Philosophy of Mind and the Uncertainty Principle

[spacer1]

I gave a brief outline of my analogy between Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and our experience vs. our reports of those experiences on this (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=57983) thread, but thought I would try and explain it more fully for your scrutiny, since I feel it has some explanatory power.

Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle (HUP) is described here (http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_Principle). Basically it says we cannot simultaneously know both the momentum and position of an electron, and that the better defined one is, the less we can know about the other in the same proportion. My analogy of momentum vs. position with our experience vs. our reports of that experience is as follows:

Position/Reports of Experience:
Any description of how something 'is', any measurement which defines and fixes some observation to a point in time, any reconstruction of our perceptions into a conscious report, lies at the Position end of the spectrum.

Momentum/Experience:
The experience of being, of having an experience, of having perceptions without reconstructing them into a conscious language report, lies at the Momentum end of the spectrum.

Basically, I find the notion of 'position' to be nothing but a mental construct, or rather, only a description (using concepts created from our experiences of reality) rather than the actuality. In actuality, we naturally have momentum, given that we are on this planet as it spins.

Implications for Philosophy of Mind:
Since language is by nature a shared means of communication, words and concepts develop for those aspects of our experiences which are shared. Therefore, any conscious language report of experience is a third-person report. The arguments that non-reductivists offer basically claim that we cannot reduce the first-person experience (momentum) completely into third-person reports (position).

However, for the non-reductivists to even make such a claim (in language) suggests that both themselves and their opponents understand what is meant by a first-person experience. It isn't the case that all we can know about each other's experience is what can be put into words. The first-person experience is known by both reductivists and non-reductivists alike, before the argument even starts.

What would be required for a complete reduction in the case of a first-person experience? Since language deals in shared concepts, a complete reduction in any other case seems possible, because we can mostly agree to the strongest argument of the day. However, since our first-person experience deals precisely in that which we do not and cannot share, such a reduction is not possible.

But, given that the nature of language is just that - to describe experience using shared concepts - such a reduction shouldn't be expected either. If I use the word 'sky', you should have some idea of the concept I am referring to, without my having to also define a certain height above the earth, colour, or any other description.

If I were to define 'sky' more sharply (which is akin to determining 'position' more accurately), I would have to consider all the elements that would be included under such a concept, and then perhaps define limits for such elements. Such a more comprehensive definition would take a lot more time to define and to communicate, and would not facilitate the same ease of transmitting understanding that the simple word 'sky' does. The ability to roll the concept of the atmosphere surrounding our planet into one word allows for greater momentum, but lacks the sharpness, or position, of the more comprehensive definition.

The fact that this written report is 'positional' itself will not suffice to answer the problem of philosophy of mind, but I hope this post goes some way to understanding why this is so.

As Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus:

"What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we cannot think" (5.61); and

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (7)

[Godless Wonder]

I can't recall if I posted this before or not... I know I thought about posting it.

The Heisenberg Uncertainty principle has some interesting effects when matter is cooled to near absolute zero. For then, since, to be that cold, the matter can't be moving very much, it's momentum is therefore pretty precisely known... it's about zero. So now, since the momentum is known so precisely, tis position can't be known precisely, yet it is not moving, so where is it? What heppens? Well, it kind of smears out into a new form of matter called the Bose Einstein condensate, in which all the atoms overlay easther and become indistinguishable from one another.

See: http://www.bec.nist.gov/

I'm not sure I see what the analogy made in the OP tells us, if anything. If the analogy is to be taken as I understand the OP, then experience takes the place of momentum, and "report of experience" takes the place of position....

Then the analog of the HUP would be: the more precise the report of the experience, the less precise the experience? And the more precise the experience, the less precise can be our description of it?

I guess I am not able to follow the analogy. What takes the place of "precision" in the analog of the HUP?

Let's stretch the thing a bit more. What is the analog of the Bose Einstein condensate? The experience should be extremely "precise" and therefore the description should "fuzz out" in some analogous way if the analogy is a good one.... How?

[spacer1]

Godless Wonder,
If the analogy is to be taken as I understand the OP, then experience takes the place of momentum, and "report of experience" takes the place of position....
Correct.
Then the analog of the HUP would be: the more precise the report of the experience, the less precise the experience? And the more precise the experience, the less precise can be our description of it?
No, let's not forget that the HUP deals with our knowledge of the momentum or position. Therefore, I would restate your comments as: The more precisely the experience is reported, the less we know of the (external*) experience we are having while we are reporting. And, conversely, the more aware we are of the experience we are having, the less able we are to describe that experience.

*And our reports relate to that which we share, which is our experience of the external world.
What takes the place of "precision" in the analog of the HUP?
I guess this would be analagous to our focus, which would be based on whether we desire to make more complete reports of our experience or whether we desire to just have an experience.

I hope this clarifies things.

[Godless Wonder]

Originally posted by spacer1
Godless Wonder,

Correct.

No, let's not forget that the HUP deals with our knowledge of the momentum or position. .

I'm not so sure about that. That's why I pointed out the Bose-Einstein condenstate. It is not just our knowledge of possition that becomes less precise as our knowledge of momentum becomes more preces, but that actual real position becomes less precise. The atoms literally smear out.

[dr_saturn]

Since the particles in a Bose-Einstein condensate must be indistinguishable, it is impossible to say that 'this' particle lies here and 'that' particle lies there. So measurement of position of an individual particle becomes impossible without disturbing the system.

I know this is getting off track from the original post. Here's encouragement to the next poster to bring it on track. I need a little more time to consider the original poster's position first.

[spacer1]

Godless Wonder,

I think dr_saturn's response to you is as good as any I could give and I am in complete agreement with it.

Although I am less sure of the implications for QM, I would say that, if my theory holds any truth, the relevant aspects for QM from my opening post would be my distinction in the analogy of "having perceptions without reconstructing them into a conscious language report" at the momentum end of the scale, and "any reconstruction of our perceptions into a conscious report" at the position end.

This is sort of a wild guess, but it may be the cycling of the brain to produce the mind which acts like a film strip, with each cycle being one frame of film, or of reality. Therefore, while our perceptions are continuous, perhaps they are no more than continuous snapshots giving the impression of absolute continuity. All the while, reality actually is continuous and we miss what happens "between each frame", creating the problems of QM???? As I said, just a guess.

This, as with my OP, assumes that HUP is not an aspect of reality, but is a consequence of the way our minds perceive that reality.

[jpbrooks]

Originally posted by spacer1



Although I am less sure of the implications for QM, I would say that, if my theory holds any truth, the relevant aspects for QM from my opening post would be my distinction in the analogy of "having perceptions without reconstructing them into a conscious language report" at the momentum end of the scale, and "any reconstruction of our perceptions into a conscious report" at the position end.



Hi spacer1, interesting topic!

Although I agree with kelsos (from the previous thread you cited above) concerning the need to bring in quantum uncertainty as a basis for our freedom of choice, I find the whole idea of finding analogical relationships between concepts in different areas of inquiry, as you have done in your HUP analogy both worthwhile (because they occasionally, as in the application of "entropy" to information theory, advance our understanding in previously obscure areas of inquiry (http://jchemed.chem.wisc.edu/Journal/Issues/1999/Oct/abs1385.html)) and interesting!

In your HUP analogy however, there can be varying degrees of certainty in measuring the position vs the momentum of a sub atomic particle in motion, whereas, one either has an experience or one doesn't. There are no varying degrees of having an experience. This may be the point at which the HUP analogy breaks down. (Or perhaps I'm just misunderstanding the analogy.)



This is sort of a wild guess, but it may be the cycling of the brain to produce the mind which acts like a film strip, with each cycle being one frame of film, or of reality. Therefore, while our perceptions are continuous, perhaps they are no more than continuous snapshots giving the impression of absolute continuity. All the while, reality actually is continuous and we miss what happens "between each frame", creating the problems of QM???? As I said, just a guess.



You are not alone in proposing a "frame-like" model of perception (http://community.gorge.net/neuro/Pages/02.html).



This, as with my OP, assumes that HUP is not an aspect of reality, but is a consequence of the way our minds perceive that reality.

HUP appears to be an inevitable limitation on the measurement of things that are sufficiently small.

[spacer1]

jpbrooks,

Thanks for your encouraging response.
In your HUP analogy however, there can be varying degrees of certainty in measuring the position vs the momentum of a sub atomic particle in motion, whereas, one either has an experience or one doesn't. There are no varying degrees of having an experience. This may be the point at which the HUP analogy breaks down. (Or perhaps I'm just misunderstanding the analogy.)
I think your misconception regarding the analogy is where you say: "one either has experience or one doesn't." At the momentum end, one has perceptions of the external world. At the position end, one makes conscious language reports of that experience. One cannot do both simultaneously. However, I imagine the process being something similar to breathing (although much faster), with the intake of sensory information and then the expelling of a best conscious explanation (conscious sense of one's surroundings) in each "frame", tying those perceptions together.
You are not alone in proposing a "frame-like" model of perception.
Thanks for the link!!
HUP appears to be an inevitable limitation on the measurement of things that are sufficiently small.
Yes, and since a measurement is a conscious fixing of some observation to a point in time, and assuming that that consciousness comes in discrete units, then discerning units on the very small scale amplifies such limitations of the mind.

On a further note to QM, with regards to wave-particle duality, I would equate waves with momentum and particles with position.

As an afterthought: The problem may just be that language is static and fixes some observation to a moment in time, which is at odds to the continuous flux of reality.

[jpbrooks]

Originally posted by spacer1
jpbrooks,

Thanks for your encouraging response.



You're welcome!



I think your misconception regarding the analogy is where you say: "one either has experience or one doesn't." At the momentum end, one has perceptions of the external world. At the position end, one makes conscious language reports of that experience. One cannot do both simultaneously. However, I imagine the process being something similar to breathing (although much faster), with the intake of sensory information and then the expelling of a best conscious explanation (conscious sense of one's surroundings) in each "frame", tying those perceptions together.



Well, the analogy to breathing appears to incur the same problem because one can only exclusively inhale or exhale. One cannot do both, in varying degrees, at the same time. Throughout the entire time that one is inhaling (or exhaling), the probability that one is exhaling (or inhaling) is zero. There is never a time when the probabilities of exhaling or inhaling are at a value between zero and 100%.



Thanks for the link!!



Sure, no problem.



Yes, and since a measurement is a conscious fixing of some observation to a point in time, and assuming that that consciousness comes in discrete units, then discerning units on the very small scale amplifies such limitations of the mind.

On a further note to QM, with regards to wave-particle duality, I would equate waves with momentum and particles with position.



