Does consciousness exist?

[Collden]

I was on the verge of composing a minor essay about this but decided to keep it (relatively) short and elaborate if anything is unclear.

Basically, I think most would agree that if we were to use a hypothetical perfect cloning device to create a perfect (down to the last quantum state) copy of a person A, person B, A and B would have two separate consciousnesses (ie, experience of being conscious), since whatever the experience of consciousness is, it arises from the material bodily composition, and if person A was to die later on, his consciousness would also disappear (thus, none of this "I don't care if you kill me because I will live on in my twin copy!")

Most would also agree that in the partial replacement (replace A with B elementary particle by elementary particle) thought experiment, the consciousness of person A doesn't actually at any point die - it's still my consciousness if my neurons were to be replaced one by one.

The question though, is if there's any real difference between the process of first creating B from A and then killing A, and the process of replacing A with B, particle by particle? It seems to me that the gradual replacement could occur infinitely fast and person A's experience of consciousness would be just as undisturbed. Is there any reason to believe that the experience would be different depending on whether the particles are replaced at a rate of one per second, one per nanosecond, or one per 10^-9999... s?

If the, still in principle "gradual", replacement of A and B occurs infintely fast, it is practically identical with the instantenous replacement of person A with person B. If our perfect cloning device was capable of instantly disintegrating person A and create the identical copy, person B, in his stead, is there any reason to believe that the experience of consciousness (whoever you consider it belonging to) would notice the transition? I doubt it, and yet the "I" of person A has clearly passed away, just as much as he would have if he was killed after his personal clone with it's own sense of self was created.

This is already getting too long-winded, but the question I'm getting at is - is there any reason to believe that our seemingly continuous and unified sense of self is actually anything more than an infinitely long series of separate and discontinuous moments, of momentary experiences of consciousness? Then, if "my" consciousness, if "I", could theoretically pass away an infinite number of times per second, what is left of the concept of a consciousness as a continuous, singular entity?

[Draygomb]

B would surely think the consciousness he has was his and it would even possibly be the same as the conscuiosness A had at the moment he was copied. But the very next moment would likely cause a divergence From A's

[Collden]

B would surely think the consciousness he has was his and it would even possibly be the same as the conscuiosness A had at the moment he was copied. But the very next moment would likely cause a divergence From A'sYes, this is part of what I'm assuming to be true for my continued reasoning - that A and B each have their own and non-shared consciousness and sense of self, even though they just happen to be identical at the moment of creation.

[Biniam Shire]

What Draygomb said.

(thus, none of this "I don't care if you kill me because I will live on in my twin copy!")

If the machine is perfect, and the copy is instantenous (i.e., for the sake of our thought experiment) then you could kill off either one in the instant that follows the copy. Without time passing, there is no experience and hence there can be no difference. As time passes of course there is a difference.

the question I'm getting at is - is there any reason to believe that our seemingly continuous and unified sense of self is actually anything more than an infinitely long series of separate and discontinuous moments, of momentary experiences of consciousness?

"momentary experiences of consciousness" is undefined, and I don't see how you could fill that phrase with any meaning. A moment - as a frozen instant in time - does not allow you to be conscious at all about anything. Consciousness is bound to the physical, chemical, etc. processing that is happening in the brain. Though cannot occur without time passing.

Consciousness is an emergent quality of brains of a certain complexity and with certain other qualities. I would suggest by starting with this essay:
"What is it like to be a bat?"
http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/Nagel_Bat.html

And follow it up with one of Daniel Dennet's books , or Jeff Hawkins' "On Intelligence".

(I am sure people with different views will pop in some reading tips that argue for alternative viewpoints).

[Koz]

B would surely think the consciousness he has was his and it would even possibly be the same as the conscuiosness A had at the moment he was copied. But the very next moment would likely cause a divergence From A's

Hmm, I have a problem with this. I do not see consciousness as being tied to experience, memories or anything other than consciousness. To me, consciousness is self-awareness and nothing more. If I create an exact copy of myself, how can I NOT be aware of this other body while also being aware of my own? If I'm NOT conscious of this other body, how can it be an exact copy (i.e. something is obviously different)?

You seem to be stating that experience would make the two consciousness' diverge, and that is certainly true, but why would one lose awareness of the other just because they are now different?

Another thought on this. If I keep some of my DNA perserved and then die, and later someone reconstructs me from my DNA to make an exact copy of how I was, why wouldn't it BE me? I may not have any memory of my previous self, and may develop a completely different personality as a result of new experiences, but it would still be the same consciousness. In other words, the same consciousness I have right now, that makes me aware of the body I am using to type this, would be the same, just with different memories/experiences.

