Mortimer J. Adler's Cosmological Argument

[Peter Kirby]

Hello,

My name is Peter, and I don't usually post around these parts but I thought I'd stop on over and test the waters. (My starting hypothesis is that the waters are tepid and inhospitable, so no worries. :p )

When I was a teenager in high school, I was moderately impressed with one book among others in the library aiming to give some reasoned defense of even the most minimalist possible theology, and that was Mortimer J. Adler's How to Think About God: A Guide for the 20th-Century Pagan. Recently, I was wondering, how well does it stand up for the 21st century reader? I fully expect the answer 'not at all,' but I still appreciate a good spat as long as the reasoning that goes into it is elucidated.

With real and immediate danger of opening up Adler to all kinds of misunderstanding, I will skip over his chapters on understanding what the God-concept refers to and what arguments for God fail, and I will proceed directly to the two chapters where he makes the argument most clearly for the unique existence of God. To give an idea of what Adler means by that, I will, however, quote from page 93, "when we think of God, we are thinking of the supreme being, having real existence in an analogical sense because that existence is (1) immaterial, incorporeal, non-physical, non-temporal, immutable, and also (2) necessary, (3) independent, unconditioned, uncaused, and (4) infinite."

And this is the argument (pages 136-137):

I am now prepared to state the propositions that constitute a cosmological argument for God's existence. Only four propositions are needed as premises. They are as follows.

1. _The existence of an effect requiring the concurrent existence and action of an efficient cause implies the existence and action of that cause._ The causal principle, thus stated, is self-evidently true, as has been said before.

2. _The cosmos as a whole exists._ Here we have the existential assertion that is indispensable as a premise in any existential inference. While it does not have the same certitude possessed by my assertion of my own existence, or your assertion of yours, it can certainly be affirmed beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. _The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent, which is to say that, while not needing an efficient cause of its coming to be, since it is everlasting [on the most charitable assumption for atheism -Ed.], it nevertheless does need an efficient cause of its continuing existence, to preserve it in being and prevent it from being replaced by nothingness._ In the light of all that has gone before, there should be no difficulty in understanding what this proposition says. The only question is whether it is true. I will return to that question presently.

4. _If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to prevent its annihilation, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused; in other words, the supreme being, or God._ We have understood that no natural cause is uncaused in its existence or action. In the light of this understanding, we are in a position to affirm the truth of this hypothetical proposition--this IF-THEN premise. Since natural and supernatural represent an exhaustive set of alternatives, the cause being sought must be supernatural if it cannot be natural.

Two of the four premises--the first and last--appear to be true with certitude. The second is true beyond a reasonable doubt. If the one remaining premise--the third--is also true beyond a reasonable doubt, we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that God exists and acts to sustain the cosmos in existence.
Thus far Adler. And in the next chapter (pp. 143-145):

That reason [that the continuing existence of the cosmos needs an efficient cause for its perpetuation] is to be found in the fact that the cosmos which now exists is only one of many possible universes that might have existed in the infiniate past, and that might still exist in the infinite future.

This is not to say that any cosmos other than this one ever did exist in the past, or ever will exist in the future. It is not necessary to go that far in order to say that other universes might have existed in the past and might exist in the future.

If other universes are possible, ten this one also is merely possible, not necessary--not the only cosmos that can ever exist in an infinite extent of time.

How do we know that the present cosmos is only a possible universe (one of many possibilities that might exist), not a necessary universe (the only one that can ever exist)?

We can infer it from the fact that the arrangement and disarray--the order and disorder--of the present cosmos might have been otherwise, might have been different from what it is. There is no compelling reason to think that the natural laws which govern the present cosmos are the only possible natural laws. The cosmos as we know it manifests chance and random happenings, as well as lawful behavior. Even the electrons and protons, which are thought to be imperishable once they exist as the building blocks of the present cosmos, might not be the building blocks of a different cosmos.

The next step in the argument is the crucial one. It consists in saying that whatever might have been otherwise in shape or structure is something that also might not exist at all.

That which _cannot_ be otherwise also _cannot_ not exist, and conversely, what necessarily exists cannot be otherwise than it is. The truth that is the thin thread on which the cosmological argument hangs runs parallel to the truth just stated. Whatever can be otherwise than it is can also simply not be at all. A cosmos which can _be otherwise_ is one that also can _not be_; and conversely, a cosmos that is capable of not existing at all is one that can be otherwise than it now is.

Applying this insight to the fact that the existing cosmos is merely one of a plurality of possible universes, we come to the conclusion that the cosmos, radically contingent in existence, would not exist at all were its existence not caused.

A merely possible cosmos cannot be an uncaused cosmos. A cosmos that is radically contingent in its existence, and needs a cause of that existence, needs a supernatural cause--one that exists and acts to exnihilate this merely possible cosmos, thus preventing the realization of what is always possible for a merely possible cosmos; namely, its absolute non-existence or reduction to nothingness.

The cosmological argument, carried out in this way, appears to establish the existence of the supreme being that acts as the exnihilating cause of this merely possible cosmos, and so explains why it continues to exist. The reasoning conforms to Ockham's rule. We have found it necessary to posit the existence of God, the supreme being, in order to explain what needs to be explained--the actual existence here and now of a merely possible cosmos.

And that's that...right? :grin:

If you can formalize with logic symbols either the first or the second extract, and do so accurately with modal logic, I would be most appreciative.

If you just want to say how stupid Adler is, hey, he's not an IIDB member. But I would prefer to keep the blows above the belt, as this argument (as with the Kalaam argument, which it is not a specimen of) has a certain intellectual plausibility--it's plausible that an intellectual could take it seriously. And so I ask you to do so likewise, agree or no, if you choose to post in response to Adler's argument.

If there is any further background I could provide on M.J. Adler, from the contents of the book, that would be helpful in evaluating his argument, let me know. Yes, he has some degree of affinity for Aristotle, and IIRC he got something of a start in philosophy of religion by disputing Aquinas's five ways. His main thrust of publication concerned pedagogy.

[Biff the unclean]

The waters aren't overly impressed by you either.

[Peter Kirby]

:frown:

[axolotl]

I don't see much new here. Seems like the standard ol' cosmological argument:

(I paraphase) "We don't know for sure how the universe was created and an infinite regress of cause and effect is kind of ooky ... so we'll say God did it!!"

"P.S. Oh yeah, and this God also keeps the universe going from moment to moment ..."

I'm not convinced. It's been pointed out many times before that any arguments for God as the "uncaused cause and unmoved mover" can also apply to the universe itself.

