Four Propositions in Metaethics

[Alonzo Fyfe]

I hold that the following four propositions are true.

(1) All true propositions attiributing value to a state of affairs relates the state of affairs being evaluated to a set of desires. (Any proposition attributing value to something that is not stating the object of evaluation's capacity to fulfill desires is a false proposition.)

(2) Some propositions if this type are objectively true; the rest are objectively false.

(3) Common moral subjectivism unjustifiably and incorrectly limits the relevant set of desires used in moral propositions to those of the agent (or the assessor).

(4) Advancing common moral subjectivism, in the face of its obvious, deep, and significant problems, is not only an instance of advancing an incorrect theory, but seriously degrades the status of atheists as moral people. How can we be moral when we make such nonsensical claims about morality?

[Adrian Selby]

I get from 1. that where there are any true propositions regarding valuing of states of affairs, these propositions relate that state of affairs to a set of desires.

Then in 2. you say that some of these propositions are objectively true.

I don't follow you, which is why I'm trying to clarify.

If a proposition such as 'Abortion is a bad thing' is indeed a proposition that relates a state of affairs to a set of desires (this seems emotivist, namely, that my saying abortion is a bad thing must somehow equate only to 'I wish people wouldn't abort fetuses') then how do we ascertain whether this proposition is objectively true, and why do you first of all say that there can be true propositions that are as you describe? It confuses me to see you say in 1. something about all true propositions having a certain character, only to say in 2. that only some of these are objectively true.

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the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[DigitalChicken]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
I hold that the following four propositions are true.

(1) All true propositions attiributing value to a state of affairs relates the state of affairs being evaluated to a set of desires. (Any proposition attributing value to something that is not stating the object of evaluation's capacity to fulfill desires are false propositions.)

If the comment in paranthesis correct? Is this grammatically correct?

(2) Some propositions if this type are objectively true; the rest are objectively false.

Why? Why can't some propositions be indeterminate?

(3) Common moral subjectivism unjustifiably and incorrectly limits the relevant set of desires used in moral propositions to those of the agent (or the assessor).

What is "common moral subjectivism"?

(4) Advancing common moral subjectivism, in the face of its obvious, deep, and significant problems, is not only an instance of advancing an incorrect theory, but seriously degrades the status of atheists as moral people. How can we be moral when we make such nonsensical claims about morality?

There is nothing in this set of principles that limits them to atheists and further I don't think all atheists by a long shot would agree with your emphasis on desires.

DC

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Adrian Selby
If a proposition such as 'Abortion is a bad thing' is indeed a proposition that relates a state of affairs to a set of desires (this seems emotivist, namely, that my saying abortion is a bad thing must somehow equate only to 'I wish people wouldn't abort fetuses') . . .

Relating a state of affairs to a set of desires is not the same as relating a state of affairs to a set of MY desires, because MY desires is not a complete set of the desires that exist.

I can relate a state of affairs to YOUR desires. (You really should take that trip to Hawaii.) I might not care one way or the other if you go to Hawaii. But, I may know you and Hawaii well enough to accurately state that a trip to Hawaii would fulfill your desires.

I can relate a state of affairs to a group of desires. "We should go see Pirates of the Carribbean this weekend." It my not be the top movie on my personal 'to see' list. But, knowing the desires of everybody in the group as I do, I can make an accurate statement that Pirates of the Carribbean will fulfill the desires in that set more than any other movie.

I may never claim that something has value unless I wish it. However, this does not imply that the claim itself means nothing more than that I desire it. Just as I may never assert as true a proposition (e.g., water is made up of H2)) that I do not believe. And, yet, the meaning of the proposition (and its truth value) remains independent of the fact that I believe it.

When a person states "X has value" that statement, if true, states, "Here is a set of desires, which may or may not be mine, in whole or in part, and X will fulfill those desires."



Originally posted by Adrian Selby
. . . then how do we ascertain whether this proposition is objectively true . . .

We objectively determine if the desires exist. And we objectively determine if the object is such that it would fulfill those desires.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
. . . It confuses me to see you say in 1. something about all true propositions having a certain character, only to say in 2. that only some of these are objectively true.

Some of those statements could be false. If I say, "You will like Pirates of the Carribean," I relate the movie to your desires. I could be wrong, either about what your desires are, or about the movie's capacity to fulfill those desires.

Thus, though all true value statements relate an object of evaluation to a set of desires, not all statements relating an object of evaluation to a set of desires are true.

[Adrian Selby]

So what's any of this got to do with the unjustifiability of moral subjectivism, if indeed I should be making a connection at all?

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by DigitalChicken
If the comment in paranthesis correct? Is this grammatically correct?

Edited original statement for grammar.


Originally posted by DigitalChicken
Why? Why can't some propositions be indeterminate?

Actually, they can. But I think that a meaningful discussion is possible without getting into the issue of fuzzy logic. I prefer to stick to the easy stuff at the start, add the complexities as needed.



What is "common moral subjectivism"?

Originally posted by DigitalChicken
What is "common moral subjectivism"?

Common moral subjectivism relates the object of moral evaluations exclusively to the likes/dislikes of the decision-maker, or of the assessor evaluating the morality of the decision-maker's decision. It attempts (and fails) to reduce moral statements to statements of the form "I like", "I dislike."


