Ethics Without God: A Personal Journey -- The Series

[Alonzo Fyfe]

What is this series and why am I writing it?

I can scarcely go a day without hearing people say that atheists are evil. Every day, theists proclaim that violence and social decay can be traced to a loss of belief in (faith in) God, practically blaming the atheist for every shooting, stabbing, and rape that gets reported in the papers.

Even today, on a CNN poll about President Bush's faith, the question phrased the options as between "separation of church and state" versus "returning morality to the white house, again making the "no religion = no morality" connection.

I could have possibly written another cold, dry treatise on ethics. However, the libraries of the world are filled with texts written on the difference between good and evil, right and wrong, that do not mention God. Yet, still, outside of academic circles, the cry that morality requires religion goes virtually unanswered.

So, I wanted this set of essays to be different. I wanted them to clearly communicate that there is a person behind these ideas.

Besides, ethics much more than abstract principles and impersonal formulae. It concerns life, and the living of that life. So, I wanted to attach these ideas to a life.

The consequence is this series of ethics essays.

ETHICS WITHOUT GOD: A PERSONAL JOURNEY

It's about my personal quest to be a good person and to live a good life. It is a quest that I hope that is far from ending. Still, I hope that this progress report contains something that others might find useful.

I will add that I think I have come up with an insight or two along the way about the nature of value in general and morality in particular. At least, I hope so. I will leave it to the reader to judge that issue for himself or herself.

I hope you find them useful.

Plus, I am always interested in any suggestions or comments that may improve these writings.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

This essay describes the start of the journey.

I was sitting in a high school history class, deciding that I did not want my life to turn out like so many others that my teacher lectured about -- people who devoted their energies and even gave their lives for causes they believed in, and wasted them because they fought for something not worth defending or promoting.

Causes such as that of the Confederate soldier in the civil war -- the person who fought for slavery.

Causes such as inquisitions, crusades, witch-hunts, empire-building.

So, where do I go to find out how to avoid these errors? Where do I go to discover the truth?

Some people said that the answer could be found in religion.

I did not think so.

In this part of the journey, I explain why.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

In Part I, I gave my reasons for thinking that one can't find any understanding of right and wrong in relgious text -- and that, in fact, nobody really tries to do so.

Another option that I was introduced to was Libertarianism, and its close relative, the Objectivism of Ayn Rand. I followed that ideology for a couple of years. Then, I started having questions.

My first questions were merely concerns. I discuss the three most significant of those concerns here.

The fourth objection came from Scotish philosopher, David Hume, and sprung from his observation that one cannot derive "ought" (value) conclusions from strictly "is" (fact) premises. Called, alternatively, the "fact/value" or "is/ought" distinction, it took the foundation out from under Objectivism.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

The objection that put Objectivism on my shelf of discarded ethical systems said that there was a gap between "is" and "ought", between "fact" and "values".

But if there is no connection between "fact" and "values", then doesn't this say that "values" have no influence or relevance in the real world?

So, we should abandon all talk of "values."

This option has its own problems.

This essay concerns more than the relationship between "value" and "fact". It concerned the relationship between "value" and "life." At the time, I also faced questions about what it takes to make a life worth living at all.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

After the previous section (with its discussion of suicide and death), this one lightens up a bit and looks at the things I found entertaining.

My questions about right and wrong, good and evil -- as well as the existence of a god and its duties of it did exist -- pursued me even into the things that I did for entertainment -- read and watch science fiction shows, play role-playing games.

For example, in my Dungeons and Dragons campaigns I created a faction that argued that Gods and mortals were moral equals -- that no difference in power between one species of another implied a natural right to rule on the part of the more powerful species or duty to obey on the part of the least powerful.

Fiction provides a very good way to look at moral issues in a whole new light.

Or, at least, I try to make the case for it in this essay.

After all, weren't Plato's writings, Hume's Dialogues, and John Rawls "Veil of Ignorance" ultimately works of fiction?

[Alonzo Fyfe]

One of the most powerful tools I discovered upon my return to college is logic.

I do not have time, in this one essay, to give anything more than a superficial discussion of the relevance of logic to my personal journey to find out how to determine right from wrong. So I don't.