NEXT ...

[Peter Kirby]

I don't see much new here. Seems like the standard ol' cosmological argument:

(I paraphase) "We don't know for sure how the universe was created and an infinite regress of cause and effect is kind of ooky ... so we'll say God did it!!"

"P.S. Oh yeah, and this God also keeps the universe going from moment to moment ..."

I'm not convinced. It's been pointed out many times before that any arguments for God as the "uncaused cause and unmoved mover" can also apply to the universe itself.

NEXT ...
This analysis is facile and false.

"It's been pointed out many times before" that this standard retort ignores the premises. Just ignores them! It does not do to claim for the cosmos a status that manifestly does not apply to it, if Adler's argument for the third premise holds good.

TRY AGAIN ...

[Cheerful Charlie]

Hello,


Quote:
I am now prepared to state the propositions that constitute a cosmological argument for God's existence. Only four propositions are needed as premises. They are as follows.

1. _The existence of an effect requiring the concurrent existence and action of an efficient cause implies the existence and action of that cause._ The causal principle, thus stated, is self-evidently true, as has been said before.

2. _The cosmos as a whole exists._ Here we have the existential assertion that is indispensable as a premise in any existential inference. While it does not have the same certitude possessed by my assertion of my own existence, or your assertion of yours, it can certainly be affirmed beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. _The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent, which is to say that, while not needing an efficient cause of its coming to be, since it is everlasting [on the most charitable assumption for atheism -Ed.], it nevertheless does need an efficient cause of its continuing existence, to preserve it in being and prevent it from being replaced by nothingness._ In the light of all that has gone before, there should be no difficulty in understanding what this proposition says. The only question is whether it is true. I will return to that question presently.

4. _If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to prevent its annihilation, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused; in other words, the supreme being, or God._ We have understood that no natural cause is uncaused in its existence or action. In the light of this understanding, we are in a position to affirm the truth of this hypothetical proposition--this IF-THEN premise. Since natural and supernatural represent an exhaustive set of alternatives, the cause being sought must be supernatural if it cannot be natural.

Two of the four premises--the first and last--appear to be true with certitude. The second is true beyond a reasonable doubt. If the one remaining premise--the third--is also true beyond a reasonable doubt, we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that God exists and acts to sustain the cosmos in existence



4. is wrong.
A. It can welll be a fact that the Universe is an infinite chain of cause and effect with nothing supernatural about any of it.

B. It could be that even if there was a supernatural cause, it is not god but a supernatural process that is impersonal and not conscious.

c. Even if it was conscious and personal, it maybe untold numbers of gods, not just one. And none of them infinite or immortal.

Adler obviously never read Hume,who pointed out most of what said about god as first cause is really analogy and there are other analogies than an infinite, omniscient, personal god.

3. is wrong. "An" efficient cause has a loaded word, "an" that implies one cause where as itmay be that there are many efficient causes, not one.

Cheerful Charlie

[Peter Kirby]

Charlie, thank you for your thoughtful comments.

4. is wrong.
A. It can welll be a fact that the Universe is an infinite chain of cause and effect with nothing supernatural about any of it.
This can hardly be an objection to (4), which is an IF-THEN; it is probably meant as an objection to (3). As an objection, it doesn't have much force, as it is merely a statement of the opposite proposition.

B. It could be that even if there was a supernatural cause, it is not god but a supernatural process that is impersonal and not conscious.
Adler never adduced the properties of 'personal' and 'conscious' of the "supreme being" of which he speaks. A non-objection then.

c. Even if it was conscious and personal, it maybe untold numbers of gods, not just one. And none of them infinite or immortal.
The possible plurality of necessary beings is a serious objection. Ockham might frown, but I do not worship at the reliquary of Ockham's razor, only smirk.

Adler obviously never read Hume,who pointed out most of what said about god as first cause is really analogy and there are other analogies than an infinite, omniscient, personal god.
And Hume obviously was not responding to Adler! For Adler does not propose the analogy of an 'omniscient' and 'personal' (!) god.

3. is wrong. "An" efficient cause has a loaded word, "an" that implies one cause where as itmay be that there are many efficient causes, not one.
The point is taken again, that Adler's argument provides no definite proof against multiplying entities without necessity. One can imagine, for example, a deity that sustains everything up to a certain point in time, and then trades off with another deity for a millennium, and so on, without end.

Polytheism, then, is the strongest objection possible to monotheism above--but note, not atheism! Queer, given that most here are not polytheists but indeed atheists.

[luvluv]

But I would prefer to keep the blows above the belt

You might be lost. This is Internet Infidels. You must be looking for another forum.

[Peter Kirby]

You might be lost. This is Internet Infidels. You must be looking for another forum.
I am lost. I looked for the 'pearls' or 'reputation' buttons, but could find no way to give you a thumbs up but to make another post. :thumbs:

[Dante Alighieri]

I'm skeptical of the third premise. We must ask: can nothingness exist? I've discussed this elsewhere, but if we understand nothingness to be that which does not possess properties (as it is not a thing) and nonexistence to be the lack of quantification of all properties, then nothingness is identical to the nonexistent. The nonexistent cannot exist therefore something must exist. Thus, I am skeptical of the idea the the universe is in risk of being replaced with nothingness.

What's wrong with my ideas?

[Peter Kirby]

I'm skeptical of the third premise. We must ask: can nothingness exist? ...
What's wrong with my ideas?
It's a false word game. When we say that nothing exists, we don't mean that Nothingness exists. We mean that for every something, it does not exist.

[Dante Alighieri]

That is, a lack of quantification of all properties, no?

[Peter Kirby]

That is, a lack of quantification of all properties, no?
No, dude. No.

[Dante Alighieri]

But, a thing is that with properties, in other words, quantified properties. To state that for every something, it does not exist, is to state that no properties are thus quantified. Formally, nothing is \neg \exists x P_0(x) \wedge ... P_n(x) or equivalently \forall x \neg P_0(x) \wedge ... \neg P_n(x) Basically, for all x, is x is not predicated by P_0 \wedge ... P_n So, given a set of predicates, all x does not possess them. This is the definition of nonexistence as well since that which is not quantified does not exist. Nothing is identical to nonexistence then.

[Peter Kirby]

But, a thing is that with properties, in other words, quantified properties. To state that for every something, it does not exist, is to state that no properties are thus quantified. ... So, given a set of predicates, all x does not possess them. This is the definition of nonexistence as well since that which is not quantified does not exist. Nothing is identical to nonexistence then.
When I say that nothing exists, I mean that no apples exist, no cars exist, no galaxies exist, none of these well-propertied things do exist. So, I don't mean the same as you apparently do.

