Problem of Evil theodicies: ~M~ & punkforchrist

[RBH]

This thread has been set up for a formal discussion (note: discussion) between ~M~ and punkforchrist, who will discuss the following Topic:

Theodicies against the logical and evidential problem of evil do not successfully reconcile the existence and nature of God.

Since this is a formal discussion rather than a debate, there is no division of affirmation and opposition. The debate will have three rounds unless the participants mutually agree to more.

A peanut gallery (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=219487) has been set up in EoG.

Enjoy!

RBH, Admin & Acting FDD Mod.

Addendum (Sept. 7): The debaters have agreed to adjust the word limit in Round 2 to 1500 words.
Addendum (Sept. 11): The debaters have agreed to adjust the word limit in Round 3 to 2500 words.

[~M~]

Dear Reader,

Note that the following dialogue is a formal discussion, not a debate. Therefore, do not expect a war. About me: My name is Michael; I am 26 year old Canadian and a continentally trained philosophy major with existentialist-cum-Buddhistic leanings. I am also an atheist. This is all you need to know—I am not dating you.

The Logical Problem from Evil (LPfE):

1. Evil Exists.
2. The existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of God.
3. Thus, God does not exist.

The idea of the LPfE is that the mere existence of evil cannot be logically reconciled with the existence of God because it would negate one or more of the essential properties of God. So, since evil exists, then god does not. In order to defeat the LfPE, PunkforChrist (PfC) or anyone only needs to show that the co-existence of evil and God is possible and not necessarily plausible. Or, for what it is worth, one could argue, like Aquinas, that evil does not exist but this is hardly a damper in my diaper because I’d just alter the LPfE to “Argument From the Absence (or Privation) of Goodness” and reassert the problem.

PfC, in your previous debate you rebuked premise two by claiming evil is instrumental in creating a greater good. This is peachy but don’t start counting your chickens so soon. Your claim appeals to consequentialism; this is a theory that is in need of justification itself before the problem is solved. It would also need to be shown that this is the best approach God could use to attain a greater good because if there existed better but neglected approach, then two things immediately occur to me:

1. God is not doing the best ‘he’ can do. Ergo, God is not omnimaximal because an omnimaximal Being by necessity of its own essential goodness must do the best it can.
2. It is possible to conceive of a greater Being; one that would, indeed, choose the better route. This conflicts with the claim that God is a Being to which no greater Being can be conceived.

However, I predict that you will proclaim that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. And, since evil exists in the actual world, then it exists in the best of all possible worlds. This is hardly evident to me and I will, in due time, deny it. However, I have some prefatory thoughts: if this is the best of all possible worlds it is because God must do the very best ‘he’ can. For ‘his’ omnimaximal nature necessitates that ‘he’ both choose and do nothing less.

Yet, if said Being must, by necessity of ‘his’ own being, always do the best ‘he’ can do, then on what basis is this Being freely willing and freely doing or even worthy of moral praise? Since, freedom of will and freedom of doing includes the ability to choose not to act the best ‘he’ and hence not do the best he can. Not to forget that moral praise only makes sense if the agent in question could have chosen and acted otherwise.

Additionally, it is absurd that an omnimaximal god would leave room for reasonable doubt and yet punish the same doubters, in one way or another, when they maintain their doubt to the end of their lives. Indeed, and I trust that you believe me when I say that it is with the best of my reasoning ability that I find atheism to be evident. Thus, theism is unreasonable to me:

Ou:~G
Ergo, ~Ru:G

So, I then pose a question: If God wants me to believe in ‘his’ existence, then why do I believe God does not exist? To make my trajectory clearer and stronger:

1. I sincerely believe God does not exist.
2. God’s existence is incompatible with my sincere belief that God does not exist.
3. Thus, God does not exist.

Moving on from the LPfE, we have then arrived at the latter conjunct entitled the ‘Evidential Problem from Evil:

1. If God exists, then there would not be any evil in the world unless that evil is logically necessary.
2. There exists much evil in the world.
3. Much of that evil is not logically necessary.
4. Therefore, God does not exist.

I can certainly see nor reason both an evident and compensating goodness coming from the many evils present in our world. But, oddly enough, I am incessantly told that God exists. So, why then, do these evils occur and to such a degree? I will leave it to you, PfC, to answer for that because it is beyond my ken.

Predicting Responses
PfC, I predict an argument similar, if not identical, to the one you deployed against ‘wiploc’ regarding perfection. I suspect it may look like this:

1. We identify things that are imperfect.
2. In order to know that something is imperfect, we must correspond the imperfection to a standard of perfection.
3. Because there are real imperfections, then there is a real standard of perfection.
4. This standard of perfection must have being, or else it is non-existent, which has been disproved.
5. God is defined as a perfect being.
6. Therefore, God exists.

I have an immediate problem with number 2. When I say that X is imperfect in relation to Y, I mean that I can identify better possible state of affairs for X in relation to Y. For instance, if I identify X as not equal to or better than X² in relation to Y, then I can conclude that X is imperfect within its relation to Y simply because there exists an identified greater. Yet, X² need to be “perfect”; in fact, it could be not equal to or greater than X³ in relation to Y. Under this model, I could grant that my manner of speaking suggests an existing standard of “perfection” but this could be dismissed as semantics. As long as by “imperfect”, I mean that there exists at least one possible better state of affairs, then I see no problem. Perhaps this will help: For all X, X is in relation to Y.



