I want to start reading Derrida...

[EsoCyn]

Should there be any background reading I should do before getting into? And if there is, after that, where should I start?

[kennethamy]

Should there be any background reading I should do before getting into? And if there is, after that, where should I start?

I think it makes no difference where you start, even if it is in the middle of a word.

[Zebulon]

I'd recommend starting with this:

Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity (http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/transgress_v2/transgress_v2_singlefile.html)

[Biniam Shire]

I'd recommend starting with this:

Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity (http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/transgress_v2/transgress_v2_singlefile.html)

I'll second that. They expand on their ideas in a whole book, which is a real milestone of the genre. Nobody should miss it.

[WarrenandTrumbull]

Should there be any background reading I should do before getting into? And if there is, after that, where should I start?

I think "Limited Inc." is widely read by graduate students. But, it depends on what you want to read.... specifically, literary criticism, political philosophy, ethics ect.?

[EsoCyn]

Ethics and political philosophy would probably be the most interesting to me, although I don't mind literary criticism.

[Space Chef]

Dude, there's nothing interesting in Derrida that you can't find in philosophers ten times as thought provoking. Derrida is a joke.

One interesting book regarding Derrida is Against Deconstruction, by J. M. Ellis.

[Zossima]

If you're interested in ethics and political philosophy, my recommendations would be "The Politics of Friendship," "Force of Law," and "The Gift of Death."

Particularly if you're interested in religion, John Caputo's "The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida" is really neat.

[No Robots]

I watched the movie, Derrida (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0303326/), this weekend. He is far more lucid orally than in his writing. The only book of his that I have read is Of Spirit (books.google.com/books?isbn=0226143198). It was a good treatment of a very difficult subject. Just because the yobs have nothing but contempt for his work doesn't mean there isn't any value in it. Hell, the yobs themselves are always doing deconstructive hatchet jobs on everything they don't like.

[EsoCyn]

I watched the movie, Derrida (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0303326/), this weekend. He is far more lucid orally than in his writing. The only book of his that I have read is Of Spirit (books.google.com/books?isbn=0226143198). It was a good treatment of a very difficult subject. Just because the yobs have nothing but contempt for his work doesn't mean there isn't any value in it. Hell, the yobs themselves are always doing deconstructive hatchet jobs on everything they don't like.

"Yobs"?

[No Robots]

Yeah, yob. I mean the people who sneer at and mock Derrida.

[Zebulon]

Who knew that Noam Chomsky, John Searle and W.V. Quine are all "yobs"? :rolleyes:

[No Robots]

"Derrida and Lacan should at least be read."--Chomsky quoted in Noam Chomsky: A Life of Dissent (www.amazon.com/Noam-Chomsky-Robert-F-Barsky/dp/0262024187) / Robert Franklin Barsky, p. 195. And, of course, Searle and Rorty also read Derrida, even if in a very critical way.

[Gamera]

Should there be any background reading I should do before getting into? And if there is, after that, where should I start?

You might want to start with one of Derrida's more accessible and pertinent essays, "The Supplement of Copula," which has many of his ideas about texts and truth focused on the subject of authorial/inter-textual influence and the primacy of language over thought.

"The Gift of Death" is also an interesting little book about Jesus' sacrificial death in the context of Western religiosity.

Derrida's confrontation with Heidegger is also important, if you're interested in the arc of postmodernism. "The Margins of Philosophy" is a good book in that direction.

Derrida is an important thinker, though I think Foucault is more impressive and relevant. Good luck.

[Gamera]

Dude, there's nothing interesting in Derrida that you can't find in philosophers ten times as thought provoking. Derrida is a joke.

One interesting book regarding Derrida is Against Deconstruction, by J. M. Ellis.


Nothing like knownothingism at a philosophy forum.

[Space Chef]

Nothing like knownothingism at a philosophy forum.

So if I don't dig Derrida, I don't know any thing? :)

[Penumbrae]

Some fairly good introductory texts not yet mentioned:

Spectres of Marx is a surprisingly clear and cogent discussion of social responsibility, politics and Fukuyama's The End of History.

Points... is a series of interviews with Derrida where he once again is asked to explain himself, and he does.

If you're already familiar with analytic philosophy, David Wood's Philosophy at the Limit is a very well-written introduction to phenomenological and deconstructive issues/problems.

[Gamera]

So if I don't dig Derrida, I don't know any thing? :)

If you call one of the more significant thinkers of the later half of the 20th century a "joke," yeah, you don't know anything. Just because you don't understand his work, or can't bother to try, doesn't mean he's the joke. I would suggest the opposite is true.

[Space Chef]

If you call one of the more significant thinkers of the later half of the 20th century a "joke," yeah, you don't know anything. Just because you don't understand his work, or can't bother to try, doesn't mean he's the joke. I would suggest the opposite is true.

Ever notice how, when someone doesn't dig something (whether it's socialism, David Lynch, etc.), fans of that thing always assume the someone doesn't understand the thing?

I read all of Hubert Selby's novels and I don't like him as an author. Does that mean I didn't understand his work?

[No Robots]

I am not a "fan" of Derrida. I do admire him as a serious, helpful and courageous thinker. His contribution to the critique of Heidegger is invaluable. Maybe we should coin a neologism in his (dis)honor:

derrider: someone who, while affecting an interest in philosophy, actually seeks to discourage its pursuit by mocking and deriding philosophers without actually citing anything they have said or written.

[Zossima]

There is a big distinction between simply not liking an author, and "derriding" him (nice little move there, NR) and calling him a "joke." I would think that this holds true even more so in a case such as this one, in which someone seems honestly curious about the author and interested in finding out for him/herself whether the author has merit.

I would not say that a mere dislike of Derrida would show that you do not understand him. That you call him a "joke," however, seems very much to indicate a lack of understanding, and a hasty dismissal. You are more than welcome to prove this indication wrong, of course.

[johno]

It is impossible to translate Derrida into English, so spend some time learning French, and then read his writings in the language in which they were written.

johno

[Preno]

Why should it be impossible? Almost inevitably, some nuances in meaning get lost in translation, but unless his ideas are valid for the French language only, why should it not be possible to express them in English?

[johno]

Why should it be impossible? Almost inevitably, some nuances in meaning get lost in translation, but unless his ideas are valid for the French language only, why should it not be possible to express them in English?

Well, from my sketchy reading, he doesn't make much sense in English. The French seem to think that he is a philosopher, so I must be missing something fundamental. I think that you have a point: his writings speak to the French intellectual temperament, and to those who admire that temperament.

johno

[No Robots]

I read On Spirit in English translation. I do read French, but I feel that I gained enough from the translation that I don't need to look up the original. I suppose if I ever got into a dispute with someone about the subject, I would make sure to check the original. But the chances of getting into a detailed discussion on this kind of thing are extremely remote, more's the pity.

[WarrenandTrumbull]

Well, from my sketchy reading, he doesn't make much sense in English. The French seem to think that he is a philosopher, so I must be missing something fundamental. I think that you have a point: his writings speak to the French intellectual temperament, and to those who admire that temperament.

johno

derrida's a hard read at first.... mostly because you have to know levinas, heidegger, hegel, Kant ect. in order to get in the door of a lot of his work. It is no suprise that it is difficult to read someone who takes these thinkers, deconstructs them and then applys that to anything from religion to pop culture to politics; his work was so advanced that maybe the top 5% in academia at first could understand what he was doing. now, however, he is widely taught in our academies.

[thedistillers]

Dude, there's nothing interesting in Derrida that you can't find in philosophers ten times as thought provoking. Derrida is a joke.

One interesting book regarding Derrida is Against Deconstruction, by J. M. Ellis.

It's true that there's nothing interesting in Derrida, because Derrida goal was never to be interesting, but to be something else that I can't really describe. We can only describe him for what he isn't (a sort of negative theology) and by saying there's nothing interesting about him is a good start.

The choice of ten times as thought provoking is interesting; why do you choose 10? Is it because of the (ethically questionable) hegemony of the number 10 (compared to say, a prime number or any irrational number besides pi)?

It's only logical (if one wants to be logical) to be against deconstruction, as deconstruction fights against itself.

[Vicious Love]

It's true that there's nothing interesting in Derrida, because Derrida goal was never to be interesting, but to be something else that I can't really describe. We can only describe him for what he isn't (a sort of negative theology)

Are you saying Derrida was the Antichrist? Because I've had my suspicions.

The choice of ten times as thought provoking is interesting;

The choice of "interesting" is fascinating, and the choice of choice - captivating.

why do you choose 10?

Because there's no particular reason to choose 9 or 11, so no one questions the utterly meaningless convention of using round numbers for this sort of thing? Does the number's being "round" make it an expression of latent feminity, subliminated by the patriarchal narrative of arithmetic?

Is it because of the (ethically questionable) hegemony of the number 10

10 is a vicious unethical bastard, 'e is. Shot a man in Reno just to satisfy a narrative. Now "a dozen", that would've been the ethical thing to say. The sustenance-giving connotation of "a baker's dozen" synthesizes with the prosaic quality of the expression to impress upon the reader the aspect of... like, some kind of ocelot, or something.

(compared to say, a prime number or any irrational number besides pi)?

Which do you suppose Derrida preferred: irrational numbers, complex numbers, or imaginary numbers?

It's only logical (if one wants to be logical) to be against deconstruction, as deconstruction fights against itself.

Deep.

Edit: Was "9 or 11" just me picking the two integers closest to 10, or was I reconstructing the narrative of mathematics via my views on terrorism? We will never know.

[Blueskyboris]

Deep.

Edit: Was "9 or 11" just me picking the two integers closest to 10, or was I reconstructing the narrative of mathematics via my views on terrorism? We will never know. I wouldn't call it your narrative of mathematics. I would call it your narrative of Western hierarchy. Now surely your internal narrative on hierarchy is influenced (and vice versa) by your views on terrorism?

[Blueskyboris]

This always seems to silence those who do not think:

From "The Gift of Death", Jacques Derrida:
"
Secrets of European Responsibility

In one of his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History Jan Patocka relates secrecy, or more precisely the mystery of the sacred, to responsibility. He opposes one to the other; or rather underscores their heterogeneity. Somewhat in the manner of Levinas he warns against an experience of the sacred as an ethusiasm or fervor for fusion, cautioning in particular against a form of demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its first intention, the removal of responsiblity, the loss of the sense of consciousness of responsiblity. At the same time Patocka wants to distinguish religion from the demonic form of sacralization. What is religion? Religion presumes access to the responsibility of the free self. It thus implies breaking with this type of secrecy (for it is not of course the only one), that associated with sacred mystery and with what Patocka regularly calls the demonic. A distinction is to be made between the demonic on the one hand (that which confuses the limits among the animal, the human, and the divine, and which retains an affinity with mystery, the intiatory, the esoteric, the secret or the sacred) and responsibility on the other. This therefore amounts to a thesis on the origin and essence of the religious. "

[Blueskyboris]

Does anyone care to discuss this quote?

