Contextualization of the action in the moral judgment thereof

[ible]

John does some action.

Before we can judge John as acting morally just or not, do we need to know
1. The situation surrounding the action?
2. The motives with which John did the action?
3. Something else...?
Examples:
i) Consider the action to be "the rape of Mary." In another thread (http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=5448167#post5448167), Angra Mainyu considered the enslavement of the human race by a superior alien race that plays mind games: if John does not rape Mary, many humans will die as a result, including John and Mary after they are both raped. But if John does rape Mary, the human race will continue as is.

But you wouldn't care to know that if you didn't think you needed to know the situation context.

If you believed motives were important, you would have to ask, "Did John rape Mary because he wanted to save humanity, or because Mary is a 10, or maybe something else?" Based upon the answer, you would say John acted morally or not.


ii) For a different example (also (http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=5453679#post5453679) given by Angra Mainyu), consider Ali who thinks it is right to give Al-Qaeda a nuclear weapon. Does Ali act morally if he gives Al-Qaeda the bomb, or does he act immorally? If the situation context is considered, Westerners would say Ali acts immorally. But if only his motives were considered, we would say Ali acts morally.



How you judge will also of course depend on your definition of morality. Perhaps--
A. A moral action maximizes good--where what is "good" is left to be defined.
B. That which is virtuous is a moral action--where virtue is meant as honesty, integrity, chastity, charity, etc.
C. Something else...?
Examples:
i) For the alien example, if you held to the "A" morality, and believed that human life was the good to be maximized, you would say that John was moral if he raped Mary, regardless of his motives. If you held to the B morality, you would say that John was moral if he didn't rape Mary in order to be chaste in their interaction, even though the aliens rape and kill them both, and kill many others besides. It would be the aliens who were immoral, not John.


iii) For a different situation example, consider two people (let's say their names are Mac and Donald), unknown to each other, that are locked in two separate rooms. They cannot communicate with each other. A mean-spirited fellow has strapped each of them to a bomb and is watching them from some control room. Each person is given a detonator to the other person's bomb. If one person blows up the other, then he is free to go. But if neither blows the other up, then the controller will blow them both up within 15 minutes. I would argue that the situation in which the controller blows them both up is the most moral, because the two blokes made the right choice, to not kill the other person.

Though, if the two people could communicate, I could imagine a situation where it would be moral for only one of them to die. I.e., one person wishes to sacrifice himself so the other can live. If you can't communicate, then pushing the button to kill the other person is tantamount to saying you deserve to live more than the other, and you don't know the other person.



Feel free to share your own moral dilemmas (or talk about the ones I listed) and how you think they point you towards accepting one or another view of morality and action contextualization.

[Angra Mainyu]

Just before some of the readers get confused about my scenarios, I presented them in a specific case when it was discussed the intuitive reaction to certain judgments; I was saying that even under certain metaethical assumptions, I'd reject a certain claim of metaphysical necessity, but I was talking about my intuitive judgment on the matter - not making a claim beyond that.

The other scenarios came up in the context of our discussion.

That said, I'm going to step out for now (I'm already involved in some other threads) and see the debate go on. :)

[Valahan]

I would say that you have to know the motive (or intention) behind the action. The situation surrounding the action would actually be included in the motive.
In the case of John, did he rape Mary only because the alien overlords forced him to? Or was he planning on raping her anyways and used the aliens as an excuse to carry out his intention? In the latter case, even if he ends up saving humanity, his action is immoral because of his intention.
Of course, intention is the component of action that is the most difficult to verify or ascertain.

[ible]

I would say that you have to know the motive (or intention) behind the action. The situation surrounding the action would actually be included in the motive.
In the case of John, did he rape Mary only because the alien overlords forced him to? Or was he planning on raping her anyways and used the aliens as an excuse to carry out his intention? In the latter case, even if he ends up saving humanity, his action is immoral because of his intention.
Of course, intention is the component of action that is the most difficult to verify or ascertain.

No doubt. People can lie about it. But is motive the only thing that needs to be considered? In the Al-Qaeda example, is Ali immoral for giving them a bomb, even though he thinks it is good to do so?


I have some more stuff from Angra Mainyu's post (http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showthread.php?p=5455351#post5455351) to reply to. George raping William in the alien scenario is another moral dilemma Angra brought up.



If the aliens planted a planet-exploding time bomb on Mt. Everest, and George came to the rescue by climbing the mountain and defusing it just in the nick of time, then we would say that George's actions in and of themselves saved humanity. In your story, when George rapes William and saves humanity, it is [i]not/i] his actions per se which save humanity, it is only through a twisted alien mind that his actions guarantee human survival.

No, there's no such thing as the actions "in and of themselves". In both cases, George acts with the intent of preventing a certain result. In both cases, if George had acted in a different manner, the result had occurred.

What you're doing is pack your own moral judgment behind the assignation of causality to George's actions; I've yet to see a definition of "cause" that would make his actions not play a causal role in one case and play a causal role in another.

But even if you came up with that definition, my intuitions would remain, so what's the point?

It's pretty clear to me that saving the world by raping somebody is not at all directly causally connected; the causal nature of it occurs only through some mediating alien mind and more directly through alien weaponry. Whereas, saving the world by defusing a bomb that would blow it up is directly causally related. I'm no high 'n mighty philosopher, so I don't know exactly how they would word this stuff.


Regarding whether morality is objective or not,...
And, by the way, multiplication tables do need people to "exist" (though I don't I'd be correct to say they "exist" in a strong sense some theists imply). If there were no people, there'd be no such tables.
As long as Nature's laws are functioning, multiplication tables in an abstract sense exist.

Regarding morality; sure, if there were no living things, and everything only followed Nature's laws, then there would be no such thing as objective morality. But if the universe was purposed to harbor life, objective morality can exist.



Well, I don't think we'll find anything that we're not looking for.... if people want to retain their own intuitions about morality, they won't get anywhere, and they won't find an agreement.

I'm not sure what you mean here.

If you're not looking for OM, you're not going to find it.


I still wonder what this "objective morality" (OM) is, but you say that our intuitions lead us to it. So, our intuitions are a tool for finding OM. So, once we find OM, we want to make our intuitions like OM? :confused:

I can't make sense of it. Our intuitions are what "detects" OM, right? Else, we couldn't use them to find OM. How can we then make them like OM?


Consider a man who just learned (on his own) some small part of mathematical logic or some such thing. Reason brought him to this learning, yet his reason isn't perfect. He makes his reason better by learning the logic.

He was using his reason before to discover other things about reality, but when he first realized that it was reason he was using, he reasoned he needed to learn more about reason.

Just when we first realize we are using our moral intuitions to judge things about reality, we realize that we ought to learn more about morality :).

As an aside, I don't necessarily want to break moral intuitions apart from reason; C.S. Lewis argues that they are at root the same.

[Angra Mainyu]

It's pretty clear to me that saving the world by raping somebody is not at all directly causally connected; the causal nature of it occurs only through some mediating alien mind and more directly through alien weaponry. Whereas, saving the world by defusing a bomb that would blow it up is directly causally related. I'm no high 'n mighty philosopher, so I don't know exactly how they would word this stuff.
My point was a reply to the claim that you judged actions "in and of themselves" (and/or recommendation for me to do the same):

You said in the other thread (http://iidb.infidels.org/vbb/showpost.php?p=5455087&postcount=141):


How is that irrelevant? Your point was that George's actions are not wrong; I disagree. If the aliens planted a planet-exploding time bomb on Mt. Everest, and George came to the rescue by climbing the mountain and defusing it just in the nick of time, then we would say that George's actions in and of themselves saved humanity. In your story, when George rapes William and saves humanity, it is not his actions per se which save humanity, it is only through a twisted alien mind that his actions guarantee human survival.

