The Human Brain

[VivaHedone]

This thread is about the interaction in our brains between the subjective (sensations, thoughts etc) and the physical (namely, flow of electrons). I've got a theory, which still sounds a bit wacky even to me, but is, I think, totally logically sound (I’m sure I’ll soon be corrected if not!).

The theory is based on the law of causality - namely, that every effect has a direct physical cause - and how it is applied to the human brain. I hope that everyone here accepts that the direct physical cause of the subjective experience is the flow of electrons and chemicals through the brain - hence, when flow of electrons ceases, as in death, subjective experience also stops.

My theory is that subjective experience cannot influence anything. It has no effect. So our sensations do not affect our thoughts, and our thoughts do not affect our actions (this may sound weird but stick with me!).

The reasoning: well, subjective experience is not a physical entity. A sensation is not made of matter; a thought has no physical structure or shape. For subjective experience to have any effect in the brain, it would have to influence the electronic and chemical signals that are the direct physical cause of all activity in the brain. Now, how is it possible for something non-physical, like a thought, to influence something physical, like flow of electrons? How can a thought or sensation physically push an electron around the brain to cause an effect? It is simply not possible.

It may seem as if what we see influences what we think, but it cannot be so, seeing as a thought requires the direct physical cause of electronic flow, and a sensation has no physical power to induce such a cause. However, there clearly is a strong connection between sensation and thought – if you see something, you think about it. Therefore I think it must be not sight, but the direct physical cause of sight, that leads to our thoughts on what we see. What I mean by this is that the electronic and chemical reactions that cause our sensations must also cause the electronic flow that in turn is the cause of our thoughts.

Similarly, it must be the direct physical cause of our thoughts that causes our actions, rather than the actual thought. Hence, this thread also serves as an argument against free will. The workings of the brain can be seen as one big chain of chemical and electronic reactions, with subjective experience a by-product of each stage.

This theory would, then, mean that subjectivity is totally unnecessary to the working of our brain – subjective experience can have no effect, so our brains would work just as well for survival purposes without it. This ties in with my Purpose of Subjectivity (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=57918) thread.

[Adrian Selby]

How can a brain avoid subjectivity if it is the kind of thing that creates a model of its environment that differentiates it from that environment. Where it is able to scan itself, assess against input its desired output, then where that involves only the one brain, a discrete entity, surely the concept of subjectivity derives from that fact and then is inherent in it.

Are you able to explain just how a sensation interacts with the brain, is there a mechanism or do they magically seem to correlate? What is the cause of your thinking that there are two kinds of thing in a causal relationship?

By calling a thought non physical, are you suggesting that it is a real something but that it is not physically real, hence some kind of dualism of substance, a non real substance or thing and a real substance or thing?

------------
are you an incorrigible analytic? (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[VivaHedone]

How can a brain avoid subjectivity if it is the kind of thing that creates a model of its environment that differentiates it from that environment. Where it is able to scan itself, assess against input its desired output, then where that involves only the one brain, a discrete entity, surely the concept of subjectivity derives from that fact and then is inherent in it.
Yet subjective experience can have no effect, so it is useles in self-assessment. Self-assessment requires only the correct electronic configuration.

Are you able to explain just how a sensation interacts with the brain, is there a mechanism or do they magically seem to correlate? What is the cause of your thinking that there are two kinds of thing in a causal relationship?
Cause and effect: electrons and chemicals cause sensations. Accepted scientific wisdom, I think.

By calling a thought non physical, are you suggesting that it is a real something but that it is not physically real, hence some kind of dualism of substance, a non real substance or thing and a real substance or thing?
Well, thoughts clearly exist, as we experience them. However, a thought is obviously not a physical entity - it is not comprised of matter. It is an experience. The physical matter is the electrons which cause thought.

[Adrian Selby]

That's where we differ then, I'm an identity theorist, and i've espoused my position on the nature of experience and subjectivity in the materialism thread below at great length :)

To summarise, my view is that the brain is an object capable of experiences, it experiences, to be a brain that works is to experience. I find this answers the problem of just why electrons etc. cause sensations, that you're saying aren't physical entities, if they're not physical what are they?

Scientific wisdom can support your view as well as mine, I'd argue mine more so, but I then I would wouldn't I :)

[Sylvan Wizard]

The reasoning: well, subjective experience is not a physical entity.Is software a physical entity?
A sensation is not made of matter; a thought has no physical structure or shape.I would say it's made of patterns of electrical activity in the brain, like software on a computer. The mind is the software running on the hardware of the brain.
For subjective experience to have any effect in the brain, it would have to influence the electronic and chemical signals that are the direct physical cause of all activity in the brain.Indeed, and self awareness gives us that power.
Now, how is it possible for something non-physical, like a thought, to influence something physical, like flow of electrons?How is it possible that software can influence itself, and to control/manipulate it's hardware as well?
How can a thought or sensation physically push an electron around the brain to cause an effect? It is simply not possible.Not directly as if by some magical force, no, but indirectly, yes.
Similarly, it must be the direct physical cause of our thoughts that causes our actions, rather than the actual thought. Hence, this thread also serves as an argument against free will.Without awareness, I would say that a creature would be a deterministic slave, simply following it's nature. But when awareness comes in, so does free will.

[VivaHedone]

Is software a physical entity?
Yes. But it doesn't have subjective experience.

I would say it's made of patterns of electrical activity in the brain, like software on a computer. The mind is the software running on the hardware of the brain.
If you cannot differentiate between the electrical/chemical signals that cause sensations and the sensations themselves, you shouldn't be posting here. An electron is not a sensation.

Indeed, and self awareness gives us that power.
How?

How is it possible that software can influence itself, and to control/manipulate it's hardware as well?
It is configured in such a way that the flow of electrons through it produces certain results. That is all.

Not directly as if by some magical force, no, but indirectly, yes.
An unsubstantiated comment. If you're saying that subjective experience does have effect, then at some point that subjective experience has to gain physical power. This I believe is impossible.