[untermensche]

Does anyone care to discuss this quote?
This term "mystery of the sacred".

It is a term from Theology.

It is a prejudice to apply the term to some emotional rapturous existence, which has no connection to this thing called "sacred".

Which is a learned, not innate or apparent, conception. Invented and then learned way after men were religious.

[comiezapr]

Because there's no particular reason to choose 9 or 11, so no one questions the utterly meaningless convention of using round numbers for this sort of thing? Does the number's being "round" make it an expression of latent feminity, subliminated by the patriarchal narrative of arithmetic?

Alright, this was laugh out loud funny.

[comiezapr]

This always seems to silence those who do not think:

From "The Gift of Death", Jacques Derrida:
"
Secrets of European Responsibility

In one of his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History Jan Patocka relates secrecy, or more precisely the mystery of the sacred, to responsibility. He opposes one to the other; or rather underscores their heterogeneity. Somewhat in the manner of Levinas he warns against an experience of the sacred as an ethusiasm or fervor for fusion, cautioning in particular against a form of demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its first intention, the removal of responsiblity, the loss of the sense of consciousness of responsiblity. At the same time Patocka wants to distinguish religion from the demonic form of sacralization. What is religion? Religion presumes access to the responsibility of the free self. It thus implies breaking with this type of secrecy (for it is not of course the only one), that associated with sacred mystery and with what Patocka regularly calls the demonic. A distinction is to be made between the demonic on the one hand (that which confuses the limits among the animal, the human, and the divine, and which retains an affinity with mystery, the intiatory, the esoteric, the secret or the sacred) and responsibility on the other. This therefore amounts to a thesis on the origin and essence of the religious. "

Ya, i guess ill discuss it a bit.

Firstly, the author of the quote seems pretty drunk and clearly had acess to a faulty thesaurus.

Ok, more seriously, ill do a bit of disecting:

Jan Patocka relates secrecy, or more precisely the mystery of the sacred, to responsibility. He opposes one to the other; or rather underscores their heterogeneity.

Now this seems like an oxymoron to me. This person, Jan, is relating secrecy to responsibility but wants to first put them in opposition to one another? Sounds kind of like Jan is working at cross purposes with him/her self. Actually, more precisely Jan wants to underscore their heterogenity. What does this mean exactly? Does Jan want to underscore that each of the two things, secrecy and responsibility, are heterogenous or that combined they make a heterogenous mixture? I cant begin to guess because really i dont even know what the hell "underscoring" is. Maybe it means highlighting; or maybe not. (That faulty thesaurus really came in handy!)

I could go on and on like this, nitpicking at the rediculous use of language, but i can sum it up thusly: the author was clearly intoxicated and was using a faulty thesaurus! Consider this my first critique:

Critique 1: the author was intoxicated and used a faulty thesaurus.

Really, when you write things you cannot be inebriated and you must have the proper materials at hand!

My second critique:

Critique 2: the author needs a more boldface marker to connect his conceptual dots.

Im going to make a little diagram of how this paragraph is structured; numbers are conceptual dots and the arrows represent connectors:

1) Jan is relating (or contrasting, i cant figure this one out) responsibility and secrecy ->

2) Jan, like Levinas, gives us a warning: experiencing sacred things results in a loss of the sense of responsibility (though whether there is a loss of responsibility isnt mentioned) ->

3) Patoka wants to distinguish religion from demonicness ->

4) Relgion incoporates responsibility into peoples lives ->

5) This implies (i dont know what kind of implication hes talking about here because its none of the kinds of implication I know of) that religion forgoes secrecy ->

6) Now were talking about dealing with the demonic on one side and responsibility on the other ->

7) This paragraph is about religion.

So, my initial reaction is "SHUT UP YOU DRUNK". But those are the words of ignorance; and i dont mean that i am somehow not schooled enough. I mean, literally, i dont know what the hell this guy is talking about. Aparrently, though it isnt stated clearly, theres some kind of argument going on here. I dont know what the argument is trying to establish because, well, he doesnt say what the hell he is doing. Maybe hes trying to tell us something about Jan's work (which is what i think). Maybe hes trying to establish something about religion (which is what i think you think). Really, he does nothing.

Anyway, he needs to do some dot connecting.

He also needs to do some dot explanation. This is the next critique:

Critique 3: The dots needs to be elucidated!

Ill explain what i mean in a rather irritating fashion:

The first signs of trouble in his argument is when he mentions, without quotation or paraphrase, two seperate people in one paragraph. Dots 1, 2 and 3 come from, really, blind assertion about an author (who probably made a blind assertion himself or pulled some garbage out of his posterior).

Then we have Dot 4. I dont know what the hell religion is acording to this guy, but if he thinks that the mark of religion is to deal with personal responsibility, in any way, then hes not talking about any religion that i have ever heard of. Religion is pretty simple: we worship the unknown and make recomendations on how to live life. Responsibility, if it plays ANY part in religion, is completly incidental. Dot 4 really just seems to be pulled out of thin air without any thought.

Theres the crazy usage of "implies". I guess he thinks that "Jan warns us that secrecy makes us lose a SENSE of responsibility" and "religion incorporates responsibility into peoples lives" implies "religion fogoes secrecy". He would, of course, be mistaken.

The distinction between demonism and religion is a pointless one since neither terms have been defined to any precision whatsoever.

So heres my problems with this quote:

The guy is drunk.
His thesaurus aint working.
Dots need connecting.
Dots need explanation.

So basically, my problem is that this thing is trash.

[comiezapr]

I dont like to post 3 times, but here goes:

In one of his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History Jan Patocka relates secrecy, or more precisely the mystery of the sacred, to responsibility. He opposes one to the other; or rather underscores their heterogeneity. Somewhat in the manner of Levinas he warns against an experience of the sacred as an ethusiasm or fervor for fusion, cautioning in particular against a form of demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its first intention, the removal of responsiblity, the loss of the sense of consciousness of responsiblity. At the same time Patocka wants to distinguish religion from the demonic form of sacralization. What is religion? Religion presumes access to the responsibility of the free self. It thus implies breaking with this type of secrecy (for it is not of course the only one), that associated with sacred mystery and with what Patocka regularly calls the demonic. A distinction is to be made between the demonic on the one hand (that which confuses the limits among the animal, the human, and the divine, and which retains an affinity with mystery, the intiatory, the esoteric, the secret or the sacred) and responsibility on the other. This therefore amounts to a thesis on the origin and essence of the religious

Since you find this significant i presume you take it that there is something significant being said here. There isnt. You should reread this quote.

It is not about religion, responsibility or secrecy. It is about the work of Jan, and a comment about this work of Jan within the framework (that i think is rediculous) of the semioticians.

Before jumping the gun about an discussion inspired by this quote im going to ask you what you think this quote means. Ive already sort of declined any kind of discussion related directly to the quote; ive insulted it and i am a prideful, unmoving man. Still though, discussion inspired BY the quote is fair game, but please intepret first.

[Blueskyboris]

This term "mystery of the sacred".

It is a term from Theology. Yes.

It is a prejudice to apply the term to some emotional rapturous existence, which has no connection to this thing called "sacred". Why? Derrida is not speaking about the "mystery of the sacred" only within the Christian traditions.

[untermensche]

Yes.

Why? Derrida is not speaking about the "mystery of the sacred" only within the Christian traditions.
Neither am I.

But sacredness is attached to things, it is not an apparent quality of things.

So how can it be the origin of something?

The origin of the concept sacredness is not the same as the origin of the concept of religion. You can have religion without this idea of sacredness.

[Blueskyboris]

Vapid responses aside:


From "The Gift of Death", Jacques Derrida:
"
Secrets of European Responsibility So the essay is about the origins of European responsibilty. Secrecy here alludes to the success of the European idea of responsibility over other systems of responsibility. In Derrida's "Spectres of Marx" he clearly states he is in favour of authentic revolution (he implies throughout the essay, with the greatest respect, that Marx's theories, while riding on the Enlightenment's radical, revolutionary essence, actually work against it. Therefore, here Derrida is telling us if we know the secrets of European responsibility, we will know the secrets of proper, revolutionary action. The secret of the Enlightenment.

In one of his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History Jan Patocka Jans is explored the less accepted philosophers in the history of Western philosophy.

relates secrecy, or more precisely the mystery of the sacred, to responsibility. So, Jan Patocka explores the relation between "the mystery of the sacred" and "European responsibility".

He opposes one to the other; Jan opposes "the mystery of the sacred" with "European responsibility".

or rather underscores their heterogeneity. For those who do not know how to use a dictionary: Underscores: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/underscores

So Jan Patrocka stresses the heterogeneity between the "mystery of the sacred" and "European responsibility".

Somewhat in the manner of Levinas he warns against an experience of the sacred as an ethusiasm or fervor for fusion, cautioning in particular against a form of demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its first intention, the removal of responsiblity, the loss of the sense of consciousness of responsiblity. So the experience of the sacred does not include enthusiasm, fervor for fusion, nor demonic rapture.

At the same time Patocka wants to distinguish religion from the demonic form of sacralization. Religion and demonic sacralization are different.

What is religion? Derrida asks a question based on the proposition directly above^.

Religion presumes access to the responsibility of the free self. Derrida thinks free will is the foundation of religion.

It thus implies breaking with this type of secrecy (for it is not of course the only one), that associated with sacred mystery and with what Patocka regularly calls the demonic. The "mystery of the sacred" is demonic, not religious.

The A distinction is to be made between the demonic on the one hand (that which confuses the limits among the animal, the human, and the divine, and which retains an affinity with mystery, the intiatory, the esoteric, the secret or the sacred) and responsibility on the other. According to Patrocka the "mystery of the sacred" and "European responsibility" (now reglion) are distinct.

This therefore amounts to a thesis on the origin and essence of the religious. " Derrida proposes that this opposition between the "mystery of the sacred" and "responsiblity" created religion.

[Blueskyboris]

Neither am I.