When we realize that distinction, that we are dealing with two parties--George and the aliens--then we judge George's actions on their own merits (which are none, he raped somebody), and we judge the aliens' actions on their own merits (also none, they are evil). Plain and simple.

But consider again the dog scenario.

The aliens don't tell George to rape anyone, but to kill his neighbor's dog.

If he does not, they'll use the bioweapon and kill (slowly and painfully) 10 million people (the dog, however, will not be harmed).

If he kills the dog, they will not use the weapon.

George kills the dog, and the weapon is not used.

Would you judge George's actions in the same way as if he'd killed the dog because he found the barking annoying, or for fun?

Or the suicide scenario: they tell George to commit suicide (leaving his children orphan). The alternative is that they'll use the weapon as before, and George's children will be among the 10 million victims.

So, he commits suicide, etc.

My suggestion is that maybe you too take context into consideration, and there are no actions "in an of themselves", but actions in context (which can be considered actions "in an of themselves", in a way, but not the way you indicated).



As long as Nature's laws are functioning, multiplication tables in an abstract sense exist.
I disagree with that.

In which sense would they "exist"?

In the sense that nature would still work as before?

But that does not imply the existence of any such being?

Mathematics is part of our conceptual framework; we use math in the models of reality we make. But that does not imply the existence of any objects like "multiplication tables". They can be said to "exist" in the world in he sense that there are humans in the world, and humans do math; also, in the sense that some people wrote those tables down (but then, what actually exists there is paper and ink, not content).


Regarding morality; sure, if there were no living things, and everything only followed Nature's laws, then there would be no such thing as objective morality.
What's "Nature's laws"?
If you mean that the universe would behave as it does (except for the lack of life, so there'd be differences), then sure, the universe would go on. But there would be no morality, or laws, or novels, or multiplication tables.


But if the universe was purposed to harbor life, objective morality can exist.
What's that objective morality, and in which sense would it exist in such universe?
Why would it not exist in a universe which harbors life, but was not designed?
What's the difference?


If you're not looking for OM, you're not going to find it.

Well, I'm not worried about the possibility of stumbling into an entity "objective morality" out there any more than I'm worried about the chance of bumping into the number 3 ;), but my question was about our intuitions, because you were suggesting that people seek to change them; but people do not seek to change their moral intuitions (nearly all of the times), but consider them important to have.


Consider a man who just learned (on his own) some small part of mathematical logic or some such thing. Reason brought him to this learning, yet his reason isn't perfect. He makes his reason better by learning the logic.

He was using his reason before to discover other things about reality, but when he first realized that it was reason he was using, he reasoned he needed to learn more about reason.
But he's not going to try to shed his mathematical/logical intuitions in the process. On the contrary, he'll use them.

[ible]

Angra Mainyu,
I hope you don't mind that I'm slowly responding to this thread. It's just not that heated right now, so I can take my time, which is nice.


But consider again the dog scenario.

The aliens don't tell George to rape anyone, but to kill his neighbor's dog.

If he does not, they'll use the bioweapon and kill (slowly and painfully) 10 million people (the dog, however, will not be harmed).

If he kills the dog, they will not use the weapon.

George kills the dog, and the weapon is not used.

Would you judge George's actions in the same way as if he'd killed the dog because he found the barking annoying, or for fun?

No, I wouldn't. I would like to know the context of the action before I judged George, more specifically his motives (his goal, the thing he was working for when he did said actions).

But I still reserve the distinction between actions (1) that directly suit the motive, and actions (2) whose motives are mediated by some other force. For example:
1. George is walking at the park with his 8 year old son, when all of a sudden a big scary dog jumps at his son. George saves his son by killing the dog.
2. George is walking down the street when the alien overlords of the earth tell him to kill the chihuahua next door, or else his son dies. George saves his son, only by some mediating alien law, by killing the little dog.


Yet I think all this stuff puts us on a slippery slope. If some doctor is told by some human regime (not aliens) that unless he experiments on (i.e. tortures) this one guy, his entire family will be killed.

If the doctor goes through with the experiments, you can say that the doctor is more moral for acting out of love for his family than if he was acting for love of torturing the fellow. But if he didn't go through with his experiments, I think he would have done the more virtuous thing (not torturing some guy), even if his family dies.





In which sense would [mathematical tables] "exist"?

In the sense that nature would still work as before?
That's the sense I mean. Nature would still follow mathematical laws.



What's that objective morality, and in which sense would it exist in such [a purposed] universe?
Why would it not exist in a universe which harbors life, but was not designed?
What's the difference?

A purposed universe has a goal: a certain set of relationships between all things. The objective morality would be this set of relationships.

A universe without purpose has no goal. If life came about, to continue existing it would try to abide by some rules. But then, if life was not the goal (because there was no goal), there is no reason to morally prefer life to non-life.



Well, I'm not worried about the possibility of stumbling into an entity "objective morality" out there any more than I'm worried about the chance of bumping into the number 3 ;), but my question was about our intuitions, because you were suggesting that people seek to change them; but people do not seek to change their moral intuitions (nearly all of the times), but consider them important to have.

C.S. Lewis talked about morality like reason. There are for one, certain facts that we have, and secondly there are certain intuitions that allow us to go from the facts to the third thing, conclusions. The facts are what we perceive or believe on authority, the intuitions are more inherent to our minds. And he argues to not mistake a conclusion for an intuition. Intuitions are good all the time (so long as they are proper intuitions), whereas conclusions are valid only given a certain set of starting facts.

So to better enunciate myself, I wouldn't say that we ought to change our moral intuitions, but only to realize which ones are truly moral intuitions.




Consider a man who just learned (on his own) some small part of mathematical logic or some such thing. Reason brought him to this learning, yet his reason isn't perfect. He makes his reason better by learning the logic.

He was using his reason before to discover other things about reality, but when he first realized that it was reason he was using, he reasoned he needed to learn more about reason.
But he's not going to try to shed his mathematical/logical intuitions in the process. On the contrary, he'll use them.

But say that he took a conclusion that was valid for one thing, and thought it was a truly logical intuition, e.g. "If A implies B, then B implies A." This isn't true all the time, which a simple example can show, but perhaps for a time he mistakes this for an intuition when it really was only a conclusion in one case with a particular set of facts.

[Riley Stone]

Yet I think all this stuff puts us on a slippery slope. If some doctor is told by some human regime (not aliens) that unless he experiments on (i.e. tortures) this one guy, his entire family will be killed.

If the doctor goes through with the experiments, you can say that the doctor is more moral for acting out of love for his family than if he was acting for love of torturing the fellow. But if he didn't go through with his experiments, I think he would have done the more virtuous thing (not torturing some guy), even if his family dies.



The word virtuous seems like a nebulous term to me. Just out of curiosity, what is the measuring stick you use to determine, in this case, that the one act is more virtuous than the other?

Let’s assume, for example, that you believe kindness to be a virtue. In this case, how would we evaluate the doctor’s action in terms of kindness? Going through with the experiments may be unkind to the patient. However, causing tremendous pain to one person as a way of sparing several people the same pain may also be seen as an act of great kindness to the people who are spared.

