Theistic Belief Is Rational: ~M~ vs. George Hathaway

[Alcyonian]

This thread has been set up for a formal debate between ~M~ and George Hathaway who will debate the following resolution:

"Resolved: theistic belief is rational."

~M~ will affirm and George Hathaway will oppose. The debate will have three rounds and ~M~ will go first, per the parameters. (http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showpost.php?p=5099296&postcount=94)

A Peanut Gallery (http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=234726) is set up in the Philosophy forum for the rest of us to comment on the debate.

Enjoy the debate!

- Alcyonian, FD Moderator

[~M~]

Prefatory Remarks, Epistemic Justification and Some Other Blather

A sentence or two about me: I am a postmodern theist and a bin of self-conflictions. I flaunt and embrace these conflictions because I believe they are essential to my humanness. I am without doubt that human perfection is only the sum of our imperfections.

I am one of the last real humanists.

I am rather hostile to the so-called ‘new atheism’ movement spearheaded by the infamous Richard Dawkins (Who let him out of the lab?) and Christopher Hitchens. Part of the reason why I am hostile towards this movement is because ‘new atheism’ seems to only caricaturize, ridicule, or ignore philosophical theology rather than take the time to understand its complexities. Moreover, and more relevantly, the ‘new atheists’ tend to utilize and encourage their followers to deploy words like ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’ to refer to their own beliefs (doxastic states) concerning God, but yet also deny theists the same enjoyment. My problem with this denial rests in its prematurity. For ‘new atheism’ has not sufficiently addressed, if addressed at all, the massive epistemological quagmire concerning epistemic justification. Indeed, my dear readers, these ‘new atheists’ need to have their wings clipped and introduced to the viscid milieu of epistemic justification.

For example, philosopher and distinguished epistemologist Alvin Plantinga said, and I quote: “It would be colossal understatement to say that Anglo-American epistemology of this century has made much of the notion of epistemic justification.”(1) In fact, epistemic justification has been such a quagmire that fellow epistemologist William Alston calls for the notion of epistemic justification to be abandoned. (2) Instead, says Alston, the foci of epistemologists should be upon the ideas of what is called epistemic desiderata and not of epistemic justifiers.

Thence, I do say, my dear atheists, to assume that there is some consensus that evidentialism is the model for justified belief is an inaccurate portrayal of contemporary scholarship. Accordingly, it is not the case that other people must meet the demands of evidentialism, but it is you who must justify your imposition of the evidentialist demand.

Lastly, I rewrote the whole debate statement. In the original, I had natural theology, moral pragmatism, religious experiences and an argument from belief as supra rationem. I decided to get rid of most of them because the commentary necessary to offer a solid exposition on all the arguments is too time consuming. I have decided to argue from moral pragmatism and what I call the phenomeno-aesthetic approach. As a result, my debate statement is roughly half of the word limit permitted to me.

I’m lazy. So sue me.

Clarifying the Terms and Scope

Concerning theism, Hathaway and I ruled out monism within this debate. Instead, we agreed upon a God of otherness; this is to say that God is a substance other than the believer. Such a God, I take it, would be something of a personal intelligence or a ‘higher’ being that has characteristics beyond our ken. This is an idea that I am quite fond of because a ‘God comprehended is no God at all’; or, at least so said the mystic writer Gehard Tersteegen.

Also, I am not saying that non-theism is irrational to believe or irrationally held (although it could be). Moreover, I am also not stating that all theistic belief is rationally held. I only claim some are rationally held and this standard was expressed in the proposal forum.

Finally, reader, you need to remember that the debate resolution does not isolate my arguments to the Abrahamic God or an omnimaximal God.

So, drop your baggage at the door, eh?

The Criterion for Justified Doxastic States

There are at least three types of rational justification: moral, evidential and pragmatic. Pragmatic justification is something like Pascal’s Wager. Moral justification is something like having warrant to believe the believeds not because it is evidenced (although it could be also evidenced) but because holding the belief is morally justified. Formally said, we can say: doxastic state α about β is morally rational (justified) for S a t, iff, α meets the O(p/c) criteria for S at t.

An explanation of the definition is given below. Notably, this is not the only definition of justification within scholarship, but it is the one that I will be working with.

God Belief-- Contra Rationem? Nah!

Pragmatic rationality is a protean theory that can easily be applied respective to circumstances of uncertainty but can also be applied in most decision-making scenarios. Questions concerning a larger scope of pragmatism could be: what are the moral, economic, social and intrapersonal considerations given hypothesis₁ over hypothesis₂? I consider this issue below.

Let us discuss Person S. Imagine that after a series of powerful ‘religious experiences’ had by Person S, Person S examined the evidence available to Person S for God’s existence and non-existence. Person S examined these evidences in a hope of finding good evidential reasons to base a belief upon. Now, imagine that Person S honestly analyzed much evidence from the best philosophers on both sides of the debate for many years and to the best of Person S’s ability. Yet, from this, person S cannot honestly assign probative values to neither God’s existence nor non-existence that extend past 0.5 or go below 0.5. Thus we have the probative values for God’s existence and God’s non-existence being equiprobable for Person S and it does not seem, for Person S, like this equiprobabality will change.

Person S feels frustrated. It seems to Person S that believing in God’s existence has a powerful influence on her life—she feels much happier (ceteris paribus) believing in God rather than non-belief in God. So, what should Person S do? George Hathaway, I suspect, would demand Person S keep the evidential imperative and so much the worse for Person S’s unhappiness. But, what do I say?

I argue this: if under the abovementioned circumstances, then Person S ought to believe God exists. Under a version of denotic logic, this is translated as: O(p/c). This logical statement says that Person S ought to do p given that circumstance c obtains.

I say there is a moral obligation for Person S because in situations like the abovementioned scenario, people ought to do what makes them the happiest; this is a normative claim that I take to be prima facie justified. Moreover, it reasonable to say that Person S’s happiness has great intrinsic value to Person S because it feels good to be the happiest one can be. Not only this, but, it is likely true that Person S’s feeling happier has great extrinsic value. This is because the people who are close to Person S will (likely) benefit from Person S’s magnified happiness and hence society will too. (3)

Notably, this ‘ought’ obtains only under the circumstance that c obtains. There can be 1 to a near infinite of necessary circumstances denoted by c, “c₁ ...... c₆ ”, to which we can assume as present within c. Certainly, a circumstance could be that belief in God and any corresponding behaviour would need to be reasonably harmless to the believer and other people. Further circumstances can be freely albeit reasonably applied, but when such necessary circumstances obtain, then so does the ‘oughtness’. Thus, so then does the corresponding imperative called Hare’s Law: □(OB⊃B!), and hence B!