(Wishing I paid more attention to Russell's essays on existence and properties),
Peter Kirby

[RAFH]

This analysis is facile and false.

"It's been pointed out many times before" that this standard retort ignores the premises. Just ignores them! It does not do to claim for the cosmos a status that manifestly does not apply to it, if Adler's argument for the third premise holds good.

TRY AGAIN ...

Big IF, as usual. Any assertion can be valid IF one assumes their premises are valid and the format of the argument is correct.

Assuming I am correct about everything I am the smartest being who has ever lived or ever will live.

Try to invalidate that argument if the assumption is accepted as valid.

Yours are no different. Assumptions are assumptions, They and any conclusions resulting from them are conditional upon the validity of the assumptions. If the assumptions are not valid, any conclusion reached from them is also invalid.

1. _The existence of an effect requiring the concurrent existence and action of an efficient cause implies the existence and action of that cause._ The causal principle, thus stated, is self-evidently true, as has been said before.


Its also a tautology and worthless one at that until it can be shown there are no effects which do not require a cause.

2. _The cosmos as a whole exists._ Here we have the existential assertion that is indispensable as a premise in any existential inference. While it does not have the same certitude possessed by my assertion of my own existence, or your assertion of yours, it can certainly be affirmed beyond a reasonable doubt.


This is valid. But as the basis for any model of reality, it means nothing.

3. _The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent, which is to say that, while not needing an efficient cause of its coming to be, since it is everlasting [on the most charitable assumption for atheism -Ed.], it nevertheless does need an efficient cause of its continuing existence, to preserve it in being and prevent it from being replaced by nothingness._ In the light of all that has gone before, there should be no difficulty in understanding what this proposition says. The only question is whether it is true. I will return to that question presently.


Not necessarily a valid premise and until there is confirming evidence or a coherent model of reality which explains such, it can not be accepted as valid.

4. _If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to prevent its annihilation, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused; in other words, the supreme being, or God._ We have understood that no natural cause is uncaused in its existence or action. In the light of this understanding, we are in a position to affirm the truth of this hypothetical proposition--this IF-THEN premise. Since natural and supernatural represent an exhaustive set of alternatives, the cause being sought must be supernatural if it cannot be natural.


Again, not necessarily a valid premise and until it is supported by confirming evidence or coherent model of reality which explains such, it can not be accepted as valid.

Two of the four premises--the first and last--appear to be true with certitude. The second is true beyond a reasonable doubt. If the one remaining premise--the third--is also true beyond a reasonable doubt, we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that God exists and acts to sustain the cosmos in existence.


The first is not a certitude by any means until it can be supported by verifiable observations.
The second is valid.
The third is not necessarily valid.
The fourth is not necessarily valid.

As such, your conclusion fails.

Indeed, you fail to present a coherent theory for the existence of god(s). You fail to present a coherent model of a god(s) based reality that corresponds accurately to the reality we experience. Until you do so, your assertions are without meaning or value.

[Dante Alighieri]

When I say that nothing exists, I mean that no apples exist, no cars exist, no galaxies exist, none of these well-propertied things do exist.

I mean the same thing. Notice my formalism. That for all x, x does not possess any properties from the set of all properties. This is identical to your definition that "We mean that for every something, it does not exist." A thing is that with properties. To say that for every thing, it does not exist is the same as saying for all x, x does not have properties.

So, I don't mean the same as you apparently do.

I disagree. See above.

(Wishing I paid more attention to Russell's essays on existence and properties),
Peter Kirby

Same here.

[Dante Alighieri]

RAFH, are you using "valid" in the formal sense?

[Peter Kirby]

Assumptions are assumptions, They and any conclusions resulting from them are conditional upon the validity of the assumptions.
But the retort presented above pretends that the assumption is false, and in fact ignores the assumption in so pretending, and that is why it fails as a retort to the argument. If the person had just said, "I disagree with the third premise," we might be going somewhere.

Not necessarily a valid premise and until there is confirming evidence or a coherent model of reality which explains such, it can not be accepted as valid.

Again, not necessarily a valid premise and until it is supported by confirming evidence or coherent model of reality which explains such, it can not be accepted as valid.

The first is not a certitude by any means until it can be supported by verifiable observations.
The second is valid.
The third is not necessarily valid.
The fourth is not necessarily valid.

As such, your conclusion fails.

Indeed, you fail to present a coherent theory for the existence of god(s). You fail to present a coherent model of a god(s) based reality that corresponds accurately to the reality we experience. Until you do so, your assertions are without meaning or value.
Well, nobody ever said logical positivism gave up the ghost.

I'm pretty sure that Adler and Quine had different opinions on what the limits of "meaning and value" are. And while you may not be able to find meaning or value in the conclusion, that does not mean that others need not.

I'm not sure that there is a "coherent theory" of the existence of anything in the sense that is demanded, and so on that count I plead guilty. Our theories are not models of reality. None of them are. Give me one model of reality that fares better, that does not resort to some slight of hand or fiat for the leap to understanding.

[Peter Kirby]

I mean the same thing. Notice my formalism. That for all x, x does not possess any properties from the set of all properties. This is identical to your definition that "We mean that for every something, it does not exist." A thing is that with properties. To say that for every thing, it does not exist is the same as saying for all x, x does not have properties.
I disagree. The x's have properties, and do not exist.

[Dante Alighieri]

Advances in the understanding of "exist", since at least the time of Descartes have understood the assignment of properties to involve hypothetical existential import, as opposed to apodictic import. For example, to say that unicorns have a horn on their forehead is to say that if anything is a unicorn, then it has horn on its forehead. It does not state that unicorns actually exist. But, if they had, then they would have this property. You cannot assert that x has a property and doesn't exist. What does that even mean?

"This non-existent apple has a weight of one pound."

[Peter Kirby]

"This non-existent apple has a weight of one pound."
Hmmm. I think it means (if phrased more appropriately) that there is no apple such that it weighs a pound and exists. (To be consistent with our reality, we could say that there is no apple such that it weighs a pound and is on Neptune and exists.) There are, in my understanding, any number of hypothetical things, which do not exist.

[Caine]

I wonder how the guy went from that load of woolly assertions all the way to munching down Jesus-wafers every Sunday.

Whatever can be otherwise than it is can also simply not be at all.

I would love to see how he proves that little gem.

I would also like to see how he shows that the universe could "be otherwise". He just restates it as truth a few times and pretends this proves his theory.