To me, if consciousness comes purely from the physical construct of the brain (which I believe it does), and you create an exact copy of that construct, it would have the EXACT same consciousness. If it did not, then the consciousness would have to be derived from something other than the physical construct. Am I way off base here? Am I making sense at all?

Koz

ETA: new poster, but long time lurker (like 5 years of lurking lol).

[dug_down_deep]

There is no physical entity called a mind, nor a consciousness, nor an identity. There are people walking around. They don't have bodies. They are bodies.

These paradoxes and star trek transporter/clone quandaries are just category errors. There is no me composed of memories. There is no you composed of self-awarenesses. There is no ghost in the machine, physically speaking.

This means nothing speaking metaphysically, though.

[Collden]

...Thanks for the essay link, it was interesting, but I wasn't aiming for the mind/body problem here.

What I'm getting at is that when "we" (I mean, most of the people whose thoughts about consciousness I've shared) think about consciousness we usually think of our sense of self as a continuous and singular entity. This leads to us even being able to ask the question:

If I was to step into a teleporter that disintegrated my body only to recreate an identical copy, down to the last quantum state, at another location, the outside world would surely not detect any difference, but would the person stepping out of the teleporter really be me, or another, perfectly identical, but still, another person?

Now we all agree that A has a consciousness, and that at the instant of cloning, B gets his own consciousness and sense of self that is as separate from A's as any two different persons consciousnesses, though initially identical, they immediately start to diverge. Now, killing person A at some point after the cloning really kills his consciousness, his "I" is gone forever, and only B remains.

Now suppose we clone B into person C two seconds after he was created and then destroy B. Person B's entire existence was two seconds long, though he would've had the experience of the lifetime of A + 2 additional seconds. Proceeding in this fashion, we could continue to create clones D, E, F, G, etc to infinity, and destroy each clone some time after the next in line was created. Lets say we shrink this period between creation and destruction to 1/infinity, ie approaching zero, the lifetime and thus the consciousness of each individual clone is approaching zero, or non-existence. The consciousness running through from copy A to copy Inf, is still having a continuous experience, even though the consciousness of every single individual clone up until the most recent - is gone!

My point is that this question with the teleporter I posted above is irrelevant since your particular consciousness and sense of self could in theory die an infinite number of times per second. There is no continuous and singular entity such that there is some sort of unifying linkage in your consciousness that the teleporter could possibly break, there is only a series of discontinually updated moments (defined not as something of zero duration, but as something approaching zero duration) in time.

[Koz]

There is no physical entity called a mind, nor a consciousness, nor an identity. There are people walking around. They don't have bodies. They are bodies.

These paradoxes and star trek transporter/clone quandaries are just category errors. There is no me composed of memories. There is no you composed of self-awarenesses. There is no ghost in the machine, physically speaking.

This means nothing speaking metaphysically, though.

Right, that's more or less what I was saying. Our bodies are physical and that is all. So if you create an exact copy of this phyisical structure, how could it NOT have the same consciousness since that consciousness is solely derived from the physical construct?

Koz

[Koz]

Now we all agree that A has a consciousness, and that at the instant of cloning, B gets his own consciousness and sense of self that is as separate from A's as any two different persons consciousnesses, though initially identical, they immediately start to diverge.

Whoa, whoa, we all agree? I don't, actually. What do you mean by the phrase "gets his own consciousness"? Where does he "get" it from? If its a manifistation of the physical brain then how can it be "different" or "his own" if its an exact copy? Wouldn't it be the exact same? If not, why not?

This isn't as cut and dry as you are making this out to be. I remember a thread very similar to this a long time ago, and there was definitly NOT a consensus that person A and person B had two distinct consciousness'.

Koz

[Collden]

Whoa, whoa, we all agree? I don't, actually. What do you mean by the phrase "gets his own consciousness"? Where does he "get" it from? If its a manifistation of the physical brain then how can it be "different" or "his own" if its an exact copy? Wouldn't it be the exact same? If not, why not?

This isn't as cut and dry as you are making this out to be. I remember a thread very similar to this a long time ago, and there was definitly NOT a consensus that person A and person B had two distinct consciousness'.

