Plantinga's [i]God, Freedom, and Evil[/i] [Archive I]

wiploc

August 5, 2003, 11:44 AM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
It is Christian doctrine that God has created beings such as Gabriel, Michael etc who have free will and have always chosen to do good.

That doctrine is wrong if it deals with Plantinga's special conception of free will, but it is probably about something else.

Let's have an example. Before creating the universe, god envisions all the worlds he can create. He can create worlds in which Gabriel sins, and worlds in which Gabriel does not sin. If god chooses to create a world in which Gabriel does not sin, then the ultimate choice, the factor determining whether Gabriel sins, lies with god, not with Gabriel. Thus, Gabriel doesn't actually have free will, since god is the one who determines that Gabriel does not sin.

Thus, according to FWp (Plantinga's special conception of free will) it is clear that Gabriel and Michael do not have free will. If the doctrines you speak of deal with FWp, they are wrong; but if they deal with FWx (any other conception of free will) they may be right, but without conflicting with Plantinga's argument.

crc

wiploc

August 5, 2003, 12:16 PM

Originally posted by wiploc

I apologize for the above strangely formatted duplicate post. I don't know what caused it. I can't delete it because I am locked out. I can edit the first of the two posts, but not the second one.

crc

[duplicate post deleted]

Steven Carr

August 5, 2003, 12:42 PM

Originally posted by wiploc
That doctrine is wrong if it deals with Plantinga's special conception of free will, but it is probably about something else.

Thus, according to FWp (Plantinga's special conception of free will) it is clear that Gabriel and Michael do not have free will. If the doctrines you speak of deal with FWp, they are wrong; but if they deal with FWx (any other conception of free will) they may be right, but without conflicting with Plantinga's argument.

Plantinga appears to have redefined free will to make it an unrecognisable concept.

Does Plantinga's logic mean that Satan was given the gift of free will but Gabriel and Michael weren't?

Nom

August 5, 2003, 02:11 PM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
Plantinga appears to have redefined free will to make it an unrecognisable concept.

Does Plantinga's logic mean that Satan was given the gift of free will but Gabriel and Michael weren't?

I have a vague memory from my Catholic/Jesuit upbringing of being taught that God created Satan even knowing he would rebel (I'm sure this is related to omnicience but it's been way too many years...). But using wiploc's example you could still fit both Gabriel and Satan into a non-free-will model. Just figure that God chose a world in which Gabriel does not sin, but Satan does. Still, I agree with your basic point: why isn't it possible to create a world in which people (or angels or whatever) can chose to sin or not, but always choose not to? :sigh: Looks like my summer reading list just expanded by one book...

theghostinthemachine

August 5, 2003, 06:29 PM

Originally posted by wiploc I've just finished reading [i]God, Freedom, and Evil, and it turns out to be non-persuasive.

Yes, but oddly enough, most contemporary philosophers agree that Plantinga's argument killed the logical problem of evil. Except for Gale, and a few others, the logical problem is dead.

Plantinga uses a convoluted argument to show that god cannot create a world in which we have free will. He's right about this, but only if we use his particular not-obviously-useful conception of free will. Plantinga's focus is on the fact that god cannot create a world with free will in which people do only good. He wants us not to notice that he has also proved that god cannot create a world with freewill in which people sin.

Boy, that sure refutes the argument. Transworld deprevity was just dealt a mortal blow!

Plantinga's argument cannot be useful to anyone who believes in freewill.

Anyone here disagree?
crc

Yes, I do. While I am not FWD person myself, it successfully refutes the logical problem of evil - which is it's purpose - it is not strictly a theodicy.

Steven Carr

August 5, 2003, 06:40 PM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
Yes, but oddly enough, most contemporary philosophers agree that Plantinga's argument killed the logical problem of evil. Except for Gale, and a few others, the logical problem is dead.

I agree. Indeed , Plantinga's argument kills the logical problem of legs dead as well.

That is the problem of believing that people only have one leg, although almost everybody I have seen has 2 legs.

However, there is no logical problem of legs. There is no logical inconstincency between my believing I have seen people with 2 legs and people actually only having one leg.

Of course, the fact that there is no logical inconsistency does not warrant me believing that people really do only have one leg.

Similarly, Plantinga's demonstration that there is no logical problem of evil produces nothing but a big yawn and a 'So what?' from most philosophers.

theghostinthemachine

August 5, 2003, 09:31 PM

<snip the most absurd analogy(?) ever produced. Argumentum Stupidity>

Similarly, Plantinga's demonstration that there is no logical problem of evil produces nothing but a big yawn and a 'So what?' from most philosophers.