Interesting! I hadn't really thought of viewing the HUP as being (possibly) part of a more general class of "Uncertainty Principles" that may apply, not only in the "macro world" within physics, but also in areas outside of physics altogether. (Gregory J. Chaitin, the discoverer of Algorithmic Information Theory, is also credited for discovering that Godelian Incompleteness was part of a more general and commonplace class of "phenomena" (www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/georgia.html). And what is true for Godelian Incompleteness might also be true for HUP. Perhaps [and this is pure speculation on my part] there is some kind of "hierarchy" of such "Uncertainty Principles" that are waiting to be discovered. Or, perhaps not. I don't know.)



As an afterthought: The problem may just be that language is static and fixes some observation to a moment in time, which is at odds to the continuous flux of reality.

Again, a good test for this analogy would be to show that position and momentum in HUP stand in the same relationship to one another as do experience and language. And, at this point, I just don't see how they do. But, again, perhaps I'm missing something.

I'll be back later.

[spacer1]

jpbrooks,
Well, the analogy to breathing appears to incur the same problem because one can only exclusively inhale or exhale. One cannot do both, in varying degrees, at the same time. Throughout the entire time that one is inhaling (or exhaling), the probability that one is exhaling (or inhaling) is zero. There is never a time when the probabilities of exhaling or inhaling are at a value between zero and 100%.
Perhaps I was mistaken in my OP, where, speaking of momentum and position, I said: "the better defined one is, the less we can know about the other in the same proportion." I cannot get my head around how these two could not be mutually exclusive, which, as you have pointed out, my analogy also claims. How could one partially know the position and partially know the momentum of a particle? Unless, of course the measurements of the two came in rapid alternating succession, as I have posited the mind as doing.

If you can imagine a conscious pen which draws a continuous straight line, and we say that the pen can remember a given "point" on that line, then we may say it can determine position. Alternatively, the pen could know its momentum as it writes, focusing on its future path, rather than keeping track of past (imaginary) points it has drawn. However, I cannot see how it could do both unless, perhaps, the pen's mind very quickly alternated between position and momentum, giving the impression of both "static" objects (or points) and constant motion.
Interesting! I hadn't really thought of viewing the HUP as being (possibly) part of a more general class of "Uncertainty Principles" that may apply, not only in the "macro world" within physics, but also in areas outside of physics altogether.
I'm not sure I understand you here. If the HUP is a consequence of the way our minds work, rather than applying to objects in the external world, then I guess, since it is an aspect of our minds, the HUP does apply to all fields involving thought and conscious reports.
And what is true for Godelian Incompleteness might also be true for HUP.
I had never considered this before, but my immediate reaction would be to notice the difference between the two. It appears that Godel's Incompleteness theory is more of a logical law, whereas, according to my hypothesis, HUP relates to the physical workings of the brain.
Again, a good test for this analogy would be to show that position and momentum in HUP stand in the same relationship to one another as do experience and language.
I await your response to my contention of mutual exclusivity of momentum and position.

[jpbrooks]

Hello spacer1!
Sorry for the delay in my response. It seems that my computer lab priviledges at UIC have been rescinded. I can now only use the computers in the campus libraries, which doesn't allow me much time to spend online when I'm away from home.

Originally posted by spacer1
jpbrooks,



Well, the analogy to breathing appears to incur the same problem because one can only exclusively inhale or exhale. One cannot do both, in varying degrees, at the same time. Throughout the entire time that one is inhaling (or exhaling), the probability that one is exhaling (or inhaling) is zero. There is never a time when the probabilities of exhaling or inhaling are at a value between zero and 100%.



Perhaps I was mistaken in my OP, where, speaking of momentum and position, I said: "the better defined one is, the less we can know about the other in the same proportion." I cannot get my head around how these two could not be mutually exclusive, which, as you have pointed out, my analogy also claims. How could one partially know the position and partially know the momentum of a particle? Unless, of course the measurements of the two came in rapid alternating succession, as I have posited the mind as doing.

If you can imagine a conscious pen which draws a continuous straight line, and we say that the pen can remember a given "point" on that line, then we may say it can determine position. Alternatively, the pen could know its momentum as it writes, focusing on its future path, rather than keeping track of past (imaginary) points it has drawn. However, I cannot see how it could do both unless, perhaps, the pen's mind very quickly alternated between position and momentum, giving the impression of both "static" objects (or points) and constant motion.



What you are suggesting seems true. It is certainly impossible for the conscious pen to focus its attention on the two different tasks you referred to at the same time. However, I'm not certain that the inability to focus our attention on more than one activity is what Heisenberg had in mind with regard to quantum uncertainty. (See the link in my comment below.)




Interesting! I hadn't really thought of viewing the HUP as being (possibly) part of a more general class of "Uncertainty Principles" that may apply, not only in the "macro world" within physics, but also in areas outside of physics altogether.



I'm not sure I understand you here. If the HUP is a consequence of the way our minds work, rather than applying to objects in the external world, then I guess, since it is an aspect of our minds, the HUP does apply to all fields involving thought and conscious reports.



Again, HUP may be an epistemological limitation rather than a psychological one. I haven't finished reading this article (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-uncertainty/) (located at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-uncertainty/ for your records), but it seems to address the issue that we have been discussing.




And what is true for Godelian Incompleteness might also be true for HUP.



I had never considered this before, but my immediate reaction would be to notice the difference between the two. It appears that Godel's Incompleteness theory is more of a logical law, whereas, according to my hypothesis, HUP relates to the physical workings of the brain.



Again, it seems (to me) that you have arrived at a kind of psychological analogy to the (epistemological) HUP,




Again, a good test for this analogy would be to show that position and momentum in HUP stand in the same relationship to one another as do experience and language.



I await your response to my contention of mutual exclusivity of momentum and position.

Again, I agree with you on the mutual (mental) exclusivity of momentum and position. But that kind of exclusivity doesn't seem to be what led to HUP.

(Sorry for the brevity of my responses. I have to run.)

[spacer1]

jpbrooks,
Sorry for the delay in my response. It seems that my computer lab priviledges at UIC have been rescinded. I can now only use the computers in the campus libraries, which doesn't allow me much time to spend online when I'm away from home.
I'm sorry to hear that. Hopefully, you can still find some time to continue this discussion.
However, I'm not certain that the inability to focus our attention on more than one activity is what Heisenberg had in mind with regard to quantum uncertainty.
Really? Even after reading the article, I came away with the impression that this was precisely the problem.
Again, HUP may be an epistemological limitation rather than a psychological one. I haven't finished reading this article (located at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-uncertainty/ for your records), but it seems to address the issue that we have been discussing.
Thanks again for the link! I was impressed last week when I came across a little section by Bohr, and this article reinforced my agreement with Bohr's thinking. These quotes from the article seem to support my hypothesis:
The most important example of complementary descriptions is provided by the measurements of the position and momentum of an object. If one wants to measure the position of the object relative to a given spatial frame of reference, the measuring instrument must be rigidly fixed to the bodies which define the frame of reference. But this implies the impossibility of investigating the exchange of momentum between the object and the instrument and we are cut off from obtaining any information about the momentum of the object. If, on the other hand, one wants to measure the momentum of an object the measuring instrument must be able to move relative to the spatial reference frame. Bohr here assumes that a momentum measurement involves the registration of the recoil of some movable part of the instrument and the use of the law of momentum conservation. The looseness of the part of the instrument with which the object interacts entails that the instrument cannot serve to accurately determine the position of the object. Since a measuring instrument cannot be rigidly fixed to the spatial reference frame and, at the same time, be movable relative to it, the experiments which serve to precisely determine the position and the momentum of an object are mutually exclusive. Of course, in itself, this is not at all typical for quantum mechanics. But, because the interaction between object and instrument during the measurement can neither be neglected nor determined the two measurements cannot be combined. This means that in the description of the object one must choose between the assignment of a precise position or of a precise momentum.

Similar considerations hold with respect to the measurement of time and energy. Just as the spatial coordinate system must be fixed by means of solid bodies so must the time coordinate be fixed by means of unperturbable, synchronised clocks. But it is precisely this requirement which prevents one from taking into account of the exchange of energy with the instrument if this is to serve its purpose. Conversely, any conclusion about the object based on the conservation of energy prevents following its development in time.
My conscious pen example seems to be in accordance with these views IMO.

It appears that physics has overcome the problem, as described in the section, The Minimalist Interpretation:
The operational meaning of these probability distributions is that they correspond to the distribution of the values obtained for these quantities in a long series of repetitions of the measurement. More precisely, one imagines a great number of copies of the system under consideration, all prepared in the same way. On each copy the momentum, say, is measured. Generally, the outcomes of these measurements differ and a distribution of outcomes is obtained. The theoretical momentum distribution derived from the quantum state is supposed to coincide with the hypothetical distribution of outcomes obtained in an infinite series of repetitions of the momentum measurement.
However, this does not eliminate the problem of the uncertainty relation, it merely builds up a probability distribution based on past empirical observations, which is much the same way as our minds work - we expect what is most probable, which is that which has mostly occurred in the past. My point here, is that the uncertainty relation holds for one observer and one experiment, and so still remains a problem, despite physics having overcome this problem via mathematical probabilities. As Heisenberg himself recognised earlier in the piece:
"the uncertainty relation does not hold for the past".

Apparently, when Heisenberg refers to the uncertainty or imprecision of a quantity, he means that the value of this quantity cannot be given beforehand. In the sequence of measurements we have considered above, the uncertainty in the momentum after the measurement of position has occurred, refers to the idea that the value in momentum is not fixed before the final momentum measurement takes place.
This is very similar to the comment I made on the other thread mentioned in my OP: "Perhaps it may be better to say we cannot come to know (learn) and express what we ultimately will learn ("at the end") simultaneously."
Again, it seems (to me) that you have arrived at a kind of psychological analogy to the (epistemological) HUP,
What distinction do you draw between "psychological" and "epistemological"?
Again, I agree with you on the mutual (mental) exclusivity of momentum and position. But that kind of exclusivity doesn't seem to be what led to HUP.
It may not be what led to it, but I still see my hypothesis as being valid, and perhaps being able to offer a more comprehensive understanding for QM.

[spacer1]

I came across this (http://www.general-semantics.org/Advanced/RPP_uncert.shtml) article, which I found interesting and which seems very relevant to this discussion:
We cannot abstract ourselves from the world. We form, together with it, an inseparable whole. There are no actors and spectators but a mixed crowd. The modern scientist must absolutely renounce the idea of a real objective world. What science does is to supply us with representative models capable of imitating regularities (or laws) which we observe, and to enable us to reason about them. The models constitute the physical representation of the world, such as defined by Planck. Physical models are as different from the world as a geographical map is from the surface of the earth.
There simply is no sense in asserting what would happen if we knew the present completely. We do not, and plainly we never can.
... contemporary science wishes to know phenomena and not things. It is in no way thing-conscious. A thing is merely an arrested phenomenon. {{My emphasis}}

[jpbrooks]

Originally posted by spacer1


jpbrooks,



Sorry for the delay in my response. It seems that my computer lab priviledges at UIC have been rescinded. I can now only use the computers in the campus libraries, which doesn't allow me much time to spend online when I'm away from home.