I give just a few examples, discussing the relevance of logic in the context of revisiting my argument in Part I that everybody, in fact, looks outside of religion for determining right from wrong. Plus, I give an example of some informal fallacies using contemporary arguments used with respect to the war Iraq.

But the question that provides the overall theme to this essay is: Why do we not teach children to think -- by teaching the informal fallacies in junior high school and more formal logic in higher grades?

I identified my personal journey as a journey to discover something good to promote where I do not, accidentally, devote my energies to doing something wrong or bad instead.

Teaching logic, or promoting the teaching of logic, seems to meet that criteria, or so I argue in Part V.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

At this point in my journey I was wrestling with a dilemma.

On the one hand, David Hume argued for a logical distinction between "is" and "ought" -- between "fact" and "value."

On the other hand, we claim that "value" influences our actions -- determines what we do and refrain from doing. Those actions are a part of the real world of the "is" or "fact" -- they concern the movement of physical matter through the physical universe. And the best first guess is that whatever can influence matter in the physical universe, must itself be something in the physical universe -- something in the world of "is" or "fact".

My question was: How do these incompatible claims fit together?

In college, I pursued two sets of courses that just so happened to reflect this dilemma. On the one hand, I took philosophy courses, where I studied the "ought" of value.

At the same time, I pursued a minor in economics. Economics sought to understand and explain human actions in terms of value choices -- to explain and predict human economic (value-oriented) behavior. As such, it was concerned with the "is" or the "fact" of value.

Part VI, here, focuses on what I learned in studying economics. Part VII will focus on what I was learning in my economics class.

A careful reader may be able to read these two sections and see the bridge that I think I eventually found between them. Of course, I am going to be focusing on just those points that are relevant in discovering such a bridge. However, I did not discover what I think is a likely bridge candidate until graduate school, which is still a little ways off.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

As I wrote in the previous introduction, at this part of my journey I am describing two areas of study that I was engaged in at college, relevant to David Hume's "is/ought gap" I talked about in Part II and Part III.

Where, in Part VI, I talked about lessons learned in my economics class concerning the "is" side of value, in this section I look at what I was learning in philosophy classes about the "ought" side of value.

In a sense, I start off with a defense of utilitarianism, seeking to protect it from objections raised on the basis of "intuitions" and "feelings".

Along the way, I also take shots at John Rawls, "veil of ignorance" in his A THEORY OF JUSTICE, and theories that treat morality as an evolved trait.

Yet, in the end, I present one objection to utilitarianism that I could not answer at the time.

[AspenMama]

Alonzo,
Thanks for sharing this with us. I am going to unsticky this now. I suggest that you submit your work to the Agora or Kiosk.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

The issue of free will bothered me. I wanted my free will, and when I came up against the idea that I might not have it, I could not sleep nights. It was one of the worst discoveries that I made in my entire life.

This was until I sat down to write the paper for my Philosophy of Human Nature class about the existence of free will. I sat down with the idea of confronting what I fear. And when I was done, I found out that I was afraid of absolutely nothing.

I already had this understanding of the free will problem under my belt when I took the Practical Ethics class that I discussed in Part VII.

When I left Part VII, I left with a problem for utilitarian-type theories. I asked "what type of creature is it that always and only does the greatest good for the greatest number?" Utilitarianism does not seem to be an ethics for humans.

After reviewing the free will problem, I take the conclusions that I reach from that issue and go back to the utilitarian problem. In the end, I offer a suggestion of what utilitarianism needs in order to become an ethic for human beings.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

This episode concerns the relationship between reason and emotion.

I am a fan of reason. But there are those who hold that people must make a choice between decisions based on reason and decisions based on emotion.

A popular science fiction franchise, Star Trek, has pushed the idea of this conflict between reason and emotion to an extreme, with its race of Vulcans who suppress emotion and base all decisions on reason (at least, ideally).

It's not possible. Decisions based on reason alone simply cannot happen. Emotions must play a role in decision making. The question is not whether, but what, role emotions play.

[Shake]

Wow! So far, so good. I'm still working my way through the many parts of this. But like I said, very good!

