The Answer: Subjective/Objective Morals

[Detached9]

Objective: True independent of others' minds.
Subjective: True dependent on others' minds.

Since morality has no existence outside of our minds, morality is a subjective issue. To claim there is an objective morality, you have to somehow prove that a non-sentient being can contemplate right and wrong. Actually, don't even bother trying, since if you aren't sentient, you aren't able to think about such matters.

Don't get me wrong, there are some universal or almost universal morals. That isn't the point though. The point is where the sense of right and wrong comes from; the mind.

When people confuse universal with objective, I feel like they've been reading too much C.S. Lewis.

[One Winged Angel]

Well, duh. :D

[Detached9]

Yet people still argue about whether morals are objective or not...

[99Percent]

Originally posted by Detached9
Objective: True independent of others' minds.
Subjective: True dependent on others' minds.

No.

Objective: True, regardless of your own feelings, immediate perceptions and interpretations.
Subjective: True according to your your own feelings, immediate perceptions and interpretations.

[Detached9]

Originally posted by 99Percent
No.

Objective: True, regardless of your own feelings, immediate perceptions and interpretations.
Subjective: True according to your your own feelings, immediate perceptions and interpretations.

You basically just re-worded my definitions to mean the same thing. Where do feelings, perceptions, and interpretations come from? The mind.

Replace "regardless" with "independently", replace "according to" with "dependently", and replace "your own feelings, immediate perceptions and interpretations" with "others' minds". Same thing.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Actually, both proposed definitions fail in the following area.

They would both classify "My wife is tired and she wants to go to bed," as "subjective" -- when, in fact, it is objective. It is a true fact about my wife -- as true as statements about her height and weight, as susceptible to proof or disproof by observation and experiment. And, yet, it is not independent of minds, because it is an objective statement ABOUT minds.

A better definition of "subjective" as opposed to "objective", is that a "subjective" claim follows the following pattern.

"Agent believes that X is true, therefore X is true."

Now, this does not apply to the statement above. My belief that my wife is tired and she wants to go to bed, does not makeit true that my wife is tired and she wants to go to bed. And even when we talk about my wife's perspective on the issue, it is more accurate to say that she believes it because it is true, than it is to say that it is true because she believes it. Even in her own case, she forms the belief based upon perceptual evidence, in her case from perceiving certain facts about her own body.

Following this pattern, a 'subjective morality' is one that holds that "Agent believes that capital punishment is wrong, therefore capital punishment is wrong." Or, what would be intuitively more plausible, "The Akkala tribe believes it is wrong to take a bath at night, therefore, it is wrong, among the Akkala, for anybody to take a bath a night."

Nothing else is required, for an action to be wrong or right, other than the belief that it is so.

And I think that this is where subjectivist theories of ethics fail. Because even if you were to go to the Akkala and ask them, they would not say that taking a bath at night is wrong because they believe it. They would say that taking a bath at night is wrong because it disturbs the forest spirits who need to sleep, or give some other reason. And, furthermore, if the only thing that can be said against taking a bath at night is that it is believed wrong, then it is not wrong in fact. To be wrong in fact, one has to be able to claim something more than that it is believed wrong.

Or, in other words, if the only thing behind the claim "it is wrong to take a bath at night" is that it is believed wrong, than the Akkala would hold that the statement 'it is wrong to take a bath at night' is false. Which is exactly opposite of what the subjectivist claims, which is that the existence of a belief is sufficient to make the statement true.

Okay, I confess, the Akkala tribe does not exist. I invented it for illustrative purposes -- to illustrate a problem with subjectivism, in that, as an account of ethics, in most (perhaps all) cases, it yields the wrong answer.

Subjectivism says that "if X is believed true, then it is true." Yet, for people making moral claims, it is very seldom the case that "if X is believed wrong, than it is wrong." Instead, they hold that "if the only thing that can be said against X is that it is believed wrong, then it is NOT wrong. To be wrong, something more is required."

Which leads to the conclusion that either morality is objective, or it does not exist. Subjectivism is not a viable alternative, because it is incoherent.

Subjectivism holds, "X is believed true is a sufficient condition for X's being true" AND "X is believed true is not a sufficient condition for X's being true." Which is a contradiction. Which is the death of subjectivism.

At least in this sense of the word.

And if one insists on going back to the more 'traditional' definitions of subjectivity -- the 'mind dependent' definitions -- one faces a different form of incoherence, derived from the fact that minds are real -- they exist -- they are a part of the objective world, and there is no legitimacy to treating minds, or statements about minds, as anything other than objective.

[Note: The above definition does NOT require that one either accept intrinsic values or be a moral nihilist. It categorizes propositions about the mind as objective, and leaves open the possibility that moral claims are, in some sense, objective statements about minds.]

[Vylo]

"objective" morals are simply those morals which are agreed upon my a majority in the society.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Vylo
"objective" morals are simply those morals which are agreed upon my a majority in the society.

This doesn't work either, because if it were true than the minority would always be wrong.

In fact, if this were true, and somebody conducted a poll showing that 75% favored capital punishment, 15% opposed, and 10% were undecided, we would have to interpret this as saying that 75% of the people believed that a majority favored capital punishment, 15% believed that a majority opposed it, and 10% had no opinion on whether a majority of the people supported capital punishment or not.

To put it mildly, such an interpretation . . . to put it mildly . . . seems somewhat inadequate.

[contracycle]

I don't think the quotes around 'objective' were accidental.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by contracycle
I don't think the quotes around 'objective' were accidental.

Quotes are commonly interpreted as "so called objective morality" or "what other people say is objective morality." (commonly referred to in philosophy as involking the use/mention distinction).

My point was, and remains, that as a theory of what other people mean when they talk of 'objective morality' (notice the use of quotes), this account fails, and fails precisely for the reason provided.

[Vylo]

Majority in sociological terms is a measure of power, not numbers. A group with a small population can have immense power and privilege, making them the majority, as the hold the majority of the power and not only determine how problems are solved, but what the problems actually are.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Vylo
Majority in sociological terms is a measure of power, not numbers. A group with a small population can have immense power and privilege, making them the majority, as the hold the majority of the power and not only determine how problems are solved, but what the problems actually are.

It is true that sociologists use the term 'morality' to refer to the beliefs held within a particular culture at a certain time. But they also use the word 'science' to refer to the beliefs in a particular culture at a particular time -- as in 'ancient Greek science'.

Yet, it is a huge (and unjustified) leap from this special usage to claiming that this accounts for the use of the word 'morality' (or 'science') when one is not doing sociology -- when one, for example, is actually doing morality or science.

Furthermore, your new interpretation does not solve the problem. The same poll could not reasonably be interpreted as "75% of the people believe that the most powerful elements of society support capital punishment, 15% of the people believe that the most powerful in society oppose it, and 10% offer no opinion about what the most powerful support or oppose." It does not work as a reasonable interpretation of such a poll.

[Vylo]

Morality is a sociological term, as society is what sets up morals. when ever you discuss morals, you are discussing sociology. Also take into acount I am a sociology major, so I tend to speak in those terms. Morality can not be spoken of independent of society, as it is a result of society's socialization process.

[Vylo]

Furthermore, your new interpretation does not solve the problem. The same poll could not reasonably be interpreted as "75% of the people believe that the most powerful elements of society support capital punishment, 15% of the people believe that the most powerful in society oppose it, and 10% offer no opinion about what the most powerful support or oppose." It does not work as a reasonable interpretation of such a poll.

It does not matter what you believe, because you are not the one that determines the problem unless you are one in a position of power. Often those with power manipulate others by simply stating what THEY feel is the problem, not what those with lack of power feel is the problem. Our society tends to solve things from the top down, first making it comfortable for those in the highest stratification. It is the group that contains the majority of power that is the majority, the thought that we base governmental decisions off a majority of the population is false. Many may say elections are even ground and that the population majority will rule there. But think about how small of a percantage of people actually vote. Those in power can instill resignation in us so that despite the fact an overwhelming majority of people may dislike the candidates, they will still win. How many times have you heard someone say voting for a third party is "throwing your vote away"? I have heard this excuse dozens of times. Not all of this is coincidence. I'm not trying to make you paranoid that big brother is out to get you, but people do actually try to manipulate the masses in ways which will benefit them, while giving the illusion that people are doing it completely of their own free will.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Vylo
Morality is a sociological terms, as society is what sets up morals. when ever you discuss morals, you are discussing sociology. Also take into acount I am a sociology major, so I tend to speak in those terms. Morality can not be spoken of independent of society, as it is a result of society's socialization process.

Sorry, sociologists did not invent the term 'morality' -- the term existed long before sociology was invented.

The most important difference between the two is that sociological statements are descriptive, while morality is prescriptive. Sociology has to do with 'is' statements, morality has to do with 'ought' statements. And since 'is' does not equal 'ought', morality is not a sociological term.

It is the case that the moral beliefs within a particular society are among the things that sociologists study. But one must be careful to distinguish the study of a thing, and the thing studied. Geology is not a rock. Sociology is not a moral system. Sociology is a set of descriptions, not a set of prescriptions.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Vylo
It does not matter what you believe, because you are not the one that determines the problem unless you are one in a position of power. Often those with power manipulate others by simply stating what THEY feel is the problem, not what those with lack of power feel is the problem. Our society tends to solve things from the top down, first making it comfortable for those in the highest stratification. It is the group that contains the majority of power that is the majority, the thought that we base governmental decisions off a majority of the population is false. Many may say elections are even ground and that the population majority will rule there. But think about how small of a percantage of people actually vote. Those in power can instill resignation in us so that despite the fact an overwhelming majority of people may dislike the candidates, they will still win. How many times have you heard someone say voting for a third party is "throwing your vote away"? I have heard this excuse dozens of times. Not all of this is coincidence. I'm not trying to make you paranoid that big brother is out to get you, but people do actually try to manipulate the masses in ways which will benefit them, while giving the illusion that people are doing it completely of their own free will.


I have no idea why you think this is relevant to my post. The fact of the matter is that people do not take the question, "Do you believe that capital punishment is wrong" to be logically identical to the question "Do you believe that the powerful in society support or oppose capital punishment?" They take these to be two distinct questions with, potentially, two distinct answers (capital punishment can be wrong even when it is supported by the powerful people in a society). Thus, any claim that the one statement can be reduced to the other is false.

In order for statement A to be reducible to statement B, A and B must at the very least have the same truth conditions. If they do not have the same truth conditions, any claim of reducibility is false.

Oh, and if you want to wave credentials around . . . my degree is in moral philosophy, and includes six years of graduate school.