I'm sorry to hear that. Hopefully, you can still find some time to continue this discussion.



I'll certainly try to respond as promptly as possible, but I just can't guarantee very timely replies on my part.





However, I'm not certain that the inability to focus our attention on more than one activity is what Heisenberg had in mind with regard to quantum uncertainty.



Really? Even after reading the article, I came away with the impression that this was precisely the problem.



Ok, let's examine the issue more in detail.




Again, HUP may be an epistemological limitation rather than a psychological one. I haven't finished reading this article (located at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-uncertainty/ for your records), but it seems to address the issue that we have been discussing.



Thanks again for the link!



You're welcome!



I was impressed last week when I came across a little section by Bohr, and this article reinforced my agreement with Bohr's thinking. These quotes from the article seem to support my hypothesis:




The most important example of complementary descriptions is provided by the measurements of the position and momentum of an object. If one wants to measure the position of the object relative to a given spatial frame of reference, the measuring instrument must be rigidly fixed to the bodies which define the frame of reference. But this implies the impossibility of investigating the exchange of momentum between the object and the instrument and we are cut off from obtaining any information about the momentum of the object. If, on the other hand, one wants to measure the momentum of an object the measuring instrument must be able to move relative to the spatial reference frame. Bohr here assumes that a momentum measurement involves the registration of the recoil of some movable part of the instrument and the use of the law of momentum conservation. The looseness of the part of the instrument with which the object interacts entails that the instrument cannot serve to accurately determine the position of the object. Since a measuring instrument cannot be rigidly fixed to the spatial reference frame and, at the same time, be movable relative to it, the experiments which serve to precisely determine the position and the momentum of an object are mutually exclusive. Of course, in itself, this is not at all typical for quantum mechanics. But, because the interaction between object and instrument during the measurement can neither be neglected nor determined the two measurements cannot be combined. This means that in the description of the object one must choose between the assignment of a precise position or of a precise momentum.
Similar considerations hold with respect to the measurement of time and energy. Just as the spatial coordinate system must be fixed by means of solid bodies so must the time coordinate be fixed by means of unperturbable, synchronised clocks. But it is precisely this requirement which prevents one from taking into account of the exchange of energy with the instrument if this is to serve its purpose. Conversely, any conclusion about the object based on the conservation of energy prevents following its development in time.




But this section seems to suggest that the inability to ascertain, precisely, the position and momentum of a particle is an actual limitation on measurement in the real world and not simply a "quirk" that exists only in the mind. However, I do realize that this is only one interpretation of quantum uncertainty.



My conscious pen example seems to be in accordance with these views IMO.



The conscious pen example combines the conscious observer, the thing being measured, and the unconscious measuring/recording instruments into one "device". But this "holistic" viewpoint represents only one interpretation of the quantum situation. Under this (quite popular) interpretation, I would be inclined to agree that quantum uncertainty is "psychologically based".



It appears that physics has overcome the problem, as described in the section, The Minimalist Interpretation:



The operational meaning of these probability distributions is that they correspond to the distribution of the values obtained for these quantities in a long series of repetitions of the measurement. More precisely, one imagines a great number of copies of the system under consideration, all prepared in the same way. On each copy the momentum, say, is measured. Generally, the outcomes of these measurements differ and a distribution of outcomes is obtained. The theoretical momentum distribution derived from the quantum state is supposed to coincide with the hypothetical distribution of outcomes obtained in an infinite series of repetitions of the momentum measurement.



However, this does not eliminate the problem of the uncertainty relation, it merely builds up a probability distribution based on past empirical observations, which is much the same way as our minds work - we expect what is most probable, which is that which has mostly occurred in the past. My point here, is that the uncertainty relation holds for one observer and one experiment, and so still remains a problem, despite physics having overcome this problem via mathematical probabilities. As Heisenberg himself recognised earlier in the piece:



Precisely! Probability comes into consideration, within the context of QM, because we are dealing with measurement. In your analogies to HUP, there is, to my knowledge (please correct me if I am wrong), nothing that corresponds to the obtaining of quantitative values from the measurement of physical phenomena. So again, the analogy doesn't appear to be exact.




"the uncertainty relation does not hold for the past".



Apparently, when Heisenberg refers to the uncertainty or imprecision of a quantity, he means that the value of this quantity cannot be given beforehand. In the sequence of measurements we have considered above, the uncertainty in the momentum after the measurement of position has occurred, refers to the idea that the value in momentum is not fixed before the final momentum measurement takes place.

This is very similar to the comment I made on the other thread mentioned in my OP: "Perhaps it may be better to say we cannot come to know (learn) and express what we ultimately will learn ("at the end") simultaneously."



Assuming that your interpretation of Heisenberg (above) is correct, I will agree with you on this point




Again, it seems (to me) that you have arrived at a kind of psychological analogy to the (epistemological) HUP,



What distinction do you draw between "psychological" and "epistemological"?



I stand corrected on the issue of terminology. in my efforts to be concise, most often due to time constraints, I am frequently sloppy in my use of terms.
The point that I was attempting to convey (in "shorthand" language) was that HUP involves the observation of physical phenomena in the world outside the observer, while your analogy involved "observations" about an "observer's" own internal experiences.




Again, I agree with you on the mutual (mental) exclusivity of momentum and position. But that kind of exclusivity doesn't seem to be what led to HUP.



It may not be what led to it, but I still see my hypothesis as being valid, and perhaps being able to offer a more comprehensive understanding for QM.



Yes, but again, only on the assumption that the analogy is exact, which still needs to be established.

[jpbrooks]

Originally posted by spacer1


I came across this article, which I found interesting and which seems very relevant to this discussion:



We cannot abstract ourselves from the world. We form, together with it, an inseparable whole. There are no actors and spectators but a mixed crowd. The modern scientist must absolutely renounce the idea of a real objective world. What science does is to supply us with representative models capable of imitating regularities (or laws) which we observe, and to enable us to reason about them. The models constitute the physical representation of the world, such as defined by Planck. Physical models are as different from the world as a geographical map is from the surface of the earth.




(As a side note) I agree that this viewpoint is one that should not be ignored, but that is precisely the way I feel about the opposing viewpoint. How could scientific inquiry proceed on the assumption that there is no real distinction between an observer and what that observer observes?




There simply is no sense in asserting what would happen if we knew the present completely. We do not, and plainly we never can.



... contemporary science wishes to know phenomena and not things. It is in no way thing-conscious. A thing is merely an arrested phenomenon. {{My emphasis}}



I'm assuming that "phenomena" and "things" are analogous to "position" and "momentum" (though not necessarily in that order) in HUP.
But here again, it is difficult to see how what is analogous to probability and measurement in physics would come into play in the phenomena/thing analogy.

I'll be back later.

[spacer1]

jpbrooks,
I'll certainly try to respond as promptly as possible, but I just can't guarantee very timely replies on my part.
No problem.
But this section seems to suggest that the inability to ascertain, precisely, the position and momentum of a particle is an actual limitation on measurement in the real world and not simply a "quirk" that exists only in the mind.
My hypothesis is, of course, only tentative. However, I would respond, here, by saying that it requires a mind to make a measurement.
The conscious pen example combines the conscious observer, the thing being measured, and the unconscious measuring/recording instruments into one "device". But this "holistic" viewpoint represents only one interpretation of the quantum situation.
Since a mind is required to make a measurement, and given the well-documented (non-extricable) relationship between the observer and the observed, it seems a valuable viewpoint. It is akin to studying how the eye works from the third-person perspective (but this assumes that HUP is more mind-related than external reality-related, or that my hypothesis is true). Regardless, I do not see how you could consider the problem non-holistically. If we substitute "person" for "pen" into your analysis above, we can see that my example combines the conscious observer (the consciousness/ego), the thing being measured (external reality), and the unconscious measuring /recording instruments (ultimately, one's perceptions of reality, including readings, and the setting, of measuring devices). These all seem to be necessary components of any measurement.
Precisely! Probability comes into consideration, within the context of QM, because we are dealing with measurement.
Why should probability come into consideration because of measurement? I thought the probability was used to predict momentum while positional measurements were being made.
In your analogies to HUP, there is, to my knowledge (please correct me if I am wrong), nothing that corresponds to the obtaining of quantitative values from the measurement of physical phenomena. So again, the analogy doesn't appear to be exact.
In my analogy to HUP, what corresponds to the obtaining of quantitative values is the entire "position" end of the HUP spectrum. To make a conscious statement that this is how something is lies at the position end, while to follow the change of the world, as it changes, is to focus one's attention toward the "momentum" end of the spectrum.
Assuming that your interpretation of Heisenberg (above) is correct, I will agree with you on this point
I am not sure what you mean by "my" interpretation of Heisenberg (above), especially given your quote of the passage was not presented the same as my original, falsely attributing the first paragraph under the quoted sentence to me. It was not my interpretation (if it is this "interpretation" you are speaking of, rather than my general hypothesis).

[spacer1]

jpbrooks,
(As a side note) I agree that this viewpoint is one that should not be ignored, but that is precisely the way I feel about the opposing viewpoint.
I'm not sure that I understand what you mean by "this viewpoint" or the "opposing viewpoint".
How could scientific inquiry proceed on the assumption that there is no real distinction between an observer and what that observer observes?
I agree. If you are suggesting that this lack of distinction is an implication of my hypothesis, then I haven't explained it properly. To bring the HUP from a feature of reality itself, to being a limitation of the human observation of that reality, is not to say that reality is dependent upon the mental. To say that we cannot know the position and momentum of an electron simultaneously need not imply that it is a feature of the matter itself. This lack of knowledge could be a feature of the matter itself, or it could be a result of our perceptions of that matter. The more parsimonious explanation, in my view, would be that HUP is a feature of our perceptions of that matter, since this allows us to maintain classical physics (I assume?), and because it just seems more intuitively obvious that our fallible perceptions explain these results, rather than that physical matter itself acts differently on the very small scale. I can't imagine that the orbits of the planets could be, or ever have been, altered by quantum effects.
I'm assuming that "phenomena" and "things" are analogous to "position" and "momentum" (though not necessarily in that order) in HUP.
Yes (and not in that order).
But here again, it is difficult to see how what is analogous to probability and measurement in physics would come into play in the phenomena/thing analogy.
Well, as I've mentioned, a measurement would be equivalent to a thing. Consciousness arrests the phenomena to a moment in time and says it is this. As for probability, it is not a part of my hypothesis, and I don't see that it is necessary part of HUP. Although quantum physics deals largely in probabilities, I assumed this was a consequence of HUP, rather than some intrisic part of HUP. We cannot simultaneously know both the momentum and position. This says nothing of probabilities. However, I would concede that both are only limits, neither of which could ever be ascertained in actuality.