Epistemic Consequentalism is a little device aimed to help against counter-claims of special pleading. The central idea is that we must look at the genre of the belief and the consequences of dropping the evidential imperative and determine the ethical value. To make an analogy, a surgeon trying to determine what testicle to remove on a patient based upon equiprobable evidence is a surgeon that could not use similar reasoning to mine. That is to say that the surgeon could not remove the left testicle because it makes the surgeon happier than any other option. For such comportment is irresponsible and should be frowned upon.

But, in sharp contrast, retired great grandma Billie Joan has no foreseeable and dire consequences for believing in God. Yet, if she dies comfortably and happier because she believes in God, then she and those close to her will likely only have good consequences. Thus, it seems to me that the ol’ bat has good morally rational grounds for God belief and if believed upon those terms, then it’d be a morally rational/justified belief.

Issues concerning doxastic voluntarism shouldn’t be a problem because a person could just take measures to increase the probative value of future belief such like surrounding one’s self with God-believers, quit reading atheology or just cease attempts to fulfill the evidential imperative for belief in God’s existence. Surely, it would be desirable to have evidential warrant but is it necessary to have epistemic justification for all beliefs or God belief? I certainly don’t see why the evidential imperative is necessary for all beliefs or God-belief; nor, have I been given good reason—despite the halo for evidentialism—to think otherwise.

So, by rearranging the evidentialist criterion for doxastic justification into a criterion for moral doxastic justification, we can surmise: doxastic state α about β is morally rational (justified) for S a t, iff, α meets the O(p/c) criteria for S at t.

The examples above offer a means to meet the criterion for moral rational belief that can be rationally believed under those terms. Whether or not a person must be aware that their belief meets those terms is an issue of the internalist-externalist debate and is not entirely relevant or important for us.

Considering God...Aesthetically and as a Human Core.

These arguments are not to be used in conjunction with the above argument and hence it stands or falls on their own merit.

I resist the apologist tendency to resort to natural theology to argue for the existence of God. In fact, I think natural theology has failed; and, I think it has failed because God is not scientifically or publicly verifiable. The claim to the existence of God and hence corresponding belief does not fall upon the domain of science; God-belief is (for some) a phenomeno-aesthetic claim. We, the theists, the aesthetes, perceive God in terms of how artists perceive beauty. (4) God is beauty and is found from within the person. Augustine once said: et ecce intus eras et ego foris et ibi te quaerebam—but see, you were within (me) and I was outside (myself); it was there that I sought you. And further: tu autem eras interior intimo meo—But you were more inward than my own inwardness. (5)

God is perceived and felt by us like that of an artist perceives and feel beauty; they are both of the same epistemic status. Yet, no one proclaims the artist’s belief in beauty to be irrationally held. And, rightfully so! For it is accepted that the artist’s belief is rationally legitimated for the artist to believe through what is called private evidence, not public evidence. Thence, I assert: if one belief is qualifies as rationally held through private evidence, then so should the other. (6)

Moreover, it seems to me that God-belief is a sui generis belief; it need not face the scrutiny of public evidentialism because it is an extension of the complex human being. God-belief functions not just as a core belief but as an identity; it provides coherence for our world; it provides a meaning for life and good reason for that person to get out of bed in the morning. I concur with the ‘new atheists’: God- belief may not be calculating, precise, or based upon some deduced proof. But, so what? Since when did humans become cyborgs or logic-chopping Vulcans? Or, since when ought we? We’re human and always living our lives to the calculating demands of evidentialism is like trying to travel a country with a map the size of a pinhead.

In a sense, I suppose God-belief is almost supra rationem, but I hesitate to make embrace this claim. I remain steadfast and assert God-belief as rationally held insofar as it is still rational to be human....it is still rational, isn’t it?

The best,

~M~
-----------------------------------------------

(1) Plantinga, Alvin. Justification in the 20th Century.

(2) “The central aim of this paper is to suggest that we should abandon the idea that there is a unique something or other properly called 'epistemic justification'.”Alston, William. Epistemic Desiderata.

(3) The idea here is something like systems theory: the part influences the whole.

(4) Hare’s Law can be based upon a prima facie oughtness or a deontic oughtness. I use a prima facie oughtness

(5)An aesthetic basis for belief in God is recognized by scholar Richard Viladesau: “...aesthetic experiences seems to play a major role—at least for some people—in the exercise for practical judgement for the belief in God...”.Theological Aesthetics. pp.,104.

(6)Turner, Denys. The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism., pp 53-55.

(7) I am well aware that I did not argue an artist’s belief in beauty can be rationally held through private evidence, but it seems to me to be prima facie justified in just saying so. I can’t imagine an argument to the contrary; and, too, I would find it difficult to defend the issue or at least explain the issue. This is because there is a certain degree of ineffability involved in these experiences. I hope the reader does not mind and grants me some charity.

[George Hathaway]

I would like to thank IIDB and the moderators of this Formal Debate Forum for providing the opportunity for formal debate beyond the brief back and forth usually found on message boards. I would also like to thank ~M~ for participating.

Before getting started I would like to introduce myself. It will help you evaluate my presuppositions about belief in general, and let you know what experience in formal logic I bring to the discussion.

I am a retired Professor of Computer Science (20 years, student an additional 15). My specialties are a) operating systems, b) formal language and the mathematical foundations of computer science – Gödel (my contribution to the art was a 'more heuristic proof of Post's Correspondence Problem'), c) programming languages and their compilers. I am also a retired practitioner of computer science – in particular a systems programmer of IBM big-iron (15 years). In addition, I am an amateur philosopher of sorts and enjoy logic-chopping. Although not relevant to the current debate, I am now a student of psychology and have opened a practice of hypnosis.