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Thank you, Shake, for the compliment.

This week's episode fits more into the "A Personal Journey" part of the title than the "Ethics Without God" part of it. It concerns the year after graduating college, before going to graduate school. It concerns, in part, why I write the way that I write, and the choices that I made.

But, don't worry, it is also the shortest section that I wrote to date, and the easiest to get through.

I figured it might be nice to take a bit of a break. After all, once this section is done, I get into graduate school, and some of the subjects get a little bit more difficult.

As usual, please feel free to send me a message with whatever comments, criticisms, identification of errors, input, rumors, inuendo, vicious gossip, snide remarks, and the like you think may make this project better.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Objective and Subjective Value

I have no idea why I waited all the way until graduate school to take the issue of moral objectivism versus moral subjectivism seriously. However, that is the way I remember it.

As a Graduate Teacher's Assistant I had to get up in front of three different groups of students on Friday and go over the subjects that the professor had lectured about earlier in the week. On the week that the professor discussed objective and subjective values, I was definitely paying attention. I had to know this stuff.

That is one of the really tremendous benefits about teaching. Subjects that one might gloss over as a student because is confident he knows them well enough to get an A on a test as an undergraduate, one has reason to study in far more detail when the test is standing in front of a room full of undergraduates answering their questions.

I will be honest. I hate both sides of this particular coin. When I listen to the objectivists, I find myself asking, "Exactly how are these intrinsic values supposed to work?" When the subjectivist speaks, I find myself saying, "So, on your account, I can basically do anything I want and thank the fates that I don't want to torture young children, because if I did . . . "

This essay goes through the classic arguments in the objectivist/subjectivist debate, and gives my take on those arguments. It does not reach any final conclusion just yet. But, please be patient. In a couple more chapters I will allow me to come back to this issue.

P.S. Back in the Moral Foundations and Principles forum somebody asked the question, "What does it mean for something to be moral?" If anybody here wants to peek ahead, I have given the answer that I will eventually reach in this series (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&postid=928705&highlight=propositional+attitudes#post928705). That post also contains a link to yet another post I wrote last week that gives a quick sketch of where the view I will be defending fits into the overall history of moral philosophy.

In the mean time, here is my take on the whole objective/subjective value debate.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Intrinsic Value

No, I am not falling behind in this project . . . not yet. I wrote this chapter and the next at the same time, because where this chapter asks questions, the next chapter (I hope) provides answers -- a few, at least.

This chapter looks at different accounts of intrinsic value. First, I present my main argument against any account of intrinsic value -- evolution.

I mean, look, an ostrich looks attractive -- to another ostrich. What better evidence can there be that beauty (or, value) is subjective?

Yet, there is a danger here. Some people take the truth about evolution and value and streatch it far beyond where reason allows it to go, so I offer some warnings about just how far it is.

I look at Aristotelian eudaemonism, Millian hedonism, G.E. Moore's preferred worlds, Kantian categorical imperatives, and a few other attempts to defend the idea that intrinsic values exist, and explain why I dismiss them.

I think that each of these options offers some element of truth, something that must be captured in any working theory of value. They are not entirely wrong -- they are all too smart for that.

Ultimately, we are still left with a question. If intrinsic values do not exist, what types of values are there?

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Relational Value

It is easier to destroy, than to build. Building is where one puts on a vest of raw, freshly cut meat and dives into a shark tank.

In graduate school, I had to take a course in the Philosophy of Psychology. One of the issues we looked at is: What is a desire?

We talk about desires (wants, wishes, preferences) all the time, but what are they? How do they work? What color are they? How much do they cost? How many desires can dance on the head of a pin?

In Philosophy of Psychology I encountered the most common theory of what desires were and how they worked, and I was surprised to have discovered something quite relevant to the question, "What is value?"

I discovered that I had not been asking a question I should have been asking all along. If values really are related to desires, then should we not be looking a little closer at what desires are in order to determine what value is?

In this chapter, I take this "most common theory of desire" that I learned in that class, and I start to build a theory of value around it.

In other words, I put on the vest of fresh cut meat, and I step into the shark tank.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Moral Value

Argh, this is getting difficult. I've done more writing, reading, rewriting, and rereading in the past week than I have since graduate school. It was great!

