Is God Incomprehensible?

[Thomas Metcalf]

Introduction

In this post, I will argue that God is indeed comprehensible to a degree great enough that we may disconfirm His existence.

Predicates and their Applications

I'm getting tired of seeing arguments of this general form:

(A) God is incomprehensible.
(B) Therefore, we cannot know whether any of His attributes contradict each other or our empirical observations.
(C) Therefore, positive atheism is false.

The step from (B) to (C) shouldn't be too controversial, so I will concentrate on (A) to (B). I think it commits the theist to far too much. Specifically, the meaning within (A) is unclear; I think most atheists would grant that God
is not fully comprehensible, but then, little about the universe is. Atheists and many theists alike believe, however, that we can decide whether certain predicates apply to God or not.

I must take a moment to say something about the motivations of the theist with the preceding argument. The theist offers this argument, usually, when a contradiction is demonstrated between two or more of God's attributes. One way out might seem to be to claim that God is in control over the laws of logic and metaphysics, and therefore, God can express certain sets of properties that would, in other individuals, be inconsistent. By this reasoning, God is strongly omnipotent; God can do literally anything, and God is immune to such contradictions.

To get "there are no contradictions within God's being" is to accept a certain sort of analytic skepticism. Now, it is analytically true that, say, omnipotence and omniscience contradict each other, so to say that they do not
requires skepticism that we know what our words mean, which in turn requires skepticism that we may choose their meanings. I do not think anyone will accept this. If it were true, as I pointed out elsewhere, one ought to inform dictionary writers and English speakers that they're wasting their time. I think it's far more useful and intuitively plausible to accept that we know exactly what our words mean, because we choose what they mean. Whether they apply to certain individuals is another story.

So a better position seems to be that, yes, omnipotence and omniscience contradict each other, but we cannot be sure of the way by which they apply to God, or whether they apply to God at all.

Now, as for the "way" by which predicates apply to subjects, this seems rather primitive. It's not even the instantiation relation between properties and particulars, I don't think, because even if properties-realism is true, predicates themselves seem to be merely a matter of language. (This accounts for the distinction between determining predicates and non-determining predicates.) So it seems that to deny that we know how predicate F applies to individual a, again, is to commit oneself to analytic skepticism and to deny that we know what the word "applies" means.

We're left with the thesis that we can't tell whether these predicates apply to God. I believe this position rests on a confusion about what we're dealing with when we talk about God. We define God to have these predicates or not to have them, so the matter is not figuring out whether God is such a being, but rather, whether the being in question exists. Of course, one could simply refrain from defining God to be omnipotent, omniscient, or whatever, but I do not think this will be acceptable to most theists. One loses completely one's ability to argue for any being; if one doesn't know what this being is, one doesn't know what it means to say this being exists. And therefore, the project of the great apologists of the past has been in vain, because they didn't even know what they were talking about.

The Deductive Argument from Suffering

I believe the foregoing are reasons to think we are indeed in a position to decide whether God's attributes can contradict each other. There is another important argument against God's existence relevant here, and that is the deductive argument from suffering. If God is strongly omnipotent, God can prevent all suffering while simultaneously producing all of His goals. Suffering exists; therefore, suffering itself must be one of God's goals. But if this is true, God is not morally perfect, and God does not exist.

The response is similar. It could take the form of the following argument:

(D) God is incomprehensible.
(E) Therefore, we cannot understand enough about God to frame sound deductive arguments about Him.
(F) Therefore, there is no sound deductive argument that mentions God.

Of course, it should be obvious that the argument is self-refuting. I do not think this is a consequence of an uncharitable presentation; I think there really are theists who believe deductive arguments about God cannot be sound. Again, this removes the theist's ability to confirm God's existence and denies the work of Aquinas through Descartes through Swinburne through Plantinga and beyond. And again, it is hard to believe deductive arguments could be made unsound simply through the addition of single term. Most theists, finally, will be uncomfortable with a sound deductive argument that presents "God does not exist" in the conclusion, even if they try to argue that it's not "really" sound.

Is it Useful to Say God is Incomprehensible?

I have one more topic to consider, and that is premises (A) and (D). Is God really incomprehensible? What does it mean to comprehend something? I agree that if God exists, this being is probably beyond our "full" comprehension, but I do not think that is enough to show we cannot disconfirm Him. We may never understand the genius of, say, Conan O'Brien, but that doesn't mean we can't say if he's defined to believe P and not to believe P, we know he doesn't exist. There is a difference between countenancing certain predicates and having a full conception of a being in question. Certainly, we cannot picture infinity, but it has never been shown that we don't understand it enough to use it in our reasoning. Similarly, we may be ignorant of a great deal of God's character, but as soon as we apply some predicate to Him, we have learned something about Him.

A case can be made, finally, that part of God's perfection requires that we can understand certain things about Him. Surely a more accessible god is better than a less accessible god, ceteris paribus. Aquinas, Anselm, and most of the other apologists believed or believe that we can indeed learn things about God, and that is one of the ways we can grow to love Him and to appreciate Him more. Perhaps the theist would rather stop believing in the God of the apologists, and replace that belief with the belief in a being named, say, God*. God* is incomprehensible and unknowable, while God is partially comprehensible and somewhat knowable. God* cannot be demonstrated to exist, de jure, while God simply has not been demonstrated to exist, de facto. God* is forever removed from humans' understanding, while humans can attempt to approach God, learn things about Him and the universe He has created, and talk to Him.

Although I am not a theist, I think the choice is clear.

[flatland]

Thank you for this restatement. I would like to restate my own opinions in turn, and maybe clear up some troubles we've been having in the thread on rationality in atheism.

You said
[quote] I think it's far more useful and intuitively plausible to accept that we know exactly what our words mean, because we choose what they mean. <hr></blockquote>

I would agree with this. By that I mean that our words do point to exactly the concepts for which we have created them. We can say 'infinity', and know exactly what we are discussing. My problem lies in the comprehension of these ideas. I use infinity beacuse I am an empiricist. I believe that we begin life tabula rasa, and that any and all knowledge that we have we have accumulated from or deduced from our experiences in the physical world. Infinity as a concept comes to be because of an argument from progression. We can see some quantity or extension of object, say a foot-long piece of steel. We then encounter a piece of steel that is 2 feet long, and then another that is 3 feet long. From this we can deduce that objects have varying extension that can grow. From the knowledge of extension and increase, we can create the idea of infinity, simply by extending a piece of steel in our minds to an extension that does not end. We can put this into words: "There is a piece of steel that does not end"(technically untrue, infinity is a concept, not a measurement, but bear with me).

Now, we have created the idea of infinity, from two true, observed ideas; extension and expansion. However, infinity does not exist. That is, it is nowhere present in the universe, and the universe comprises all of reality. We still have this idea, and a word that points to it. But, this idea is false. There is no 'infinity', except as an abstract. As an abstract, we can understand of this idea only what we deduce from other ideas. This is insufficient to fully understand an idea in the same way that we can understand the idea "wood" or "1 kilogram". That is what I mean when I say that we cannot comprehend infinity fully; since it is, in essence, a false concept, we cannot comprehend it in the same way that we can understand true ideas.

If I have not helped you to understand my position, just tell me and I will refrain from pestering you further here; I don't think we need to get into another semantic debate.

Somewhat along the lines of your last topic, I would like to note that the god you are discussing, and that I discussed elsewhere, is resting on a giant if-then statement. That is, only if there is something other than the natural universe, then a god of this type could exist. Since there is not, the truth or falsity of the existence of such a god becomes moot. To claim the existence of such a realm is to enter into a self-defeating argument in the same way that you constructed; such a realm is incomprehensible, so no sound deductive arguments can be formed about it.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by flatland:

"However, infinity does not exist. That is, it is nowhere present in the universe, and the universe comprises all of reality. We still have this idea, and a word that points to it. But, this idea is false. There is no 'infinity', except as an abstract." (Emphasis original.)

Now, wait a minute. I have a real problem with saying an idea is true or false. (If you think concepts are such robust entities, you're straying dangerously close to rationalism, and it just seems doubtful.) An idea that contains within it some indexical might in fact fail to refer to its referent, such as the idea of "God, the being that is omnipotent," but those sorts of ideas seem to be rare and irrelevant here. We're talking about the idea of infinity; now, maybe it doesn't correspond to anything in the universe, but that doesn't make it "false" and I don't see why we can't understand it to some degree. I see a difference between a concept failing to pick out anything in the universe, and us not understanding that concept enough to know what the word means.

"To claim the existence of such a realm is to enter into a self-defeating argument in the same way that you constructed; such a realm is incomprehensible, so no sound deductive arguments can be formed about it."

Any argument you'd use to try to advance that statement would be unsound, then. My position is that just because we're going outside a physical universe is not yet enough reason to say we can't make deductive arguments that mention entities outside the physical universe. Even if we couldn't, that would only be because we would never know whether our concepts correspond to something existing "out there," not because we don't understand what our own concepts mean.

[Jobar]

One of the many things wrong with Christian reasoning, I believe, is that they act as though they can build the upper stories of their house before they finish the foundation.

There is a hierarchy of meaning. Before we can meaningfully discuss, say, quantum mechanics, we must learn the meanings of many simpler and more basic words. The same is true of God.

If we cannot (or have not yet) prove the existence of an entity which we denote God, it is meaningless to discuss whether he is a unity or a trinity, or his inevitableness, or whether he approves of the eating of pork. You must put all the wheels on the cart before you can drive it, and if we have not satisfactorily demonstrated the completeness of our God-concept we can not then build any more meanings with or about it.

Before we even start discussing God's existence, we must come to a mutually satisfactory *meaning* of the word God. And so far, we have none.

[Boro Nut]

[quote]Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
<strong>Is God Incomprehensible?</strong><hr></blockquote>

How could we ever know?

Boro Nut

[rdalin]

[quote]Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
<strong>
I believe the foregoing are reasons to think we are indeed in a position to decide whether God's attributes can contradict each other. There is another important argument against God's existence relevant here, and that is the deductive argument from suffering. If God is strongly omnipotent, God can prevent all suffering while simultaneously producing all of His goals. Suffering exists; therefore, suffering itself must be one of God's goals. But if this is true, God is not morally perfect, and God does not exist.
</strong><hr></blockquote>

This argument only applies to a specific type of god; that is, one similar to the Judeo/Christian model. It certainly does not apply to many others: the deist god, for example, who created and set the universe in motion and then left it alone. It's also easy to posit a malign god, who likes to punish people, or a whimsical and capricious god. The argument from suffering is very limited, I think.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by Boro Nut:

"How could we ever know?"