Not true at all. Plantinga's argument revolutionized how philosophers think about the logical problem of evil. Mackie touted the logical problem of evil as a clear disproof of God, and so have others. Plantinga's rebuttal (more clearly stated in The Nature of Necessity) did exactly what it was intended to do - refute what atheists touted as a disproof of God. The shift since then has been to move to the evidential problem of evil. Putting the philosophy world (at the time, the atheistic endings of logical positivism) on its head is hardly a big yawn. Now go somewhere and read a book.

Kat_Somm_Faen

August 5, 2003, 10:22 PM

TGhostITM,

How exactly does saying that in order to have free will you have to have evil and God cant do anything about that? That means that God has a law he can not break and that law is governing even the behavior of God.

Hardly a good argument for a theist IMO.

The again if there is free will how can God claim there will be Armageddon and how can any of the "prophecies" in the Bible be true? They can only be true if there in fact IS an imutable destiny and that is in conflict with free will. And in fact if God knows future why the hell bother with this lifew? Just create a Hell and put those God know sin into it wothout any "life" and just fill Paradise with those that would obey God.

It would seem that this God is quite finite and limited; bound by the even greater laws and consideration that even humans can understand that.

This argument is quite lacking in content IMO.

wiploc

August 5, 2003, 11:30 PM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
Now go somewhere and read a book.

Be nice.
crc

wiploc

August 6, 2003, 12:07 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
Plantinga's argument revolutionized how philosophers think about the logical problem of evil.

Thanks. I suspected that was the case, but I hadn't seen it in black and white.

Mackie touted the logical problem of evil as a clear disproof of God, and so have others.

Mackie was clearly correct.

If there were a god who
1. Didn't want us to suffer, and
2. Was able to prevent our suffering, and
3. Knew how to prevent our suffering,
Then there would be no suffering.

There's no way around that. There are only five ways to even try to get around that. You could say any of these:

1. God isn't all that powerful.
2. God isn't all that good.
3. God isn't all that smart.
4. We don't suffer.
5. Logic doesn't count.

Among other moves, Plantinga makes move number 2. He claims god is good, but says there is no way to infer from god's goodness that he doesn't want us to suffer. In other words, he leaves the word "good" undefined. When Plantinga says god is "good," he isn't really making any claim at all.

Plantinga's rebuttal (more clearly stated in The Nature of Necessity) did exactly what it was intended to do - refute what atheists touted as a disproof of God.

It was sleight of hand. First, Plantinga's FWD (Free Will Defense) works only for his peculiar definition of free will. Second, if we do adopt that definition, then god can't give sinners free will any more than he can give free will to the righteous.

Let A be people having free will; and let B be people not sinning. Plantinga set out to show that god couldn't create a world in which both A and B are true. He did that --- again, only as regards his own notion of freewill --- but only by showing that god can't create a world in which A is true period, regardless of whether B is true. Proving that god can't give people free will is hardly useful as a "free will defense."

The shift since then has been to move to the evidential problem of evil. Putting the philosophy world (at the time, the atheistic endings of logical positivism) on its head is hardly a big yawn.

Granted, Plantinga's argument has been effective; people were persuaded by it. The point of this thread is discuss whether it actually makes sense.

crc

B. H. Manners

August 6, 2003, 12:55 AM

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
"Sataniel?"

Also, isn't the reference to Lucifer really a reference to Nebuchadnezzar?

It is a reference to the King of Tyre who was supposed to be destroyed because of his pride and sin. The reference will be found in the book of Isaiah.

The term Lucifer is not in the actual Hebrew.

Tyler Durden

August 6, 2003, 02:38 AM

Pardon me folks, but being stuck on a classical model of theism isn't contributing to the dialogue, other than dropping ugly strawmen. Plantinga's theism avoids the problems of a classical omnimax god, on the strength of a different flavor - process theology.

For example, the ultra-atheism of Sartre's philosophy does not dispute/refute/deny the God of process theology. :(

Luiseach

August 6, 2003, 02:42 AM

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
Pardon me folks, but being stuck on a classical model of theism isn't contributing to the dialogue, other than dropping ugly strawmen. Plantinga's theism avoids the problems of a classical omnimax god, on the strength of a different flavor - process theology.

For example, the ultra-atheism of Sartre's philosophy does not dispute/refute the God of process theology. :(

What's 'process theology'? :confused:

Luiseach the Curious.

Tyler Durden

August 6, 2003, 02:47 AM

Hell if i knew, Luis Each, cuz i never got over that hump in the philosophy of religion class. Here's more. (http://www.religion-online.org/cgi-bin/relsearchd.dll/showarticle?item_id=2493)

Steven Carr

August 6, 2003, 02:58 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
<snip the most absurd analogy(?) ever produced. Argumentum Stupidity>

Not true at all. Plantinga's argument revolutionized how philosophers think about the logical problem of evil.

Abuse is not a recognised philosophical position.

Please prove a logical contradiction between the following statements

1) Almost everybody I have seen has had 2 legs
2) People generally only have one leg.