But sacredness is attached to things, it is not an apparent quality of things. You are making a mistake here, because I agree with you:
Sacredness is attached to things, and is not a quality of things. But it is a quality of a self-consciousness that values. The mystery of the sacred is a mystery and is sacred to self-conscious beings. Therefore, the opposition between "the mystery of the sacred" and "responsibility" is correct, because they are both the result of self-conciousness.

So how can it be the origin of something? Religion comes from the mind of the self-conscious. It is not a thing "out there". All its manifestations "out there" are a result of the internal workings of self-consciousness.

The origin of the concept sacredness is not the same as the origin of the concept of religion. You can have religion without this idea of sacredness. Do you have any examples?

[untermensche]

You are making a mistake here, because I agree with you:
Sacredness is attached to things, and is not a quality of things. But it is a quality of a self-consciousness that values. The mystery of the sacred is a mystery and is sacred to self-conscious beings. Therefore, the opposition between "the mystery of the sacred" and "responsibility" is correct, because they are both the result of self-conciousness.
They are opposite in that sacredness raises something above you, really it is a lowering of self below something, while responsibility raises you above something else.

But they are not opposite to each other. They are merely opposite movements of the self, either below something or above something.
Do you have any examples?
I have religion in that I can recognize the mystery of existence, but I do not have the sacred because I do not mentally lower myself below this mystery. I am equal to this mystery in every way, a part of it, not above or below it in any way.

[Blueskyboris]

They are merely opposite movements of the self Is the same as saying they are opposites.

I have religion in that I can recognize the mystery of existence, but I do not have the sacred because I do not mentally lower myself below this mystery. I am equal to this mystery in every way, a part of it, not above or below it in any way. No, I mean among established religions.

[anders]

Can Derrida be "even wrong"? (http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/000024.html)
My colleague would open one of Derrida's works to a random page, pick a random sentence, write it down, and then (above or below it) write a variant in which positive and negative were interchanged, or a word or phrase was replaced with one of opposite meaning. He would then challenge the assembled Derrida partisans to guess which was the original and which was the variant. The point was that Derrida's admirers are generally unable to distinguish his pronouncements from their opposites at better than chance level, suggesting that the content is a sophisticated form of white noise. On this view, as Wolfgang Pauli once said of someone else, Derrida is "not even wrong.".

[Space Chef]

Can Derrida be "even wrong"? (http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/000024.html)

That's interesting.

Here's an interesting article about Deconstruction, and Culler's book On Deconstruction.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/5964

[untermensche]

Is the same as saying they are opposites.
If I walk away from you in one direction and then crawl away from you in the opposite direction, does that make walking the opposite of crawling?
No, I mean among established religions.
We have to look at the function of religion.

It is an instrument of power. At least it has been one in the West for centuries. So of course instruments of power want people to lower themself to the power. They indoctrinate people to the sacred for this reason.

[Gamera]

This always seems to silence those who do not think:

From "The Gift of Death", Jacques Derrida:
"
Secrets of European Responsibility

In one of his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History Jan Patocka relates secrecy, or more precisely the mystery of the sacred, to responsibility. He opposes one to the other; or rather underscores their heterogeneity. Somewhat in the manner of Levinas he warns against an experience of the sacred as an ethusiasm or fervor for fusion, cautioning in particular against a form of demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its first intention, the removal of responsiblity, the loss of the sense of consciousness of responsiblity. At the same time Patocka wants to distinguish religion from the demonic form of sacralization. What is religion? Religion presumes access to the responsibility of the free self. It thus implies breaking with this type of secrecy (for it is not of course the only one), that associated with sacred mystery and with what Patocka regularly calls the demonic. A distinction is to be made between the demonic on the one hand (that which confuses the limits among the animal, the human, and the divine, and which retains an affinity with mystery, the intiatory, the esoteric, the secret or the sacred) and responsibility on the other. This therefore amounts to a thesis on the origin and essence of the religious. "


The Gift of Death is one of Derrida's more difficult essays (and that's saying a lot). I just reread it recently with a friend.

Derrida contemplates Patocka's argument that religion as mysterious union is contrary to responsibility to others, which is the trajectory of Western religion from Plato through Christianity. It is the distinction of the subject for other subjects, including God, that gives rise to morality, ethics, and responsibility. The free self, able to make choices, is the basis of responsibility.

Derrida takes this distinction as a starting point, but goes on to claim that it is "unthought" in Christianity (or more precisely repressed). The repression of the mysterium tremendum in Christian discourse as the origin of religion results in a contraditory ethical regime epitomized somewhat by the Christian understanding of the Binding of Isaac, as elaborated by Kierkegaard.

[David B]

The Gift of Death is one of Derrida's more difficult essays (and that's saying a lot). I just reread it recently with a friend.

Derrida contemplates Patocka's argument that religion as mysterious union is contrary to responsibility to others, which is the trajectory of Western religion from Plato through Christianity. It is the distinction of the subject for other subjects, including God, that gives rise to morality, ethics, and responsibility. The free self, able to make choices, is the basis of responsibility.

Derrida takes this distinction as a starting point, but goes on to claim that it is "unthought" in Christianity (or more precisely repressed). The repression of the mysterium tremendum in Christian discourse as the origin of religion results in a contraditory ethical regime epitomized somewhat by the Christian understanding of the Binding of Isaac, as elaborated by Kierkegaard.

Coining words, or using big esoteric ones, does not necessarily lead to profundity.

Didn't some fairly well thought of philosopher once say that anything that can be said at all can be said simply? Or something to that effect?

David B

[Gamera]

Coining words, or using big esoteric ones, does not necessarily lead to profundity.

Didn't some fairly well thought of philosopher once say that anything that can be said at all can be said simply? Or something to that effect?

David B


I think some fairly well thought of philosopher also said ignorance is bliss.

[David B]

I think some fairly well thought of philosopher also said ignorance is bliss.

Which one was that, then?

The one I was referring to was, just in case you don't know, Wittgenstein.

David B

[Blueskyboris]

If I walk away from you in one direction and then crawl away from you in the opposite direction, does that make walking the opposite of crawling? I'd have to ask you if you even believe in opposites. Is white the opposite of black? How about yes and no? White and black seem a bit more problematic than yes and no, just like crawling and walking. Yes-and-no is the fundamental opposition underlying self-consciousness, while black-and-white is an opposition the result of yes-and-no. Walking and crawling are not fundamentally opposites like yes-and-no, but they are different enough for opposition as an analogy to be made. Since all analogies are rooted in yes-and-no, it follows that because walking and crawling are distinct forms of human locomotion, that they could be described as opposites. Walking is, afteralll, "not-crawling"; and crawling is "not-walking".

We have to look at the function of religion.

It is an instrument of power. At least it has been one in the West for centuries. So of course instruments of power want people to lower themself to the power. They indoctrinate people to the sacred for this reason. No, we have to look at established religions, not theories that attempt to explain it. Can we apply Derrida's argument to religions? Or more importantly, the Christian religion in its genesis?

[StaticAge]

A great start on Derrida would be Dermot Moran's "Introduction to Phenomenology" because Derrida only comes in at the end, but you can easily see where he sort of fits in, what his basic ideas and projects were, etc, and there should be no headache or anything getting through it or comprehending it.

I would never recommend reading Derrida to just anyone. Are you the kind of person who sees Kant or Hegel's work as a mental challenge? If so, reading Derrida might be a lot of fun for you. But if complex writing irritates or frustrates you, stay clear, it would just be an exercise in futility.

But if you are still game, I suggest first a very small book you could read in a couple of hours called "Positions" which is a series of interviews with Derrida, and "Margins of Philosophy" which is a series of ten essays by him tied together and given an introduction. "Limited Inc" is a silly book, and sort of unfortunate; its just a public printed squabble between him and John Searle.

Very unfortunate- I mean, here on this board for instance, you have a lot of people who will tell you that Derrida is incomprehensible nonsense. Searle didnt think so, and was willing to engage Derrida, even if he was mistaken about what Derrida was talking about. But Derrida took that opportunity to demonstrate some of his own ideas through a series of jokes made at Searle expense as well as outright attacks. It is actually not that bad a read because some of it is actually funny. But I like Searle a lot, and I just think the whole incident was a shame.

Here's a summary of that exchange:

Derrida: I like JL Austin. Some of the things he says are similar to my own ideas
Searle: You silly French man, stay away from my mentor, his ideas are nothing like that [gives examples]
Derrida: You dont understand my ideas and make assumptions about what I meant, so I will only call you names and make light of everything you said, even if what you said might have been valid

[Von Smith]

Does anyone care to discuss this quote?

I've not read the essay, nor the work by Patocka that Derrida refers to, and quite frankly, the quoted paragraph does little to persuade me that I ought to. If I want to read an unintelligible-but-nonetheless-supposedly-important philosopher with interesting, novel, and sometimes crazy ideas about things like history and the interplay of ideas in Western Europe, my time is probably better spent reading Hegel.

[untermensche]

I'd have to ask you if you even believe in opposites. Is white the opposite of black? How about yes and no? White and black seem a bit more problematic than yes and no, just like crawling and walking. Yes-and-no is the fundamental opposition underlying self-consciousness, while black-and-white is an opposition the result of yes-and-no. Walking and crawling are not fundamentally opposites like yes-and-no, but they are different enough for opposition as an analogy to be made. Since all analogies are rooted in yes-and-no, it follows that because walking and crawling are distinct forms of human locomotion, that they could be described as opposites. Walking is, afteralll, "not-crawling"; and crawling is "not-walking".
I don't buy it.

White is the entire visible spectrum while black is the absence of the entire visual spectrum. True opposites.

There is nothing that makes crawling the opposite of walking. It is very closely related to walking in fact. Something like walking has no opposite. Most things have no opposite. Just as this concept of the sacred has no opposite.
No, we have to look at established religions, not theories that attempt to explain it. Can we apply Derrida's argument to religions? Or more importantly, the Christian religion in its genesis?
Not at the Genesis no.

Christianity as we know it had it's real Genesis when the Romans adopted Christianity. They turned it into something different from what it had been up to that point. Almost all the dogma and doctrine was created after this point. Even though it's true Genesis was hundreds of years earlier.

[Kronocide]

I'd recommend starting with this:

Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity (http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/transgress_v2/transgress_v2_singlefile.html)

Most definitely the place to start.