I feel that this quote from my last post might help explain my position:
There simply is no sense in asserting what would happen if we knew the present completely. We do not, and plainly we never can.
I think we could imagine the state of "pure position" would be one without time. Like a snapshot of reality at any given time, we could then go on to describe in fine detail every aspect of this snapshot in conscious language reports. These reports, however, would be tied to one point in time, and so not every detail would be applicable to other times - even the best current explanations will be surpassed.

At the "pure momentum" end, there would be no (need for) memory of past events, only the experience of the continual present moment. One does not need to make conscious language reports, so one does not need to formulate one's experiences into models of reality via language.

[ZikZak]

Spacer1,

I think your assertion that:
The more precisely the experience is reported, the less we know of the experience we are having while we are reporting. And, conversely, the more aware we are of the experience we are having, the less able we are to describe that experience.
is very zen. :)

Your analogy of language/object to position/momentum is intriguing, and I'm also interested in your comparison of QM probabilities to heuristics and probabalistic ways of thinking. I'll have to think about it some more, but I can also see a lot of misconceptions about QM in this thread. I'd warn you in advance that my interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is generally, "shut up and calculate!"

First, the HUP is not a statement of incomplete knowledge. In other words, the point is not that position (x) and momentum (p) actually exist simultaneously but that it is impossible to know them both, but rather that particles actually have neither distinct positions nor momenta. What they have instead is a "wave function," a something which isn't akin to anything whatsoever within our common experience. Choosing to observe x or p is a bit like choosing the angle at which you are going to look at a Volkswagon. You can never see the steering wheel and the fuel tank of the Volkswagon simultaneously. Similarly, when a particle is observed, we see different "perspectives" (we call them "projections") of the wave function, depending on whether we are detecting its position, momentum, or some combination thereof. The difference is that when we look at a Volkswagon's steering wheel, the car doesn't change. But when we observe a wave function, the wavefunction becomes its perspective. The Volkswagon becomes the steering wheel... and then changes like a wave back into a Buick when we aren't looking.

Not only are distinct, independent, omnipresent (but unmeasureable) values of x and p not necessary to the theory of QM (and thus eliminated by Occam's Razor), there is significant mounting evidence that such "hidden variables" actually do not exist. See, for example, this article. (http://christ21.info/pdf/1999-epr-and-hidden-variables.pdf) There are some indications that these experiments may contain errors and need to be improved, but every experiment since then has obtained similar results. I believe the results are correct with about 85% confidence.

Second, it's somewhat unfortuante that the events we correlate with the collapse of the wavefunction are called "observations" (language is vague, you see :) ). The word "observation" implies the involvement of a concious agent, but none is necessary. A better word would be "interactions," and that's the word i use in my class. Between interactions, the particle travels like a wave, but when it interacts, it does so as a particle. So QM says that "particles" are waves when they are all alone, but particles when they interact with others.

I probably have more to say.... but must go teach this stuff to impressionable students now.

[John Page]

Originally posted by jpbrooks
Well, the analogy to breathing appears to incur the same problem because one can only exclusively inhale or exhale. One cannot do both, in varying degrees, at the same time.
Hi JP!

...then how do Australian aboriginies play the didgeridoo? See here especially section 7 on circular breathing. (http://aboriginalart.com.au/didgeridoo/dig_background.html)

Cheers, John

[spacer1]

ZikZak,
I think your assertion is very zen. :)
I'd never thought about it before, but now that you mention it, I do recognize the similarity.
...the point is not that position (x) and momentum (p) actually exist simultaneously but that it is impossible to know them both, but rather that particles actually have neither distinct positions nor momenta. What they have instead is a "wave function," a something which isn't akin to anything whatsoever within our common experience.
I was under the (possibly mistaken) impression that the wave function was a probability distribution of the particle's position when making measurements of momentum, or vice versa. Additionally, I assumed that such a probability distribution was used because we could not observe both measurements simultaneously. If this is the case, I have already spoken about the relationship of probabilities to HUP, quoting from the article posted by jpbrooks earlier in the thread (and the first quoted sentence is by Heisenberg himself):
"the uncertainty relation does not hold for the past".

Apparently, when Heisenberg refers to the uncertainty or imprecision of a quantity, he means that the value of this quantity cannot be given beforehand. In the sequence of measurements we have considered above, the uncertainty in the momentum after the measurement of position has occurred, refers to the idea that the value in momentum is not fixed before the final momentum measurement takes place.
If HUP does not hold for the past then the use of probabilities cannot resolve it, but seems a logical consequence of it.
Not only are distinct, independent, omnipresent (but unmeasureable) values of x and p not necessary to the theory of QM (and thus eliminated by Occam's Razor), there is significant mounting evidence that such "hidden variables" actually do not exist.
I mentioned earlier in the thread that I believed that pure momentum and position were only limits, neither of which could be attained in actuality. However, I am somewhat confused by your referring to them as "hidden variables", since I thought hidden variables referred to unknown causes for a particle's movements?

When you say that values of position and momentum could be eliminated by Occam's Razor, this also surprises me since it seems intuitively obvious that a particle must have some definite position in space at some point in time, otherwise just what are we measuring? However, I could agree to it insofar as it is in accordance with another quote I mentioned earlier in the piece:
A thing is merely an arrested phenomenon.
See, for example, this article.
Given that Bell's Inequality rests on probabilities, I'm not sure how closely this relates to HUP and my analogy in general, for the reasons on probability and HUP given above.
The word "observation" implies the involvement of a concious agent, but none is necessary. A better word would be "interactions," and that's the word i use in my class. Between interactions, the particle travels like a wave, but when it interacts, it does so as a particle.
Could you describe how you differentiate between wave-like and particle-like behaviour? Would "interactions" involve a noticeable change in the properties of the objects (particles) involved?

[ZikZak]

Originally posted by spacer1

I was under the (possibly mistaken) impression that the wave function was a probability distribution of the particle's position when making measurements of momentum, or vice versa.

The wave function exists between measurements as well as when measurements are being made. Otherwise, yes, one projection of the wave function would be the probability distribution of the particle's position. (this particular projection is often called The wave function in elementary texts and the popular press.) Another projection would be the probability distribution of the particle's momentum. For each observable quantity (such as position, momentum, energy, angular momentum, etc.) there exists a projection of the wave function giving the probability distribution.

Additionally, I assumed that such a probability distribution was used because we could not observe both measurements simultaneously.

Not quite; it's actually the other way around. We cannot observe x and p simultaneously because of the way the probability distributions are related. (in other words, today when we derive QM, we do not start with Heisenberg's Uncertainty as the fundamental relationship; it arises from the equations naturally.)

If you measure a particle's position, then the probability distribution of position (which could have originally been just about anything) suddenly becomes zero everywhere you didn't measure the particle, and extremely large in the small region where you did measure the particle. But "collapsing the wave function" like this is a little bit like squishing a blob of jello. If you squish one projection (like the position distribution) into a tiny space like that, the other projections tend to squirt outwards. In this case, the momentum projection "squishes out" so that nearly any momentum is equally probable.

I mentioned earlier in the thread that I believed that pure momentum and position were only limits, neither of which could be attained in actuality. However, I am somewhat confused by your referring to them as "hidden variables", since I thought hidden variables referred to unknown causes for a particle's movements?

In this context, "hidden variable" theories would say that the particle actually has definite x and p at the same time, but we are technologically unable to measure them both simultaneously. They would also say that the wavefunction is a representation not of the actual physics but of our inability to determine all the hidden (but extant) values. The evidence seems to suggest that these hidden variables do not exist, and that the wavefunction is all there is.

When you say that values of position and momentum could be eliminated by Occam's Razor, this also surprises me since it seems intuitively obvious that a particle must have some definite position in space at some point in time, otherwise just what are we measuring?

Unfortunately, QM is anything but intuitively obvious. I studied it for years and didn't understand it until late in graduate school. Most students never really get a grip on it. The human brain, I think, was just never designed to understand something so bizarre. There are interesting proposals that seriously suggest that QM is not even logical. In this case, "a particle must have some definite position in space at some point in time" would be interpreted in QM as simply saying that the wavefunction takes on a certain form (zero everywhere except where the particle is measured--- called a "delta function") at that point in time.

Could you describe how you differentiate between wave-like and particle-like behaviour? Would "interactions" involve a noticeable change in the properties of the objects (particles) involved?

At times like the above, when the wavefunction is a delta function or close to it, the behavior is that of a particle. When the particle intracts with other particles, they normally tend to become delta functions and have definite position. But constant interactions are required to maintain the shape of the delta function, because as time goes on, the deltas are unstable and tend to "spread out" until the particle loses its "sense of definite position" and becomes a wave. So when particles are interacting, they're localized in a particular location--- particles. When they stop interacting, their wave functions spread out and they become delocalized and travel like waves.

[spacer1]

ZikZak,
The wave function exists between measurements as well as when measurements are being made.
Would you say that time (or motion) is continuous, even at the quantum level?
Another projection would be the probability distribution of the particle's momentum.
Hence my "or vice versa."
We cannot observe x and p simultaneously because of the way the probability distributions are related.
How are the probability distributions related? I would guess an orthogonal/perpendicular relationship, since position only requires one measurement at one point in time, whereas momentum requires (at least) two measurements at two points in time.
(in other words, today when we derive QM, we do not start with Heisenberg's Uncertainty as the fundamental relationship; it arises from the equations naturally.)
So HUP remains a fundamental relationship, regardless of whether you account for it in the equations or not? This seems at odds to your suggestion that we could disregard x and p via Occam's Razor.