Maximal Imperfection--> ? ? ?--X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7--? ? ? <--Maximal Perfection



Now, imagine that I allocated the actual world as X4. This would mean that there exists an identified and better possible state of affairs of X in relation to Y than X4. Thus, X4 is imperfect but yet without the need to contemplate a standard of perfection. X1 and X7 is where I might have some epistemic-cum-metaphysical problems but they are quite irrelevant. Speaking for myself, I do not know what moral perfection is or if it does actually exist; I could take a tentative stab at it that I’d identify as X7 but this does not stop me from identifying X6 and lower as inferior--at least I see no good reason why it would.

Moreover, it is because I identify X5 through X7 as better possible state of affairs that I conclude God does not exist. After all, if God exists, then at the very least an X7 actual world would too.

I predict a free will defence but there are many variants of the FWD and so I may be misdirected. Assuming, however unlikely, you successfully remedy the abovementioned problem regarding divine freedom, then it would be the case that God is maximally benevolent, freely choosing and freely acting. I take for granted that it is also the case that God either does not or needs not to endure evil to understand goodness. Thus, God always and freely chooses the maximal good whilst understands evil but does not or needs not to endure evil. And, if God can only do what is logically possible and God exists, then it would follow that the above is logically possible.

So, my question is this: if God can both choose and act freely but yet always chooses the good whilst not necessarily enduring evil but still understands evil, then why couldn’t God create us with the same circumstances? In this way, evil would ‘exist’ within our understanding of the concept and not manifested within our feelings or expressed in our behaviours. This is a better possible state of affairs than what we currently endure and hence the actual world is not the best world. Thus, God does not exist because the actual world not being the best of all worlds is incompatible with the existence of God.

Lastly, I predict you may state that that the EPfE is too presumptuous because we measly humans cannot fathom Gods reasons and I do intend to disagree, but if I may first ask: what is not too presumptuous? For, if the LPfE is unsound and the EPfE is too presumptuous, then what is a defeater? From previous dialogue with you, I have gotten the impression that there is no defeater.

The Best,

~M~

[punkforchrist]

First off, I want to thank the forum for hosting this important discussion, as well as RBH for filling in the moderating duties, and finally ~M~ for graciously joining me as we talk about the problem of evil. This is not a debate per se, but a mutual exchange of ideas.

I should make clear at the get go that I am defending two basic contentions. 1) The reality of evil is not inconsistent with the existence of God; and 2) the reality of evil actually presupposes God.

So what about the first contention? ~M~ presents two separate arguments. First is the logical problem of evil; the second is the evidential version. To begin with the former, he states:

1. Evil Exists.
2. The existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of God.
3. Thus, God does not exist.

This, of course, is a valid argument, but its soundness depends on premise (2). ~M~ explains that God's goodness and omnipotence would entail that God would prevent all evil. We might revise the argument like this.

1. If God exists, He is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
2. Evil exists.
3. Therefore, God must either not be omnipotent, omniscient, or omnibenevolent, or none.
4. Therefore, God does not exist.

What is peculiar about this argument is that no necessary contradiction can be found between God's omnimax nature and the existence of evil. What ~M~ must argue is 1) it is in God's power to prevent all evil; and 2) an omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evil. There are some considerations, however.

The logical compatibility between (1) and (2) above may be demonstrated if (1) entails

(1') God can prevent evil unless evil is logically necessary or if God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing it.

Notice that (1') does not conflict with either (1) or (2). [1]

Moving on from here, ~M~ next presents the evidential problem of evil.

1. If God exists, then there would not be any evil in the world unless that evil is logically necessary.
2. There exists much evil in the world.
3. Much of that evil is not logically necessary.
4. Therefore, God does not exist.

What I would question is (3). How can we possibly know if the evil that exists is not necessary in order to bring about the greatest good? He continues.

So, why then, do these evils occur and to such a degree? I will leave it to you, PfC, to answer for that because it is beyond my ken.

I will admit that I don't know the answer. God has not revealed his reason for allowing evil. However, that should not entail that God cannot have a morally sufficient reason. This is something that is beyond our comprehension.

Likewise, ~M~ asks

If God wants me to believe in ‘his’ existence, then why do I believe God does not exist?

God has not revealed the answer to this question, either (at least not to me). However, as I will argue, the fact that ~M~ recognizes the reality of evil is evidence that God has revealed himself to him.

This brings us to my second contention--that evil actually presupposes God. Now, ~M~ anticipates my argument. However, because of the many nuances inherent in the argument from perfection, I prefer to offer a more contemporary moral argument.

What is interesting about the problem of evil is that the atheist himself/herself does not have a coherent answer to it. If, in fact, evil is a reality, then in effect what ~M~ is saying is that there is a "way things ought to be." We ought not rape or torture children or take what is not ours or unjustly kill or lie. These things are wrong. Now, if there are moral absolutes, then that brings us right to God. Consider the following syllogism.

1) If there are moral absolutes, then there is a moral law giver.
2) There are moral absolutes.
3) Therefore, there is a moral law giver, which is God.