And, a special thanks to a bunch of people in the "Moral Foundations and Principles" forum for reading postings on some of these ideas and commenting on them.

Anyway . . .

This is the post where I present an actual theory of moral value. In Part XIII, I discussed value terms in general, and gave a few examples. As I said earlier, a good theory of value must explain what different types of value claims have in common, but how they differ. Here, I give special attention to the concept of moral value.

Moral value, like all value, describes relationships between states of affairs and desires.

Moral value, in specific, and insofar as it is different from other types of value, describe relationships between desires and (other) desires. With respect to moral value, desires are both object AND subject.

The details are inside the article -- including a grand finale to the whole "subjective vs. objective" debate. Here, I give my final answer to the question, "Do you believe that moral values are subjective or objective?"

And that answer is: "Well, yes. Sure. Of course."

Anyway, as always, this is another 'rough draft' and I continually look for comments, criticisms, and suggestions for improvement.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Still writing after all these weeks.

I think that one of the worst feelings a graduate student could have is to put mega-hours of work into developing an idea, then reading a book assigned for a class and finding the bulk of what one likes the most of those ideas in that book.

This was my experience when I took a seminar on Moral Realism, and encountered the book ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG by J.L. Mackie.

This theory discusses Mackie's error theory, and includes some of the major elements commonly discussed in ethical theory.

Universalizability. In what sense should one make the moral principles one accepts universal.

Internalism.. Can it be the case that a person may have an obligation to do something that he has absolutely no reason to do?

Reasons. What types of reasons are there for doing the right thing, or abstaining from doing the wrong thing?

As always, anybody who wishes to make comments, criticisms, suggestions, or any type of useful feedback, your comments are more than welcome.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

The hard part has just ended, defining the core of the theory. This section deals with a few loose ends.

(1) The Location Analogy. One of the ways that I describe the theory that I defend here is as 'objective moral relativism'. The whole idea of putting 'objective' and 'relativism' in the same phrase strikes some people the same way as putting 'round' and 'square' in the same phrase.

But 'objective relativism' is not at all a difficult concept to pick up. It's true of location. So, in this section, I describe how morality can be both objective and relative by drawing an analogy to location, which is clearly both objective and relative.

(2) David Hume's Is/Ought gap. I began this series with concern over an important question -- if there is a gap between is and ought then how do oughts cause substances in the physical universe to move (e.g., human action)? I have discussed this issue earlier in the context of the subjective/objective debate. Here, I take on specifically the is/ought gap, and show how it can be bridged.

(3) Coherence vs. harmony. In an epistemology class I was exposed to the idea that beliefs -- even the beliefs of different people -- should form a coherent whole. Any incoherence is a bad thing. Using this as a starting point, I asked about the types of relationships we should be looking for in terms of desire. I found that coherence does not work; it causes problems and solves nothing. Instead, with desire, the relevant relationship is harmony. I look closely at the idea of what a harmony of desires.

These three subjects are meant to add a little more body to the skeleton of a theory discussed in the previous sections, by showing how it can handle certain relevant problems.

If you find any errors or problems with these arguments, I am always interested in hearing about them, so that I can correct them in a future edition of these postings.

Thank you.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

This part concerns the relationship between morality and law.

It includes discussions of the following topics:

(1) Mens rea; how the concept of a 'guilty mind' can best be understood as a mind having bad desires or the absence of good desires, and how this is reflected in the various types of excuses that can be used to avoid blameworthiness -- accident, mistake of fact, greater cause, consent, and diminished capacity.

(2) What is a good law? (Answer: A law that a person with good desires would support.)

(3) Is there an obligation to obey the law? (Answer: No, there is only an obligation to obey good law.)

(4) Is it true that we ought not to legislate morality? (Answer: No. Indeed, morality is the only thing that ought to be legislated -- at least as far as the criminal law is concerned.)

(5) Should offense be illegal? (Answer: Yes, for a sufficiently strong offense.)

(6) Should offensive words or communicative acts be illegal?(Answer: No. Offensive words should be countered by force of reason, not force of arms.)