Good question. This is related to something I mentioned in the original post. If God's incomprehensibility blocks our epistemic access to His properties, then we're not in a position to say He's incomprehensible.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by rdalin:

"The argument from suffering is very limited, I think."

Well, of course it is, when one goes by population of gods themselves. But when one goes by populations of believers, the argument from suffering becomes very relevant.

[Keith Russell]

Thomas:

I've said much the same thing, as well. I have often said that subjectivism is self-defeating: if we cannot know, we cannot even know that we cannot know--about 'God', or anything else.

Keith.

[Joseph Backs]

I once engaged a friend of mine in a heated argument over whether or not the character The Rock (on WWE and in the movies) exists.

My friend stated that The Rock is only a character and thus does not exist. I stated that The Rock exists, because he is a character and that character exists - in fact, that's who we were talking about, isn't it? I stressed emphatically.

My friend then proceeded to accuse me of not being able to tell the difference between fantasy and reality, being that the man who 'plays' The Rock is only acting - he is always himself, never that character IN REALITY -- the character is a facade, a fantasy that we all believe in for the moment it is being acted out, and then we realize (as we always knew anyway) that it's just our suspension of disbelief that keeps us from always knowing the falsehood. We're using our imaginations.

So, I went on, beleiving in what? A character that doesn't exist? The Rock. A character. Doesn't exist? Impossible. Then what are we believing in?

There's a problem here I'd like many of you good semantic-maniacs to rue over. If it's possible we can -- in proper terms -- "imagine" what something is (the Ball of Wax argument) without being able to picture it in our minds ...

And still know it as an ever-changing expandable object ...

And it's possible for us to know the ultimate good without picturing it ... well is this too elementary an argument for you so far?

Am I not up to par? I apologize. It's very late where I am.

Still, my friend used the word imagination frivolously. But in fact, he was really hurting his own stance there.

Finally, if we can know infinity (nevermind abstractly for that's irrelevant) ... if we can know it and image-in it ...

How can it not exist. I don't put a question mark there. I'm tired. I conclude with a statement that is neither a question nor a statement, but still exists and we know it to be what it is, without the question mark, and without being a statement because statements are not worded with a "how" to commence their course.

And yet again, we know it to be what it is ... neither a statement nor a question. Cannot define it, and know it to be.

Joseph

[rdalin]

[quote]Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
<strong>Well, of course it is, when one goes by population of gods themselves. But when one goes by populations of believers, the argument from suffering becomes very relevant.</strong><hr></blockquote>

Good point.

[mattbballman]

Dear Metcaf,

You have a thoughtful presentation in your post. By way of prefacing my criticisms, I want to accede certain observations you have made. First, I agree that the Barthian theism hypothesis, that God is incomprehensible, is false. Secondly, I think that the specific incomprehensible thesis with respect to the theodicy you have represented here also false. Thirdly, I agree that it is ineffective to abolish the "God of the apologists" in favor of a numinous God* if and only if God is not equal to God*.

With respect to two criticisms I have, I have two.

(i) That omniscience and omnipotence are contradictory is logically false. In order to contradict omniscience you would have to say something like "God is not all-knowing" or "God is not omniscient." Similarly, to contradict omnipotence you would have to say "God is not all-powerful" or "God is not omnipotent." But such contradictories do not appear in these two attributes. All was have are

(a) God is omniscient
(b) God is omnipotent

But (a) does not contradict (b) explicitly. Now, if there are any tacit premises that can be flushed out to bolster a contradiction then that will be your undertaking.

(ii) It is fascinating that there are still defenders of the deductive/logical problem of evil today. As Peter Van Inwagen of the University of Syracuse reports, "It used to be widely held that evil was incompatible with the existence of God: that no possible world contained both God and evil. So far as I am able tell, this thesis is no longer defended" ("The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence," Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 5: Philosophy of Religion, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing, 1991), p. 135.). This observation is being embraced by more atheist philosophers today for the same deficit that I mentioned in (i) above. There is no overt contradiction between "an all-good God exists" and "evil exist." And to secure this observation, if it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil (no matter what it is) then no contradiction exists.

In my analysis, I have not appealed to a Barthian theism in order to defend theism against these two criticisms. As an analytical philosopher myself, I believe that theism enjoys formidable support and is immune to these types of objections.

matt

[ December 14, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]</p>

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by mattbballman:

"All was have are

(a) God is omniscient
(b) God is omnipotent

But (a) does not contradict (b) explicitly."

Every being that is omnipotent can perform any logically possible action. Any being that is omniscient can learn. To learn is a logically possible action. That is the form of my objection to the coherence of omnipotence and omniscience. I believe there's much more to say, but this is a start.

"There is no overt contradiction between 'an all-good God exists' and 'evil exist.' And to secure this observation, if it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil (no matter what it is) then no contradiction exists."

Be careful. Note that in my original post I said, "If God is strongly omnipotent, God can prevent all suffering while simultaneously producing all of His goals." (Italics added.) The deductive argument from suffering is unsound against a weakly omnipotent God, but is indeed sound against a strongly omnipotent God (one Who can perform any action whatsoever, even the logically impossible). Again, there's more to say, but this should keep things moving.

[Vorkosigan]

if it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil (no matter what it is) then no contradiction exists."

How is this a valid formulation of the AoE? The contradiction lies in the properties of being all good AND all powerful and permitting evil, not in being all-good and permitting evil. It's not surprising that philosophers have rejected a non-argument.

Vorkosigan

[mattbballman]

G'day

(i) I do not find it plausible to define omniscience in terms of including learning. Omniscience is the final state to which all learning strives toward. To be omniscient is to already know or be aware of all propositional truths. This is not inconsistent with being omnipotent.

(ii) This artificial usage of "strong" versus "weak" omnipotence is unsatisfactory. It sounds a bit like saying that some arguments are "strongly" deductive and others are "weakly" deductive. However, you have chosen to define "strong omnipotence" as being able to do even the logically impossible. Now this entirely extirpates the problem of evil altogether. You see, if God can do the logically impossible (which I do not think is accurate, but that is what you suggest) then He can create a world where He is both evil and good and it doesn't matter if that is self-contradictory. And he can also simultaneously good and bad. So much for the problem of evil! With respect to my statement, “if it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil (no matter what it is) then no contradiction exists" it is not intending to be a formulation of the deductive argument from Evil (the destructive dilemma). It is a response to it. Rather, it is a logically possible state of affairs. And if this is logically possible then no contradiction exists between God's omniscience and His omnipotence.

matt

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by mattbballman:

"To be omniscient is to already know or be aware of all propositional truths. This is not inconsistent with being omnipotent."

Omnipotence entails the ability to perform any logically possible action. "To learn" is a logically possible action. Omniscience may not be defined in terms of learning, but it entails that one is unable to learn.

"This artificial usage of 'strong' versus 'weak' omnipotence is unsatisfactory."

I'm not sure what you mean with "artificial." The terms are reasonably common in the literature.

"You see, if God can do the logically impossible ... then He can create a world where He is both evil and good and it doesn't matter if that is self-contradictory."

Right. But God would have no reason to do this, unless God wants to be evil for evil's own sake, and this is inconsistent with our definition of God. While God can perform logically impossible actions, we still know what it means to say God is morally perfect, and we know what "morally perfect" means -- unless you want to descend into theistic skepticism.

"And if this is logically possible then no contradiction exists between God's omniscience and His omnipotence."

The deductive argument from evil is not intended to indicate an inconsistency between omnipotence and omniscience.

[mattbballman]

Mr. Metcaf,

"Omnipotence entails the ability to perform any logically possible action. "To learn" is a logically possible action. Omniscience may not be defined in terms of learning, but it entails that one is unable to learn."

-- Right. And since the omniscience of God entails that there is nothing left for God to learn, omnipotence does not apply to that feature. Certainly God has the ability to learn but has no use for it given the completeness of His knowledge. Otherwise you would be preposing a self-contradictory statement: God must learn if and only if there is nothing left to learn.


"I'm not sure what you mean with "artificial." The terms are reasonably common in the literature."

-- This distinction is not made in the broadest majority of the scholarly literature on the subject. Be that as it may, I find it artificial for the reason I noted in my last post.

Right. But God would have no reason to do this, unless God wants to be evil for evil's own sake, and this is inconsistent with our definition of God. While God can perform logically impossible actions, we still know what it means to say God is morally perfect, and we know what "morally perfect" means -- unless you want to descend into theistic skepticism."

-- But if one can aptly define omnipotence as doing what is logically impossible, then it makes no difference if there are contradictions associated with permitting evil. So what? Those would be logical constraints that this definition of omnipotence already decries. Again, I do not hold this view of omnipotence.

"The deductive argument from evil is not intended to indicate an inconsistency between omnipotence and omniscience."

-- You are correct. My statement should have said that there is no contradiction between God's omnibenevolence and His omnipotence.

matt

[seebs]

[quote]Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
<strong>Originally posted by mattbballman:

"All was have are

(a) God is omniscient
(b) God is omnipotent

But (a) does not contradict (b) explicitly."

Every being that is omnipotent can perform any logically possible action. Any being that is omniscient can learn. To learn is a logically possible action. That is the form of my objection to the coherence of omnipotence and omniscience. I believe there's much more to say, but this is a start.
</strong><hr></blockquote>

I don't buy this one. To learn is "to acquire knowledge you do not already have". To say that an omniscient being acquired knowledge it didn't already had strikes me as logically impossible. Thus, I don't think this is a limit of "omnipotence". "Logically possible" must be understood as "logically possible for the being so defined", not just "we can invent something that could do this, but it might be very different".

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by seebs:

"'Logically possible'" must be understood as 'logically possible for the being so defined', ..."

This won't end up working, because we can imagine the character McEar, a being who can only scratch his ear. It is logically impossible for him to do anything else, and therefore, he is omnipotent.

[seebs]

[quote]Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
<strong>Originally posted by seebs:

"'Logically possible'" must be understood as 'logically possible for the being so defined', ..."