(2) should not be controversial, since why else would the problem of evil be raised at all? In an atheist universe, there is no problem of evil, since there is no God, and hence no moral absolutes, and no standard of goodness by which to determine whether something is evil in the first place.

(1) should also be granted. The reason for this is because what we notice about morality is that it is a personal quality. Impersonal things, like rocks, quasars, gravitational pulls, and radiation possess no moral agency. If there are moral absolutes, they need to be grounded in an absolute personality. Now, I admit that this does not give us a full-blown picture of the Christian God. What it does do, though, is allow us to incorporate the moral argument as part of a cumulative case for God. Atheism does not allow such an absolute personality, whereas theism does. Hence, it only makes sense to talk about the problem of evil from a theistic perspective.

Now that we've covered my two basic contentions, what about some of ~M~'s side questions? He asks:

if God can both choose and act freely but yet always chooses the good whilst not necessarily enduring evil but still understands evil, then why couldn’t God create us with the same circumstances?

There are two observations I would make about this. 1) The question presupposes a libertarian free will (LFW) defense. As a Christian, I am not necessarily committed to this view, so even if the argument succeeds in undermining LFW, it does not destroy a rational belief in an omnimax God. 2) It is not clear that the conditions that ~M~ speaks of are logically possible in the greatest of all worlds. It may be the case that our choosing evil is a necessary precondition for bringing about the greatest good.

~M~ claims that I must first validate consequentialism in order for (2) to be a sound rebuttal. However, I must respectfully disagree with this, since consequentialism is not what the debate is about. If he wishes to argue that there is something morally repugnant with this view, then I will simply ask how he comes to this conclusion apart from the existence of moral absolutes, and hence from the absolute personality, God. It seems that ~M~ is arguing that God is under a moral obligation to prevent evil. The problem with this, besides begging the question, is that if there are any moral absolutes, then that nullifies the atheist's claim that there is no God!

Finally, ~M~ asks:

if the LPfE is unsound and the EPfE is too presumptuous, then what is a defeater?

Of course, I don't believe there is a sound defeater of God, especially in the problem of evil. However, hypothetically a defeater may be realized if the theist's argument is somehow shown to be illogical.

I submit, then, that the problem of evil not only fails to undermine God's existence, but actually affirms it.

[1] This argument was paraphrased from Michael Martin's book, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, page 335.

[~M~]

PfC,

According to you, if there is something “morally repugnant” about consequentialism, then I am free to criticize. However, this is problematic for two reasons: (1) there exists at least a dozen forms of consequentialism and I have no idea what particular model I need to address. As for (2), it is a misleading reflection of my statement. For, there is no immediate need for me to argue that there is something “morally repugnant” about consequentialism because it would suffice for me to argue that there exists a possible, bettered but yet a neglected approach. An approach, for instance, like the total non-existence of evil.

You see, your appeal to consequentialism was said to have only permitted evil but this does not address why evil exists at all. Indeed, ‘to permit’ is an illocutionary act for something or behaviour that is a pre-existent. But, I see no good reason why evilness could not have been a non-existent; and in fact, as far as I can see, it would have been better this way. For instance, there could only exist positive degrees of goodness; only positive degrees of pleasure, no grief and no pain, etc. Or, evil could only exist within our conceptual understanding and we could be wholly good; thus, like god, we must always do the best we can. Any one of these cases, as far as I can see, would be worse in no way albeit better in some.

However, if there is any logical impossibility within any of the mentioned state of affairs, then you need to point that out because I do not see it; or if they are somehow not better in comparison to the actual state of affairs, then you need to point that out too. For, if there is not, then my novel argument is true: there exists a possible, bettered state of affairs than the actual world. And this is incompatible with the existence of God because God always does the best ‘he’ can do. Thus, God does not exist.
This argument could be reformulated as:

1. The actual world is not the best of all possible worlds.
2. That the actual world is not the best of all possible worlds is incompatible with the existence of God
3. Therefore, God does not exist.


Moving on, you wisely abandoned your previously held perfection argument. Yet, you deployed and blatantly misplaced a related axiological argument. I say this because our discussion is not dealing with Atheism vs. Theism; or my beliefs, as an atheist, vs. your beliefs as a Catholic. Instead, the discussion topic is whether theodicies successfully reconcile Catholic beliefs. Thus, for the purposes of the discussion, I could root my morals within some lesser god other than the omnimaximal God that is in question and consequently your argument is ineffective. Yet, I do not see this as wholly necessary because an atheist, in this discussion, can be secured in ignoring such queries. This is because an atheist could merely accentuate the internal logical impossibility/inconsistency or improbability of the Catholic beliefs; the atheist needs not to have an objectified concept of good and evil in his own worldview (although I do), but rather merely needs to understand such concepts within the Catholic worldview and identify them accordingly.

In any case, I will not be addressing the veracity of your axiological argument on the grounds of simple irrelevance to the topic that we both agreed upon.

However, I am curious: What is your God’s relation to the good and the evil as a “giver”? What does it mean to give moral prescriptions and do moral declarations exist independently of your God?