I am well described as skeptic or agnostic and currently atheist. For me, truth or falsity of statements are a matter of human opinion with one exception which will be discussed below. As a Mystic Universalist it is my judgment that if (conditionally only) there is a god that preserves consciousness that god would, if god is fair, treat all consciousness (human included) the same. I have gone so far as to found a non-church at http://ChurchOfTheOneMiracle.org to put my humanist universalist philosophy on the web.

With that introduction, let’s get started.

Counter to Theistic Belief is Rational.

We are here to decide the correctness of proposition: Theistic belief is rational. We search for whether or not “Theistic belief is rational” is a true1 proposition. Three conclusions will be reached.

Summary

Conclusion 1. The fundamental properly basic2 infallible belief is “I experience”3.
Conclusion 2. Theistic belief may be rational when that belief is untrue.
Conclusion 3. Theistic belief that rests on faith is irrational on its face.

Executive Summary: The only infallible properly basic belief or necessary truth for all consciousnesses is -- I experience. Any logical conclusions that are held by some philosophers4 who hold there are more properly basic beliefs may be reasoning from false premises. Both inductive5 and abductive6 reasoning are fallible. All other beliefs7 are actually derived from the one infallible properly basic belief -- I experience. To believe in a God that is literally beyond human ken – beyond the possibility of any person to know – requires that irrational (founded on lack of evidence) belief system known as having religious faith.

Argument

Definitions

Theistic belief means (for the purposes of this debate as agreed to by the participants) -- Belief in a single God with powerful characteristics beyond human ken.8

God means a specific single God (or pantheon with God then being the greatest of gods in the pantheon), while god (lower case) means a kind of being with supernatural powers. A theistic God (or one of the other gods if a pantheon) responds to belief magic9 or ritual magic10 with favors not available to those who do not believe or do not perform the ritual. There are examples of god-belief that are not theism -- God-belief: Pantheism11 is not a theistic belief. Panentheism12 is not a theistic belief. Deism13 is not a theistic belief.

Atheism means the denial of theism; to not hold any theistic belief. Atheism does not deny the possible existence of some god past, present or future, pending evidence.

Belief in means to believe the reality of a postulated being (or fact, but that does not concern us here).

How the following definition of rational belief was arrived at from a variety of choices.

1) A belief derived from logical deductive steps from trusted premises.
2) A belief presupposed by the society in which one lives.
3) A belief generated by a sane mind.
4) A belief that is so beautiful it must be true.

We must rule out (2) because mere local cultural belief can surely be wrong. Indeed, must be wrong because different cultures presuppose contradictory things.

It cannot be (3) either because sane minds have believed in God (their own version) and at the same time and place other sane minds have believed that no god is possible and hence no God. One or the other must be wrong and so (3) cannot be right.

It cannot be (4) because the same snowflake can inspire the atheist to believe that beauty is in the symmetry of nature, while the theist looks at it and declares that because it is so beautiful there must be a god behind the design. Again (4) cannot work because it leads to a contradiction.

Rational belief14 shall be taken to mean that the reason or cause of a belief is derived from the application of valid logical argument15 to deduce conclusions from prior knowledge.

Rational belief in must mean believed reality of a particular being (or fact, but that does not concern us here) derived from logical steps from trusted premises.

A note on the word is in the topic itself. One proposed topic which I rejected was “Theistic belief can be rational” for two reasons: 1) because the “can be” opens us to modal logic (Modal logic, in turn, deals with “possible” universes.16) and 2) because theistic belief can be rational.

Use of the word is has a number of implications. The topic as stated implies that the situation right now, today, given the information that is generally available to all and sundry (to rule out the cases of the primitive societies today that do not have the information that we have) is the state of things being discussed. It has been entirely rational in the past to hold a theistic belief based on the then-current evidence.

The fundamental properly basic infallible belief is “I experience."

Experience is fundamental18

What is theistic belief or, similarly, atheistic belief? Either is a conclusion from sensory experience along with mental experience.

What is necessary for belief? First, to be a conscious being, an experiencer. Second, to have the mental experience of using logic and reason to draw inferences and deductions. Third, to actually have had some experiences. Fourth, to have applied logic and reason to these experiences and drawn an inference or deduction.

We will define knowledge as justified true belief. Not just believed, but true belief. Not only true belief, but justified or warranted17 to hold that belief. The justification, the warrant that turns true belief into justified true belief, should rest on infallible true beliefs, absolute knowledge.

Descartes’ claim was that “I think” is absolute knowledge derived from mental experience. From this he concluded his famous “I am” as a justified or warranted true belief. Our argument is similar, but what I take as a more fundamental properly basic belief: I experience. This must come before his properly basic holding of “I think.”

Sensory experience

All the sensory experiences are taken to be fact by default in the mind upon presentation by the neurology. Sensory concepts like “green,” “hot,” “very loud,” “bright,” or “painful” arise unbidden. Even when one hears only imaginary voices, or sees hallucinations, the mind is given these as real by the neurology. Since we know there can be illusions we doubt and so crosscheck. It looks like it is there; can I sense it with another sense? Can I touch it, taste it, feel it, hear it, and smell it and they all agree? If all of these checks pass and if it passes the mental experience test then it is taken as knowledge. Not as the result of deduction but because of sensory experience.

Mental experience

The other check is done by the mind alone operating on memory of prior sensory experience. It must pass a memory experience consistency check. If there is still doubt, we may ask another to verify that they sense it the same way. Sanity check for knowledge.

One can believe in (the reality of) beings, like Santa Claus, Tinker Belle, Jesus, God, Mohammed, Buddha, Jim Jones, or Archangels. Some of these it is reasonable and logical to believe in (the reality of) and some not. Some of these beliefs make sense as knowledge, while others do not.

Properly basic beliefs are those beliefs that every adult human being with (at least a not well below average) sound mind (and so most sane philosophers) must surely accept unconditionally as being true. Some holdings commonly called properly basic:

I experience. Beingness exists. Change happens. I think. I am.
We know that beingness exists from experiencing beingness in ourselves.
We know that change happens from experiencing change.
We know that thinking happens from the experience of reasoning.
We know of personal existence from the experience of thinking.