This won't end up working, because we can imagine the character McEar, a being who can only scratch his ear. It is logically impossible for him to do anything else, and therefore, he is omnipotent.</strong><hr></blockquote>

Fine by me! :)

I see your objection, I just don't think the results of your method are quite right. I mean, obviously, I haven't got a large stable of variously logically constrained omnipotent beings to look at and test, but my sense is that "can't be omnipotent because of this logical contradiction" and "omnipotence means being able to do anything logically possible" are in flat opposition.

I think my objection would be that the definition of Mr. McEar doesn't even make *sense*. It's one thing for omnipotence to run into an underlying definitional structure or category limit; it's another thing entirely to just hand it a list of allowed actions.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by mattbballman:

"And since the omniscience of God entails that there is nothing left for God to learn, omnipotence does not apply to that feature."

How do you define "x has the ability to y"? I say either there is a possible world in which x performs y, or if x chooses to y, x will sometimes succeed. Sure, there is nothing for God to learn -- but there is no magic wand that lets me do whatever I want. I can't do many actions without that nonexistent wand, and God can't learn without these nonexistent facts.

I could agree with saying that God has the ability to learn if we could say that eventually, someday, God might learn. But that's not so. God will never learn. God will always fail if He tries to learn. There is no chance whatsoever of God ever learning. Do these sound like descriptions of a being who has the ability to learn, or of a being who does not have the ability to learn?

"But if one can aptly define omnipotence as doing what is logically impossible, then it makes no difference if there are contradictions associated with permitting evil."

Omnipotence (ex hypothesi) is the ability to perform logically possible actions, not to be a logically contradictory being. Even if it were, God would simply have no reason to keep evil around, and it just becomes very doubtful that something like God would want to allow suffering for no reason whatsoever, or would want to be self-contradictory. If the Christian must admit her god is internally inconsistent, I think the atheist is in a better position.

[seebs]

I think it sounds like a being of whom it is meaningless to speak of learning.

I think I have a better example. Let's reverse the sense of Mr. McEar. Let's invent something which doesn't *have* an ear. It's not a "limitation" of omnipotence to say "he can't scratch his ear, because he doesn't have one".

Now, let's say we define learning as "filling gaps in your knowledge"... ;)

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by seebs:

"...not a 'limitation' of omnipotence to say 'he can't scratch his ear, because he doesn't have one'."

I think it is. The action is "to scratch one's ear," and either he can perform it, or he can't. What do you mean when you say "x has the ability to do y"? To me, it's either "there is a possible world in which x does y" or "sometimes, when x tries to do y, x succeeds." Do you have a different definition?

"Now, let's say we define learning as 'filling gaps in your knowledge'... "

Again, God can't do this, because God doesn't have those gaps. It's as if I'm stuck in a room with nothing to read. In that situation, do I have the ability to perform "to read a book"? I'd say no -- I only gain this ability when I leave the room. Sure, if there were a book in there, I could read it, but that's akin to saying if God weren't omniscient, He could learn.

[ December 20, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Metcalf ]</p>

[seebs]

I think, in both cases, we're clearly running up against a meaningful limit to "logically possible".

It is obviously logically possible to "be unable to do much of anything, really", but I don't think an omnipotent being can do it.

Certain things logically contradict the nature of the being, and as such, are not logically possible *in that context*.

I think all this does is push further away from "any sequence of words" omnipotence, into a more pragmatic "you know, change the laws of physics, that kind of thing" omnipotence.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by seebs:

"It is obviously logically possible to 'be unable to do much of anything, really', but I don't think an omnipotent being can do it."

I don't think we should put different ways to be within our domain. We're talking about actions here, not conditions or characters. Plus, to be semipotent, as you mention, doesn't seem to indicate any sort of power at all, while "to learn" does.

"I think all this does is push further away from 'any sequence of words' omnipotence, into a more pragmatic 'you know, change the laws of physics, that kind of thing' omnipotence."

Well, if that's what you want to do, but I think you're actually abandoning real omnipotence. As long as there's a logically possible more powerful being, we're not talking about maximal power anymore. Imagine a being that can change the laws of physics and learn, for example.

[seebs]

Interesting! This is tricky enough that I am obliged to admit that I am not certain at all of any answers in this area; it'll take some thinking.

Okay, a few random thoughts:

I don't think language applies well to any of this stuff. I've found too many cases where my instinctive "should this be possible" response comes and goes depending on which of two logically equivalent wordings I've used. I may be leaning in the direction of "incomprehensible enough to be not meaningfully debatable" on this... but I *hate* doing that, 'cuz it strikes me as a cop-out.

The problem here is that I can always *describe* a more-powerful being; I can just say "something more powerful than an omnipotent being". Is this meaningless? Probably. But then, "omnipotent" may turn out to be internally incoherent. I've ruled out category errors ("rock so heavy he can't lift it") as not challenges to the coherence of omnipotence... but I think the underlying question of exactly what we mean by "everything" is not well-defined.

It seems clear to me that my inability to lift a car is a limitation of my abilities, but my inability to never have been anything like me is merely a logical problem. Note that lots of *other* people can do it just fine! Thus, there's a category of self-referential things that I believe are legitimately excluded from the idea of omnipotence.

I think the problem here comes in when we add characteristics other than omnipotence alone. For instance, if we add "eternal" to a being, it is not longer possible for that being to "cease to exist"; this contradicts the idea of eternalness.

However, that's not a limit of *power*; rather, it's a limit of *nature*. This is like the common hand-waving "God by His nature cannot sin", which may be either a tautology or one of the most comforting things anyone's ever said. (No idea which, myself.)

So, perhaps a suitable modification would be "omnipotence is the ability to do anything not logically exclusive of your defined attributes"... Hmm. Of course, if we assert that I'm defined as having the powers of an ordinary person, then *I'm* omnipotent, so either I'm very very sorry about the continued existance of evil, or that line of argument is wrong.

I'm stumped; I am convinced that there is a useful way to express omnipotence-coupled-with-other-characteristics, but I can't seem to figure out where the boundaries ought to be.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by seebs:

"But then, 'omnipotent' may turn out to be internally incoherent."

Well, that's another consideration we should use in our definition of "omnipotent." We don't want one that is indeed internally incoherent. We want it to be possible for a being to be omnipotent.

"It seems clear to me that my inability to lift a car is a limitation of my abilities, ..."

It might be useful to say here that your inability to lift a car is a contingent limitation, or a limitation based upon an accidental property. If you were twenty times as strong as you are now, you could probably lift that car, and I don't think that if you woke up that strong tomorrow, we'd say you had ceased to exist.

"Thus, there's a category of self-referential things that I believe are legitimately excluded from the idea of omnipotence."

Yeah, but just a few. I think we should be careful here. We should exclude the ones that prevent any being from being omnipotent, but not the ones that just prevent some specific being from being omnipotent.

"For instance, if we add 'eternal' to a being, it is not longer possible for that being to 'cease to exist'; this contradicts the idea of eternalness."

Kind of, yeah. If we say a being is necessarily existing, it cannot commit suicide. There's another action it can't perform.

"However, that's not a limit of *power*; rather, it's a limit of *nature*."

I don't really understand this distinction. Isn't one's power a part of one's nature? Suppose (to borrow an example from Morriston) I'm afflicted with severe mental paralysis in the form of indecision. I'm never going to do anything, but if I could just make up my mind, I could do what I wanted to do. This seems to be a nature-limitation, but I'm definitely not omnipotent. (I don't think.)

"Of course, if we assert that I'm defined as having the powers of an ordinary person, then *I'm* omnipotent, so either I'm very very sorry about the continued existance of evil, or that line of argument is wrong."

Yeah, you'd better be sorry. :) That's the McEar problem I was talking about earlier.

"I am convinced that there is a useful way to express omnipotence-coupled-with-other-characteristics, but I can't seem to figure out where the boundaries ought to be."

Well, I confess: There is a way. Kind of. It was prominently introduced in Flint and Freddoso's "Maximal Power" (in The Existence and Nature of God), although I suspect it appeared earlier. We could talk about states of affairs rather than about tasks. God has the ability to bring about any logically possible state of affairs, for example. This avoids conflict with one's essential properties. It's not a logically possible state of affairs in which God learns, so it's not a problem that God can't bring it about.

This approach has its own problems, however. I strongly recommend Morriston's "Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are They Coherent?" He argues that God can't bring about a logically possible state of affairs, something like "all humans are maliciously tortured forever" or something similar, because He's necessarily morally perfect.

[seebs]

[quote]Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
<strong>
Yeah, but just a few. I think we should be careful here. We should exclude the ones that prevent any being from being omnipotent, but not the ones that just prevent some specific being from being omnipotent.
</strong><hr></blockquote>

Hmm. I'm not sure I agree. For instance, it seems to me that "can't learn because it already knows everything" isn't the same *kind* of problem for omnipotence as "can't do anything contrary to the will of another being".

[quote]<strong>
"However, that's not a limit of *power*; rather, it's a limit of *nature*."

I don't really understand this distinction. Isn't one's power a part of one's nature? Suppose (to borrow an example from Morriston) I'm afflicted with severe mental paralysis in the form of indecision. I'm never going to do anything, but if I could just make up my mind, I could do what I wanted to do. This seems to be a nature-limitation, but I'm definitely not omnipotent. (I don't think.)
</strong><hr></blockquote>

Ugh. You're right.

And yet, none of this comes close to convincing me to drop my belief in an omnipotent, omnsicient being; my response to "God can't learn" is "duh, that wouldn't make any sense".

So... if what I believe in isn't really "omnipotence", what's the right word for it?

[quote]<strong>
"I am convinced that there is a useful way to express omnipotence-coupled-with-other-characteristics, but I can't seem to figure out where the boundaries ought to be."

Well, I confess: There is a way. Kind of. It was prominently introduced in Flint and Freddoso's "Maximal Power" (in The Existence and Nature of God), although I suspect it appeared earlier. We could talk about states of affairs rather than about tasks. God has the ability to bring about any logically possible state of affairs, for example. This avoids conflict with one's essential properties. It's not a logically possible state of affairs in which God learns, so it's not a problem that God can't bring it about.</strong><hr></blockquote>

Interesting! That's a good approach, although I suspect it'll run into trouble. But I rather like it.

[quote]<strong>
This approach has its own problems, however. I strongly recommend Morriston's "Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are They Coherent?" He argues that God can't bring about a logically possible state of affairs, something like "all humans are maliciously tortured forever" or something similar, because He's necessarily morally perfect.</strong><hr></blockquote>

If I am obliged to admit that my favorite invisible sky-pixie is simply unable to be bad, well, that's fine by me. :)

That's a very good point, but I'm fine with accepting logical limits or self-imposed ones.