[Blueskyboris]

I've not read the essay, nor the work by Patocka that Derrida refers to, and quite frankly, the quoted paragraph does little to persuade me that I ought to. If I want to read an unintelligible-but-nonetheless-supposedly-important philosopher with interesting, novel, and sometimes crazy ideas about things like history and the interplay of ideas in Western Europe, my time is probably better spent reading Hegel. Of course, why you choose Hegel over Derrida is a mystery. Why chose any untelligible in the first place? In fact, why learn scientific terminology? Just call all seemingly unintelligble prose crap!

[Blueskyboris]

I don't buy it. I don't remember putting a price tag on my posts?? Therefore, they are not for sale, so using "I don't buy it" doesn't make any sense.

White is the entire visible spectrum while black is the absence of the entire visual spectrum. True opposites. Maybe, or maybe they are just opposite movements. Maybe there is no fundamental oppositions between "black" and "white". Maybe the opposition that seems to clear to you is really just a manifestation of the logical form "yes/no" operating in your head.

There is nothing that makes crawling the opposite of walking. It is very closely related to walking in fact. Something like walking has no opposite. Most things have no opposite. Just as this concept of the sacred has no opposite. See above.

I think part of the problem is how you

Christianity as we know it had it's real Genesis when the Romans adopted Christianity. They turned it into something different from what it had been up to that point. Almost all the dogma and doctrine was created after this point. Even though it's true Genesis was hundreds of years earlier. Could it be said that the Romans took the Roman mystery of the sacred and combined it with Christ's responsibility for others/God. Surely you are not going to assert that Christianity did not exist before it mixed with Rome.

[untermensche]

Could it be said that the Romans took the Roman mystery of the sacred and combined it with Christ's responsibility for others/God. Surely you are not going to assert that Christianity did not exist before it mixed with Rome.
It wouldn't make responsibility the opposite of the sacred had they.

[Zossima]

I don't know why this quote seems like so much gibberish to some people here. It seems to me quite comprehensible.


In one of his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History Jan Patocka relates secrecy, or more precisely the mystery of the sacred, to responsibility. He opposes one to the other; or rather underscores their heterogeneity.

There's no contradictory mumbo-jumbo here, unless you've decided going in that every apparent contradiction is a damning offense. Opposition is a kind of relation -- secrecy is set alongside responsibility, and Patocka seeks in relating them to show how they are not one and the same thing. Indeed, if they were, they could not be related to each other as two different things -- a thing cannot be related to itself, it is itself. Moving on...

Somewhat in the manner of Levinas he warns against an experience of the sacred as an ethusiasm or fervor for fusion, cautioning in particular against a form of demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its first intention, the removal of responsiblity, the loss of the sense of consciousness of responsiblity. At the same time Patocka wants to distinguish religion from the demonic form of sacralization.

Patocka warns against a rapturous experience in which the soul is enveloped into its surroundings, and forgets itself -- think the Dionysian revelry that Nietzsche describes in his Birth of Tragedy. In this experience, responsibility dissolves away, because the self dissolves away; the individuating action of the Apollinian impulse (to continue in Nietzsche's terms) is nonexistent. Patocka (and, presumably, Derrida) wishes to talk about a religious experience that does quite the opposite -- brings the self to its responsibility.

What is religion? Religion presumes access to the responsibility of the free self.

Of course, this is not an empirical definition. Derrida (and Patocka) didn't come up with this definition by asking people what their religion was to them, or any such similar process. The definition comes about from a certain philosophical position, not unlike that of Kant and Kierkegaard before him. Religion comes about as a relationship of man to God, in which the responsibility of the free self is of absolute importance.

It thus implies breaking with this type of secrecy (for it is not of course the only one), that associated with sacred mystery and with what Patocka regularly calls the demonic.

The experience of the religious, of the responsibility of the free self, must break with the type of secrecy and mystery involved with the demonic, that rapturous experience in which the responsible self is dissolved. Merely a restatement of what has already been said.

A distinction is to be made between the demonic on the one hand (that which confuses the limits among the animal, the human, and the divine, and which retains an affinity with mystery, the intiatory, the esoteric, the secret or the sacred) and responsibility on the other. This therefore amounts to a thesis on the origin and essence of the religious. "

Once again, something of a restatement. In Patocka's thesis about the origin and essence of the religious, he underscores the heterogeneity of secrecy and responsibility. In so doing, he brings to light a fundamental relation between the two (namely, a relation of opposition) which will hopefully open a revealing inquiry.

What's so difficult about that? What about this makes it the ramblings of a drunk? I really don't see it.

[untermensche]

....Patocka warns against a rapturous experience in which the soul is enveloped into its surroundings, and forgets itself -- think the Dionysian revelry that Nietzsche describes in his Birth of Tragedy. In this experience, responsibility dissolves away, because the self dissolves away; the individuating action of the Apollinian impulse (to continue in Nietzsche's terms) is nonexistent. Patocka (and, presumably, Derrida) wishes to talk about a religious experience that does quite the opposite -- brings the self to its responsibility....
To try to see this in a modern text I look at the invasion of Iraq and the rapturous ecstasy, free of any responsibility to "collateral" damage, in how it was commited.

Yet it was commited by folks who swear they are religious and in awe of the sacred.

It seems to me religion and responsibility have no connection at all.

I'm sure we could find many Americans who would agree with me with regards to Islam.

[Zossima]

To try to see this in a modern text I look at the invasion of Iraq and the rapturous ecstasy, free of any responsibility to "collateral" damage, in how it was commited.

Yet it was commited by folks who swear they are religious and in awe of the sacred.

It seems to me religion and responsibility have no connection at all.

I'm sure we could find many Americans who would agree with me with regards to Islam.

This is exactly why I said that this definition of religion is not empirical. If it were, you would certainly be right in saying that it would be quite an inadequate definition. But what Patocka and Derrida describe is a certain essence of religion, which certain "religious" people certainly stray away from at times. The very point of this introductory paragraph is to introduce the thesis that true religion might be something very different from what it is often claimed to be.

[untermensche]

This is exactly why I said that this definition of religion is not empirical. If it were, you would certainly be right in saying that it would be quite an inadequate definition. But what Patocka and Derrida describe is a certain essence of religion, which certain "religious" people certainly stray away from at times. The very point of this introductory paragraph is to introduce the thesis that true religion might be something very different from what it is often claimed to be.
My argument is that this "essence" is not found in religion. It is found in some people, or really in all people but to different degrees. So of course some who call themselves religious have it in a large degree, but their religion has nothing to do with them having it.

[Zossima]

My argument is that this "essence" is not found in religion. It is found in some people, or really in all people but to different degrees. So of course some who call themselves religious have it in a large degree, but their religion has nothing to do with them having it.

Fair enough. However, it's worth reading the rest of "The Gift of Death" to find out why Derrida insists on the close relationship between religion and responsibility. It might be the case (and, in fact, it is) that he is making a further point that is not yet clear in the introductory paragraph.

[Blueskyboris]

Fair enough. However, it's worth reading the rest of "The Gift of Death" to find out why Derrida insists on the close relationship between religion and responsibility. It might be the case (and, in fact, it is) that he is making a further point that is not yet clear in the introductory paragraph. Yes.

[Blueskyboris]

My argument is that this "essence" is not found in religion. It is found in some people, or really in all people but to different degrees. So of course some who call themselves religious have it in a large degree, but their religion has nothing to do with them having it. Again, you make the same mistake. "Religion" is caused by people, not the other way around. The mystery of the sacred and Christian responsibility are both viewpoints that exist only in people's heads.

[Blueskyboris]

This is exactly why I said that this definition of religion is not empirical. If it were, you would certainly be right in saying that it would be quite an inadequate definition. But what Patocka and Derrida describe is a certain essence of religion, which certain "religious" people certainly stray away from at times. The very point of this introductory paragraph is to introduce the thesis that true religion might be something very different from what it is often claimed to be. I think you are presenting a false-dichotomy. Patrocka and Derrida are analyzing religion in its genesis. They are concerned with what religion is when it starts, initially, not how it expands as a political entity. So it's not how "certain" religious people act, but how people act religiously in it's essential inception.

[untermensche]

Again, you make the same mistake. "Religion" is caused by people, not the other way around. The mystery of the sacred and Christian responsibility are both viewpoints that exist only in people's heads.
I do not think religion has such a big effect as some think.

People will act responsiby and without responsibility with or without religion. The religion has nothing to do with it.

As we clearly see in the world. The people who call themselves religious are bloothirsty killers and saints.

[Cheerful Charlie]

Of course, why you choose Hegel over Derrida is a mystery. Why chose any untelligible in the first place? In fact, why learn scientific terminology? Just call all seemingly unintelligble prose crap!


Hegel is at least historically important. "Why the fuck did we listen to this guy?"


CC

[Blueskyboris]

I do not think religion has such a big effect as some think.
Keep in mind that I am not arguing that "religion has a big effect". I am arguing that religion is wholly the result of processes happening in people's heads.

People will act responsiby and without responsibility with or without religion. The religion has nothing to do with it. If one compares the ancient Greek and Rome forms of "responsibility" to Christian responsibility is it clear that they were not responsible. However, if one does not compare the two, one can conclude that both the ancients and Christians were responsible, but in their own ways. The Greek and Romes responsible to those higher and lower on the hierarchy and the Christians responsible to each other. In both societies religion played a central part of life. Therefore, your job is to find the primitive society that lacked religion and present it as an example. That is, if you want your argument to work.

As we clearly see in the world. The people who call themselves religious are bloothirsty killers and saints. True. Completely true. But this is the "religious" expanded into the political. Some individuals use religion merely as an political instrument, just as they use everything as a political instruments.

[untermensche]

Keep in mind that I am not arguing that "religion has a big effect". I am arguing that religion is wholly the result of processes happening in people's heads.

If you are saying that religion creates the type and extent of concern people have for one another, it channels concerns in specific directions, then I would agree.

But religion does not create the concern itself.

It does not create responsibility. It shapes a type of responsibility.

[Blueskyboris]

If you are saying that religion creates the type and extent of concern people have for one another, it channels concerns in specific directions, then I would agree.

But religion does not create the concern itself.

It does not create responsibility. It shapes a type of responsibility. I'm saying it does both. Remember, I am saying religion is fully the result of brain processes.