Moving on, divine freedom is a topic we touched upon but you were not very helpful. All I learned from you is that you believe I presupposed libertarian free will (LFW) and that you need not necessarily believe LFW as a Christian. This neither (1) tells me what you do believe (2) or what Christians do believe (3) or refutes the argument. I dislike having to walk you through this, PfC. What type of free will does God possess? Please be as specific as you can.

The Evidential Argument for Evil

Ah, yes. The old epistemologically retarded defence wherein humans are said to be basically too retarded to assess whether there exists unnecessary evil. Paul summed it up in Romans 9:20 and it is tantamount to announcing the hoary slogan that God acts in mysterious ways.

Replies:

1.So what? The whole issue based upon our standards and within our epistemic abilities. Even granted that we are epistemically retarded, it would nevertheless be the case that these evils evidentially appear to be unnecessary and thus according to our standards and limitations god does not appear to be good. In fact, far from it! And, if it is evident that such evils are unnecessary, then our belief that they are not unnecessary evil is unreasonable. Belief Logic: G= gratuitous evil and ~G is the negation.

Ou:G
Ergo, ~Ru:~G

Moreover, given our retardation it would be reasonable for us to believe that there is no gratuitous evil and quite natural for us too! Since, of course, we do so to the best of our ability within the human condition.

2.On what grounds can we have to say God is good? After all, God could have logically necessary and sufficient reason for doing and/or allowing goodness for a greater evil that has yet to be revealed to us. How can we know?

3.Perhaps God could have sufficient reason but this is not the same as saying God does have sufficient reason. You need to argue that God does have sufficient reason.

4.The mere possibility that we may be wrong is not reason to think we are wrong or reason to withhold judgement. Indeed, this is neither about knowing or certainty but reasonable belief. To put it in other ways: It is possible that I could be wrong that I am not a brain in a vat or that a demon is not controlling my thoughts or that I am not dreaming. Yet, this does not prevent me from reasonably believing otherwise. Don’t you agree?


5.God’s goodness is not falsifiable. This is related to (1). This may not seem too bad at first glace but lets see how far we can take this: Imagine that God’s angels or Jesus himself visited earth today but their behaviour was excluded to molesting or even decapitating our children in the most painful fashion amid church services across North America. And, thereafter, they impose a Nazi-like global rule. Sounds ridiculous? Sure. But it serves to prove a point that, under your philosophy, we cannot make such judgements under any circumstances within our human condition. Not only this but belief in God’s perfect goodness is to be retained; corresponding non-belief from the PoE is irrational and I take it that God ought to still be worshipped too. In other words, PfC, your philosophy is quite consistent with this fellow’s advice:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SG0CQxRULg0

6.So long that I believe God exists, then all existing evil is necessary and must lead to a greater good. Thus, I can firmly believe that it must lead to the greater good even without my involvement. Consequently, it seems morally just for me to allow evil to occur because it is both necessary and will always lead to a greater good regardless of what I do or not do for that matter. Indeed, it seems pointless for me, you and everyone else to even involve themselves in such matters.

The Best,

~M~

[punkforchrist]

In my opening statement, I defended two basic contentions that uphold the existence of God in spite of the problem of evil. Let's look at each of them.

First, I argued that the reality of evil is not inconsistent with the existence of God. ~M~ spent most of his time in his second post addressing this. He states:

(1) there exists at least a dozen forms of consequentialism and I have no idea what particular model I need to address.

It should be made clear that the term "consequentialism" has many complex connotations, and not all of them are consistent with Christian theism. ~M~ implictly recognizes this. What I am merely defending, however, is that it is perfectly legitmate to believe that God allows some evil to exist in order to bring about the greatest good.

He continues:

(2), it is a misleading reflection of my statement. For, there is no immediate need for me to argue that there is something “morally repugnant” about consequentialism because it would suffice for me to argue that there exists a possible, bettered but yet a neglected approach.

As we will see later, this position is inconsistent with atheism.

An approach, for instance, like the total non-existence of evil.

~M~ contends that the total non-existence of evil is best. We need to be careful about what this entails, however. For how does ~M~ know that it is logically possible to bring about the greatest good without at least some evil? What he amalgamates is the conception of the greatest good existing apart from any evil, with its actual possibility (or "feasibility"). The two have not been shown to be synonymous.

~M~ elaborates a bit on his view in the next paragraph.

But, I see no good reason why evilness could not have been a non-existent; and in fact, as far as I can see, it would have been better this way.

Now, I don't deny that there is a logically possible world containing no evil. What I'm questioning is whether such a world is the best of all worlds. My worthy counterpart asserts that this would have been better, but that's all we have--his assertion.

The crux of the matter is the following statement.

However, if there is any logical impossibility within any of the mentioned state of affairs, then you need to point that out because I do not see it

There is a subtle shift of the burden of proof in ~M~'s proposition. He argues that I have to present positive evidence that evil is necessary to bring about the greatest good. This, however, minimizes the task of the proponent's case. What ~M~ has to prove is that there exists a logically possible (re: "logically feasible") world that is objectively better than the actual world. This is no easy task, which is one reason the problem of evil has been critically undermined by philosophers.