If you can not (and you can't) please start following Plantinga's example and start believing we only have one leg :)

If Plantinga can refute the logical problem of evil, I can refute the logical problem of legs.

All I need is a logically possible world where I am deluded about the number of legs I have seen, or I have met only people with prosthetic legs , or some sort of Truman Show type world where I am systematically deceived, and ,voila, I have refuted the logical problem of legs.

All of these are actually far MORE plausible than Plantinga's created worlds.

But please show that my statements are logically inconsistent in all possible worlds (without resorting to abuse)

Luiseach

August 6, 2003, 03:13 AM

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
Hell if i knew, Luis Each, cuz i never got over that hump in the philosophy of religion class. Here's more. (http://www.religion-online.org/cgi-bin/relsearchd.dll/showarticle?item_id=2493)

Thanks for the link...I'll enjoy reading it.

:)

Steven Carr

August 6, 2003, 03:19 AM

Originally posted by wiploc

Plantinga uses a convoluted argument to show that god cannot create a world in which we have free will. He's right about this, but only if we use his particular not-obviously-useful conception of free will. Plantinga's focus is on the fact that god cannot create a world with free will in which people do only good.

As I have already pointed out, Plantinga's claim that it is logically possible that all creaturely essences suffer from Transworld Depravity (TM) fails if there are creatures such as Gabriel and Michael who clearly do not.

It is like claiming that it is logically possible that God could only create humans with white skin, when we know for a fact that there are black people.

Plantinga's claim is contradicted by the (alleged) facts, even on a Christian view.

And, transworld depravity is a really dubious concept to start of with.

Secular Pinoy

August 6, 2003, 03:49 AM

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
the God of process theology. :( Isnt' that panentheism? BTW, here's a webpage (http://mb-soft.com/believe/txn/process.htm) discussing process theology.

wiploc

August 6, 2003, 07:19 PM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
Yes, but oddly enough, most contemporary philosophers agree that Plantinga's argument killed the logical problem of evil. Except for Gale, and a few others, the logical problem is dead.

Ah, the argument from authority. And such authority!

Let me ask you this, if "most contemporary philosophers" disagreed with you, would it give you pause?

I started this thread because I see a fatal flaw in Plantinga's argument. I want to discuss the logic of that, not to take a vote among people who don't see the flaw.

The flaw is this. God had a choice of which world to create. He could create one in which people don't sin, or one in which they do. God didn't get to create that world because that would be god chosing that they not sin, thereby negating their free will.

The flaw in this argument is that god had to choose which world to create. If it negates people's free will for god to create one world, then it negates people's free will for him to create the other. Thus, the free will defense simply doesn't work.

Boy, that sure refutes the argument. Transworld deprevity was just dealt a mortal blow!

Transworld depravity is gibberish. It makes no sense to say that if I was Joan of Arc in an imaginary world, one of my characteristics in that world is that I am me in this world. That kind of talk has no "truth value."

crc

wiploc

August 6, 2003, 07:36 PM

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
Pardon me folks, but being stuck on a classical model of theism isn't contributing to the dialogue, other than dropping ugly strawmen. Plantinga's theism avoids the problems of a classical omnimax god, on the strength of a different flavor - process theology.

The PoE only refutes the traditional Christian god. It has nothing to do with the god of process theology.
crc

Xeno

August 7, 2003, 12:24 AM

My understanding of Plantinga's argument is as follows:

1. In order for moral good to be coherent, moral evil must be possible

This means that what makes a person's action at any particular event good is the fact that he freely chose good over evil.

2. In order for moral evil to be possible, people must be given free will

This means that for any person at a particular situation, it must be possible that they choose to do evil.

Therefore,

3. It is not possible for god to create a morally perfect world with free will

In doing so he would remove the right of every person to freely choose an evil action, thus making moral good an incoherent concept.

Your objection seems to be "But then he couldn't create a world where people sin", but that is hardly an objection. The free will defence means that it is possible for a person to do either. That is:

If God created a morally perfect world, a person is not free to sin.
If God created a morally imperfect world, a person is free to sin and free not to sin.

Plantinga's objection to a morally perfect world is that it is contradictory to human's free will and therefore impossible. A person doing good in a morally perfect world isn't doing good at all, they are doing what is necessary (Ie. all actions are necessarily good in a morally perfect world), and then personal agency goes out the window.

It should be noted the problem of evil is not conceded to either side, it is just the logical problem of evil is so unconvincing either way that atheist philosophers abandoned it.

Steven Carr

August 7, 2003, 12:43 AM

Originally posted by Xeno
Plantinga's objection to a morally perfect world is that it is contradictory to human's free will and therefore impossible. A person doing good in a morally perfect world isn't doing good at all, they are doing what is necessary (Ie. all actions are necessarily good in a morally perfect world), and then personal agency goes out the window.