The most fundamental properly basic belief, the one upon which all others rest, is “I experience.” Everything else that one believes must rest on this fundamental properly basic belief. Those who do not experience in any way, neither sensory experience, nor thinking experience are simply not capable of any belief at all.

All consciousnesses, human, inhuman, alien, cosmic, supernatural, or mystic must experience. To be conscious is to experience the sensation of first-person being -- to have a sense of the here and now changing.

All other properly basic beliefs derive from the fundamental properly basic belief -- I experience.

Theistic belief may be rational when that belief is untrue.

The holding that Theistic belief is rational then means that belief in a specific God could be, today, inferred from experience by means of logic or is properly basic and so will be believed by everyone.

Theistic belief could be rational for some individual if all of that individual’s experience leads that individual to deduce characteristics of an all-powerful being. Like the cargo cults of the South Pacific where aircraft are beneficent Gods. They had evidence; their conclusion was wrong. Incorrect but rational theism can be resolved with new experience that contradicts the tenets of that theism. This works only for those who have an open mind and so might consider their faith to be in error. This is rare among theists I have met.

There are fallible properly basic beliefs: Belief in the Flying Spaghetti Monster, Belief in the Great Pumpkin, Belief in Santa Claus, Belief in God, Belief in a Universalist God, Belief in the man Jesus, Belief in Christ, Belief in Allah, Belief in the existence of real prophets and a God who talked to them through personal revelation, Belief in Fairies, and Belief in Unicorns.

Are there any properly basic infallible beliefs? Yes, one. The foundation for all necessarily true belief. It is “I experience change.”

We should only draw conclusions from absolute truth because incorrect conclusions may be drawn by valid logical inference from faulty premises. One absolute truth is available to each of us and all of us (the sane and not mentally disabled adult ones, at least). The belief in God cannot be deduced from the only possible absolute truth that a human may know. Many theologians, even Saul/Paul knew this and demanded that the believer must have faith. If the Christian God could be proven, by the way, Christianity fails if Paul is right as he claimed the only way was by faith19 or belief magic.

Theistic belief rests on (irrational) faith.

Is the Theist Axiom valid?


The Theist Axiom

There is a God, a highest power in a supernatural realm that has unfulfilled wants about human behavior and has issued rules that must be obeyed because this God said so. Moreover, my co-believers will get benefits not available to people who worship a pretend god or none at all. To get these benefits, faith (belief magic) or ritual (ritual magic) must be used. Those that do not take this step will not only not get the benefits (in some theologies eternal joy, in others current benefit), but they will suffer a punishment (in some theologies eternal torture, in others current suffering).

Note that a being with unfulfilled wants is not omnipotent. For an omnipotent being all truly wanted events instantly happen.

It has been said by philosophers back when Latin was the language of philosophy: Ex nihilo nihil fit. From nothing nothing can come.

Yet, faith is “from nothing – believe.” Have faith because there are a whole bunch of people who had this faith and only good things came of that faith for the faithful. Have faith because some man (called a prophet) claimed to be able to know what God wants but is not getting, and this same God can predict the future with 100% accuracy.

Ex nihilo nihil fit, is the justification for claiming that there must have been a creator. Something cannot come from nothing.

However, strangely, is not used to rule out this thing called faith as a means to truth. The faithful who justify a creator thus must, in my opinion, suffer from horrible cognitive dissonance.

There is one out for the theist left. Personal revelation. As Muhammad had, like Joseph Smith and Buddha had and like Moses had (or the one that I, myself, had that led to my founding my non-church). If those were not hallucinations then surely we must believe. From the fact that hearsay reports of revelation seem so unreliable, then the theist’s only choice is to have a personal revelation that could be neither hallucination, nor a dream (my case) nor hearing voices.

Nothing comes from nothing.

In an interview with Alvin Plantinga (he is the one who is the “A”)20 I have added emphasis to show how Plantinga holds his belief from nothing.

Q. If we accept belief in God as rational on the grounds which you have presented, how do we also know that this belief is true?
A. You have to think about that in the context of the same question with respect to perception or memory or other minds. Fundamentally, in these cases it is a matter of trusting one's cognitive faculties, I guess. It seems true. One's inclined to believe in other minds, one's inclined to believe in the past, one's inclined to believe in immaterial objects and many of us are also under certain circumstances inclined to believe in God. I don't know if there's any way of getting outside of our faculties in these cases and sort of checking the matter independently. I don't know how one would do this.
Q. Some English philosophers-Farrer, Mascall, Trethowan, Owen, Lewis-see belief in God as being a fundamental insight triggered by certain experiences or under certain circumstances instead of seeing it as the end-product of an inferential process.
A. I'd go along with that. But I would say that for many people it's not so much a matter of coming to an insight by virtue of long hard thinking. It's more a matter of just being inclined, as Calvin says, under various circumstances, to form this belief about God.

Various Christian apologist arguments for God-in-general all eventually rest on similar considerations.21 The generality is that an awesome experience has led to their God-belief. The atheist scientist sees the same awesomeness and arrives at a different conclusion. Einstein is one such.
A knowledge of the existence of something we cannot penetrate, of the manifestations of the profoundest reason and the most radiant beauty - it is this knowledge and this emotion that constitute the truly religious attitude; in this sense, and in this alone, I am a deeply religious man. (Albert Einstein)22

I do not believe in a personal God and I have never denied this but have expressed it clearly. If something is in me which can be called religious then it is the unbounded admiration for the structure of the world so far as our science can reveal it. (Albert Einstein, 1954)

Endnotes.


