The Logical Problem of Evil proves that God does not exist. Dante Alighieri vs. ~M~.

[George Hathaway]

This thread has been set up for a formal debate between Dante Alighieri and ~M~.


Resolved: the Logical Problem of Evil proves that God does not exist.

Dante Alighieri will affirm and ~M~ will oppose.

There will be four 600 word rounds with up to 10 days to respond. Dante Alighieri will go first. (per parameters (http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showpost.php?p=5157706&postcount=15))

First entry due February 29, 2008.


A Peanut Gallery (http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=5156009&postcount=1) is set up in the Existence of Gods forum for the rest of us to comment on the debate.

Enjoy the debate!

- George Hathaway, FD Moderator

[Dante Alighieri]

What's the Problem?

The logical problem of evil (LPoE) proves that God doesn't exist, where God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. The LPoE argues that since God is able to not allow such evils (being omnipotent and omniscient) and God should not allow such evils (being morally perfect), worlds at which God and evil coexist are impossible. The actual world contains evil, therefore, God doesn't exist.

The Theist's Reply

Theists typically offer morally sufficient reasons (MSRs) to counter the LPoE. They concede that God could eliminate evil, but they argue that God does not want to eliminate it, since there is some MSRs for its existence. That is to say that God has a good reason for allowing evil that permits its existence, so worlds at which God and evil co-exist are compatible.

My Reply

My argument is that MSRs are impossible. p =def "God has MSRs for allowing evil." The theist holds that

(1) possibly (God has MSRs for allowing evil) [◊p]

MSRs entail that there are some purposes such that God should accomplish such that God must allow evil. This means that it's impossible that such purposes are accomplished without God's allowing of evil; if it were possible, then God could have accomplished such purposes without evil. Allowing evil in that case is gratuitous and inconsistent with God. The theist actually holds to □(q & r) =def "necessarily(God accomplishes His purposes and allows evil)"

(2) Impossibly (God accomplishes His purposes and doesn't allow evil) [~◊~(q & r)]

This entails

(3) Necessarily (q & r) [□(q & r)]

Recall that the theist wants this to be possible. So,

(4) Possibly (2) [◊□(q & r)]

Under S5 modal logic, (4) entails (3), since anything that is possibly necessary is necessary. (3) also entails (4), since any true proposition is possible. (3) and (4) entail each other, are materially equivalent, and logically equivalent, since both express the necessity of (q & r). However, propositions are necessary iff its negation entails contradictions. However, no contradiction follows from ~(q & r) i.e. God could join humanity in loving union with Him without evil. Hence, it's possible that God accomplishes His purposes and doesn't allow evil. The argument continues

(5) (3) entails (2) [□(q & r) → ~◊~(q & r)]

(6) Possibly (God accomplishes His purposes and doesn't allow evil) [◊~(q & r)]

(7) Not necessarily (q & r) [~□(q & r)]

(s & t) =def "God and evil exist." (s & t) entails the necessity of (q & r) or the former is false. So,

(8) If (s & t), then (2) [(s & t) → □(q & r)]

(9) (7) [~□(q & r)]

(10) ~(s & t)

By DeMorgan's Law,

(11) Either God doesn't exist or evil doesn't exist. [(~s v ~t)]

Add the fact that evil exists

(12) Evil exists [i.e., t]

By disjunctive syllogism, it follows that

(13) God doesn't exist [i.e., ~s]

Theistic Rejoinders

Plantinga's Free Will Defense (PFWD) is a common rejoinder. I'll say one thing. PFWD uses libertarian freedom. LF requires undetermined actions, which are uncaused. Now, if so, then the agent exercises no causal influence over their own actions, so the agent doesn't actualize their own actions: they aren't responsible for them. LF defenders reply that the agent causing the action is uncaused. But,the agent exercises no causal influence of their own undertaking of the action. It simply happens and the agent isn't responsible. If determined, the agent acts contrary to LF. Or it simply happened. We can go down the infinite regress of the agent causing that it causes... but nothing causes infinite regresses. Therefore, the agent's actions are brute facts, which simply happen; hence, the agent isn't responsible for them. A theory of freedom in which the agent isn't responsible for their own actions is incoherent. Since PFWD uses LF, PFWD is incoherent.

[George Hathaway]

This debate has been cancelled due to administrator action involving ~M~. The peanut gallery will remain open.

Many thanks to Dante Alighieri.