined that what is now wanting to me is perhaps of more difficult acquisition than that of which I am already possessed; for, on the contrary, it is quite manifest that it was a matter of much higher difficulty that I, a thinking being, should arise from nothing, than it would be for me to acquire the knowledge of many things of which I am ignorant, and which are merely the accidents of a thinking substance; and certainly, if I possessed of myself the greater perfection of which I have now spoken [in other words, if I were the author of my own existence], I would not at least have denied to myself things that may be more easily obtained [as that infinite variety of knowledge of which I am at present destitute]. I could not, indeed, have denied to myself any property which I perceive is contained in the idea of God, because there is none of these that seems to me to be more difficult to make or acquire; and if there were any that should happen to be more difficult to acquire, they would certainly appear so to me (supposing that I myself were the source of the other things I possess), because I should discover in them a limit to my power.
I always ask, "What is perfection?" Perfection is meaningless to me without the term of selfishness. People trying to prove god always bring up this term perfect and never seem to want to give it meaning. Selfishness is frowned upon in most cultures, but people are selfish (heck are brains themselves are the most selfish organ in my body). One doesn't say "I am selfish". One says, "I am perfect". Both statements mean the same thing.
in order to doubt we exist, we would have to exist.
But we do not have to be god. He could have stopped at meditation 1 and been done with it. I would not call it drivel, I said unsophisticated. He is letting his desires creep into his mind and corrupt his thoughts.
The Meditations and The Discourse are two of the greatest works in Western Philosophy, and in Western literature.
That very reason is why I read them. I would suggest all people do as well. Everybody quotes Discourse on Method, why not read it?
It must have been Descartes' evil twin brother who was invented by the Evil Demon to pretend to be Descartes, and deceive all those innocent, unsuspecting people who were reading Descartes for the first time.
I don't believe it was his brother. It said Rene Descartes as the author. The text matches well with the one given in the sticky I used for easier quoting. The book had a black cover, but I don't think that means evil brother as fanciful art tends to be put on a dust jacket, or in the text. I probably just formed my own opinions about the book. A lot of people don’t like that. I got a lot of crap for disliking Frankenstein by Mary Shelly. It’s the problem with opinions. Opinions are very self centered.

[kennethamy]

I am paraphrasing. I also did not bring up the parts I agreed with. I know there are two English versions of Meditations. I was reading a translation from the Latin version, but I don't believe this should cause problems. The French may say something different. Discourse was from the French. I find Meditations is far better than Discourse philosophically.


And my objection here is was he keeps in. The parts that he does not doubt are anything that agrees with him already. All that he seems to doubt is everyone else who disagrees. It comes off as a sort of half skepticism. I can understand opinions of people who have never read the book. I always say of this text, "often quoted, and not often read" as is my experience with this book.

I will quote my offending statements startion with #1:

This whole section is a letter to a school of theology to promote the book, and may only be appended to the reader in the preface. I.e. I was not supposed to see it in context with the text. The statement was that atheists were not well known as intellectuals and tended to be delinquents (I may be slightly paraphrasing the book is not in my hand). So, he did not even need to write the text. I ignored it anyways as it was poor form and prejudice is rarely particularly enlightening philosophically, and let him continue.

Quote 2:

The skepticism part was fine. Meditation I was fine.
It was part II when he started to try to define words, and gave up on it as it would require universal definitions, and establish communication that I did not find appealing. The flabbergasting is from the fact that it’s right back to discourse again.
From the book (meditation 2 number 5 in the online version):

Emphasis mine. I am bothered by this statement. It’s too difficult and a waste of time? Communicating ideas is too hard and lengthy to even be considered?
He is obsessed with trivia (He does a lot of trivia in Discourse as well). Addition problems, two plus two is four, two plus three is five. Geometric problems squares have four sides and the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees. He brings these up in both texts, and asks about their meaning, but never gets to it. The act of establishing definition is a warrant to give up.
I, as opposed to Descartes, don't take statements to be trivial unless they are words that have a universal definition among those participating in the discussion. I break things down into their most simple unarguable terms. From the end of my post:

It’s just how I work. There is no knowledge without understanding.