To determine that one action is more virtuous than another, do we list each thing that we consider to be a virtue, for example kindness, honesty, etc., and then assign point values of some kind? Given the moral dilemma you posed, where one must choose the best of two evils, I just don’t see how we can come up with any sort of calculated or objective determination of which action is the most virtuous.

[Angra Mainyu]

Angra Mainyu,
I hope you don't mind that I'm slowly responding to this thread. It's just not that heated right now, so I can take my time, which is nice.
Ok, but as I said before, this was merely a side point in the other thread, and I was just responding to a point about appealing to our intuitions to try to make a case for metaphysical necessity.

I didn't intend to discuss these matters.



No, I wouldn't. I would like to know the context of the action before I judged George, more specifically his motives (his goal, the thing he was working for when he did said actions).
Ok, so you too take context into consideration when you make moral judgments. That's what I was saying. :)

Incidentally, George does those actions to prevent the alternative scenario (10 million slowly and painfully killed).

Based on the information available to him (past behavior of the aliens, capabilities, etc.), his assessment is that they'd be almost certain to carry out their threat if he does not comply, but won't do it if he does comply.


But I still reserve the distinction between actions (1) that directly suit the motive, and actions (2) whose motives are mediated by some other force. For example:
1. George is walking at the park with his 8 year old son, when all of a sudden a big scary dog jumps at his son. George saves his son by killing the dog.
2. George is walking down the street when the alien overlords of the earth tell him to kill the chihuahua next door, or else his son dies. George saves his son, only by some mediating alien law, by killing the little dog.


Yet I think all this stuff puts us on a slippery slope. If some doctor is told by some human regime (not aliens) that unless he experiments on (i.e. tortures) this one guy, his entire family will be killed.

If the doctor goes through with the experiments, you can say that the doctor is more moral for acting out of love for his family than if he was acting for love of torturing the fellow. But if he didn't go through with his experiments, I think he would have done the more virtuous thing (not torturing some guy), even if his family dies.

I don't know how I'd judge the doctor; I probably would neither condemn him nor praise him - unless I or someone I care about gets tortured, in which case I might condemn him anyway. Of course, that's not the answer someoone who wants to convince others to take a particular stance on the matter would want to give. :D

Anyway, as you reduce the level of threat, judging the case becomes more difficult to most people. I'd say the scenario "tends" to a moral dilemma, so to speak.

An example would be the following:

Source: http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-InnatenessChapter.pdf

Consider the following
moral dilemma (the crying baby dilemma): It's wartime, and you and some of your
fellow villagers are hiding from enemy soldiers in a basement. Your baby starts to
cry, and you cover your baby’s mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand
your baby will cry, the soldiers will hear, and they will find you and the others and kill
everyone they find, including you and your baby. If you do not remove your hand,
your baby will smother to death. Is it okay to smother your baby to death in order to
save yourself and the other villagers? This is a very difficult question. Different
people give different answers and nearly everyone takes a relatively long time to
answer.


That's the sense I mean. Nature would still follow mathematical laws.
Rather, I'd say we use math and other concepts to model nature. Nature would still be nature, regardless.


A purposed universe has a goal: a certain set of relationships between all things. The objective morality would be this set of relationships.
I'm not sure what you mean.
The universe is not a conscious being. It has no goal. Its creator may have one or more, but that's not the goal of the universe.

Also, if this goal of the creator's is "a set of relationships between all things", and objective morality is that set, then objective morality is the goal of the universe's creator.

Now, you have a dilemma:

1) The goal is the decision of the creator, who could have chosen something else. Then morality is - in the mind-dependent sense - subjective.

Still, it's not relative but, in terms of truth-values, absolute, if moral statements like "X is wrong" mean something like "X is against the goals of the creator".

Apart from the fact that Creator Command Theory (ok, let's call it Divine Command Theory - DCT - for traditional reasons, but I'm not conceding that the creator would need to be omnipotent, omniscient, etc.) seems extremely unlikely (in other words, that's just a mistaken theory), you don't get objective morality here in the mind-independent sense.

You get absolute morality and no error theory, but then, you could (potentially; I'm not saying you do) get that in a non-created universe as well - all you need is that moral judgments are truth-apt and everyone means the same by them, so their truth-value does not depend on the person making the judgment, and that some judgments "X is wrong" are true.

2) Achieving that goal was the morally right thing to do in an objective sense, independently of what the creator decided. He just happened to decide to do the right thing. But in that case, the creator is irrelevant to the issue of objective morality.

Whatever he does, there's some objective morality (not saying that such mind-independent entity exists or is even a coherent concept, but let's make the necessary assumptions and meta-assumptions for the sake of the argument). If he decides not to create the universe, but the latter arises as a result of other processes, without this entities' involvement, then there'd still be some objective morality (whatever that is) - unless you want to argue that the processes that results in the formation of a universe without a creator would destroy this entity "objective morality", but you'd have to describe such entity and show that as well if you want to make a case.


A universe without purpose has no goal. If life came about, to continue existing it would try to abide by some rules. But then, if life was not the goal (because there was no goal), there is no reason to morally prefer life to non-life.
Life would not have been the goal of the creator (since there's no creator), but then, it may be the goal of human beings. Besides, whether life is someone's goal is not the point as far as I can tell:

You're making here a first-order ethical claim that if life was not the goal of the creator, tehn there's no reason to morally prefer life to non-life. Since moral relativism or an error theory would rule out your religion, we may as well assume for the sake of the argument that neither obtains, and now you just need to back that claim.

As it is, it's just a claim you make.

But my intuitions lead me to morally prefer life to non-life (in some cases, anyway; I'd kill some annoying mosquitos, bacteria, etc.), even though I have no reason to believe in a creator.

In short, you seem to be saying something like:

P1: If the univere was not created, then the universe was not created for a purpose.
P2: If the universe was not created for a purpose, then nothing is morally right or wrong.

P1 is obviously true.

But P2?

If an error theory is true, then nothing is morally right or wrong, so P2 is true.

But in that case (i.e., assuming a moral error theory), the following is also true:

P3: If the universe was created for a purpose, then nothing is morally right or wrong.

P4: If 2 + 2 = 4, then nothing is morally right or wrong.

In other words, if you assume the consequent, of course all those conditionals follow. But what's the point? You're not assuming an error theory. In fact, you deny error theories, relativism, etc.

So, let's assume some things are morally right or wrong (whatever that is), and let's further assume that's absolute. Then, on that basis, P2 is equivalent to "the universe was created for a purpose".

So, you're just making a claim that the universe was created. Based on what?
Saying that it's based on some objective morality (or absolute, or any kind of morality) isn't going to be persuasive, since you haven't shown a link between the existence of such morality (assuming it does exist) and a creator.



But say that he took a conclusion that was valid for one thing, and thought it was a truly logical intuition, e.g. "If A implies B, then B implies A." This isn't true all the time, which a simple example can show, but perhaps for a time he mistakes this for an intuition when it really was only a conclusion in one case with a particular set of facts.
He made a mistake, ok.
But I don't see how that affects the matter at hand.

[ible]

Yet I think all this stuff puts us on a slippery slope. If some doctor is told by some human regime (not aliens) that unless he experiments on (i.e. tortures) this one guy, his entire family will be killed.

If the doctor goes through with the experiments, you can say that the doctor is more moral for acting out of love for his family than if he was acting for love of torturing the fellow. But if he didn't go through with his experiments, I think he would have done the more virtuous thing (not torturing some guy), even if his family dies.