[Amen-Moses]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
But one must be careful to distinguish the study of a thing, and the thing studied. Geology is not a rock. Sociology is not a moral system. Sociology is a set of descriptions, not a set of prescriptions.

Actually it is the term "Sociologist" that is recent, Priests, Judges, Politicians, Teachers etc are all Sociologists and always have been even if they don't label themselves such.

Humans have been doing sociology for aeons, that is how morality arose in the first place, sans sociology morality has no meaning, that is why we don't talk about morality when regarding other social species, they don't have sociology (that we are aware of that is).

Amen-Moses

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Amen-Moses
Actually it is the term "Sociologist" that is recent, Priests, Judges, Politicians, Teachers etc are all Sociologists and always have been even if they don't label themselves such.

Humans have been doing sociology for aeons, that is how morality arose in the first place, sans sociology morality has no meaning, that is why we don't talk about morality when regarding other social species, they don't have sociology (that we are aware of that is).

Amen-Moses

I fail to see how this addresses the issue. Sociology is descriptive. Morality is prescriptive. They are two different kinds of things.

[Vylo]

Do you believe that the powerful in society support or oppose capital punishment

Where do you get this question from the question is

"Do the powerful in society support or oppose capital punishment?"

Your beliefs have next to no influence on the matter unless you yourself are in a position of power, your question is never asked.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Vylo
Where do you get this question from the question is

"Do the powerful in society support or oppose capital punishment?"

Your beliefs have next to no influence on the matter unless you yourself are in a position of power, your question is never asked.

But on your account, this question is being asked because "Is X wrong?" and "Is X opposed by the power-majority of people in society?" are the same question.

My counter to this is that it makes no sense to propose that these two questions are simply different wordings for what is, in fact, the same question.

And if you claim that "I didn't say they were the same question." My response would then be to say "wrong is whatever the power-majority of people in society oppose" means that "Is X wrong?" and "Is X that which the power-majority of people in society oppose" are the same question.

[Note: This is known as G.E. Moore's "The Open Question Argument", which is a standard way of demonstrating that a person is committing "the naturalist fallacy."]

[Detached9]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
[B]Actually, both proposed definitions fail in the following area.

They would both classify "My wife is tired and she wants to go to bed," as "subjective" -- when, in fact, it is objective. It is a true fact about my wife -- as true as statements about her height and weight, as susceptible to proof or disproof by observation and experiment. And, yet, it is not independent of minds, because it is an objective statement ABOUT minds.

Excellent point here. I concede my argument.

Subjectivism says that "if X is believed true, then it is true." Yet, for people making moral claims, it is very seldom the case that "if X is believed wrong, than it is wrong." Instead, they hold that "if the only thing that can be said against X is that it is believed wrong, then it is NOT wrong. To be wrong, something more is required.

Which leads to the conclusion that either morality is objective, or it does not exist. Subjectivism is not a viable alternative, because it is incoherent."

Not exactly relevant to what I was discussing, but also a valid point.

And if one insists on going back to the more 'traditional' definitions of subjectivity -- the 'mind dependent' definitions -- one faces a different form of incoherence, derived from the fact that minds are real -- they exist -- they are a part of the objective world, and there is no legitimacy to treating minds, or statements about minds, as anything other than objective.

Agreed. I'm glad someone finally attacked my argument.

The part that confuses me about objective morality is I don't understand how to make a case for it without using an argument from popularity. Perhaps someone could enlighten me.

[JerryM]

This is just what I find useful for defining these terms:

Objective: that which can be observed or experienced by others

Subjective: that which is perceived or experienced only by an individual

If I break my arm, an x-ray of the fracture is objective. The pain is subjective. My behavior as a result of being in pain, such as holding my arm immoble, or moaning is objective--but the pain itself is only felt by me. Of course, at a very fundamental level, everything is perceived or experienced by individuals. So it is probably more accurate to say that the sum of many concordant subjective experiences equals an objective experience. And it also is apparent that it is the agreement or consensus of individuals that make something objective. Whether we like to admit it or not, moral systems in any society are ultimately established by convention or consensus. This doesn't mean that these morals are the best, or most correct. Moral systems are always a work in progress. In the modern age, with widespread travel and communication, societies change and evolve. It is inevitable that ideas of right and wrong must also change, at least to some degree. For many people, this is very unsettling, but I don't see any alternative.

[kctan]

Quote from JerryM,
If I break my arm, an x-ray of the fracture is objective. The pain is subjective. My behavior as a result of being in pain, such as holding my arm immoble, or moaning is objective--but the pain itself is only felt by me. Of course, at a very fundamental level, everything is perceived or experienced by individuals. So it is probably more accurate to say that the sum of many concordant subjective experiences equals an objective experience.

The pain is as objective as the fracture. It can be measured by using CATs.

When you start describing your pain to another, that's when the subjective part comes into play.

It would be better to say objective experiences give rise to subjective description of such experiences.

All actions are objective, even a choice of non-action is itself an action. It's the interpretation that is subjective.

[bd-from-kg]

Detached9

Since morality has no existence outside of our minds, morality is a subjective issue.

Your argument is fallacious. In order for a proposition to be objectively true it is not necessary that it refer to something in the natural world, or even to something that exists or is of such a nature that it might exist. For example, it is arguable (in fact a great many very competent philosophers believe) that the natural numbers don’t “exist” in any meaningful sense, and a great many more believe that if they exist at all, they exist only in minds. The only other alternative, so far as I can see, is that they exist in a mysterious realm of “ideals”. Just the same, regardless of which of these options is correct, it is objectively true that 2 + 2 = 4.

To say that morality is objective means only that some moral statements are objectively true. And it appears that the same alternatives are available to the moral objectivist as to the “arithmetic objectivist”. He can say that morality, as such, doesn’t “exist” in any meaningful sense, but that a moral statement such as “torturing newborn babies just for the fun of it is wrong” is nevertheless objectively true. Or he can say that morality exists only in minds, but that some moral statements are nonetheless objectively true. Or he can say that morality exists in the realm of “ideals”, and that some moral statements are objectively true.

None of this shows that morality is objective. (In fact, I don’t believe that it is.) The point is simply that your argument is fallacious. It’s just not that simple. If it were, intelligent men of good will would not still be arguing about it after thousands of years.

As for subjective moral theories, I agree with Alonzo Fyfe’s comments. No subjective theory is remotely plausible as an interpretation of what almost anyone means when they make moral pronouncements. Thus, practically no one who says “torturing innocent babies just for fun is wrong” means that he personally disapproves of it (or has a certain negative feeling about it, or anything of this sort); or that those who do such things disapprove of it; or that most people in his society disapprove of it; or that most people who have ever lived or will live disapprove of it. Nor does anyone interpret such pronouncements coming from others in any of these ways. Subjectivism is a complete failure as an account of what people mean by moral statements, or of the purpose or function of such statements.

JerryM:

Of course, at a very fundamental level, everything is perceived or experienced by individuals. So it is probably more accurate to say that the sum of many concordant subjective experiences equals an objective experience.

Not so. If a new virus hits a community (or the entire world for that matter) that causes everyone to hallucinate little semitransparent Martians following them around all day for a couple of weeks, this does not equal the objective experience of little semitransparent Martians following everyone around all day for a couple of weeks. If everyone had the subjective experience of conversing with God every day, this would not equate to the objective experience of God conversing with everyone every day. (It’s plausible, of course, that this would be the cause of these experiences, but the universal occurrence of such experiences would not be the same thing as God conversing with everyone every day; it would be meaningful to ask whether this is what’s really happening or whether there’s a naturalistic explanation.)

And it also is apparent that it is the agreement or consensus of individuals that make something objective.

Again, not so. Aside from the cases mentioned above, let’s suppose that everyone, or practically everyone, agrees that Mozart’s most beautiful music is more beautiful than anything ever written by Salieri. (In point of fact, practically everyone familiar with the music of these composers does agree with this.) Does that make Mozart’s music objectively more beautiful than Salieri’s? I don’t think so.

Whether we like to admit it or not, moral systems in any society are ultimately established by convention or consensus.

This commits the very same fallacy that Alonzo refuted earlier. The term “the moral system of society X” is a descriptive term; it denotes certain practices and attitudes of the people in society X. This has nothing to do with the question of whether moral statements such as “torturing babies for the fun of it is wrong” are objectively true in that society. It’s logically possible that this statement (or others of the same form) is objectively true even though almost everyone in society X disagrees with it.

[The AntiChris]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg


it is objectively true that 2 + 2 = 4.

“torturing newborn babies just for the fun of it is wrong” is nevertheless objectively true.
Are you using the same sense of "objective" in these two statements?

Chris

[bd-from-kg]

The AntiChris:
Are you using the same sense of "objective" in these two statements?

Pretty much. (But keep in mind that I didn't make the second statement.) To say that a statement (or proposition) is objectively true means that it's true regardless of whether anyone believes that it's true, and regardless of anyone's attitude or feeling toward it. In the case of moral statements it has become standard usage to say that "'X is wrong' is objectively true" also implies that it's true regardless of anyone's attitude or feeling toward X. (Otherwise theories called "subjective" would qualify as objective since it may be objectively true that the relevant person(s) have the requisite attitude toward X.)

[The AntiChris]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
In the case of moral statements it has become standard usage to say that "'X is wrong' is objectively true" also implies that it's true regardless of anyone's attitude or feeling toward X.
So, in theory at least, it's possible for activity "X" to be universally considered "right", but, at the same time, it could really be objectively "wrong". How would we know?

Chris

[bd-from-kg]

The AntiChris:

So, in theory at least, it's possible for activity "X" to be universally considered "right", but, at the same time, it could really be objectively "wrong". How would we know?

First off, I did not say that this was possible in theory; I said that objective moral theories generally entail that it is.

Obviously if an action were universally considered right but was really objectively wrong we wouldn’t know. There’s nothing inherently contradictory about the possibility that everyone is wrong regarding some objective fact. So I have to assume that the question you really have in mind is something like, “Even if everyone considered a certain kind of act to be “right”; how would we know that it really was right?”

As I said from the start, I’m not an objective moralist. If I thought there was a really plausible objective moral theory I’d probably subscribe to it. And the answer to the question of how we could tell whether a given act is right or wrong depends strongly on which objective moral theory one is talking about. Theists would say that the way to tell is to check what God has said. Classic utilitarians would say that the way to tell is to calculate the balance of pleasure over pain for each alternative. Intuitionists would say that the way to tell is to consult one’s innate moral sense. Randians would say... but you get the idea.