Without awareness, I would say that a creature would be a deterministic slave, simply following it's nature. But when awareness comes in, so does free will.
You have yet to show how awareness can even have effect, let alone produce free will.

[VivaHedone]

I'm going away for a couple of weeks - enjoy the discussion, while I'm on some sunny beach pretending not to stare at that topless 19-year old beautiful Mediterranean girl...

[Godless Wonder]

Originally posted by VivaHedone
[...] I hope that everyone here accepts that the direct physical cause of the subjective experience is the flow of electrons and chemicals through the brain - hence, when flow of electrons ceases, as in death, subjective experience also stops.
Technically the electrons are still there, nothing happens to them. Here, I'm allowing your word, "electrons" to stand for all the matter...

My theory is that subjective experience cannot influence anything.[...]

The reasoning: well, subjective experience is not a physical entity. A sensation is not made of matter; a thought has no physical structure or shape. [...]

I disagree. Those photons hitting your retina? Triggering impulses in your nerves? leading to your....dare I say it?...to your brain? None of that is of the physical, material world? I say, it is all of the material world.

Your thoughts have no shape? Tell that to the radiologists and neurobiologists who study this stuff who take pictures showing various brain regious showing activity correlating with specific thoughts. If I remove a piece of your brain, do you not suffer some memory loss, some decrease in your ability to function? The brain requires no magic. Just because we don't understand something completely is no reason to say that it must be magic. I would argue that if you memorize a random 7 digit number, there are physical (non-magical) changes which happen inside your brain to make that memory, and allow you to recall it later.

Here's an interesting book that I found very informantive and entertaining. Maybe you'd like it too. "What makes you tick, how the brain works in plain english" by Thomas B. Czerner
ISBN: 0-471-37100-9

[Sylvan Wizard]

"Is software a physical entity?"
Yes. But it doesn't have subjective experience.It would if it was conscious.
If you cannot differentiate between the electrical/chemical signals that cause sensations and the sensations themselves, you shouldn't be posting here. An electron is not a sensation.Actually, it is. Or rather, part of one. Our minds are made up of these electrochemical signals, and these sensations exist solely in the mind, so it logically follows that sensations consist of electrochemical signals in the brain.
"Indeed, and self awareness gives us that power."
How?I haven't worked that out yet, even though I feel it's necessary to save my concept of free will.
"How is it possible that software can influence itself, and to control/manipulate it's hardware as well?"
It is configured in such a way that the flow of electrons through it produces certain results. That is all.Our brains are also configured in such a way that electrochemical signals produce certain results.
"Not directly as if by some magical force, no, but indirectly, yes."
An unsubstantiated comment. If you're saying that subjective experience does have effect, then at some point that subjective experience has to gain physical power. This I believe is impossible.Impossible? If it were impossible you would be unable to type your reply. When you move your fingers to type you are consciously directing your fingers to move. The electrochemical signals in your brain are influencing your muscles to cause them to move in the manner necessary to type.
"Without awareness, I would say that a creature would be a deterministic slave, simply following it's nature. But when awareness comes in, so does free will."
You have yet to show how awareness can even have effect, let alone produce free will.It's my belief that we are largely deterministic, and only consciousness gives us free will. Without it, one cannot have free will. A flatworm has no brain, no consciousness, and no free will. It reacts purely on instinct, merely reacting in a purely deterministic manner. I don't know exactly how consciousness can allow for a way out of determinism quite yet, and I'm not entirely certain it can, but I'm still looking into it.

[VivaHedone]

I disagree. Those photons hitting your retina? Triggering impulses in your nerves? leading to your....dare I say it?...to your brain? None of that is of the physical, material world? I say, it is all of the material world.
Actually, it is. Or rather, part of one. Our minds are made up of these electrochemical signals, and these sensations exist solely in the mind, so it logically follows that sensations consist of electrochemical signals in the brain.

There is an important difference here, central to the whole argument. Electrons etc cause sensations, but they are not the sensations themselves. The sensation is the feeling these electrons and so on generate. AN ELECTRON IS NOT A SENSATION BUT THE CAUSE OF ONE.

Impossible? If it were impossible you would be unable to type your reply. When you move your fingers to type you are consciously directing your fingers to move. The electrochemical signals in your brain are influencing your muscles to cause them to move in the manner necessary to type.
Precisely. It is not the subjective experience that produces the effect, but instead the electrochemical signals that also produce the subjective experience.

[Adrian Selby]

AN ELECTRON IS NOT A SENSATION BUT THE CAUSE OF ONE.

What makes you say this? Why can't the undergoing of processes in the brain, be the undergoing of 'mentallings' i.e. why can't our experiences be what it is like to be undergoing brain processes?

[VivaHedone]

What makes you say this? Why can't the undergoing of processes in the brain, be the undergoing of 'mentallings' i.e. why can't our experiences be what it is like to be undergoing brain processes?
An electron is a negatively charged particle of matter. It is not a sensation. Yes, electrons/chemicals moving through neural pathways induce sensation, but they cannot be said to be sensations. Even if our sensations are the feeling of electrons moving through the brain, then there is a clear difference between the electrons themselves and the feeling of those electrons, just as there is a difference between chocolate and the taste of chocolate.

[Adrian Selby]

but they cannot be said to be sensations.

i still don't get why they can't be the same. what can a sensation be if not the experience arising out of being a complex functioning brain?

[VivaHedone]

i still don't get why they can't be the same. what can a sensation be if not the experience arising out of being a complex functioning brain?
A sensation is an 'experience arising out of being a complex functioning brain'. An electron is a negatively charged particle of matter. Spot the difference.

[Adrian Selby]

You obviously seem to think that the two are rigid designators for 'things' and that there is no way they can be expressions that derive from an epistemological state of affairs that suggests they can indeed be 'things' but have subsequently, through the research, been able to be thought about as in fact rigidly designating a single thing, i.e. a newer epistemological state advanced by observation of the complexity of the brain.