However, I understand your main point is that (the evidence suggests that) the limitations imposed by HUP are inherent in matter itself, rather than being merely a limitation of our knowledge regarding that matter.
But "collapsing the wave function" like this is a little bit like squishing a blob of jello. If you squish one projection (like the position distribution) into a tiny space like that, the other projections tend to squirt outwards. In this case, the momentum projection "squishes out" so that nearly any momentum is equally probable.
This is HUP in action, and a restatment of "we cannot simultaneously know both the momentum and position of an electron, and that the better defined one is, the less we can know about the other in the same proportion" from my OP. I also read somewhere once that getting a definite value for x or p is impossible because spacetime itself would be warped by the infinite value of the opposite (x or p) measurement?
In this context, "hidden variable" theories would say that the particle actually has definite x and p at the same time, but we are technologically unable to measure them both simultaneously.
How can you have a definite measurement of p at one point in time? Wouldn't a determination of momentum require (at least) two measurements? At a single moment of time, momentum doesn't exist, does it? Or, perhaps it just isn't knowable?
There are interesting proposals that seriously suggest that QM is not even logical.
Given what definition of "logical"?
In this case, "a particle must have some definite position in space at some point in time" would be interpreted in QM as simply saying that the wavefunction takes on a certain form (zero everywhere except where the particle is measured--- called a "delta function") at that point in time.
I still think the point I raised remains valid. To perform the experiment, one must be pointing their sensors at some point in space at some point in time to measure some thing(s). Regardless of the properties of those things, there is still something we are measuring, somewhere, at some time.
...when the wavefunction is a delta function or close to it, the behavior is that of a particle. When the particle intracts with other particles, they normally tend to become delta functions and have definite position. But constant interactions are required to maintain the shape of the delta function, because as time goes on, the deltas are unstable and tend to "spread out" until the particle loses its "sense of definite position" and becomes a wave. So when particles are interacting, they're localized in a particular location--- particles. When they stop interacting, their wave functions spread out and they become delocalized and travel like waves.
Thanks for the clarification. I'll have to give this further thought.

[ZikZak]

Originally posted by spacer1
ZikZak,

Would you say that time (or motion) is continuous, even at the quantum level?

It's treated as such in standard QM. Expectations are that when/if a theory of quantum gravity is formulated, it will treat space and time as "grainy."

How are the probability distributions related? I would guess an orthogonal/perpendicular relationship, since position only requires one measurement at one point in time, whereas momentum requires (at least) two measurements at two points in time.

The momentum probability distribution is the Fourier Transform of the position distribution. (sorry, but you asked!) It's really the properties of the Fourier Transform which prevent both x and p from being precicely measured simultaneously.

So HUP remains a fundamental relationship, regardless of whether you account for it in the equations or not? This seems at odds to your suggestion that we could disregard x and p via Occam's Razor.

I mean to say that the way quantum is derived today, the HUP arises naturally from the equations and not as an assumption that initially goes into the equations. Why is this at odds with disregard of hidden variables?

However, I understand your main point is that (the evidence suggests that) the limitations imposed by HUP are inherent in matter itself, rather than being merely a limitation of our knowledge regarding that matter.

Right, exactly.

This is HUP in action, and a restatment of "we cannot simultaneously know both the momentum and position of an electron, and that the better defined one is, the less we can know about the other in the same proportion" from my OP. I also read somewhere once that getting a definite value for x or p is impossible because spacetime itself would be warped by the infinite value of the opposite (x or p) measurement?

Right, I'm certainly not arguing against the validity of HUP, rather that the HUP is not a statement about our lack of knowledge and is a statement about actual, physical reality.

In reference to your second point, I'd merely say that it's impossible to make an exact measurement of any quantity becauase all experiements involve measurement uncertainty, and even if they didn't, you'd have nowhere to write down an infinitely precise result.

I wouldn't agree or disagree with your statement, because the interaction of QM and spacetime is almost completely unknown.

How can you have a definite measurement of p at one point in time? Wouldn't a determination of momentum require (at least) two measurements? At a single moment of time, momentum doesn't exist, does it? Or, perhaps it just isn't knowable?

Allow the particle whose p you wish to measure to be absorbed by another massive particle, then measure the momentum/energy transferred to the second particle in whatever way you like. This is a measurent of the momentum/energy of the first partcle at the, um, "moment of impact."

Given what definition of "logical"?

Perhaps I should be more precise and say "not amenible to deductive reasoning." Basically Bell's inequality requires you to make a choice between discarding hidden variables (making QM a non-local theory--- and physicists hate nonlocal theories) or discarding the deductive reasoning on which the inequality is based.

I still think the point I raised remains valid. To perform the experiment, one must be pointing their sensors at some point in space at some point in time to measure some thing(s). Regardless of the properties of those things, there is still something we are measuring, somewhere, at some time.

OK, I'll agree with that.

[spacer1]

ZikZak,
Expectations are that when/if a theory of quantum gravity is formulated, it will treat space and time as "grainy."
So, spacetime would be considered matter in itself, rather than merely a receptacle for matter?

I know that space and time are inseparable, but this would seem to apply more to the "space"/matter aspect than the "time"/motion (of that matter) aspect, wouldn't you say?

A bad analogy might be how we perceive water as being "grainy" whereas a fish might not?
The momentum probability distribution is the Fourier Transform of the position distribution. (sorry, but you asked!) It's really the properties of the Fourier Transform which prevent both x and p from being precicely measured simultaneously.
Thanks. I'll look into it.
spacer1: So HUP remains a fundamental relationship, regardless of whether you account for it in the equations or not? This seems at odds to your suggestion that we could disregard x and p via Occam's Razor.
ZikZak: Why is this at odds with disregard of hidden variables?
My idea was that if HUP is evidenced to hold, and HUP deals with position and momentum, then position and momentum would appear to be factually corresponding concepts which we cannot disregard.

However, I now realize [since you spoke of "hidden variables" (and after re-reading your previous posts)] that you meant precise measurements of x and p, rather than disregarding x and p altogether.

Additionally, are precise measurements of x and p (and whatever other concepts are measured) the only "hidden variables", or does this also encompass other unknown factors for which we do not yet have concepts?
In reference to your second point, I'd merely say that it's impossible to make an exact measurement of any quantity becauase all experiements involve measurement uncertainty...
Might this uncertainty factor be enough to make up for the 10% (?) difference highlighted by Bell's Inequality? (Sorry if this doesn't make much sense, but I haven't quite grasped the significance of Bell's Inequality. I'll have to re-read your link again.)
Allow the particle whose p you wish to measure to be absorbed by another massive particle, then measure the momentum/energy transferred to the second particle in whatever way you like. This is a measurent of the momentum/energy of the first partcle at the, um, "moment of impact."
Wouldn't you first have to know the properties of the particle you are measuring so you could know how much energy it has gained or lost at impact, perhaps by making a positional measurement on the particle beforehand? If so, it seems you still need to make two measurements to determine momentum.
Perhaps I should be more precise and say "not amenible to deductive reasoning." Basically Bell's inequality requires you to make a choice between discarding hidden variables (making QM a non-local theory--- and physicists hate nonlocal theories) or discarding the deductive reasoning on which the inequality is based.
There have been other instances of faulty deductive reasoning. I don't see why we need to rid ourselves of all deductive reasoning simply based on one instance where all the pieces don't seem to fit.
spacer1: Regardless of the properties of those things, there is still something we are measuring, somewhere, at some time.
ZikZak: OK, I'll agree with that.
The quote from the above was made under the impression that as a wave, matter has no definite form. However, aren't we measuring things with definite form, in order for us to be able to sense these things (even with the aid of technology)?
(I know I'm probably way off base here, so feel free not to respond to this last point if you wish.)

[ZikZak]

Originally posted by spacer1
ZikZak,

So, spacetime would be considered matter in itself, rather than merely a receptacle for matter?

Not exactly, i.e. spacetime isn't a form of matter, but it does have some properties of its own akin to properties of matter such as shape, curvature, motion, and elasticity.

A bad analogy might be how we perceive water as being "grainy" whereas a fish might not?

Wow... your water is perceptibly grainy? Sounds nasty. :)

If spacetime is grainy, it's grainy on scales much smaller than even the scales of protons and electrons. "Grainy" in this context meaning not-exactly-continuous--- you can be in spacetime position A or in its neighbor B but not "in between" them, since there would be no in between.

However, I now realize [since you spoke of "hidden variables" (and after re-reading your previous posts)] that you meant precise measurements of x and p, rather than disregarding x and p altogether.

Right.

Additionally, are precise measurements of x and p (and whatever other concepts are measured) the only "hidden variables", or does this also encompass other unknown factors for which we do not yet have concepts?

x and p are the archetypical examples, but the same kinds of things could be said for energy, interaction time, angular momentum, spin, etc.

Wouldn't you first have to know the properties of the particle you are measuring so you could know how much energy it has gained or lost at impact, perhaps by making a positional measurement on the particle beforehand? If so, it seems you still need to make two measurements to determine momentum.

Not if the original particle is absorbed during the collision, such as when a photon is absorbed by an atom, for instance. Indeed, even measuring the color (wavelength) of a photon independently of a collision is a direct measure of its energy and momentum.

There have been other instances of faulty deductive reasoning. I don't see why we need to rid ourselves of all deductive reasoning simply based on one instance where all the pieces don't seem to fit.

True, but the only assumptions known to go into the EPR experiment for Bell's inequality is that quantum mechanics makes accurate predictions (verified innumerable times via experiment) and that physics is local (a philosophically nice bit of metaphysics). Since Bell's inequality is violated, either one of these assumptions must be incorrect or the deductive reasoning leading to the inequality is invalid. The actual deductions involved are relatively simple, so the fault almost certainly does not lie in the reasoning itself.

I'm not actually arguing for this point, merely pointing out that there are those who do. Locality is precious to many physicists (Einstein called the EPR paradox "spooky action at a distance"), so much so that some are willing to propose that QM violates deductive logic rather than give it up.

The quote from the above was made under the impression that as a wave, matter has no definite form. However, aren't we measuring things with definite form, in order for us to be able to sense these things (even with the aid of technology)?
(I know I'm probably way off base here, so feel free not to respond to this last point if you wish.)

It depends on what you mean by "definite form." We don't generally look at atoms through microscopes, and when we do, they appear very fuzzy. You would almost certainly never see the "form" of an electron or proton. At those small scales, generally what we do see are exchanges of energy rather than "physical form."

In fact, I'd argue that an electron has no well defined "physical form." Occasionally it is well-localized (like when it hits a detector, or is trapped in a computer chip), but even then I'm not sure that constitutes "form."

[boneyard bill]

Spacer1 writes:

However, for the non-reductivists to even make such a claim (in language) suggests that both themselves and their opponents understand what is meant by a first-person experience. It isn't the case that all we can know about each other's experience is what can be put into words. The first-person experience is known by both reductivists and non-reductivists alike, before the argument even starts.

I think this paragraph makes your point sufficiently well without bringing in Heisenberg. As far as I can see, you are using the uncertainty principle here in an analogical, not a literal, sense. In that case you can get along quite well without it. I think you would be better off elaborating your point without reference to the uncertainty principle. It seems like more of a distraction than anything else.