Anyway, the main point that I’d like to get across is that both objective and subjective moral theories are wrong. Moral statements (IMHO) are neither factual statements about some “external reality”, nor are they simply reports about some actual person or persons’ current subjective state(s).

[The AntiChris]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
Anyway, the main point that I’d like to get across is that both objective and subjective moral theories are wrong. Moral statements (IMHO) are neither factual statements about some “external reality”, nor are they simply reports about some actual person or persons’ current subjective state(s).
Thanks. You've made things much clearer now. I think.

Chris

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
Anyway, the main point that I’d like to get across is that both objective and subjective moral theories are wrong. Moral statements (IMHO) are neither factual statements about some “external reality”, nor are they simply reports about some actual person or persons’ current subjective state(s). [/B]

This is substantially consistent with what I have been claiming. But it requires specifying what moral claims are if not these two things -- because way too many people think of these as being mutually exclusive/jointly exhaustive options. It has to be one or the other.

But this is not the case. There are other subjective state(s) in existence other than those of the person making the moral claim, and reports about these subjective states are reports about some "external reality". So, objectivism and subjectivism are NOT mutually exclusive options -- it is possible for some types of claims to be both.

One alternative here is 'intersubjectivism' -- that if enough people dislike something, then it is wrong. Though intersubjectivism does not work either -- if X% of the people don't like Y, how does this imply that the 1 - X% of the people who have different likes and dislikes ought not to do it?

I propose that moral claims ultimately describe relationships between desires and other desires, regardless of who has them. Rape and murder generally thwart the desires of others, which is what makes them wrong. These relationships describe objective facts about subjective states -- facts that are independent of people's attitudes towards these facts, but fully dependent on people's attitudes towards all other things

[bd-from-kg]

Alonzo Fyfe:

There are other subjective state(s) in existence other than those of the person making the moral claim, and reports about these subjective states are reports about some "external reality". So, objectivism and subjectivism are NOT mutually exclusive options -- it is possible for some types of claims to be both.

First off, I was clearly not restricting the subjective states that a moral statement might be a statement about (according to subjective moral theories) to those of the person making the claim. In fact, I explicitly listed the possibility that they might be about the subjective states of everyone who ever did exist or will exist as one of the many that I was rejecting. That’s pretty inclusive.

On the other hand, I did mean to refer only to the kinds of “subjective states” that I listed – for example, attitudes, feelings, and beliefs about the acts in question. (See below.)

One alternative here is 'intersubjectivism' -- that if enough people dislike something, then it is wrong. Though intersubjectivism does not work either -- if X% of the people don't like Y, how does this imply that the 1 - X% of the people who have different likes and dislikes ought not to do it?

As long as it talks only about subjective states that actually exist (or did exist, or will exist), this is still a version of subjectivism, and fails for the same reasons.

I propose that moral claims ultimately describe relationships between desires and other desires, regardless of who has them. Rape and murder generally thwart the desires of others, which is what makes them wrong.

Unless your position has changed since the last time we had a discussion, your moral theory is a version of utilitarianism, which is pretty much universally considered an objective moral theory, even though - as you note - it makes the rightness or wrongness of an act dependent on subjective states. But not the kinds of subjective states that I had in mind. That is, what determines the rightness or wrongness of an act, according to your theory, is not the attitude or feeling that some people have toward the act, but the attitude or feeling some people have toward its consequences (and those of the alternatives).

Just the same, as you know, I have several objections to your theory. The three main ones are:

(1) It bases the rightness or wrongness of an act entirely on desires that someone has right now. It ignores desires that some people (some of whom might not even exist yet) may, or certainly will, have in the future, the fulfillment of which may be strongly affected by the act in question.

(2) It bases the rightness or wrongness of an act on actual desires. This objection has nothing to do with whether the desires in question exist now, as opposed to in the future or past. The objection is that it ignores potential desires – most importantly, desires that some people would have if they had more knowledge and understanding, or if they were more perfectly rational.

(3) It makes statements like “It would be right for X to do Y” purely descriptive rather than prescriptive. That is, it becomes a description of the relationship between desires and other desires, or between desires and the effect that the act in question would have (or might reasonably be expected to have) on the objects of those desires rather than a statement about “what to do”.

Ironically, this is an instance of the very naturalistic fallacy that you mentioned in one of your own posts. Thus, according to your theory “X’s doing Y is wrong” means that X’s doing Y involves the “relationship between desires and other desires” the constitutes an act’s being wrong. We can allow a more general description of just what state of affairs constitutes Y’s being wrong; say, for example, that it is a certain relationship between the consequences of Y and certain desires, and of these desires to one another. Let’s define R as this complex of relationships (or just one very complex relationship) and define R(Y) to mean that the act Y satisfies this relationship. Now consider the two questions:

(a) Is Y wrong?

(b) Does Y involve the complex of relationships denoted by R; or in other words, does R(Y) hold?

According to your theory these are the same question.

My counter to this is that it makes no sense to propose that these two questions are simply different wordings for what is, in fact, the same question.

And if you claim that "I didn't say they were the same question," my response would then be to say "wrong is whatever satisfies the relationship R" means that "Is Y wrong?" and "Does Y satisfy the relationship R?" are the same question.

And of course, the demonstration that they are not the same question is that almost everyone would say that they do not have the same truth conditions. That is, almost no one would agree that “Y satisfies the relationship R” is dispositive with respect to the question “Is Y wrong?” Or to put it another way, while it may be the case that those acts, and only those acts, which satisfy R are in fact wrong, the statement “those acts, and only those acts, which satisfy R are wrong” makes a substantive claim; it is not a tautology. It makes sense to ask whether an act which satisfies the relationship R is in fact wrong. Even if we had never seen an exception to the rule that just those acts satisfying R are wrong, we would listen with some interest to a seemingly intelligent person’s claim that he had found an exception to this rule and not automatically treat him as a crackpot, as we would someone who claimed to have found a two-horned unicorn, or a married bachelor.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
First off, I was clearly not restricting the subjective states that a moral statement might be a statement about (according to subjective moral theories) to those of the person making the claim.

Sorry, I did not mean to imply otherwise. My comments were entirely neutral with respect to what you may or may not have offered to fill in the blanks -- they were meant only to assert that there is a blank to be filled in, and how I would fill them in. I had no doubt that you would have alternatives.


Originally posted by bd-from-kg
Unless your position has changed since the last time we had a discussion, your moral theory is a version of utilitarianism, which is pretty much universally considered an objective moral theory, even though - as you note - it makes the rightness or wrongness of an act dependent on subjective states.

Well, there are two types of utilitarianism.

One type argues for the maximization of some sort of 'intrinsic' value -- the 'greatest good for the greatest number' in these versions argues that there is some sort of intrinsic good to be made greatest -- i.e., pleasure, freedom from pain, and happiness have intrinsic value.

Of course, I do not hold to this type of utilitarianism.

But this is the most common form of utilitarianism -- the type that most people have in mind when they say that utilitarianism is objective.

The view that I defend is what Robert Adams calls 'motive utilitarianism', what Peter Singer calls 'sentiment utilitarianism' and what I call 'desire utilitarianism'. It is utilitarian in that it depends on a calculus - a summing (in this case of the fulfillment of different desires by a desire). But it is important to keep it distinct from the many versions of utilitarianism that hold that one is summing up some sort of 'intrinsic' value.


Originally posted by bd-from-kg
That is, what determines the rightness or wrongness of an act, according to your theory, is not the attitude or feeling that some people have toward the act, but the attitude or feeling some people have toward its consequences (and those of the alternatives).

Well, not entirely by the attitude or feeling toward the act, but I cannot deny that they are relevant. All desires are relevant. This includes desires for (or aversions to) the act. But it is only one consideration among many. The mistake is in taking these sentiments as being all there is to it, when these sentiments are merely one piece of a much larger picture.


Originally posted by bd-from-kg
(1) It bases the rightness or wrongness of an act entirely on desires that someone has right now. It ignores desires that some people (some of whom might not even exist yet) may, or certainly will, have in the future, the fulfillment of which may be strongly affected by the act in question.

Whoa, if I said this then it must have been on a night when I was too tired to be thinking clearly. All desires that will come into existence, as a result of pursuing a particular option, are certainly relevant. The thwarting of a future desire is as wrong as the thwarting of a present desire.

Though, desires that will not exist are not relevant.

Desires that might exist should be weighed according to the probability that they will exist.

What I think you are referring to here is my position that the mere existence of a desire has no value. In order to have value, something must be the object of a desire. This applies to desires -- a desire does not obtain value merely by existing. In order for a desire to have value it too must be desired, or it must be useful in bringing about something else that is desired.


Originally posted by bd-from-kg
(2) It bases the rightness or wrongness of an act on actual desires. This objection has nothing to do with whether the desires in question exist now, as opposed to in the future or past. The objection is that it ignores potential desires – most importantly, desires that some people would have if they had more knowledge and understanding, or if they were more perfectly rational.

Well, actually, I may be willing to base the conclusion on desires that a person would acquire with greater knowledge and understanding, but I deny that knowledge and understanding has any power to generate desires. The belief/desire distinction follows the fact/value and the is/ought distinction. You can't derive the latter (desire, value, ought) from the former (belief, fact, is).

Using an example that I will hereby steal from another thread, a person, lost in the desert, comes across a jar marked 'poison' that, unknown to him, contains clean water. He BELIEVES he should not drink from the bottle. It would even be reasonable to say that he does not want to drink from the bottle.

However, when I talk about a person's desires, I do not talk about these pseudo-desires that are based on false beliefs. I talk about the desires that a person actually has. In this case, yes, the person has a desire not to drink poison, and a desire to drink water. These desires are best fulfilled by drinking the contents of the jar. Only, he does not KNOW this. Discovering that the jar contains clean water does not, in fact, change the person's desires. Those desires are the same. It only changes the agent's awareness over how he can best fulfill those desires.

It is true that I am only concerned with the desires that exist or will exist. However, these may differ significantly from what a person THINKS (often wrongly) would fulfill his desires.


Originally posted by bd-from-kg
(3) It makes statements like “It would be right for X to do Y” purely descriptive rather than prescriptive. That is, it becomes a description of the relationship between desires and other desires, or between desires and the effect that the act in question would have (or might reasonably be expected to have) on the objects of those desires rather than a statement about “what to do”.

What you seem to take here as a two-way distinction is actually widely recognized as a three-way distinction. The elements are:

Descriptive. A statement that contains no motivating or action-guiding component whatsoever.

Hypothetical imperative. A statement that describes a state where the motivational or action-guiding element is conditional, as on a desire. A statement such as, "if you want to lose weight, you should consume fewer calories and exercise more," is a hypothetical imperative, depending entirely on the existence of a desire to lose weight.