1 In this essay I will use the word true as an adjective to describe propositions whose warrant (or justification) is in the correspondence of that proposition to reality.
2 A properly basic belief is one that a believer holds to be necessarily true without proof, possibly even contrary to reason. -- Amesbury, Richard, "Fideism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/entries/fideism/>.
3 Experience (when unqualified) includes both sensory experience and mental experience.
4 Plantinga, for example: “If naturalism is true, there is no God, and hence no God (or anyone else) overseeing our development and orchestrating the course of our evolution. And this leads directly to the question whether it is at all likely that our cognitive faculties, given naturalism and given their evolutionary origin, would have developed in such a way as to be reliable, to furnish us with mostly true beliefs.” -- http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/naturalism_defeated.pdf
5 Inductive reasoning is reasoning from stereotype. All cats I have experienced have had certain characteristics so the next one I will encounter will as well.
6 Abductive reasoning. This fits the stereotype found by inductive reasoning so this must be an example.
7 Even those so-called "properly basic" beliefs like "I see a tree" or "He is angry" or “That sunset is beautiful.”
8 See IIDB http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=232630&page=3
9 Belief magic is the theory that what one believes matters to God.
10 Ritual magic includes gestures like prostration, kneeling, keening, praying aloud, eating and drinking certain items, sacrifice, and worship.
11 Pantheism is a metaphysical and religious position. Broadly defined it is the view that (1) "God is everything and everything is God … the world is either identical with God or in some way a self-expression of his nature" (Owen 1971: 74). -- Levine, Michael, "Pantheism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2007 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/pantheism/>.
12 From a pantheistic perspective, panentheism is just a variety of theism. It involves both the belief that God is a person (has a mind, is conscious etc) and the belief that God is partially, or in some respect, transcendent. Like deism and pantheism, it too is best seen, from a Western perspective, as a response to theism — a way of overcoming allegedly unacceptable aspects. Levine, op cit.
13 Deistic accounts restrict God's activity to only the beginning of the cosmos -- Kvanvig, Jonathan, "Creation and Conservation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2007 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/creation-conservation/>.
14 The debate participants could not agree on a definition before the debate. The only way I could support the antithesis is to understand that the word means supported by logical argument.
15 Validity of an argument may be verified through symbolic logic. This does not rule out verification by other means.
16 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/#PosWorSem, and Edward Zalta in personal correspondence.
17 Plantinga, Alvin. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. And Plantinga, 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
18 Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 1999, Basic Books, A member of the Perseus Books Group, and Metaphors we Live By, same authors, The University of Chicago Press, 1980
19 Romans 3:22-24
20 http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth06.html
21 Turek and Geisler in I don’t have enough Faith to be an Atheist, and Francis Collins in Language of God.
22 http://www.spaceandmotion.com/albert-einstein-god-religion-theology.htm

[~M~]

How the following definition of rational belief was arrived at from a variety of choices.

1) A belief derived from logical deductive steps from trusted premises.
2) A belief presupposed by the society in which one lives.
3) A belief generated by a sane mind.
4) A belief that is so beautiful it must be true.
We must rule out (2) because mere local cultural belief can surely be wrong. Indeed, must be wrong because different cultures presuppose contradictory things. It cannot be (3) either because sane minds have believed in God (their own version) and at the same time and place other sane minds have believed that no god is possible and hence no God. One or the other must be wrong and so (3) cannot be right. It cannot be (4) because the same snowflake can inspire the atheist to believe that beauty is in the symmetry of nature, while the theist looks at it and declares that because it is so beautiful there must be a god behind the design. Again (4) cannot work because it leads to a contradiction.

Hathaway is presenting an exposition of rational belief that is bereft of proper understanding of the subject. For instance, he wants to rule out number (2) because a ‘mere local cultural belief can surely be wrong’. Yet, simply because a belief can be wrong does not make it irrational to believe. Beliefs based upon science, history, and so forth can be wrong too. Heck, if we extend Hathaway’s reasoning, then any belief wherein we can be wrong is irrational and that includes well evidenced beliefs.

Now, while I, like Hathaway, do not necessarily agree with (3), I’d say Hathaway’s reasoning for dismissing (3) is odd. Rationally believed beliefs can be argued as person relative and need not be consistent with other rationally believed beliefs of other people. For instance, let us take the roughly given claim of reliablism:

If S’s believing p at t results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process...then S’s belief in p at t is justified.


Imagine that Person S’s belief that God exists fits the above definition and Person R’s belief that God does not exist fits it too. Just because person S’s belief that God exists fits this definition and Person R’s belief that God exists does not, it does not mean that reliablism is somehow untrue. It would just be the case that both beliefs from Person S and Person R are rationally held. Do note that there is a qualifier and hence does not violate the law of identity.


And, what about (4)? If the reference to beauty is a response to my own claim, then we have some problems. First, I have a hard time seeing a theist problem ‘I see beauty and hence their must be a design’. The word ‘must’ is a modal operator for ‘necessarily’ and is not something I would not support. Moreover, if this is a reference to my claim, then it is a strawman. This is because I did not say that the phenomeno-aesthetic claim was an inference from beauty to design, but that it was a phenomeno-aesthetic claim itself.

Finally, we arrive (1). (1) is Hathaway’s golden boy. I’m banking on the idea that Hathaway will change his definition upon the following accentuations:

(a) The word ‘deduce’ and no other qualifications would leave beliefs based upon inductive and abductive reasoning in the dust. In other words, say goodbye to many apparent rationally believed beliefs in history and science.
(b) While, I do think it could still be rationally believed, Hathaway’s golden boy would also include reasoning that is circular.
(c) For Hathaway, true justified beliefs are the ‘trusted’ premises that are then deduced to reliable beliefs. But, what of epistemic chains? That is to ask, what if I wish to infer other propositions that are to be taken as rationally believed beliefs from other rationally believed beliefs that are in turn deduced from ‘trusted premises’, ‘knowledge’ or what Hathaway calls ‘justified true beliefs’. It seems to me that such an epistemic chain has no place in Hathaway’s argument. This is because Hathaway lists rationally believed beliefs as those that hail from justified true beliefs and not other rationally believed beliefs. The problem with this is that it would challenge the accumulative arenas of thought that atheists hold so dear: science and history. You see, these arenas of thought operate on an accumulation of believeds; they operate on an epistemic chain. The rationally believed beliefs are used to help infer or directly infer other propositions that will, in turn, also be rationally believed beliefs. Yet, this cannot happen under Hathaway’s definition because it is rationally believed beliefs are those justified by knowledge, not other rationally believed beliefs.
(d) Hathaway’s exposition on JTB seems to lack any sort of development from the criticism that stems from the Gettier counterexamples. This is epistemology 101.


I could go on but what's the point?


Since we know there can be illusions we doubt and so crosscheck. It looks like it is there; can I sense it with another sense?