Originally posted by DigitalChicken
There is nothing in this set of principles that limits them to atheists and further I don't think all atheists by a long shot would agree with your emphasis on desires.

True, these propositions can be accepted by non-atheists. And it is true that most atheists would have objections to these propositons. In particular, I suspect that many atheists would object to (3) and, from this, also object to (4).

Yet, I am prepared to defend them from whatever objections may be raised.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Adrian Selby
So what's any of this got to do with the unjustifiability of moral subjectivism, if indeed I should be making a connection at all?

It depends on what you mean by "moral subjectivism".

I am raising my objections against common moral subjectivism -- the type that reduces moral statements to statements of the form "I like," and "I do not like".

Moral statatements, instead, should be understood as statements of the form "good for us", "not good for us". Where "good" means "capable of bringing about the fulfillment of of our desires."

These types of statements are objectively true or false.

If your definition of moral subjectivism is sufficiently broad, than this says nothing against that conception of subjectivism. But, to the degree that one's definition of moral subjectivism narrows, to that degree objections can be raised against it.

[Adrian Selby]

It's still meaningful to ask whether fulfilling our desires is indeed a good thing in all cases. Does this then mean that equating good with 'capability to fulfil desires' isn't the only kind of moral statement?

What is the difference between my desiring something and my liking something in a general sense?

Also, do you think its possible in principle to objectively determine someone's desires, i.e. are we taking objective determination to mean a person's own report of their desires?

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the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Adrian Selby
[B]It's still meaningful to ask whether fulfilling our desires is indeed a good thing in all cases. Does this then mean that equating good with 'capability to fulfil desires' isn't the only kind of moral statement?

There are several ways to account for this "meaningful to ask" quality.

First, moral statements are not the only type of value statement, and it is meaningful to ask whether something is "good" relative to one set of desires is also "good" relative to another set of desires. For example, "It tastes bad, but will it stop my headache?"

Second, while it is meaningful to ask if X fulfills a desire, it is also meaningful to ask whether that desire fulfills other desires. That is to say, it is meaningful to ask whether the desire is, itself, good. So, while taking a drug may fulfill a desire, the desire for the drug may be in conflict with several other desires. This means that the desire for the drug (the addiction) is bad.

Third, it is meaningful to ask whether something that is "good" in the sense of fulfilling desires is also "good" in the sense of having intrinsic value. It is a meaningful question to ask, but the answer is always "no." Intrinsic value does not exist. All TRUE value statements relate objects of evaluation to a set of desires. But FALSE value statements about intrinsic merit can still be meaningful.

In other words, proposition (1) is a statement about what exists, and "meaningful to ask" is not relevant to questions about what exists.



Originally posted by Adrian Selby
What is the difference between my desiring something and my liking something in a general sense?

"like" is to "desire" like "human" is to "mammal".

The word "desire" covers all of our affective dispositions. Like, dislike, hate, loathe, want, prefer, wish, care, love, etc. All of these are members of the family of "desire".



Originally posted by Adrian Selby
Also, do you think its possible in principle to objectively determine someone's desires, i.e. are we taking objective determination to mean a person's own report of their desires?

Yes. Even though we cannot see beliefs and desires, we can hypothesize their existence in terms of their ability to explain things we can see. We do it all the time -- every time we seek to explain somebody's actions we do so by postulating a set of beliefs and desires that has the best fit in terms of the behavior we observe. When we get new data, it either confirms our theory, or falsifies it, forcing us to create a new theory.

Determining desires, then, is subject to the same type of system of observation, hypothesis, experiment, verification/falsification system as anything else we do.

Note: Research suggests that, even when we talk about our own desires, we are offering a theory grounded on observations about ourselves -- a theory that is sometimes wrong. We can have desires we do not know about, and not have desires we claim to have. People who do research into intentional states have some very reliable ways of determining what desires and beliefs people have, and comparing them to the desires and beliefs they claim to have.

Professional marketers and public relations groups use this type of knowledge against us all the time, manipulating our choices by looking for the desires we have and act on but do not know about.

[Furby]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe

Second, while it is meaningful to ask if X fulfills a desire, it is also meaningful to ask whether that desire fulfills other desires. That is to say, it is meaningful to ask whether the desire is, itself, good. So, while taking a drug may fulfill a desire, the desire for the drug may be in conflict with several other desires. This means that the desire for the drug (the addiction) is bad.


In the case that a fulfilment of a person's desire will only thwart his own desires and does not affect the desires of anyone else, is it still considered a bad desire?

What about if one of the person's desires is so strong that it overrides all his other desires, such as the drug addict whose craving for drugs is such that he is willing to sacrifice all his other desires in order to fulfill that one desire.

In other words, does the strength of the desire count when evaluating whether it is a good desire or should just the number of desires that it thwarts or fulfills be considered.

For example, my desire to have lots of money is extremely trivial when compared to my desire to see my family safe, so I have a weak desire for money and a strong desire for my family's happiness.

Suppose performing action A will fulfill many of a person's weak desires but thwart one of another person's strong desires and action B will do the opposite. Is A or B the right thing to do?

[Furby]

I would like to add another example to my above post.

Suppose that by killing a child, you can get tons of money and by distributing this money among other people, you can fulfill many of their desires. Suppose further that the child is abandoned and unwanted and the people to whom you distributed the money are in no way starving to death or in dire financial straits.

According to your moral theory, is this a good or bad thing?