It should be noted the problem of evil is not conceded to either side, it is just the logical problem of evil is so unconvincing either way that atheist philosophers abandoned it.

But God has created beings with free will who have never chosen evil eg Gabriel and Michael.

Are you claiming that Gabriel and Michael never do good , because they have never chosen evil?

How could God have created beings with free will who have never chosen evil, if you and Plantinga keep telling him it is impossible for him to do so?

As for the logical problem of evil being so unconvincing, the sheer extravagance of Plantinga's invention of transworld depravity shows how far theists have to reach to try to put up any sort of defence against it.

Why do you say that something is not good if it is 'necessarily' good?

It is like saying something is not a circle , if it must be a circle because it is the set of points equidistant from a given centre. It is illogical to say that if something is 'necessarily' X, then it is not X at all.

Xeno

August 7, 2003, 12:54 AM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
But God has created beings with free will who have never chosen evil eg Gabriel and Michael.

Are you claiming that Gabriel and Michael never do good , because they have never chosen evil?

How could God have created beings with free will who have never chosen evil, if you and Plantinga keep telling him it is impossible for him to do so?

This is more a question for Christian apologetics. If you want to put me in a position to defend Christian theism, I would say that Gabriel and Machael are good only in the context of this world, but in the world they live in (heaven), they do good necessarily.

As for the logical problem of evil being so unconvincing, the sheer extravagance of Plantinga's invention of transworld depravity shows how far theists have to reach to try to put up any sort of defence against it.

Extravegent or not, it has been enough to silence virtually all atheist philosophers against the logical poe.

Why do you say that something is not good if it is 'necessarily' good?

It is like saying something is not a circle , if it must be a circle because it is the set of points equidistant from a given centre. It is illogical to say that if something is 'necessarily' X, then it is not X at all.

This seems to me to be a false analogy. Moral good is not like being a square as moral evil is like being a circle. A circle is not a circle because it has the possibility of being a square and chooses to be a circle instead, but moral good is moral good because a person has the possibility of committing moral evil but chooses to be good instead.

Steven Carr

August 7, 2003, 01:29 AM

Originally posted by Xeno
his is more a question for Christian apologetics. If you want to put me in a position to defend Christian theism, I would say that Gabriel and Machael are good only in the context of this world, but in the world they live in (heaven), they do good necessarily.

Plantinga is not doing Christian apologetics??

You did not answer the question of how God created beings with free will who have never chosen evil (unlike Satan, who had free will and chose evil)

Why do you say Gabriel and Michael do good 'necessarily'? It is part of Christian doctrine that there was nothing compulsory about angels choosing to do good. It is just that God has created a world which contains these 2 beings who have free will and have always chosen good.

Extravegent or not, it has been enough to silence virtually all atheist philosophers against the logical poe.

Such as Sobel , Gale, Quentin Smith?

This seems to me to be a false analogy. Moral good is not like being a square as moral evil is like being a circle. A circle is not a circle because it has the possibility of being a square and chooses to be a circle instead, but moral good is moral good because a person has the possibility of committing moral evil but chooses to be good instead.

To say that somebody does not do good because he is a good person by nature is just playing with words.

Are there any possible worlds in which Jesus would have chosen to do a sinful act?

Is is nature such that Jesus does good 'necessarily'? Did Jesus have free will?

It does seem a strange definition of 'good'.

If I offer somebody 1 dollar to kill a child, which response indicates a morally good person and which a morally bad person?

'No way. I would never ever choose to kill a child for one dollar, no matter how many times you repeat your offer. I am just not interested in doing that. I would be sickened to the stomach even to think of doing that.'

or response 2 :-

'I suppose I could kill a child for one dollar. I won't this time, but ask me again, as there is a possibility I will accept'.

Clearly person 2 is the morally good person, as person 1 has ruled out the possibility of his ever choosing this evil act, while person 2 was really tempted, but has chosen to do good on this one time :-)

wiploc

August 7, 2003, 10:30 AM

Originally posted by Xeno
My understanding of Plantinga's argument is as follows:
<snip>
2. In order for moral evil to be possible, people must be given free will

This means that for any person at a particular situation, it must be possible that they choose to do evil.

Suppose I contemplated stealing a stick of gum. (Let's call stealing gum the "gum crime.") And let us suppose that if I comitted the gum crime, it would be be a sin. Let us further suppose that my decision was to not commit the gum crime. If god did not create the world, if the world just happened, we would all agree that I had free will, and that I used my free will to do good.

What if god created the world? Plantinga would say that I did not have free will. He would say that it was god who chose whether I would sin, by choosing which world to create. Therefore, in Plantinga's peculiar analysis, if I freely choose not to sin, my choosing no longer counts as free.

This seems to me a useless way to define free will. Plantinga can think of free will that way if he wants to; but if he wants to be consistent, he should also say that, in a god-created world, you also don't have free will if you choose to sin.