I hope you find these useful, and please contact me with any questions, comments or comments you might have.

And, if any wonder, yes, this series will eventually come to an end. According to my most recent outline (which changes on the average of every 4.2 seconds) it will end at Part XXVI.

9 more parts to go, then I will have to rewrite the bloody thing.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

I'm back. Sorry about the vacation. I had some things to do.

This edition concerns rationalization -- those little tricks of the mind that people like to play on themselves in order to convince themselves that something wrong really isn't wrong.

They are examples of backwards thinking. Somebody likes a conclusion, and suddenly any argument, every piece of evidence, every, everything heard or read gains credibility simply because it supports one's favorite conclusion, or is immediately dismissed because it supports the opponent. It is backwards, because the beliefs are 'justified' in virture of giving support to the favored conclusion, rather than determining which conclusion is best supported by the evidence.

When I looked into this issue of rationalization, I found out that a lot of professional literature had been devoted to this subject, and that one of the most influential has been the following:

Sykes, Joshua and David Matza. "Techniques of Neutralization", American Sociological Review, 1957, pp 664+.

I actually find 'rationalization' to be one of the most . . . destructive of human characteristics. I have written this particular essay mostly in the hopes that what is recognized, can be avoided.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Since this series of essays is on ethics, it is vital at some point to get to a discussion of such issues as capital punishment, abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. This is where I discuss these issues.

Actually, an essay such as this is not sufficient to give any of these subjects the level of detail they deserve. The purpose of this particular essay is not to decisely prove the truth of one position or another on any of these issues. This essay has a different goal.

(1) To give some examples of how the overall theory of morality discussed in previous parts lends itself to the discussion of specific issues.

(2) To identify and to clear away some of the bad arguments that cloud intelligent discussion on these issues.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Voting

This section became one of the hardest to right, mostly because I am not sure that the conclusions that I reached in it are correct. I have my doubts.

This section concerns an event that happened during my final years of graduate school. I went to vote, and a clerical error prevented me from doing so. The mistake kept me and a couple hundred other people off of the registration list. This ultimately got me to thinking about the idea that "every vote counts."

It does not, as the judge in the case said in his final decision. Since those prohibited from voting would not have altered the outcome of any election, the votes need not be counted. They are not relevant.

In this essay, I ultimately express my agreement with that judge. Voting is a waste of time -- a ritual that makes people feel comfortable that they have done something meaningful when, in fact, they have done nothing of the sort. Those who truly want to do something meaningful with their lives will look elsewhere for their chance to 'do the right thing.'

I also take on the issue of third parties. Before I came to the realization that my vote does not count, I worked hard for the libertarian party. Then I came to realize that working for a third party, in a "winner take all" political system like our own is a mistake.

[Kevbo]

Alonzo, in Part III of your series, you state the following:

We must admit, at the start, that somewhere out there exists a bridge across David Hume's is/ought (fact/value) chasm. To Hume, the existence of such a bridge seemed 'inconceivable'. But to agree with Hume on this, forces us either into the dualist or eliminativist views rejected above. It may well be difficult to imagine where we may find such a bridge, but that such a bridge exists is entirely conceivable once we consider the alternatives.

This means that we must deny the claim that science can tell us nothing about the difference between right and wrong, good and evil, art, beauty, and meaning. All of these things are real, a part of the ineliminable explanation for observable changes in the physical world around us, and thus a legitimate subject for scientific investigation.

This means that somewhere in the world, evil exists, and once we find it we can put it under a microscope, see how it works, offer up theories of cause and effect, experiment in ways to alter it, or to eliminate it. We simply need to find the is/ought bridge; the fact/value connection.

I understand how implausible this option is. At this point, I am simply offering it as the least implausible of the three options available. Once we rule out dualism and eliminativism, some type of "science of the ought" is all we have left. Ultimately, the idea that good and evil, right and wrong, are something that we can look at and study with the same diligence and precision we give to our other sciences should be looked upon as a good thing -- something that truly shows promise in our quest to make the world a better place.