Hence, ~M~'s first premise ("1. The actual world is not the best of all possible worlds.") has yet to be defended. What I'm wondering is how is it possible to know the truth of (1) without being omniscient? It would seem manifest that in order to know that this is not the best of all possible worlds, then one would have to have absolute knowledge of every particular of our actual world. My counterpart surely does not claim this.

As for divine freedom, I don't see any real need to commit to one view over another. There are theodicies that assume a libertarian view of free will; others, a compatibilist position. The expediency of my argument is that all kinds of theodicies can appeal to it. What ~M~ unintentionally confuses is the what and the how. It is logically possible for God to have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. How is this? God has not revealed the answer, but presumptuous to assume that He therefore cannot have one, whatever it is.

it would nevertheless be the case that these evils evidentially appear to be unnecessary

But to whom does it appear this way? It is apparent that we have a presuppositional conflict. Because of our incompatible worldviews, ~M~ will necessarily interpret the evidence one way, and I another way.

God could have logically necessary and sufficient reason for doing and/or allowing goodness for a greater evil that has yet to be revealed to us. How can we know?

I believe ~M~ has conceded one of the points. He asks, "How can we know" that God is good? Notice the reversibility of the question. The theist simply asks, "How can we know God does not have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil?" Once again, this is due to the conflict of worldviews.

Perhaps God could have sufficient reason but this is not the same as saying God does have sufficient reason. You need to argue that God does have sufficient reason.

As I argued before, this is a shift of the burden of proof. If the problem of evil is going to be at all a successful argument against God, then it must demonstrate that God cannot have such a morally sufficient reason.

It is possible that I could be wrong that I am not a brain in a vat or that a demon is not controlling my thoughts or that I am not dreaming. Yet, this does not prevent me from reasonably believing otherwise. Don’t you agree?

I agree that the belief in an external world, etc., is a properly basic belief. However, I disagree that surd evil is entailed by properly basic beliefs (what ~M~ calls "reasonable belief"). All we have is ~M~'s assertion that there exists unnecessary evil. But assertion is not proof.

God’s goodness is not falsifiable.

I agree that God's goodness is not falsifiable, but it is very meaningful. We might say the same thing about propositions, alethic realism, laws of reason, and mathematical and analytical axioms. ~M~ has implicitly assumed that in order for us to have reasonable belief, then the belief itself must be falsifiable. For one thing, I'm not sure what ~M~ intends to entail by "falsification". Is he alluding to logical positivism or some other verificationist method? Secondly, if his argument work, it would prove too much. For then we wouldn't be able to appeal to such non-falsifiable realities such as our cognitive faculties and laws of discourse and reason.

So long that I believe God exists, then all existing evil is necessary and must lead to a greater good.

To echo an earlier point, this claim is reversible. As long as one believes that some existing evil is unnecessary, then God does not exist. However, this brings us right back to the presuppositional conflict mentioned above. So how should this conflict be resolved?

Well, my second contention was that the problem of evil actually presupposes God's existence. The fact that ~M~ has appealed to the reality of evil is evidence of his knowledge of moral absolutes, and therefore his knowledge of God. I contend, then, that ~M~ must borrow from my worldview in order to raise the problem of evil at all. However, in so doing, he ends up undermining his own atheistic presupposition.

Now, he states that this is irrelevant to our current issue. I respectfully disagree. For if the reality of evil presupposes the existence of moral absolutes, and ultimately God, then it is one evidence that the Christian (and specifically Catholic) theodicy successfully answers the problem of evil. Once again, here is the un-refuted syllogism:

1) If there are moral absolutes, then there is a moral law giver.
2) There are moral absolutes.
3) Therefore, there is a moral law giver, which is God.

What does it mean to give moral prescriptions and do moral declarations exist independently of your God?

We know that something is good because it reflects God's character. God is good and He is the ultimate standard of goodness itself. What ~M~ has raised is the Euthyphro dilemma. However, the dilemma actually raises more problems than it solves. For if a moral standard must exist outside of God, then does a standard have to exist outside of that standard, and that one outside of another, and so on ad infinitum? What I have argued is that if there are moral absolutes, then they have to be grounded in an absolute personality, since morality itself cannot exist in abstraction from a person (morality is a personal quality).

To sum up, ~M~ has not given us justification for believing that God does not have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. Further, he ends up borrowing from my worldview in order to criticize it, which ends up in self-contradiction.

Best regards,
pfc

[~M~]

To begin, I want to address this cantankerous claim that I possess the burden of proof. I am not aware of any epistemic or contractual obligation put forth at any time that imposes such an imperative. It was my generous impression that we’d share the burden, apparently not. In fact, as it seems, there exists a hypocritical standard wherein I am said, from you, to be in need of supporting my allegation that there exists a possible, bettered world and yet you are said to be free of any corresponding obligation that this must be the best of all possible worlds or that it is possible God permits evil for the greater good. Not to mention your reluctance to explain to me your stance of divine freedom! Almost for the entirety of this discussion, you have undeservingly assumed the role of an armchair sceptic who demands more than mere assertion and yet in return is reluctant to satisfy the very same standards that he imposes unto others.

Let be it said that evilness and suffering challenges the compatibility of a perfect Being and hence the onus of proof falls unto the theist; not the challenger. And, I predict you will respond that evilness makes no sense on my worldview but let us remember that contrary to your incessant attempts, this is not a discussion concerning atheism vs. theism. I could easily proclaim my moral roots in an all-good but not as powerful God; a problem I accentuated earlier and you ignored.

