Omniscience AND free will. A different atheistic viewpoint.

[ecco]

Quotes made by, presumably, atheists taken from A few things Atheists can clear up…

Also, if an omniscient God existed (or even one that could predict behavior with 100% accuracy), Newcomb's paradox conclusively shows that free will could not exist. Non-omniscient gods are logically compatable with free will.

The existence of an omniscient god precludes free will.

The existence of an omniscient God, whose foreknowledge of future events is necessarily correct, completely precludes human free will.

Yes, free will does exist. But with a all knowing all-present God there can only be a deterministic world where there is no real free will.

A being knowing every action before you ever take it shows predetermination and lack of free will.

…would seem to indicate that atheists believe that an omniscient god and free will are mutually exclusive.

Christians, on the other hand, believe their god is, among other things, omniscient and that mortals do have free will. I’m not sure of the evidence for the omniscient part, but belief in free will is evidenced by everything from Eve’s choice to the concept that a homosexual can “choose” to change.

I am an atheist who believes, as an intellectual exercise, that an omniscient god and free will are not mutually exclusive. I welcome any comments on the following:

In a universe somewhat similar to ours, two gods meet to demonstrate themselves to the mortals. Their names are Niscie and Potie. Niscie is omniscient and Potie is omnipotent. These are the only powers they have.

They meet in a setting similar to a casino. There are two identical tables similar to craps tables with two notable differences: There are no numbers or colors, only green felt; both tables, instead of being smooth like a craps table, have a number of small bumps. At one end of each table stands one of the gods and a mortal. Each mortal has a single di. Prior to each roll, each god correctly predicts the outcome. (Alternatively – prior to any rolls, each god predicts the outcome of all the rolls).

Potie knows the outcome because he absolutely controls the placement of the di in his mortal’s hand; the exact force with which the di will be thrown; the specific angle of the wrist; the precise moment of release; precisely which bumps will be hit; precisely the reaction of the di to hitting bumps; etc. The mortal, of course, has no knowledge that he is being manipulated.

Niscie foreknows the outcome simply because he is omniscient. He controls no part of the action of his mortal in the throwing of the di.

Several things, it seems to me, are apparent from this thought exercise:
1. An omnipotent god forcing his will is indistinguishable from an omniscient god exercising his skill.
2. A universe with an omniscient god allowing his mortals to exercise free will is not a logical impossibility.

[JohannGoodflag]

First off: what would you say that it means for "will" to be "free"?

[Deleet]

First off: what would you say that it means for "will" to be "free"?

That he is not in jail?

Free, as in cannot be determined beforehand.

[JohannGoodflag]

Free, as in cannot be determined beforehand.

That would be a common answer. However, it seems that ecco has something different in mind, if "free will" is to be compatible with infalliable foresight.

[ecco]

First off: what would you say that it means for "will" to be "free"?

I can eat the apple or not eat the apple. It does not mean I can fly.

[ecco]

Free, as in cannot be determined beforehand.

Did you even bother to read (and perhaps try to understand) my post?

[Gundulf]

Ecco, I agree with you. (of course, I'm a theist that believes in God's omniscience and that I'm free, so of course I would).

But the reason it makes sense to me isn't just the theological - I've conceived it based on the famous Star Trek time travel episodes - where someone goes back in time and has absolute, perfect knowledge of what will happen - the simple fact that such knowledge exists, before the action, does not, in and of itself, morph a being into a mindless automaton, unable to exercise free will.

If I took a history book and zapped back in time to 1859, and did NOTHING to change history (hid on a deserted island or something) - my absolutly correct knowledge that Booth would shoot Lincoln would not make him do it, nor take away his free will, or the like.

I really am at a loss as to why people take it as an absolute given that correct foreknowledge of an action robs an individual of his ability to make free choices. The free choice may also be determined in a sense, but this looks therefore like a "both/and" situation, not "either or".

[Gundulf]

That he is not in jail?

Free, as in cannot be determined beforehand.

If we're using 'free' as in 'cannot be determined beforehand', however, then logically (or just semantically), sure, omniscience cannot coexist in that sense of 'free will'. Generally we theists don't use the word in that sense, but only in the sense that I choose what I want to do, that I am not being coerced, etc.