[PaulK]

Adler's argument does not seem very persuasive and seems to rely on some very questionable assumptions that are not explicitly stated. I'll list two that need to be discussed.

Firstly Alder assumes an absolute dichotomy between contingency and necessity. He assumes that if a thing has any contingent features it must be entirely contingent. This dichotomy is clearly false. It could be necessary that the universe exists but that certain features could be contingent.

Secondly he assumes that anything that is contingent cannot be self-sufficient - it must require continuing maintenance. Yet there is no justification for such an assumption in the quoted text. Even if the universe is contingent it could be self-sustaining.

I see no reason to accept either of these assumptions - on the face of it both are likely false.

[Jaggers]

A merely possible cosmos cannot be an uncaused cosmos. A cosmos that is radically contingent in its existence, and needs a cause of that existence, needs a supernatural cause--one that exists and acts to exnihilate this merely possible cosmos, thus preventing the realization of what is always possible for a merely possible cosmos; namely, its absolute non-existence or reduction to nothingness.I've read through your quoted passages carefully twice now Peter, and I can't see how the above-quoted text is more than a mere assertion, unsupported by the rest of the text. I don't see how the fact (if it is one) that the cosmos is contingent and might not exist at all implies or even suggests that it needs a necessary cause to continue existing. Am I missing something?

Also, it appears to me that "supernatural" was slipped in there. I'm unclear what the difference is between "natural" and "supernatural." And I did not see any elucidation in the text, merely an assertion that "We have understood that no natural cause is uncaused in its existence or action" and then a dichotomy drawn between "natural and "supernatural."

Finally, I think it may have been pointed out, but at most this argument points to some necessary cause of the contingent cosmos. How one moves from that to a "supreme being, having [a] real existence existence [that] is (1) immaterial, incorporeal, non-physical, non-temporal, immutable, and also (2) necessary, (3) independent, unconditioned, uncaused, and (4) infinite" is unclear to me. Maybe he fleshes that out more elsewhere in the book, but I don't see it here.

[RAFH]

I've read through your quoted passages carefully twice now Peter, and I can't see how the above-quoted text is more than a mere assertion, unsupported by the rest of the text. I don't see how the fact (if it is one) that the cosmos is contingent and might not exist at all implies or even suggests that it needs a necessary cause to continue existing. Am I missing something?

Depends on your definition of 'missing' as well as the connotation of the entire question. Do you include in 'your missing' that which was not there to begin with?

[Jaggers]

Depends on your definition of 'missing' as well as the connotation of the entire question. Do you include in 'your missing' that which was not there to begin with?No actually. My current tentative conclusion is that it was not there. But it may have been there but merely missed by me. Which is why I asked. It seems pretty obvious to me, which is why I wonder if I missed it.

[TySixtus]

This is simply another first cause argument, packaged much the same way as all other First Cause arguments are packaged.

We are presented with a dichotomy: Either A) the universe has always existed (either through acausal creation or infinite progression) or B) the Universe has a starting point, ergo it had a creator.

Since the first option seems weird to people, they go with option B. Nevermind that there are vast fields of study (QM) devoted to figuring out how A can (and under scrutiny, does) work.

Really, Alder has packaged his skepticism of infinity into the First Cause argument.

ETA:

If other universes are possible, ten this one also is merely possible, not necessary--not the only cosmos that can ever exist in an infinite extent of time.

Doing probability on something that has already happened is pointless. The probably of something that has already occured is 1.

Alder is taking the stance that many Christians take: they look at the universe and Earth and its distance from the sun and the human tolerance for heat and radiation and by golly, it is a miracle that we seem to be in exactly the right spot in the cosmos to survive! God is Great!

Unfortunately, this is rather like looking at your glasses and praising god for giving you a nose to hold them up. I mean, what are the odds that your nose just happens to be in the best possible spot to hold up your glasses! God is Great!

Ty

[joedad]

This is simply another first cause argument, packaged much the same way as all other First Cause arguments are packaged.

We are presented with a dichotomy: Either A) the universe has always existed (either through acausal creation or infinite progression) or B) the Universe has a starting point, ergo it had a creator.

Since the first option seems weird to people, they go with option B. Nevermind that there are vast fields of study (QM) devoted to figuring out how A can (and under scrutiny, does) work.

Really, Alder has packaged his skepticism of infinity into the First Cause argument.

ETA:

Doing probability on something that has already happened is pointless. The probably of something that has already occured is 1.

Alder is taking the stance that many Christians take: they look at the universe and Earth and its distance from the sun and the human tolerance for heat and radiation and by golly, it is a miracle that we seem to be in exactly the right spot in the cosmos to survive! God is Great!

Unfortunately, this is rather like looking at your glasses and praising god for giving you a nose to hold them up. I mean, what are the odds that your nose just happens to be in the best possible spot to hold up your glasses! God is Great!Exactly. How is the cosmos contingent on there being the god? It’s actually the other way around.

If you don’t have the cosmos you don’t need the god. That’s pretty simple to understand. The reason people talk about the god is because the cosmos already exists. The fact that the cosmos already exists makes the very existence of the god possible, not necessary.

Spirits live in mountains. Mountains don’t live in spirits. What am I missing?

[joedad]

It's a false word game. When we say that nothing exists, we don't mean that Nothingness exists. We mean that for every something, it does not exist.You mean IF it does not exist.

So how can something not exist? How can the cosmos or any part thereof not exist? Show us how that's possible.

[Cheerful Charlie]

Charlie, thank you for your thoughtful comments.



Quoting your OP.
4. _If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to prevent its annihilation, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused; in other words, the supreme being, or God._ We have understood that no natural cause is uncaused in its existence or action. In the light of this understanding, we are in a position to affirm the truth of this hypothetical proposition--this IF-THEN premise. Since natural and supernatural represent an exhaustive set of alternatives, the cause being sought must be supernatural if it cannot be natural.


My reply:
4. is wrong.
A. It can well be a fact that the Universe is an infinite chain of cause and effect with nothing supernatural about any of it.

You posted:

This can hardly be an objection to (4), which is an IF-THEN; it is probably meant as an objection to (3). As an objection, it doesn't have much force, as it is merely a statement of the opposite proposition.

Adler never adduced the properties of 'personal' and 'conscious' of the "supreme being" of which he speaks. A non-objection then.


Above in 4., you represent him as doing exactly that.
"Supreme being or God". "The cause must be a supernatural being".

There is no reason for Adler to say any of this. There are other possibilities. Adler is merely making assertions and it is up to him to prove them, not just assert them.