Really, when it comes down to it, "omnipotent" is much less of a firm philosophical standpoint in my cosmology than an underlying model of "cannot be effectively opposed unless He gives permission".

Fascinating!

You have no idea how nice it is to finally see a debate about omnipotence that doesn't come down to someone handwaving and saying "but of course that's silly" no matter what points anyone makes. :)

[mattbballman]

metcaf,

"How do you define "x has the ability to y"? I say either there is a possible world in which x performs y, or if x chooses to y, x will sometimes succeed. Sure, there is nothing for God to learn -- but there is no magic wand that lets me do whatever I want. I can't do many actions without that nonexistent wand, and God can't learn without these nonexistent facts."

-- "X has the ability to do y" implies that X can do whatever is logically possible for X to do. In the case of X=God, God is omniscient and so has nothing left to learn (y). Therefore, it is not logically possible for X to have the ability to do y if X is an all-knowing God and y is learning.

"Omnipotence (ex hypothesi) is the ability to perform logically possible actions, not to be a logically contradictory being. Even if it were, God would simply have no reason to keep evil around, and it just becomes very doubtful that something like God would want to allow suffering for no reason whatsoever, or would want to be self-contradictory. If the Christian must admit her god is internally inconsistent, I think the atheist is in a better position."

-- Again, I agree with you that God cannot actualize contradictions. This was a response to your pointing out that some theists think God can perform contradictions. In their paradigm, there is no problem of evil. In my paradigm, the problem of evil is not an intellectual problem after all. So, in neither case does the problem of evil call into question the existence of the "3-omni" God.

matt

[luvluv]

matt:

You should definitely post more often.

(P.S., I'm going to be in Myrtle Beach for a basketball tournament this weekend. I'm up the road in Wilmington.)

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by mattbballman:

"'X has the ability to do y' implies that X can do whatever is logically possible for X to do. In the case of X=God, God is omniscient and so has nothing left to learn (y). Therefore, it is not logically possible for X to have the ability to do y if X is an all-knowing God and y is learning."

This faces the well-known problems of McEar and McNothing. The former is a being who can only scratch his ear and the latter is a being who cannot do anything. In the case of x=McEar, McEar can do nothing except scratch his ear and therefore cannot perform any action a where a is not "to scratch one's ear." Therefore, it is not logically possible for x to have the ability to do y if x is a being who can only scratch his ear and y is any other action.

"In their paradigm, there is no problem of evil."

Only if they are comfortable in saying that their god is internally inconsistent. Yet it's possible to say God is strongly omnipotent without saying He has the ability to "be" internally inconsistent (because this isn't really an action). So they have to believe (1) their God is strongly omnipotent and (2) their God is doing something He has no need to do to accomplish His goals. The latter provides more evidential reason to doubt His existence.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by seebs:

"If I am obliged to admit that my favorite invisible sky-pixie is simply unable to be bad, well, that's fine by me. :) "

I believe it's possible to extend this example to produce a conflict with omniscience, but I'm in the middle of a paper on it and I don't want to say more now.

"Really, when it comes down to it, 'omnipotent' is much less of a firm philosophical standpoint in my cosmology than an underlying model of 'cannot be effectively opposed unless He gives permission'."

That's another way to do it, but it doesn't really seem to square with most people's intuitions. I would be omnipotent if I existed in an otherwise empty universe, or a universe that just contained a few insects and me. This is another option, of course, but most people think omnipotence is more about being as powerful as a being could be, not just as powerful as a being that currently exists is.

[seebs]

[quote]Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
<strong>
"Really, when it comes down to it, 'omnipotent' is much less of a firm philosophical standpoint in my cosmology than an underlying model of 'cannot be effectively opposed unless He gives permission'."

That's another way to do it, but it doesn't really seem to square with most people's intuitions. I would be omnipotent if I existed in an otherwise empty universe, or a universe that just contained a few insects and me. This is another option, of course, but most people think omnipotence is more about being as powerful as a being could be, not just as powerful as a being that currently exists is.</strong><hr></blockquote>

Right, well, I'm including opposition by, say, "physics". :)

I think the problem is that common sense suggests that someone who already knows everything is more powerful than someone who can still learn. Perhaps the correct thing to do is migrate towards a "power" concept of -potence rather than a "set of options" concept. Hmm.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by seebs:

"I think the problem is that common sense suggests that someone who already knows everything is more powerful than someone who can still learn."

I agree, but I think if we go deeper into that intuition we'll find that we tacitly believe being omniscient will allow a person to perform more actions or to bring about more states of affairs. Mere knowledge itself doesn't seem to be about power, unless I can use that knowledge for something.

[seebs]

[quote]Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
<strong>Originally posted by seebs:

"I think the problem is that common sense suggests that someone who already knows everything is more powerful than someone who can still learn."

I agree, but I think if we go deeper into that intuition we'll find that we tacitly believe being omniscient will allow a person to perform more actions or to bring about more states of affairs. Mere knowledge itself doesn't seem to be about power, unless I can use that knowledge for something.</strong><hr></blockquote>

Hmm. Interesting; down that path, I could almost argue that omnipotence *implies* omniscience, but that strikes me as wrong.

I think you've mostly succeeded in convincing me that I don't understand the omni* words well enough to be sure of logical conclusions I think I've drawn from them. Which isn't what you wanted, but it's at least interesting. ;)

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by seebs:

"I could almost argue that omnipotence *implies* omniscience, but that strikes me as wrong." (Emphasis original.)

I think it usually implies the ability to become omniscient, unless the subject is defined as always constantly learning things, or something similarly weird.

"I think you've mostly succeeded in convincing me that I don't understand the omni* words well enough to be sure of logical conclusions I think I've drawn from them."

Well, that's still a good thing to realize. I agree that there's a general intuition that omnipotence and omniscience would be compatible, but there's a general intuition that earth is flat, to use a cliché example.

[seebs]

[quote]Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf:
<strong>
Well, that's still a good thing to realize. I agree that there's a general intuition that omnipotence and omniscience would be compatible, but there's a general intuition that earth is flat, to use a cliché example.</strong><hr></blockquote>

Yup. I know that some of the counterarguments strike me as clearly flawed. This one reveals that I'm not sure the terms made sense in the first place... Although I suspect that's more a limitation in me than in the theoretical possibilities.

[mattbballman]

metcaf,

Was already working on this post in Word, so I'll just post the text here:


"This faces the well-known problems of McEar and McNothing. The former is a being who can only scratch his ear and the latter is a being who cannot do anything. In the case of x=McEar, McEar can do nothing except scratch his ear and therefore cannot perform any action a where a is not "to scratch one's ear." Therefore, it is not logically possible for x to have the ability to do y if x is a being who can only scratch his ear and y is any other action."

-- Although this illustration is somewhat accurate, it does not takin into account that the limitations on God are those that would make Him less than God. In the case of McEar, everything about his nature makes him a lesser being than, say, human beings. But the limitations on God are such that make Him the greatest conceivable being. God cannot be immoral, He cannot cease to exist, He cannot experience sin, and so forth. These are welcome limitations on a Being that is maximally great. McEar is an unfortunate being who would not be considered to have omnipotence except to say that he is omnipotent in what it is logically possible for him to do. And if McEar could do more than scratch his own ear, he would be qualitatively superior to his former self. Omnipotence for God entails the same thing except His limitations, if permitted, would make Him less of a being, not more of one. So, in discussing the ontology of a Being entailing its limitations is accurate in its example, it is devoid of the important aspect or character of those limitations that Make God truly omnipotent and great.

"Only if they are comfortable in saying that their god is internally inconsistent. Yet it's possible to say God is strongly omnipotent without saying He has the ability to "be" internally inconsistent (because this isn't really an action). So they have to believe (1) their God is strongly omnipotent and (2) their God is doing something He has no need to do to accomplish His goals. The latter provides more evidential reason to doubt His existence."

-- I don't believe that theists of this paradigm have to believe anything because their paradigm accepts logical contradictions. Again, I don't hold this position myself.

matt

[mattbballman]

luvluv,

Thank you for the encouragement! Good luck on whatever basketball aspirations you're aiming towards!!!

matt

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by mattbballman:

"So, in discussing the ontology of a Being entailing its limitations is accurate in its example, it is devoid of the important aspect or character of those limitations that Make God truly omnipotent and great."

Wait a minute. I can grant that God would be maximally great. But this may entail (in fact, I think it does entail) that God is not maximally powerful. Let's not just stick them together like that; as it happens, McEar would certainly not be maximally great, although he would satisfy the conditions for omnipotence.

"I don't believe that theists of this paradigm have to believe anything because their paradigm accepts logical contradictions."

Well, it's one thing to accept the ability to be logically contradictory, and another to accept the ability to create logical contradictions. I guess theists could accept both of those, but they need not.

[diana]

[quote]Omnipotence for God entails the same thing except His limitations, if permitted, would make Him less of a being, not more of one. <hr></blockquote>

matt,

Is it possible for a being to be "more" or "less" of a being? Can you dig half a hole?

[quote]I know that some of the counterarguments strike me as clearly flawed. This one reveals that I'm not sure the terms made sense in the first place... Although I suspect that's more a limitation in me than in the theoretical possibilities.<hr></blockquote>

seebs,

I've just read through this thread, start to finish, and by the end of the first page I was thinking, "Isn't omnipotence in itself a nonsense term?"

The problem I see is that we all know--or think we know--what we mean by "omnipotent," but when we actually start thinking about what this meaning would entail, we start putting conditions on a being's supreme power in order to make it possible. But conditions are still conditions, and the very act of applying conditions erodes true "omnipotence."

d

[luvluv]

I was debating this with Thomas in another thread but I will repost it here. Are we sure that omnibenevolence entails the INABILITY to do evil. Could not a being be said to be omnibenevolent simply by NOT doing evil?

On another thread, Thomas made the claim that if God tried to do evil that he would fail. I don't believe this is NECESSARILY the case. It could be that He would succeed, and would then cease to be omnibenevolent. Thomas further stated that this would make Him cease to be God. I maintain that it wouldn't, except by our definition of Him. He would have still created all of reality and would have done all the other activities theists ascribe to God. He would simply not be truly omnibenevolent as we describe Him.
Doesn't Rabbi Harold Kushner have a concept of finite godism? I think this is the major philosophy of that group, and how they overcome the problem of evil. They say God is not omnibenevolent yet but is growing towards it.