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Furby
In the case that a fulfilment of a person's desire will only thwart his own desires and does not affect the desires of anyone else, is it still considered a bad desire?

Morally bad, as in 'evil'? No. The concept of morality (barring false claims of intrinsic value) seems intimately tied to thwarting the strong and stable desires of others.

Yet, it is still bad in a sense (in a practical sense) as any of us with bad habits would testify. I have some desires I would rather be rid of, specifically because of their tendency to stand in conflict and to thwart other desires that I have.


Originally posted by Furby
In other words, does the strength of the desire count when evaluating whether it is a good desire or should just the number of desires that it thwarts or fulfills be considered.

Strength counts.

That which fulfills a strong desire is better than that which fulfills a weak desire -- though a sufficiently large number of weak desires might combine to overpower a single strong desire.


Originally posted by Furby
Suppose performing action A will fulfill many of a person's weak desires but thwart one of another person's strong desires and action B will do the opposite. Is A or B the right thing to do?

As with my first answer in this post (above), it is important to distinguish between two senses of 'right'; practical 'right' (the best action relative to the desires of the agent), and moral 'right' (the best action relative to good desires, where good desires are those desires that tend toward the fulfillment of other desires).

The description above provides insufficient information for evaluating the question of moral 'right'.

It also turns out to provide insufficient information to answer a question about practical 'right'. It is possible that a sufficiently large number of weak desires can outweigh a strong desire -- the answer is not necessarily one or the other. The decision-maker needs to weigh the various pros and cons against his or her desires to see which is the strongest. It may be difficult to determine.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Furby
Suppose that by killing a child, you can get tons of money and by distributing this money among other people, you can fulfill many of their desires. Suppose further that the child is abandoned and unwanted and the people to whom you distributed the money are in no way starving to death or in dire financial straits.

Before answering the question: I am curious as to which of the initial propositions (if any) this is seen as objecting to. It cannot be an objection to (1) because this is an ontological claim. At best, this type of argument can yield the conclusion "Iwould not like it if 1 were true." But not liking the fact that something is true does not make it false. (2) is simply a statement about (1). This cannot be a defense of (3), since common subjectivism holds that killing the child can be good even if others do not benefit, at least for any person who wants to see the child killed. And (4), in return, is a sociological claim about the consequences of advocating (3).

Yet, as a point for better understanding the larger context into which these four propositions fit, it deserves an answer.

Killing the child is very probably -- almost certainly -- a bad thing.

The distinctly 'moral' system does not evaluate actions according to whether the act itself fulfills the most desires. It evaluates actions according to whether the actions fulfill good desires.

Of course, there can be no such thing as an intrinsically good desire. Desires, like all things, can only be good or bad in virtue of their capacity to fulfill (other) desires. A good desire is one that tends generally to fulfill other desires; a bad desire is a desire that tends to thwart other desires.

So, the question is one of whether killing the child will fulfill good desires, not a question of whether it would fulfill whatever desires happened to exist.

Now, I need to justify the claim that the capacity to fulfill 'good' desires, rather than merely 'existing' desires, is what matters.

I do not see any sense in evaluating an action independent of its causes -- to say to an agent that, "The best causes for action for you to have had would have caused you not to do X, but you ought to have done X."

There is a principle in moral theory that says that "ought" implies "can" -- and that if you cannot will a child into health, then it is not the case that you ought to do so (or that anybody can blame you for failing to do so). Similarly, if it is not causally possible for a person with good desires to have done X, then it makes no sense to say that he ought to do X, or to blame him for a failure to do X.

And the goal of morality is to bring it about that people have good desires -- that is to say, good causes for action. Given this, it makes no sense to recommend to him that he be the type of person who does things that a person with good desires would not do.

So, we evaluate actions according to whether they are acts that a person with good desires would perform, where 'good desires' are good in the only way anything can be good -- in virtue of their capacity to fulfill desires.

Now, please, return to your example. I read it, and notice in myself an aversion to the type of situation in which a person kills a child for money.

However, I have relatives who have a strong aversion to the thought of an interracial couple. Tell them a story leading to an interracial marriage, and one will get a very strong averse reaction.

This causes me to go to question how much weight we can put on these aversions. It appears that these aversions are only evidence of whether we DO or DO NOT like a particular result, not evenidence that we SHOULD or SHOULD NOT like a particular result. To answer this second question, we must look at the merits of the relevant desires.

I believe that it is possible to argue that an aversion to killing innocent people (or an aversion to having innocent person be killed) is a good aversion. It is good because, if generally adopted, it would likely prevent the thwarting of desires and aid the fulfillment of desires. Now, a person with a strong aversion to killing innocent people would have a strong aversion to killing the child in your example -- as well as have a strong aversion to having the child killed for their benefit. If an aversion to killing the child is good, then killing the child is evil (something a person with good desires would not do).

At the same time, I believe that an aversion to interracial relationships is a bad aversion. Such an aversion tends to thwart desires -- namely, the desires of those who want to enter into such a relationship. A person with good desires would not have an aversion to interracial relationships.

On these grounds, I hold that the killing of the child in this example is probably a bad thing. It is not the type of thing that a person with good desires would do. It is not the type of thing that others with good desires would want him to do.

[Furby]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
Before answering the question: I am curious as to which of the initial propositions (if any) this is seen as objecting to.