I sense a certain amount of what is called ‘epistemic circularity' here. But, I am not committed to attacking coherentism in this reply. However, it would be interesting to hear on what basis is the belief that coherentism is true is a rationally believed belief.


We should only draw conclusions from absolute truth because incorrect conclusions may be drawn by valid logical inference from faulty premises.


The idea here is that we should always try to be sure that our methodology is what is called ‘truth tropic’ or going towards ‘truth’. (whatever the heck ‘truth’ is) I take it that Hathaway is referring to a grand narrative Truth and not personal truth. The arguments I gave are not ‘truth tropic’ and I reject, for reasons mentioned in my first statement, why ALL beliefs must or should be based upon some sort of ‘truth tropic’ methodology.

There is a God, a highest power in a supernatural realm that has unfulfilled wants about human behavior and has issued rules that must be obeyed because this God said so. Moreover, my co-believers will get benefits not available to people who worship a pretend god or none at all. To get these benefits, faith (belief magic) or ritual (ritual magic) must be used. Those that do not take this step will not only not get the benefits (in some theologies eternal joy, in others current benefit), but they will suffer a punishment (in some theologies eternal torture, in others current suffering)


The debate scope or topic does not necessitate me to affirming a God with or relations to any of the above. But, please, if you think you can show our readers that I am somehow obligated to the abovementioned, then do so! I encourage you.

<edit>

[George Hathaway]

From ~M~'s initial post:

In the original, I had natural theology, moral pragmatism, religious experiences and an argument from belief as supra rationem.
Then I cannot respond to them since you did not present them. I am limited by our agreed upon rules of the debate to only respond to the arguments presented.


God-belief-- Contra Rationem? Nah!

Let us discuss Person S. Imagine that after a series of powerful ‘religious experiences’ had by Person S, Person S examined the evidence available to Person S for God’s existence and non-existence. Person S examined these evidences in a hope of finding good evidential reasons to base a belief upon. Now, imagine that Person S honestly analyzed much evidence from the best philosophers on both sides of the debate for many years and to the best of Person S’s ability. Yet, from this, person S cannot honestly assign probative values to neither God’s existence nor non-existence that extend past 0.5 or go below 0.5. Thus we have the probative values for God’s existence and God’s non-existence being equiprobable for Person S and it does not seem, for Person S, like this equiprobabality will change.

Person S feels frustrated. It seems to Person S that believing in God’s existence has a powerful influence on her life—she feels much happier (ceteris paribus) believing in God rather than non-belief in God. So, what should Person S do? George Hathaway, I suspect, would demand Person S keep the evidential imperative and so much the worse for Person S’s unhappiness. But, what do I say?

I argue this: if under the abovementioned circumstances, then Person S ought to believe God exists. Under a version of denotic logic, this is translated as: O(p/c). This logical statement says that Person S ought to do p given that circumstance c obtains.

I say there is a moral obligation for Person S because in situations like the abovementioned scenario, people ought to do what makes them the happiest; this is a normative claim that I take to be prima facie justified. Moreover, it reasonable to say that Person S’s happiness has great intrinsic value to Person S because it feels good to be the happiest one can be. Not only this, but, it is likely true that Person S’s feeling happier has great extrinsic value. This is because the people who are close to Person S will (likely) benefit from Person S’s magnified happiness and hence society will too. (3)

Notably, this ‘ought’ obtains only under the circumstance that c obtains. There can be 1 to a near infinite of necessary circumstances denoted by c, “c₁ ...... c₆ ”, to which we can assume as present within c. Certainly, a circumstance could be that belief in God and any corresponding behaviour would need to be reasonably harmless to the believer and other people. Further circumstances can be freely albeit reasonably applied, but when such necessary circumstances obtain, then so does the ‘oughtness’. Thus, so then does the corresponding imperative called Hare’s Law: □(OB⊃B!), and hence B!

"..from this, Person S cannot honestly assign probative values to neither God's existence nor non-existence that extend past 0.5 or go below 0.5."

The Searcher after truth (Person S in your metonymy) can honestly assign probability values (not 'probative values') to both. The rational searcher might well note that the world could be as it is without any Theistic God at all and thus lower that probability to an infinitesimal. He might well understand that pantheism, panentheism or deism are not easily ruled out, and still conclude that there is no Theistic God (one beyond human ken and so must be taken on faith). In one stroke he can rule out all of these because faith is "something from nothing."

"...Gods existence has a powerful influence on her life -- she feels much happier (ceteris paribus) believing in God rather than non-belief in God."

It is not "ceteris paribus" -- all things being equal -- because all things are not equal regarding which (theistic or non-theistic) God to believe in.

An individual whose highest value is personal happiness (even at the expense of others) is well described by the word sociopath. That "it makes me happier" (all things being equal) to believe in X can lead to false belief. If it makes me happier to be a (successful) kidnapper (who is then happier with the ransom) as a justification for kidnapping comes to mind.

I argue this: if under the abovementioned circumstances, then Person S ought to believe God exists. Under a version of denotic logic, this is translated as: O(p/c). This logical statement says that Person S ought to do p given that circumstance c obtains.

I say there is a moral obligation for Person S because in situations like the abovementioned scenario, people ought to do what makes them the happiest; this is a normative claim that I take to be prima facie justified.
"...if under the abovementioned circumstances, then Person S ought to believe God exists." That it makes someone happier in any given circumstances does not demand an ought. There are, after all, commonly held ethical and moral considerations not involved with any religion.

There is a doxastic holding that I agree with. Philosophers -- or even more generally, everyone -- ought to be concerned with how any particular belief is warranted.



Epistemic Consequentalism is a little device aimed to help against counter-claims of special pleading. The central idea is that we must look at the genre of the belief and the consequences of dropping the evidential imperative and determine the ethical value.

... retired great grandma Billie Joan has no foreseeable and dire consequences for believing in God. Yet, if she dies comfortably and happier because she believes in God, then she and those close to her will likely only have good consequences. Thus, it seems to me that the ol’ bat has good morally rational grounds for God belief and if believed upon those terms, then it’d be a morally rational/justified belief.

...

The examples above offer a means to meet the criterion for moral rational belief that can be rationally believed under those terms. Whether or not a person must be aware that their belief meets those terms is an issue of the internalist-externalist debate and is not entirely relevant or important for us.