What would be required for a complete reduction in the case of a first-person experience? Since language deals in shared concepts, a complete reduction in any other case seems possible, because we can mostly agree to the strongest argument of the day. However, since our first-person experience deals precisely in that which we do not and cannot share, such a reduction is not possible.

Is there anything in this that refutes the non-reductivist position? That seems to be your objective here, but I don't see how it is achieved.

[spacer1]

ZikZak,
Not exactly, i.e. spacetime isn't a form of matter, but it does have some properties of its own akin to properties of matter such as shape, curvature, motion, and elasticity.
Okay.
Wow... your water is perceptibly grainy? Sounds nasty.
Well, I did say it was a bad analogy. :)
If spacetime is grainy, it's grainy on scales much smaller than even the scales of protons and electrons. "Grainy" in this context meaning not-exactly-continuous--- you can be in spacetime position A or in its neighbor B but not "in between" them, since there would be no in between.
So, there would be some "smallest" unit, or building block, of spacetime, which in this case would be that designated by position A or B?
x and p are the archetypical examples, but the same kinds of things could be said for energy, interaction time, angular momentum, spin, etc.
Which ones stand in relation to each other in the same way as x and p? I know energy and time do, but is "interaction time" the same thing? Does spin have such an "opposite"?
Not if the original particle is absorbed during the collision, such as when a photon is absorbed by an atom, for instance. Indeed, even measuring the color (wavelength) of a photon independently of a collision is a direct measure of its energy and momentum.
Do you need any sort of foreknowledge in order to determine momentum? I assume you do not for position?
Since Bell's inequality is violated, either one of these assumptions must be incorrect or the deductive reasoning leading to the inequality is invalid. The actual deductions involved are relatively simple, so the fault almost certainly does not lie in the reasoning itself.
Some comments after re-reading the article:
It seems that opposite spins is virtually a given? It is, after all, presupposed for the EPR experiment. I don't know how worthy this observation may be, but I noticed that if you already account for opposite spins, then Bell's inequality vanishes (i.e. the probabilities return to 50%), but I suppose this is merely taking entanglement for granted? The same can be said for the three-axis measurements where, if you disregard the top and bottom rows of the table (in the article) in which all the spins measured at A are up and at B are down (and vice versa), you again get a result of 50%. However, again, I feel like I'm only highlighting Bell's Inequality, for how can the two particles interact to let the other "know" to have the opposite spin? But then, why should we assume that they do interact at all? Couldn't they just have the opposite spin due to the nature of matter or space or magnetic fields, or something?

Additional comments after re-re-reading the article:
Firstly, as per EPR, you cannot measure the x and p of a single particle, so they ingeniously attempt to create entangled particles (with opposite spins) so as to determine both properties from two separate measurements. Bell goes on to claim that the number of possible outcomes with entanglement differs from that with no entanglement, but how does this relate to EPR, which presupposes entanglement? If you accept entanglement as axiomatic, then there is no possible situation of having the theoretical category of "independent particles". It isn't a possible outcome, so the possible number of combinations is only ever 30, not 36 (as per the article example). "6 combinations possible if two independent particles (non-entangled) are measured cannot occur anymore." If you have to send out entangled particles in order to determine both properties, then these six combinations (and "independent particles") weren't possible to begin with.
I'm not actually arguing for this point, merely pointing out that there are those who do.
When I read back over your comments that I had posted to here, I realized that my response was somewhat misplaced.
Locality is precious to many physicists (Einstein called the EPR paradox "spooky action at a distance"), so much so that some are willing to propose that QM violates deductive logic rather than give it up.
Just to clarify, non-locality refers to "action" at super-luminal velocities?
At those small scales, generally what we do see are exchanges of energy rather than "physical form."
I realized that that was probably the case after I had posted.

[spacer1]

boneyard bill,
I think this paragraph makes your point sufficiently well without bringing in Heisenberg.
I think that I originally took the idea from HUP, and I think that the "fuzziness" at the edges of each make it a suitable analogy. For example, at the position/reports of experience end, we cannot make a full description of our experience at any moment in time given that we have momentum.
As far as I can see, you are using the uncertainty principle here in an analogical, not a literal, sense.
Yes, it is only an analogy, as I stated in the OP.
Is there anything in this that refutes the non-reductivist position? That seems to be your objective here, but I don't see how it is achieved.
I guess that if there was a question to the non-reductionists implicit in my comments, it would be: What would you consider to be a suitable total reduction of your experience into language? You may answer that it cannot be done, and that's why you are a non-reductionist, but I don't think reductionists expect it to be able to be done, either, since the only reduction which would satisfy you would be the experience itself. However, what I understand by the term "reduction", in this instance, is merely a third-person report, which is all I believe the reductionists believe they can gain (or offer).

[boneyard bill]

Spacer1 writes:

I guess that if there was a question to the non-reductionists implicit in my comments, it would be: What would you consider to be a suitable total reduction of your experience into language? You may answer that it cannot be done, and that's why you are a non-reductionist, but I don't think reductionists expect it to be able to be done, either, since the only reduction which would satisfy you would be the experience itself. However, what I understand by the term "reduction", in this instance, is merely a third-person report, which is all I believe the reductionists believe they can gain (or offer).

If I understand your point correctly, you are claiming that conscious experience cannot be reduced to language. But you are also claiming that that does not make the non-reductive position true because the problem lies in the deficiencies of language and not in any conceptual or evidentiary problems with the reductive approach.

But I think this evades the issue. Why is a reductive explanation of sentient experience called for in the first place?

It is only called for because of the claims of materialist philosophy. Materialists claim that nothing exists except matter and physical processes. If that is the case, sentient experience needs to be reduced to such processes, and I do not see why language should be a barrier to describing physical processes.

If there is a problem with formulating such a description, it seems to me quite logical to assume that the difficulty may very well be that sentient experience cannot be described in terms of physical processes simply because it is not a physical process.

To put it more simply, if sentient experience is a physical process it ought to be amenable to description through third person reports. I don't see how your suggestion overcomes that problem.

[Adrian Selby]

Why is a reductive explanation of sentient experience called for in the first place?

It is only called for because of the claims of materialist philosophy.

A reductive explanation is called for because the orthodox dualist explanation is replete with problems. The claims of materialist philosophy are intimately tied in with the whole enterprise of finding an explanatory model for that which we experience.

I don't subscribe to the idea that it is too difficult to translate the language used to describe experience into a language that is consistent with the PO model I've outlined, and has been implicit in our discussions, on other threads. I post at length regarding Edgar Wilson's approach to the problem of translatability in this thread:

http://www.thedeepdark.com/atheism/board/showthread.php?s=&postid=105705#post105705

Specifically the last two posts, as at the time I'm posting this.

The only reason there is currently a lack of amenability, or ready translatability is more to do with the infant state of research into this most complex of biological systems, in my view, it is not per se lacking amenity such that we can conclude any contrary view is to be preferred generally.

[spacer1]

Originally posted by boneyard bill:
If I understand your point correctly, you are claiming that conscious experience cannot be reduced to language.
Conscious experience cannot be completely reduced to language. I would say that such a perfect reduction would consist of a re-presentation of the actual experience.
But you are also claiming that that does not make the non-reductive position true because the problem lies in the deficiencies of language and not in any conceptual or evidentiary problems with the reductive approach.
The problem lies in the deficiency of language, or alternately, in the richness of experience. Assuming that language is built upon our recognition of patterns in experiences would suggest that there are unique aspects of an experience which language cannot capture.
But I think this evades the issue. Why is a reductive explanation of sentient experience called for in the first place?
I didn't realize that this was the issue, nor am I suggesting that we must make reductive explanations of experience. Your question suggests that you lean more toward the momentum end of my analogy, in that you'd prefer to have an experience that to describe that experience, but your (positional) question here seems to contradict that. That is to say, why do you care whether others are making reductive explanations of sentient experience? You should be busy having an experience, if that's what you value more.
It is only called for because of the claims of materialist philosophy. Materialists claim that nothing exists except matter and physical processes. If that is the case, sentient experience needs to be reduced to such processes, and I do not see why language should be a barrier to describing physical processes.
It is not so much language itself that is the problem, but re-presenting every aspect of one's experience via language which is the problem. If you monitor my brain states and ask me questions relating to my experience while you do so, monitoring how my brain states alter, you can only know my experience from what I tell you, which is limited by the language I use to describe my experience, as well as the your interpretation of my description. If you were to perform the experiment on yourself, you would be limited by my analogy to HUP, in that you could not simultaneously have an experience and be able to (completely) describe that experience.
If there is a problem with formulating such a description, it seems to me quite logical to assume that the difficulty may very well be that sentient experience cannot be described in terms of physical processes simply because it is not a physical process.
Since the idea of a non-physical process suggests some other-wordly or supernatural explanation, I would be more inclined to apply Occam's Razor to it (since it seems so far removed from all of my prior experiences), rather than to there simply being limitations to description.
To put it more simply, if sentient experience is a physical process it ought to be amenable to description through third person reports. I don't see how your suggestion overcomes that problem.
I hope the above has offered at least some idea of why I believe this to be the case.

[spacer1]

ZikZak,

I have come to realize that what I stated in my last post regarding your article was erroneous. However, at the risk of embarassing myself further, I think I see some more possible problems with the first table (of possible combinations) as posted in your article:

Firstly, it states in the article that "the spins around the X and Z axes are not simultaneously measureable according to the uncertainty principle." However, the table (demonstrating Bell's Inequality) gives values for XZ and ZX, which seems to contradict this.

Secondly, in the same table, it gives values for both XZ and ZX (as well as for XY, YX and YZ, ZY), which appears to me as a double counting, since the XX, YY and ZZ values only occur "once", in comparison. (i.e. there isn't an X1X2 AND an X2X1 measurement.) Put more simply, I don't see why we need to measure ZX once XZ has been measured.

I'm not sure that this brings the probabilities back to 50%. However, am I correct in assuming that the experimental evidence suggests a probability of 50%?

[boneyard bill]

Spacer1 writes:

I didn't realize that this was the issue, nor am I suggesting that we must make reductive explanations of experience. Your question suggests that you lean more toward the momentum end of my analogy, in that you'd prefer to have an experience that to describe that experience, but your (positional) question here seems to contradict that. That is to say, why do you care whether others are making reductive explanations of sentient experience? You should be busy having an experience, if that's what you value more.

You've lost with this part. I'm not sure we're talking about the same thing. When you talk about "reduction," what are you proposing to reduce? And what are you proposing to reduce it to? I had assumed that you were using the standard arguments from the philosophy of mind debate. But it now appears to me that you may be talking about something else.