Categorical imperative. A statement where the motivational or action-guiding element is unconditional. "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me" is a categorical imperative -- it does not depend on anybody's beliefs or desires. It is a brute fact of nature.

The imperatives that I write about in my moral theory are not descriptive claims, nor are they categorical imperatives (of which, I am eager to assert, there are none in the real world). They are hypothetical imperatives. They are no more problematic than statements of the form, "If you want to lose weight, you should exercise more." In fact, there is only one relevant difference. While the weight statement above refers only to one person's desires, moral claims are "we" statements. They take the form, "Given everything that we -- all of us -- want and everything that future people will want, we ought to have an aversion to killing innocent people."

It is a hypothetical imperative. It is conditional on what "we want and all future people will want." It is not merely descriptive.


Originally posted by bd-from-kg
Ironically, this is an instance of the very naturalistic fallacy that you mentioned in one of your own posts. Thus, according to your theory “X’s doing Y is wrong” means that X’s doing Y involves the “relationship between desires and other desires” the constitutes an act’s being wrong. We can allow a more general description of just what state of affairs constitutes Y’s being wrong; say, for example, that it is a certain relationship between the consequences of Y and certain desires, and of these desires to one another. Let’s define R as this complex of relationships (or just one very complex relationship) and define R(Y) to mean that the act Y satisfies this relationship. Now consider the two questions:

(a) Is Y wrong?

(b) Does Y involve the complex of relationships denoted by R; or in other words, does R(Y) hold?

According to your theory these are the same question.

My counter to this is that it makes no sense to propose that these two questions are simply different wordings for what is, in fact, the same question.

And if you claim that "I didn't say they were the same question," my response would then be to say "wrong is whatever satisfies the relationship R" means that "Is Y wrong?" and "Does Y satisfy the relationship R?" are the same question.

Very good.

In fact, I am willing to argue that these are the same question. The relevant criteria, then, is whether they have the same truth conditions. If one can find an example where the truth conditions for one statement differ from the truth conditions for the other, then this would be a significant objection. Without such an example, the reduction of one statement to the other holds.

However, it is not sufficient to point out instances where people BELIEVE that the two statements are different, or SUSPECT that they might be different. This was G.E. Moore's mistake. He took the mere suspicion of a difference between the two statements as sufficient. Contemporary thought says that this, in itself, is a fallacy. The truth conditions must actually be different -- there must be a condition under which one statement is true, and the other false, or vice versa.

I believe that the example that you are referring to involved a claim that "wrong" is "that which the power majority in a society said is wrong". Against this, I offered the following hypothetical:

Assume that a poll takes place, and the pollster asks "Do you think that capital punishment is wrong." 80% say 'no', 15% say 'yes' and 5% give no response. Now, you ask the 15% who say 'no' a further question. 'Do you believe that the power-majority in society believes that capital punishment is wrong'. The same people who answered 'yes' to the first question would answer 'no' to the second. The two statements do not have the same truth conditions. Therefore, they are not the same question.

Even with this test one must be careful. Take, for example, the reduction of 'water' to 'H20.' Take any statement containing the word 'water' and substitute 'H2O', and you preserve the truth conditions. Yet, let us assume that we find a person who thinks that water is H2O2. This person would REPORT that substituting 'H2O' for 'water' changes the truth conditions. Yet, his report does not PROVE that water is not H2O. Again, the proof requires that the two statements actually have different truth conditions. It is not sufficient to merely show that people believe that they have different truth conditions.

So, yes, the thesis that I defend does depend on the ability to reduce statements about right and wrong to a certain type of relationship between desires and other desires without changing the truth conditions. And it is true that offering an example in which the truth conditions change would be a refutation of this theory. Yet, an actual divergence in truth conditions is required -- that it 'makes sense' or "would seem possible that' is not sufficient.

With respect to the view that I was criticizing, there is an actual divergence in the truth conditions for the questions, "Is capital punishment wrong?", and "Is capital punishment opposed by the power-majority in society?" -- instances where people who fully understand both questions would answer 'yes' to one and 'no' to the other.

Can you provide me with a similar counter-example to the theory I defend?

Note: For most proposed counter-examples, I will argue that the counter-example contains a mistake of fact (e.g., "there exists a God" or "there exists intrinsic value"). These are akin to the alleged counter-example above involving the person who thinks that Water is H2O2. It does not refute the claim the water is H2O. To refute the claim one must provide an example where crossing out 'water' in one instance and substituting 'H2O' actually changes a true statement to false, or a false statement to true. Moral statements involving God or intrinsic value are always false.]


P.S. Just to put it on the record. You are very, very good at this.

[phaedrus]

bd-from-kg

Just curious, what sort of moral system/theory do you like or would like to be in place so that you can subscribe to it?

What are you views on evolutionary ethics...

jp

What is morality in any given time or place? It is what the majority then and there happen to like, and immorality is what they dislike. Alfred North Whitehead : Dialogues

The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation. Jeremy Bentham : Works

Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense - nonsense upon stilts. Jeremy Bentham : Anarchical Fallacies

[bd-from-kg]

Alonzo Fyfe:

I apologize in advance for the length of this post. But the questions discussed here are close to the heart of what this forum is supposed to be about, and I think a discussion of your theory can help illuminate them.

Much of what I have to say I’ve said before, but at least the examples and illustrations are different, and some of it, I think, is actually new. Anyway, lots of readers won’t be familiar with it since we haven’t debated these matters for quite some time. So here goes.

Whoa, if I said this then it must have been on a night when I was too tired to be thinking clearly. All desires that will come into existence, as a result of pursuing a particular option, are certainly relevant. The thwarting of a future desire is as wrong as the thwarting of a present desire...

Desires that might exist should be weighed according to the probability that they will exist.

Ah, I must be misremembering.

But I still seem to recall that you did not count desires that would come into existence as a result of one choice but not another. For example, if one choice would result in the creation of a number of happy humans whose desires would be largely fulfilled, while a second choice did not, this wouldn’t count in favor of the first choice or against the second. The reason, as I recall, is that if one made the second choice the probability that these desires would come into existence would be zero, and therefore (by your “probability weighting”) they wouldn’t count.

Well, actually, I may be willing to base the conclusion on desires that a person would acquire with greater knowledge and understanding, but I deny that knowledge and understanding has any power to generate desires. The belief/desire distinction follows the fact/value and the is/ought distinction. You can't derive the latter (desire, value, ought) from the former (belief, fact, is).

Yes, I understand that you allow for increased K&U to change one’s desires for instrumental ends – i.e., things that are means to further ends. But you don’t allow for desires for new ultimate ends that can be produced by new K&U.

Thus, you might want to drink water (either because being thirsty is unpleasant or because you want to stay alive) but believe falsely that a certain bottle does not contain water, so you have no desire to drink from that bottle. With increased knowledge you may desire to drink from it because you now know that it contains water. But this only works because your desire to drink from the bottle is a desire for an instrumental end. The ultimate end – to relieve the discomfort or to stay alive – was there all along.

In other words, if increased K&U changes your beliefs about what actions would further your ultimate ends, that’s all well and good; your theory allows for this. But if it changes your ultimate ends, that’s a different matter; your theory will not count potential desires for new ultimate ends that result from increased K&U (or from anything else for that matter).

For example, suppose that I’m living in the antebellum South and have no interest in slavery one way or another. But if I were to be taken into slavery myself I would very quickly gain a far deeper knowledge and understanding of what it’s like to be a slave. As a result I would develop a passionate, lifelong desire to free all slaves. According to your theory, since this would be a new desire that would only come into existence as a result of new knowledge and understanding (which is not actually going to occur) it doesn’t “count” in determining what either I or anyone else “ought” to do. In fact, even if this is true of everyone in the society (which seems to me to be quite likely) this would have no implications regarding whether the slaves should be freed.

I think this is a fatal weakness of your theory. The powerful desire that most people would have (and would always have had, in all times and places) to abolish slavery if they had the kind of intimate, first-person acquaintance with it that would come from being a slave, even if only for a day, is by far the strongest reason why slavery is wrong. (As Lincoln put it, "As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master.") It may be that your theory can somehow be tortured into yielding the conclusion that slavery is wrong, but if so it arrives at this conclusion for the wrong reasons. When a theory can only reach an obviously correct conclusion through circuitous reasoning that has little to do with the real reason why the conclusion is correct it’s very unlikely that it will “luck out” every time in this way. In any case, a valid moral theory should be able to tell us not only that things like slavery are wrong, but why they’re wrong.

bd:
(3) [Your theory] makes statements like “It would be right for X to do Y” purely descriptive rather than prescriptive. That is, it becomes a description of the relationship between desires and other desires, or between desires and the effect that the act in question would have (or might reasonably be expected to have) on the objects of those desires rather than a statement about “what to do”.

Alonzo:
What you seem to take here as a two-way distinction is actually widely recognized as a three-way distinction...

First off, your usage of both “hypothetical imperative” and “categorical imperative” is puzzling, to say the least. The term “categorical imperative” is normally reserved for Kant’s categorical imperative. As for “hypothetical imperative”, well, let’s look at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s article on Kant’s metaphysics (http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/k/kantmeta.htm):

Kant distinguishes two kinds of law produced by reason. Given some end we wish to achieve, reason can provide a hypothetical imperative, or rule of action for achieving that end. A hypothetical imperative says that if you wish to buy a new car, then you must determine what sort of cars are available for purchase.

Your “weight” example fits this schema nicely. but then you go off the rails. You offer as an example the sentence:

(*)Given everything that we - all of us - want and everything that future people will want, we ought to have an aversion to killing innocent people.

And you argue that (*) is also a hypothetical imperative. It isn’t, unless you’re inventing a new private language that the rest of us are not privy to.

A true hypothetical imperative is actually a type of descriptive statement. For example, “If you want to get to the nearest K-mart, head west on route 51” is equivalent to “The nearest K-mart can be reached most easily by heading west on Route 51”.

It’s true that a hypothetical imperative can be put into the form, “Given S, you should do T”. But “S” in this case must be of the form “you want such-and-such to be the case”. And even then you don’t necessarily have a hypothetical imperative.

Consider these statements:

(1) Given that you desire to kill Smith and that a great many people desire that he not be killed, you should do it by slipping an undetectable poison into his Martini.

(2) Given that you desire to kill Smith and that a great many other people desire that he not be killed, you shouldn’t kill Smith.

Here the conditional in both cases refers entirely do various people’s desires. But (1) is a hypothetical imperative because it tells you how to fulfill your desire in the face of many opposing desires, whereas (2) is not a hypothetical imperative because it tells you that, after taking all relevant desires into account, you ought not to try to fulfill your desire at all. In other words, this is a moral imperative.