This argument also applies to terrorist suicide bombers. They see no foreseeable and dire consequences for believing in God. They are sure they will get their 72 grapes (if one takes the Qu'ran literally) in a future afterlife just like great grandma Billie Joan "knows" she will meet her great grandchild in heaven.

To exercise irrationality -- faith -- because it promises future benefit does not provide the necessary ought. There are other means than faith to the very same ethics and morality (which are an ought ) that great grandma Billie Joan so loves.



Considering God...Aesthetically and as a Human Core.

It would be a fantastic state of affairs if some kind of really wonderful afterlife could be obtained really, really easily. It would be a most wonderful thing if my just believing in a particular God were magic. It would be so grand if ritual magic could have God-provided benefits. Wouldn't it be wonderful and awsome if the Creator of the Universe cared for me as an individual.

These considerations do not make any God-belief more probable than non-God-belief. These considerations do not provide an ought to that belief.

Although Keats asserted "Beauty is truth, truth beauty" it is generally not the case. It is quite often the case that truth has beauty. Mathemeticians search for symmetry and simplicity. There is an elegance in Euler's equation, in Newton's laws, in Einstein's famous conclusion. Sometimes mathematicians discover inelegant truths like the proof of the four color theorem which is a very long computer generated proof that, in my opinion, no human being can understand as a whole.

Some truths are ugly. It is an ugly truth that 9-11 happened, for example.

Some beauty has no relationship to truth. There are beautiful thoughts that have been expressed by poets that have no relationship to reality. "In Xanadu did Kubla Khan A stately pleasure-dome decree : Where Alph, the sacred river, ran Through caverns measureless to man: Down to a sunless sea."


In a sense, I suppose God-belief is almost supra rationem, but I hesitate to make embrace this claim. I remain steadfast and assert God-belief as rationally held insofar as it is still rational to be human....it is still rational, isn’t it?
Yes, God-belief is held to be by theists (to translate the Latin) "above rationality." This is, in point of fact, exactly how they justify their belief by faith. They recognize that belief by faith is not rational and hold instead that it is "above rationality." I look at the same beliefs and find them sub rationem -- "beneath rationality."

To be rational is not a necessary property of being a sane adult human being. There are irrational, yet sane, people in the world today. Pick any two leaders of religions contrary to your theology (whether that theology is theist or atheist). For me I note that the Pope and Muslim authorities are both sane and yet both them are (the theist may hold that only one is) dead wrong.

Only after the fundamental belief (non rationem) in their God (Yaweh or Allah) is first assumed (by means of irrational faith) do they engage their sane rationality.

Regards,
George Hathaway

(This response was prepared and submitted within hours after ~M~'s first post. The FD moderators wanted my rebuttal to follow yours. I have complied by re-posting this.)

[~M~]

In Defense of The Moral Argument

Hello, reader. Permit me, if you will, a question: whose arguments received the bulk of Hathaway’s reply? Because my arguments, I must say, remain unscathed and virtually unrecognized.

Hathaway says that a rational researcher would employ Ockham’s razor and proclaim that the ‘world could be seen without any Theistic God’. What reason does he give for that? Well, none. For Hathaway, it’s just that way. Yet, what Hathaway leaves out is that Ockham’s razor is to be applied to the simplest explanation and that it does not simply necessitate non-theism. Scholar and philosopher of science Richard Swinburne wrote a whole chapter on why we should accept theism as the simplest explanation. (1) Thence, it is all but settled and Hathaway’s claim needs to be supported.

Moreover, what if the person could not decide which state of affairs was the simplest and hence the razor could not be deployed—what then? Hathaway would have you believe a rational person would not see it that way. I certainly do disagree with this. But, yet, we are not talking about rational people, but only rationally believed beliefs. Thus Hathaway is off track.

Then, to my great dismay, he wants to relate great grandma Billie Joan to a sociopath. Yet, this completely ignores what I said about epistemic consequentalism and the deontic conditions of O(p/c). My arguments were clear as day that the argument from moral pragmatism is to only be applied to situations wherein there are no considerably harmful consequence(s). Therefore, I must ask, how Hathaway got the idea that he can compare a kidnapper or even suicide bombers to great grandma Billie Joan? I say again: if any corresponding behaviour from the belief is considerably harming or imposing upon other people, then yes! By all means! You better evidence those beliefs because it becomes a social responsibility and liability.

Yet, reader, I ask you: are the beliefs and consequences of great grandma Billie Joan comparable to kidnappers or suicide bombers? Of course not! If they were, that is, if Hathaway is right, then considering that a huge majority of the world’s population “irrationally” believes in God, then where is the regnant chaos among my fellow Canadians? There is none.

Hathaway moves unto denying that in ‘any given circumstances’ there is no ‘ought’ for great grandma Billie Joan to believe in God. But, I'm curious: what about her belief in God simply being permitted rather than obligated? And, I should also ask: what reasons does Hathaway give for this denial? Well, none. He just says:

There is a doxastic holding that I agree with. Philosophers -- or even more generally, everyone -- ought to be concerned with how any particular belief is warranted.

Yet, if this is just a matter of simple concern, then I concur. But, what’s his point?

I suspect that Hathaway means to defend evidentialism. Although, of course, he actually offers no defence for evidentialism and yet in my first statement I made it quite clear that epistemologists are not settled on the matters. I say again, there is no consensus among epistemologists that justified doxastic states are only those that are well evidenced.(2) It seems as though Hathaway wants to continue the assumption upon an ipsedixitism. Ironically, so it seems, Hathaway’s own imposition of evidentialism is without evidence!

Reconsidering God...Aesthetically

Hathaway then goes unto stating that my argument from phenomeno-aesthetics does not offer an ‘ought’ for God-belief or make it the proposition that ‘God exists’ more probable than not. Well, yes. I concur. But, I was clear that the argument was not to be taken in conjunction with the other argument. Hence, there is no good reason to think I was offering an argument frm 'oughtness'. Moreover, even in the absence of ‘oughtness’, it does not mean that God-belief is not to be permitted. There is a difference between ought to do X and permitted to do X.