Further on to the book with Quote 3:

Again I am paraphrasing effectively meditation 3 to the end in a few simple statements. After deciding again that he is the center of the universe because he can only trust himself. So he is the truth giver, he is his life, he is his morals, he is god but he does not want to blaspheme (29 and 30)

I always ask, "What is perfection?" Perfection is meaningless to me without the term of selfishness. People trying to prove god always bring up this term perfect and never seem to want to give it meaning. Selfishness is frowned upon in most cultures, but people are selfish (heck are brains themselves are the most selfish organ in my body). One doesn't say "I am selfish". One says, "I am perfect". Both statements mean the same thing.

But we do not have to be god. He could have stopped at meditation 1 and been done with it. I would not call it drivel, I said unsophisticated. He is letting his desires creep into his mind and corrupt his thoughts.

That very reason is why I read them. I would suggest all people do as well. Everybody quotes Discourse on Method, why not read it?

I don't believe it was his brother. It said Rene Descartes as the author. The text matches well with the one given in the sticky I used for easier quoting. The book had a black cover, but I don't think that means evil brother as fanciful art tends to be put on a dust jacket, or in the text. I probably just formed my own opinions about the book. A lot of people don’t like that. I got a lot of crap for disliking Frankenstein by Mary Shelly. It’s the problem with opinions. Opinions are very self centered.

Are you sure it was Descartes you were reading? I don't recognize anything Descartes wrote from your comment. (Did Descartes say that he was perfect? Could you cite any passage to support that?)

[Dr. Retard]

The Discourse does not start out with the Ontological Proof. It starts out with an autobiographical narrative of how Descartes came to the stage when he decides to embark on the method of doubt as a way of gaining certain knowledge. The Ontological Argument appears only in Part iv of the Discourse. There are six parts of the Discourse, so it does not appear until 2/3d's of the way into the book. The Cogito Argument, also appears in Part iv.So, what you have heard is wrong.

Well, shit, dude, I did say I've never read it. For what it's worth, it came up in a discussion because I thought the 5th Meditation ontological proof requires all the previous stuff vindicating the truth rule, given that it seems to rely on a version of the truth rule applied to true and immutable natures (something like "whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive as belonging to an essence does belong to that essence"). And I was told maybe not, because in the Discourse the ontological proof comes before everything else. Maybe I misunderstood, but that's what I was going on.

[Dr. Retard]

PJPSYCO, just to take a particular passage, you're really misreading that big quote from the 3rd Meditation. Descartes is in the middle of the second version of his causal argument for God's existence. He's asking "from what causes did I get my existence?" and considering possible candidates: himself, his parents, some other imperfect causes, or God. He starts with himself and he rules that out right away because if he could bring himself into existence, then he could and would have given himself all the other perfections (total knowledge, total power, etc.) and he would be God -- but clearly he's not God, for he's still ignorant of all sorts of stuff at this stage in the Meditations. He says a few more things about the topic (whether he could have gotten his existence from himself), but he ends up satisfied that this is impossible, that he must have gotten his existence from some other being besides himself, and he moves on to consider his parents.

Put simply: you think Descartes is saying he's God. In fact, he's saying he's not God, and that it's impossible for him (Descartes) to be the cause of his own existence.

[kennethamy]

Well, shit, dude, I did say I've never read it. For what it's worth, it came up in a discussion because I thought the 5th Meditation ontological proof requires all the previous stuff vindicating the truth rule, given that it seems to rely on a version of the truth rule applied to true and immutable natures (something like "whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive as belonging to an essence does belong to that essence"). And I was told maybe not, because in the Discourse the ontological proof comes before everything else. Maybe I misunderstood, but that's what I was going on.

And I told you you were wrong. Poor Descartes. He isn't read, yet everyone seems to think they know what he wrote. Descartes' truth-rule, as you term it, is that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true, but that depend on the "Divine Guarantee". God certifies that if I do my part, and have a clear and distinct perception, then God will do His part, and guarantee that the clear and distinct perception is true. That is why Descartes tells us that the Atheist cannot know that the Pythagorean theorem is true.