The word virtuous seems like a nebulous term to me. Just out of curiosity, what is the measuring stick you use to determine, in this case, that the one act is more virtuous than the other?

Thanks for joining the conversation, Riley. For the most part, I use my intuitions to say whether an action is virtuous or not.



Let’s assume, for example, that you believe kindness to be a virtue. In this case, how would we evaluate the doctor’s action in terms of kindness? Going through with the experiments may be unkind to the patient. However, causing tremendous pain to one person as a way of sparing several people the same pain may also be seen as an act of great kindness to the people who are spared.
That's not the situation that I described (if a doctor doesn't torture a patient, his family is killed), but if you want to elaborate on what you're imagining a little more, that would be great.

Personally I don't think kindness is a virtue. Kindness is often the result of charity/love, which is a virtue, but love will also need to mean tough love in appropriate circumstances.



To determine that one action is more virtuous than another, do we list each thing that we consider to be a virtue, for example kindness, honesty, etc., and then assign point values of some kind? Given the moral dilemma you posed, where one must choose the best of two evils, I just don’t see how we can come up with any sort of calculated or objective determination of which action is the most virtuous.

For any given action, to do it or not to do it, I think we can decide which way is the more virtuous. For the doctor who must torture the patient unless his family is to be killed, I believe the most virtuous action on his part is to not torture the patient. Because it is in his power to not cause the patient more harm than otherwise, and it is an outside force which kills his family--the blame for killing the family falls on the force, not himself.




Ok, so you too take context into consideration when you make moral judgments. That's what I was saying. :)

I would judge him differently if he did it to save people rather than if he just wanted to rape or kill. But that doesn't mean I think George did the best thing.



I don't know how I'd judge the doctor; I probably would neither condemn him nor praise him - unless I or someone I care about gets tortured, in which case I might condemn him anyway. Of course, that's not the answer someoone who wants to convince others to take a particular stance on the matter would want to give. :D
What if you were a member of the family of the doctor? Would you prefer that the doctor sacrifice his personal integrity to preserve your lives?

Here is also why I will judge a little differently than you. I believe humans are immortal; they will live past the grave, and what's important is their integrity and choices, not how many people's lives they save on earth. (Though, for many disciplines, e.g. doctors, this is their goal, and a source of their integrity building experience on earth.)



Anyway, as you reduce the level of threat, judging the case becomes more difficult to most people. I'd say the scenario "tends" to a moral dilemma, so to speak.
But nothing in the universe has ultimate power. When you go beyond the universe, I would say there is an ultimate power; but nothing within the universe will ever be able to take away our (immortal) lives, complete with our integrity/honor. Only we choose to take it away.



Rather, I'd say we use math and other concepts to model nature. Nature would still be nature, regardless.

But unless we are approximating nature's laws by the math and such by which we model nature, our math wouldn't work. So whatever our math is an approximation of, is what I would say exists independent of human observers.



I'm not sure what you mean.
The universe is not a conscious being. It has no goal. Its creator may have one or more, but that's not the goal of the universe.
If I create a computer program, the goal of the computer program (what it produces in the end) is the goal that I have for it, unless I am a bad computer programmer.



Also, if this goal of the creator's is "a set of relationships between all things", and objective morality is that set, then objective morality is the goal of the universe's creator.

Now, you have a dilemma:

1) The goal is the decision of the creator, who could have chosen something else. Then morality is - in the mind-dependent sense - subjective.

Still, it's not relative but, in terms of truth-values, absolute, if moral statements like "X is wrong" mean something like "X is against the goals of the creator".

Consider a triune creator, consisting of three Persons in one Being. The First and Second Persons are in a specific relationship that exists forever, independent of time; the embodiment of this relationship is the Third Person.

For God to legislate the Morality that is a part of him (the Third Person) is then not arbitrary, but instead it leads us to contemplate that which lasts forever.



You get absolute morality and no error theory, but then, you could (potentially; I'm not saying you do) get that in a non-created universe as well - all you need is that moral judgments are truth-apt and everyone means the same by them, so their truth-value does not depend on the person making the judgment, and that some judgments "X is wrong" are true.
But I don't see how that could be true, unless there is some moral standard somewhere, just as nature's laws exist somewhere.



2) Achieving that goal was the morally right thing to do in an objective sense, independently of what the creator decided. He just happened to decide to do the right thing. But in that case, the creator is irrelevant to the issue of objective morality.

Yes, the Euthyphro dilemma. Let me know what you think of my triune Creator response above, because I think it answers the problem.



You're making here a first-order ethical claim that if life was not the goal of the creator, tehn there's no reason to morally prefer life to non-life. Since moral relativism or an error theory would rule out your religion, we may as well assume for the sake of the argument that neither obtains, and now you just need to back that claim.

As it is, it's just a claim you make.

Why do I have to back the claim? I'm not the one who lives in a creatorless universe worldview. What reason do you have for the moral preference of life to non-life?



In short, you seem to be saying something like:

P1: If the univere was not created, then the universe was not created for a purpose.
P2: If the universe was not created for a purpose, then nothing is morally right or wrong.

[later...]

So, let's assume some things are morally right or wrong (whatever that is), and let's further assume that's absolute. Then, on that basis, P2 is equivalent to "the universe was created for a purpose".

Unless there is a set of relationships that is the goal/purpose of the universe, then I don't see how there could be an absolute moral right or wrong. P2 would be equivalent to "if there is a moral right and wrong, the universe was created for a purpose." And you know I'm not assuming absolute morality; that's a subject for debate.



Saying that it's based on some objective morality (or absolute, or any kind of morality) isn't going to be persuasive, since you haven't shown a link between the existence of such morality (assuming it does exist) and a creator.
My trinity idea might produce such a link.




But say that he took a conclusion that was valid for one thing, and thought it was a truly logical intuition, e.g. "If A implies B, then B implies A." This isn't true all the time, which a simple example can show, but perhaps for a time he mistakes this for an intuition when it really was only a conclusion in one case with a particular set of facts.
He made a mistake, ok.
But I don't see how that affects the matter at hand.

Just talking about how, if we find ourselves assuming incorrect moral intuitions, we oughta realize that.

[Angra Mainyu]

I would judge him differently if he did it to save people rather than if he just wanted to rape or kill. But that doesn't mean I think George did the best thing.
Ok, but what if he killed his neighbor's dog? (in the scenario I presented earlier).


What if you were a member of the family of the doctor? Would you prefer that the doctor sacrifice his personal integrity to preserve your lives?
Perhaps. I don't know; the situation is difficult to assess.


Here is also why I will judge a little differently than you. I believe humans are immortal; they will live past the grave, and what's important is their integrity and choices, not how many people's lives they save on earth. (Though, for many disciplines, e.g. doctors, this is their goal, and a source of their integrity building experience on earth.)
But in this case, your judgment differs from mine (at least partly) as a result of your beliefs about immortality.

But my point earlier was about how I would judge George's actions, and my judgement is based on a scenario where humans are mortal.

By the way, that's George's belief as well.


But nothing in the universe has ultimate power. When you go beyond the universe, I would say there is an ultimate power; but nothing within the universe will ever be able to take away our (immortal) lives, complete with our integrity/honor. Only we choose to take it away.
I don't know what it'd even mean to go beyond the universe, but I don't see why you start your paragraph with "but". It does not seem to be related to what I said. :confused:

Regardless, since we're not immortal (such claim sounds like Russells's teapot or better yet Sagan's dragon in the garage to me; it's as groundless as it gets), that's not a factor to be considered.