Cheerful Charlie

[wiploc]

My name is Peter, and I don't usually post around these parts but I thought I'd stop on over and test the waters.


Welcome to these here waters.



...quote from page 93, "when we think of God, we are thinking of the supreme being, having real existence in an analogical sense because that existence is (1) immaterial, incorporeal, non-physical, non-temporal, immutable, and also (2) necessary, (3) independent, unconditioned, uncaused, and (4) infinite."


That may be what he thinks of. The old-style Christian god, the one who walked in the garden, rode a pillar of fire to get down from heaven, changed his mind, and was in our image, and couldn't defeat chariots of iron, while he may have been independent, unconditioned (whatever that is), and uncaused, I don't think he was any of those other things.




And this is the argument (pages 136-137):

[quote]I am now prepared to state the propositions that constitute a cosmological argument for God's existence. Only four propositions are needed as premises. They are as follows.

1. _The existence of an effect requiring the concurrent existence and action of an efficient cause implies the existence and action of that cause._ The causal principle, thus stated, is self-evidently true, as has been said before.


Causes are normally thought to precede effects. Today was caused by yesterday, not by some other simultaneous today.

Quantum physicists, at least some of them, don't believe in cause, at least at a quantum level.

The whole of #1 is very far from self evident.




2. _The cosmos as a whole exists._ Here we have the existential assertion that is indispensable as a premise in any existential inference. While it does not have the same certitude possessed by my assertion of my own existence, or your assertion of yours, it can certainly be affirmed beyond a reasonable doubt.


I want to stipulate. That is, I agree that stuff exists. But I don't want to seem to endorse any other part of #2. I particularly object to that "beond a reasonable doubt," language, which seems to me to suggest that a presupposition (that stuff exists) can be based on statistical odds. I object to the use of the word "cosmos" to refer to less than everything. I object to the use of the phrase "whole cosmos," particularly when it is intended to refer to less than everything. I object to the notion that I can be more certain of my own existence than I can be of the existence of some stuff which isn't necessarily everything.

But I stipulate: The cosmos exists.

Oh, and let me point out now that when my wife gets home I will post and shut down. This is likely to end abruptly, but I'll come back and finish it later.




3. _The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent, which is to say that, while not needing an efficient cause of its coming to be, since it is everlasting [on the most charitable assumption for atheism -Ed.], it nevertheless does need an efficient cause of its continuing existence, to preserve it in being and prevent it from being replaced by nothingness._ In the light of all that has gone before, there should be no difficulty in understanding what this proposition says. The only question is whether it is true. I will return to that question presently.


I disagree with those who call this a first cause argument. It's more like the argument that the planets would quit circling the sun if they weren't being pushed by angels.

I see no reason to believe that things wink out of existence unless they are maintained in existence by other things (which other things are not faced with that issue because they never wink out of existence, even in the absense things which maintain them).




4. _If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to prevent its annihilation, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused; in other words, the supreme being, or God._ We have understood that no natural cause is uncaused in its existence or action. In the light of this understanding, we are in a position to affirm the truth of this hypothetical proposition--this IF-THEN premise. Since natural and supernatural represent an exhaustive set of alternatives, the cause being sought must be supernatural if it cannot be natural.


Where to begin? Let me arbitrarily limit my disagreement to, "the existence of which is uncaused," and, "in other words, the supreme being, or God." Those seem impressively arbitrary.




Two of the four premises--the first and last--appear to be true with certitude.


Outrageous.

#4 could be made true by taking out parts of it (particularly the parts about god, since god has been defined, above, in ways that are flamingly inconsistent with what is being set up here) so it ends up saying something like, "If the natural and the supernatural are together mutually exhaustive, and if the natural is caused by something that is not itself natural, then it follows that the cause of the natural is something supernatural." But that's trivial and useless. Notice that we could substitute "real and unreal" or "true and false," for "natural and supernatural," and this premise work just as well. We could even substitute Donny and Marie, and it would still work.

But he didn't settle for the trueism. He stuck in that stuff about god. (If we substituted Donny and Marie, would that prove that Marie is god?) Therefore the claim #4 is certain is blatantly false.

#1 is also not certain. Rather, it is wildly implausible. There's no reason to believe any of it.






The second is true beyond a reasonable doubt.


I believe #2 is true. But when he introduces that "reasonable doubt" langugage, it makes me suddenly agnostic. Why can't he admit that this is just the way he imagines things are. Then I'd be with him.




If the one remaining premise--the third--is also true beyond a reasonable doubt, we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that God exists and acts to sustain the cosmos in existence.

My wife isn't home yet, but I'm going to sign off now in anticipation. I'll be back later. Thanks for introducing this argument. It is new to me.

crc

[RAFH]

No actually. My current tentative conclusion is that it was not there. But it may have been there but merely missed by me. Which is why I asked. It seems pretty obvious to me, which is why I wonder if I missed it.

I tend to agree with you, its not there, whatever it isn't or wasn't. So, unless we both missed what wasn't there, it probably didn't exist.

[RAFH]

Exactly. How is the cosmos contingent on there being the god? It’s actually the other way around.

If you don’t have the cosmos you don’t need the god. That’s pretty simple to understand. The reason people talk about the god is because the cosmos already exists. The fact that the cosmos already exists makes the very existence of the god possible, not necessary.

Spirits live in mountains. Mountains don’t live in spirits. What am I missing?

The spirits in the lake? Or behind the wall, or under the tree, or in the cavern ... ... ...

[Yahzi]

(My starting hypothesis is that the waters are tepid and inhospitable, so no worries. :p )
They are only corrosive to unsubstantiated bullshit and wild, groundless assertions.

1. QM particle/anti-particle spontaneous creation and annilation. An effect so powerful it evaporates black holes.

2. Wow, a theist admits the universe exists! I concede that surprised me.

3. Complete bullshit. The universe exists is a fact, so he makes up the wholly unsubstantiated and impossible to even investigate claim that the universe would cease to exist without some magical fairy.

"I give you cheese... therefore, car-key gnomes!"

4. Even more staggering bullshit. Even granting the bullshit in 3, why would the sustaining cause need to be uncaused? Why couldn't it be sustained by the universe, in a symbiotic relationship? Is it because Adler doesn't understand big words like "symbiotic?"

How did supernatural sneak in there, and how did that get turned into God? Why wouldn't a supernatural squirrel be just as effective, or a simple light source? The universe could as easily be powered by a supernatural night-light as require a thing called God.


This entire argument boils down to: "If we assume the universe has a set of attributes that require a God to create it, we can prove that God created the universe."