[Dr. Retard]

And I told you you were wrong. Poor Descartes. He isn't read, yet everyone seems to think they know what he wrote. Descartes' truth-rule, as you term it, is that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true, but that depend on the "Divine Guarantee". God certifies that if I do my part, and have a clear and distinct perception, then God will do His part, and guarantee that the clear and distinct perception is true. That is why Descartes tells us that the Atheist cannot know that the Pythagorean theorem is true.

You're really being mean-spirited for no reason. I have read Descartes, but just the Meditations (and a bit of the Rules, a bit of the Objections and Replies, and lots of secondary literature). I seem to think I know what he wrote because I have in fact read him, and I've read the Meditations in particular extremely carefully. I said what I said about the Discourse because of a conversation I had with three early modern scholars, one of whom is publishing a book on the Meditations. We spent half a semester reading over his manuscript and meeting once a week before he came to give a colloquium. So I'm not doing anything wrong or untoward by making claims about Descartes says in the Meditations. Why are you being so mean-spirited? Because (I'm guessing this is what happened) I misunderstood one of the guys when he said "Yeah, but be careful, because in the Discourse, the ontological proof comes before everything else" and then passed on my misunderstanding with the explicit warning that I hadn't read the Discourse? Well, assuming that's what happened, then that is not a big deal, and I've done nothing wrong, nothing worth being mean-spirited about.

[Dr. Retard]

Descartes' truth-rule, as you term it, is that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true, but that depend on the "Divine Guarantee". God certifies that if I do my part, and have a clear and distinct perception, then God will do His part, and guarantee that the clear and distinct perception is true. That is why Descartes tells us that the Atheist cannot know that the Pythagorean theorem is true.

Also, you write this stuff as if I am unaware of it, or as if I had said something that contradicted it. But neither is true, so I don't get why you wrote it.

Here's my only guess: When I wrote about "a version of the truth rule applied to true and immutable natures (something like 'whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive as belonging to an essence does belong to that essence')", you thought I was writing about the main truth rule, the one that shows up at the beginning of the 3rd Meditation. But I was talking about the version that shows up right before the ontological proof in the 5th Meditation, when he's talking about true and immutable natures.

Also, just to be safe, I'll add that I didn't make up the term "truth rule". Lots of Descartes scholars use the term, and it shows up all over the place in the secondary literature.

[wiploc]

I thought it interesting to start a book with the sugestion that one would reject everything then build back up, but keep so much baggage. He talks about knocking things down like a house, but he seems to keep everything but the furniture and drapes. He keeps his foundational beliefs in Christianity. Which of course invalidates any claim to prove a god as it was assumed.

Consider the possibility that he was not a theist at all. Given that he could be burned at the stake if he made overt claims that Christianity was illogical, do you think he could have done anything more to undermine Christianity than to say what he did?

crc

[PJPSYCO]

As to god and perfection. Descartes repeatedly equates the two which should be an unarguable point to the text.
In meditation 4 #4 the conection between god and perfection is blatant.
I observe that there is not only present to my consciousness a real and positive idea of God, or of a being supremely perfect,
He repeatedly states his goal as to be this perfection. It's a selfish desire. To be godly will give him his truth, and his morals.

Consider the possibility that he was not a theist at all. Given that he could be burned at the stake if he made overt claims that Christianity was illogical, do you think he could have done anything more to undermine Christianity than to say what he did?

Which is a distinct possibility. However the later meditations have been plagurised by so many christians that I was almost sick to read them.

[Nitrousoxide]

You know, that phrase, "I think therefore I am." never really impressed me. He's assuming the existence of logic, one of the things he should be throwing out in clearing himself of all that which might be controled by the evil scientist.

"I am, I exist" seems to work far better though. It doesn't make use of logic, but instead uses our intuition, something we would surely still have, even throwing out the whole basket of apples to get at the bad ones.

[KLK]

"I think therefore I am" is erroneous and therein lies all the problems that emanate from it. It asserts the primacy of consciousness, a familiar theistic notion.

"I am therefore I think" correctly encompasses the primacy of existence; consciousness plays second fiddle (and doesn;t have to play at all for existence to exist).

[Preno]

"I think therefore I am" is erroneous and therein lies all the problems that emanate from it. It asserts the primacy of consciousness, a familiar theistic notion.