Therefore, according to Plantinga's definition of free will, If god created the world, you don't have free will regardless of whether you sin.

Therefore,

3. It is not possible for god to create a morally perfect world with free will

In doing so he would remove the right of every person to freely choose an evil action, thus making moral good an incoherent concept.

But, since it would be the same in a world with sin, it is impossible for god to make any world in which people have free will.

Your objection seems to be "But then he couldn't create a world where people sin", but that is hardly an objection. The free will defence means that it is possible for a person to do either. That is:

If God created a morally perfect world, a person is not free to sin.
If God created a morally imperfect world, a person is free to sin and free not to sin.

Plantinga's theory is that god contemplated all of the possible worlds, deciding which one to create. He thought, "I could create world A, in which Charlie doesn't create the gum crime, but if I do that, Charlie won't have free will because I will be the one who really decided that Charlie doesn't sin. Therefore, I'd better create world B, in which Charlie does committ the gum crime."

The problem with that analysis is that if god canceled my free will in the one case, then he canceled it in the other.

He didn't really cancel it in either case, as far as I can see. But if we want to say he did, and we want to be consistent, then we have to say he did in both cases, not just one. The logical result of Plantinga's move is to say god can't create any world with free will.

Don't say that, "is hardly an objection." If god cannot create any world with free will, then the FWD (free will defense) is disposed of.

crc

Xeno

August 7, 2003, 11:41 AM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
Why do you say Gabriel and Michael do good 'necessarily'? It is part of Christian doctrine that there was nothing compulsory about angels choosing to do good. It is just that God has created a world which contains these 2 beings who have free will and have always chosen good.

You should note in a morally imperfect world it is possible for someone to always choose good.

Such as Sobel , Gale, Quentin Smith?

As of yet they have not been able to come up with a convincing argument. Neither side has presented a convincing argument.

To say that somebody does not do good because he is a good person by nature is just playing with words.

That is not what I'm saying. You are confusing necessity with personal agency. A good person by nature does do good, but only in a morally imperfect world.

If I offer somebody 1 dollar to kill a child, which response indicates a morally good person and which a morally bad person?

'No way. I would never ever choose to kill a child for one dollar, no matter how many times you repeat your offer. I am just not interested in doing that. I would be sickened to the stomach even to think of doing that.'

or response 2 :-

'I suppose I could kill a child for one dollar. I won't this time, but ask me again, as there is a possibility I will accept'.

Clearly person 2 is the morally good person, as person 1 has ruled out the possibility of his ever choosing this evil act, while person 2 was really tempted, but has chosen to do good on this one time :-)

Is person 1 morally good if it is not logically possible for him to accept?

Xeno

August 7, 2003, 11:43 AM

Originally posted by wiploc
Therefore, in Plantinga's peculiar analysis, if I freely choose not to sin, my choosing no longer counts as free.

The key point is that you don't sin necessarily. In a morally perfect world, you cannot commit the gum crime because of necessity. In a morally imperfect world, it is logically possible for you to both commit the gum crime and not commit the gum crime, which is what makes not committing the gum crime morally good.

But, since it would be the same in a world with sin, it is impossible for god to make any world in which people have free will.

Perhaps you don't understand Plantinga's concept of free will in the first place.

It is not that God must create a world where he doesn't know what you are going to do, God must create a world where it is logically possible for you to do both moral good and moral evil. In a morally perfect world, you must do the morally right act by necessity. In a morally imperfect world, it is logically possible for you to do either moral good or moral evil.

He didn't really cancel it in either case, as far as I can see. But if we want to say he did, and we want to be consistent, then we have to say he did in both cases, not just one. The logical result of Plantinga's move is to say god can't create any world with free will.

Don't say that, "is hardly an objection." If god cannot create any world with free will, then the FWD (free will defense) is disposed of.

crc

It's true he cancels your libertarian free will either way, but no one takes the concept of libertarian free will seriously anymore. If you enter the candy store at a certain time, on a certain date, with a certain frame of mind, you will commit the gum crime. The difference is in a morally imperfect world the decision is based on personal agency over necessity.

wiploc

August 7, 2003, 01:42 PM

Originally posted by Xeno
The key point is that you don't sin necessarily. In a morally perfect world, you cannot commit the gum crime because of necessity.

If I'm good, you say it was morally necessary.
If I'm bad, you say it was free will.

That's a double standard. Why won't you let me be good and still call it free will?

In a morally imperfect world, it is logically possible for you to both commit the gum crime and not commit the gum crime, which is what makes not committing the gum crime morally good.

But if I don't actually commit the crime, then you say it wasn't logically possible for me to commit it. Why do you say that? And why do you change your line if I do commit the crime?

Perhaps you don't understand Plantinga's concept of free will in the first place.