I don't know that we KNOW that the INABILITY to do evil is a necessary component of omnibenevolence. What if someone simply DECIDED not to do evil and never failed to stick by that decision? That would not indicate an inability. I asked this question of Thomas Metcalf but I can't find the thread to see his response so I'll ask everybody over here.

Would a being who has the ability to do evil, but refrains from doing so perfectly be any less worthy of the title of omnibenevolence than a being incapable of evil?

[luvluv]

By the way mattballman, I am not in a basketball tournament, I'm going to watch one. My days of playing ball anywhere but the YMCA are pretty much over.

[luvluv]

oops

[Thomas Ash]

I don't think it would make God any less omnipotent not to be able to learn. It's not meaningful to define omnipotence as the ability to perform any verb or set of verbs like 'learn' or 'create a rock the creator can't lift.' I doubt any theist or atheist would have much problem with saying God can't by definition 'skateboard' or 'do the hokey-kokey and turn about' :D , but is still omnipotent.
Omnipotence is better understood as the ability to actualize any logically coherent set of affairs. So just like we can bring it about that a certain skateboard moves or even that we are moving on it (if you are good enough at balancing ;) ), God can also bring about the same state of affairs of the movement of the skateboard or us moving on it. This helps show why McEar isn't really omnipotent - he may by his nature not be able to do anything other than scratch his ear, and thus be by definition unable to tie his shoelaces, but someone else can always tie his shoelaces. But no one can bring it about that God learns, because that's not a meaningful state of affairs for an omniscient being.

[Jobar]

I'd like to clear up a misunderstanding from the first page. Thomas Metcalf replied to mattballman:

"All was have are

(a) God is omniscient
(b) God is omnipotent

But (a) does not contradict (b) explicitly."

Every being that is omnipotent can perform any logically possible action. Any being that is omniscient can learn. To learn is a logically possible action. That is the form of my objection to the coherence of omnipotence and omniscience. I believe there's much more to say, but this is a start."

I am sure Thomas M. meant 'cannot'. There was some confusion resulting from that, although I think everyone is clear on it now.

The logical problems with omnipotence and omniscience have never seemed as sharp as those which involve omnibenevolence.

Thomas Ash said
Omnipotence is better understood as the ability to actualize any logically coherent set of affairs.

I'd be careful using that definition of omnipotence, because in fact the observable world is not always logically coherent! If all the universe behaved within the framework of classical physics this might be defensible, but in fact quantum mechanics and relativity have aspects which are not 'logical'. They are simply real.

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Jobar
Thomas Ash said
Omnipotence is better understood as the ability to actualize any logically coherent set of affairs.

I'd be careful using that definition of omnipotence, because in fact the observable world is not always logically coherent! If all the universe behaved within the framework of classical physics this might be defensible, but in fact quantum mechanics and relativity have aspects which are not 'logical'. They are simply real.

How exactly does quantum mechanics contain aspects which aren't 'logical'? We've actually been having quite a lot of discussions about quantum mechanics in the philosophy forums recently (as it relates to relativity), so I'd be interested to hear what you have to say about it... I understand that it's probabilistic (unless it only appears probabilistic, and there are underlying principles which fully explain results) and not classically deterministic, but there is nothing actually illogical in being probabilistic, is there?

[Jobar]

Well, just to point you towards the many millions of words on the subject- how can something be both a particle (localized) and a wave (non-localized)? The two seem mutually exclusive- yet all experiments indicate that at the quantum level, reality is both local and nonlocal. Look at it one way- wave. Look at exactly the same phenomenon a different way- particle.

If you want to get really confused, try studying the philosophical aspects of Bell's Theorem. It is a proof that there are no 'hidden variables' in the math of quantum mech- so that yes, Virginia, things really are of a dual wave-particle nature. :banghead:

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Jobar
Well, just to point you towards the many millions of words on the subject- how can something be both a particle (localized) and a wave (non-localized)? The two seem mutually exclusive- yet all experiments indicate that at the quantum level, reality is both local and nonlocal. Look at it one way- wave. Look at exactly the same phenomenon a different way- particle.

If you want to get really confused, try studying the philosophical aspects of Bell's Theorem. It is a proof that there are no 'hidden variables' in the math of quantum mech- so that yes, Virginia, things really are of a dual wave-particle nature. :banghead:

I still don't see how that's illogical, per se. It may be hard to get your head around, but it's not a logically incoherent state of affairs like God succesfully removing all evil from the world and there still being evil in the world, or a statement 'p' being both true and not true. I know you could argue that something being both a particle and a wave, two completely different things, one with mass and one with no mass, is contradictory. But couldn't you argue that the nature of things, and the 'stuff' they're actually made of, has never been understandable in the first place, and so it's not the same sort of logical contradiction as, say, God both being omniscient and learning? Or maybe you couldn't - :confused: .
As for Bell's Theorem, I don't seem to have a textbook on quantum mechanics handy (believe it or not ;) ), but if you could fill me in (only needs to be very briefly) on the philosophical implications I'd be very grateful. :notworthy Quantum mechanics seems to be something that, sooner or later, you have to try and get your head around if you want to discuss these sorts of issues.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash :
"It's not meaningful to define omnipotence as the ability to perform any verb or set of verbs like 'learn' or 'create a rock the creator can't lift.'"

Oh, it's certainly meaningful. It's just that it prevents God from being omnipotent, so theists prefer to change the definition to something less intuitive:

"Omnipotence is better understood as the ability to actualize any logically coherent set of affairs."

There are logically coherent states of affairs God cannot actualize. He cannot actualize the state of affairs:

It rains in Seattle and no omnipotent being every exists.

Hoffman and Rosencrantz point out this problem, and Morriston (following Flint and Freddoso) points out that He also cannot actualize a state of affairs similar to:

Thousands of innocent beings are maliciously tortured forever.

These are logically coherent states of affairs; both are possible per se. Yet god cannot bring them about. It follows that God is not omnipotent.

Finally, God cannot pass the Maximal Power Test because it is possible to imagine a more powerful being. Consider the being Jane who can bring about any logically coherent state of affairs and perform any logically possible action. It seems intuitively clear that Jane would be more powerful than God, and therefore, God is not omnipotent.

[diana]

Finally, God cannot pass the Maximal Power Test because it is possible to imagine a more powerful being. Consider the being Jane who can bring about any logically coherent state of affairs and perform any logically possible action. It seems intuitively clear that Jane would be more powerful than God, and therefore, God is not omnipotent.

Hmnk.

I don't think it's possible to imagine a more powerful being than God. When it gets down to it, it's impossible to imagine a being as powerful as God is supposed to be, which is why we're having this discussion.

It is only possible to define a being more powerful.

(I know...semantics.)

d

[capnkirk]

Being the incorrigibly applications-oriented engineer that I am, it seems to me that any god that is incomprehensible is by virtue of that quality therefore also IRRELAVENT!!

To clarify: How can one derive valid premises for conducting one's life from a source that is incomprehensible? Simply put, one can not. If one cannot derive valid life-principles from a given source, then that source is irrelavent to that purpose...period.

Does god and religion have any purpose other than to provide a guide for living one's life (discounting the political and Machiavellian ones)?

[luvluv]

Is my question not being addressed because it is really smart or really stoopid?

I can't tell anymore.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by luvluv

"Would a being who has the ability to do evil, but refrains from doing so perfectly be any less worthy of the title of omnibenevolence than a being incapable of evil?"

First, I think God indeed can't do evil. God is morally perfect, and therefore will never stop being morally perfect (because to do so would be morally imperfect). If and only if x can't do y, there is no possible world in which x does y. And there is no possible world in which God does evil, so I don't see how He could be said to have the ability to do evil.

Second, I think both of those beings would be equally morally perfect. Moral perfection is about always choosing the morally best option, and both of those beings would satisfy that predicate.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by diana

"I don't think it's possible to imagine a more powerful being than God. When it gets down to it, it's impossible to imagine a being as powerful as God is supposed to be, which is why we're having this discussion."

I'd say we can imagine it. I can imagine a unicorn; that doesn't mean I'm occurrently thinking about the activity of its immune system, the physics of the air trapped in its fur, etc. Imagination is just a (possibly incomplete) idea that matches some concept, I think.

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf
Originally posted by Thomas Ash :
"It's not meaningful to define omnipotence as the ability to perform any verb or set of verbs like 'learn' or 'create a rock the creator can't lift.'"

Oh, it's certainly meaningful. It's just that it prevents God from being omnipotent, so theists prefer to change the definition to something less intuitive:

"Omnipotence is better understood as the ability to actualize any logically coherent set of affairs."
I'm sure you're not accusing me of being a theist :( . But at the risk of sounding like an apologist, I will defend this view of omnipotence, because I think it's a defensible one.

There are logically coherent states of affairs God cannot actualize. He cannot actualize the state of affairs:

It rains in Seattle and no omnipotent being every exists.
Right, well God could not do this. But I don't think it is a logically coherent state of affairs. In a universe where God existed as a necessarily existent being, and the fundamental support for the existence of the whole universe (this is what theists believe, remember - that God is not only the creator of the universe, but sustains it in its existence) it is logically incoherent to put together the terms 'God' and 'does not exist' (as well as 'it rains in Seattle', if God sustains the universe.) It's just like saying 'square circle.' Of course, this assumes that the part of the theistic hypothesis about there being 'necessarily existent beings' is meaningful, and there's no real argument for why we should think this is so.
Hoffman and Rosencrantz point out this problem, and Morriston (following Flint and Freddoso) points out that He also cannot actualize a state of affairs similar to:

Thousands of innocent beings are maliciously tortured forever.

These are logically coherent states of affairs; both are possible per se. Yet god cannot bring them about. It follows that God is not omnipotent.
I thought you agreed that God could not bring this about because he would be a morally perfect being. It's not that he would be incapable of bringing this logically coherent state of affairs about, it's that he would never decide to. This is a different case to the McEar challenge - it's more like if McEar could do anything, but because of his fondness for scratching his ear only ever decided to do this.
Finally, God cannot pass the Maximal Power Test because it is possible to imagine a more powerful being. Consider the being Jane who can bring about any logically coherent state of affairs and perform any logically possible action. It seems intuitively clear that Jane would be more powerful than God, and therefore, God is not omnipotent.
Just included for completeness.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Thomas Ash :

Don't worry; I don't think you're a theist. I'm just trying to emphasize the somewhat ad hoc nature of the move from "task" to "state of affairs."