Your posts have acted like a ball and chain attached to the ankle of this discussion. Consequently, I have not learned much about your philosophy.

LPfE

You want to know how I can say the actual world is not the best of all worlds without being an omniscient. Well, you missed the qualifier of the claim and so I will repeat it: As far as I can see, the actual world is not the best of all possible worlds. “I” refers to me; a human person and I make this claim from “as far as I can see” within the human condition. And, as far as I can see, it is possible because given my understanding of God, it is within God’s power. It is true that there exists an epistemic possibility that I may be wrong, but so what? What epistemic occlusion do I face as a human knower that you do not face? That is to ask what epistemic licence do you have to make claims about what is possibly or necessarily the case with your God that I do not possess?

Moreover, on a similar note, I could accuse you of non-sequitur because your argument for the material implication: “if absolute morals exist, then so does a giver (God)”, did not say why a moral law giver is omnimaximal. For, the argument, as you left it, is wholly consistent with the existence of a lower but all-good deity and hence is a far cry from Catholic beliefs. (Remember that a PoE advocate need not to be a non-theist)

Moving on, you wish to know how I can say that a world is better. I assume that you wish to examine my own moral position; your interest in me is flattering. But, my personal moral philosophy is not relevant to whether the PoE remains a problem for Catholic beliefs; again, allow me to remind you that the topic of discussion is whether Catholic theodicies successfully reconcile the PoE. Eliminating my moral philosophy serves as a non-theist serves to kick my feet out from underneath me rather than actually address the PoE or the internal problem it poses.

But, if you must know my own moral philosophy is incoherent with a God because it is based upon contingent life. I am a Randian egoist; I hold that our moral agency was most likely the product of evolutionary forces and that there are plausible phylogenetic narratives to account for such.

Consequently, moral agency is based upon life and the values to sustain life and flourish. It a sense they are objective because they transcend the individual and apply to the species, but in another they are cultural. The term I choose to use to describe them is provisional. What remains to be seen, however, is the question “why do I have moral agency?’ is tantamount to asking me ‘why am I horny?’—it’s your nature. And, you ought to be moral because it is the best way to ensure you life and that you live happily. If you wish to know more about some foundations of my moral philosophy, then read Tara Smith’s ‘Viable Values’.

In any case, since this discussion is not about my actual beliefs, I could deploy any moral philosophy. I could aver that morality exists as principles aimed to attain the happiest states of affairs because it is the most desirable state of affairs. Thus, there is at least prima facie justification in proclaiming betterness is found within a state of affairs to which there is a highest degree of happiness than one that possesses a lesser degree. Thus, if God existed, God would create to the best of ‘his’ ability to create a state of affairs to which I and everyone else is the happiest and hence as my argument went, it would be the total non-existence of evil. Yet, evil exists. a and that contradicts the principle.

You could reply, as you did with wiploc, with analogous reasoning present that there must be some pain for the over all greater good. Say, for instance, getting your tooth removed to avoid an infection. However, the analogue is limited by human limitations and is not omnimaximal. Consequently, your analogy fails at posing any kind of similarity to the issue at hand.

Evidential Problem-o from Evil

PfC,

You did a good job of disorganizing and isolating my objections from their context. I have to search throughout my post to find out what you are replying to. This is extremely annoying and it must be for our readers too.

But to whom does it appear this way? It is apparent that we have a presuppositional conflict. Because of our incompatible worldviews, ~M~ will necessarily interpret the evidence one way, and I another way.

I see no reason why a presuppositional conflict would interfere with mere appearance. There is no contradiction in saying that X appears to be Y, but it is actually not. See, for instance, the Müller-Lyer illusion.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/M%C3%BCller-Lyer_illusion.svg/200px-M%C3%BCller-Lyer_illusion.svg.png

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCller-Lyer_illusion

The problem is that we have prima facie justification to believe what appears to be the case unless given compelling reason to think otherwise. Merely telling me that God could/does have a reason for evil but the reason is unknown because it is super TOP SECRET information, which in turn must have a justification that is super TOP SECRET information is hardly sufficient reason to believe otherwise, don’t you agree? To help accentuate the point: imagine if I deployed such reasoning as a criminal defence lawyer. I’d be laughed at, wouldn’t I?


I believe ~M~ has conceded one of the points. He asks, "How can we know" that God is good? Notice the reversibility of the question. The theist simply asks, "How can we know God does not have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil?" Once again, this is due to the conflict of worldviews.

Nah, you misunderstood me. I was using your own reasoning against you to present that such a line of thought eliminates any way of knowing your God is good. Thus, it is quite defeating of your own position.

As I argued before, this is a shift of the burden of proof. If the problem of evil is going to be at all a successful argument against God, then it must demonstrate that God cannot have such a morally sufficient reason.

This is just a load of nonsense. The EPfE needs not to argue that God “cannot” have sufficient moral reason. The word “cannot” is a modal operator that is interchangeable with ‘necessarily not’. What you mean is “does not”. The “does not” stance is a prima facie justified in the absence of evidence to the contrary because we are, indeed, acting upon what appears to be the case. That is, of course, that AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE, there exists evil that is logically unnecessary and hence my argument follows accordingly. In response, you have merely argued that God “could” have morally sufficient reason but this is far cry from arguing what is plausible or what your stance actually entails you to hold: Necessarily, all evil is necessary.