"I am therefore I think" correctly encompasses the primacy of existence; consciousness plays second fiddle (and doesn;t have to play at all for existence to exist).No, stones exist but they do not think. Thinking does not follow from existence.

[Simen]

"I think therefore I am" is erroneous and therein lies all the problems that emanate from it. It asserts the primacy of consciousness, a familiar theistic notion.

"I am therefore I think" correctly encompasses the primacy of existence; consciousness plays second fiddle (and doesn;t have to play at all for existence to exist).

Wrong. Consciousness doesn't follow from existence, but existence does follow from consciousness.

[KLK]

No, stones exist but they do not think. Thinking does not follow from existence.Correct. It doesn't have to follow--especially if that which exists isn't sentient!

Wrong. Consciousness doesn't follow from existence, but existence does follow from consciousness.Wrong. Existence has primacy, not consciousness. This is rather easily seen: one must assume existence in order to attempt to refute it, ergo it has primacy. Existence exists. Consciousness follows (for the sentient) and cannot be said to exist without presupposing existence first.

[kennethamy]

Wrong. Consciousness doesn't follow from existence, but existence does follow from consciousness.

The customary confusion between necessary and sufficient conditions. Thinking is a sufficient condition for existing, but not a necessary condition for existing: and existing is a necessary condition for thinking, but not a sufficient condition for thinking. (I don't mean you, of course).

Reading is a necessary condition for understanding what you have read, but as illustrated a number of times, not a sufficient condition for understanding what you have read.

[Nitrousoxide]

"I think therefore I am" is erroneous and therein lies all the problems that emanate from it. It asserts the primacy of consciousness, a familiar theistic notion.

"I am therefore I think" correctly encompasses the primacy of existence; consciousness plays second fiddle (and doesn;t have to play at all for existence to exist).


Existence is primary to consciousness in the sense that something needs to exist in order for consciousness to adhere to an object (or, at least, so we think). However, his plan was not to first show that we exist, and from that show that we think. As others have stated, not all things which exist also think.

Instead, what he was trying to go about doing was show that we do actually think, from which it should be deduceable that we exist. Thinking is sufficient for existence (again, not an uncontentious claim) but existence is not sufficiant for thinking, though it might be necessary.

[kennethamy]

Thinking is sufficient for existence (again, not an uncontentious claim) .

Why would you say that? Thinking is sufficient for existence just as walking, or bike-riding, or doing anything, is sufficient for existence, for the obvious reason that no one can do anything unless he exists.

And existence is not sufficient for thinking (stones exist), but it must be necessary as I have just pointed out. In general, if X is sufficient for Y, then Y is necessary for X. And that is a truth of logic.

[Simen]

Wrong. Existence has primacy, not consciousness. This is rather easily seen: one must assume existence in order to attempt to refute it, ergo it has primacy. Existence exists. Consciousness follows (for the sentient) and cannot be said to exist without presupposing existence first.

What do you mean, "one must assume existence in order to refute it?"

Also, you misunderstood what I said. If we know that X is conscious, we can infer that X is exist. We cannot infer from the fact that X exists that X is conscious.

[Ishmael]

I finished reading Discourse on Method and Meditations in First Philosophy by Rene Descartes in a double reader (from herein referred to as discourse and meditation respectively), and I was very philosophically unsatisfied. I think that I need to discuss the texts to get something out of them.

I'll start with discourse as meditation is a response to it, and discourse contains the famous "I think therefore I am" line (from what I can tell most quoted without read). I thought it interesting to start a book with the sugestion that one would reject everything then build back up, but keep so much baggage. He talks about knocking things down like a house, but he seems to keep everything but the furniture and drapes. He keeps his foundational beliefs in Christianity. Which of course invalidates any claim to prove a god as it was assumed. He gets to thinking therefore he is but this is mearly because he has not only rejected the ideas of others, but others overall. This makes the idea, "I think therefore I am", as a self centering idea. Then he goes further to point out how if he self centers it shows that his selfish ideals are all true. Its like his problem with the universe was that everyone got to pick the drapes and he found them distasteful. So, he decides to burn the drapes and put new ones up more to his liking.