Koz
The consciousness of B is his own because it stems from his body, from the moment of his conception, the continued development of his conscious experience is based on his sensory input, not A's, which he has no present or future access to. A and B have separate consciousnesses, not in the sense that they're initially different - they're initially identical - but in the sense that the circumstances of their continued experiences are tied to their own separate bodies and sensory organs.

I mean, of course this is just my interpretation (it just takes a whole lot of extra space to keep pointing out "I think" and "this is how I see it", etc), but are my thoughts more clear now?

[Koz]

The consciousness of B is his own because it stems from his body, from the moment of his conception, the continued development of his conscious experience is based on his sensory input, not A's, which he has no present or future access to. A and B have separate consciousnesses, not in the sense that they're initially different - they're initially identical - but in the sense that the circumstances of their continued experiences are tied to their own separate bodies and sensory organs.

I mean, of course this is just my interpretation (it just takes a whole lot of extra space to keep pointing out "I think" and "this is how I see it", etc), but are my thoughts more clear now?

No, I understand what you are saying, perhaps its ME that's not being clear enough. This is something that I've thought about a lot over the last several years, and the only real conclusion I've come to, is that it is very difficult to verbalize coherently.

Where we differ on this subject I think, is the definition of consciousness. When I say consciousness, I mean only the actual spark of awareness, and don't mean anything involving experience, memories, thoughts, etc. Just the "it" that makes you aware that you exist.

To build on your example, what if person A and person B were both totaly cut off from all sensory input? There would still be consciousness, even without sensory input to "diverge" the two. So, how would they be different now?

See, if consciousness is a direct by-product of the physical brain, and you recreate that physical brain, you would recreate the same by-product as well (i.e. the same consciousness). But, it seems impossible to us that we would be aware of two bodies at the same time, which is where I've languished for the last several years pondering this issue. It seems intuitive that when you clone someone they have their "own" consciousness, but I honestly can't see how that would be. Man, I hope I'm not just spouting jibberish here.

Koz

[Koz]

Heh, I just noticed this thread: http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=205540 which deals with a lot of consciousness issues.

Koz

[Collden]

No, I understand what you are saying, perhaps its ME that's not being clear enough. This is something that I've thought about a lot over the last several years, and the only real conclusion I've come to, is that it is very difficult to verbalize coherently.

Where we differ on this subject I think, is the definition of consciousness. When I say consciousness, I mean only the actual spark of awareness, and don't mean anything involving experience, memories, thoughts, etc. Just the "it" that makes you aware that you exist.

To build on your example, what if person A and person B were both totaly cut off from all sensory input? There would still be consciousness, even without sensory input to "diverge" the two. So, how would they be different now?

See, if consciousness is a direct by-product of the physical brain, and you recreate that physical brain, you would recreate the same by-product as well (i.e. the same consciousness). But, it seems impossible to us that we would be aware of two bodies at the same time, which is where I've languished for the last several years pondering this issue. It seems intuitive that when you clone someone they have their "own" consciousness, but I honestly can't see how that would be. Man, I hope I'm not just spouting jibberish here.

KozAh, yes I think of consciousness as the subjective experience of sensory input and neural states, with ideas like the sense of self, memories, and awareness being part of the latter. Cut off from sensory input, there shouldn't be anything to affect neural states, so the consciousnesses of A and B would stay identical, but they would still be separate. If some event of quantum chance occured in the body of one person but not the other that affected that persons neural state, I think they would probably begin to diverge from that point.

[Iacchus]

This is already getting too long-winded, but the question I'm getting at is - is there any reason to believe that our seemingly continuous and unified sense of self is actually anything more than an infinitely long series of separate and discontinuous moments, of momentary experiences of consciousness? Then, if "my" consciousness, if "I", could theoretically pass away an infinite number of times per second, what is left of the concept of a consciousness as a continuous, singular entity?We are always conscious, it's just that moment to moment something different holds our attention, which makes us very likely to forget what held our attention the moment before.

[Tears In The Rain]

Your physical existence is not really, continuous. Every moment your "A" is basically destroyed and replaced with "B". Your consciousness is the same way. The continuity is an illusion based on the way we store and access memory. You could say there is only "now". It seems like our memories give us access to "the past" but what we are actually aware of is not the past but our present memories of the past which are a type of representative fiction.

[Simen]

Hmm, I have a problem with this. I do not see consciousness as being tied to experience, memories or anything other than consciousness. To me, consciousness is self-awareness and nothing more. If I create an exact copy of myself, how can I NOT be aware of this other body while also being aware of my own? If I'm NOT conscious of this other body, how can it be an exact copy (i.e. something is obviously different)?