I'm asking why it is you think they have to be different, i.e. why the difference you espouse, being one of perspective somehow engenders a material difference. Is it perhaps because you're working with a model that suggests a relationship of distinct things, if so, what forms the basis for the model?

Also, I'm not comparing a single electron to an experience, that's stupid, I assume you weren't either.

------------
the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[VivaHedone]

You obviously seem to think that the two are rigid designators for 'things' and that there is no way they can be expressions that derive from an epistemological state of affairs that suggests they can indeed be 'things' but have subsequently, through the research, been able to be thought about as in fact rigidly designating a single thing, i.e. a newer epistemological state advanced by observation of the complexity of the brain.
Are you John Prescott? Or is it all the sangria that makes this totally incomprehensable to me? Either way, clarification in thicko-language would come in handy. Congratulations for getting that all into one sentence, though.

For me, it is a quite simple case of cause and effect. Cause = electrons/chemicals flowing through neural passages. Effect = subjective exprerience/sensations. How can the two be the same thing?

[Adrian Selby]

Well, the point I was trying to make, by all my questions, was related to this comment.

Depending on our assumptions, we find different things possible.
To a Cartesian Dualist, it is possible to conceive of there being a mind in its own realm and linked to a brain in the physical realm. If you work on the assumption that the mind is the brain, it is not possible to conceive this.

I'm asking you for the basis by which you conceive that there is a distinction. You appear to be highlighting a 'common sense' view, that we have neurons on the one hand and experience or sensations on the other. Do you agree that the key to this difference lies in the perspective we have on the event. A sensation seems to be what one calls something that happens to oneself. We do not see or observe sensations in others, only physical events. The difference, at least, appears to be one of access to the state that is defined as a sensation and a physical event.

------------
the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)
In my view the difference is only one of perspective on a given state, and that state is objectively described as a brain state. This is only possible to conceive of as a perspicuous description of what's going on because of advances in our observations and theories regarding the brain. 500 years ago, the brain would no doubt, indeed even now perhaps, be thought of as little more than some crude porridge that shares the same kind of space 'behind our eyes' as our minds do. That view has changed, and only in epistemologically more recent states have different views on what is conceivable come to make sense.

So, the question must be, to what extent are either of our views perspicuous regarding the supposed distinction, or origin of the events we call 'mind events' and 'brain events'.

[Mexicola]

Just a question for VivaHedone: why are we supposing that 'subjective experience' has no effects on 'the world'? Surely if I see a lion in front of me, I'll run away. Is this not a physical effect in the world? The same applies for even what we consider the most 'subjective' experiences, such as aesthetic or moral judgments; these too have effects in the world. So exactly which aspect of 'subjective experience' is the one which is 'left over' for your theory after you've dealt with the ones that have effects in the world?
Your theory, in case you don't know, is called 'Epiphenomenalism'. It's been around for quite a while in the philosophy of mind, and is a result of certain Cartesian assumptions concerning consciousness. In the past 30 years this picture has gradually become very unfashionable, largely because better replacements have come along. Try reading Daniel Dennett's accessible Consciousness Explained for a good example of why the Cartesian paradigm is being abandoned. Consciousness (or rather, discussions of it) rely upon what Richard Rorty called the 'Incorrigibility of the Mental'; ie that we tend to take people's word for what they are experiencing. This leads (intuitively, but problematically) to the Cartesian idea that we are presented with a privileged 'sphere' of experience which is entirely private, and this in turn leads to positions like Epiphenomenalism. But it doesn't have to. We can regard this 'sphere' as not some special epistemologically privileged domain, but rather as formed out of our immediate judgments themselves. So, our seeing an apple as red does not mean that there is some inner 'apple' picture 'in' consciousness, but rather just that we have judged that there is a red apple in the world. Rorty's point is that this judgment of the apple is incorrigible, because we don't usually question it, but that this doesn't mean there is some privileged domain on which we make these judgments; it is simply the judgments themselves we don't question.
So... back to the main question. If we get rid of this 'Cartesian Theatre' (as Dennett calls it) of privileged experience, then we can allow that our subjective experience (ie judgments about our environment) do have effects on the world. And then there isn't much of a step to asking 'what exactly is left over once we account for all our effect-causing experiences?'
If you stick with the Cartesian view of consciousness as a privileged subjective domain (in some metaphysical sense) then, yes, Epiphenomenalism is probably the best theory on offer. But that's like saying that we should buy the dodgy produce from this shop simply because we don't want to bother looking at any others...

[Albert Cipriani]

For me, it is a quite simple case of cause and effect. Cause = electrons/chemicals flowing through neural passages. Effect = subjective exprerience/sensations. How can the two be the same thing?

Cause = a river flowing over jagged rocks.
Effect = smooth rocks.

Conclusion: the river flowing and the rocks getting smoothed are one in the same process, not one in the same thing as you suggest.

Your problem consists in your insistence upon ostricising the electrons that flow from objective experiences from the electrons that flow from subjective judgements about those experiences. It's like you think water can only flow in a river and something else must be doing the smoothing of river rocks.

Why can't objective electrical flows beget subjective electrical flows? Why must subjective judgements be non-material events?


