Dante Alighieri
May 10, 2007, 12:55 PM
Robin Collins' confirmatory teleological argument is based upon the prime principle of confirmation. Basically, if evidence E comports better with hypothesis A as opposed to B, it is more rational to accept A over B. Collins argues that fine-tuning is more probable under a theistic universe as opposed to an atheist one. Now, what I think the teleological argument strictly shows is that "It is probable that there is an ordering force." Now, classical theists will also attempt to argue that this ordering force is a supermind of some type: a creative intelligence.
Now, I think one should be cautious in exercising such a treacherous analogical gap. The analogy of human designers to that of a universal Designer seems vast and perhaps unfairly anthropocentric in its analysis. Analogies, as it is well known, can be improperly used when stretched too far. The extension between a human designer and a universal one, and the empirical experience lacking for the latter, does not appear to allow for a reliable basis upon which to base the teleological argument.
This, incidentally, happens to be one of Hume's objections, in the guise of Philo in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. The reason that Cleanthes reply of a benevolent voice I think fails is because of the analogical gap between human designers and world designers and lack of such a wide chasm between benevolent voices and human voices. Systematic experience of a benevolent voice given in all intelligible human languages wherein it becomes readily apparent there is no naturalistic cause for such would constitute valid warrant for belief in God. One is readily familiar with the inferences of systematic apprehension of voices and the probable conclusion of a person. But, there is a greater gap between human designers and world designers, one very vast, since one is claiming the design of an entire world.
Now, what of this ordering force? Now, what I'm thinking, and perhaps I'm wrong, is that Collins' argument, and even other teleological arguments, can support the antithetical conclusion of naturalism. Now, strictly speaking, all teleological arguments show is an ordering force. The theist generally attempts to show it to be a creative supermind. Now, perhaps the naturalist can gently point out the belief in an entirely different ordering force: one in which we are constantly in contact with - natural law. Natural law would automatically act as an ordering principle to constrain and conform the universe and thus, it appears that it would also be probable under such a naturalistic universe, that the universe would be so fine-tuned.
An argument that can indicate its very antithesis is clearly not a useful one and thus, perhaps a theistic teleological argument may not work. Where did I go wrong in my musings?
By the way, I'm not so much as interested in the idea of providing specific scientific hypotheses that explain fine-tuning or life i.e. the multiverse and evolution. I'm interested in the idea that the teleological argument strictly shows the probability of an ordering force being higher than without and the nature of this ordering force. Given a lack of knowledge beyond that, I do not see an inductive inference to that of a creative intelligence, due to an analogical gap and perhaps due to the utter indifference most of the universe shows. Whatever constrains the universe, it does not appear to be too anthropocentric, and hence, the personality of such an ordering force becomes suspect.
Now, I think one should be cautious in exercising such a treacherous analogical gap. The analogy of human designers to that of a universal Designer seems vast and perhaps unfairly anthropocentric in its analysis. Analogies, as it is well known, can be improperly used when stretched too far. The extension between a human designer and a universal one, and the empirical experience lacking for the latter, does not appear to allow for a reliable basis upon which to base the teleological argument.
This, incidentally, happens to be one of Hume's objections, in the guise of Philo in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. The reason that Cleanthes reply of a benevolent voice I think fails is because of the analogical gap between human designers and world designers and lack of such a wide chasm between benevolent voices and human voices. Systematic experience of a benevolent voice given in all intelligible human languages wherein it becomes readily apparent there is no naturalistic cause for such would constitute valid warrant for belief in God. One is readily familiar with the inferences of systematic apprehension of voices and the probable conclusion of a person. But, there is a greater gap between human designers and world designers, one very vast, since one is claiming the design of an entire world.
Now, what of this ordering force? Now, what I'm thinking, and perhaps I'm wrong, is that Collins' argument, and even other teleological arguments, can support the antithetical conclusion of naturalism. Now, strictly speaking, all teleological arguments show is an ordering force. The theist generally attempts to show it to be a creative supermind. Now, perhaps the naturalist can gently point out the belief in an entirely different ordering force: one in which we are constantly in contact with - natural law. Natural law would automatically act as an ordering principle to constrain and conform the universe and thus, it appears that it would also be probable under such a naturalistic universe, that the universe would be so fine-tuned.
An argument that can indicate its very antithesis is clearly not a useful one and thus, perhaps a theistic teleological argument may not work. Where did I go wrong in my musings?
By the way, I'm not so much as interested in the idea of providing specific scientific hypotheses that explain fine-tuning or life i.e. the multiverse and evolution. I'm interested in the idea that the teleological argument strictly shows the probability of an ordering force being higher than without and the nature of this ordering force. Given a lack of knowledge beyond that, I do not see an inductive inference to that of a creative intelligence, due to an analogical gap and perhaps due to the utter indifference most of the universe shows. Whatever constrains the universe, it does not appear to be too anthropocentric, and hence, the personality of such an ordering force becomes suspect.