I haven't read past Part III, so I don't know if you address this again, but I think that there is one small error in this reasoning. This quote leads me to believe that you are stating something along the lines of, "since 'ought,' has a real effect on our lives, it must be objectively real and scrutable by science."

I think that another possibility is being left out: "Since what our minds tell us 'ought' to be has a real effect on our lives, there must be a physically real mental cause for 'ought' principles that are scrutable by science."

Our minds can create a construct that can have a very real effect on our lives, but the construct itself must not have an objective existence outside of our minds. Here's an easy example that you are well familiar with: religion. Science can explain the psychology of religious thinking, but it can't analyze the claims of religion because these claims describe nonphysical entities.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Kevbo
I haven't read past Part III, so I don't know if you address this again, but I think that there is one small error in this reasoning. This quote leads me to believe that you are stating something along the lines of, "since 'ought,' has a real effect on our lives, it must be objectively real and scrutable by science."

I think that another possibility is being left out: "Since what our minds tell us 'ought' to be has a real effect on our lives, there must be a physically real mental cause for 'ought' principles that are scrutable by science."

Our minds can create a construct that can have a very real effect on our lives, but the construct itself must not have an objective existence outside of our minds. Here's an easy example that you are well familiar with: religion. Science can explain the psychology of religious thinking, but it can't analyze the claims of religion because these claims describe nonphysical entities. [/B]

I did not leave this out. Properties of the mind are objectively real and scrutable by science, and their capacity to cause action are not mysterious.

Sections VIII, and XII through XV discuss this. But it doesn't work to say "just because Agent believes X is good, then X is good." It may explain the link between mental attitude and action, but it fails in a bunch of other areas, as discussed in the essays.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Eventually, you just gotta leave college. After 12 years of study, my time came.

Those 12 years had given me a theory of ethics -- of right and wrong -- that I am fairly comfortable with.

Yet, it still had problems. In this section, I describe what I think are the two most serious sets of questions I still do not know how to answer. If a better theory comes along, it will prove itself better in its ability to handle these two issues.

Yet, I do not see these problems as being nearly as serious as the problems with competing theories. As I write in this essay:

And, yet, I hold that the theory that I have been defending is still 'something better' when seen in contrast with many of the popular theories circulating today.

Divine command theories falsely presuppose the existence of a God and can't explain why we ought to obey God.

Intrinsic value theories, such as 'natural law' or 'natural rights' theories, can't show that these natural moral properties actually exist.

Moral sense theories can't provide any reason for believing that we sense anything more than our own likes and dislikes.

Action-guiding theories violate the laws of nature by divorcing actions from their causes, and intention-oriented theories cannot handle negligence.

Agent-subjectivism and assessor-subjectivism suffer from the fact that they cannot handle moral debate and tells people nothing about how they should handle cases of two assessors or agents with different preferences.

Evolutionary theories fallaciously attempt to derive 'ought' from 'is', and have nothing at all to way about how two beings with different evolutionary histories should treat each other -- and all of us have at least slightly different evolutionary histories.

So, yes, there are problems with the theory that I have advanced. But the problems with its competitors are much, much more serious.

And then the next question came up. What to do after graduate school? What do I do with the results of all of these years of study?

[lowmagnet]

Alonzo,

Do you want someone to convert this into LaTeX for you, in order to make a nicer print copy (One can make PDFs, etc this way) for 'big blue room' distribution?

I'd be happy to typeset this for you. Let me know via PM or this thread (It's subscribed)

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by lowmagnet
Alonzo,

Do you want someone to convert this into LaTeX for you, in order to make a nicer print copy (One can make PDFs, etc this way) for 'big blue room' distribution?

I'd be happy to typeset this for you. Let me know via PM or this thread (It's subscribed)

If you believe it is worth the effort, I would be pleased to have it done on the second draft.

As I wrote somewhere in the dark and distant past, I am writing this way mostly as a way of establishing discipline -- attempting to make sure that this does not get half done and then left on a hard drive somewhere to rot.

This is merely a rough first draft that I happen to get typed on my commute to and from work -- but the need to get something posted is at least motivating me to get the chapters done and not put them off.