The example was simply an add-on to the first post, on whether strength of desires should count when evaluating good/bad desires, i.e., whether the child's strong desire to live and lead a fulfilling life should override all other persons' weak desire for money. It was not meant as an objection to the initial propositions.

Edited to add:

Actually, your earlier post already answered the question and there was no need for the subsequent one. But it was still useful in clarifying what you meant by good/bad desires.

[Adrian Selby]

Alonzo, can we derive any ethical principles from your metaethical viewpoint? I'm interested in why you propose point 3 from your OP, and hope you can expand upon it.

Also, I still don't see how, having defined desire and like the way you have, you've done anything to dispel the view that they're synonymous. I can like drugs even though my liking them is bad for me.

My only problem with your view that we can objectively determine desires is that I find it hard to see how we could *not* objectively determine desires. If someone likes drugs and disagrees that its bad for them, we objectively determine they're a nihilist. They disagree, we ascribe it to some other view, I really don't know at what point we can be said to not be able to objectively determine desires. I raise this point because you say that a good desire can be said to be one that promotes further desires, which begs a question about any ultimate desires existing, or if not, I would question at least how we can say a desire is 'bad' simply because it thwarts further desires.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Adrian Selby
Alonzo, can we derive any ethical principles from your metaethical viewpoint? I'm interested in why you propose point 3 from your OP, and hope you can expand upon it.

This methodology actually recommends the practices and conclusions that are a part of most (secular) ethical debate.

It easily supports the conclusion that rape, theft, murder, and slavery are wrong. Aversions to rape, taking things that don't belong to you, killing the innocent, or treating people like property are good aversions. These are not things tha a person with good desires (and good aversions) would do.

For complex issues, it argues that there is no easy answer. For example, the issue of capital punishment gets reduced to "Which is better, (1) an aversion to killing (no capital punishment), or (2) an aversion to murdering combined with a desire to kill murderers (capital punishment)? It is a difficult question to answer -- but it is to be answered by looking at which set of desires is best (better capable of fulfilling other desires). If you look at any thread on capital punishment, this largely accounts for the elements of such a debate.

But it also sets limits on the debate. Claims to the effect that killing is intrinsically wrong, or claims of the form "I like capital punishment, therefore it is good," can both be thrown out as irrelevant to the debate of which aversion is "good for us."

Is the desire to have a sexual relationship with somebody of the same gender generally fulfill desires, or thwart them? The same arguments used in the defense of interracial relationships apply to intragender relationships -- the aversion to such relationships is bad because it thwarts desires. All intrinsic value claims interjected into the debate can be dismissed as false. Arguments about unnaturalness make claims that a certain family of acts have intrinsic (desire-independent) value.

An aversion to mixing church and state is good. A look at history, and at current events in several parts of the world, will reveal a great deal of desire-thwarting associated with mixing church and state. The conclusion that an aversion to mixing church and state is good is not merely an opinion -- it is a fact.

Applying these principles to any thread around here would certainly clean up the debate quite a bit -- filtering out irrelevant intrinsic-value claims as well as claims based on common (agent-centered, or assessor-centered) subjectivism. And, once cleaned up, might actually reveal a clear correct answer.

Originally posted by Adrian Selby
Also, I still don't see how, having defined desire and like the way you have, you've done anything to dispel the view that they're synonymous. I can like drugs even though my liking them is bad for me.

I do not understand what the term "they're" refers to in this question.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
If someone likes drugs and disagrees that its bad for them, we objectively determine they're a nihilist.

A 'nihilist'? That conclusion seems a bit too strong to be justified. The desire for the drug is certainly in conflict with a number of other desires. He may deny this, but it reasonable to believe that his assertions of denial are false. Denial is something that addicts are good at.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
I raise this point because you say that a good desire can be said to be one that promotes further desires, which begs a question about any ultimate desires existing, or if not, I would question at least how we can say a desire is 'bad' simply because it thwarts further desires.

Ultimate desires?

Do you mean, by this, desires that have intrinsic value -- independent of their capacity to fulfill other desires? No such value entity exist. If it did exist, how would it work? How would we know about it? The only value that exists is the capacity to fulfill desires, directly or indirectly. I see no evidence for any other type of value in the universe.

Unless you have a problem with how other things can be good or bad in terms of their capacity to fulfill desires (movies, food, sunsets, spare-time activities, etc.), I see no reason to see a problem with desires, also, having value in terms of their capacity to fulfill or thwart other desires.

[Adrian Selby]

I do not understand what the term "they're" refers to in this question.

It refers to the terms 'desire' and 'like'.

The nihilist conclusion is a possible conclusion.

Is the wrongness of rape merely an aversion of rape? If so, why is the rapist not averse? This suggests to me that we classify aversion as the majority view on it, and equate that with it being wrong.

As for ultimate desires, you said earlier that a desire for drugs could be seen to be a bad desire, and that this implies certain other desires are good because they do not thwart desires beyond them. I'm asking therefore whether there's a chain of desires, or a set of desires that interrelate. It seems to me that no desire is good in itself, as you say, but that seems at odds with your definition that there is good in a desire, namely its ability to propagate other desires. How is this not intrinsic to the desire in question? Practically it seems we have a way of deciding how good a desire is, does it promote others?

If however one does desire annihilation, then the question of drug use promoting annihilation does appear to make the desire to use drugs a good desire.