Religion might not have created responsiblity itself, but perhaps it did? The problem I am having here is that most civilizations and even the most primitive tribes have had some sort of worship. Combine this with the fact that worship is "hierarchical" and you should realize that responsiblity (to the tribe leader, to your elders, your sister/brother, etc) has always been intimately intertwined (or the same thing?) with the responsiblity to worship (the God, the Gods, the witch doctor, the demigod leader)

[Von Smith]

I've not read the essay, nor the work by Patocka that Derrida refers to, and quite frankly, the quoted paragraph does little to persuade me that I ought to. If I want to read an unintelligible-but-nonetheless-supposedly-important philosopher with interesting, novel, and sometimes crazy ideas about things like history and the interplay of ideas in Western Europe, my time is probably better spent reading Hegel. Of course, why you choose Hegel over Derrida is a mystery. Why chose any untelligible in the first place? In fact, why learn scientific terminology? Just call all seemingly unintelligble prose crap!


My contempt for Derrida is a contempt bred of familiarity, although I haven't read much of his later work. As a former liberal arts grad student, I have read my share of him; I even used some of his early materials on Husserl as a (minor) source in one of my Master's reports. The deconstructionist twaddle he helped engender is one of the reasons I stopped taking the prospect of an academic career seriously. While my verdict of him isn't as harsh as Quine's, I don't happen to think that investing any more time in Derrida will add value, and nothing I have seen in this thread convinces me otherwise.

[No Robots]

The deconstructionist twaddle he helped engender is one of the reasons I stopped taking the prospect of an academic career seriously.

Same here. But I see the problem as deriving not from deconstructionism itself, but from the abuse of deconstructionism. Deconstructionism is a powerful tool, but it has been used by the hacks to beat down their opponents and to make themselves look like the inscrutable Mandarins they want to be. The essential idea of examining discourse to expose its contradictions is an extremely valuable contribution to the human sciences.

[Gamera]

I think some fairly well thought of philosopher also said ignorance is bliss.

Which one was that, then?

The one I was referring to was, just in case you don't know, Wittgenstein.

David B

He didn't write very clearly. I'm sure he's on your blacklist.

[Zossima]

The essential idea of examining discourse to expose its contradictions is an extremely valuable contribution to the human sciences.

But that idea has been around for a long time. And it's called "criticism," not "deconstructionism," whatever that is.

[No Robots]

But that idea has been around for a long time. And it's called "criticism," not "deconstructionism," whatever that is.

Deconstruction is a part of criticism. And it has indeed been around for a long time: it is fundamental to the Socratic technique. However, its isolation and articulation is an achievement of significance on the part of Derrida.

[Blueskyboris]

My contempt for Derrida is a contempt bred of familiarity, although I haven't read much of his later work. As a former liberal arts grad student, I have read my share of him; I even used some of his early materials on Husserl as a (minor) source in one of my Master's reports. The deconstructionist twaddle he helped engender is one of the reasons I stopped taking the prospect of an academic career seriously. While my verdict of him isn't as harsh as Quine's, I don't happen to think that investing any more time in Derrida will add value, and nothing I have seen in this thread convinces me otherwise. And until you give use some reason for "having contempt" for Derrida you will be nothing more than someone with an opinion. :huh:

[Blueskyboris]

The essential idea of examining discourse to expose its contradictions is an extremely valuable contribution to the human sciences.

But that idea has been around for a long time. And it's called "criticism," not "deconstructionism," whatever that is. From what I have read, deconstruction = criticism + context.

[Gamera]

Of course, why you choose Hegel over Derrida is a mystery. Why chose any untelligible in the first place? In fact, why learn scientific terminology? Just call all seemingly unintelligble prose crap!


My contempt for Derrida is a contempt bred of familiarity, although I haven't read much of his later work. As a former liberal arts grad student, I have read my share of him; I even used some of his early materials on Husserl as a (minor) source in one of my Master's reports. The deconstructionist twaddle he helped engender is one of the reasons I stopped taking the prospect of an academic career seriously. While my verdict of him isn't as harsh as Quine's, I don't happen to think that investing any more time in Derrida will add value, and nothing I have seen in this thread convinces me otherwise.

What is "twaddle" to have dispelled the epistomological naivety of prior philosophers that discouse is about "truth" rather than about the agendas of the institutions that generate the discourse (or more precisely, the whole notion of truth is part of those institutional agendas and hence historical)?

Go into detail.

[Blueskyboris]

Hi Gamera,
Could you please reorder your question? I parsed it and it does not make any sense. It is a run-on question. "What is "twaddle" is to have dispelled"... Are you asserting that Derrida was a twaddler because he thought believing in truth naive? And that he should have analyzed the institutions that create truth if he wanted enlightenment?




My contempt for Derrida is a contempt bred of familiarity, although I haven't read much of his later work. As a former liberal arts grad student, I have read my share of him; I even used some of his early materials on Husserl as a (minor) source in one of my Master's reports. The deconstructionist twaddle he helped engender is one of the reasons I stopped taking the prospect of an academic career seriously. While my verdict of him isn't as harsh as Quine's, I don't happen to think that investing any more time in Derrida will add value, and nothing I have seen in this thread convinces me otherwise.

What is "twaddle" to have dispelled the epistomological naivety of prior philosophers that discouse is about "truth" rather than about the agendas of the institutions that generate the discourse (or more precisely, the whole notion of truth is part of those institutional agendas and hence historical)?

Go into detail.

[Von Smith]

My contempt for Derrida is a contempt bred of familiarity, although I haven't read much of his later work. As a former liberal arts grad student, I have read my share of him; I even used some of his early materials on Husserl as a (minor) source in one of my Master's reports. The deconstructionist twaddle he helped engender is one of the reasons I stopped taking the prospect of an academic career seriously. While my verdict of him isn't as harsh as Quine's, I don't happen to think that investing any more time in Derrida will add value, and nothing I have seen in this thread convinces me otherwise. And until you give use some reason for "having contempt" for Derrida you will be nothing more than someone with an opinion. :huh:

I never pretended to be anything more than someone with an opinion, and I don't owe you a better reason than what I have already given.

[Blueskyboris]

And until you give use some reason for "having contempt" for Derrida you will be nothing more than someone with an opinion. :huh:

I never pretended to be anything more than someone with an opinion, and I don't owe you a better reason than what I have already given. Which is zilch. Socrates said as much, but as a pretext for his argument.. Where is your argument?

[Von Smith]

My contempt for Derrida is a contempt bred of familiarity, although I haven't read much of his later work. As a former liberal arts grad student, I have read my share of him; I even used some of his early materials on Husserl as a (minor) source in one of my Master's reports. The deconstructionist twaddle he helped engender is one of the reasons I stopped taking the prospect of an academic career seriously. While my verdict of him isn't as harsh as Quine's, I don't happen to think that investing any more time in Derrida will add value, and nothing I have seen in this thread convinces me otherwise.

What is "twaddle" to have dispelled the epistomological naivety of prior philosophers that discouse is about "truth" rather than about the agendas of the institutions that generate the discourse (or more precisely, the whole notion of truth is part of those institutional agendas and hence historical)?

Go into detail.

What is twaddle is gratuitously opaque prose with a low signal-to-noise ratio. And you give Derrida and the Yaleys too much credit for having "dispelled the epistemological naivete", etc. Derrida was just one of a generation of Continental thinkers to develop such ideas. They were pervasive among the 'Tel Quel' crowd.

[Gamera]

What is "twaddle" to have dispelled the epistomological naivety of prior philosophers that discouse is about "truth" rather than about the agendas of the institutions that generate the discourse (or more precisely, the whole notion of truth is part of those institutional agendas and hence historical)?

Go into detail.

What is twaddle is gratuitously opaque prose with a low signal-to-noise ratio. And you give Derrida and the Yaleys too much credit for having "dispelled the epistemological naivete", etc. Derrida was just one of a generation of Continental thinkers to develop such ideas. They were pervasive among the 'Tel Quel' crowd.


I never said he wasn't. I think Foucault is the more important relevant thinker. Nonetheless, Derrida's Gift of Death, Supplement of Copula, Response To Lacan's Seminar on Poe, and Of Grammatology are very important works. The prose is "opaque" only because he has the guts to take on difficult issues not broached by other philosophers. Heidegger's prose is absolutely difficult -- because he's trying to discuss matters in a way the leaps out of traditional metaphysical discourse. So what? Heidegger's works are seminal. Judging thinkers on their prose is like evaluating the flightworthiness of a plane by its seat covers.

[Gamera]

Hi Gamera,
Could you please reorder your question? I parsed it and it does not make any sense. It is a run-on question. "What is "twaddle" is to have dispelled"... Are you asserting that Derrida was a twaddler because he thought believing in truth naive? And that he should have analyzed the institutions that create truth if he wanted enlightenment?



What is "twaddle" to have dispelled the epistomological naivety of prior philosophers that discouse is about "truth" rather than about the agendas of the institutions that generate the discourse (or more precisely, the whole notion of truth is part of those institutional agendas and hence historical)?

Go into detail.


Hello Bluesky. I think Von Smith understood (see his response below). Derrida's writing is not twaddle, but very important, which was my point in addressing Von Smith's claim to the contrary. You seemed to have reversed my meaning. If my sentence structure was the cause, well, this is an online forum after all.

As Derrida might say (did say) a letter is never delivered to its intended recipient.

I think you and I are on the same wavelength here.

[Blueskyboris]

What is twaddle is gratuitously opaque prose with a low signal-to-noise ratio. And you give Derrida and the Yaleys too much credit for having "dispelled the epistemological naivete", etc. Derrida was just one of a generation of Continental thinkers to develop such ideas. They were pervasive among the 'Tel Quel' crowd.


I never said he wasn't. I think Foucault is the more important relevant thinker. Nonetheless, Derrida's Gift of Death, Supplement of Copula, Response To Lacan's Seminar on Poe, and Of Grammatology are very important works. The prose is "opaque" only because he has the guts to take on difficult issues not broached by other philosophers. Heidegger's prose is absolutely difficult -- because he's trying to discuss matters in a way the leaps out of traditional metaphysical discourse. So what? Heidegger's works are seminal. Judging thinkers on their prose is like evaluating the flightworthiness of a plane by its seat covers. Unfortunately your analogy does not quite capture the problem most readers have with Derrida. Judging writers on the complexity of their prose is like demanding that a space age civilization travel between the stars using a caravel.

Let me repeat: there is nothing wrong with complex prose. It just means you have to use your brain.

[Blueskyboris]

Hi Gamera,
Could you please reorder your question? I parsed it and it does not make any sense. It is a run-on question. "What is "twaddle" is to have dispelled"... Are you asserting that Derrida was a twaddler because he thought believing in truth naive? And that he should have analyzed the institutions that create truth if he wanted enlightenment?