For the sake of the argument, we could consider that the aliens scenario is a scenario where there's no god.


But unless we are approximating nature's laws by the math and such by which we model nature, our math wouldn't work. So whatever our math is an approximation of, is what I would say exists independent of human observers.

What exists are objects in the universe - reality -, and we make models of the universe using our senses and mental tools.

There don't have to be "laws" out there, independent of human observers, at least not in the sense that you seem to suggest. What happens is that there are regularities in the way objects in the universe interact. In that sense, one could talk about "laws of nature", but there's no requirement for any entity "laws of nature" existing as an object in the world. We don't need such an ontological commitment.


If I create a computer program, the goal of the computer program (what it produces in the end) is the goal that I have for it, unless I am a bad computer programmer.
That's "the goal of the computer program" in the sense of "the goal for which the program was made" (even if you're a bad programmer); however, the program itself doesn't have goals - granted, we can speak metaphorically to convey the idea of what the program actually does, but it'd be an equivocation to try to use that in order to claim that the universe has a goal in a different sense of the word "goal".

By the way, the universe, unlike a program, contains entities with agency, who have their own goals.


Consider a triune creator, consisting of three Persons in one Being. The First and Second Persons are in a specific relationship that exists forever, independent of time; the embodiment of this relationship is the Third Person.

I can't consider the first part.

"Exists forever", I understand, but "exists independent of time" is not something I can understand, as long as we're talking about objects in the world.



For God to legislate the Morality that is a part of him (the Third Person) is then not arbitrary, but instead it leads us to contemplate that which lasts forever.

I don't understand that.


But I don't see how that could be true, unless there is some moral standard somewhere, just as nature's laws exist somewhere.

No, they do not.
There's no object "laws of nature" floating around. As I mentioned before, I'm not more likely to bump into the laws of nature than I'm likely to bump into the number 3.

There can "be" laws of nature in the sense I explained above, but I don't see why they'd have to exist "somewhere" - or even what it would mean for the "laws of nature" to exist somewhere.

How could you get that in a non-created universe?
The same way you could get statements like "X is yellow" to be true. Not that I buy this type of moral theory, but if you're proposing Divine Command Theory, I point out that the alternative is not less likely as far as I can tell.

Further, even in your scenario (i.e., Divine Command Theory), there'd be no moral standard "somewhere" (what would it even mean for a moral standard to be somewhere?); there'd be an entity, the creator, issuing commands.



Yes, the Euthyphro dilemma. Let me know what you think of my triune Creator response above, because I think it answers the problem.

Sorry to disappoint, but that's not something I can understand I'm afraid. Maybe it's time to agree to disagree.



You're making here a first-order ethical claim that if life was not the goal of the creator, then there's no reason to morally prefer life to non-life. Since moral relativism or an error theory would rule out your religion, we may as well assume for the sake of the argument that neither obtains, and now you just need to back that claim.

As it is, it's just a claim you make.
Why do I have to back the claim? I'm not the one who lives in a creatorless universe worldview. What reason do you have for the moral preference of life to non-life?

I'm not making any claims.

You're the one a making a first-order claim with no grounds. Whether there's a creator is irrelevant to the matter at hand, as far as I can tell. You've not connected the existence of a creator with morality.

As for my reasons for acting as I do, I have my own intuitions. But I'm not claiming anything.


Unless there is a set of relationships that is the goal/purpose of the universe, then I don't see how there could be an absolute moral right or wrong. P2 would be equivalent to "if there is a moral right and wrong, the universe was created for a purpose." And you know I'm not assuming absolute morality; that's a subject for debate.
But if there's no absolute morality, then your religion is in error, so we can assume absolute morality for the sake of the argument.

But if the point is absolute morality, and you propose DCT, then we're still back to the issue of absolute colors. If "X is red" can be absolute without a creator, then why not "X is wrong"? What's (in light of the proposed DCT) the difference?

You say that "Unless there is a set of relationships that is the goal/purpose of the universe, then I don't see how there could be an absolute moral right or wrong"; I don't see how that could exist with a creator any more than without it; again, what does the creator's goal have to do with morality?


My trinity idea might produce such a link.

Unfortunately, I can't understand that idea.

[ible]

Thanks for your continued participation in the discussion, Angra. I've mixed around your response, so that similar topics are put together, hopefully without too much confusion.


I would judge him differently if he did it to save people rather than if he just wanted to rape or kill. But that doesn't mean I think George did the best thing.
Ok, but what if he killed his neighbor's dog? (in the scenario I presented earlier).
As the human race, even if we are dying "as a result" (of the aliens' weapons) of George's not killing the dog, I don't think we should complain to George that he didn't twist his integrity (and kill his neighbor's dog) to "save humanity" (through the twisted aliens' ideas).

Therefore, although I would judge George less harshly if he acted to save humanity rather than out of a desire to kill the dog, I still think he shouldn't forget his virtue in his dealings with creatures of the world.

If you think about it, though, this has a link to old Jewish sacrificial ideas. They believed that sacrificing the animal life paid for their own society’s sin, in light of God's wrath. Do you think those sacrifices were moral?

I personally think all sacrifices should be chosen by the sacrificee, otherwise they are not really sacrifices. E.g. If I am a soldier, and a grenade lands in the midst of my camp; if somebody holds me in front of it, it was not moral, but if I leap on it of my own volition, to spare my comrades, it was virtuous.


Regarding the doctor torturing the patient, else his family dies, if you were a member of the family:

Perhaps. I don't know; the situation is difficult to assess.
You don't have any answer? I'm interested in hearing what you'd say.



But in this case, your judgment differs from mine (at least partly) as a result of your beliefs about immortality.
Yeah, given a different set of beliefs, our moral intuitions will take us to different conclusions.



But my point earlier was about how I would judge George's actions, and my judgement is based on a scenario where humans are mortal.
How would you vote differently, if humans were immortal? Oh, and also if you believed that each of our choices brings us closer to either heaven or hell. Perhaps you’d stay the same.


Regarding something from later in your post, why you choose life over non-life.
As for my reasons for acting as I do, I have my own intuitions. But I'm not claiming anything.
Fair enough. But I wouldn't mind trying to see what your purpose is. Do you hope to just be a good person, somebody your family and such looks up to? What motivates you to be good?




Anyway, as you reduce the level of threat, judging the case becomes more difficult to most people. I'd say the scenario "tends" to a moral dilemma, so to speak.
But nothing in the universe has ultimate power. When you go beyond the universe, I would say there is an ultimate power; but nothing within the universe will ever be able to take away our (immortal) lives, complete with our integrity/honor. Only we choose to take it away.
I don't know what it'd even mean to go beyond the universe, but I don't see why you start your paragraph with "but". It does not seem to be related to what I said. :confused:
You were talking about reducing the level of threat, from alien overlords and raping people to human regimes and torturing people.

You talk about alien overlords having ultimate power, but they really don't. In my belief system, God has ultimate power; he will judge, and the aliens will not escape judgment. (Nor will we humans.)



For the sake of the argument, we could consider that the aliens scenario is a scenario where there's no god.
No god and no objective morality? Then we must do as the aliens tell us to. OBEY! :notworthy:






What exists are objects in the universe - reality -, and we make models of the universe using our senses and mental tools.