Seems you are insisting upon a real metaphysical distinction between objective and subjective experience. I reject this notion as I reject the notion of a distinction between natural and supernatural phenomina. Such distinctions, like the hours in the day or colors in a rainbow are merely useful but arbitrary conventions, not real metaphysical constraints. -- Sincerely, Albert the Traditional Catholic

[Morpheus]

yo mexicola,

Consciousness (or rather, discussions of it) rely upon what Richard Rorty called the 'Incorrigibility of the Mental'; ie that we tend to take people's word for what they are experiencing. This leads (intuitively, but problematically) to the Cartesian idea that we are presented with a privileged 'sphere' of experience which is entirely private, and this in turn leads to positions like Epiphenomenalism. But it doesn't have to. We can regard this 'sphere' as not some special epistemologically privileged domain, but rather as formed out of our immediate judgments themselves. So, our seeing an apple as red does not mean that there is some inner 'apple' picture 'in' consciousness, but rather just that we have judged that there is a red apple in the world. Rorty's point is that this judgment of the apple is incorrigible, because we don't usually question it, but that this doesn't mean there is some privileged domain on which we make these judgments; it is simply the judgments themselves we don't question.

i'm not too knowledgeable regarding rorty's position, but i'm not sure i understand how this solves the problem of consciousness.

when it comes to seeing a red apple, there is "something that it is like" for me to see a red apple, and there is "something that it is like" for you to see a red apple. however, only i have access to the "something that it is like" for me to see a red apple; that is to say, no one outside of myself can know what it is like when i see a red apple. this is the purported subjective aspect of consciousness. does this not seem to imply some epistemological distinction between what can be known equally by everyone (e.g., some material/chemical fact about the physical human body) , and the phenomenal aspect that can only be known by he who experiences that specific phenomenon?

i'm not sure how your comments on judgment get around this, but perhaps i'm just not understanding them.

albert cipriani, in your last post you asked

Why must subjective judgements be non-material events?

material events are scientifically observable (theoretically, at least). if each person's phenomenal aspect (i.e., his subjectivity) is material, then what differentiates it from other material things such that it cannot be empirically observed as well?

with regard to epiphenomenalism, it seems quite unlikely that the phenomenal realm has no effect on the physical realm, if the two are indeed ontologically distinct. consider the very utterance of the phrase "i am conscious." what causes me to affirm this proposition, if it is not the subjective phenomenality that i experience?

this is one of my favorite topics, despite the fact that i need to read a lot more on the issues before i dare say that i am well-versed.

[Adrian Selby]

if each person's phenomenal aspect (i.e., his subjectivity) is material, then what differentiates it from other material things such that it cannot be empirically observed as well?

In my view it can be a physical process 'undergone'. To undergo a physical process is to have, in the case of brains, an experience.

The only reason that there seems to be a difference is because the object is sufficiently complex a system to support a detailed (incredibly detailed and sophisticated) interaction with an environment.

It is in a crude sense no different to the phenomenal aspects of animals, its just more complex.

------------
the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[Mexicola]

Originally posted by Morpheus
yo mexicola,

i'm not too knowledgeable regarding rorty's position, but i'm not sure i understand how this solves the problem of consciousness.

when it comes to seeing a red apple, there is "something that it is like" for me to see a red apple, and there is "something that it is like" for you to see a red apple. however, only i have access to the "something that it is like" for me to see a red apple; that is to say, no one outside of myself can know what it is like when i see a red apple. this is the purported subjective aspect of consciousness. does this not seem to imply some epistemological distinction between what can be known equally by everyone (e.g., some material/chemical fact about the physical human body) , and the phenomenal aspect that can only be known by he who experiences that specific phenomenon?

i'm not sure how your comments on judgment get around this, but perhaps i'm just not understanding them.The Rorty thing is just the idea that the incorrigibility of the mental is not a fundamental metaphysical fact but rather 'just' a human practice. The rest of the paragraph isn't from Rorty. I should have made that clearer.
But anyway. The point I was making was questioning the claim that 'no one other than me can know what it is like when I see a red apple'. Why do you claim this as though it were self-evident? How do you know, a priori, that scientific investigation could not discover this? Assuming this at the start seems to beg the question a bit...
The role of judgment in all this is to get away from the idea of qualia. Qualia are postulated as a 'what it is like' which is completely private and unknowable by anyone else. I (along with many other people, eg Dennett) think that assuming such qualia as a starting point leads us into error, as I said above. On the qualia view, when we see something red we are presented with an internal qualia which we subsequently identify as 'redness' (ie the 'Given' is then 'taken'; given a name) The problem here is the status of the qualia, which seems to evade characterisation as physical (mental images in the brain being...problematic) On the judgment view then, when we see something red we just... see something red. The judgment is not a subsequent process but is bound up with the recognition of the object as 'red'. The judgment happens, if you like, prior to consciousness, as opposed to on the basis of it.
This facilitates the avoidance of problems with consciousness because consciousness is, on the judgment model, formed from meaningful judgments, not primitive 'given' qualia. These are much easier to understand as results of the activities of the brain than mysterious 'given' qualia of 'what it is like'.
The 'what it is like' on the judgment model can be communicated to others precisely because it is meaningful, unlike qualia. So if we want to tell someone what our experience of an apple is like, we can describe it. The point about judgments is that experience itself is a sort of 'description', not a given which we subsequently describe. Similarly, this idea of 'what it is like' also has advantages for science. Given that judgments are always, by definition, 'present' in consciousness (as they form what is 'in' it), they always have some behavioural/physical effects. This means we don't need to account for qualia which are 'there' in consciousness but have no effects in the world; judgments by definition do have these effects.
I'm sure there's plenty more you could ask about this but, to save me time and effort, I strongly recommend you read Daniel Dennett's Consciousness Explained. Most of the above is a simplified version of his ideas in that book. His main thesis is that consciousness, rather than being formed by a 'Cartesian Theatre' in which we are given experience, is actually more like a book being edited, revised and cut as it is formed. This means that only things which have an effect in the world (by thought, speech, etc) can possibly be conscious, indeed they are by definition. Think about consciousness of an object. Anything you can possibly say or think about it is, obviously, conscious (by virtue of you noticing that you've said/thought it) Consciousness for Dennett is then a sort of 'cognitive celebrity', in which only the 'famous' thoughts/judgments (those which 'catch on' enough to have effects of some sort) are conscious.
A lot of people however don't like this idea. I can see why it's counter-intuitive. We intuitively suppose that when we pick out and notice something, like a clock ticking, it must have already been 'there' in consciousness before we 'noticed' it. Dennett's move is simply to question how we are entitled to this claim, given that until we 'noticed' it we weren't, by definition, aware of it! For Dennett, being 'noticed' (in a very general sense) is being conscious.
Incidentally, this fits in well with the claim that experience is conceptual, not pre-conceptual, as it avoids the picture of experience as 'Given' prior to judgments.