Hello Bluesky. I think Von Smith understood (see his response below). Derrida's writing is not twaddle, but very important, which was my point in addressing Von Smith's claim to the contrary. You seemed to have reversed my meaning. If my sentence structure was the cause, well, this is an online forum after all.

As Derrida might say (did say) a letter is never delivered to its intended recipient.

I think you and I are on the same wavelength here. Yes, we are on the same page, but only because some letters are delievered to their intended recipients.

[Gamera]

I never said he wasn't. I think Foucault is the more important relevant thinker. Nonetheless, Derrida's Gift of Death, Supplement of Copula, Response To Lacan's Seminar on Poe, and Of Grammatology are very important works. The prose is "opaque" only because he has the guts to take on difficult issues not broached by other philosophers. Heidegger's prose is absolutely difficult -- because he's trying to discuss matters in a way the leaps out of traditional metaphysical discourse. So what? Heidegger's works are seminal. Judging thinkers on their prose is like evaluating the flightworthiness of a plane by its seat covers. Unfortunately your analogy does not quite capture the problem most readers have with Derrida. Judging writers on the complexity of their prose is like demanding that a space age civilization travel between the stars using a caravel.

Let me repeat: there is nothing wrong with complex prose. It just means you have to use your brain.


It's like demanding that quantum mechanics stop using all those complex mathmatical formulae to express the collapse of the wave function, and instead use hand puppets.

[Von Smith]

What is twaddle is gratuitously opaque prose with a low signal-to-noise ratio. And you give Derrida and the Yaleys too much credit for having "dispelled the epistemological naivete", etc. Derrida was just one of a generation of Continental thinkers to develop such ideas. They were pervasive among the 'Tel Quel' crowd.


I never said he wasn't. I think Foucault is the more important relevant thinker.

Agreed.

Nonetheless, Derrida's Gift of Death, Supplement of Copula, Response To Lacan's Seminar on Poe, and Of Grammatology are very important works.

I'll have to take your word on Gift of Death. I've read Supplement and a good chunk of Grammatology; Supplement was mildly interesting, and it made some interesting comments that touched on the notion of linguistic incommensurability, a problem I used to be really interested in. I couldn't tell you much about Grammatology, as I've pretty much forgotten it. I understand they are considered important, but I couldn't tell you why.

The prose is "opaque" only because he has the guts to take on difficult issues not broached by other philosophers. Heidegger's prose is absolutely difficult -- because he's trying to discuss matters in a way the leaps out of traditional metaphysical discourse. So what? Heidegger's works are seminal.

So are Hegel's, yet Blueskyboris professes mystification as to why I would read them. At any rate, the "struggling with difficult concepts" excuse is overused. Kant is struggling with difficult concepts, and his prose can be rough sledding, but it is rarely opaque. Descartes is struggling with difficult concepts, Duhem is struggling with difficult concepts, Poincare is struggling with difficult concepts, Merleau-Ponty is struggling with difficult concepts. Reading them can be challenging, although not always for the same reasons. But having plowed through them, I am least left with a sense of having some lesson to take home (well, not always; I'm still not sure what M-P means by the "flesh" in his later writings).

I rarely got that from Derrida, and judging how others react to him -including those who admire him and claim to be influenced by him, like J. Hillis Miller- I suspect that isn't a purely personal failing on my part.

Judging thinkers on their prose is like evaluating the flightworthiness of a plane by its seat covers.

I suspect Derrida himself would disagree. After all, is he not all about examining the process of writing itself rather than accepting the myth that there are "underlying ideas" to extract from a text? :p All jesting aside, one cannot divorce an assessment of Derrida from an assessment of his prose, as his expository style is a major part of his project, and of his influence. It is one of the swords by which he lives or dies, and my verdict is that he usually dies. (Perhaps he merely wishes thereby to illustrate the death of the author, but I doubt it)

And who says I can't judge a plane by its seat covers? :p

"The emphasis on comfort betrayed by the efforts airline companies put into better seat-covers betrays an attempt to suppress into the background that which the capitalistic interests do not wish the traveler to consider. By making the flight more comfortable, the process of flying becomes transparent -invisible in fact- to the traveler. He is supposed to notice, as little as possible, the enormous forces at work to furnish his convenience as a consumer, the resources and labor being exploited in the effort to get him from point A to point B. The traveler, in experiencing the comfortable seat-covers, thinks of his flying experience mainly as a comfort-experience, and in so doing, becomes a fellow-traveler in the conspiracy to suppress awareness of the exploitation upon which his convenient existence is predicated."

OK, that isn't so much Derridian as it is straight post-colonial Marxian, but it's not clear to me that playing the game by Derridian rules (if that's what one can call them) has any more merit than playing it by Frankfurt School rules.

[No Robots]

The fundamental problem is the notion that something meaningful can be said about Nothingness. This contaminates the whole line of Hegel-Heidegger-Derrida. See Chap. 12 of Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. 2. Philosophy needs always to keep in mind Parmenides: "Nor is there nor will there be anything apart from Being."

[Gamera]

The fundamental problem is the notion that something meaningful can be said about Nothingness. This contaminates the whole line of Hegel-Heidegger-Derrida. See Chap. 12 of Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. 2. Philosophy needs always to keep in mind Parmenides: "Nor is there nor will there be anything apart from Being."

Except that as Heidegger points out, Being is no thing. That's the problem and paradox in addressing Being in its particular beingness. Being is not just another thing like a shoe or a kumquat. It is in fact no-thing.

[Gamera]

I
I suspect Derrida himself would disagree. After all, is he not all about examining the process of writing itself rather than accepting the myth that there are "underlying ideas" to extract from a text? :p All jesting aside, one cannot divorce an assessment of Derrida from an assessment of his prose, as his expository style is a major part of his project, and of his influence. It is one of the swords by which he lives or dies, and my verdict is that he usually dies. (Perhaps he merely wishes thereby to illustrate the death of the author, but I doubt it)

Like I say, I find Foucault more congenial to my thinking. But to use the pejorative "opaque" to characterize Derrida's strategy of consciously avoiding everyday discourse to avoid its hidden assumptions, misses the point, I think.

[Von Smith]

I
I suspect Derrida himself would disagree. After all, is he not all about examining the process of writing itself rather than accepting the myth that there are "underlying ideas" to extract from a text? :p All jesting aside, one cannot divorce an assessment of Derrida from an assessment of his prose, as his expository style is a major part of his project, and of his influence. It is one of the swords by which he lives or dies, and my verdict is that he usually dies. (Perhaps he merely wishes thereby to illustrate the death of the author, but I doubt it)

Like I say, I find Foucault more congenial to my thinking. But to use the pejorative "opaque" to characterize Derrida's strategy of consciously avoiding everyday discourse to avoid its hidden assumptions, misses the point, I think.


Only people who don't like Derrida ever seem to miss the point. People who admire him give "alternate readings". :p

[Blueskyboris]

So are Hegel's, yet Blueskyboris professes mystification as to why I would read them. At any rate, the "struggling with difficult concepts" excuse is overused. Kant is struggling with difficult concepts, and his prose can be rough sledding, but it is rarely opaque. Descartes is struggling with difficult concepts, Duhem is struggling with difficult concepts, Poincare is struggling with difficult concepts, Merleau-Ponty is struggling with difficult concepts. Reading them can be challenging, although not always for the same reasons. But having plowed through them, I am least left with a sense of having some lesson to take home (well, not always; I'm still not sure what M-P means by the "flesh" in his later writings).

I rarely got that from Derrida, and judging how others react to him -including those who admire him and claim to be influenced by him, like J. Hillis Miller- I suspect that isn't a purely personal failing on my part. This response underlines why you have had problems with Derrida. You are confusing "concepts" with prose. Derrida used difficult prose to communicate difficult concepts.

Also, Kant is dead. He is not struggling with anything.

[Blueskyboris]

Like I say, I find Foucault more congenial to my thinking. But to use the pejorative "opaque" to characterize Derrida's strategy of consciously avoiding everyday discourse to avoid its hidden assumptions, misses the point, I think.


Only people who don't like Derrida ever seem to miss the point. People who admire him give "alternate readings". :p And sometimes people who neither admire him or dislike him simply read his sentences.

[No Robots]

Except that as Heidegger points out, Being is no thing. That's the problem and paradox in addressing Being in its particular beingness. Being is not just another thing like a shoe or a kumquat. It is in fact no-thing.

The problem comes where Beingness, because it is not a thing, is regarded as nothingness. This is the crude sophistry which infects much of philosophy.

[No Robots]

From a paper (http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpnegri10.htm) by Antonio Negri:

Spinoza systematically inverts Heidegger: to Angst (anxiety) he opposes Amor, to Umsicht (circumspection) he opposes Mens, to Entschlossenheit (resolution) he opposes Cupiditas, to Anwesenheit (being-present) he opposes the Conatus, to Besorgen (concern) he opposes Appetitus, to Möglichkeit (possibility) he opposes Potentia. In this opposition, an anti-purposive presence and possibility unite that which different orientations of ontology divide. At the same time, the indifferent meanings of being are precisely divided—Heidegger orients himself towards nothingness, and Spinoza towards plenitude. The Heideggerian ambiguity which wavers in the void resolves itself in the Spinozian tension which conceives of the present as plenitude.

Plenitude of Beingness or void of nothingness: This is the polarity within philosophy. Spinoza stands as the great spokesman of the plenitude of Being, whereas Heidegger belongs to the resistance against Spinoza that finds its great leader in Kant. Derrida stands among those who, while sensing the futility of any alternative to Spinoza, remain unwilling or unable to fully champion him.

[Gamera]

Except that as Heidegger points out, Being is no thing. That's the problem and paradox in addressing Being in its particular beingness. Being is not just another thing like a shoe or a kumquat. It is in fact no-thing.

The problem comes where Beingness, because it is not a thing, is regarded as nothingness. This is the crude sophistry which infects much of philosophy.

I don't look at Heidegger's exploration of the ontological difference as sophistry, but as a remarkable leap into an area of our existence that prior philosophers failed to even recognized, due to their naivety. I think Spinoza's monism was pretty much discredited by Husserl and the problem of historicity. But in any case, Spinoza leaves utterly unthought the question of the Being of beings, by privileging (first conflating God, Being and Nature), and then privileging a certain faculty for accessing "Nature" -- reason. Thus, in Spinoza's unthought metaphysicals, nature stands against culture, which falls into error to the extent is doesn't "understand" nature/God/Being, which is subject to rational description (and apparently nothing else).