I agree that God's goodness is not falsifiable, but it is very meaningful. We might say the same thing about propositions, alethic realism, laws of reason, and mathematical and analytical axioms. ~M~ has implicitly assumed that in order for us to have reasonable belief, then the belief itself must be falsifiable. For one thing, I'm not sure what ~M~ intends to entail by "falsification". Is he alluding to logical positivism or some other verificationist method? Secondly, if his argument work, it would prove too much. For then we wouldn't be able to appeal to such non-falsifiable realities such as our cognitive faculties and laws of discourse and reason.

Not even close. What I meant to show you was the absurdity of your belief when taken to the limits. That is to accentuate that under your reasoning, JC could molest, rape and behead our children amid Church service and you could not proclaim him to be immoral. In fact, as I said, corresponding non-belief from the PoE would be irrational and I take it that God ought to still be worshipped too. This strikes me as something anti-intellectual and not something I can imagine many Christians adhering to if my hypothetical situation occurred. You also seem to be hinting that God’s existence is a properly basic belief but, alas, there is no argument for this claim.

I have reached an end of my participation in this discussion. I am disappointed in both the practice of sorely putting the burden of proof unto me and your arguments because I found them weak; there exists much better defences that I was more than willingly to discuss like transworld depravity. I know we aimed to keep this argument accessible to our listeners, but I think we bored them. For, the peanut gallery is ignored to such an extent that you would think it has leprosy. Too bad, I say.

The Best,
Michael

[punkforchrist]

Since this is a formal discussion, and not a debate, I'd like to switch over and talk with ~M~ directly.

Michael, I've enjoyed our conversation, and I although some of your expectations may not have been met, we've begun to dig into some of the real issues. Since it's only possible to scratch the surface in an exchange with three rounds, I believe a lot has been made clear.

Regarding the burden of proof, I find your following two statements inconsistent.

It was my generous impression that we’d share the burden

Let be it said that evilness and suffering challenges the compatibility of a perfect Being and hence the onus of proof falls unto the theist; not the challenger.

If we both have an equal burden of proof, then how can the burden rest squarely on my shoulders? That's why I said you attempted a burden-shift. In one sense, I do have a burden of proof--namely, to undermine the conclusions you've drawn. That's traditionally the role of the opponent. The theist only needs to demonstrate the possibility, rather than the necessity, of God's having a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. So to the charge of hypocrisy, I plead innocent.

However, I'm curious as to why in an atheistic universe, there's anything inherently wrong with hypocrisy. I want to be careful in qualifying that I believe atheists are perfectly capable of being moral. Atheists can indeed be moral, but it is in spite of their respective worldview that they are moral. What I'm saying, then, is that even if I am guilty of hypocrisy (which I don't believe I am), your observation of it only undermines the atheist's conclusion.

I could easily proclaim my moral roots in an all-good but not as powerful God; a problem I accentuated earlier and you ignored.

I actually did address this in my opening statement, however subtly, "Now, I admit that this does not give us a full-blown picture of the Christian God. What it does do, though, is allow us to incorporate the moral argument as part of a cumulative case for God."

When we couple this conclusion with the failure of the problem of evil to undermine God's existence, we are left with the sound observation that God is undefeated.

Well, you missed the qualifier of the claim and so I will repeat it: As far as I can see, the actual world is not the best of all possible worlds.

I don't see how this relates to the logical problem of evil, since you are appealing to your interpretation of the available evidence.

That is to ask what epistemic licence do you have to make claims about what is possibly or necessarily the case with your God that I do not possess?

The difference is that the atheist in the argument claims that the existence of God and the existence of evil are logically incompatible. The theist, on the other hand, merely points out that they are not logically incompatible, and that God may exist. The claim of the atheist is much more ambitious and so requires much further explanation.

Moreover, on a similar note, I could accuse you of non-sequitur because your argument for the material implication: “if absolute morals exist, then so does a giver (God)”, did not say why a moral law giver is omnimaximal.

I didn't claim that it did, but only that it is one piece of evidence that supports the Christian's case. As I said above, when we couple the moral argument with the logical possibility of both God and evil, we gain a clearer picture that the atheist's claim (via the problem of evil) is unsuccessful. Just in passing, I'll note that a powerful cumulative case can be made for Christian theism when we combine the moral argument with the kalam cosmological argument, and further, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ as evidenced by His resurrection from the dead. But that is more appropriate for another discussion.

I hold that our moral agency was most likely the product of evolutionary forces and that there are plausible phylogenetic narratives to account for such.

Then why raise the problem of evil? If there are no absolute moral obligations apart from what results from random evolutionary processes, then what does the atheist mean by "the problem of evil"? That's why I claimed that there's no problem of evil in an atheistic universe. Further, I find the moral-evolutionary view peculiar in that it requires the atheist to affirm that we may have evolved in such a way that we would view things like rape and the torture of children as morally neutral, or even praiseworthy. Yet, when pressed, atheists do not live consistently with this position. When we say that rape is wrong, we don't merely mean that we don't like it. We literally mean that it's wrong--people ought not rape or torture.