[spacer1]

Originally posted by boneyard bill:
When you talk about "reduction," what are you proposing to reduce? And what are you proposing to reduce it to? I had assumed that you were using the standard arguments from the philosophy of mind debate. But it now appears to me that you may be talking about something else.
I thought I had covered what I meant by "reduction" in my earlier comments of the same post. Perhaps I'm not fully aware of the "standard arguments" of philosophy of mind, so maybe you could offer your definition of what you mean by "reduction"?

[boneyard bill]

Adrian Selby writes:

A reductive explanation is called for because the orthodox dualist explanation is replete with problems. The claims of materialist philosophy are intimately tied in with the whole enterprise of finding an explanatory model for that which we experience.

I didn't know that the dualist explanation was "orthodox," but aside from that what are the problems with it? I realize that is filled with problems for someone who is already committed to materialism. But on what basis should I conclude that materialism hold more promise than dualism or idealism?

Also, I should point out that neither dualism nor idealism require a reductive explanation for consciousness. So the reason a reductive explanation is called for is to defend materialist claims, not to explain consciousness per se. Indeed, under dualism or idealism, sentient experience doesn't need to be explained. It is accepted as a given just as the laws of physics are not explained. They just are.

[Adrian Selby]

Are you saying its inappropriate to ask for evidence of the connection of the mind to the brain, how are they connected? What evidence is there for a different ontological realm other than that you find materialist claims unsatisfactory? Don't you find the lack of evidence or even an explanation of how something immaterial and unaffected by the material realm nevertheless engages in a consistent relationship with it, but, in the case of a given mind, is in a relationship of a spatiotemporal kind, when such a relationship ought by definition to be impossible for things in realms outside of physical reality.

The dualist position is orthodox in the sense that it represents orthodox, traditional thinking on the subject.

Also, don't confuse the intent of materialists with the axioms they work from. It's not that reduction is required for materialists, its that reduction makes sense, and from that the materalist position builds.

It's nice to think that under dualism sentient experience doesn't need to be explained, but its rather lame to simply state that:

"So what is the mind then?"
"It's ok, it doesn't need to be explained."
"That's ok then."

[boneyard bill]

Adrian Selby writes:

Are you saying its inappropriate to ask for evidence of the connection of the mind to the brain, how are they connected?

I think we've been over this before. It's quite simple to suggest that the mind and brain are connected in a law-like relationship and then see if this approach is more fruitful than trying to reduce the mind to brain processes. It fact, it's pretty much the way neuro-science researchers are proceeding in light of the fact that they don't have a reductive explanation.

Science establishes law-like relationships all the time. The laws of physics, for example. Is it a valid criticism of science that it hasn't reduced the laws of physics to something simpler and more basic?

What evidence is there for a different ontological realm other than that you find materialist claims unsatisfactory?

What evidence is there for a materialist ontology in the first place? Materialism is something that has to be proven not something that has to be refuted.

There is plenty of evidence for the mind as a possible ontological realm since we all have minds and wouldn't even know that the world exists if we didn't have one. I know the mental ontological realm through direct experience. The physical world, however, is only inferred.


Don't you find the lack of evidence or even an explanation of how something immaterial and unaffected by the material realm nevertheless engages in a consistent relationship with it, but, in the case of a given mind, is in a relationship of a spatiotemporal kind, when such a relationship ought by definition to be impossible for things in realms outside of physical reality.

They only "ought to be impossible" if you presuppose materialism in the first place.

Also, don't confuse the intent of materialists with the axioms they work from. It's not that reduction is required for materialists, its that reduction makes sense, and from that the materalist position builds.

No, reduction is required or materialism is not true. Again, reduction only makes sense if you presuppose that materialism is true from the outset.

My view is that if reductionism makes sense, a reductive explanation should be easy to produce and yet no such explanation has been successful.

It's nice to think that under dualism sentient experience doesn't need to be explained, but its rather lame to simply state that:

So what is the mind then?" It's ok, it doesn't need to be explained."
"That's ok then."


Say what? Are you claiming you don't know what the mind is? We all have a mind. We know what it is through direct experience. The question is whether this mind is a basic feature of our existence that is not reducible or whether it is reducible to physical processes.

What reason do we have for proving that it is reducible to physical processes except to prove the validity of materialist ontology? We don't need such an explanation to do scientific research. A fundamental correlation between brain processes and mental processes is just as good for a neuro-scientist as a cause and effect relationship.

The only point of a reductive explanation is to prove the validity of materialist metaphysical claims.

[John Page]

Originally posted by boneyard bill
What evidence is there for a materialist ontology in the first place? Materialism is something that has to be proven not something that has to be refuted.

There is plenty of evidence for the mind as a possible ontological realm since we all have minds and wouldn't even know that the world exists if we didn't have one. I know the mental ontological realm through direct experience. The physical world, however, is only inferred.
Yes, the heart of the matter.

What you seem to be saying is that your mental experiences bring you direct experience of the mental realm, of which part are the observations and resulting theory that go to make up physics.

IMO its not an issue of differing ontological realms. If all that we know (however we know it and however accurate it is compared to physics-related observations) begs the ontological question of "How do we know this?", then its not helpful to presuppose one thing is dependent upon another or preceeds it etc.

The excellent thing about the physical (part of reality) is that we can readily intersubjectively agree measurements pertaining to it. The mental (part of reality), however, is much more difficult to nail down due to the (apparent) difficulty of experiencing objectively precisely because one's mental experience is not directly accesible to another.

So, leaving aside whether one emerges from or is supervenient upon the other, the challenge is to have a consistent model joining a) our own subjective experiences, b) our intersubjective experience of seemingly-fixed-external-things-in-themselves and c) objective views about the subjective experiences of others.

I'm not totally certain about this philosophy-of-everything, though. ;)

Cheers, John

[Adrian Selby]

As with our previous dialogue, you appear to be viewing the issues in a less than adequate light in my view, and persist in thinking that because nothing needs explanation beyond 'there is a lawlike connection' this is somehow simpler than positing a reduction ontologically speaking. However, a constructive way to approach your counterpoints as I see it is to expand on my view, with the purpose of bringing into a different light your problems with it and your own view so you can see why we differ.

I view our differences as stemming from having different metaphysical models. You seem to think that reduction is a forced thing, something that has to be proved, as though your own view doesn't. In fact, as competing models that attempt to frame as coherently and completely as possible experience and that which is experienced, both models must be assessed on what they do and don't do. The adoption of either, while not a choice like you'd make in a supermarket, nevertheless depends on what you value from your model. Mine is that it offers the most coherent and parsimonious explanation for the most observations, i.e. it offers a pattern or a cipher for experience that can support and in some cases underly particular modes of discourse as well as observations.

It's quite simple to suggest that the mind and brain are connected in a law-like relationship and then see if this approach is more fruitful than trying to reduce the mind to brain processes. It fact, it's pretty much the way neuro-science researchers are proceeding in light of the fact that they don't have a reductive explanation.


It is indeed simple to suggest a law like connection and see where that gets us. However, you fail to outline any way in which this can be fruitful. You also presume neuroscientists do not have reductive explanations. I'm sure some don't, but nevertheless explanations consistent with their work exist. What misses the point here is that neuroscientists are not themselves involved in considered assessments of the explanatory frameworks and modes of discourse that typify the mind body problem. I've read research by cognitive neuroscientists that does attempt to explain mental attributes in physical terms, and model the way the brain works in order to map the observations to behaviour understood generally in mental terms and predicates. It is not an uncommon practise to find researchers in cognitive science attempting to frame what we understand through mental predicates in physical terms, to identify in the brain how it is that the person continues on in the way that they do.

Positing only a law like connection is not so very different from positing an identity as regards what we might consider fruitful. It's just that the one doesn't fit with your metaphysical presuppositions and we haven't moved beyond our sets of presuppositions to see why either of us should adopt the other. Yet.

In both cases the importance of the mental is stressed, its only in the latter that a reduction occurs ontologically, while a dualism is retained phenomenologically. I'd go further personally to maintain that the anthropomorphism inherent in having a first person perspective and being unable to frame third person or perspective independent models until very recently is the only reason we have a tension that calls itself the mind body problem.

You also seem to discount the fruit yielded from the position that the mind is in fact brain processes. I have expounded at length one particular theory that takes the fruit of the labours of scientists and underpins them so that they offer coherent insights into traditional philosophical problems. I've outlined in a previous thread how the theory is even falsifiable in your view, though paradoxically, falsification is impossible from within the model. The thread, page 2:

http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=54049&perpage=25&highlight=biperspectival&pagenumber=2

Science establishes law-like relationships all the time. The laws of physics, for example. Is it a valid criticism of science that it hasn't reduced the laws of physics to something simpler and more basic?

This isn't the problem, science establishes law like relationships between things in the physical realm, not between a thing in a physical realm and something you don't think needs explaining in a realm that by definition, unless you know otherwise, cannot be of a nature that we can define it terms of spatiotemporality. The benefit, not the reason for, but the benefit of the identity theory is that it sees this problem and offers a model that explains that which we term mental in physical terms, namely that it downplays as irrelevant the first person anthropomorphisation and passive godlike spectator view of the individual passed down from Descartes and every other ontological dualist at some distance from the physical, with humans as physical systems dynamically interacting with the environment in goal directed manners etc. etc.

Identity theory posits that we can describe the phenomenological states described as 'mentallings' in terms of the undergoing of physical processes. I've said this many times to you before. In this respect it posits that there is a lawlike relationship, just one of predicates, or, one of the extradermal and intradermal perspectives inherent in there being an object that has such emergent properties and the view of something that isn't that particular object.

There is plenty of evidence for the mind as a possible ontological realm since we all have minds and wouldn't even know that the world exists if we didn't have one. I know the mental ontological realm through direct experience. The physical world, however, is only inferred.


Are you equating the mind with a realm? Is there a different realm for each different mind? You have inadvertently outlined numerous problems your position creates.

Can you describe the mental ontological realm for me? At least, can you describe what is going on in your mind that is experience of the mind itself, the object that is the mind, and not the experience of, or conjoined and otherwise reconfigured memories of the real world as sensed. I doubt there is anything your mind experiences that is not or was not the result of sensory input?