[VivaHedone]

Just a question for VivaHedone: why are we supposing that 'subjective experience' has no effects on 'the world'? Surely if I see a lion in front of me, I'll run away. Is this not a physical effect in the world? The same applies for even what we consider the most 'subjective' experiences, such as aesthetic or moral judgments; these too have effects in the world. So exactly which aspect of 'subjective experience' is the one which is 'left over' for your theory after you've dealt with the ones that have effects in the world?
Take the lion example. What I'm saying is that it is not the experience of seeing the lion which causes you to run away, but the neurons that cause you to see the lion. I explained my justification for this in the original post. To run away, you need certain electrons to flow down certain nerves. Now, as the actual sight of the lion is not a material thing, it surely has no physical power to cause these electrical signals. Therefore it must instead be the material cause of your sight of the lion, rather than the subjective experience of seeing the lion, that causes you to run away. This begs the question, why the sight? Why not just the electrons? (See 'Purpose of Subjectivity'.)

Of course this argument depends on the distinction between the electrons/chemicals that cause sensation and the actual sensation itself, and it is this distinction which is coming under attack.

Cause = a river flowing over jagged rocks.
Effect = smooth rocks.

Conclusion: the river flowing and the rocks getting smoothed are one in the same process, not one in the same thing as you suggest.
But there is a distinction between the river flowing and the smooth rocks, yes? The smooth rocks arise from the process of the river flowing, but this does not mean that the flowing river and smooth rocks are one and the same thing.

Why can't objective electrical flows beget subjective electrical flows?
All electrical flows are objective. An electrical flow is not an 'experience', but a material occurence. The sight or feeling of an electrical flow is an experience, but not the flow itself.

To use your example, a smooth rock is a material thing.The sight and feel of the rock are subjective experiences.

Seems you are insisting upon a real metaphysical distinction between objective and subjective experience.
There is no such thing as an 'objective experience'. Experience is by definition subjective.

I'm asking you for the basis by which you conceive that there is a distinction.
One is material, the other immaterial. You cannot pick up a sensation; you cannot experience an electron. I have a feeling I may be missing the point here, but keep trying to drum it in!

N.B. I have got a bit confused when describing mental processes, so to save time from now on 'electrons' shall be used to describe all electrical flows and chemical reactions and neurons etc. that cause subjective experience.

[John Page]

Originally posted by VivaHedone
My theory is that subjective experience cannot influence anything. It has no effect. So our sensations do not affect our thoughts, and our thoughts do not affect our actions (this may sound weird but stick with me!).

The reasoning: well, subjective experience is not a physical entity.
A subjective experience results from an arrangement of physical matter. The sensation is different than that what causes it. A thought is a type of sensation.

When you see a lion this is a material experience, your mind/brain compares the incoming sense data with its archetypal concept for lion (size, color, locations, #legs etc.)

My analogy for what your theory is saying is as follows. There is a piece of paper with the numeral 1 written on it. The numeral 1 is not a material entity in the sense of carbon atoms on cellulose - it is the form of those atoms that denote the quantity "one". However, I can pick up a material pencil and proclaim "There is one pencil".

While your subjective experience of life is your own, we can nevertheless communicate these experiences to discover our minds/brains give rise to these experiences in the first place.

Cheers, John

Cheers, John

[Mexicola]

VivaHedone:

I think the source of your problems is the assumption that now that science has discovered 'electrons' they are 'all that really exists', the 'building blocks', as it were, of everything else. This seems a fairly silly assumption which comes from the view of the world as like a Lego object. Modern science is a bit more complex than that.
The crucial point about this is that your question 'which electrons are the experience?' is like someone asking 'which electrons are the cat?' Sounds like an okay question? Well what if we chop the cat in half? Which group of electrons are now the cat? Both? But then surely the cat is in two places at once! Silly! So, neither? But then all we've done is separate two groups of electrons! How can this have 'destroyed' the cat? Surely then the cat didn't exist at all! If it did then it was the group of electrons, but we've just shown that the group of electrons can still exist (in two places) but the cat not! Therefore they're not the Same Thing!(Note: Not Serious Argument, Just Example)
This is the sort of argument which Greek philosophers were fond of, and its the same sort of one anayltic philosophers have often got their logical knickers in a twist over. They assume a certain 'ultimate structure/unit' of reality, and then argue from there that nothing else can exist in that way (physically, usually), so whatever it is we're talking about must be MetaPhysical!
Of course we want to say the cat existed the whole time. So then the cat isn't just a particular group of electrons, it's something like a functional property of them. Move them around in the wrong way, and it'll stop existing.
Now, arguably, the same applies for sensations. Sensations are a functional property of certain other groups of electrons. They don't 'physically' exist ('physically' meaning 'just electrons') but then neither did the cat as we saw above. They're something that certain groups of electrons do when put together in the right way. What these electrons do is think about 'themselves' (as humans), and 'their' environment. You'll want to ask: 'Well, in that case, where do these things happen? Are they physical events?', but this just brings us back to the 'cat/electron' argument. You want to be able to pick out certain electrons and say 'These are the sensation' and for this to somehow explain consciousness. It isn't like that. You need (to explain consciousness) to explain functionally what the electrons do. Or rather, what the atoms and molecules which the electrons make up do. Or rather, what the cells which the atoms and molecules make up do. Or rather, what the areas of the brain which the cells make up do. Or rather, what the organisms of which the areas of the brain are a part do. You need all these levels of explanation (and more, eg what language in which the organism speaks/thinks, etc) to give a satisfactory explanation of consciousness. You're not going to get it with simple 'but which of these electrons is the sensation?' questions. The question makes something similar to a 'category mistake'. Sensations aren't things like electrons. This doesn't however mean they're 'non-physical entities' which inhabit a 'non-physical world' of consciousness (except just as a figure of speech) any more than cats are 'reflections of the Platonic form'. It just means they're more complex properties of electrons, like other living things are. You're not going to get a definition of any of these (or any other things, arguably) in simple 'x is made up of group of electrons y, or else it does not exist' form. Try giving one of these definitions for movement, or gravity, or energy, or... This doesn't mean they don't 'exist'. Just that you're looking in the wrong 'place'; at the wrong level of description.