"Of course, this assumes that the part of the theistic hypothesis about there being 'necessarily existent beings' is meaningful, and there's no real argument for why we should think this is so."

Indeed. Alethic modal status is not a determining predicate. But even if God were a necessary existent, we should want an omnipotent being to be able to bring about any state of affairs that is logically consistent per se, not just given the existence of God. Suppose God's existence made the state of affairs in which someone or other eats a hot dog impossible. "To eat a hot dog" seems to be an action that an omnipotent being ought to be able to perform. So in that situation, we should conclude, instead, that it's impossible for a being to be omnipotent, that God's existence prohibits omnipotence.

"It's not that he would be incapable of bringing this logically coherent state of affairs about, it's that he would never decide to." (Italics original.)

There is no possible world in which God brings about this state of affairs; if God were to try to bring about this state of affairs, He would fail; I do not see any other way to unpack "cannot bring about" than the possible-worlds analysis or the try-and-fail analysis. Morriston also asks us to imagine a being with severe mental paralysis; if this being could just decide what to do, it would do it, but it is extremely indecisive, and the result is that it does nothing in every possible world. This being wouldn't be omnipotent, I don't think.

"Just included for completeness."

Wait... do you mean you concede this point? I don't understand your response.

[diana]

Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf
Originally posted by diana

"I don't think it's possible to imagine a more powerful being than God. When it gets down to it, it's impossible to imagine a being as powerful as God is supposed to be, which is why we're having this discussion."

I'd say we can imagine it. I can imagine a unicorn; that doesn't mean I'm occurrently thinking about the activity of its immune system, the physics of the air trapped in its fur, etc. Imagination is just a (possibly incomplete) idea that matches some concept, I think.

Good morning, Thomas.

I can imagine a unicorn, too, but my idea of a unicorn is basically a horse with a horn. However, were I to try to imagine a unicorn that was simultaneously capable of being invisible and pink, my imagination itself would fail at that point.

If I try to imagine a being who is more powerful than me, I have no problem. But as soon as I try to imagine a being that is all-powerful, my brain seizes, because omnipotence is, in its pure form, logically impossible. This is precisely why it is necessary to redefine it (from "all-powerful") to "the ability to do anything that is logically possible [and possibly add: and not outside that being's nature]."

If the concept of omnipotence itself were coherent, there would be no need to redefine it.

I was simply using the term "imagine" to include the characteristics of the being in question, as I understand them to be defined. This is what I meant when I said we aren't capable of imagining God.

Hope that helps.

d

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf
Thomas Ash :

Don't worry; I don't think you're a theist. I'm just trying to emphasize the somewhat ad hoc nature of the move from "task" to "state of affairs."

"Of course, this assumes that the part of the theistic hypothesis about there being 'necessarily existent beings' is meaningful, and there's no real argument for why we should think this is so."

Indeed. Alethic modal status is not a determining predicate.
Yes, I think 'necessarily existent' is just a case of arbitrarily strining two words together and assuming that they refer to a meaningful concept. Personally, I don't have any idea of what it would mean for something to be 'necessarily existent', and see no reason from what I've experienced in the universe to suppose that there could be such a thing.
But even if God were a necessary existent, we should want an omnipotent being to be able to bring about any state of affairs that is logically consistent per se, not just given the existence of God.
I don't think I accept this. The logically coherent states of affairs that God, as an omnipotent being, can bring about have to be total states of affairs, taking into account everything that's the case, including God's existence. So any state of affairs God can bring about has to be consistent with both everything else that's the case in the universe, and with God's existence.
Suppose God's existence made the state of affairs in which someone or other eats a hot dog impossible. "To eat a hot dog" seems to be an action that an omnipotent being ought to be able to perform. So in that situation, we should conclude, instead, that it's impossible for a being to be omnipotent, that God's existence prohibits omnipotence.
I don't think "God eats a hotdog" is a meaningful sentence. :) It's no less illogical than "God creates a square circle" or "God waves his arms" (he doesn't have any arms.
"It's not that he would be incapable of bringing this logically coherent state of affairs about, it's that he would never decide to." (Italics original.)

There is no possible world in which God brings about this state of affairs; if God were to try to bring about this state of affairs, He would fail; I do not see any other way to unpack "cannot bring about" than the possible-worlds analysis or the try-and-fail analysis. Morriston also asks us to imagine a being with severe mental paralysis; if this being could just decide what to do, it would do it, but it is extremely indecisive, and the result is that it does nothing in every possible world. This being wouldn't be omnipotent, I don't think.
I'd go for the first unpacking of "cannot bring about." I think I considered this in a previous post, but I'd say Morriston's hypothetical being is omnipotent if he could bring about anything, but just never trys or wants to try to do anything. He's not omnipotent if he wants to do it but can never bring himself to despite his effort becuase of some physical impediment.
"Just included for completeness."

Wait... do you mean you concede this point? I don't understand your response.
I didn't want to leave that part of your post out for anyone else following the discussion, though I wasn't myself going to comment on it.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash :

"I don't think I accept this. The logically coherent states of affairs that God, as an omnipotent being, can bring about have to be total states of affairs, taking into account everything that's the case, including God's existence. So any state of affairs God can bring about has to be consistent with both everything else that's the case in the universe, and with God's existence." (Italics original.)

I agree that any state of affairs God can bring about has to be consistent with God's existence, but this is analytically true. Suppose God prohibited every being from doing anything. If this were true, then a being who could do nothing would be omnipotent. I think a better use of "omnipotent" would entail that if God had such an existence, no being could be omnipotent.

"I don't think 'God eats a hotdog' is a meaningful sentence. :) It's no less illogical than 'God creates a square circle' or 'God waves his arms' (he doesn't have any arms."

There is a clear difference between your first and third examples, and the second. The action described in the second is impossible per se and the first and third are only impossible ex hypothesi. (This is related to the discussion directly above in this post.) Again, there are some actions that it just seems would make a being more powerful if it were able to perform.

"I'd go for the first unpacking of 'cannot bring about.'"

But then God cannot bring about the situation, because there is no possible world in which He brings about that situation.

"He's not omnipotent if he wants to do it but can never bring himself to despite his effort becuase of some physical impediment."

So mental limitations do not preclude omnipotence, but physical limitations do? That seems rather ad hoc to me.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by diana :

"If I try to imagine a being who is more powerful than me, I have no problem. But as soon as I try to imagine a being that is all-powerful, my brain seizes, because omnipotence is, in its pure form, logically impossible. This is precisely why it is necessary to redefine it (from 'all-powerful') to 'the ability to do anything that is logically possible [and possibly add: and not outside that being's nature].'" (Sic.)

I've been going with amended forms of omnipotence all along. I say it's possible to imagine a being with sophisticated omnipotence (as in, "logically possible actions"). Your bracketed comment won't work, because it falls prey to the problem of McEar. Are you familiar with it?

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf
Originally posted by Thomas Ash :

"I don't think I accept this. The logically coherent states of affairs that God, as an omnipotent being, can bring about have to be total states of affairs, taking into account everything that's the case, including God's existence. So any state of affairs God can bring about has to be consistent with both everything else that's the case in the universe, and with God's existence." (Italics original.)

I agree that any state of affairs God can bring about has to be consistent with God's existence, but this is analytically true. Suppose God prohibited every being from doing anything. If this were true, then a being who could do nothing would be omnipotent. I think a better use of "omnipotent" would entail that if God had such an existence, no being could be omnipotent.
Could you spell this example out a bit more? I'm not sure I fully understand what you're saying. Are you saying that if, given God's existence, it is logically impossible for any being (apart from God) to do anything, then they are omnipotent because the courses of action they cannot take are logically excluded? But they're not under my definition of state-of-affairs omnipotence. The beings are not omnipotent because God can actualize these states of affairs even though they can't. It's only if the states of affairs are in themselves logically incoherent (like there being a square circle) rather than it being logically impossible for certain specific types of being to actualize them (like if God "prohibited every being from doing anything") that an omnipotent being doesn't have to be able to bring them about.

"I don't think 'God eats a hotdog' is a meaningful sentence. :) It's no less illogical than 'God creates a square circle' or 'God waves his arms' (he doesn't have any arms."

There is a clear difference between your first and third examples, and the second. The action described in the second is impossible per se and the first and third are only impossible ex hypothesi. (This is related to the discussion directly above in this post.) Again, there are some actions that it just seems would make a being more powerful if it were able to perform.
I think it's just as meaningless to talk about an armless being waving its arms as it is to talk about a square circle. What you're saying is that I can wave my arms and God can't, so I must be more powerful than God. :) Thanks, but if you look at it from the perspective of states of affairs it's not the case that I can do something that God can't. I can bring it about that my arms wave - so can God. I can't bring it about that God's nonexistent (even forgetting that God is nonexistent himself ;) ) arms wave, and neither can God, but given that the latter is a meaningless conjunction of words, it's not a big problem for either of our claims to omnipotence.
"I'd go for the first unpacking of 'cannot bring about.'"

But then God cannot bring about the situation, because there is no possible world in which He brings about that situation.
I plead bad phrasing. I meant the second unpacking would be required to say you have found a way in which God's omnipotence is disproved.
"He's not omnipotent if he wants to do it but can never bring himself to despite his effort becuase of some physical impediment."

So mental limitations do not preclude omnipotence, but physical limitations do? That seems rather ad hoc to me.
What I meant was that if God wants or tries to do something, but finds he cannot, then he's not omnipotent. If he never wants or tries to do it in any possible world (though in theory he has the power to do it), then he's still onipotent. Forget the bit about a physical impediment, except insofar as I don't think you can call a part of Gods nature (such as benevolence) an "impediment" any more than you can call a part of my thought processes (such as remembering that it's not a good idea to eat red hot peppers and thus not doing so) an "impediment."

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash :

The Nature of God's Omnipotence

"But they're not under my definition of state-of-affairs omnipotence. The beings are not omnipotent because God can actualize these states of affairs even though they can't."