I don't agree with it, but I think I do understand it. He says that if there are two possible worlds in which I have free will, one in which I do the crime, and the other in which I don't, then god cannot create the one in which I don't commit the crime. By creating that world, he would be choosing that I not sin. If he does the choosing, I don't really have free will.

That is Plantinga's twisted conception of free will. The problem is that he doesn't use it consistently. Plantinga thinks god can create the world in which I sin without overshadowing my free will in the same way that he would by creating the world in which I don't sin. That doesn't make any sense.

It is not that God must create a world where he doesn't know what you are going to do,

That would certainly solve Plantinga's problem, but he doesn't make that move. He allows that god is really omniscient; where he hedges is on god's omnipotence and goodness.

God must create a world where it is logically possible for you to do both moral good and moral evil. In a morally perfect world, you must do the morally right act by necessity. In a morally imperfect world, it is logically possible for you to do either moral good or moral evil.

Among the possible worlds in which he gives us free will, there are some worlds in which we choose not to sin. Those are morally perfect worlds, right? God no more extinguishes our free will by creating those worlds than he extinguished our free will by creating this one.

It's true he cancels your libertarian free will either way, but no one takes the concept of libertarian free will seriously anymore.

I'm not familiar with "libertarian free will." Would you give me a short explanation.

In any case, I'm using Plantinga's conception of free will. I don't take it seriously, but I am willing to hear him out, to see where it logically leads. His problem is that it doesn't lead where he wants, so he two-steps between two different concepts of free will to get his desired outcome.

If you enter the candy store at a certain time, on a certain date, with a certain frame of mind, you will commit the gum crime. The difference is in a morally imperfect world the decision is based on personal agency over necessity.

An omnipotent god could have created a world in which I enter the candy store at another time, say because I had a flat tire. If it is god's choice when I commit the crime, why isn't it god's choice when I don't commit the crime? If I have freewill when I sin, why don't have freewill when I don't sin? If it is necessity when I don't sin, why isn't it necessity when I do sin?

crc

Steven Carr

August 7, 2003, 02:27 PM

Originally posted by Xeno

As of yet they have not been able to come up with a convincing argument. Neither side has presented a convincing argument.

Was Jesus morally good as there is no possible world in which he can choose wrong?

If you think Plantinga's arguments are at all relevant, show that there is a logical problem of legs :-

ie prove that the following are logically inconsistent in all possible worlds

1) Almost everybody I have seen has had 2 legs
2) People only have 1 leg.

And explain why showing that these are logically consistent, by creating an absurd world where they are not inconsistent, lends any support to the believers in one legs.

Even if Plantinga's dubious metaphysics and bizarre creation of something called 'transworld depravity' (although Christians are adamant that Gabriel and Michael have free will and do not choose evil), actually worked, the effect would still be a big yawn.

Steven Carr

August 7, 2003, 02:46 PM

Originally posted by wiploc
If I'm good, you say it was morally necessary.
If I'm bad, you say it was free will.

That's a double standard. Why won't you let me be good and still call it free will?

Plantinga's (and Xenos') arguments are a lot more understandable if you subsititute 'desire to do evil' for 'free will'.

God must create people with a desire to do evil, because if he created them with a desire to do good, they would not have free will (read 'desire to do evil').

Not only does it make Plantinga's arguments more understandable, but also true, as they are then tautologus.

Steven Carr

August 7, 2003, 02:52 PM

Originally posted by Xeno

In a morally perfect world, you must do the morally right act by necessity. In a morally imperfect world, it is logically possible for you to do either moral good or moral evil.

Where are the goalposts now?

Now it is not enough for us to be able to CHOOSE between good and evil to have freewill, now we actually have to commit evil.

If we were perfect beings , we would still be choosing between good and evil, and fighting our tendency to do evil (perhaps by praying constantly to God to give us strength , guidance and support as we fight temptation.)

Xeno's argument is that if we were good people, we would always choose good, and so not be good people.......

This seems illogical to me.

Of course, this idea that in a world where God had created beings with free will who never choose evil, it would be LOGICALLY impossible for them to choose wrong is inconsistent, and a strawman representation of what atheist proponents of the logical problem are asking for.

Angels , such as Gabriel and Michael, can logically choose evil. Even if you don't believe in them it is conceptually possible for them to have done so. After all, other angels have chosen evil.

So there is nothing LOGICALLY impossible about Gabriel and Michael choosing evil. God just happens to have created a world where they have free will and have never chosen evil.

Just as it was logically possible for there to have been no America. It just so happens that God has created a world where there was an America.

God could have created a world where there were beings with free will who, as it turns out, never commit sin, without removing ANY logical possibility of it having turned out otherwise.

Mageth

August 7, 2003, 03:46 PM

Jesus, Gabriel, et al have been mentioned, but what about God? Xians often define god as good, perfect, and unable to do "wrong" or "evil", supposedly because of his nature.