I honestly can't imagine how that isn't self-evident.

it's plausible that an intellectual could take it seriously.
No, it isn't. It is simply the arbitrary assignment of attributes.

[Alf]

This analysis is facile and false.

"It's been pointed out many times before" that this standard retort ignores the premises. Just ignores them! It does not do to claim for the cosmos a status that manifestly does not apply to it, if Adler's argument for the third premise holds good.

TRY AGAIN ...

I also started to frown upon the third premise. It seems patently false to me.

First off - I don't know that the cosmos need a "sustainer". This is old philosophical babbage from the ancients. They saw that if you stopped pulling the cart, the cart would stop. Left to itself things would grind to a halt. To them this was a universal principle. Now we know it is due to friction and in an environment with little friction things tend to go on for a long time and with zero friction there is no reason for anything to stop.

So why should we accept that the cosmos "need" a sustainer? Also, he point out that things in the cosmos are contingent. They could be otherwise or not at all. However, it is a category error to then conclude that the cosmos - as cosmos - is contingent and need not be. The parts in it could be different and need not exist at all but the cosmos as cosmos show know sign of being contingent. For anything to exist it must exist in a cosmos - ergo the cosmos is necessary and not contingent even though its parts is contingent and could be otherwise than how they are.

Alf

[graymouser]

3. _The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent, which is to say that, while not needing an efficient cause of its coming to be, since it is everlasting [on the most charitable assumption for atheism -Ed.], it nevertheless does need an efficient cause of its continuing existence, to preserve it in being and prevent it from being replaced by nothingness._ In the light of all that has gone before, there should be no difficulty in understanding what this proposition says. The only question is whether it is true. I will return to that question presently.
This is incorrect. The whole argument is a wild misreading of modal logic's term "possible" (<>P means "there is a logically possible world in which P obtains") into an extreme interpretation of "possible" (if P is possible, then it is possible that, at any moment, P will obtain). This implies a theory of reality in which, without some "necessary" grounding, things pop in and out of existence. We've moved beyond logic into the realm of pure, unmitigated fantasy. You couldn't possibly prove this theory of reality, and Adler's attempt to make it from simply the fact that it's possible that the universe would exist in a different form is laughable.

[everettf]

Peter, since your coming from cosmology, could you please point out where this god resides. I'll help by supplying this site (http://hubblesite.org/gallery/album/the_universe_collection/pr2004021a/).
When you consider where we are in this universe. A little backwater sun with planets.
My atheism really comes from cosmology. A belief in religion comes strictly from hearsay, nothing more. All beliefs in mysticism comes from hearsay.

Gods are invisible friends for adults.

Everettf

[wiploc]

If you don’t have the cosmos you don’t need the god. That’s pretty simple to understand.

If you don't have a cosmos, that proves that god exists. Otherwise, what would keep stuff from popping into existence? Only something supernatural can maintain nothingness.

crc

[Gundulf]

I've read through your quoted passages carefully twice now Peter, and I can't see how the above-quoted text is more than a mere assertion, unsupported by the rest of the text. I don't see how the fact (if it is one) that the cosmos is contingent and might not exist at all implies or even suggests that it needs a necessary cause to continue existing. Am I missing something?

Also, it appears to me that "supernatural" was slipped in there. I'm unclear what the difference is between "natural" and "supernatural." And I did not see any elucidation in the text, merely an assertion that "We have understood that no natural cause is uncaused in its existence or action" and then a dichotomy drawn between "natural and "supernatural."

Finally, I think it may have been pointed out, but at most this argument points to some necessary cause of the contingent cosmos. How one moves from that to a "supreme being, having [a] real existence existence [that] is (1) immaterial, incorporeal, non-physical, non-temporal, immutable, and also (2) necessary, (3) independent, unconditioned, uncaused, and (4) infinite" is unclear to me. Maybe he fleshes that out more elsewhere in the book, but I don't see it here.


I must concur here, I have big questions how he 'proves' statement #4 -


4. _If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to prevent its annihilation, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused; in other words, the supreme being, or God._ We have understood that no natural cause is uncaused in its existence or action. In the light of this understanding, we are in a position to affirm the truth of this hypothetical proposition--this IF-THEN premise. Since natural and supernatural represent an exhaustive set of alternatives, the cause being sought must be supernatural if it cannot be natural.


The rest of it, if I read it right was basically "this world is only possible, it must have been made by something necessary". Besides that this is debatable philosophy about necessary things v. possible things, I could conceive of other possibilities even granting his assertion here - perhaps there really are an infinity of other possible universes, there is no necessary thing that caused any of them.

This cosmological argument also breaks down the way most of them do - EVEN IF I grant him, "OK, there is some 'necessary' thing that is the cause of the present state of affairs... why must that thing have to be the Christian (or any monotheistic) God? Why couldn't this current universe, and all its matter and energy, just somehow be the 'necessary' ground of being? Just because he claims that this matter and energy are only 'possible' ways? How does he know it is only possible and not necessary - perhaps there is no other possible arrangement of being besides matter and energy. How exactly is he proving that this universe's molecules are in fact NOT the ground of their own being, and that they would cease to exist without something else?

Hey, I'm a Christian, and of course I agree with him that God is necessary and this world is only possible. But I don't see how he has adequately demonstrated that using philosophy or physics in any remotely convincing way.

[wiploc]

That reason [that the continuing existence of the cosmos needs an efficient cause for its perpetuation] is to be found in the fact that the cosmos which now exists is only one of many possible universes that might have existed in the infiniate past, and that might still exist in the infinite future.


By that logic, if I had to make a peanut butter standwich then that sandwich would maintain itself. But if I could have made either a hummus sandwich or a peanut butter sandwich, then I have to maintain my sandwich by an act of will (and am therefore god).

We have no reason to believe Adler's claim.




This is not to say that any cosmos other than this one ever did exist in the past, or ever will exist in the future. It is not necessary to go that far in order to say that other universes might have existed in the past and might exist in the future.


I think he's careless with his usage. If I had made the hummus sandwich, then this would be a different universe? Is that different than saying that this universe would be different? The fact that I made a peanut butter sandwich means that the universe might not exist?

As near as I can see, he's just being sloppy with definitions.




If other universes are possible, [then] this one also is merely possible, not necessary--not the only cosmos that can ever exist in an infinite extent of time.


If I had a choice about making that sandwich, then one day the whole universe might end and be replaced by another? There's no reason to belive that.




The next step in the argument is the crucial one. It consists in saying that whatever might have been otherwise in shape or structure is something that also might not exist at all.