It still makes good intuitive sense to say that if God's existence prohibits some state of affairs that would be possible per se, then no being can be maximally powerful. Suppose God's existence prohibits any state of affairs except the states of affairs in which only one person exists, and sits in a rocking chair doing nothing. In this situation, we ought to say that no being can be maximally powerful, because maximal power requires the ability to bring about more possible per se states of affairs than this rather mundane one.

"I think it's just as meaningless to talk about an armless being waving its arms as it is to talk about a square circle."

Indeed, but the predicate "waves its arms" is not meaningless. That's how it's different from "draws a square circle." And we can turn these into states of affairs with "someone or other freely waves his or her arms" versus "someone or other freely draws a square circle." The former is logically possible, and the latter is not; yet God cannot bring about the former, and I can.

"What you're saying is that I can wave my arms and God can't, so I must be more powerful than God. :)"

I'm afraid not. I'm saying that a being (name her "Jane") who was just like God except that she could bring about "lots of innocent persons are tortured maliciously" would be more powerful than God. The set of states of affairs Jane could bring about would be more pollent than the set of states of affairs God could bring about.

Can God do evil?

"What I meant was that if God wants or tries to do something, but finds he cannot, then he's not omnipotent."

Suppose God tries to cause Himself to choose evil. He tries to set in motion a chain of events that will result in Him choosing evil. He will fail in this endeavor, because there is no such chain of events. Yet I (and Jane) will not necessarily fail when we try to set in motion a chain of events that results in one of us choosing evil.

[capnkirk]

How did this thread digress from "Is god incomprehensible?" to "is god omnipotent?"?

Time to start a new thread!

[luvluv]

Thomas Metcalf:

First, I think God indeed can't do evil. God is morally perfect, and therefore will never stop being morally perfect (because to do so would be morally imperfect). If and only if x can't do y, there is no possible world in which x does y. And there is no possible world in which God does evil, so I don't see how He could be said to have the ability to do evil.

Isn't this begging the question somewhat? Where did you establish that x can't do y? Isn't this what we are debating?

I think that whatever omnibenevolence entails, it has to entail some form of conscious abstention from evil. I don't see how God could be said to be omnibenevolent simply because when He tries to do evil, He fails. One would think that He would cease to be omnibenevolent simply in the trying. Could we really say that if God really wanted to rape and murder and cause suffering, but was incapable of doing so, that He was omnibenevolent?

So I think you first have to establish God's inability to do evil as opposed to His choice not to do evil. In saying that there is no possible world in which God could do evil you are simply assuming God's inability to do evil. Why could I not believe that God could do evil He simply perfectly refrains from doing so? In that scenario there are possible worlds in which God does evil. Maybe I am missing something but you seem to be totally disregarding this possibility and I can't understand why.

Second, I think both of those beings would be equally morally perfect. Moral perfection is about always choosing the morally best option, and both of those beings would satisfy that predicate.

Well, wouldn't that render your disproof unsound? Why couldn't a Christian simply say that omnibenevolence simply means that although God is capable of evil He perfectly abstains from it? Wouldn't that be a sufficient answer to the supposed contradiction of omnibenevolence to omnipotence?

I'd like to weigh in on the necessary existent argument if I could. I think this is based on the cosmological argument in which we see the contrast between contingent beings (who might not have existed) and necessary beings (who could not have not existed). A necessary being is necessary because contingent beings exist. Since contingent beings exist there must either be a infinte regress of contingent beings or a necessary being who can supply his own existence. I think the term "necessary" emerges from the realities that a) we are here and b) an infinte regress of actual events in time is impossible. Therefore, some being must be able to supply it's own existence and this being is therefore called necessary. By classical definition, a necessary being could not not exist, and this would be true whether there are contingent beings or not. But I could see someone supporting the position that a necessary being is necessary, from an inductive standpoint, because contingent beings exist; if contingent beings did not exist then the necessary being might not be necessary. This is not an explicitly theistic belief, as I conceded to Thomas Metcalf earlier. The necessary being could be some eternal law of physics which provided for the existence of everything else.

[Darth Dane]

Yin and Yang, together they form the Tao

Tao = God

That which is everything.





DD - Tao Spliff

[mattbballman]

Tom,

Just responding your last post to me. Interesting thread BTW.

(i) In order for God to be the greatest conceivable being, he would have to at least be both omnipotent and omniscient (among other qualities). And McEar's omnipotence within his limited sphere elicits a less-than-great performance. McEar could be better; God cannot conceivably be better than what He is described as already.

(ii) When I say "less of a being" or "more of one" I am not referring to a level of their existence (that one exists somehow more than the other) but, rather, the qualitative feature of being ontologically superior versus being ontologically inferior. If God's "limitations" were granted to Him somehow, then this would make God more inferior per his nature. For example, if the ability to lie were granted to God then this would make Him less than omnibenevolent. If God were granted the ability to swim then He would be less than immutable. If God had the ability to learn then this would make him less than omniscient.

matt

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf
Originally posted by Thomas Ash :

The Nature of God's Omnipotence

"But they're not under my definition of state-of-affairs omnipotence. The beings are not omnipotent because God can actualize these states of affairs even though they can't."

It still makes good intuitive sense to say that if God's existence prohibits some state of affairs that would be possible per se, then no being can be maximally powerful. Suppose God's existence prohibits any state of affairs except the states of affairs in which only one person exists, and sits in a rocking chair doing nothing. In this situation, we ought to say that no being can be maximally powerful, because maximal power requires the ability to bring about more possible per se states of affairs than this rather mundane one.
This depends what you mean by God's exitence prohibiting certain soas (I was typing out 'states of affairs' far too often :) ...) If there is a state of affairs that would be logically incoherent in a possible world where God existed (eg. there being no omnipotent being, or - arguably - there being meaningless suffering), then God does not have to have the ability to bring it about in order to be omnipotent. If however you mean that God's existence simply arbitrarily prohibits a certain state of affairs like your example of people doing things other than sit in a rocking chair, even though those soas remain logically coherent and comprehensible, then God is not omnipotent if he cannot bring such soas about. But in practice theists only ever deny that God could bring about the first type of situations, like round circles or him (an omnbenevolent being) doing evil. I think they're justified in this, and can still claim he remains omnipotent.
"I think it's just as meaningless to talk about an armless being waving its arms as it is to talk about a square circle."

Indeed, but the predicate "waves its arms" is not meaningless. That's how it's different from "draws a square circle." And we can turn these into states of affairs with "someone or other freely waves his or her arms" versus "someone or other freely draws a square circle." The former is logically possible, and the latter is not; yet God cannot bring about the former, and I can.
The predicate "waves its arms" is meaningless considered on its own without naming someone whose arms are being waved, and it remains meaningless when you put its together with an ethereal being which, by definition, has no arms. You haven't answered my point that God can bring it about that "my arms wave" just as much as I can, but that neither of us can bring about the soa in which God waves his arms, as he doesn't have... well, you get it :D .
"What you're saying is that I can wave my arms and God can't, so I must be more powerful than God. :)"

I'm afraid not. I'm saying that a being (name her "Jane") who was just like God except that she could bring about "lots of innocent persons are tortured maliciously" would be more powerful than God. The set of states of affairs Jane could bring about would be more pollent than the set of states of affairs God could bring about.
God can bring about evil in the sense that he does have the power to do this (not in some other senses of 'can'), he just wouldn't in any possible situation... see my answer to your paragraph below.
Can God do evil?

"What I meant was that if God wants or tries to do something, but finds he cannot, then he's not omnipotent."

Suppose God tries to cause Himself to choose evil. He tries to set in motion a chain of events that will result in Him choosing evil. He will fail in this endeavor, because there is no such chain of events. Yet I (and Jane) will not necessarily fail when we try to set in motion a chain of events that results in one of us choosing evil.
:mad: God CAN TOO do evil! (except that he doesn't exist... I seem to have gotten so into defending the comprehensibility of his being omnipotent that I've started talking as though he exists ;) !) God would never try to set in motion such a chain of events as you describe, because this would mean bring about a logically incomprehensible state of affairs: that in which God does evil. On my model, he can bring about the soa in which you (or Jane...) do evil, just as much as either you can bring about that soa. Now I come to think of it, there is a possible problem with this. His bringing about the soa in which someone else does evil is morally equivalent to his bringing about the evil with a proxy. So then there is a certain, logically coherent soa (that of you doing evil) that he cannot bring about, although you can. Hmm, this may be a problem, if God bringing about the soa in which you do evil is indeed morally equivalent to his doing evil himself...

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by luvluv
I'd like to weigh in on the necessary existent argument if I could.
Feel free! ;) This is an interesting one...
I think this is based on the cosmological argument in which we see the contrast between contingent beings (who might not have existed) and necessary beings (who could not have not existed). A necessary being is necessary because contingent beings exist. Since contingent beings exist there must either be a infinte regress of contingent beings or a necessary being who can supply his own existence. I think the term "necessary" emerges from the realities that a) we are here and b) an infinte regress of actual events in time is impossible. Therefore, some being must be able to supply it's own existence and this being is therefore called necessary. By classical definition, a necessary being could not not exist, and this would be true whether there are contingent beings or not. But I could see someone supporting the position that a necessary being is necessary, from an inductive standpoint, because contingent beings exist; if contingent beings did not exist then the necessary being might not be necessary. This is not an explicitly theistic belief, as I conceded to Thomas Metcalf earlier. The necessary being could be some eternal law of physics which provided for the existence of everything else.
Well, you've only put forward an argument for believing that a necessarily existent being must exist. I think (of course, you could question my empiricist approach) you must first give an example of what sort of thing a 'necessary being' would be. Looking around the world we only see 'things' which have properties like 'grey', 'big', or 'has a trunk' and so on. What does it mean for something to have the property 'necessary', which is a totally different type of property from the other properties we see things as having? Is 'necessary' a predicate you can stick on any old thing? Could there be a 'necessary elephant', or is it only the case that there is a 'necessary perfect' being'? I don't think (as yet) a 'necessary being' has been defined properly, and consequently it has about as much meaning as 'square circle.'
PS: Do you think we should move this to another thread? It's an interesting discussion in its own right. All those in favour, PM "aye".

[luvluv]

Where's Thomas Metcalf at anyways?

Well, Thomas, I was thinking that the term "necessary" applies in an inductive sense. The necessary being must be necessary because contingent beings exist, contingent beings cannot bring themselves into existence, and there cannot be an infinite regress of contingent beings in time bringing about the existence of other contingent beings, THEREFORE there must be some "necessary" being who brought this cycle into existence. This being must, necessarily, be able to supply it's own existence.