If then someone desires to murder on the grounds that the people murdered, being no longer alive would have affected the world for a net loss of potential propagations of desire, then murder can be justified on this grounds.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

[i]Originally posted by Adrian Selby

It refers to the terms 'desire' and 'like'

The distinction that I draw between common subjectivism and this theory is not based on a distinction between "desire" and "like", but on the distinction between "me" and "us", as well as the distinction between direct and indirect relationships between the object of evaluation and the desires -- the distinction between "I like X" (direct relationship) and "X is good for me (indirect relationship).

These are the two areas that the common subjectivist gets wrong. Common subjectivists use "I/me" when they should be using "we/us", and speak of direct "like" relationships when they should be including indirect "good for/useful" relationships.

Edited to add: A third area that the common subjectivist gets wrong is that they evaluate actions, laws, and institutions directly, rather than indirectly according to what would be fulfill the good desires.


[i]Originally posted by Adrian Selby
The nihilist conclusion is a possible conclusion.

I guess I need to know what you mean by 'nihilist'. I am a 'nihilist' (I prefer the term 'eliminativist') about intrinsic values, but not about desire-dependent values.


[i]Originally posted by Adrian Selby

Is the wrongness of rape merely an aversion of rape? This suggests to me that we classify aversion as the majority view on
it, and equate that with it being wrong.

No. It consists in the fact that an aversion to rape is a good aversion for people generally to have -- it comes highly recommended. "Good aversion" means that it

is an aversion that would tend to lead more to the fulfillment of other desires, directly and indirectly.

An aversion can be 'good for us' even though a majority of the people do not know this (the majority can be wrong), in the same way that vitamins can be 'good for us' even where a majority of people are not aware of this.


[i]Originally posted by Adrian Selby
I'm asking therefore whether there's a chain of desires, or a set of desires that interrelate. It seems to me that no desire is good in itself, as you say, but that seems at odds with your definition that there is good in a desire, namely its ability to propagate other desires. How is this not intrinsic to the desire in question? Practically it seems we have a way of deciding how good a desire is, does it promote others?

The form of reasoning, in epistemology, is called 'coherentism'. There are no foundational beliefs but, instead, a belief is justified in virtue of being a member of the most coherent web of beliefs.

In mathematics and logic these are called 'recursive functions'. In philosophy of language, the corresponding form of reasoning is referred to by the term 'hermaneutic circles'. One word is defined
by using other words, which in turn are defined by using other words, which eventually circule back to the first word.

These are known as "virtuous circles" to distinguish them from "vicious circles" which is the type of reasoning identified by
the term 'begging the question'.

It is not properly called 'intrinsic' because value depends on how something stands in relation to something external (or, in other words, it depends on extrinsic properties) -- namely, other desires. Independent of those other desires -- looking at only its internal (intrinsic) properties, the desire in question has no value.


[i]Originally posted by Adrian Selby
If however one does desire annihilation, then the question of drug use promoting annihilation does appear to make the desire
to use drugs a good desire.

Because the badness of a desire for drugs is extrinsic, the badness of drugs does disappear with certain changes in its extrinsic properties (relationship to other desires).

Consider, here, our desire to drink (water). The desire for water has different extrinsic properties than the desire for drugs (at least, I am assuming, we are talking about drugs such as cocaine, crack, heroin, and the like). If the desire for cocaine had the same extrinsic properties as water, then the desire for cocaine would have the same value as our present desire for water.

Now, I am assuming that many common beliefs about the extrinsic value of some of these drugs are true. If I am mistaken about the extrinsic properties of the desire for cocaine, then I am wrong about the value of the desire for cocaine.


[i]Originally posted by Adrian Selby
If then someone desires to murder on the grounds that the people murdered, being no longer alive would have affected the world for a net loss of potential propagations of desire, then murder can be justified on this grounds.

A couple of caveats:

First, if the argument is sound, the killings would not be called 'murder'. Murder is defined as 'unjustified killing', and unjustified killing can never be justified, by definition.

So, the question is: should such a killing be called 'murder'?

Second, I am not certain if I follow your example the way you intended. Where you talk about 'potential propagations', I am confused by what you mean by this.

We would have to assume that the agent is reliable at identifying such people. Else, we introduce the desire-thwarting elements of uncertainty and fear among those who might be killed. With this, we are already talking about a science-fiction universe involving conclusions not relevant in the real world (i.e., the situation described in the movie Minority Report).

In addition, there must be no alternative to killing that is less desire-thwarting. It is likely that a desire to capture and confine would be better than a desire to kill, which means a good person would not be the one with a desire to kill, but the one with the desire to capture and confine.

Untlimately, the conclusion that is easiest to support is the commonly accepted principle that if we can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is a danger to others, it is permissible to confine that person. But, there is a strong presumption in favor of the accused that can only we outweighted by substantial evidence to the contrary (to prevent the ill consequences of error).

[Alonzo Fyfe]

To provide another illustration of these propositions in practice, I call your attention to Scigirl's initial post in this thread (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=59410&perpage=25&pagenumber=1)

The argument begins with an assumption that a good person would have an aversion to accepting weak arguments. A person who truly cares about being right is a person who would have an aversion to being seduced by fallacious arguments and unsupported premises.