However, 'not determined beforehand' even rules out a 'deterministic' universe, where the course of events of all things is able to be predicted, and is in fact determined, by the actual physical laws of the universe. Then you need something, dare I say, 'supernatural' to explain how everything in the universe is not, in fact, "determined" by the laws of nature.

[LuisGarcia]

If I took a history book and zapped back in time to 1859, and did NOTHING to change history (hid on a deserted island or something) - my absolutly correct knowledge that Booth would shoot Lincoln would not make him do it, nor take away his free will, or the like.

I really am at a loss as to why people take it as an absolute given that correct foreknowledge of an action robs an individual of his ability to make free choices.

Let me try to help. Niscie, by his powers, knows what's going to happen (he's omniscient).

Therefore he knows I'm going to have a banana for breakfast tomorrow. Before the event, he knows what I will chose. Because he's omniscient.

So, tomorrow morning, rolls around. I get out of bed and go down for breakfast. I seemingly have a free choice as to what to have for breakfast. I could choose a bacon butty, or a bowl of porridge, or just a cup of coffee, or a banana.

The point being, if I choose anything except the banana, regardless of why I choose then Niscie was wrong.

So in order to preserve the omniscience, I only have a "choice" of one thing.

Either I only have a choice from an option set of size one (and therefore could not chose anything else, i.e. no free will), or I can chose something else, thus proving the omniscience false.

If I went back to 1859, and watched Lincoln getting killed, there would not be any causal mechanism between that and me watching Booth killing Lincoln. Booth would still think he was exercising free will in shooting Lincoln. But suppose he chose not to. That would mean that my knowledge that he did was incorrect. Either he has an option set of one or my knowledge is imperfect. Choose.

[JohannGoodflag]

I can eat the apple or not eat the apple. It does not mean I can fly.

Your first statement entails that there is more than one possible future event. So, if there is more than one possibility for a future event, how does "Niscie" know which is to occur?

Suppose Niscie came up to you, gave you an apple, and predicted that you would eat it. Are you able to choose not to eat the apple?

[LuisGarcia]

If we're using 'free' as in 'cannot be determined beforehand', however, then logically (or just semantically), sure, omniscience cannot coexist in that sense of 'free will'. Generally we theists don't use the word in that sense, but only in the sense that I choose what I want to do, that I am not being coerced, etc.

but it doesn't matter whether you are being coerced or not if you only have a choice from an option set of size one, no?



However, 'not determined beforehand' even rules out a 'deterministic' universe, where the course of events of all things is able to be predicted, and is in fact determined, by the actual physical laws of the universe.


Yup. Free will is a fragile thing. All kinds of things can rule it out. Personally, I think that what is the common conception of "free will" cannot exist under any conception of the universe.

If there is a causal chain of events leading to the choice, then it's not free. If there is no such chain, then in what way is it will? I think we need a better definition of what we mean.


Then you need something, dare I say, 'supernatural' to explain how everything in the universe is not, in fact, "determined" by the laws of nature.

No, you don't. You need a) a better definition of free will, or b) assuming you can show (which you haven't) that not everything is determined by the laws of nature, then you need to rule out all possible better laws of nature first.

[RAFH]

but it doesn't matter whether you are being coerced or not if you only have a choice from an option set of size one, no?




Yup. Free will is a fragile thing. All kinds of things can rule it out. Personally, I think that what is the common conception of "free will" cannot exist under any conception of the universe.

If there is a causal chain of events leading to the choice, then it's not free. If there is no such chain, then in what way is it will? I think we need a better definition of what we mean.



No, you don't. You need a) a better definition of free will, or b) assuming you can show (which you haven't) that not everything is determined by the laws of nature, then you need to rule out all possible better laws of nature first.

Good post, Luis, keep it up.

One point though, there are not laws of nature, those are man's artifacts, parts of the model by which we explain nature to ourselves. They are descriptive, not prescriptive. They describe what does happen, they do not cause it to happen.