I have no idea what this thing might be or what shape it might take. In my opinion, only a being with at least two of the classical God's attributes (omniscience, or at least super intelligence; and omnipotence) could really explain the universe as we see it. But this "necessary" being could simply be some ultimate law of physics. Regardless, something must exist which can explain it's own existence without appeal to another agent or entity.

I'd still like some commentary on my original point. I still think it may simply be really dumb ( I like matt's explanation better and it works sufficiently to me) but I'd still like to know what everbody thinks about it. Thomas Metcalf, do you still hold that the contradictions between omnipotence and omniscience and the contradictions between omnipotence and omnibenevolence eliminate any possibility of the existence of God? Have these discussions moved you on these points at all?

[luvluv]

With all due respect Thomas and Thomas, I think you are missing the point. God's omnibenevolence has nothing to do with the fact that if He tried to do evil He would fail, it has everything to do with the fact that He would never try to do evil. Wouldn't God cease to be omnibenevolent simply in having the intent to do evil? So how in the world can we describe omnibenevolence as a lack of ability? It is a lack of intent, if anything.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by luvluv :

"Isn't this begging the question somewhat? Where did you establish that x can't do y? Isn't this what we are debating?"

That's the point of the biconditional above. If I can establish that there is no possible world in which God does evil, I can establish that God cannot do evil. Now, a possible world is a maximal consistent conjunctive proposition, and this proposition cannot be consistent if it contains "... and a morally perfect being does evil ... " -- so such a maximal proposition is not consistent, and therefore not a possible world.

"Why couldn't a Christian simply say that omnibenevolence simply means that although God is capable of evil He perfectly abstains from it? Wouldn't that be a sufficient answer to the supposed contradiction of omnibenevolence to omnipotence?"

Suppose we take the "try / fail" version of "capable." The proposition "If God tried to do evil, God would succeed" is false. You could claim out that if God tried to do evil, He would no longer be morally perfect, but there are two responses to be made; first, this is not clear, because I could say that God would know ahead of time He'd fail, so He knew there was no danger of the evil actually happening and therefore it wasn't an evil action; and second, if God tried to do evil, He wouldn't be God anymore, and the being doing evil in the consequent wouldn't be God -- and therefore we still couldn't say God was doing evil.

The claim that a being Who always chooses good wouldn't definitely be morally perfect doesn't seem very intuitively appealing. The incapability could be a result of God's own moral nature, which still seems to preserve morality.

"Since contingent beings exist there must either be a infinte regress of contingent beings or a necessary being who can supply his own existence."

I think it makes sense to say that this being could cease to exist, and therefore, is not necessary the way the Anselmian means. That is, perhaps we need one being, the existence of which is only contingent on itself, but this being could still cease to exist.

[Thomas Metcalf]

mattbballman :

No one is denying that McEar would not be maximally great; rather, we are denying that God would be maximally powerful. Perhaps (as several philosophers have argued), maximal power is not as great a property as, say, moral perfection.

So what it makes sense to do, to me, is to say that God is as powerful as is consistent with maximal perfection or maximal greatness. Perhaps this is not maximal power per se, but it is still great power.

[Thomas Metcalf]

Thomas Ash :


"You haven't answered my point that God can bring it about that 'my arms wave' just as much as I can, but that neither of us can bring about the soa in which God waves his arms, as he doesn't have... well, you get it :D . " (Italics original.)

I can bring about "someone or other freely waves his or her arms," and God cannot. There we have at least one consistent state of affairs that God cannot bring about.

"God would never try to set in motion such a chain of events as you describe, because this would mean bring about a logically incomprehensible state of affairs: that in which God does evil."

But it wouldn't, because God would know ahead of time that He would fail.

"So then there is a certain, logically coherent soa (that of you doing evil) that he cannot bring about, although you can. Hmm, this may be a problem, if God bringing about the soa in which you do evil is indeed morally equivalent to his doing evil himself..."

I believe the correct answers come from this sort of recognition. God cannot bring about "Someone or other freely does evil" and such is another consistent state of affairs God cannot bring about.

[luvluv]

Thomas Metcalf:

That's the point of the biconditional above. If I can establish that there is no possible world in which God does evil, I can establish that God cannot do evil. Now, a possible world is a maximal consistent conjunctive proposition, and this proposition cannot be consistent if it contains "... and a morally perfect being does evil ... " -- so such a maximal proposition is not consistent, and therefore not a possible world.

Why couldn't there be a possible world in which a formerly morally perfect being lost His perfection? My question is what is the logical contradiction involved in a being who has always perfectly abstained from evil, and being in that sense omnibenevolent, if He were to one day commit an evil act? If his omnibenevolence consists of restraint or abstention then I can't see how this occurance would be a logical contradiction.

Suppose we take the "try / fail" version of "capable." The proposition "If God tried to do evil, God would succeed" is false. You could claim out that if God tried to do evil, He would no longer be morally perfect, but there are two responses to be made; first, this is not clear, because I could say that God would know ahead of time He'd fail, so He knew there was no danger of the evil actually happening and therefore it wasn't an evil action; and second, if God tried to do evil, He wouldn't be God anymore, and the being doing evil in the consequent wouldn't be God -- and therefore we still couldn't say God was doing evil.

I still say that we do not know that if God tried to do evil He would fail, and that further we never will know because God will never try to do evil. I don't see how your first objection is really applicable. Why would an omniscient, omnipotent Being waste it's "time" (so to speak) trying to do things that it cannot do because it is against it's nature? And I still say that evil intentions are as damning to omnibenevolence as evil actions. If I had the serious intention and desire to personally murder everyone on this planet, that would be a moral failing on my part (to say the least), even if I knew that I could never do such a thing. For God to intend an immoral action, even if He did so with the knowledge that such a state of affairs could never be actualized, He would cease to be omnibenevolent.

As to your second objection, I again disagree. We do not know that the being that would have done the evil would not longer be God, the being would simply no longer fit our classical definition of God. Let us take Bob. Let us consider that Bob exists both in actuality and as a concept in our head (as God must, if He exists).
According to our concept of Bob, Bob never eats spinach. To do so would be positively un-Boblike. Now suppose the actual Bob defies convention one day and actually eats spinach. Would Bob cease to exist or would our erroneous definition of Bob cease to exist?

If God were to do evil, He would still be God, we would simply have to redefine what the term meant. Our defintions cannot circumscribe of confine the qualities of an entity which actually exists. If, in reality, God did evil, he would not cease to be God. At most, He would cease to be omnibenevolent. We describe omnibenevolence as a characterstic of God's essence but certainly we can conceive of Deistic concepts of God which are no less worthy of the name which lack this attribute altogether. A being which is omniscient, omnipotent, and nearly omnibenevolent would certainly still be worthy of the name of God, particualrly if no being existed who was in greater possession of these attributes. In saying that God's omnibenevolence is possibly the result of abstention, I guess I am effectively saying that it is possible that omnibenevolence is not part of God's essence the same sense that omniscience and omnipotence are. But would that make Him any less omnibenevolent or any less God if He always perfectly abstained from evil? I don't see how it would. So while I don't necessarily believe this I think it is a suitable answer to the argument: God is omnibenevolent He is simply not NECESSARILY omnibenevolent. He chooses to be so. (By the way, Orthodox Islam actually believes this: they believe that God's will is prior to all of his other attributes and so He is not necessarily omnibenevolent. And there God is defined as being omnimax. So they seem to have preceded me in finding a way around your dilema)

Overall though you have failed to establish that an omnibenevolent Being would ever try to do evil (whether it was within His power or not) so I still don't see how you can claim that He is incapable of evil. Neither of your objections pose a realistic possibility regarding how an omnibenevolent God would attempt to do evil. How can we ever know this?

I still would like to ask you though if you still believe that God cannot exist based on these supposed contradictions, or do you simply take our notion of what God is to be unreasonable or untenable?

[Thomas Metcalf]

Originally posted by luvluv :

"Why couldn't there be a possible world in which a formerly morally perfect being lost His perfection?"

There could, unless this being is omnipotent and omniscient. It is morally imperfect to choose to stop being morally perfect, and an omnipotent, omniscient God couldn't be tricked or forced into ceasing to be morally perfect.

"Why would an omniscient, omnipotent Being waste it's 'time' (so to speak) trying to do things that it cannot do because it is against it's nature?"

Well, I agree that it wouldn't. But the fact remains that if it did, it would fail. That's how we're currently unpacking "capable." If you want to propose a different unpacking, we can consider it.

"And I still say that evil intentions are as damning to omnibenevolence as evil actions."

But remember, God's not having an evil intention, because He knows He'll fail in causing Himself to commit evil. It's not evil if you know it's not going to happen.

"Would Bob cease to exist or would our erroneous definition of Bob cease to exist?"

Bob cannot eat spinach without causing a being defined the way Bob has been to cease to exist; God cannot do evil without causing a being defined the way God has been defined to cease to exist. I can.

"God is omnibenevolent He is simply not NECESSARILY omnibenevolent. He chooses to be so."

This position departs from several theistic philosophers, but as I have argued above, morally perfect beings such as God cannot cease to be morally perfect.

"I still would like to ask you though if you still believe that God cannot exist based on these supposed contradictions, ..."

I believe that a being defined the way God has been defined (omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect) cannot exist. That's another way of saying I believe God cannot exist.

[mattbballman]

metcaf,

But that's just it -- God's logical self-limitations are made by His other great-making attributes such as being all-good. In McEar's instance, his limitations are based on his contingency as a material, animated ear.

matt

[mattbballman]

metcaf,

But that's just it -- God's logical self-limitations are made by His other great-making attributes such as being all-good. In McEar's instance, his limitations are based on his contingency as a material, animated ear.

matt

[mattbballman]

metcaf,

But that's just it -- God's logical self-limitations are made by His other great-making attributes such as being all-good. In McEar's instance, his limitations are based on his contingency as a material, animated ear.

matt

[mattbballman]

apologize for the repitition:-D

[Thomas Metcalf]

mattbballman :

We both agree that God and McEar suffer limitations, and that God's is the result of a great-making attribute and McEar's is the result of an unfortunate physical condition. Yet I don't think we can say that omnipotence is just as mu