Isn't that like saying that if a river changes a little bit every day, then water doesn't necessarily flow downhill?

And why do we even need the qualifier? Why don't we just say that stuff could be nonexistent? Why do we limit the claim to say that only flexible stuff could be nonexistent?




That which _cannot_ be otherwise also _cannot_ not exist,

But there are lots of things that cannot be otherwise that don't exist. Almost all of them, in fact.



and conversely, what necessarily exists cannot be otherwise than it is.

That doesn't follow. The fact that a river-that-must-exist must exist is no evidence at all that it can't do accretion and avulsion.



The truth that is the thin thread on which the cosmological argument hangs runs parallel to the truth just stated. Whatever can be otherwise than it is can also simply not be at all. A cosmos which can _be otherwise_ is one that also can _not be_; and conversely, a cosmos that is capable of not existing at all is one that can be otherwise than it now is.

Applying this insight to the fact that the existing cosmos is merely one of a plurality of possible universes, we come to the conclusion that the cosmos, radically contingent in existence, would not exist at all were its existence not caused.


No we don't. We have been given nothing that even tends to support this claim.




A merely possible cosmos cannot be an uncaused cosmos.

He made that up.



A cosmos that is radically contingent in its existence, and needs a cause of that existence, needs a supernatural cause--one that exists and acts to exnihilate this merely possible cosmos, thus preventing the realization of what is always possible for a merely possible cosmos; namely, its absolute non-existence or reduction to nothingness.


That's his conclusion, but he has not supported it. I could argue that if the cause of the universe never changed, then the universe it was causing would never change, and therefore the fact of change in the universe proves that an unchanging cause does not exist. That's not a good argument; there's no reason to believe it, but it is at least as strong as Adler's argument.




The cosmological argument, carried out in this way,

I don't see how this qualifies as a first-cause argument. Adler admits that the universe may be infinitely old, and may be without a first cause. What he argues for is a concurrent cause. That's not a cosmological argument. It's much more like the ontological argument, trying to define something into existence.



appears to establish the existence of the supreme being that acts as the exnihilating cause of this merely possible cosmos, and so explains why it continues to exist. The reasoning conforms to Ockham's rule. We have found it necessary to posit the existence of God, the supreme being, in order to explain what needs to be explained--the actual existence here and now of a merely possible cosmos.


He looks at the world, imagines that it would be different if it was ("Why is all this stuff here?") and pointlessly adds a useless complication ("This stuff is here because it is maintained by something else, something infinite, personal, intangible, unchanging even though the stuff it maintains keeps changing, impossible-not-to-exist even though everything else is possible not to exist, and a god even though nothing else is a god") and calls that compliance with Occham razor? That's just nuts.


Adler's argument is based on quite a few assumptions. The assumptions are unsupported, some of them obviously unsupportable. His conclusion, therefore, is not effectively supported by his argument. We have no reason to agree with his conclusion.

crc

[joedad]

If you don't have a cosmos, that proves that god exists.You can’t not have a cosmos, or any part thereof. That much is certain. You can pretend there is no cosmos by I don’t see how that “proves” anything.

Otherwise, what would keep stuff from popping into existence? Only something supernatural can maintain nothingness.But I do get your meaning. Without the lack of a cosmos, most theists aren't able to compose a theology.

[Amedeo]

Adler's Argument:

And this is the argument (pages 136-137):

Quote:
I am now prepared to state the propositions that constitute a cosmological argument for God's existence. Only four propositions are needed as premises. They are as follows.

1. _The existence of an effect requiring the concurrent existence and action of an efficient cause implies the existence and action of that cause._ The causal principle, thus stated, is self-evidently true, as has been said before.

2. _The cosmos as a whole exists._ Here we have the existential assertion that is indispensable as a premise in any existential inference. While it does not have the same certitude possessed by my assertion of my own existence, or your assertion of yours, it can certainly be affirmed beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. _The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent, which is to say that, while not needing an efficient cause of its coming to be, since it is everlasting [on the most charitable assumption for atheism -Ed.], it nevertheless does need an efficient cause of its continuing existence, to preserve it in being and prevent it from being replaced by nothingness._ In the light of all that has gone before, there should be no difficulty in understanding what this proposition says. The only question is whether it is true. I will return to that question presently.

4. _If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to prevent its annihilation, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused; in other words, the supreme being, or God._ We have understood that no natural cause is uncaused in its existence or action. In the light of this understanding, we are in a position to affirm the truth of this hypothetical proposition--this IF-THEN premise. Since natural and supernatural represent an exhaustive set of alternatives, the cause being sought must be supernatural if it cannot be natural.

Two of the four premises--the first and last--appear to be true with certitude. The second is true beyond a reasonable doubt. If the one remaining premise--the third--is also true beyond a reasonable doubt, we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that God exists and acts to sustain the cosmos in existence.

About # 1. the causal principle, namely that "if there is an effect, then there is a cause" is certainly true. This is also true, that "being an effect" is NOT a property , characteristic, or attribute of anything. "To exist," To be an effect," etc. are not properties of anything. You can explore an apple forever, and you will never have any datum, and fact, any written tag, that it exists, or that it is an effect. We know it to be an effect when we observe a tree generating it. We know a watch to be an effect, when we observe a man constructing a watch. It is only on the basis of previous experiences that, as Hume said, you will distinguish an artifact from a natural object, or a natural object being produced by another.

The being an effect of anything has be to established, since an object itself gives no evidence of being an effect.

If we speak of things that are ascertained to be effects, then we can say that each one has an efficient cause (that is, an agent that produces it).

Speaking of experienced or experienceable causes and their effect, we find that there are various efficient causes:

-- One is called generation, as the generation of an apple from a speck of a tree (which then grows, etc.).
-- Another one is called production, as in the case of a man assembling the parts of a watch, parts which he (or somebody else) made by molding various given materials.
-- Another one is what I call creation, as it involves neither operating on things, nor giving off a portion of oneself which has the potentials of assimilating, etc., wherefore it becomes an independent entity. It involves putting forth energy, which causes some things to vibrate and thus issue sounds. Sounds are NOT manufactured, the way a watch is, or generated [by detachment from one's own entity.] By a thrust on the larynx, something unique is brought into being which -- to repeat -- is not a modification of an existing object.
On the other hand, involuntarily, the body creates heat. Heat is not a modified object. (Heat, sound, light, and the like are not bodies. The language about bodies -- production; generation -- is ill-suited for them. One speak of creation or of "transductive causality," if he wishes.)