If we can demonstrate that a person is being persuaded by weak arguments, we not only show that his conclusion is unfounded. We can infer something stronger -- that the person being persuaded by those arguments does not have the concerns for being right that a good person would have. They are not good people.

Scigirl than goes on to argue that certain arguments against homosexuality are so weak that a person concerned with being right would not fall for them. Thus, the people she is writing about do not have the concern for being right that a good person would have. Thus, they are deserving of moral condemnation.

The form of reasoning is entirely consistent with what would be recommended under these propositions.

[Adrian Selby]

I'm interested in why you choose to place emphasis on moral statements relating to more than one person, i.e. that morality is better understood to be about 'us' than 'me'.

If I say 'abortion will be good for us' to my partner, and she disagrees we can argue about it. If we still disagree then haven't I only given reasons for why I desire abortion. What I've done is determine the propagation of desires from my own point of view, and attempted to explain how these should be weighted to my partner. She may disagree. As such I've simply only said why it is I desire an abortion, I've talked a good deal about 'us' but only really from my own perspective as regards the value to place on certain desires.

How could we objectively determine what the actual propagational value of a given desire is to fulfil further desires?

It might be that there are common situations requiring a moral decision that, when the sets of desires are laid on the table, it is clear that they are contrary to each other such that a conclusion cannot be objectively determined merely through analysis of the desires of the people involved. Are you suggesting we call in further and further desires till some imaginary scales tip up? Do we then call this the 'right' decision?

Your points about the badness of actions being extrinsic to the actions seems at odds to the comments regarding the fact that we commonly are averse to things like killing, rape, theft etc.

However, in Germany in the 30's, a good many citizens, academics and other otherwise intelligent people assisted the Nazis in their denigration of the Jews. Theft of property was the first and most common publicly approved event of which it could not be said that the majority were averse. Equally, the element of fear, so some research tells me, was clearly not present or at all influential in the decision making of these people.

There thus appear to be views and arguments that promote theft and murder of certain social groups by others, and the aversion that we have cannot be said to be all that stable.

This particular point aside, your view on the moral reprehensibility of people being related to or defined by someone's concern with having a strong argument presupposes there can be no strong arguments for, for example, ethnic separatism, or with the far trickier subject of abortion, there doesn't seem to be arguments such that one view is clearly right and one is clearly wrong. As long as someone has a strong argument it seems, they're a good person, for it appears the basis for moral condemnation lies in how persuaded they are of weak arguments, given their actual stances, as you say, have no intrinsic value, but are constituted by coherent groups of desires that promote each other to as full an extent as possible.

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[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Adrian Selby
I'm interested in why you choose to place emphasis on moral statements relating to more than one person, i.e. that morality is better understood to be about 'us' than 'me'.

Ultimately, because when I try to understand a moral debate, a 'me' interpretation makes no sense of what is going on, while a 'we' interpretation makes sense.

Assume that I use a 'me' interpretation. Moral debates must then be interpreted as follows:

"I approve of X"

"Well, I don't approve."

"You're wrong, I do approve."

"No, you're wrong. I don't approve."

If this is an accurate account of what moral debates are about everybody who participates in such debates are raging lunatics.

If we change the "me" to "us" (and interpret 'us' to mean not only the participants in the debate, but all members of society), change "approve" and "disapprove" to "good for" and "not good for", and a couple of other adjustments, you get something that makes sense.

"If we all had an aversion to X, we would all be better off."

"No we wouldn't"

"Here is why I believe that we will be better off. (Start listing groups of people and why their desires are more likely to be fulfilled if we all had an aversion to X.)"

"No we wouldn't, and here's why. (Start listing groups of people and why their desires are less likely to be fulfilled if we all had an aversion to X -- as well as why the first person's claims about desires that would be fulfilled are false.)"

If you take this and apply it to the claims that people make when they debate moral issues, this makes sense of what is going on.

Following the principle that an interpretation that makes sense is better than an interpretation that does not, I conclude that people engaged in moral debate are debating about which desires (and aversions -- an aversion to X simply being a desire that not-X), if generally adopted, would tend to fulfill desires regardless of who had them.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
If I say 'abortion will be good for us' to my partner, and she disagrees we can argue about it. If we still disagree then haven't I only given reasons for why I desire abortion. What I've done is determine the propagation of desires from my own point of view, and attempted to explain how these should be weighted to my partner. She may disagree. As such I've simply only said why it is I desire an abortion, I've talked a good deal about 'us' but only really from my own perspective as regards the value to place on certain desires.

First, a clerification. Moral 'good' is 'good for us' in the broad sense. Not just good for you and your partner, but whether a universal aversion to abortion would better fulfill all desires regardless of who has them (or not).

But, still, debates of the form "good for me and my partner" have the same relevant elements for purposes of the debate you are discussing here.

In such a debate, your desires are certainly relevant. As are your partner's desires. If all you are doing is giving weight to your own desires, then you are not discussing "good for us", you are only discussing "good for me." But the fact that you are not discussing weight relative to your partner's desires does not imply that it does not exist.

When I discuss issues with my partner, I have no problem looking for what is "good for us." She wants to have a horse. I don't care for horses. On the other hand, I like to save for the future. She would spend everything we have today if she could. So, we compromise. As much money as she spends on her horse I get to put into investments. This rule is "good for us."