[Nowhere357]

Mexicola
Surely if I see a lion in front of me, I'll run away. Is this not a physical effect in the world?
Exactly so. That our mental experiences influence the brain must be the default position.

It seems the primary objection is the mystery of how a non-physical mind can influence the physical brain. But it's accepted that the mental experience is caused by the brain - thus showing that influence can cross the 'gap' in at least one direction. Why should the thought that influence can cross in the other direction cause conceptual difficulty?

This facilitates the avoidance of problems with consciousness because consciousness is, on the judgment model, formed from meaningful judgments, not primitive 'given' qualia. These are much easier to understand as results of the activities of the brain than mysterious 'given' qualia of 'what it is like'.
But judgement involves thoughts and memories as well as the direct experience of awareness.
Qualia refers to the quality of the direct experience. I don't see where they are in contradiction. The definition of qualia seems self-evident and useful to me.

Merriam-Webster
Main Entry: qua·le
Function: noun
Inflected Form(s): plural qua·lia /'kwä-lE-&/
Etymology: Latin, neuter of qualis of what kind
Date: 1675
1 : a property (as redness) considered apart from things having the property : UNIVERSAL
2 : a property as it is experienced as distinct from any source it might have in a physical object

[VivaHedone]

The crucial point about this is that your question 'which electrons are the experience?' is like someone asking 'which electrons are the cat?'
I have never to my recollection asked that question. My point is that electrons are not the experience, but the cause of it.

Well what if we chop the cat in half? Which group of electrons are now the cat? Both?
I have never claimed that cats consist of electrons, merely that material mental processes do. But still, the answer is neither, since a cat is a complex arrangement of matter. To alter the arrangement of matter in a way which means that the cat cannot function is to destroy the cat.

Sensations aren't things like electrons.
Thankyou.

They're something that certain groups of electrons do when put together in the right way.
You cannot do a sensation. Sensation is not a verb. Electrons create a sensation.

You want to be able to pick out certain electrons and say 'These are the sensation' and for this to somehow explain consciousness.
No I don't. This is a quite remarkable statement, as I am arguing that electrons (or rather, electro-chemical mental processes) are not in fact sensations but the cause of them.

You need (to explain consciousness) to explain functionally what the electrons do. Or rather, what the atoms and molecules which the electrons make up do. Or rather, what the cells which the atoms and molecules make up do. Or rather, what the areas of the brain which the cells make up do. Or rather, what the organisms of which the areas of the brain are a part do. You need all these levels of explanation (and more, eg what language in which the organism speaks/thinks, etc) to give a satisfactory explanation of consciousness.
I know that the workings of the brain are hugely complex, and you need this sort of wide understanding to try and explain it. However, that is not what I am trying to do. I am trying to distinguish between the mental processes that are the direct physical cause of sensation, and the sensation themselves. This is to support my argument that it is not sensations but the material cause of sensations that has any physical effect.

I don't think there is any satisfactory explanation of consciousness, anyway (see Purpose of Subjectivity (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=57918)).

It seems the primary objection is the mystery of how a non-physical mind can influence the physical brain. But it's accepted that the mental experience is caused by the brain - thus showing that influence can cross the 'gap' in at least one direction. Why should the thought that influence can cross in the other direction cause conceptual difficulty?
There is a big difference. I am mystified as to how the brain causes sensations (again see Purpose of Subjectivity (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=57918)), but the physical brain is clearly able to cause effect. Subjective experience, however, is immaterial, and therefore cannot cause effect. You have declined to address any of my opening arguments, and I invite you to do so.

[Nowhere357]

VivaHedone
There is a big difference. I am mystified as to how the brain causes sensations (again see Purpose of Subjectivity), but the physical brain is clearly able to cause effect. Subjective experience, however, is immaterial, and therefore cannot cause effect.
Why do you accept that the physical affects the immaterial (the brain causes sensations), but claim it to be impossible that the immaterial can affect the physical (the immaterial cannot cause effect)?

You have declined to address any of my opening arguments, and I invite you to do so.
Your op included this statement:
This theory would, then, mean that subjectivity is totally unnecessary to the working of our brain – subjective experience can have no effect, so our brains would work just as well for survival purposes without it.
Your claim that subjective experience can have no effect is what I am addressing. It looks to me like your only support is the assertion that all effects must have physical causes (thereby begging the question of whether the mind affects the body), but maybe I'm missing something. Hence my question.

[boneyard bill]

Vivahedone writes:

The reasoning: well, subjective experience is not a physical entity. A sensation is not made of matter; a thought has no physical structure or shape. For subjective experience to have any effect in the brain, it would have to influence the electronic and chemical signals that are the direct physical cause of all activity in the brain. Now, how is it possible for something non-physical, like a thought, to influence something physical, like flow of electrons? How can a thought or sensation physically push an electron around the brain to cause an effect? It is simply not possible.

You are assuming that event must have one and only one cause, but is that reasonable? Aristotle identified four causes. (Sorry, I can't remember them off the top of my head).

It is certainly true that a physical event must have a physical cause but that doesn't necessarily complete the story. The thermostat on my furnace causes the fire to come on but there isn't enough energy in a temperature change to light the fire. The change in temperature provides the information that is necessary to send a signal that releases enough physical energy to light the fire.