Under that definition in combination with some of the arguments on this thread, esp. those of Xeno, it would seem that God has no free will (he can't choose to do wrong), and that God cannot be good, because everything he does is by definition "good", and what "good" he does he does "necessarily."

theghostinthemachine

August 7, 2003, 11:40 PM

[i]Originally posted by Steven Carr Abuse is not a recognised philosophical position.

A bit sensitive. I see no lack of insults towards theists here at infidels. Most often, it seems arguments are dismissed as 'slight of hand' arguments, or big 'so whats'. I apologize if you felt insulted, but I found your analogy to be disingenious and absurd.

Please prove a logical contradiction between the following statements

1) Almost everybody I have seen has had 2 legs
2) People generally only have one leg.

If you can not (and you can't) please start following Plantinga's example and start believing we only have one leg :)

First, you are making a category error. These are the propositions that are question:

(i) God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.

(ii) Evil exists.

Evil, as Christian theists view it, is the privation of good. These are your propositions:

(i') Almost everybody I have seen has had 2 legs.

(ii') People generally only have one leg.

Since atheists are attempting a reductio ad absurdum, it is apparent that your analogy does not work. And further, you have worded this so there is no contradiction (you may be blind, you have not seen very many people), so it would be impossible to elicit a contradiction. But this would not force theists to follow Plantinga and start to believe that people generally only have one leg. However, premise (ii') would be denied - it certailny not a necessary truth. The logical problem of evil holds (ii) 'evil exists' to be a necesarry truth in order to draw a contradiction with (i). Nor is your above, consistent to Plantionga's argument or the logical problem of evil. More properly stated, your argument should say:

(I) Almost everybody has two legs.

(II) People generally have only one leg.

In which a reductio can be drawn.

The logical problem of evil argues from the fact of (ii) 'evil exists' to attempt a reductio. Your argument cannot argue from the fact of (ii') 'People generally only have one leg'.

Plantinga argument maintains that in order for there to be a contradiction, more premise are needed that are necessary truths, which the athiest has not offered. Plantinga maintains that the following is possible (not that it attains):

"God is omnipotent, and it was not within His power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil."

Plantinga's work, among showing a few other keen insights, demonstrated that a possible world exists where the above is possible.

If Plantinga can refute the logical problem of evil, I can refute the logical problem of legs.

Only by your use of a false analogy, and a fasle premise.

All I need is a logically possible world where I am deluded about the number of legs I have seen, or I have met only people with prosthetic legs , or some sort of Truman Show type world where I am systematically deceived, and ,voila, I have refuted the logical problem of legs.

Great! But this has nothing at all to do with the logical problem of evil, and Plantinga's refutaion of it. As mentioned, you have already worded it so there is no contradiction. Plantinga argued from necessary truths, your second premise is not true at all.

All of these are actually far MORE plausible than Plantinga's created worlds.

But please show that my statements are logically inconsistent in all possible worlds (without resorting to abuse)

I am sure that you do find these arguments to be more plausible than Plantinga's. You have your atheist blinds on really tight. Most philosophers (including your atheist philosophers) would disagree with you. Are you more trained in philosophy, logic, and modalities than they are?
I rely in part, on their expertise in the area of philosophy. You seem to be more concerned with your presuppositions and atheist faith.

Xeno

August 7, 2003, 11:49 PM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
Was Jesus morally good as there is no possible world in which he can choose wrong?

Again, this is a question for Christian apologists. I am just defending Plantinga's logical argument against the POE.

A Christian theist could claim the following:

Either,
1. Jesus did moral good necessarily because he was God.
Or,
2. Jesus chose to do moral good over moral evil in every possible case.

If you think Plantinga's arguments are at all relevant, show that there is a logical problem of legs :-

ie prove that the following are logically inconsistent in all possible worlds

1) Almost everybody I have seen has had 2 legs
2) People only have 1 leg.

And explain why showing that these are logically consistent, by creating an absurd world where they are not inconsistent, lends any support to the believers in one legs.

I fail to see how the problem of legs relates to the problem of evil at all. The problem of legs has nothing to do with necessity nor logically possible worlds.

Even if Plantinga's dubious metaphysics and bizarre creation of something called 'transworld depravity' (although Christians are adamant that Gabriel and Michael have free will and do not choose evil), actually worked, the effect would still be a big yawn.

Ipse dixit, I'm afraid. The reaction so far hasn't been a big yawn.

Where are the goalposts now?

Now it is not enough for us to be able to CHOOSE between good and evil to have freewill, now we actually have to commit evil.

Ipse dixit/strawman. Logical necessity being applied to your actions is where your free will is denied.

If we were perfect beings , we would still be choosing between good and evil, and fighting our tendency to do evil (perhaps by praying constantly to God to give us strength , guidance and support as we fight temptation.)

This is not true. You wouldn't be fighting anything. You would be doing moral good by necessity.