You seem to be stating that experience would make the two consciousness' diverge, and that is certainly true, but why would one lose awareness of the other just because they are now different?
Think about it for a second. Where is consciousness generated? In the brain. Why am I not aware of the contents of other people's consciousnesses? Because their consciousness is in their brain, as my consciousness is in mine. There is no connection between my brain and theirs. If there were, I could conceivably be aware of other people's consciousnesses, and they would effectively fuse into one consciousness.

One would not lose awareness of the other because it was never aware of the other in the first place. There was never a connection between them. B is equal to A, in contents, but B was never connected to A, so when B feels the same way as A, it is only because B was created identical to A.


Another thought on this. If I keep some of my DNA perserved and then die, and later someone reconstructs me from my DNA to make an exact copy of how I was, why wouldn't it BE me?
You are your body. There is only your body, there is no ghost in the machine. If someone had another body that was identical to your body, they would still not be you, because you are your body, and they are their body, and the two may be identical in composition but they are not identical. Just like two water molecules may be identical in composition, but still not identical; one may be outside my window here in Norway, and another may be at the south tip of India, or on an exoplanet.

I may not have any memory of my previous self, and may develop a completely different personality as a result of new experiences, but it would still be the same consciousness. In other words, the same consciousness I have right now, that makes me aware of the body I am using to type this, would be the same, just with different memories/experiences.
Again, you are your body. When your body has changed, you have changed. When your consciousness changes, you have changed.


To me, if consciousness comes purely from the physical construct of the brain (which I believe it does), and you create an exact copy of that construct, it would have the EXACT same consciousness. If it did not, then the consciousness would have to be derived from something other than the physical construct. Am I way off base here? Am I making sense at all?

I don't see how you make sense. You say that something is identical to another thing, when clearly they're not. I think you're making an error of abstraction here. On the one hand, you can abstract away consciousness and say that it is the pattern of quantum states or whatever that makes up your body. However, then you start talking as if they were identical on another level of abstraction, as if they were not only identical in pattern but also composed of the exact same particles. Clearly A and B are made up of different particles, even thogh the pattern they form are identical.

You confuse identity with conenction, too. You say that one would be aware of the other, when in fact that would only be true if they were the same not only on the level of patterns (i.e. the patterns the particles that make them up make) but also on the level of particles, in which case saying one is a clone of the other makes no sense, because that would be like saying I am a clone of myself, because I am aware of myself.

[Chuck Rightmire]

It seems to me that this topic was given a good overhauling about a year ago without any conclusions. I would suggest that consciousness exists in all of us as the functions of the brain. If they made a copy of me by cloning, that clone would have the same potential I did when I was born and it would be shaped by what happened to it subsequently. Essentially, the same thing occurs in the machine where we are copied for transport as in certain science fiction books (not the Star Trek kind of transporter). The copy starts with the same basic consciousness as the original, as pointed out above, and develops on its own path so that eventually they might argue which is the original but by the time they are ancient they would bear different scars and different memories, maybe even different perceptions of the same memory. Consciousness has to be continuous, I propose, because it only exists in the past. Because perception takes hours, minutes, seconds or micr0seconds, our perception, even of our thoughts, is of something that has passed. Any interruption of that perception results in lack of a memory as shown by some people who cannot remember the final minutes before a car crash. If consciousness comes in small instances, I would think that the memories would not be trashed by the trauma of the crash.:notworthy:

[jam454]

Most would also agree that in the partial replacement (replace A with B elementary particle by elementary particle) thought experiment, the consciousness of person A doesn't actually at any point die - it's still my consciousness if my neurons were to be replaced one by one.

I read somewhere that all the particles in our bodies are replaced after a certain period of time. The only way to understand this is to create exact replicas of people.Have yall ever seen that movie The Sixth Day?

[Collden]

Your physical existence is not really, continuous. Every moment your "A" is basically destroyed and replaced with "B". Your consciousness is the same way. The continuity is an illusion based on the way we store and access memory. You could say there is only "now". It seems like our memories give us access to "the past" but what we are actually aware of is not the past but our present memories of the past which are a type of representative fiction.Thanks, this is basically what I was getting at. The idea that your sense of self is constantly being destroyed and reborn may not be that profound, but still most of us seem to be unsettled by the thought of being "killed" and recloned in a more tangible fashion (ie, the teleportation thought experiment, Will it really be me?), since we have a not easily shaken sense of a continuous "I", even though in principle, the "I" of our consciousness is always dying.