This is important because, since (*) is not a hypothetical imperative, it is “not merely descriptive”, just as you say. But this fact poses a problem for your theory. If “not merely descriptive” statements of this sort are capable of being “true”, what is it that makes them true? Let’s take (*), for example. If it’s true, is it a necessary or contingent truth?

To say that it’s a contingent truth means that it’s true in this world, but not in all possible worlds. So, if it’s a contingent truth, what is about this world that makes it true? What would have to be true about this world to make it false? What empirical evidence do you have that it’s true? It seems clear that you wouldn’t count any conceivable empirical fact as evidence for or against it, so I think this option can be rejected out of hand.

If it’s a necessary truth, it must be true in all possible worlds. But what is it about this statement that would make it true in all possible worlds? Is there some mysterious metaphysical reality that makes certain some moral statements necessarily true regardless of what anyone thinks, feels, or believes? I don’t think that you believe this; it’s equivalent to a belief in a transcendent moral reality or an intrinsic property of “ought-to-be-doneness”.

The only other possibility is that it’s true by definition. That is, you define “ought” in such a way that (*) is true simply by virtue of this definition. The problem with this is not merely that this is not how such terms are used; it’s that it’s not compatible with how moral terms like “ought” work. This is the same criticism that you’ve leveled many times against subjective moral theories, so you can hardly reject it as a criticism of your own theory. Either you’re giving an account of how terms like “ought” are actually used by most people, or you’re inventing your own private language. And the distinctive feature of moral language is that it is not about “what is the case”, but about “what to do”, That is, it is not (and is not understood to be) merely descriptive, but prescriptive.

The fact that this is an essential (in fact, the essential) feature of moral language can be seen by considering how we would go about determining what words in a hitherto unknown language refer to moral concepts. For example, let’s say that people in this society often marry more than one person, and that everyone agrees in calling this practice “jatery”. But some of these people also call the practice “rimula” while others call it “wixar”. We further observe that, while marrying more than one person is the only thing ever described as “jatery”, many other disparate sorts of actions and behaviors are described as “rimula” and “wixar”, and that in most cases almost everyone agrees as to which term applies. We further observe that people universally show approval of acts that they describe as “rimula” and disapprove of those they describe as “wixar”, rewarding the former and punishing the latter, even when not everyone agrees with them that the term in question is applicable.

At this point we’re justified in concluding that “rimula” and “wixar” are the words used by this society for the concepts “morally right” and “morally wrong”. The reason for this conclusion is the clear nexus between the acts to which these terms are applied and the attitudes that people display toward those acts. For purposes of discerning the meaning of these words, it doesn’t matter what acts they’re applied to. The purpose and function of these terms is not to describe the acts they’re applied to (i.e., to ascribe specific properties to them) but to indicate approval or disapproval of them. (This is greatly oversimplified of course; the function of moral terms is not merely to indicate approval or disapproval in general, but to indicate a special kind of approval or disapproval. But we need not go into that here.) The main point is that such terms are not descriptive. If someone were to propose to settle the question of whether the practice of “jatery” is “rimula” or “wixar” by simply defining these terms appropriately, so that it was “rimula” (say) by definition, the response would be either blank incomprehension, or a statement to the effect that he clearly doesn’t understand what “rimula” and “wixar” mean. Moral questions cannot be settled simply be defining moral terms in this way. Once you start defining moral terms so that certain specified acts are “right” or “wrong” (or “rimula” or “wizar”) by definition, they cease to be moral terms at all. That’s just not how moral terms work.

Now we’re finally in a position to deal with the last part of your post.

bd: (simplified)

Consider the two questions:

(a) Is Y wrong?

(b) Does R(Y) hold?

According to your theory these are the same question.

My counter to this is that it makes no sense to propose that these two questions are simply different wordings for what is, in fact, the same question.

Alonzo:
In fact, I am willing to argue that these are the same question.

I’ve just explained at length why they cannot possibly be the same question. The first is not a question of fact, whereas the second is.

The relevant criteria, then, is whether they have the same truth conditions.

That’s not really true, The correct statement is the one you made earlier, that this is a necessary condition for two statements being equivalent. It’s not a sufficient condition. But I’ll get to this later. For now let’s see whether the two statements even satisfy this necessary condition.

In analyzing whether two questions mean the same thing it is permissible to look at other possible worlds. Even if the truth conditions for two statements coincide in this world if they don’t coincide in all other possible worlds, the two questions do not have the same meaning. For example, in this world most humans perceive an object as blue if it reflects photons of a certain wavelength WBA. (Oversimplified again, but there’s no point in getting too technical here.) But clearly there’s a possible world in which beings just like us except for the way they perceive colors (and thus surely qualify as human) perceive an object as “blue” if it reflects photons of a significantly different wavelength WBH. In our world the truth conditions for “Do most people perceive this object as blue?” and “Does this object reflect photons of wavelength WBA?” have the same truth conditions, but in some other possible worlds they don’t. And this is sufficient to show that they’re not the same question.

Now let’s imagine a world in which satisfying a desire always resulted in total, abject misery for the person involved, whereas failing to satisfy any desires always resulted in pure ecstasy. Would it be true in this world that “X ought to do Y” is always true if and only if it resulted in the satisfaction of the maximum possible number of desires? It seems pretty self-evident to me that it would not. Surely you would agree that there are some cases where making everyone affected by your action thoroughly miserable is not morally preferable to making everyone involved perfectly ecstatic, even if your action satisfied all relevant desires?

Here’s another counterexample, which is possible in a world much more similar to ours than the one in the example above (though IMO not possible in certain respects in this world). Suppose that a situation arises in which everyone has a powerful desire that a small group of people (say Jewish babies) should be subjected to extreme, prolonged torture. Moreover, as it happens, subjecting them to such torture will make the society as a whole permanently much happier, and thus make it possible to satisfy a far larger number of clearly legitimate desires than any alternative. Clearly, under these circumstances, doing so will have property R(Y) (roughly speaking, it will maximize desire satisfaction). So according to your criterion these babies ought to be tormented mercilessly even though they are perfectly innocent.

Now if you really believe this, you have a dramatically different notion of what “ought” means than the vast majority of people do. In which case you cannot be seriously claiming to be giving an account of what most people mean by “ought” in the moral sense. It may be what you mean, but that’s not what we’re discussing here.

However, it is not sufficient to point out instances where people BELIEVE that the two statements are different...

But when the question is one of what a word means, what most people “believe” is highly relevant. The meaning of a word is determined by common usage, not by Alonzo Fyfe’s fiat. As you point out, if most “people who fully understand both questions would answer 'yes' to one and 'no' to the other” this is a definitive refutation of the claim that the two questions are the same question (which in this case means that the proposed definition is not a correct account of what most people mean by it). In both of the cases I cited, I think that it’s clear that the vast majority of people would agree, after fully understanding both questions, that the acts in question satisfy your criterion R and that the acts nevertheless ought not to be done.

This was G.E. Moore's mistake. He took the mere suspicion of a difference between the two statements as sufficient.

That’s an unfair characterization. His point was that if anyone considers the two questions “Is it right for X to do Y?” and “Does such-and-such a state of affairs hold in the ‘real world’?” (where the term “state of affairs” is understood to refer to the consequences of the act in question and its alternatives) he would see clearly that they are not the same question. That is, even given that the stipulated state of affairs holds, it still makes sense to ask whether the action in question is right. Or to put it another way, the fact that state of affairs S holds cannot, in itself, make it true by definition that it is right for X to do Y.

It seems clear to me that Moore is right about this. It seems to me to be absurd to say that since state of affairs S holds, it is literally nonsensical to suggest that it might not be right for X to do Y in the sense in which it is literally nonsensical to suggest that a three-sided polygon might not be a triangle. It might be clearly false (like saying that the sky is white), but it is not logically incoherent.. And even if you disagree that this is true of any state of affairs, it surely is clear that it’s true of a great many states of affairs. for any state of affairs that you can stipulate, it’s at least often the case that a rational person might, without inconsistency, agree that this state of affairs holds and yet not consider Y to be the “thing to do”.

Some examples might perhaps make this clearer. Suppose that Jones says, “I don’t agree with your criterion of rightness. I think that one ought to do what conduces to the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness, regardless of people’s desires. And Edwards might say, “I think that knowledge and understanding are great goods in themselves. The unexamined life is not worth living; it’s better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. So one ought to do what conduces to the greatest possible knowledge and understanding. Or at any rate, these must certainly be taken into account along with people’s desires in determining what one ought to do.” (Other reasonable criteria could also be proposed, but these have been championed by some great minds, so they will do.) What is one to say to Jones and Edwards? That they don’t understand what “ought” means? Or at least that they mean very different things by “ought” than you do? This seems absurd. Jones and Edwards are not merely offering different definitions of “ought”; they are disagreeing about what the determining conditions are for whether one ought to do something in the very same sense of “ought”.

The basic problem with your theory is that you are defining one particular (fairly plausible) criterion for “oughtness” and trying to make it a definition of “oughtness”. This is fundamentally wrongheaded.

[bd-from-kg]

phaedrus:

Just curious, what sort of moral system/theory do you like or would like to be in place so that you can subscribe to it?

Having just finished a 3000+ word reply to Alonzo, I don’t have time to give anything like a complete exposition of my moral theory right now. But I’ll try to give a short outline, and perhaps try to fill it in later.

I believe that there are fundamental, virtually definitional aspects of human nature such that if everyone had sufficient knowledge and understanding and were sufficiently rational, almost everyone would agree to a very large extent regarding which acts they would approve and disapprove of. Valid moral statements are those that correspond to what almost everyone would approve or disapprove of under these conditions.

In a sense there’s nothing written in concrete about valid moral principles. If human nature were significantly different, different moral principles would be valid, or possibly no moral principles would be valid. But it’s an objective fact that human nature is what it is, and in this sense there’s an “objectively valid” morality. Of course this allows for considerable regional variation. It’s quite possible that there would be substantial disagreement about just what kind of society is “best” overall, even among people with unlimited knowledge and understanding. But even if almost everyone with enough K&U would agree that a particular social structure is “suboptimal” replacing it with a “better” one might not be worth the social upheaval. And there would likely be a lot of agreement about what actions are “right” and “wrong” in the context of a particular social structure. (If you’re looking for an “absolute” morality – i.e., rules that are valid regardless of the type of society, etc., you’ll find a few [e.g., killing someone for pocket change is wrong] but not all that many. The great majority of moral rules are contextual, because the effects of a given action depend on the type of society. And few rules are absolutely valid, even within a given society, since the effects also depend on the specific circumstances.)