In addition, it is possible for you and your partner to come to an agreement about what is "good for us," and still say, "I don't care if this option is good for us, I'm not going to do it." So, agreement over the (factual) statement over what is "good for us" does not entail anything about what either participant will do. Anybody who does not care about what is "good for us" will sacrifice this for the sake of what is "good for me". This does not imply that there is no such thing as "good for us," only that one of the partners does not care about it.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
How could we objectively determine what the actual propagational value of a given desire is to fulfil further desires?

We look at what the desire is for. (All desires can be expressed in terms of an attitude for a proposition P, such as "I desire that I live in Montana." Now, we look to see if P is in any type of essential conflict with any other P that might be the object of some other desire.

It's the case that it would be difficult to determine precisely. However, as in many things in life, we do not need exact values. We only need to look at the larger influences and reach a conclusion that "the final value is somewhere around X."

If you gave me a stack of numbers and asked me to figure out an approximate total quickly, I would not add all of the numbers. I would quickly add the largest numbers (and, for these, only the first few significant digits), and in something like "there are about 100 additional numbers in here each averaging around 500 so I'll add another 50,000," and I can get a number that is close enough for all practical purposes.

This is how we evaluate desires. We look for the strongest effects, factor in an estimate of the weaker effects, and arrive at a total that is close enough for all practical purposes.

We do this all of the time in all of our decision making. Arguing that it cannot be done would effectively be arguing that we cannot make decisions, because we can never have any idea of what will happen.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
Are you suggesting we call in further and further desires till some imaginary scales tip up? Do we then call this the 'right' decision?

Or, we could say, "the options are of such equal value that it really doesn't matter" and move on to something important. It all depends on whether we expect further research will turn up a significant shift in the scales. Small shifts simply are not worth the time and effort to worry about.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
Your points about the badness of actions being extrinsic to the actions seems at odds to the comments regarding the fact that we commonly are averse to things like killing, rape, theft etc.

Ultimately, the wrongness of these things does not depend on whether we DO have an aversion to them, but whether such an aversion would tend to fulfill other desires. Which is an extrinsic value. Intrinsic value does not exist.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
There thus appear to be views and arguments that promote theft and murder of certain social groups by others, and the aversion that we have cannot be said to be all that stable.

I believe that a moral theory that yields the conclusion that "therefore, nobody in fact ever commits theft or murder" can easily be dismissed as absurd.

People who do not have good desires do evil things. And they do these things voluntarily.



Originally posted by Adrian Selby
As long as someone has a strong argument it seems, they're a good person, for it appears the basis for moral condemnation lies in how persuaded they are of weak arguments, given their actual stances, as you say, have no intrinsic value, but are constituted by coherent groups of desires that promote each other to as full an extent as possible.

No. Being a good person actually depends on having good desires -- not merely believing one has good desires (or even believing for good reason that one has good desires) -- just as the warm bloodedness of dinosaurs depends on whether they were in fact warm blooded, not on whether we believe they were warm blooded or even we believe for good reason that they were warm blooded. There is a fact of the matter to be discovered.

[Adrian Selby]

"If we all had an aversion to X, we would all be better off."

What's the difference between this and adding at the start 'In my opinion' ?

I'm glad you think that one way of looking at it makes more sense than another, egoists and subjectivists would disagree, the charge of lunacy does not affect the force of the subjectivist case on its own. There issue would be precisely, I'm guessing, that the question of what is good for us is really about what we think is good for us from our own point of view, and that's all we're expressing. There's nothing absurd in that as it stands.

Ayer's point in all this is that we might think we're talking about what is good for all of us, but really we're only expressing our own points of view, our own desires. It mischaracterises the position to say that someone believing 'I like/dislike' isn't considering others, they're merely saying something about the statements that take the form, 'this would be generally good/bad'.

Thus
If all you are doing is giving weight to your own desires, then you are not discussing "good for us",

is really acknowledging that whatever we think we're doing, we're really only discussing what's good for us.

What you've decided in your horse example is that compromise is good for you two. Is it the best course of action? Could you or your partner have been persuaded had you taken longer over your considerations? Possibly. I don't see how one can compromise on the issue of abortion however, its life or death. As such, the problem we might have is that we cannot reach agreement yet something must be done. I don't see how we can call the conclusion 'right' simply in virtue of our expressing our views. Furthermore, we can't assume we get factual agreement either, as such, I can't see how we can maintain that there are clearly some actions that propagate more desires than others. Where this is further muddied is with regard to the 'us' here. It is the main part of ethics to consider what is good or bad for everyone generally, but while one may frame some general moral principles from that, it nevertheless is the case that there are deviations from these principles that seem clearly justifiable. We sometimes kill others to stop them from killing, and we justify it, so it isn't murder. However, if the others killing have their own justifications, such as is the case in times of war, what then? Would a nation lie down in defeat because it could not cope with the logical arguments made by those who would come to change its way of life? The force of argument does not appear to confer rightness or wrongness in my view, except insofar as we say that what we determine to be right is whatever we can't actually disagree with effectively. I'm not saying this is automatically wrongheaded, by any means.

This is how we evaluate desires. We look for the strongest effects, factor in an estimate of the weaker effects, and arrive at a total that is close enough for all practical purposes.

And is this an objective or subjective determination? Of course it contains components such as 'this group generally will desire this going off the evidence I have' yet the weight of that consideration in any view for me is the subjective element, for someone can acknowledge that view, such as in the abortion discussion I had with my wife, but put no real weight on it. How we weight our considerations of the desires and the extent to which they fulfil other desires seems to be the issue here.