In all cases, something new is brought into the field of existing/occurring things; but the "effects" in question are not entitities that pop into being out of nothing. They are always the results of activities on some existing thing.

About # 2: It is true that the universe as a whole exists. I must note, however, that the existing universe is the presently existing universe. The present universe does not contains thing which existed in the past or that may exist tomorrow. The present universe is nor static, abiding, lingering for any length of time. The present is the everchanging limit between what was and what will be. As a universe begins, it also ends: it BECOMES; there is no such a thing as an EXISTING universe, although our memory of what was gives us the impression that time stands still, for in our memory, we encompass what has actually vanished and what is being experience now. The verb "to occur" is the proper verb for the universe and our very being. (Innumerable events are simultaneous and we experience them in space, but TIME is of the essence of being, and Time does not preserve what was.)

So, let us not confuse the whole universe which is present at any time with the HISTORY of Being, of which we have only memory traces. The real universe is constantly in flux: constantly beginning and ending. It would be absurd to say that our universe had a beginning 1000 or 1000 billion years ago. It is always in a state of formation and de-formation. The forms or essences come and go; the energy that forms is the perennial constant, That-Which-Is , but never as such.

About # 3. A new idea is introduced here: The whole universe is radically "contingent", dependent; that is, it cannot sustain itself [whether it is cause or not, according to Adler]. So, he does not equate the contingency of the universe with its being an effect [in some way or other]. So, if the concept of EFFECT is not at play here, where does he find this self-insufficiency or impotence on the part of the universe to sustain itself?

There are aspects of things or of the universe that are not self-sufficient. What is self-sufficient is called Substance; what is not self-sufficient, unable to exist on its own, of itself, and impotent (unable to act), is called an accident by Aristotle, such as the shape or size or color or position or seasonal time of a substance. Substance is energetic/dynamic being that needs no support and does not depend on anything else. The Universe is The Substance, with aspects, ever changing or, as Eurigena put it, it is Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata: nature in the making and Nature being made, Cause and Effect in succession and in a never-ending cycle. The Universe is that which mould itself. What could make Being self-sufficient, if it were not self-sufficient? Answer: That Which Is Not (Nothing). But Nothing neither is nor can be conceived; it is perfectly impotent. It can do nothing, nor can it explain anything. "Nothing" and "God" are the same. (God cannot be a being, a reality next to the universe's reality. If there are two Beings, each is finite and, therefore self-insufficient. ) To suppose for a moment that somehow the universe is not self-sufficient and that it requires a God for its continued existence raises two questions:

-- By what nonsense do you try to explain a known reality by an unknown reality? And
-- Where do you get the knowledge that God is a self-sufficient being (so that it could be the support of the universe's existence), when you do not even know whether God exists?

About # 4. We know the universe exists, and existence [see Parmenides and the other ontologists] is such that it cannot change into nothing, nor can nothing change into Being. Essences or forms of the universe come and go; they constitute the fleeting nature of the universe, but there is a continuing existence: there is no absolote coming into being, nor absolute annihilation. That is the nature of being, whether you call it Universe, God, or a Nightmare. A god would be needed to preserve an apple as an apple. An immortal apple is a divine apple. But the whole universe bears withness that there is no essences preserving God. There is birth and death -- which the philosophers called PHYSIS. There is also a universe of the imagination, where all sorts of things are created fully-formed and immortal... were it not for Eve's paying heed to a talking serpent, the craftiest serpent that a God ever created. The men who invented the mythical world knew not beans about Being or anything else. Yes, a god is needed for their world of the imagination; unfortunately, it is not the real IMPERMANENT world in which we move, live, and have our being.

[Panpsychist]

Hello,

My name is Peter, and I don't usually post around these parts but I thought I'd stop on over and test the waters.
Hi, I'm new around here too. :wave:


I agree with appears to be the consensus, that this is hardly an impressive argument. It is a variation on the First Cause argument, applying a requirement for a first cause to sustation existence rather than to begin it.

I deny the simplistic "causal principle" on the basis of quantum mechanics, and its blind application to existence as a whole rather than to specific causes and effects; causation is a relation within existence. I accept that "the cosmos as a whole exists" but am annoyed that Adler seems to consider beings (god) outside the "whole cosmos". I hotly deny the third premise, that existence requires a substratum (of apparently non-existent things?!!) to be. And I very much deny the fourth "premise", which is really a whole assortment of wrong assertions (the cause need not be "super"-natural except by arbitrary division of existence in the natural and supernatural; its existence need not be uncaused, for it can be caused by further turtles all the way down; this supernatural uncaused cause need not be god but merely a a supernatural uncaused cause). The whole argument is hence a confused mesh of unsupported and wrong premises, poor definitions, and bad reasoning.

[JamesBannon]

Peter,
I'm possibly a bit late here. If so, I apologise.

Firstly, I am not even sure that it is proper to speak of the cosmos as a whole (unless Adler mean the totality of all that exists - which would necessarily include god).

Secondly, given that objects within the cosmos are radically contingent, which I will grant, it does not necessarily follow that the existence of the cosmos itself is radically contingent. This seems like a fallacy of composition to me.

Finally, if we define the cosmos of the totality of all that exists then that would make god's existence similarly radically contingent.

[Cheerful Charlie]

Peter,
I'm possibly a bit late here. If so, I apologise.

Firstly, I am not even sure that it is proper to speak of the cosmos as a whole (unless Adler mean the totality of all that exists - which would necessarily include god).

Secondly, given that objects within the cosmos are radically contingent, which I will grant, it does not necessarily follow that the existence of the cosmos itself is radically contingent. This seems like a fallacy of composition to me.

Finally, if we define the cosmos of the totality of all that exists then that would make god's existence similarly radically contingent.

Cosmos is a Greek word meaning the entire physical universe. First used by Heraclitus if I am not mistaken.
Universe means all including non-material and physical things besides.
from Latin Unis, all.

Cheerful Charlie

Cheerful Charlie

[JamesBannon]

Then it becomes a special pleading fallacy because he, rather conveniently, places spiritual things outside the domain of discourse. Even so, I still think there is a fallacy of composition.

[trendkill]

There are, in my understanding, any number of hypothetical things, which do not exist.I don't think so, Anselm. :P Let's rephrase so we can see where the problem is. We'll change the word "are" to "exist" for clarity (they are synonymous in this context, after all; "there are things which..." and "there exist things which..." mean the same). Then, we'll eliminate mention of properties other than existence so they don't cloud the issue (bye bye location, "hypothetical", and "any number"), and we get:

There [exist]...things, which do not exist.Oops.