As a double reader it doesn't stop. So, on to meditations which is presented as a response to discourse according to the preface. He starts with a clear fallacy in suggesting that atheists are either stupid and/or evil (I found this statement unnecessary, but expected nothing less after discourse), and suggests that this time he is going to prove there is a god again. He actually starts off good, but when he gets to having to deal with other people again, he goes downhill. He gets to the universal definition among people ideal, but decides that it would be to hard!?!!?! I began flabbergasting at this point, how rejecting a philosophy because one finds it daunting is anywhere near reasonable is beyond me. I kept reading his book (I don’t like to critique things I am not familiar with). He could at least have tried something new in return. Nope, back to discourse with the self centered ideal. I am truth. I am life. I am morals. I am God, or at least aspire to be God as not to blaspheme (knowing deep down inside that I am God and his perfection). If I were talking to him at this time I would have said “What makes altruism so God damn hard?" (I’m sorry, Descartes damn hard?). He never really did get to that (back to the to hard part I suspect). It is just more of “I am the truth, the life, the way”. Finishing on any deviations to said internal perfection is the person not being selfish enough.

I am left totally unsatisfied. This book set makes me think the idea of masturbating making one sick and blind can apply quite readily to mental masturbation. I think the only good thing that comes out of this experience would be that I know what "I think therefore I am" actually means, and reject it outright as philosophically unsophisticated drivel. It was nice of him to totally support my idea that ones god is the personification of ones selfishness. That was totally confirmed in these books.

I have not read Descartes on geometry yet, so I will reserve judgement on his mental capabilities but this is a poor start. Heck with his constant reference to a triangles angles being 180 degrees as a trivial fact and not a consequence that any figure whose line segments all connect to each other and endpoints are all on a circle has a sum of 180n-360 degrees (where n is the number of sides) slightly worries me at what I might see there, but I will reserve my judgement. Descartes seems to be a slightly more sophisticated Pascal.

I do wonder what other people think of the discourse and meditations as they are highly praised (or at least highly repeated).

Rubbish, you haven't even begun to have spent enough time with the text. God back to it!

[Nitrousoxide]

Why would you say that? Thinking is sufficient for existence just as walking, or bike-riding, or doing anything, is sufficient for existence, for the obvious reason that no one can do anything unless he exists.

And existence is not sufficient for thinking (stones exist), but it must be necessary as I have just pointed out. In general, if X is sufficient for Y, then Y is necessary for X. And that is a truth of logic.

It has been suggested by some that all one is able to say in the situation that Descartes put himself into (that is, throwing out all of his beliefs) is not that he thinks, but rather that thinking is going on or thinking is taking place. The use of the "I" in his assertion is too strong, and he can't be sure that it is "he" who is doing the thinking.

I think it was George Lichtenberg who said this, but I do have a terrible memory for names.

[kennethamy]

It has been suggested by some that all one is able to say in the situation that Descartes put himself into (that is, throwing out all of his beliefs) is not that he thinks, but rather that thinking is going on or thinking is taking place. The use of the "I" in his assertion is too strong, and he can't be sure that it is "he" who is doing the thinking.

I think it was George Lichtenberg who said this, but I do have a terrible memory for names.

Bertrand Russell. But what has that to do with whether existence is a necessary condition for thinking?

[drewjmore]

Consider the possibility that he was not a theist at all. Given that he could be burned at the stake if he made overt claims that Christianity was illogical, do you think he could have done anything more to undermine Christianity than to say what he did?

crc

I've often thought that the obvious circularity of his reasoning (reliance on the assumption of the demon to prove god's existence) was proof that he did not actually believe the argument. This simple and obvious flaw could not have been overlooked by so strong a logical mind. If one reads the text with that in mind (and it's been years now since I actually read it), many of the, apparently superfluous, belabored points & digressions make sense as deliberately demonstrating the absurdity of the argument.

IM(dimly remembered)O

[Nitrousoxide]

Bertrand Russell. But what has that to do with whether existence is a necessary condition for thinking?

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding Russell, but I took from his argument that he thinks there might be thinking which is done, without there being an object which is doing the thinking. That is, that the action, thinking, can take place without an object which can be said to be preforming it.