And, contra Hathaway, my argument was not based upon probable reasoning and so I agree with him that it does not make God more probable. Yet, what's his point? I believe this is Hathaway’s implicit attempt to impose evidentialism through the backdoor. But, evidentialism is something he needs to argue for, but did not even try to argue for. Thus Hathaway begs the question!


I conclude that Hathaway's reply was largely the construction and genocide of strawmen. Hathaway offered poor analogies and begged the question.

Did I win this debate? I think so. But, I don’t feel like a victor. I feel misunderstood and frustrated.

I apologize for the stillborn debate.

The best,

~M~

[George Hathaway]

Here is a summary of my initial post and ~M~'s response:

Conclusion 1. The fundamental properly basic infallible belief is “I experience”.
Conclusion 2. Theistic belief may be rational when that belief is untrue.
Conclusion 3. Theistic belief that rests on faith is irrational on its face.


Conclusion 1 stands unrebutted.

The case is made in Philosophy in the Flesh that all beliefs are grounded in sensory and mental experience. I have presented a version (quite abbreviated, they wrote a whole book that recognizes and addresses all counter arguments).

See http://stairs.umd.edu/236/plantinga.html for a philosophical discussion of Plantinga's version of "properly basic."

Agreement to Conclusion 2 came in a discussion of my definition of rationality.

He wants to rule out (2) [A belief presupposed by the society in which one lives] because a "mere cultural belief can surely be wrong." and then you go on to say Yet, simply because a belief can be wrong does not make it irrational to believe.

I find it quite rational to believe in wrong facts. That is the point of conclusion 2.

However, it is quite irrational to believe in wrong facts that are known by the believer to be wrong.

We are left then with any rebuttal to my definition of rationality (what ~M~ calls my "golden boy."): A rational belief is a belief derived from logical deduction from trusted premises. I am not surprised that ~M~ might disagree. We could not agree to a definition in the pre-debate.

(a) The word ‘deduce’ and no other qualifications would leave beliefs based upon inductive and abductive reasoning in the dust. In other words, say goodbye to many apparent rationally believed beliefs in history and science.
(b) While, I do think it could still be rationally believed, Hathaway’s golden boy would also include reasoning that is circular.
(c) For Hathaway, true justified beliefs are the ‘trusted’ premises that are then deduced to reliable beliefs. But, what of epistemic chains? That is to ask, what if I wish to infer other propositions that are to be taken as rationally believed beliefs from other rationally believed beliefs that are in turn deduced from ‘trusted premises’, ‘knowledge’ or what Hathaway calls ‘justified true beliefs’. It seems to me that such an epistemic chain has no place in Hathaway’s argument. This is because Hathaway lists rationally believed beliefs as those that hail from justified true beliefs and not other rationally believed beliefs. The problem with this is that it would challenge the accumulative arenas of thought that atheists hold so dear: science and history. You see, these arenas of thought operate on an accumulation of believeds; they operate on an epistemic chain. The rationally believed beliefs are used to help infer or directly infer other propositions that will, in turn, also be rationally believed beliefs. Yet, this cannot happen under Hathaway’s definition because it is rationally believed beliefs are those justified by knowledge, not other rationally believed beliefs.
(d) Hathaway’s exposition on JTB seems to lack any sort of development from the criticism that stems from the Gettier counterexamples. This is epistemology 101.


(a) All scientific, mathematical, and historical rationally held beliefs fall in one of two classes. Unconditional and conditional. Examples of unconditional all rest on direct experience. Subitizing (instant justified knowledge of how many objects are seen when 1,2 or 3 objects are presented) along with the realization that 1 item together with 1 item is 2 items is how mathematics gets started. (From Where Mathematics Comes From by Lakoff and Núñez) Other examples of unconditional belief are that gravity happens and that electromagnetic effects happen; there are almost no others. The rest of scientific, mathematical and historic beliefs are conditional. They are all of the form (If axioms then conclusions). Scientists, mathematicians and historians change their belief when an axiom is proven to be in error. The axioms are recognized as axioms. The scientist believes his axioms match reality, but recognizes that they may be only inductive or abductive and so may (in the fullness of time) be shown to have been in error.

I recognize the Axiom of Experience (The future will be like the past because, in the past, the future has been like the past) as an axiom, not an absolute fact. It rests entirely on induction. A pretty good one though, I think.

(b) I see no argument for circularity. I see an unsupported assertion of circularity. The "trusted premises" in my definition of rationality is: What must believed by all ("I experience change.") This is the non-circular grounding. Further trusted premises may be found by logical deduction.

(c) Contrary to your assertion -- "It seems to me that such an epistemic chain has no place in Hathaway's argument" -- I delight in epistemic chains. From prior trusted premises new trusted premises may be deduced.


(d) You incorporate by reference "Gettier's counterexamples." This hardly qualifies as an argument. First, it commits the fallacy of argument from authority. Secondly, you have not presented the counterexample nor shown how they relate to my definition of rationality.

I said, "We should only draw conclusions from absolute truth because incorrect conclusions may be drawn from faulty premises." There is nothing mystic in my usage of the words "absolute truth." All I meant (and it may have been clearer to use different words) was that we should only draw conclusions from known facts. Known facts -- what I called absolute truth -- are about what actually is real. Some of these are grounded in direct experience. Others are correctly deduced from prior known facts.

Your "I'm banking on the idea that Hathaway will change his definition" is banking on something that happens not to be the case. I hope I have cleared up your misunderstanding of my wording.

I presented the Theist Axiom as a definition, in a sense, of what I understand all theisms to be. "The debate scope does not necessitate me to affirm a God with or relations to any of the above." I am not concerned with your beliefs. I do not know what your theology is. You might well be atheist. An atheist can argue a theist position.

You did not deny the accuracy of the Theist Axiom as applied, not necessarily to you, but instead to theists.

Conclusion 3 that theistic religious belief (as described in the Theist Axiom) is something from nothing -- the epitome of illogic -- stands unrebutted.

Finally, I would like to thank the moderators of the Formal Debate Forums for their work in this debate.

Yours,

George Hathaway

[Alcyonian]

Thank you ~M~ and George Hathaway for participating in this debate. Discussions can now continue in the Peanut Gallery (http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=234726). This debate is now concluded.

Thread closed.

Alcyonian (FD Moderator)