In any case, moral statements and principles are not “true” any more than “Close the door” is true. They are not statements of fact; they do not express propositions. They are not descriptive, but prescriptive. To say that they are “valid” is not to say that they are true, but rather to say that they are in accord with human nature.

This is an intersubjective theory, but of an unusual kind. It says that what matters, morally speaking, is not what people do in fact agree about, but what they would agree about if they had sufficient knowledge and understanding. I think that this accords perfectly with our moral intuitions, yet it is very commonly overlooked or ignored. It explains why it makes sense to debate moral questions. If subjective theories (or intersubjective theories of the usual sort) were correct, the fact that a certain person or persons approved or disapproved of a give action would be dispositive regarding its moral status, so the only meaningful kind of moral debate would be a debate about whether the relevant person(s) did in fact approve or disapprove of the act. But in my theory it makes perfect sense to say that an act might be wrong even if most people (or even all people) approve of it, since they might not approve of it if they had sufficient K&U. And, of course the fact that I approve of an act, or that the agent considers it “right”, isn’t dispositive either, since either of us might have a different attitude if we had sufficient K&U.

I trust that I’ve left you thoroughly confused.

What are your views on evolutionary ethics...

I think that what most people mean by “evolutionary ethics” is bunk.

To be more precise, theories that attempt to derive moral principles from the fact of evolution, or the fact that natural selection tends to select for certain traits, are completely off the mark. The fact that we got to be the way we are via this or that process is completely irrelevant to ethical questions.

On the other hand, sociobiology may be able to provide real insights into just what our basic nature is; what fundamental desires and ends humans generally to have (i.e., are natural for humans) based on the knowledge that we were produced by an evolutionary process. IN other words, to the extent that it has implications about what our nature is rather than how it got to be that way, it has some real bearing on ethical questions.

For example, the fact that almost everyone has a strong desire to live is highly relevant to ethical questions. But the fact that this nearly universal desire was produced by natural selection is not relevant. It wouldn’t make any difference, morally speaking, if this desire had come to be nearly universal in some other way.

On the other hand, many people on these boards seem to think that a desire to help other people for its own sake rather than because it serves the agent’s self-interest in some way, is somehow “unnatural” and therefore irrational. But sociobiology tells us that such desires, far from being unnatural, are to be expected as a natural product of evolutionary forces. They’re just as natural (though not nearly as strong) as the desire to live. Thus sociobiology tells us that “moral systems” that attempt to ground morality entirely on self-interest are wrongheaded. There’s nothing uniquely “natural” or “rational” about self-interested motives, and there’s certainly no reason to believe that people have no motives but self-interested ones.

As for your quotations:

I disagree completely with Whitehead. If it were true, all moral debates would be total nonsense. It shows an appalling lack of understanding of the purpose and function of moral language.

Bentham’s first statement is not too far from the mark in that “the greatest happiness” is reasonably close to being a valid criterion of the rightness of an action. But this principle is hardly the foundation of a proper moral theory; it’s closer to being a consequence or corollary of one. (And IMO it’s not strictly valid; there are some exceptions.)

Finally, Bentham’s dismissal of the concept of “natural rights” is correct in one sense: there are no mysterious transcendent entities called “rights” floating around out there in the Platonic realm of Ideals. But the concept of rights makes sense if interpreted in a reasonable way. For example, saying that I have a right to life can be interpreted to mean that (1) It would be wrong (ordinarily) for someone to kill me, and perhaps (2) The state should (ordinarily) take positive measures to prevent other people from killing me.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

I am preparing my treatise in response to your posting against me above, but I wanted to make a quick comment on this point:

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
I believe that there are fundamental, virtually definitional aspects of human nature such that if everyone had sufficient knowledge and understanding and were sufficiently rational, almost everyone would agree to a very large extent regarding which acts they would approve and disapprove of. Valid moral statements are those that correspond to what almost everyone would approve or disapprove of under these conditions.

You see, I agree with this. I also hold that there are certain things that all people with sufficient knowledge and understanding would call 'moral' or 'immoral', and this is what moral statements report.

Where I disagree is that there is any necessary connection between what they would call 'moral' or 'immoral', and what they would like and dislike. They would not reach this conclusion by what they would, in fact, like under conditions of sufficient knowledge and experience, but on what they should like (what it would be good for them to like).

What they would like could be just about anything, and so going with what they do like under conditions of sufficient knowledge and experience places no limits on what is right or wrong. And, furthermore, because there is no necessary connection, we have know way of knowing what they could like or dislike under these conditions, so no way of knowing the answers to moral questions.

Additional work would be required to convert what they do like into what they should like.

And if they confuse the two -- if where what they should like deviates from what they do like (under conditions of sufficient knowledge and understanding), and opt for what they do like, then they opt against what they should like, and evil (in the form of the malevolent genius) is the result.

Now, when you say "approve of" above -- it could mean "views as something they should desire" or "is something they do desire". So, your phrasology is ambiguous between our two theories.

And the ultimate difference between them is whether a person with sufficient knowledge and understanding would actually have these desires. I say they would not -- that what they would desire could be just about anything. However, there would be one common answer to the question of what they should desire, however much it may deviate from what they come to desire in fact.

[Dang. I think I just summarized two whole days of work into a simple five-minute post.]


P.S. I substantially agree with tour statements about evolutionary ethics, Whitehead, utilitarianism, and Bentham.

[bd-from-kg]

Alonzo Fyfe:

Where I disagree is that there is any necessary connection between what they would call 'moral' or 'immoral', and what they would like and dislike.

I’m defining “right” and “wrong” in terms of what people would approve or disapprove of (this is a little more precise than “like” and “dislike”) under these conditions. What they would call “moral” and “immoral” is irrelevant.

And I don’t think that the terms “approve” and “disapprove” in this context are especially problematic, because I’m not talking about moral approval, but simply “approval”. A person approves of X’s doing Y if he feels “Yes, that’s what I’d prefer that he did, all things considered, in this situation.”

They would not reach this conclusion by what they would, in fact, like under conditions of sufficient knowledge and experience, but on what they should like (what it would be good for them to like).

You’re trying to force a circularity where there is none. I’m not talking about what the people in question would think they “should” approve of, but what they would approve of.

What they would like could be just about anything, and so going with what they do like under conditions of sufficient knowledge and experience places no limits on what is right or wrong.

This is merely an unsupported assertion. There’s no justification for it whatsoever. You might just as well claim that, if everyone were to become familiar with classical music, they’d be just as likely to prefer Salieri to Mozart as the other way round. But everything we know points to the conclusion that nearly all of them would in fact prefer Mozart. Certainly there seems to be no logical reason to prefer Mozart to Salieri, but that doesn’t mean that the results would in fact be random.

And, furthermore, because there is no necessary connection, we have know way of knowing what they could like or dislike under these conditions, so no way of knowing the answers to moral questions.

See my previous answer. The lack of a necessary (meaning, I presume, logically necessary) connection doesn’t mean that there is no connection, or that any such connection could not be predicted.

And if they confuse the two -- if where what they should like deviates from what they do like (under conditions of sufficient knowledge and understanding), and opt for what they do like, then they opt against what they should like, and evil (in the form of the malevolent genius) is the result.

My position is that the rare genius who would remain malevolent even under conditions of a thoroughgoing understanding of himself (among other things) would have to have a seriously defective brain structure, just as the occasional person who is unable to distinguish blue and green is defective in some way. The existence of such people does not show that there is not a “humanly natural” way to be in these respects. It just shows that some people are defective.

There’s actually some pretty good empirical evidence of this right now. The people who most closely resemble your “malevolent genius” are psychopaths. An unfortunate name, since it conjures up an image of someone like Hannibal Lecter. Real psychopaths are more often like your local used car salesman or scam artist. Their distinguishing feature is not a tendency to violence, but a total or near-total lack of conscience. This seems to derive from a near-total inability to imagine or understand the psychological effects that their actions have on others, which in turn seems to be closely related to their own near-total lack of affect (emotions). And there is considerable evidence that this whole syndrome is closely related to a specific kind of defect in the brain.

Now, when you say "approve of" above -- it could mean "views as something they should desire" or "is something they do desire". So, your phraseology is ambiguous between our two theories.

I hope that I’ve resolved this ambiguity to your satisfaction.

And the ultimate difference between them is whether a person with sufficient knowledge and understanding would actually have these desires. I say they would not - that what they would desire could be just about anything.

This is a question of fact, and all the evidence suggests that you're wrong. Moral language would have no useful function or purpose if the effect of increased knowledge and understanding were completely unpredictable (other than telling each of us how to get what he wants most efficiently). But in fact it does have a useful purpose and function, precisely because increased knowledge and understanding has (at the least) a strong tendency to being people’s desires into better harmony with one another. This can be seen very clearly even with the very imperfect level of understanding which is actually attained fairly often. How much more harmonious would people’s desires be if they were able to attain a very strong level of empathetic understanding of everyone who might be affected by their actions? Isn’t it reasonable to suppose that they would be very harmonious indeed? Of course this level of understanding isn’t possible as a practical matter. But my theory does not limit the level of knowledge and understanding that would determine “right” and “wrong” to what’s practically possible.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
I’m defining “right” and “wrong” in terms of what people would approve or disapprove of (this is a little more precise than “like” and “dislike”) under these conditions.

Then you are defining "right" and "wrong" as something that is totally arbitary and unknowable. Because this is what is true of this "what a person would desire with sufficient knowledge and understanding." It could be anything, and we have no way of determining this.

It "could be anything" because there is no necessary connection between knowledge and understanding, and what a person "prefers" (except in an instrumental sense). A person who, today, desires D1, D2, and D3, can acquire perfect knowledge and understanding, and still have no reason to change those desires.

If the desires do change, it is still entirely contingent. A desire to own slaves is as compatible with perfect knowledge and understanding, as a desire to abolish slavery. "malevolent omnicience" is just as coherent as "benevolent omnicience."


Originally posted by bd-from-kg
You’re trying to force a circularity where there is none. I’m not talking about what the people in question would think they “should” approve of, but what they would approve of.

I know you're not.

The "should" is my theory, and what distinguishes your theory from mine, is that I include the word "should", and you do not.


Originally posted by bd-from-kg
This is merely an unsupported assertion. There’s no justification for it whatsoever. You might just as well claim that, if everyone were to become familiar with classical music, they’d be just as likely to prefer Salieri to Mozart as the other way round. But everything we know points to the conclusion that nearly all of them would in fact prefer Mozart. Certainly there seems to be no logical reason to prefer Mozart to Salieri, but that doesn’t mean that the results would in fact be random.