Consequently, moral agency is based upon life and the values to sustain life and flourish.

But why should we uphold such things? I agree that we should, but I'm wanting to know the epistemic basis for it. If our morality is merely contingent on our happiness, then a consistent approach would require that we allow the actions of a sociopath to be done, since it makes him happy. Marquis de Sade received pleasure by inflicting pain on people; it made him happy. What objection can be raised against this if moral absolutes do not exist independently of our conventional adoption of them?

If you wish to know more about some foundations of my moral philosophy, then read Tara Smith’s ‘Viable Values’.

Thank you. I'll check it out.

I could aver that morality exists as principles aimed to attain the happiest states of affairs because it is the most desirable state of affairs.

But why should one be obligated to act in such a way as to bring about happiness?

Thus, if God existed, God would create to the best of ‘his’ ability to create a state of affairs to which I and everyone else is the happiest and hence as my argument went, it would be the total non-existence of evil.

The question is whether there is a logically possible world in which everyone is maximally happy and there is no evil. What I've argued is that because of the many factors in any given possible world, there is no way of knowing whether such a world is possible without being omniscient. The notion of transworld depravity raises this issue.

You could reply, as you did with wiploc, with analogous reasoning present that there must be some pain for the over all greater good. Say, for instance, getting your tooth removed to avoid an infection. However, the analogue is limited by human limitations and is not omnimaximal.

It is omnimaximal if it is logically impossible to have the greatest good without some evil.

I see no reason why a presuppositional conflict would interfere with mere appearance.

The reason it does is because all of our respective beliefs are interpreted by our ultimate presuppositions. Note, for example, that often nations with the most suffering are also filled with the most faith.

There is no contradiction in saying that X appears to be Y, but it is actually not.

So do you agree that the problem of evil may not be a defeater of Christian theism?

The problem is that we have prima facie justification to believe what appears to be the case unless given compelling reason to think otherwise.

Right, and I've argued that the moral argument gives such a compelling reason, given the implausibility of atheism in regards to moral absolutes.

The “does not” stance is a prima facie justified in the absence of evidence to the contrary because we are, indeed, acting upon what appears to be the case.

I believe I have given evidence to the contrary, which is that Christian theism provides the necessary preconditions for moral absolutes.

What I meant to show you was the absurdity of your belief when taken to the limits. That is to accentuate that under your reasoning, JC could molest, rape and behead our children amid Church service and you could not proclaim him to be immoral.

To put your statement in the form of a question, we might ask: could God will that rape and murder be virtuous? This strikes me as similar to asking: could God make a square-circle? It doesn't make sense to posit the irrational, and since rape and murder are antithetical to virtue, and God is foundation of virtue, then it follows logically that God cannot will rape and murder.

In other words, you're essentially affirming the antecedent. If God willed murder to be virtuous, then it would virtuous. However, this does not mean the contrapositive is actually possible. Since God wills only what is virtuous, and murder is not virtuous, then God does not will murder.

You also seem to be hinting that God’s existence is a properly basic belief but, alas, there is no argument for this claim.

That wasn't my intention, but I do find discussions centered around properly basic beliefs most interesting.

there exists much better defences that I was more than willingly to discuss like transworld depravity.

I implicitly argued in favor of transworld depravity when I stated that the best of all worlds may necessarily contain some evil, but further exposition would require much more than a few thousand-word posts, as I think you would agree.

In any case, I'm glad to have explored this question with you some. I regret that you've been disappointed in some of the areas we haven't covered, but I think a much more specific debate/discussion resolution would be required. After all, the term "theodicy" is very general, but I understand and appreciate your desire to think through the merits of specific theodicies, like Plantinga's free will defense. Instead of that approach, what I've sought to do is establish the merit of the "moral sufficiency" theodicy: God allows some evil for the sake of the greatest good. In my estimation, this has been neither disproved nor undermined, although you've argued that it appears that some evil is unnecessary. I'll make three general observations about this. 1) it appears that you've put much more weight on the evidential version of the problem of evil rather than the logical version. 2) I expected more specific examples of such evidences, rather than a general statement that it appears that there's unnecessary evil. 3) Assertion is not proof. I realize you believe that some evils appear to be unnecessary to you, but what may appear one way to you may not appear the same way to another.

I'd like to give a specific example. Suffering is undoubtedly a real state of affairs in our world. When we think of the many AIDS victims in Africa, for example, there is certainly something that tugs at each of us. We cry out, "why does this have to happen?" Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing the answer with any high degree of certainty. But what is interesting is that it is often those who suffer the most who come to faith. Their suffering brings them to the realization of their need of salvation. In an analogous way, our recognition of the evils that exist lead us to the knowledge of God. In an atheistic worldview, the torture of children may be painful, but it cannot be said to be wrong. It only makes sense in a theistic worldview to talk about an absolute right and wrong.

So in a way, I believe your arguments end up supporting one element of a cumulative case for Christian theism.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

The formal discussion is now complete. We would like to thank ~M~ and punkforchrist for their participation. Discussion can be continued in the peanut gallery.

KWSN, FD Moderator