There don't have to be "laws" out there, independent of human observers, at least not in the sense that you seem to suggest. What happens is that there are regularities in the way objects in the universe interact. In that sense, one could talk about "laws of nature", but there's no requirement for any entity "laws of nature" existing as an object in the world. We don't need such an ontological commitment.

[...later]

There can "be" laws of nature in the sense I explained above, but I don't see why they'd have to exist "somewhere" - or even what it would mean for the "laws of nature" to exist somewhere.

In other threads, I've broken down the created order into three realms that comprise reality as we know it. The "what," which has particles and fields and such; the "how" which governs how these particles interact, and the "why" as in the purpose of these things. Nature's laws are in the "how" realm, which is not something we directly see, but must infer through looking at the "what." But that doesn't mean that nature's laws don't exist apart from human observation. But if they do not exist, then I don't see how human observation could approximate them ;).


There's no object "laws of nature" floating around. As I mentioned before, I'm not more likely to bump into the laws of nature than I'm likely to bump into the number 3.
What are you talking about? You may not bump into any laws of nature, but you’re certainly being run through them constantly! Gravity’s pulling you down (presumably, if you are on earth), your cells are using chemistry to live and construct stuff, the electrons in your butt are helping you levitate due to the electromagnetic repulsion from the electrons in the chair, etc.





You're the one a making a first-order claim with no grounds. Whether there's a creator is irrelevant to the matter at hand, as far as I can tell. You've not connected the existence of a creator with morality.
Ok, so P2 was equivalent to, "If objective morality exists, then God exists." I’ll do a little argument for that:

If we assume that objective morality is eternal/immutable, then it already has qualities of being god-like. So let's cheat, and say, "If OM is the highest thing, then let God = OM. Otherwise, let the highest thing that exists be what we mean when we say God."

Now, we still don't know if this God is also Creator. But I appeal to something which may or may not seem intuitive to you: "Aspects of Creation are in some way reflections of the attributes of its Creator." E.g., the vastness and beauty and awe (in terrifying ways, too) of the universe is a reflection of the vastness and beauty and awe of the Creator. Also, the anger that we humans feel about perceived sin is a (dirty) reflection of the wrath of the Creator against real sin. So it appears that the Creator gave us ideas of morality (or let them develop through evolution, if you must look at it that way). So either the Creator is an agent of God (OM), or the Creator is also God. If there is no need to multiply hypotheses, we can equate God with the Creator.

You could argue that the “morality” that the Creator gave to us doesn’t really approximate OM, perhaps because the Creator is evil. But assuming that existence per se is a good thing (it’s what we do with it that becomes evil), being able to create a new realm would require the Creator to be partially good; partial goodness on the part of an eternal being implies full goodness IMO--otherwise there is an internal conflict, which leads to destruction of self rather than eternal existence. Therefore I think it more likely that the Creator is good rather than evil.



That's "the goal of the computer program" in the sense of "the goal for which the program was made" (even if you're a bad programmer); however, the program itself doesn't have goals - granted, we can speak metaphorically to convey the idea of what the program actually does, but it'd be an equivocation to try to use that in order to claim that the universe has a goal in a different sense of the word "goal".

By the way, the universe, unlike a program, contains entities with agency, who have their own goals.
That's right, it's more like a program that is a game, massively played online or something like that. Except we can't choose to play this game :frown:. Well, I guess technically we can commit suicide, and in your view of reality that gets you out of it; but in my world you're immortal, so... that just puts you in a different part of reality.




Regarding the possibility of morals existing apart from God:

But if the point is absolute morality, and you propose DCT, then we're still back to the issue of absolute colors. If "X is red" can be absolute without a creator, then why not "X is wrong"? What's (in light of the proposed DCT) the difference?
Who said “X is red” is absolute? (Even granting that you say it only at a particular time.)

The possibility of absoluteness exists only in a regular universe (i.e. shows regularities), and I don’t think we should expect a universe to have regularities unless it is created by a rational, intelligent, good Creator.

Likewise, only if there is an OM can we say that something is truly wrong. We could be incorrect about saying so, but we wouldn’t be incorrect that there were things called right and wrong; rather we were just approximating OM incorrectly. But if OM does not exist, then we are merely stating our preferences and what we should like or not like given a certain situation, tantamount to preferring cheddar over swiss on a burger. De gustibus non est disputandum.


Further, even in your scenario (i.e., Divine Command Theory), there'd be no moral standard "somewhere" (what would it even mean for a moral standard to be somewhere?); there'd be an entity, the creator, issuing commands.

My scenario is a little more subtle than that. The objective moral standard is in God. Yet how can a being that does not need to relate to anything know how to relate to other beings? (I hopefully can say morality is about relationships, without argument.) God is independent from the created order; what would he know about relationships? Well, the Christian reply is that God is in a relationship with himself: God is composed of three Persons in one being. We have the Father, the Son proceeding from the Father, and the Holy Spirit springing up from the relationship between the two. God lasts for all eternity; this relationship lasts through all eternity. As immortal humans, we must approach the OM in the HS, for that is how we will harmoniously get along forever, just as God does.

What is harmony, what is good? We wouldn’t know them unless God embodied/expressed them. But you will find that in my scenario, God “legislates” from his own nature; he does not arbitrarily choose between “loving people” and “murdering people” for what we ought to do. God legislates that which will last for eternity, which he knows, because he is eternal.




You say that "Unless there is a set of relationships that is the goal/purpose of the universe, then I don't see how there could be an absolute moral right or wrong"; I don't see how that could exist with a creator any more than without it; again, what does the creator's goal have to do with morality?
The final state of the created order, which God will see achieved, is harmonious and everlasting. God knows all about everlasting relationships, since he is in one, and commands obedience to it. So in a sense I do adhere to DCT, but in another sense I think the morality he commands "works.” It is not arbitrary.

[Angra Mainyu]

As the human race, even if we are dying "as a result" (of the aliens' weapons) of George's not killing the dog, I don't think we should complain to George that he didn't twist his integrity (and kill his neighbor's dog) to "save humanity" (through the twisted aliens' ideas).

Therefore, although I would judge George less harshly if he acted to save humanity rather than out of a desire to kill the dog, I still think he shouldn't forget his virtue in his dealings with creatures of the world.
The expression "forget his virtue" seems to be part of your moral judgment.

My judgement would be very different. I would not only not judge George harshly for killing the dog, I would not judge his actions wrong at all - but I would if he refrain from killing the dog to protect some nebulous "virtue", even when (correctly) believing that his not killing the dog would get the "kill all the humans" reply from the aliens.


If you think about it, though, this has a link to old Jewish sacrificial ideas. They believed that sacrificing the animal life paid for their own society’s sin, in light of God's wrath. Do you think those sacrifices were moral?
I don't think the situation is similar: the alien threat is (in the scenario) real, whereas Yahweh's threat is not.

It's hard to know their reasons behind the sacrifices. The fact is that failing to carry out the sacrifices might have resulted in the death penalty for the defector. Under such threat (real, unlike Yahweh's), it's quite understandable that some ancient Hebrews would do the sacrifices. I wouldn't pass moral condemnation on them.

On the other hand, I would judge their approval of the actions of the wrathful Yahweh as morally wrong.


You don't have any answer? I'm interested in hearing what you'd say.
I'm afraid I don't have an answer. I don't know how I'd react.