I am saying that there is nothing about Mozart that classifies it as "ought to be liked". There is nothing special about liking Mozart, it just happens to be what people like and the liking of it is totally arbitrary.

And even if X% of the people would like Mozart, that this does not imply that there is anything wrong with the 1-X% who would not like Mozart. Nothing can be said against them. There is no reason to hold that this 1-X% is in any way defective or deficient, just different.

On your account, the same would have to be said of the 1-X% who would prefer to own slaves, or to rape, or to torture another person. There is nothing incoherent with a person with sufficient knowledge and understanding liking these things. And where such a person exists, you can say nothing against them. Indeed, you would have to argue that it would be immoral for them NOT to own slaves, to rape, or to turture people.


[Note: On the account that I give, I can still say that these things are bad in virtue of their 'lack of harmony' (tendency to thwart) other desires -- namely, those of the victims of slavery, rape, and sadism.

You see, for a victim of child abuse, on your theory, to condemn the abuser, the victim would have to be saying, "You would not have wanted to do this to me if you had sufficient knowledge and understanding of what you were doing."

I do not think that this is true in many cases -- the nature of these desires is that the individual would have them regardless of their level of knowledge and understanding. But even if I am wrong on this regard, the mere POSSIBILITY is sufficient to raise problems. The wrongness of child abuse is not that "the abuser did something that he would not have truly wanted to do if he had sufficient knowledge and understanding." The wrongness of child abuse is that it harms the child. Whether the abuser would have wanted to do this type of thing if he had sufficient knowledge and understanding is irrelevant. There is no sense in which one would say, "We condemned you because we thought that you would not have wanted to do this if you had sufficient knowledge and understanding, but we were wrong. Our condemnation was mistaken."


Originally posted by bd-from-kg
My position is that the rare genius who would remain malevolent even under conditions of a thoroughgoing understanding of himself (among other things) would have to have a seriously defective brain structure, just as the occasional person who is unable to distinguish blue and green is defective in some way.

Please note that "defective" is a value judgment.

You are now no longer defining good as what a person with sufficient knowledge and understand would prefer, but you are now defining it as what a person with sufficient knowledge and understanding and a good (non-defective) brain structure would prefer. But, what do you mean by "good (non-defective) brain structure?" Doesn't determining one brain structure as "good" (non-defective) and another as "bad" (defective) require a theory of value? If so, then how can you derive a theory of value from the concepts of a good (non-defective) and bad (defective) brain structure?

I would handle the concept of a "defect" in terms of "having a tendency to thwart desires". And, indeed, I can even handle "defective desires" in terms of "desires that tend to thwart (other) desires". But I use my theory of value to evaluate "defect". I do not use "defect" as a part of my theory of value.

[phaedrus]

bd-from-kg

While i will write in detail later....an observation....

You said about Whitehead's comments "What is morality in any given time or place? It is what the majority then and there happen to like, and immorality is what they dislike.".....

I disagree completely with Whitehead. If it were true, all moral debates would be total nonsense. It shows an appalling lack of understanding of the purpose and function of moral language.

But earlier in your post you said....

Valid moral statements are those that correspond to what almost everyone would approve or disapprove of under these conditions. (emphasis mine)

Why the contradiction?

And with regard to bentham, you said But this principle is hardly the foundation of a proper moral theory; it’s closer to being a consequence or corollary of one. (And IMO it’s not strictly valid; there are some exceptions.)

One of the main objectives of any moral theory or laws has to be "The greatest happiness of the greatest number ". What else can be the objective?

jp

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by phaedrus
bd-from-kg

While i will write in detail later....an observation....

You said about Whitehead's comments "What is morality in any given time or place? It is what the majority then and there happen to like, and immorality is what they dislike.".....

I disagree completely with Whitehead. If it were true, all moral debates would be total nonsense. It shows an appalling lack of understanding of the purpose and function of moral language.

But earlier in your post you said....

Valid moral statements are those that correspond to what [b]almost everyone would approve or disapprove of under these conditions. (emphasis mine)

Why the contradiction?


It is not a contradiction. "What people happen to like at a given time and place" does not equal "What people would value under conditions of sufficient knowledge and understanding."

It is no more equal than defining truth as "What John Smith believes at any given place and time," compared to "What John Smith would believe under conditions of full knowledge and understanding of the subject in question."

Sorry, bd-fromkg. I couldn't resist giving the answer.

[phaedrus]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
It is not a contradiction. "What people happen to like at a given time and place" does not equal "What people would value under conditions of sufficient knowledge and understanding."

It is no more equal than defining truth as "What John Smith believes at any given place and time," compared to "What John Smith would believe under conditions of full knowledge and understanding of the subject in question."

Sorry, bd-fromkg. I couldn't resist giving the answer.

Err...how does one define "full knowledge and understanding", do you have an objective methodology in place to measure that? Are you stating that human beings make moral decisions/choices under "full knowledge and understanding"?

The key here is "majority" and "almost everyone"

[tudal]

I disagree completely with Whitehead. If it were true, all moral debates would be total nonsense. Correct. So what's your point?
It shows an appalling lack of understanding of the purpose and function of moral language. Or an appalling sufficient understanding...

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by phaedrus
Err...how does one define "full knowledge and understanding", do you have an objective methodology in place to measure that? Are you stating that human beings make moral decisions/choices under "full knowledge and understanding"?

The key here is "majority" and "almost everyone"

I share these questions. Yet, it still remains that any charge that bd-from-kg is contradicting himself in these matters is false. There may be error, but there is no contradiction.

[phaedrus]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
I share these questions. Yet, it still remains that any charge that bd-from-kg is contradicting himself in these matters is false. There may be error, but there is no contradiction.

What sort of an answer is that? You came in and answered, so justify your position

jp

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by phaedrus
What sort of an answer is that? You came in and answered, so justify your position

jp

I did justify my position.

My position being, "the claim that these statements are contradictory is false."

[phaedrus]

You are joking right? That is a statement, not a response to the questions raised by me to your so-called answer.

And you just stated your position...didnt justify it:rolleyes:

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by phaedrus
You are joking right? That is a statement, not a response to the questions raised by me to your so-called answer.

And you just stated your position...didnt justify it:rolleyes:

I think you are confusing a statement of the form "criticism C against X is false" with one that says "X is true." There is no inconsistency in holding "X is false, yet those who raise criticism C against X are not raising a valid point. There are valid points that an be raised against X, criticism C is not one of them."

I happen to believe that to truly understand that X is false, one must be able to distinguish the valid criticisms of X from the invalid criticisms.

"bd-from-kg contradicted himself in making these two statements" is NOT a valid criticism.

[bd-from-kg]

phaedrus:

As for your claim that I contradicted myself, Alonzo has answered this already. (Thanks, A.F.) But perhaps I can explain the comment that if Whitehead’s statement were true all moral debates would be nonsense.

What Whitehead said was that morality is what the majority in the given time and place happen to like. Now let’s look at a typical moral debate, say one about capital punishment. It might go something like this:

Proponent: “The threat of execution deters many murders, thereby saving many innocent lives. Surely the loss of some guilty-as-sin murderers is a small price to pay for this.”

Opponent: “But suppose that we execute an innocent person by mistake? I don’t want to be a party to that. In fact, I don’t want to be a party to cold-bloodedly killing anyone who doesn’t pose an immediate threat to anyone.”

The crucial fact here is that in this debate both parties are offering what they consider reasons for considering capital punishment to be right or wrong. But if Whitehead were right, the only relevant reasons would be reasons to believe that a majority in that time and place happen to like or dislike capital punishment. Thus every one of the arguments offered on both sides would be completely beside the point. The only sensible kind of debate on capital punishment (if Whitehead were right) would go more like this:

Proponent: “I have a poll here that shows that a majority of this community now favors capital punishment.”

Opponent: “That poll has serious methodological flaws. This poll, which shows that a majority in this community now opposes capital punishment, is far more trustworthy.”

Proponent: “But that poll...”

After more of the same:

Proponent: “Tell you what; let’s go out right now and do a really well-designed poll. That will settle the question of whether capital punishment is right or wrong definitively.”

Opponent: “Great idea! Why didn’t I think of that? What’s the point of all this wrangling? If we do an accurate poll we'll know for sure whether capital punishment is right or wrong – today at least.”

Needless to say, this is simply not how moral debates are conducted.

On the other hand, on my theory the usual type of moral debate makes perfectly good sense. So my theory, unlike Whitehead’s, has at least the merit of being consistent with the “logic of moral discourse”.

One of the main objectives of any moral theory or laws has to be "The greatest happiness of the greatest number ". What else can be the objective?

Oh, lots of things. According to Aristotle the purpose of acting morally is to “live well” or to “have a good life. (This sounds circular, but it isn’t. Unfortunately there’s no word in the English language that corresponds to the concept represented by the Greek word eudaemonia that he used.) Plato believed that to be virtuous was to be in harmony with oneself and with the cosmos, and that attaining this harmony was the proper goal of a human being. Many philosophers have held that justice was the ultimate good: “Let justice be done although the heavens fall”. We also have Alonzo’s view that the goal is to satisfy as many “good” desires as possible, which presumably is not quite the same thing as maximizing overall happiness. The view that I mentioned in an earlier post, that knowledge and understanding are valuable in themselves, has been held by a number of respected thinkers. Many philosophers have considered the ability to appreciate beauty to be a great good; they would say that a world in which no one could discern any significant difference between Mozart and Salieri, or between Shakespeare and an inane limerick, to be lacking something of the utmost importance even if everyone in it were perfectly happy. Finally, there’s rationality: most people would say that they would not consider it a great good for themselves if they were to be perfectly happy, but completely insane, for the rest of their lives, and certainly most of us do not find the prospect of all of mankind becoming drooling but happy idiots terribly appealing. It’s far from obvious that all of these notions are nonsensical.

[phaedrus]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
I think you are confusing a statement of the form "criticism C against X is false" with one that says "X is true." There is no inconsistency in holding "X is false, yet those who raise criticism C against X are not raising a valid point. There are valid points that an be raised against X, criticism C is not one of them."

I happen to believe that to truly understand that X is false, one must be able to distinguish the valid criticisms of X from the invalid criticisms.

"bd-from-kg contradicted himself in making these two statements" is NOT a valid criticism.

He, he, verbal calisthenics. If there is confusion, it is in your answer.

If you make a statment "the claim that these statements are contradictory is false", you will have to justify that position.