My other point is reality is not deterministic, but probabilistic. At small enough scales this is highly apparent within a very small region with very few (one, ideally) particles, at large enough scales the probabilities of many particles average out into a semblance of determinism.

[Nitrousoxide]

Let's lay out a few things here.

First there are two sorts of views with what it is to be able to act freely.

First there is the incompatiblist view. This is the sort that people who attest that perfect foreknowledge and free will are incompatable hold. One who holds this belief would say that determinism precludes free will.

There is also the compatibilist view, and this says that determinism and free will are consistent.

The division primarily arises from a difference opinion of what it is to be free. Few really disagree with incompatablists that certain definitions of free will are incompatable with determinism. For instance, an incompatablist might say that one is free in action x if and only iff one is the originating cause for action x.

Where the disagreement is primarily focused is not as to whether determinism and free will contradict, but it focuses on what free will is. There are definitions of free will which are consistent with determinism. There are definitions of free will which are inconsistent with determinism. How one determines which one is the "right" one is by no objective means. It's ultimately a baseless position one must take. Like nearly all baseless positions, it's highly contentious and debated. And personally, I don't think a solution can ever arise to the discussion because of the nature of the subject being discussed.

To borrow a phrase from Fichte (though he was talking about realism and idealism), “the kind of philosophy one chooses depends upon the kind of person one is." I think that he was far more right than he could have ever hoped for in this respect.

[Infideliation]

I've conceived it based on the famous Star Trek time travel episodes

Ahh.. you must have missed the old twilight zone episode featuring a young Shatner. He starts going insane around a machine in a diner that perfectly predicts the future. =)

[Gundulf]

So in order to preserve the omniscience, I only have a "choice" of one thing.

Either I only have a choice from an option set of size one (and therefore could not chose anything else, i.e. no free will), or I can chose something else, thus proving the omniscience false.

If I went back to 1859, and watched Lincoln getting killed, there would not be any causal mechanism between that and me watching Booth killing Lincoln. Booth would still think he was exercising free will in shooting Lincoln. But suppose he chose not to. That would mean that my knowledge that he did was incorrect. Either he has an option set of one or my knowledge is imperfect. Choose.

If that was the case, then 'free will' is not just incompatable with omniscience, but also with time travel.

From your point of view, he had one option. But his action caused your knowledge, not the other way around. The idea that YOUR knowledge limited his choice is the fallacy, if I can be so bold - it was HIS CHOICE that limited YOUR knowledge. You do not have 'free knowledge' - YOU are limited in knowing one and only one thing, because of his 'free will.'

The argument could be made that my free choices are what 'cause' and/or 'limit' an omniscient being's knowledge - not the other way around.

[LuisGarcia]

If that was the case, then 'free will' is not just incompatable with omniscience, but also with time travel.

Yup. Like I said, it's a fragile thing that gets ruled out by many other things.



From your point of view, he had one option. But his action caused your knowledge, not the other way around.


Yup.



The idea that YOUR knowledge limited his choice is the fallacy



Yup. But not it's not my fallacy :)

, if I can be so bold - it was HIS CHOICE that limited YOUR knowledge.


Is irrelevant. It was his choice from an option set of size one. Otherwise my knowledge was wrong.


You do not have 'free knowledge' - YOU are limited in knowing one and only one thing, because of his 'free will.'


But if I have knowledge of that thing before he makes that choice then he only has a choice from an option set of size one. I know, for a fact, that I have had a beer this evening. Now that it is actual, certain knowledge, that cannot be changed. If I had a time machine, and could go back and change that fact, then it was not certain knowledge.


The argument could be made that my free choices are what 'cause' and/or 'limit' an omniscient being's knowledge - not the other way around.

Yep, but it wouldn't be an argument that means much, I'm afraid. If perfect knowledge of what will happen exists before the event, then there is only one set of possible outcomes regardless of how much participants feel like they're choosing. If pre-knowledge is even possible, then there is only one possible future path.

Let me put it this way, suppose I have a time machine and can go forward to tomorrow, and see what your first words on waking are. You "freely choose" what to say on waking, and I just observe what you say. Your choice has defined my knowledge. Let's call that time loop A.