Yeah, given a different set of beliefs, our moral intuitions will take us to different conclusions.

I'd say "judgments" rather than "conclusions", but yes, that would happen because we can only judge an event as we understand it (so, in a way, it would be like judging different events).

The question is whether that divergence would exist (and if so, to what extent) if we eliminate the different beliefs. Suppose the alien scenario (i.e., George's killing the dog) is a scenario where there's no God. How would you judge George then?


How would you vote differently, if humans were immortal? Oh, and also if you believed that each of our choices brings us closer to either heaven or hell. Perhaps you’d stay the same.

That depends on which particular kind of immortality that is. You suggest two places - Heaven and Hell. Could you give a (brief) summary of the conditions that have to be met in order to get to either of them, and a (brief, if possible) description of those places?


Fair enough. But I wouldn't mind trying to see what your purpose is. Do you hope to just be a good person, somebody your family and such looks up to? What motivates you to be good?
There is no ulterior motive, if I'm acting upon my moral intuitions (i.e., doing what I perceive as correct).

It's what I feel inclined to do.

For instance, I may feel inclined to eat a chocolate ice-cream because my gustatory intuitions motivate me (i.e., because the ice-cream in question is delicious). I'm not saying the kind of feeling is the same (certainly, it's not the same in the kind of morality), but I'm using this example to illustrate the point: I don't do it for achieving a certain result.

Then again, you could say in the case of the ice-cream I do it for the pleasure of eating delicious stuff. I don't think in most cases there's such conscious planning: I just want to eat it because it's delicious. But true, it makes me feel good to eat it (unless it has certain side effects that are unpleaseant, in which case I also have motivations not to eat it, and I'll act upon my stronger motivation - on what else?).

It's true that eating the yummy ice-cream would make me feel good. In the case of morality, doing the right action would also make me feel good - and doing the wrong action would make me feel bad, as eating disgusting food would, only the type of "good feeling" and "bad feeling" is quite different in the case of morality and food, but the fact that it makes me feel in pleseant or unpleaseant manners is similar.


You were talking about reducing the level of threat, from alien overlords and raping people to human regimes and torturing people.

You talk about alien overlords having ultimate power, but they really don't. In my belief system, God has ultimate power; he will judge, and the aliens will not escape judgment. (Nor will we humans.)
I see.

Ok, then suppose that in my alien scenario, there's no God.

The same for all my other scenarios. Would that change your judgments? If so, how?


For the sake of the argument, we could consider that the aliens scenario is a scenario where there's no god.
No god and no objective morality? Then we must do as the aliens tell us to. OBEY! :noteworthy:
You're introducing another condition. I said nothing about morality. I said no God.
Morality remains the same, whether "objective" or not. (I'm not sure what you mean by "objective"; I already considered possibilities and explained why a creator (or even God) would make no difference; since we disagree, maybe we can't get pass that to make a judgment on the scenario).

In other threads, I've broken down the created order into three realms that comprise reality as we know it. The "what," which has particles and fields and such; the "how" which governs how these particles interact, and the "why" as in the purpose of these things. Nature's laws are in the "how" realm, which is not something we directly see, but must infer through looking at the "what." But that doesn't mean that nature's laws don't exist apart from human observation. But if they do not exist, then I don't see how human observation could approximate them ;)
What would it even mean for those "laws" to "exist" in some realm?
It seems to be a category error.

If they exist in some realm (not that I find that meaningful), what would it mean for human observation to approach them?

As I mentioned, I think we can model reality. We can make more accurate models predicting behavior. But what exist are objects reacting to each other in certain ways, and having certain regularities. Those regularities don't "exist", "somewhere" out there, as objects floating in space or somewhere else (what would that even mean, again?). It's just that objects in the universe behave in certain ways. There's no need for a mysterious realm of "laws" - and again, I don't think that's meaningful.

How would those laws influence the universe? Would they have a causal effect? If so, they would be spatio-temporal entities in the universe, or some multiverse if you want to limit the scope of "universe". But in that case, do we need a realm of "how" laws to govern the realm of "how" laws and how it interact with the "what"?

Yet, in any case, the "how" realm, is also a "what" realm: it's some weird stuff out there, but still stuff out there.

But I'm afraid I can't make this any clearer than I did in my previous post, which clearly didn't convince you - and your objection seems to remain the same. I think that either we leave it at that, or we keep going in circles.


What are you talking about? You may not bump into any laws of nature, but you’re certainly being run through them constantly! Gravity’s pulling you down (presumably, if you are on earth), your cells are using chemistry to live and construct stuff, the electrons in your butt are helping you levitate due to the electromagnetic repulsion from the electrons in the chair, etc.
No, it's not "the laws of nature" as some weird object, that "runs" me; instead, other objects interact with me and pull me down, etc. In other words, the Earth is a large object that pulls me down, interacting with me in ways we describe as "gravity". We make models that account for that observation and many others, and allow us to make predictions.

But what I deny is that there is any realm of objects "out there", separated from the universe (and yet somehow influencing it :confused: ) where there's an object "gravity". Moreover, I don't find the claim that there's such realm meaningful. What would it be for gravity to "exist" in that manner? How would it manage to influence me when I'm close to the Earth?

Ok, so P2 was equivalent to, "If objective morality exists, then God exists." I’ll do a little argument for that:

If we assume that objective morality is eternal/immutable, then it already has qualities of being god-like. So let's cheat, and say, "If OM is the highest thing, then let God = OM. Otherwise, let the highest thing that exists be what we mean when we say God."

I'm afraid we're talking past each other. You don't seem to understand my points, and I definitely don't understand yours. I don't know what "objective morality" is; I don't know how this object could be eternal/immutable (i.e., in which sense).

You draw a parallel with the "laws of nature" to illustrate your point; I appreciate the effort, but I'm afraid I don't understand what those "laws of nature" are or could possibly be - and the impression I keep getting is that of a category error: what would it be for this stuff to "exist" in the world and not be temporal? :confused:


Now, we still don't know if this God is also Creator. But I appeal to something which may or may not seem intuitive to you: "Aspects of Creation are in some way reflections of the attributes of its Creator." E.g., the vastness and beauty and awe (in terrifying ways, too) of the universe is a reflection of the vastness and beauty and awe of the Creator. Also, the anger that we humans feel about perceived sin is a (dirty) reflection of the wrath of the Creator against real sin. So it appears that the Creator gave us ideas of morality (or let them develop through evolution, if you must look at it that way). So either the Creator is an agent of God (OM), or the Creator is also God. If there is no need to multiply hypotheses, we can equate God with the Creator.
The best I can get is that there's this entity "God" who created the "universe".

But then, you're limiting the scope of the word "universe"; still, there's a larger reality (say, the multiverse), where an entity "God" exists, and he created another entity "universe" where there are other entities (like a box with ants, for example, only he created the ants).

But now we have problems like: if there have to be laws (whatever that is) what about the laws of the multiverse?

The rest, I'm afraid I don't understand. "Aspects of Creation are in some way reflections of the attributes of its Creator." does not seem intuitive to me. I don't understand it. :confused:

For instance, you say "E.g., the vastness and beauty and awe (in terrifying ways, too) of the universe is a reflection of the vastness and beauty and awe of the Creator.". What would it mean for the beauty of the universe to be a "reflection" of the beauty of God?

Those sound like big words, but I can't understand what they mean, beyond the claim that God created the universe.