Needless to say, the vast realm of unthought assumptions in this position boggles the mind.

[Gamera]

From a paper (http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpnegri10.htm) by Antonio Negri:

[INDENT]Spinoza systematically inverts Heidegger: .

To do so, Spinoza must have mastered time travel, among his other skills in discerning God.

[premjan]

Heidegger was about 200 years after Spinoza.

[No Robots]

To do so, Spinoza must have mastered time travel, among his other skills in discerning God.

Heidegger was about 200 years after Spinoza.

Negri's point is that Heidegger and others prattle away as if Spinoza had never existed, as though his work did not provide full refutation of all their scholastic blather. As Constantin Brunner puts it:

Spinoza's Ethics was published in the year 1677 and uncounted men have since had before their eyes what is written therein: and yet they have not seen it. Uncounted men! Of treatises on Spinoza alone more than three thousand have appeared. Only Spinoza himself has still not appeared unto them. The Ethics of the year 1677 is a modern book the actual effectiveness of which with respect to what is here considered, and also in many other respects, has not yet begun to make itself felt.—Brunner, Science, spirit, superstition, p209n.

Of those who fail to consider Spinoza, or who consider him 'refuted', Brunner has this to say:

It will suffice to indicate here their scholastic business in "pure nothingness", in their critique of thinking and in their critique of Spinozism, including naturally their "immanent critique" of it. Let us repeat once more: Spinozism as such will never be an object and hence not a disputed object for a conscience where Truth instantly vanishes and is replaced by something else and opposite. It is against that "otherness", against the degradation of absolute thought into absolutized relativity and negativity, into that immanentized, antithethic thought of the common folk (and such it remains, even if one introduces as one of its components a special scholastic term, e.g. the word "postulate") which creates its critique against its own figments.—Brunner, Spinoza contra Kant.

As for Husserl having refuted Spinoza, we have this:

Thus too Spinoza, who spoke of "deus sive natura," is made into a pantheist or his teaching is interpreted as "parallelism" (even Husserl does this), whereas Spinoza actually teaches identity.—Goetz, To live is to think: the thought of twentieth-century German philosopher Constantin Brunner, -p. 111.

I note that Gamera calls himself a "Heideggerian Christian." Derrida examines the close connection between Christianity and Heidegger in the conclusion of his book, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Derrida posits a dialogue between Christian theologians and Heidegger in which the former say to the latter, "You say the most radical things that can be said when one is a Christian today" (p. 111). Derrida emphasizes that there exists an exchange between Christians and Heidegger in which "the places can sometimes be exchanged in a disturbing way." He illustrates this as follows:

We have here a programme and a combinatory whose power remains abyssal. In all rigor it exculpates none of the discourses which can thus exchange their power. It leaves no place open for any arbitrating authority. Nazism was not born in the desert. We all know this but it has to be constantly recalled. And even if, far from any desert, it had grown like a mushroom in the silence of a European forest, it would have done so in the shadow of big trees, in the shelter of their silence or their indifference but in the same soil. I will not list these trees which in Europe people an immense black forest, I will not count the species. For essential reasons, the presentation of them defies tabular layout. In their bushy taxonomy, they would bear the names of religions, philosophies, political regimes, economic structures, religious or academic institutions. In short, what is just as conf-usedly called culture, or the world of spirit.—Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, p.109-110.

Christians must sever their connection to Heidegger's thought, lest they fall under the same opprobrium. As Hans Goetz puts it:

Heidegger... wants to penetrate to absolute values and standards ; he begins by asserting the special position of human being over against all other being, and he ends—one might almost say of necessity—by proclaiming the special position of the "Aryan race" over against the rest of mankind, a view he promoted and tried to justify "philosophically" in his addresses as Rector of Freiburg University. This is reason enough for us not to dwell on Heidegger any longer.—Goetz, ibid, p. 144

[Gamera]

Negri's point is that Heidegger and others prattle away as if Spinoza had never existed, as though his work did not provide full refutation of all their scholastic blather. As Constantin Brunner puts it:

I think it's fair to say Heidegger knew Spinoza's work pretty well. He places it the realm of the Ontotheology path Western thought took.

[Spinoza's Ethics was published in the year 1677 and uncounted men have since had before their eyes what is written therein: and yet they have not seen it. Uncounted men! Of treatises on Spinoza alone more than three thousand have appeared. Only Spinoza himself has still not appeared unto them. The Ethics of the year 1677 is a modern book the actual effectiveness of which with respect to what is here considered, and also in many other respects, has not yet begun to make itself felt.—Brunner, Science, spirit, superstition, p209n.

I'm glad you find such solace in Spinoza. I personally find his thinking naive and archaic.

I note that Gamera calls himself a "Heideggerian Christian." Derrida examines the close connection between Christianity and Heidegger in the conclusion of his book, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Derrida posits a dialogue between Christian theologians and Heidegger in which the former say to the latter, "You say the most radical things that can be said when one is a Christian today" (p. 111). Derrida emphasizes that there exists an exchange between Christians and Heidegger in which "the places can sometimes be exchanged in a disturbing way." He illustrates this as follows:

We have here a programme and a combinatory whose power remains abyssal. In all rigor it exculpates none of the discourses which can thus exchange their power. It leaves no place open for any arbitrating authority. Nazism was not born in the desert. We all know this but it has to be constantly recalled. And even if, far from any desert, it had grown like a mushroom in the silence of a European forest, it would have done so in the shadow of big trees, in the shelter of their silence or their indifference but in the same soil. I will not list these trees which in Europe people an immense black forest, I will not count the species. For essential reasons, the presentation of them defies tabular layout. In their bushy taxonomy, they would bear the names of religions, philosophies, political regimes, economic structures, religious or academic institutions. In short, what is just as conf-usedly called culture, or the world of spirit.—Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, p.109-110.

Christians must sever their connection to Heidegger's thought, lest they fall under the same opprobrium. As Hans Goetz puts it:

Heidegger... wants to penetrate to absolute values and standards ; he begins by asserting the special position of human being over against all other being, and he ends—one might almost say of necessity—by proclaiming the special position of the "Aryan race" over against the rest of mankind, a view he promoted and tried to justify "philosophically" in his addresses as Rector of Freiburg University. This is reason enough for us not to dwell on Heidegger any longer.—Goetz, ibid, p. 144[

You're much too focussed on labels. By Heideggerian Christian, I only mean that Christianity has become mired in doctrines and creeds, which have made destroyed its essense of love. Christianity must be about one's existence, not one's thinking. That is the essence of the gospel. So contrary to your view (which is slightly off topic) Christianity must become "Heideggerian" or it will continue not to be Christianity at all.

[No Robots]

Christianity must be about one's existence, not one's thinking. That is the essence of the gospel.

First off, our thoughts are our lives. Second, Christianity is not about one's existence, but about the existence of the One:

Hear, O Israel, Beingness is our god, Beingness is One.--Dt. 6:4

[Blueskyboris]

Spinoza proposed many axioms, which means his philosophy is predicated a series of fundamental assumptions. If Heidegger went further and successfully analyzed one of Spinoza's fundamental assumptions, then at least part of his philosophy has surpassed Spinoza's.

Heidegger argues that all things exist; that all things are beings. But when we try and figure out what Being is, which is an attribute of all things that exist, we find that Being is in fact a no-thing.

Combining this argument with the idea of becoming and we have the groundwork for a better understanding of Free Will - perhaps better than Spinoza's if reinterpreted correctly.

I would be careful about projecting Heidegger as an opposite of Spinoza. Heidegger respected Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Spinoza. It is probably better to think of Heidegger as an expansion of those philosophies.

[Blueskyboris]

Christianity must be about one's existence, not one's thinking. That is the essence of the gospel.

First off, our thoughts are our lives. Second, Christianity is not about one's existence, but about the existence of the One:

Hear, O Israel, Beingness is our god, Beingness is One.--Dt. 6:4
I'm quite sure my bowel movements are part of my life. And I am quite sure I don't have a thought about each bowel movement at every instance during its action.

[No Robots]

Spinoza proposed many axioms, which means his philosophy is predicated a series of fundamental assumptions.

All of Spinoza's philosophy is derived from one assumption, to wit, that Being exists. This is the foundation of all philosophy. It cannot be denied without self-contradiction.

If Heidegger went further and successfully analyzed one of Spinoza's fundamental assumptions, then at least part of his philosophy has surpassed Spinoza's.

But that's just it: he didn't successfully come to grips with the absolute nature of Beingness. Instead, he continually seeks to reify Beingness, notoriously so in indentifying Beingness with the Nazi regime.

Heidegger argues that all things exist; that all things are beings. But when we try and figure out what Being is, which is an attribute of all things that exist, we find that Being is in fact a no-thing.

And as I said above, it is not the case that Beingness is nothingness just because it is essentially unthingly. Humans perceive Beingness only as things; this makes thingliness an attribute of Beingness, and not the other way around.

Combining this argument with the idea of becoming and we have the groundwork for a better understanding of Free Will - perhaps better than Spinoza's if reinterpreted correctly.

And there we have an important reason for Heidegger's resistance to Spinoza: he wants to preserve free will in the face of Spinoza's absolute determinism. There is no becoming: there is only Beingness, which we perceive as thingly motion and falsely construe as becoming.

I would be careful about projecting Heidegger as an opposite of Spinoza. Heidegger respected Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Spinoza. It is probably better to think of Heidegger as an expansion of those philosophies.

Heidegger is indeed part of the opposition to Spinoza, despite whatever lip service he might have occasionally paid. Don't forget that he called Spinoza a "foreign body in philosophy." There exists in humanity a polarity between the people of spirit and the common folk. The two greatest expositors of the thought of each of these types are, respectively, Spinoza and Kant. Heidegger most definitely belongs with Kant as an expositor of the thought of the commonality, devoid of all true spirit.

I'm quite sure my bowel movements are part of my life. And I am quite sure I don't have a thought about each bowel movement at every instance during its action.