Of course, our computer technology provides information that causes all kinds of things to happen that are much more sophisticated than a thermostat.

Likewise, sentient experience provides the information that is necessary to tell the organism to run from the lion. The physical cause of the running are the leg muscles. But the lion is also a cause of the running and the sensation of the lion is also a cause of the running. So this one act has three causes.

This theory would, then, mean that subjectivity is totally unnecessary to the working of our brain – subjective experience can have no effect, so our brains would work just as well for survival purposes without it. This ties in with my Purpose of Subjectivity thread.

Let's carry the point one step further. You are in the jungle and someone tells you there is a lion coming, and you run away. You have no sensation of a lion, and you still run away. What causes you to run away from a lion when you have no sensation of it? According to your theory, the cause of the running and the cause of the sensation are the same, but the sensation itself plays no causal role. But if you have no sensation of a lion then the action of running should not follow. And yet you do run anyway. Why is that? Your theory cannot explain it.

But, of course, you run because you have information that the lion is coming toward you even though you have not experienced that fact directly. It is the information regarding the location of the lion that causes you to run. Information has causal power. Sentient experience is information. Therefore, sentient experience can play a causal role by interacting with the physical even though a physical act also needs a physical cause.

[Adrian Selby]

VivaHedone,

The being mystified is a consequence of your dualistic position. It's no wonder when you have that model of the subject matter that you have these intractable problems of immaterial and material cause effect relations. Perhaps a new model is in order?

After all, you maintain the sensation is different to the undergoing of brain processes, you just haven't actually supported it. You have reiterated this view that I've in turn interpreted as being based on two different perspectives on the same states. You call different a 'sensation' and 'electron' while ignoring the fact that one is subjective and the other is objective. This does not mean they are different. It can mean they are different senses by which we refer to that which can be considered their common, possibly identical referent.

Again, the processes by which cruder central nervous systems interact with the environment to me are different in terms of complexity only. You can either deny this, and posit that homo sapiens uniquely have immaterial natures, or you can posit anything from the identity theory I espouse to some panpsychic view of everything being capable of consciousness. Either way, if you're positing that the sensation is immaterial, for example, the sensation induced by a tiger that triggers 'run away' behaviour, then what is it that other animals lack in virtue of behaving this way?

------------
the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[pmurray]

Originally posted by VivaHedone
So our sensations do not affect our thoughts, and our thoughts do not affect our actions (this may sound weird but stick with me!).

IMO: Sensations are thoughts, albeit of a peculiar kind. A a materialist, I do not accept that "thoughts" take place in a parallel platonic world of some kind.

When a row of domioes falls, is it because of the physical reactions between the atoms of each domino and the next, or is it because the first one was pushed and this caused a chain reaction? Obviously, these are two ways of saying the same thing.

[VivaHedone]

After all, you maintain the sensation is different to the undergoing of brain processes, you just haven't actually supported it. You have reiterated this view that I've in turn interpreted as being based on two different perspectives on the same states. You call different a 'sensation' and 'electron' while ignoring the fact that one is subjective and the other is objective. This does not mean they are different. It can mean they are different senses by which we refer to that which can be considered their common, possibly identical referent.
The difference appears to be that you believe the subjective experience and objective occurrence of a process to be fundementally the same thing, and I believe them to be different.

I think they are sufficiently different, anyway, for the purposes of cause and effect, ie. the objective occurrence can provide cause without the subjective experience also being the cause.

You have yet to rufute this.

The thermostat on my furnace causes the fire to come on but there isn't enough energy in a temperature change to light the fire. The change in temperature provides the information that is necessary to send a signal that releases enough physical energy to light the fire.
The thermostat is not, then, the direct physical cause of the fire coming on at all, but merely the cause of the cause.

Likewise, sentient experience provides the information that is necessary to tell the organism to run from the lion.
How? How is that experience translated into physical force?

Will reply to the rest later - must go.

[boneyard bill]

Posted by Vivahedone:

BB:
Likewise, sentient experience provides the information that is necessary to tell the organism to run from the lion.

Viva:
How? How is that experience translated into physical force?

By being, as you put it, the cause of a cause. Information can cause physical actions to take place just as it does with my thermostat and just as it does in countless computer, industrial, and military actions all the time.

But lets suppose for a moment that we didn't actually have these examples. Is it not true, nonetheless, that it happens.

I call you an asshole. You punch me in the face. What "caused" you to punch me in the face? Certainly your arm muscles provided the physical force, but it was my insult and your sensitivity that produced the action. This is just about undeniable. So why are you trying to fit this data into some kind of quasi-materialist theory? Why not accept the data and build your theory around it rather than the other way around?

[Adrian Selby]

I am mystified as to how the brain causes sensations

Why should I try to refute your view that there is a distinction when you can't provide a causal explanation yourself. As I said, perhaps you need a different model, one that does provide an explanation. Are there other grounds on which you prefer not to adopt a new model?

the objective occurrence can provide cause without the subjective experience also being the cause.

Some occurrences such as the automatic balancing of the endocrinic system are caused by regulatory processes in the brain, but with Bill's example of the insult, the cause, in my view, results from the holistical behaviour of different brain systems, those that are necessary components for the brain to be such that it can scan its own states and form 'pictures' of the events within and outside of it.

Anyway, just how does one provide a falsification of the immaterial?

[VivaHedone]

Why should I try to refute your view that there is a distinction when you can't provide a causal explanation yourself.
Nothing in this:
I am mystified as to how the brain causes sensations
Contradicts this:
The difference appears to be that you believe the subjective experience and objective occurrence of a process to be fundementally the same thing, and I believe them to be different.

I think they are sufficiently different, anyway, for the purposes of cause and effect, ie. the objective occurrence can provide cause without the subjective experience also being the cause.