To suggest that, as an example, an abstract number forms a counterexample does not do you sufficient service, for you ask for evidence of a mental realm, and I take that experience of abstract numbers must be evidenced in this realm? How exactly do you experience abstract numbers in this realm? What is the mode of perception of an abstract number? How does the mind form a number as part of its ongoing processes? These issues are not so different from the ones reductionists have regarding logical concepts. The rejoinder to physicalism critics regarding the supposed lack of a physical correlate or basis for 'concepts' I've provided a link for already in this thread:

http://www.thedeepdark.com/atheism/...5705#post105705

Aside from those questions, which I don't take to be sufficient rejoinders on their own, I can tell you that the model I'm espousing doesn't in fact view the physical realm as inferred, because it views the perspective and the consciousness as physical. Thus, taking that as the contentious starting point you think it is, it has at least the benefit therefore of sidestepping your view that we only infer the physical world. Given we are physical, on this view, the sense organs and the world that the brain interfaces with, and is considered a subsystem of, is almost if not actually symbiotically connected to the world external to the brain itself, indeed, the moulding of brain processes and the moulding by brain processes by and of the environment experimentally established in the work of Vygotsky in particular ('Development of the Higher Mental Functions' 1960) and Luria ('The Working Brain' 1973) accords more strongly with the research of neuroscientists it would seem than the lack of research involved in positing a lawlike connection along with the statement that 'sentient experience doesn't need to be explained'.

In relation to my earlier question of how the material and immaterial could not conjoin by definition, you said only that:

They only "ought to be impossible" if you presuppose materialism in the first place.

This does not in fact answer the question of just how they conjoin. I guess your answer might to you be sufficient as 'they have a lawlike relation or connection'.

I'm asking for the nature of this connection. Are you prepared to say its an ineffable lawlike connection, are you indeed in any way able to describe the connection itself, how it works, how it is that one mind and brain follow each other about the way they do, why there is such a productive relationship and why there never seem to be mental events without physical events. Because I have a model that fits the bill, it asserts they're one and the same, ontologically, and we then see how well the model does from that point. So far you've not pointed out flaws in the model that haven't been addressed, to my knowledge, and if the addressing is flawed I would be keen to understand more clearly the deficiencies.

No, reduction is required or materialism is not true. Again, reduction only makes sense if you presuppose that materialism is true from the outset.


Materialism can be true by understanding the dualism for what it is, phenomenological only. The reduction is ontological, and you're not a materialist, or in my case an identity theorist, first in order to believe that.

In my view, you assess the theory in the light of the current model you have, and in my case I found that with a subtle shift in the model, the discrepancy with an otherwise holistical pattern of great parsimony (the scientifically constructed pattern of empirical knowledge) I found the spikes that at one point in time made the model seem less complete an explanation than it could be was enhanced. At some point in the past then, I found the idea that the mental realm and talk of it was curious at best. This didn't mean that I thought materialism was true, for my model was not coherent at that point.

For some people, a different set of experiences (like not doing a philosophy degree) may have left the model incoherent in some respects, as I believe many people's models of reality are, or it may have had the parts that would be necessary but not sufficient conditions for the materialist view disregarded in favour of other explanations for the experienced world and self, perhaps for example theistic explanations. In this latter respect I have at least one friend who became a theist and in my terms would have therefore altered his pattern so it became coherent for him, though its terms were different, and I still feel the problems are manifold in his pattern.

Say what? Are you claiming you don't know what the mind is? We all have a mind. We know what it is through direct experience. The question is whether this mind is a basic feature of our existence that is not reducible or whether it is reducible to physical processes.


Do we have 'a mind' ie an entity that is called a mind or do we have a stream of 'mentallings'. I've said previously that I think this entity view of the mental is indicative of no more than a subject predicate obsession with western language structure, and it makes as much sense to break down statements about experience into adverbial terms, as, for example, the Chinese do. On this view there is no mind as an entity, just successions of mentallings. This of course enhances the pattern of my metaphysical model insofar as the brain is sensibly viewed as a system that is constantly responding and filtering and processing successive states of the environment in accordance with it. It is procedural, and an adverbial theory of the mental as mentallings matches, as identity, with processes in a way which doesn't obviously create a spike with observations that perhaps neurophysiologists have made regarding brain processes and the connected mental events which you take to be 'in' or 'of' a mind. Do you understand what the mind is as an entity apart from successions of complex and interrelated processes, are these processes in your view happening to a 'something' an immaterial organ or system of some kind. It really is unclear.

You can see how a difference in perspective between us renders redundant this view the question of whether a mind is a basic feature of existence. Such a question is moot if we have no idea what a mind is beyond processes. Are mental processes or mentallings a basic irreducible feature of existence? Well, I think not, because I still haven't found out how an immaterial process or thing affects and is affected by the brain. Relationship, probably, indeed, certainly it would seem on the traditional view, but nature of relationship, I have found no explanation. Pineal gland anyone?

What reason do we have for proving that it is reducible to physical processes except to prove the validity of materialist ontology? We don't need such an explanation to do scientific research.

I have a reason at least, I'm in the business of finding a model that can explain all of it, not render as entirely translatable all the hierarchy of vocabularies and modes of discourse into some base language, such that the problems retain their full nature and an equal utility of problem solving is attainable at this level, just offer an explanation that coheres and spreads its net as wide and as parsimoniously as possible, indeed, is of its nature capable of describing why translation of problems from one mode of discourse to another is pointless (Laszlo's systems philosophy).

I disagree that explanatory models like this are of no use to scientific research, I think the scientific endeavour is to provide knowledge as completely as it can of reality, and help us understand how things work. It's process is usually that of third person observation. Can an explanatory framework in a perspective independent vocabulary such as cognitive science offers predict and provide useful insights into what was previously held to be non material processes?

If brain processes seem to fire and co-ordinate intentional movement, and there is no interference or interface with some non material agent working the controls (the ghost in the machine) then the wondering of how, if it is taken to be true that the brain does it all, one can explain mental events becomes part of the process of science. The construction of complete reality models is not solely within science's domain, as the patterns have to be rendered in terms amenable to the existing patterns formed through the experience of living one's life. As such, the questions take place at a conceptual and logical level, attempting to make sense of the evidence of the observations of scientists among others. Personally I believe it was only a matter of time before scientists would find their way from engaging their efforts into the world around us and started to analyse each other, and find in that some of the once startling claims that materialists find fruitful models for coherently and parsimoniously patterning experience.

So, leaving aside whether one emerges from or is supervenient upon the other, the challenge is to have a consistent model joining a) our own subjective experiences, b) our intersubjective experience of seemingly-fixed-external-things-in-themselves and c) objective views about the subjective experiences of others.

It appears also that John is interested in metaphysical models that can provide a coherent framework for a, b and c. We all have these models, they're coextensive with observation, to a point, but are contradictory or at least contrary with regard to what they assert. I'm much more interested these days in the question of why we value coherence and parsimony and whether this has any bearing on an objective evaluation of differing metaphyisical models.

Cheers,

Adrian

------------
the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[ComestibleVenom]

Originally posted by boneyard bill
I think we've been over this before. It's quite simple to suggest that the mind and brain are connected in a law-like relationship and then see if this approach is more fruitful than trying to reduce the mind to brain processes. It fact, it's pretty much the way neuro-science researchers are proceeding in light of the fact that they don't have a reductive explanation.

We already have a reductive explanation because the problems of neuroscience involve problems of reduction. Nobody has coherently posited what such a law-like relationship would be other than a system of conceptual relationships between mind-talk and neuro-talk.

In point of fact, that's just the aim of reduction: systems for understanding the extent to which our levels of dicourse approximate or correspond methodologically.

Is it a valid criticism of science that it hasn't reduced the laws of physics to something simpler and more basic? We're reconceptualizing physical reductions all the time. It's not a one-directional process. Reduction requires we look at the larger picture of how our theories may usefully inform each other.



What evidence is there for a materialist ontology in the first place? Materialism is something that has to be proven not something that has to be refuted.
I agree that science must justify itself. But considering that the scientific image, the scientific METHOD intimately involve intertheoretic reductionism, you have to bring something more substantial up against the most substantial epistemological development in the history of ideas.

But you have missed the point altogether. The task of the sciences are to speak to each other and justify themselves in the others. Even skyhooks need a laser elevator shaft.

There is plenty of evidence for the mind as a possible ontological realm since we all have minds and wouldn't even know that the world exists if we didn't have one. I know the mental ontological realm through direct experience. The physical world, however, is only inferred.

I contend that your position incoherent. If your mind provides information about which you are able to speak, it is investigatable in the normal scientific manner and thus requires no other ontological realm but this one.

Secondly is your belief that we know ourselves best without reference to the outside world. But since we know about neuroscience, drugs, history, social learning about the self this is empirically false. Thus, unless you abandon the scientific image, you are incorrect.

If you abandon the scientific image, you cannot appeal to it's credibility, but only yourself - as pope.


My view is that if reductionism makes sense, a reductive explanation should be easy to produce and yet no such explanation has been successful.

If you think it should be easy to produce, you have not paid attention to the way in which it is developed in scientific practice. We discover unanticipated limiting cases often, we are uncertain where all our theories go wrong or where previously insignificant technicalities are shown to be fundamental.

Science has been successful many times, though there is ultimately no such thing as scientific perfection. Although it is imperfect, it's knowledge is many times better than the pefection of 'your' access to your own incoherent, fictitious and provisional theories about your own mind.

[boneyard bill]

John Page writes:

The excellent thing about the physical (part of reality) is that we can readily intersubjectively agree measurements pertaining to it. The mental (part of reality), however, is much more difficult to nail down due to the (apparent) difficulty of experiencing objectively precisely because one's mental experience is not directly accesible to another.

The basis of modern science is precise measurement. But then it runs into trouble when it has something it cannot measure. And what cannot be measured is the measurer. But Buddhism says that the measurer is what it's all about.

But I don't think we have to stop there. We can know more about the nature of our existence . We just cannot know it with the precision that modern scientific thought expects.

[boneyard bill]

Adrian Selby writes:

As with our previous dialogue, you appear to be viewing the issues in a less than adequate light in my view, and persist in thinking that because nothing needs explanation beyond 'there is a lawlike connection' this is somehow simpler than positing a reduction ontologically speaking.

The problem with my arguing this topic is that i always get such long replies. Oh well. Here we go again.

I have no problem with someone positing an ontological reduction. The problem is that no reductive explanation has been forthcoming. You will claim that the identity theory qualifies but I disagree. More on that later.

If you don't have a reductive explanation then the obvious course is to proceed with your research anyway. But now it also makes sense to posit a law-like relationship because, in doing so, you can use those laws as explanations of other observations. If a reductive explanation is subsequently produced, no damage is done to the work you have already produced. It just means the laws can be reduced.

It isn't a question of being simpler. It's a question of dealing with what you have, with actual experience, and not allowing your research to be side-tracked by dwelling on an assumption you cannot prove. If that assumption is false, your research will go no where.

I view our differences as stemming from having differ