When I finish (which should be shortly -- I have only four or five more parts planned) -- I will read through it again and feel absolutely horrified that I put something so rough out in public. I will make (what I hope are) improvements -- addressing some of the comments, questions, and concerns expressed by those who have read this draft.

That version might be worthy of your treatment.

This version . . . I'm not so sure.

I thank you for your offer.

[lowmagnet]

No problem! I'll keep your thread subbed.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Out in the real world now, with 12 years of college behind me in the perfectly worthless field of moral philosophy, the question comes up as to how to behave ethically in the real world.

I adopted two projects in my months after graduate school.

The first project was to write something entertaining that would also be educational on matters of ethics -- for example, a novel about humans and gods in which Plato's EUTHYPHRO argument plays a central role.

So, I started writing, and completed two novels and a dozen short stories.

The other project involved investing -- not only for my future, but for the future after I died. But investing has its own moral responsibilities.

It is not, I argue, morally permissible to simply hand money to any person who can get you a high rate of return by whatever legal means are available. There are many legal things that still ought not to be done.

And a discussion of the ethical responsibilities of the investor goes on into a discussion on the ethical responsibilities of the business leader -- a topic that will play an even greater role in the next essay.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

I don't really want to post this particular chapter, and have put it off because of it.

I like to be a nice guy, get along with everybody. But, in developing a view of right and wrong; good and evil; there comes a point where one has actually use it, and some people may not like the results.

After leaving college, I got a job in a company that, among other things, did environmental consulting work. And among the subjects that they performed research on was Global Warming. (As people in the field do, they prefer to call it Climate Change.)

And while I was doing this work I found that a political faction who did not like the conclusions that these researchers were reaching, were waging a political campaign against it, that largely involved distorting the research and its intentions. In looking at the credentials of those who lead this political campaign, they had to know what they were doing. And, yet, they seemed not to care.

Ultimately, the issue is not one of one scientific theory versus another. The arguments used against the conclusions reached by Climate Change researchers were not scientific arguments at all. They involved logical fallacies. Diversions. Distractions. Straw men and red herrings.

And it does not take an understanding of science to refute them. It takes an understanding of logic.

In this essay, I focus on three arguments that are often used in opposition to the conclusions reached by climate change researchers.

The Ice Age argument. Scientists were predicting ice ages 30 years ago, now they are predicting global warming. Obviously, we can't trust them.

The Solar Cause argument. The sun is causing the change, not human emissions of CO2.

The Heat Island Effect. The increasing temperature readings do not reflect climate change at all. It reflects the fact that cities are warmer than rural areas.

The failure of these three arguments have to do with their logic, not their content. And the people involve in creating and promoting these arguments have to know that they are deceptive.

They have to know, and they have to not care. They have to value the money in their pocket so much they are willing to risk great a great deal of destruction for a paycheck.

They have to be, as I write in this essay, like a person who would distract a neighbor at risk of being run over by a car, on the grounds that if the neighbor gets hit he may inheret is neighbor's car.

Because that is what these arguments are. A destraction.

Well, the details are to be found in the essay itself.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

In this essay, I plagairize myself, more or less.

Within weeks after Dolly, the first clone created from an adult cell, was announced I had heard more nonsense arguments against cloning than I could stand.

So, I wrong my own article, Against a Prohibition on Cloning, to counter these arguments. I guess, because it was one of the first systematic defenses of cloning in a universe that seemed nearly unanimously opposed, it got a bit more attention than I was expecting.

In looking over the article, it is difficult to escape notice how well it fits into the flow of this project. In part it tells the story of my journey to investigate the issue of Ethics Without God. Because it is, part ethical argument, and part personal story.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

This essay discusses some of the ethical issues concerned with space development.

Space has always interested me, ever since I was a kid. I must confess that I always wanted to believe that space development was a good idea, because I liked the idea of cities (and manufacturing centers, and power stations) in space.

I do not know how realistic it is, but I have spent some time thinking about the ethical issues of space development.

In discussing this issue with people, I find it strange how many people seem to fall into two extreme camps. There are those who seem to think that humans ought not to go into space -- how any human sign is a corruption and that we are doing the universe a favor if we confine this human infestation to one lonely planet, rather than let it spread. I'm afraid that I find this a somewhat sickening world view, and I am surprised at how common it seems to be.