Or, perhaps I was mistaken and he was merely saying that it was hasty of Descartes to say the he was doing the thinking. Rather another being or object might have been doing it.

I don't actually believe that thinking can take place without some object with which it might be doing the thinking, I was merely relating what I thought a major philospher had contended was the case. Of course, I could be wrong about what the proper reading of his argument was though....

[kennethamy]

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding Russell, but I took from his argument that he thinks there might be thinking which is done, without there being an object which is doing the thinking. That is, that the action, thinking, can take place without an object which can be said to be preforming it.

Or, perhaps I was mistaken and he was merely saying that it was hasty of Descartes to say the he was doing the thinking. Rather another being or object might have been doing it.

I don't actually believe that thinking can take place without some object with which it might be doing the thinking, I was merely relating what I thought a major philospher had contended was the case. Of course, I could be wrong about what the proper reading of his argument was though....

Russell held that given Descartes' epistemic principles that assumptions were banned, Descartes ought not to have assumed that thinking requires a thinker. But that does not mean that it is not necessary that if something is thinking, that the something that is thinking exist. Certainly, if it is Descartes who is doing the thinking, then it is necessary that Descartes exist.

A different problem arises at the next stage of the argument when Descartes asks who (or rather, what) it is doing the thinking, and comes to the conclusion that what is doing the thinking is, (a) a substance, and (b) that this substance if a mind or a soul, so that it turns out that Descartes is a mind or a soul, and has a body; but is a mind or a soul.

[Nitrousoxide]

Russell held that given Descartes' epistemic principles that assumptions were banned, Descartes ought not to have assumed that thinking requires a thinker. But that does not mean that it is not necessary that if something is thinking, that the something that is thinking exist. Certainly, if it is Descartes who is doing the thinking, then it is necessary that Descartes exist.

Ah, yes, that seems to be a far more reasonable reading than what I got out of it. That the restrictions Descartes put on himself would require that he not assume that thinking requires a thinker seems far more plausable than it actually being the case that thinking doesn't require a thinker.

As I origionally understood Russell to be saying, it was not a terribly great leap to go from saying that "thinking need not be done by a thinker" to, "thinking is not sufficiant for the existence of a thinker."

Very good then, my origional assertion that some philosophers don't think that thinking is sufficiant for existence and that existence is necessary for thinking was mistaken as far as I know.

[PJPSYCO]

Rubbish, you haven't even begun to have spent enough time with the text. Go back to it!(word correction mine)
I would suggest that you go to me second post (#7) where I did go back to it, and actually address my grievances. I provided quotes directly from the text. From the online version:
Meditation 2 number 5 - making up definitions is difficult and time consuming
I quoted the text directly but this passage is ignored (I'm interpreting it wrong even though I used the same words - it's not Descartes even though it is a direct quote).
Meditation 3 number 29 ad 30 - aspirations to be godly
The other part is from my third post (#15)
Meditation 4 number 4 in support of my conclusions about 3 29 and 30 - god is perfect implying aspirations to perfection

Reading is a necessary condition for understanding what you have read, but as illustrated a number of times, not a sufficient condition for understanding what you have read.
This is a statement I totally agree with. It is interesting that my objections don't seem too taken totally seriously. I got a lot of your stupid, read it again. I brought it upon myself by not quoting, and I apologize for that.
There is still ignoring of the passage I had the most objection too(med. 2, #5) is of high interest to me. It my primary reason for finding Meditations unsound.
My other objection has been dealt with better, but I further object. The thesis statement is clearly God is the inevitable conclusion to thought. My objection to the thesis is that God is perfection (med. 4 #4 as cited), and perfection is an aspiration usually towards selfishness (my own thought), and Descartes god definition is thus:
the idea by which I conceive a God [sovereign], eternal, infinite, [immutable], all-knowing, all-powerful, and the creator of all things
These are all extreme words. God is not normal, mediocre or equal in any way, and it is the aspiration to truth (med. 3, 29-30). So, truth is corrupted by desire, which I totally object to on the grounds that he did not establish desire as a valid way to get to truth.