Perhaps we have to discuss here the basics of potty training:

Each thing is affecting others as well as being affected and all things are bound up among each other in a mutual relationship of affecting and being affected. A thing is possible only to the extent that all things are possible and interrelated. In order to comprehend why this truth can gain ascendancy upon the general public only so slowly and with much difficulty, it is necessary to keep in mind the stubborn inertia of public thinking in all its enormity. Otherwise one cannot understand, and it will remain a complete mystery why the four facts of inhaling and exhaling, of the intake and excretion of food, of begetting and being begotten, and no less that of our motions, i.e. that we move and have to move our body and its various members as well as other things, so that they may serve the purpose of maintaining our body—why these four facts collectively, which everyone has constantly before his eyes, have not long since evoked in even the most obtuse minds the natural conviction of our entwinement in the unitary world of things and the utterly lucid awareness of our belonging, as part of it, to the motion of the whole. Each thing is possible only to the extent that all things are possible and are mutually interactive.--Brunner, Science, Spirit, Superstition (http://constantinbrunner.info/pages/primer.htm#p18)

Our thinking is identical to our bodily motion. Naturally, much of our bodily motion is not consciously thought. But when we do think about it, it is obvious that bodily motion and thought are one.

[Blueskyboris]

All of Spinoza's philosophy is derived from one assumption, to wit, that Being exists. This is the foundation of all philosophy. It cannot be denied without self-contradiction. Exactly. An assumption he did not examine closely. Being as a quality can not be found. Both Spinoza and Heidegger conceeded Beings, but only Heidegger examined Being.

But that's just it: he didn't successfully come to grips with the absolute nature of Beingness. In your opinion, you mean.

Instead, he continually seeks to reify Beingness, notoriously so in indentifying Beingness with the Nazi regime. Beingness? I don't think so. Heidegger attempted to use his philosophical framework to explain the rise of German philosophy and German cultural power. He tried to explain the German Dasein, not the NAZIS.

And as I said above, it is not the case that Beingness is nothingness just because it is essentially unthingly. Humans perceive Beingness only as things; this makes thingliness an attribute of Beingness, and not the other way around. Which thingliness is an attribute of a thing?

And there we have an important reason for Heidegger's resistance to Spinoza: he wants to preserve free will in the face of Spinoza's absolute determinism. There is no becoming: there is only Beingness, which we perceive as thingly motion and falsely construe as becoming. Indeed, Heidegger disagrees on this point, but only because he thought Spinoza hadn't examined his axioms well enough. However, when one looks at Spinoza's and Heidegger's entire philsophies, one is struck by the overwhelming similiarities.

You should realize that both Spinoza and Heidegger are dead. And you should also realize that they were not contemporaries. This is a very important point. Heidegger, during his lifetime, could talk to Spinoza, so to speak, through his text. Spinoza, however, never spoke to Heidegger, because Heidegger in person and in text never existed for him. Therefore, setting up two non-contemporary philosophers as philosophical opposites, when one philospher never had the chance to consider the other's arguments, is complete nonsense.

Our thinking is identical to our bodily motion. Naturally, much of our bodily motion is not consciously thought. But when we do think about it, it is obvious that bodily motion and thought are one. But when we do think about it ... But if our thinking is identical with our bodily motion they wouldn't we never stop thinking about our bodily motion?

[pgscott]

But if our thinking is identical with our bodily motion they wouldn't we never stop thinking about our bodily motion?

Personally, I would say yes, and then add, that consciousness is symptomatic of our thinking being out of sync with our body. 90% of thinking is unconscious.

I guess it would depend on how you define thinking, if thinking is confined to the conscious realm then one would not agree with the above.

[No Robots]

Being as a quality can not be found. Both Spinoza and Heidegger conceeded Beings, but only Heidegger examined Being.

Beingness is not a quality. It is the sole real existent, what Spinoza calls Substance.

Beingness? I don't think so. Heidegger attempted to use his philosophical framework to explain the rise of German philosophy and German cultural power. He tried to explain the German Dasein, not the NAZIS.

The National Socialist Revolution brings a complete transformation in our German existence.... Doctrines and "ideas" shall no longer be the rule of your Being. The Führer, he and he alone, is the present and future German reality and its law.—Heidegger, "Message to German Students", Freiburger Studentenzeitung, Nov. 3, 1933.

Which thingliness is an attribute of a thing?

What I said was that thingliness is an attribute of Beingness. In Spinozist terms, extension is an attribute of Substance.

Indeed, Heidegger disagrees on this point, but only because he thought Spinoza hadn't examined his axioms well enough. However, when one looks at Spinoza's and Heidegger's entire philsophies, one is struck by the overwhelming similiarities.

There is only one true philosophy, as Spinoza himself declared. And as all great philosophers who followed him have said, Spinoza is the greatest expositor of that true philosophy. To the extent that someone is a philosopher at all, he is Spinozist. To the extent that someone deviates from Spinoza, he is not a philosopher. Heidegger plays at philosophy, but he is not a philosopher; and while he makes a play at dealing with Beingness, he in fact comes nowhere close to the true doctrine as articulated by Spinoza.

You should realize that both Spinoza and Heidegger are dead. And you should also realize that they were not contemporaries. This is a very important point. Heidegger, during his lifetime, could talk to Spinoza, so to speak, through his text. Spinoza, however, never spoke to Heidegger, because Heidegger in person and in text never existed for him. Therefore, setting up two non-contemporary philosophers as philosophical opposites, when one philospher never had the chance to consider the other's arguments, is complete nonsense.


A philosopher's thought is his life. Spinoza's thought is alive, and thus the essence of his Beingness is alive. Heidegger did not accurately read Spinoza. Heidegger is a type that Spinoza new well, and accurately described.

But when we do think about it ... But if our thinking is identical with our bodily motion they wouldn't we never stop thinking about our bodily motion?

Our thought consists of three specificates: feeling, knowing and willing. When we take a dump, we feel it; and this feeling is thinking. When we actively reflect upon the feeling by associated it with a representation, then we enter the specificate of knowing. Much of what we feel never enters the specificate of knowing.

[Gamera]

First off, our thoughts are our lives. Second, Christianity is not about one's existence, but about the existence of the One:



Slightly off topic, but I just can't help mentioning that this isn't what the gospel narrative is about. You've confused doctrine (which is useless) with faith (which is transforming according to the gospel).

And that is exactly why Heideggerian, existential Christianity is really the essence of the gospel, not all the nonsensical ratiocination about the trinity and substances and sin.

[Gamera]

Beingness is not a quality. It is the sole real existent, what Spinoza calls Substance.


Well that solves that problem. No need to think about it any further.

[No Robots]

Well that solves that problem. No need to think about it any further.

Quite so, quite so. After all, the sublime is merely the sublime. It is our reality of things that is of interest to us. Philosophy teaches us, though, to bear in mind at all times that this reality of things is not absolute reality in and of itself; but it is rather our perception of reality as it really is, our means of understanding reality. By bearing this relativity of our perception in mind, we avoid the problem of hypostatizing our own relative understanding. Philosophy asserts that the thingly manifold of our perception is in absolute reality an ideal unity: Beingness is One. The practical benefit of this outlook is that we can better ascertain the relationships between things if we start from the conviction that all things are essentially one.

[Blueskyboris]

pgscott,

Personally, I would say yes, and then add, that consciousness is symptomatic of our thinking being out of sync with our body. 90% of thinking is unconscious.

I guess it would depend on how you define thinking, if thinking is confined to the conscious realm then one would not agree with the above. Indeed.

[Gamera]

Well that solves that problem. No need to think about it any further.

Quite so, quite so. After all, the sublime is merely the sublime. It is our reality of things that is of interest to us. Philosophy teaches us, though, to bear in mind at all times that this reality of things is not absolute reality in and of itself; but it is rather our perception of reality as it really is, our means of understanding reality. By bearing this relativity of our perception in mind, we avoid the problem of hypostatizing our own relative understanding. Philosophy asserts that the thingly manifold of our perception is in absolute reality an ideal unity: Beingness is One. The practical benefit of this outlook is that we can better ascertain the relationships between things if we start from the conviction that all things are essentially one.


Yep, nothing happening here. Everybody go home and stop thinking. Spinoza figured it all out for us.

[Blueskyboris]

No Robots,
Beingness is not a quality. It is the sole real existent, what Spinoza calls Substance. This is a mere assertion. One can not look and find the "sole real existent". And if one examines Being for it, one finds that the Being that unites all Beings is in fact a no-thing.

The National Socialist Revolution brings a complete transformation in our German existence.... Doctrines and "ideas" shall no longer be the rule of your Being. The Führer, he and he alone, is the present and future German reality and its law.—Heidegger, "Message to German Students", Freiburger Studentenzeitung, Nov. 3, 1933. And?

The above quote is an example of a red herring.

What I said was that thingliness is an attribute of Beingness. In Spinozist terms, extension is an attribute of Substance. The problem with this line of assertion is that it assumes a premise as true when that premise is the very subject that is under examination.

If we examine real Beings we find that Being is a no-thing. Positing that "thingliness is an attribute of Beingness" is mere conjecture. One must argue from real existents to metaphysical truths, not from metaphysical truths to real existents. You, and Spinoza, have the carriage before your horses.

There is only one true philosophy, as Spinoza himself declared. LOL. Carriage before the horses.

And as all great philosophers who followed him have said, Spinoza is the greatest expositor of that true philosophy. Great philosophers do not follow.

To the extent that someone is a philosopher at all, he is Spinozist. :notworthy: Carriage before the horses.

To the extent that someone deviates from Spinoza, he is not a philosopher. Carriage before the horses.

Spinoza was no better than the Catholics with his argumentation.

Heidegger plays at philosophy, but he is not a philosopher; and while he makes a play at dealing with Beingness, he in fact comes nowhere close to the true doctrine as articulated by Spinoza. Carriage before the horses.

A philosopher's thought is his life. Spinoza's thought is alive, and thus the essence of his Beingness is alive. Heidegger did not accurately read Spinoza. Heidegger is a type that Spinoza new well, and accurately described. Spinoza, like the Christians, posited too many axioms.

Our thought consists of three specificates: feeling, knowing and willing. When we take a dump, we feel it; and this feeling is thinking. When we actively reflect upon the feeling by associated it with a representation, then we enter the specificate of knowing. Much of what we feel never enters the specificate of knowing. You have merely redefined feeling and acting as thought itself. Now, if you are interested in supporting an argument that everything is the thought of God, because God is everything, then I can see why you would make this argument. But from a scientific and empirical perspective it makes no sense. People simply do not think about their bodily functions 24-7. When I do, I get a little freaked out.



Much of what we feel never enters the specificate of knowing. That's because we don't think about our bodies all the time.