Others want to develop space, but insist that it be done according to the strictest of libertarian capitalist principles -- without exception, and without compromise, or not at all. Which, given political reality, is causally indistinguishable from saying that space ought not to be developed at all.

My view is moderate. I believe that political compromise is a virtue -- to hold to an extreme position and insist that it must be met without the least bit of compromise is to hold an unwarranted level of arrogance.

Over the course of this discussion, I end up making some very general observations, on the merits and demerits of capitalism generally. Though I like capitalism, it does have its weaknesses. It is burdened by the Free Rider problem, and by the heavy costs in some instances of privatizing certain types of property (e.g., air and space). Plus, I spend a fair amount of time in general discussion about the conflict between the environment and capitalism.

I don't know for sure, but some times, when the mood hits me just right, I think that these arguments actually make sense.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

IT'S DONE!

This is the final chapter in the Ethics Without God series, which takes the chain of events up to the present day.

And, yes, I do mention the Internet Infidels in this chapter, since this is where I have been spending a great deal of spare time recently.

Those who have tracked my participation in these forums will recognize the two dominant themes in this section:

In the Moral Philosophy forums I am a fairly persistent critic of subjectivism and evolutionary theories of ethics. In this chapter, I repeat those criticisms.

In the Separation of Church and State forums I have posted essays on "In God We Trust", "One Nation, Under God", "10 Commandments", and "Faith Based Initiatives". Those essays make up the other significant portion of this essay.

And, for those who want a brief account of what this series of essays is about, I try to sum up the most significant elements at the end of the chapter.

And, I want to thank everybody for their help, comments, criticisms, and input.

The next task -- take this rough draft and try to turn it into something with a bit more polish. I continue to invite feedback by anybody who can think of something that may be done to improve the quality of the product that I have tried to create.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

So, now what do I do?

[Secular Pinoy]

Do you have a website? Sign up for Geoshitties or Tripud so that you could post your series there, and make it available for download, too.

[AspenMama]

Alonzo,
Are you asking what to do now with your articles?

I will suggest to you again, that you submit your writing here to the Kiosk. Here are the instructions: http://www.infidels.org/infidels/submit.shtml

While there may be a great relevance here in this forum to your work, discussion forums aren't conducive to exhibiting articles. A better placement would be in our kiosk.

----AspenMama, SL Moderator

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by AspenMama
I will suggest to you again, that you submit your writing here to the Kiosk.

I looked again at the submission requirements, and I have some trouble seeing a fit between what I write and Kiosk articles. Length. Subject matter. I may write an article against Subjectivism, but I don't see a place there for a project of this magnitude.

[Thomas Ash]

Hi Alonzo,

I have a website called Atheist Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/atheistground/) - part of my broader website on politics, philosophy, science and history, Big Issue Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/) - and I'd be happy to put your articles up if you want to (either in the atheism section, or the ethics section under 'Philosophy.' I get submissions from people, but to be honest they're not normally this good! :) I get about 500 visitors a day, so you'd get quite a few eyeballs. Obviously, you'd keep full copyright and could put it up anywhere else too, etc., etc. ...

Best wishes,

Thomas Ash
E-mail: webmaster@bigissueground.com

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Well . . .

Fact: The whole series is a draft, and it needs quite a bit of polishing. (More on the order of reconstructive surgery, but we don't need to go there.)

I would like to post the second draft for a new audience, somewhere. Not, necessarily, an infidelic audience, but people who have an interest in the subjects relevant to this series.

If anybody has any comments, criticisms, or issues that they think I should address for the rewrite, PLEASE let me know what they are.

[Thomas Ash]

Hi Alonzo,

I think i could guarantee the sizeable audience of people who aren't solely infidels. Like I said, I get about 500 visits to the site a day, and a fair amount of e-mail from people who read my essays about morality and religion and the failure of the arguments for god's existence (http://www.bigissueground.com/atheistground/) and a re clearly Christians, though sometimes quite reasonable ones who see my point. :) .

If you do polish them (or even if you don't), I'd be happy to at least put them up.

Best wishes,

Thomas Ash