Originally posted by Adrian Selby
There thus appear to be views and arguments that promote theft and murder of certain social groups by others, and the aversion that we have cannot be said to be all that stable.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I believe that a moral theory that yields the conclusion that "therefore, nobody in fact ever commits theft or murder" can easily be dismissed as absurd.

People who do not have good desires do evil things. And they do these things voluntarily.


This is not necessarily the conclusion, rather, the conclusion I see is that we can't go calling theft an act that actually and always entails the net thwarting of desires over propagation. Insofar as it may propagate desires (for we determine the boundaries of interest after all) it is not definable as evil, and our aversion to it is no strong defense of a net thwarting.

Being a good person actually depends on having good desires

I'm sure, but how you're defining what a good desire is rests upon a view regarding the propagation of, and the weight one applies to that propagation of desires, and the view that one believes they are good is simply a function of the lack of certainty regarding the extent to which they can be sure that they are in fact good and that their views, if adopted generally, would lead to the overall net increase in desire fulfilment.

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[Alonzo Fyfe]

Sorry I am late in responding. I have been involved in a formal debate (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=59835) relevant to the subject of this thread.

I wish to inform you that the most recent posting in that debate addresses the same concerns that you raised here. Specifically, it provides an analysis of how to compare one desire to others that addresses the concerns you raised above.

Your objections seem to treat desires as discrete events -- like actions. Desires are not discrete events, they are dispositional states. Propositional attitudes - to be more precise. Because they are propositional attitudes we can use propositional logic to look at the agreement or disagreement between different desires.

[wiploc]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
(1) All true propositions attiributing value to a state of affairs relates the state of affairs being evaluated to a set of desires. (Any proposition attributing value to something that is not stating the object of evaluation's capacity to fulfill desires is a false proposition.)

I like to translate dense prose into less precise but more easily understood language. One advantage of this is that it makes the ideas more easy to deal with; another is that it gives you a chance to correct me if I read you wrong. So, if I read you right, #1 says,

1. If you say something is good, you are saying that it is good for something. More specifically, you are saying it is good it is good for someone, that it satisfies someone's desires.




(2) Some propositions if this type are objectively true; the rest are objectively false.

2. No claim that something is good can be subjective. That is, if wiploc says things like, Broadcast News would have benefitted from a third act; Moonstruck was better than My Best Friend's Wedding; and Dances With Wolves was too long, these are not subjective judgements. He is either absolutely right or absolutely wrong.




(3) Common moral subjectivism unjustifiably and incorrectly limits the relevant set of desires used in moral propositions to those of the agent (or the assessor).

3. People who think morality is subjective are wrong. They should know better. Morality is not in the eyes of the beholder.




(4) Advancing common moral subjectivism, in the face of its obvious, deep, and significant problems, is not only an instance of advancing an incorrect theory, but seriously degrades the status of atheists as moral people. How can we be moral when we make such nonsensical claims about morality?

4. Christians call atheists "moral relativists" to make us look bad. It is bad tactics to fall in with them and say, "Yup, yup, I wouldn't know a moral virtue if it bit me on the ass. Well, I might know one, but there's no reason for you to ask what I think is moral because your moral truths are different from mine. There is no way that one person can meaningfully criticise the behavior of ano--- Hey! Stop that! Church and state are supposed to be separate!"

If truth were on the side of subjectivism, that might justify some of this behavior; but since it is both wrong and self destructive, people ought to cut it out.




How'm I doing, Alonzo?
crc

[Adrian Selby]

Your objections seem to treat desires as discrete events

I disagree. Statements I make regarding the propagation of desires, something I think you might be getting at, do not necessarily imply a propagation of discrete desires in an individual, but could mean the propagation of certain dispositional states in the individual and those affected by them.

As for your post that deals with my objection, could you point in particular to it in that formal debate, I'd find that helpful.

Also, do you have a response to my point about your view that 'morality is only about 'us'' is a statement that subjectivists interpret as 'in my view morality is only about 'us'', only as it stands, you're not characterising, it seems to me, the subjectivist position accurately.

Cheers,

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[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
.....
I am raising my objections against common moral subjectivism -- the type that reduces moral statements to statements of the form "I like," and "I do not like".

Moral statatements, instead, should be understood as statements of the form "good for us", "not good for us". Where "good" means "capable of bringing about the fulfillment of of our desires."
Alonzo Fyfe, despite my objections to your stance, I actually have quite a bit of sympathy for it.

Yet what I see in the above is no more --- or would quickly become no more --- than a semantically-empty euphemism replacement;
to me, there is no real difference in practice to saying
"I like"
or
"good for us".

I assume here you wish to emphasize a much greater social component, yet I do not see how your recommended strategy would be safe from cliqueishness replacing society in your equation.

[tronvillain]

I, of course, must disagree with the third proposition: "Common moral subjectivism unjustifiably and incorrectly limits the relevant set of desires used in moral propositions to those of the agent (or the assessor)." If one so desires, one may take into account the desires of everyone else, but if one does not so desire there does not appear to be any reason to do so. Subjectivism takes into account that individuals do take into account the desires of others to a greater or lesser degree, but realizes that few if any individuals take into account the desires of everyone equally with their own. Why should they?