For example, lots of people can make a statement "Pink Unicorn exists"

jp

[phaedrus]

bd-from-kg

As for your claim that I contradicted myself, Alonzo has answered this already. (Thanks, A.F.)

Well then maybe you can answer the questions posed to him after his so-called answer -

He said It is not a contradiction. "What people happen to like at a given time and place" does not equal "What people would value under conditions of sufficient knowledge and understanding."

It is no more equal than defining truth as "What John Smith believes at any given place and time," compared to "What John Smith would believe under conditions of full knowledge and understanding of the subject in question."

Sorry, bd-fromkg. I couldn't resist giving the answer.

And I asked Err...how does one define "full knowledge and understanding", do you have an objective methodology in place to measure that? Are you stating that human beings make moral decisions/choices under "full knowledge and understanding"?

The key here is "majority" and "almost everyone"

What Whitehead said was that morality is what the majority in the given time and place happen to like. Now let’s look at a typical moral debate, say one about capital punishment. It might go something like this:

<snip>

The crucial fact here is that in this debate both parties are offering what they consider reasons for considering capital punishment to be right or wrong. But if Whitehead were right, the only relevant reasons would be reasons to believe that a majority in that time and place happen to like or dislike capital punishment. Thus every one of the arguments offered on both sides would be completely beside the point. The only sensible kind of debate on capital punishment (if Whitehead were right) would go more like this:

<snip>

Needless to say, this is simply not how moral debates are conducted.

On the other hand, on my theory the usual type of moral debate makes perfectly good sense. So my theory, unlike Whitehead’s, has at least the merit of being consistent with the “logic of moral discourse”.

I seriously dont understand how from a single quote, you were able to comprehend the entire work/proposals of Whitehead. Apart from that, lets get back to basics......what happens after all these debates??? How do laws come into place??? Because a particular view or a consensus view on an issue is endorsed by the MAJORITY. Dont see your distinction here....whitehead's quote merely indicates what is moral and immoral is dependent on the majority's opinion. How the majority come to the conclusion, either based on a public debate or merely a show of hands. In the past, MAJORITY didnt mind slavery or didnt give a damn about Female Suffrage, those things changed because the change in the mind set of the MAJORITY

Oh, lots of things.........<snip>........most people would say that they would not consider it a great good for themselves if they were to be perfectly happy, but completely insane, for the rest of their lives, and certainly most of us do not find the prospect of all of mankind becoming drooling but happy idiots terribly appealing. It’s far from obvious that all of these notions are nonsensical

First the quote didnt say all those things are nonsensical. And second, all those things ........

living well
harmony
justice
aesthetics
rationality

.......what is the objective of all these things. Would you say "improving the quality of life" ? If yes, "greatest number" of the society have to agree that this is what improves their lives and thereby resulting in "the greatest happiness". While we might have zillions of views on what is good and what is bad, in order to function as a society we come to a consensus based on what the majority want or are convinced about.

At the same time one should also remember what Tocqueville said I hold it to be an impious and detestable maxim that, politically speaking, the people have a right to do anything; and yet I have asserted that all authority originates in the will of the majority. Am I, then, in contradiction with myself? A general law, which bears the name of justice, has been made and sanctioned, not only by a majority of this or that people, but by a majority of mankind. The rights of every people are therefore confined within the limits of what is just. A nation may be considered as a jury which is empowered to represent society at large and to apply justice, which is its law. Ought such a jury, which represents society, to have more power than the society itself whose laws it executes? When I refuse to obey an unjust law, I do not contest the right of the majority to command, but I simply appeal from the sovereignty of mankind. Some have not feared to assert that a people can never outstep the boundaries of justice and reason in those affairs which are peculiarly its own; and that consequently full power may be given to the majority by which it is represented. But this is the language of a slave

Mill also held similar views on the "tyranny of the majority", but that is another debate.

jp

[bd-from-kg]

phaedrus:

Well then maybe you can answer the questions posed to him after his so-called answer...

Alonzo’s “so-called” answer was a perfectly good, complete answer to the point he addressed.

It’s helpful in these forums to learn a little elementary courtesy. Gratuitous insults are not conducive to fruitful discussions.

And I asked ...

Yes, and oddly enough Alonzo chose not to attempt a complete exposition of my theory. What were you expecting?

...how does one define "full knowledge and understanding", do you have an objective methodology in place to measure that?

Do you have a methodology to measure whether Smith is more knowledgeable than Jones? Asking for a methodology to measure extremely complex things is pretty silly. Economists can’t even agree on how to measure inflation, or the level of unemployment, or the federal deficit for that matter.

Anyway, I never used the term full knowledge and understanding. I used the word “sufficient”. And I’m willing to take a stab at what I meant by that, at least. A person has “sufficient” knowledge and understanding of a question if his opinion or attitude would not change significantly if he had more.

Now, how can we determine when this point is reached? We can’t. But it’s often possible to have a rational, informed opinion. For example, suppose that a hundred of the best chess players in the world are given the task of analyzing a fairly complicated position. After a couple of minutes they agree that move X is “best”. After a couple of hours the consensus has changed and they now believe that move Y is best. Two years later they’re still at it, and still agree that move Y is best. At this point we’re entitled to form the opinion that they would probably stick with move Y no matter how long they studied the position, and no matter how thoroughly they understood it. It’s possible that we’re wrong about this, but it’s a rationally justified opinion.

It’s true that the question in this example is factual, but the question is such that the correct answer cannot be determined with certainty no matter how much time and effort is put into it. That doesn’t mean that there’s not a correct answer. (Of course, there might not be a correct answer. For example, there may be two different ways to win, and some players would prefer to win one way and others the other no matter how well they understood the position.)

Are you stating that human beings make moral decisions/choices under "full knowledge and understanding"?

Heavens, no.

... lets get back to basics......what happens after all these debates??? How do laws come into place??? Because a particular view or a consensus view on an issue is endorsed by the MAJORITY.

Yes. And if Whitehead had said that what a given community considers or treats as moral or immoral is what the majority of the people in that community consider moral, I would have no quarrel with him (other than that he was wasting his readers’ time with such banal observations).

Don’t see your distinction here....Whitehead's quote merely indicates what is moral and immoral is dependent on the majority's opinion.

Yes, that’s what it indicates. And as I explained at some length, this view is demonstrably false – in fact, ridiculous.

How the majority come to the conclusion...

The conclusion about what? About what things are moral and immoral? But if Whitehead is right, the question of what things are moral is identical to the question of what the majority happen to like. So what the majority would be coming to a conclusion about is what the majority likes. But if we look at a typical moral debate it’s pretty obvious that this is not what they’re about. It looks very much as though what they’re about is not what people do like and dislike, but what they should like and dislike. Of course this isn’t very helpful in terms of moral philosophy since “should” is itself a moral term. It seems pretty clear that this whole line of thought leads to a dead end. What we need to know is what moral debates are about. And observing that the purpose of these debates is to try to arrive at a consensus doesn’t even give us a hint as to what this consensus would be a consensus about.

.......what is the objective of all these things [living well, harmony, justice, aesthetics, rationality]?

I think you missed the point. These things were proposed as ends in themselves, as things worth achieving for their own sake.

If yes, "greatest number" of the society have to agree that this is what improves their lives and thereby resulting in "the greatest happiness".

Why does a majority have to agree that something conduces to the "greatest happiness" in order for it to be so? More importantly, aren't you just assuming that the "greatest happiness" is the only thing thing that is worth attaining for its own sake?

Certainly the philosophers who have championed some of the theories I’ve mentioned wouldn’t agree with this at all. You might be right, but it’s a position that requires argument. It’s not a self-evident truth that can simply be proclaimed dogmatically.

While we might have zillions of views on what is good and what is bad, in order to function as a society we come to a consensus based on what the majority want or are convinced about.

That may or may not be true, but what does it have to do with the subject of this thread?

At the same time one should also remember what Tocqueville said I hold it to be an impious and detestable maxim that, politically speaking, the people have a right to do anything...

An impious maxim??

I see little point in commenting on your last paragraph unless you relate it to the rest of the thread and give us some idea where you’re going with this.

[bd-from-kg]

Alonzo Fyfe:

bd:
I’m defining “right” and “wrong” in terms of what people would approve or disapprove of ... under these conditions.

AF:
Then you are defining "right" and "wrong" as something that is totally arbitrary and unknowable.

Even preferences that are deeply embedded in human nature, like the desire to live, or the desire to be happy rather than miserable, are “arbitrary” in a cosmic sense. But so what? I never claimed that my moral system was “objective” in the sense of being independent of human feelings or desires. As for its being “unknowable”, of course we can’t know with certainty, and certainly not in detail, what people would approve of if they had sufficient K&U. But we can make some good educated guesses.

[What a person would desire with sufficient knowledge and understanding]
could be anything, because there is no necessary connection between knowledge and understanding, and what a person "prefers".

You’re right that there is no necessary connection. But that’s like saying that there’s no necessary connection between having a deep knowledge and understanding of Shakespeare and Edgar Guest and preferring Shakespeare to Guest. Of course there’s no necessary connection, but almost everyone with such a deep understanding will in fact prefer Shakespeare. Similarly, there’s no necessary connection between having a deep knowledge and understanding of sexual abuse of young children and disapproving of it, but in fact almost everyone who has such a deep knowledge and understanding disapproves of it strongly.

A person who, today, desires D1, D2, and D3, can acquire perfect knowledge and understanding, and still have no reason to change those desires.

Well, there’s no such thing as “perfect” K&U, but yes, it’s logically possible that someone could increase his K&U dramatically without changing his desires. But it’s not how human nature works.

If the desires do change, it is still entirely contingent. A desire to own slaves is as compatible with perfect knowledge and understanding, as a desire to abolish slavery. "malevolent omniscience" is just as coherent as "benevolent omniscience."

Yes, yes, yes. It’s contingent. It’s compatible. It’s coherent. Etc., etc. But the question is: what actually happens?

I am saying that there is nothing about Mozart that classifies it as "ought to be liked". There is nothing special about liking Mozart, it just happens to be what people like and the liking of it is totally arbitrary.

Yes, and happiness, survival, etc. just happen to be what people like, and their liking them is totally arbitrary. What’s your point? That there’s no absolute morality embedded in the very fabric of reality? I grant you that.

And even if X% of the people would like Mozart, that this does not imply that there is anything wrong with the 1-X% who would not like Mozart.

No, it doesn’t imply that, but it seems very likely to me that there is some defect in their brain structure that accounts for their inability to distinguish great music from tripe. When we come to simpler matters this seems even clearer. For example, a child I know is clearly tone deaf. When she pla