Ok, we're cool. Now, I come back in time to today, and let time run its course. I have knowledge of the future defined by your "free choice" in the future. Now, we're about to run time loop B. Either I know, for a fact what will happen in B, i.e. B=A, and you are about to be faced with a choice of size one, or you can choose something else (i.e. you have free will) but I cannot guaruntee that my knowledge is perfect. i.e. no omniscience.

[darkfox]

Niscie foreknows the outcome simply because he is omniscient. He controls no part of the action of his mortal in the throwing of the di.


This bit really needs a few more paragraphs! What is meant by control - succinctly, in what way does an omnipotent god control one’s actions, and how is an omniscient god capable of knowing one's actions?

I am omniscient, granted without the omni bit, if I see a pool ball heading towards a pocket with a certain velocity and no chance of perturbance then I know where the ball will end up. But, given more complex situations my omniscient qualities fail. Nevertheless - my knowing the future, to varying degrees, is predicated around determinism within nature. If the motion of the pool ball did not obey any regularities then I would be incapable of forming any knowledge about the future actions of the ball. What you need to do is illustrate how an omniscient god can know the future without the subjects of his knowledge being determined.

When I talk about determinism, I normally mean that a later state of a system is dependent on an earlier state of the system. That is to say, that there is a relation between the states of the system. If absolutely unerring knowledge of the future exists in a prior state, then the later state qualifies as being determined because it bears a relation to the prior state (if you have a better way of defining determinism let me know). In a roundabout way, knowledge is information and determinism is the idea that there is a unbreakable relation between past, present and future states of a system - in that the latter states are determined by the previous states - from this point of view, knowledge in no way can be seen as different from the material universe which it describes!

As a side note, once something is known with absolute certainty it can be said that that something is determined - that the something in question is no longer free to be other than what is already known.

[ecco]

DarkFox
…succinctly, in what way does an omnipotent god control one’s actions

From the OP
he absolutely controls the placement of the di in his mortal’s hand; the exact force with which the di will be thrown; the specific angle of the wrist; the precise moment of release; precisely which bumps will be hit; precisely the reaction of the di to hitting bumps; etc.

DarkFox
What you need to do is illustrate how an omniscient god can know the future without the subjects of his knowledge being determined.

Let’s say you are one of the mortals standing around the craps table watching Niscie display his powers. Let’s say you have the audacity to ask him this question. Let’s say he answers, “It’s just something I can do”.

Your question brings to mind one of the theist arguments against evolution. “If you can’t explain abiogenesis, then evolution must be invalid”.

Just because something cannot be explained (yet) does not mean it isn’t so.

[ecco]

LuisGarcia
So in order to preserve the omniscience, I only have a "choice" of one thing.

Yet Niscie did predict the outcome without forcing any choices on the mortal rolling the di at his table. The mortal had the choice of how hard to throw the di, an in which general direction.

[ecco]

Nitro…
Like nearly all baseless positions, it's highly contentious and debated. And personally, I don't think a solution can ever arise to the discussion because of the nature of the subject being discussed.

Hence, a hypothetical discussion.

[ecco]

Gundolf
If I took a history book and zapped back in time to 1859, and did NOTHING to change history

That would be a horrible waste of time travel. Hell, tweak something.

[ecco]

DarkFox
As a side note, once something is known with absolute certainty it can be said that that something is determined - that the something in question is no longer free to be other than what is already known.

We mortals know the past. We do not know the future. Taking a hint from Gundolf, let’s look at a scenario.

An omniscient and omnipotent god decides to create a universe. It doesn’t matter, from his perspective, if he big-bangs into creation or takes the all-done-in-six-days-but-make-it-look-old approach. To a has-always-existed-will-always-exist god time has little meaning.

He creates the universe and lets it play out until it ceases to exist. Although he could, he exercises no control over his creation. He just sets it in motion and lets it do its thing. He observes and remembers everything that happens.

He watches an Eve eat an apple; he sees and hears every tree that falls in the woods; he knows how many atoms comprise a given substance at any given moment.