You could argue that the “morality” that the Creator gave to us doesn’t really approximate OM, perhaps because the Creator is evil. But assuming that existence per se is a good thing (it’s what we do with it that becomes evil), being able to create a new realm would require the Creator to be partially good; partial goodness on the part of an eternal being implies full goodness IMO--otherwise there is an internal conflict, which leads to destruction of self rather than eternal existence. Therefore I think it more likely that the Creator is good rather than evil.
I don't know what an "eternal being"; presumably, one that will always exist. I also don't know what OM is. But whatever it is, I don't see why eternal existence would mean that partial goodness implies full goodness (whatever that is, I'll treat it intuitively). The fact that the creator created entities that are not fully good (where he could have done otherwise) would mean that he was fully good but decided to make evil stuff. It seems counter-intuitive. At least, that would make him partly evil. Would that mean fully evil?

And how would an internal conflict lead to destruction?
If an entity is eternal and can't die, then if he has conflicting feelings, he still can't die, can he? So, no destruction.

By the way, your view is that we're immortal too. So, partial goodness leads to full goodness (whatever that is, I meta-assume it's something for the sake of the argument). So, we're all fully good if we're partially good. But that also contradicts your stance.

So, we're not fully good. So, since we're eternal, we're not partially good.


Who said “X is red” is absolute? (Even granting that you say it only at a particular time.)
I did. :D

If you say "X is red" and I say "X is not red", one of us is mistaken, right?
The truth-value of "X is red" does not depend on who says it, and so it's an absolute statement - at least, that's the sense of absolute I was talking about.


The possibility of absoluteness exists only in a regular universe (i.e. shows regularities), and I don’t think we should expect a universe to have regularities unless it is created by a rational, intelligent, good Creator.

1) Why?

2) If that's true, and since the multiverse has to contain regularities in order for the creator to exist as a conscious being, it follows that the multiverse (and thus, the creator; let's call it God1) has a creator. Let's call it God2.

Then, there's a multiverse2, with regularities allowing God2 to exist as a conscious being, so we need God3, in multiverse3.

Inductively, we have denumerably infinite Gods; for all positive integers k, Godk+1 created Godk.

It is a rather complicated view. But I still don't see 1) Why?


Likewise, only if there is an OM can we say that something is truly wrong. We could be incorrect about saying so, but we wouldn’t be incorrect that there were things called right and wrong; rather we were just approximating OM incorrectly. But if OM does not exist, then we are merely stating our preferences and what we should like or not like given a certain situation, tantamount to preferring cheddar over swiss on a burger. De gustibus non est disputandum.
Actually, if you take a look at how people talk about evaluative matters (just look for some "agree or disagree games"), you'll see that there's a lot of discussion on different matters, not just morality.

People say things like "X is tasty", "yes, I agree", "true", etc., "Y is interesting", "No, I don't think so"; "That's beautiful, isn't it", "Yes, it is"; "Should the writers have killed off character Z?" "No, they shouldn't have.", "I disagree; I think they should have"[and reasons follow].

In the case of gustatory taste, attempts to convince by reasons are unlikely (understandably so, since the other person isn't likely to change her judgment "not tasty" by means of reasons, since her gustatory intuitions keep saying "not tasty"*); on the other hand, when it comes to whether something is interesting, or whether characters should have been killed off, etc., there's much discussion.

* Not always, though. For instance, some time ago my sister was telling me that Coca Cola (she works for Coca Cola) would stop production of some beverage (say, A), and would produce B instead.

She: We're not making A anymore. We're making B, which is tastier.

I: Well, maybe tastier to most people, but some people (like me) might find A tastier.

She: No, we studied the market and over 75% of subjects responded that B was tastier, so it's tastier.

I: Ok, but that means that a large majority finds it tastier, not that it is tastier to everyone.

She: B is tastier. Period..

I opted out of the debate (no point in getting into a dispute over it). Most people don't have statistics to back their claim of tastiness. But again, when it comes to discussing sports, movies, books, TV shows, etc., that's a different matter.

Still, it is true that in the case of morality, more time and effort is dedicated to convincing people, and opting out of the debate is usually something that takes longer - if it ever happens -, but how important something is to someone does not seem to be connected to whether it's objective in (most of) the senses of "objective" I've encountered. Global expressivism might have a different take (still reading on that one), but surely you're not a global expressivist, so whatever you mean by "objective", I don't know why it'd be predicated of morality and not of those other matters.

Consider, for example, aesthetic judgment, or gustatory judgment.

John: A burger with swiss is tastier than a burger with cheddar.

Jack: A burger with cheddar is tastier than a burger with swiss.

In which sense of "objective" are those judgements not objective?

Now, consider the following:

John: That apple is red.

Jack: No, that apple is green.

Are those judgements objective? Not objective? In which sense?


My scenario is a little more subtle than that. The objective moral standard is in God.
I don't understand that. What is an objective moral standard, and what would it be for it to "be in" God?

Yet how can a being that does not need to relate to anything know how to relate to other beings?
That seems unproblematic.
I may not need to take an aspirin, but that doesn't mean I don't know how to do it.


(I hopefully can say morality is about relationships, without argument.)
About relationships, in the sense that morality, as a psychological human phenomenon, is related to interaction between humans.


God is independent from the created order; what would he know about relationships?
Well, if you make a computer program, you're independent of it, but that does not mean you don't know about the program (or how programs interact with each other in the operating system you make).


Well, the Christian reply is that God is in a relationship with himself: God is composed of three Persons in one being. We have the Father, the Son proceeding from the Father, and the Holy Spirit springing up from the relationship between the two.
3 different people means 3 different entities (basic human intuition of agency). Which one is the creator? That one would be God by your definition; the others will not.


God lasts for all eternity; this relationship lasts through all eternity. As immortal humans, we must approach the OM in the HS, for that is how we will harmoniously get along forever, just as God does.
What does the OM (whatever that is) have to do with getting along forever?

If you're saying that if we behave in a certain manner to one another, we'll get along forever, even assuming that we're immortal I find that doubtful - I don't think all humans would accept the same manner, as a way of behaving or as a way of allowing others to behave.

But assuming that that's true, how does that need the existence of some object OM in some other object HS?


What is harmony, what is good? We wouldn’t know them unless God embodied/expressed them. But you will find that in my scenario, God “legislates” from his own nature; he does not arbitrarily choose between “loving people” and “murdering people” for what we ought to do. God legislates that which will last for eternity, which he knows, because he is eternal.

First, we're eternal too by assumption. How come we don't know?

Second, if God legislates according to his own nature, he's doing what he prefers, right? And he's defining morality. But he can't do that, unless "X is morally wrong" means something like "God disapproves of X". And even if that's the case, you still have subjective morality (i.e., mind-dependent; it depends on the mind of God).

Third, what about "God is good"? Does that mean "God approves of God?". I doubt it. What is said about God when it's said that he's good?


The final state of the created order, which God will see achieved, is harmonious and everlasting. God knows all about everlasting relationships, since he is in one, and commands obedience to it. So in a sense I do adhere to DCT, but in another sense I think the morality he commands "works.” It is not arbitrary.
So, there's a way of behaving towards one another that allows humans to get along forever - or so is your claim - and that would apparently make morality "objective", in some sense of "objective" that you use.

But what if there's no God, not immortality, yet there's a way of behaving towards one another that allows humans to get along for the rest of their lives - we just need to learn more about human psychology to find out what that is. Would that mean morality is "objective", by the same sense of "objective"?