Some occurrences such as the automatic balancing of the endocrinic system are caused by regulatory processes in the brain, but with Bill's example of the insult, the cause, in my view, results from the holistical behaviour of different brain systems, those that are necessary components for the brain to be such that it can scan its own states and form 'pictures' of the events within and outside of it.
So you accept that the cause is the brain systems that form the picture rather than the picture itself?

By being, as you put it, the cause of a cause.
This answers nothing. Still, the immaterial is required to gain physical power, in order to cause the cause.

I call you an asshole. You punch me in the face. What "caused" you to punch me in the face? Certainly your arm muscles provided the physical force, but it was my insult and your sensitivity that produced the action.
No - your insult set off the chain of electrons which caused me to hear the insult, and these electrons set off another chain which caused my feelings of sensitivity and my thoughts about your insult, and these electrons caused the movement of another lot of electrons, which caused the muscles in my arm to move. One long chain of physical reactions, with subjective experience arising at separate stages. It's the only way it can work.

Why do you accept that the physical affects the immaterial (the brain causes sensations), but claim it to be impossible that the immaterial can affect the physical (the immaterial cannot cause effect)?
Everything must have a physical cause. Therefore subjective experience has physical cause. And therefore (non-physical) subjective experience cannot provide cause.

Your claim that subjective experience can have no effect is what I am addressing. It looks to me like your only support is the assertion that all effects must have physical causes (thereby begging the question of whether the mind affects the body), but maybe I'm missing something. Hence my question.
Are you contending the law of causality then?

[Nowhere357]

Originally posted by VivaHedone
Everything must have a physical cause. Therefore subjective experience has physical cause. And therefore (non-physical) subjective experience cannot provide cause.
Given the first statement, of course your conclusion follows.

I question your first statement. Tell me, what exactly are the physical causes for quantum randomness?

Also, why does mind to brain present conceptual difficulties for you, when brain to mind does not?

[tronvillain]

I am not really sure what the problem here is supposed to be. Isn't this all just about the level of explanation you are using? Trying to explain human physical actions in terms of individual atoms is theoretically possible, just as trying to explain the actions of a computer is, but in both cases a higher level of explanation is more useful: in the case of one, conscious experience, and in the case of the other, the operation of a program.

VivaHedone:
No - your insult set off the chain of electrons which caused me to hear the insult, and these electrons set off another chain which caused my feelings of sensitivity and my thoughts about your insult, and these electrons caused the movement of another lot of electrons, which caused the muscles in my arm to move. One long chain of physical reactions, with subjective experience arising at separate stages. It's the only way it can work.
No, the chain of electrons is you hearing the insult, and the other chain of electrons is you being sensitive and insulted, and so on. As I said, it is all about level of explanation.

[Adrian Selby]

So you accept that the cause is the brain systems that form the picture rather than the picture itself?

I used picture in inverted commas, the brain systems undergo successive states, and a set of those states will be the picture, occurring simultaneously with many non conscious brain functions in their given states.

the objective occurrence can provide cause without the subjective experience also being the cause.

Prove it. Prove also this isn't, as Tronvillain states, a confusion over the mode of explanation at a certain hierarchical level in relation to another explanation.

------------
the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[boneyard bill]

Vivahedone writes:

No - your insult set off the chain of electrons which caused me to hear the insult, and these electrons set off another chain which caused my feelings of sensitivity and my thoughts about your insult, and these electrons caused the movement of another lot of electrons, which caused the muscles in my arm to move. One long chain of physical reactions, with subjective experience arising at separate stages. It's the only way it can work.

There is a problem with your point here. The chain of electrons that cause you to hear the insult and the subsequent chain of electrons leading to your thought do not possess sufficient energy to move the muscles of your arm. As physical causes go, they are insignificant. They are significant only insofar as they carry information, not energy. So information is the crucial causal connection here, not energy. Therefore, information can cause physical muscles to move. But your thought is information. So your thought is sufficient cause to move your muscles.

Everything must have a physical cause. Therefore subjective experience has physical cause. And therefore (non-physical) subjective experience cannot provide cause.

What is the basis for your first premiss? And even if we accept that, why do you conclude that there must be only a physical cause? And why only ONE cause?

Are you contending the law of causality then?

What law of causality are you referring to?

[Nowhere357]

boneyard bill
Therefore, information can cause physical muscles to move. But your thought is information.
It seems clear to me that the brain uses the mind to process information. There must be a two-way communication going on. Some solid support is that the ability to recall memory is dependant on mental attendance to lay down the memory in the first place. It's not enough to just look at a page in a book, we must actually read it - mental attendance. The brain reacts to our awareness in order to build memory.

[Adrian Selby]

Therefore, information can cause physical muscles to move.

Is this why you don't believe the universe is a closed system as it were?

How can information cause physical muscles to move when it has no 'energy' whatsoever, indeed, I'm not sure how appropriate a concept it is to be considered as the same sort of thing, causally speaking, as electrons. When we see automatic responses in the limbs from the stimulation of electrons in the brain, or rather, collections of electrons known as neurons, we see muscles moving. I'm a little surprised you think that one cannot cause the other.

[boneyard bill]

Adrian Selby writes:

How can information cause physical muscles to move when it has no 'energy' whatsoever, indeed, I'm not sure how appropriate a concept it is to be considered as the same sort of thing, causally speaking, as electrons. When we see automatic responses in the limbs from the stimulation of electrons in the brain, or rather, collections of electrons known as neurons, we see muscles moving. I'm a little surprised you think that one cannot cause the other.

I don't understand what you're trying to get at. Electrons in the brain don't have enough physical energy to "cause" muscles to move. They cause muscles to move because of their information content.

The causal connection from my insult to getting hit in the face is strictly an information connection until the arm muscles move. Only the arm muscles have sufficient energy to impact my face with damaging force. So there is no strictly physical cause and effect (in the sense of measuring the ergs or something like that) from my insult to my being hit in the face.