At the eventual demise of the universe he “travels” back to it’s beginning – knowing everything that will happen. He knows Eve will eat the apple.

One cannot make the argument that Eve must now eat the apple – it’s too late. Eve has already eaten the apple. One could say it happened in the god’s past-present-future but it happened in Eve’s past. A past where she willfully made a choice.

[darkfox]

One cannot make the argument that Eve must now eat the apple – it’s too late. Eve has already eaten the apple. One could say it happened in the god’s past-present-future but it happened in Eve’s past. A past where she willfully made a choice.

Fact remains, in the above example, "God" did not have knowledge as to what Eve would do the first time around! This is really trivial, I cannot claim that I have prior omniscient knowledge of events if I set my omnimax VCR to record the universe then watch the universe on video a couple of weeks later.

Here is a little semantics:

Freedom one:

God knows precisely what you will do prior to you doing it but does not interfere in any manner with what you will do!

Freedom two:

God does not know precisely what you will do because your actions are free from his knowledge!

World one:

You are a free agent, but what you do is known before you choose to do it!

World two:

You are a free agent, and what you do is not known before you choose to do it!

Do you refuse to accept that there is a semantic difference between the two types of freedom?

The free agent in the first world must do what is known to be true - he is determined to act in accordance with the knower's knowledge because there is nothing more binding in nature than truth. When one talks of deterministic causality in nature one is simply making truth statement about the state of the past or present that will apply in some relational manner to the future. In determining one's future actions, how is the concept of force any different from unerring knowledge? What substantiates either's ability to generate unerring qualities in the future actions of individuals? It is either true or not true that God's knowledge is binding to the agent's actions, just like it is either true or not true that a set of forces and inequalities bears a relation to a future state with unerring precision. I think Hume may have had a word or two to say about this!

Quite simply, you need to illustrate the independence of the knower's knowledge and the agent's actions for freewill to exist! Yet, you are claiming that there is no independence between the knower's knowledge and the agent's actions as the agent must act unerringly in accordance with the knower's knowledge.

The agent in the second world has independence from God's knowledge. God's knowledge is incapable of limiting the agent because there is no binding between God's statements and the actions of the agent!

Just because something cannot be explained (yet) does not mean it isn’t so.

There are many things that evolution cannot explain because evolution does not explain anything - it simply gives the intellectual framework to explain things! None of this has any bearing here because we are not trying to explain something that we know to be true - we are trying establish whether or not something is possible! So your quote “It’s just something I can do” doesn't really work because it's assuming the existence of the thing that people say is illogical - nice try though!

[ecco]

Darkfox,

Sorry for the delay in responding, an important personal matter came up.

Darkfox
So your quote “It’s just something I can do” doesn't really work because it's assuming the existence of the thing that people say is illogical - nice try though!

Darkfox, put yourself back in time several thousand years to the era of the Egyptian pyramid builders. They “knew” the world was flat and in the middle of the universe. Could you convince them the world is a ball spinning over 25,000 mph and rotating around the sun? Could you explain people that people don’t fall off the bottom and get thrown into space by the rotation? Could you explain how logical it all is by telling them about gravity and graviton and warped space and gravity waves? The would probably say your explanation “doesn't really work because it's assuming the existence (something) illogical.

Now put yourself at Niscie’s craps table and ask him to explain how He can know the future and still not violate your free will. His explanation would be as impossible to comprehend as the Egyptian’s found your explanation of a logical, known fact to be incomprehensible.

Of course, when one really examines the problem, it is not that a paradox exists between Omniscience and free will – it is the very existence of Omni-anything that is ridiculous. Once, as any good scientist will admit, you let supernaturalism into the picture, all bets are off.

With this in mind I fail to see why so many atheists argue against the co-existence of omniscience and free will. Given omniscience and free will, one can argue about the piss-poor work of the Christian watchmaker. Before he ever designed Eve, he knew she would fail the apple test. If he was really concerned with producing a good product, he could have tweaked her design just a tad. But he didn’t, and the result was that, 1500 or so years later, he had to brutally kill almost all of Eve’s descendents. Pretty shoddy watchmaking indeed.