Xeno's argument is that if we were good people, we would always choose good, and so not be good people.......

Straw man. That is not my argument at all. My argument is if it is logically impossible for you to do evil, you cannot be called good, in any meaningful sense of the word.

Of course, this idea that in a world where God had created beings with free will who never choose evil, it would be LOGICALLY impossible for them to choose wrong is inconsistent, and a strawman representation of what atheist proponents of the logical problem are asking for.

Atheist proponents are questioning the existence of moral evil in the world an omnibenevolent god created, there is no strawman. Plantinga's argument shows how a morally perfect world and free will are inconsistant. If you cannot logically deduce how Plantinga's argument fails to offer compatibility between moral evil and an omnibenevolent god, the logical problem of evil fails for the atheist.

God could have created a world where there were beings with free will who, as it turns out, never commit sin, without removing ANY logical possibility of it having turned out otherwise.

But the issue is a morally perfect world. It is not logically possible for a being to commit evil in a morally perfect world. If you admit this, then you admit that moral evil has to be possible in the world to allow free will. If you admit moral evil has to be possible, the problem of evil fails for the atheist.

Xeno

August 7, 2003, 11:52 PM

Originally posted by wiploc
If I'm good, you say it was morally necessary.
If I'm bad, you say it was free will.

That's a double standard. Why won't you let me be good and still call it free will?

That is not what I'm saying.

If you do good in a morally imperfect world, you are good.
If you do evil in a morally imperfect world, you are evil.
It is not necessary for you to be either in a morally imperfect world.

In a morally perfect world, you would necessarily do good. You'd have no choice to do either.

But if I don't actually commit the crime, then you say it wasn't logically possible for me to commit it. Why do you say that? And why do you change your line if I do commit the crime?

I'm not changing my line at all. It is logically possible for you to do either in a morally imperfect world.

I don't agree with it, but I think I do understand it. He says that if there are two possible worlds in which I have free will, one in which I do the crime, and the other in which I don't, then god cannot create the one in which I don't commit the crime. By creating that world, he would be choosing that I not sin. If he does the choosing, I don't really have free will.

No, he can create either world. The only way he can't create either world is if he creates a morally perfect world, and that's when your free will disappears.

Among the possible worlds in which he gives us free will, there are some worlds in which we choose not to sin. Those are morally perfect worlds, right? God no more extinguishes our free will by creating those worlds than he extinguished our free will by creating this one.

But Plantinga takes it to the extreme, and thinks about the morally perfect world, not just a world in which you choose not to commit the gum crime. In a morally perfect world, all your actions are logically necessary. That is the distinction between a morally perfect and a morally imperfect world. When your actions are logically necessary you lose free will.

I'm not familiar with "libertarian free will." Would you give me a short explanation.

Libertarian free will states that you can choose two actions at one time in one possible world: That is, you can both choose to commit the gum crime and choose not to commit the gum crime in the same world.

An omnipotent god could have created a world in which I enter the candy store at another time, say because I had a flat tire. If it is god's choice when I commit the crime, why isn't it god's choice when I don't commit the crime? If I have freewill when I sin, why don't have freewill when I don't sin? If it is necessity when I don't sin, why isn't it necessity when I do sin?

crc

You have Plantinga's concept of free will in both cases, because in each case your actions were not logically necessary. They would only be logically necessary in a morally perfect world.

Xeno

August 7, 2003, 11:53 PM

Originally posted by Mageth
Jesus, Gabriel, et al have been mentioned, but what about God? Xians often define god as good, perfect, and unable to do "wrong" or "evil", supposedly because of his nature.

Under that definition in combination with some of the arguments on this thread, esp. those of Xeno, it would seem that God has no free will (he can't choose to do wrong), and that God cannot be good, because everything he does is by definition "good", and what "good" he does he does "necessarily."

This is another question a Christian apologist would have a better answer for. A Christian theist could claim:

1. God does good necessarily only in the context of our world.
2. God, being omnipotent, has the power to do evil, but the omnibenevolence of his nature prevents him from doing so. In this way he also necessarily does good.

I don't think Christian theists would have a problem with this definition, as they usually equate God to mean good anyway.

Steven Carr

August 7, 2003, 11:58 PM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
(i') Almost everybody I have seen has had 2 legs.

(ii') People generally only have one leg.

Since atheists are attempting a reductio ad absurdum, it is apparent that your analogy does not work. And further, you have worded this so there is no contradiction (you may be blind, you have not seen very many people), so it would be impossible to elicit a contradiction. But this would not force theists to follow Plantinga and start to believe that people generally only have one leg. However, premise (ii') would be denied - it certailny not a necessary truth. The logical problem of evil holds (ii) 'evil exists' to be a necesarry truth in order to draw a contradiction with (i).

What is this? 'evil exists' is a 'necessary truth'?

Are you claiming that it is impossible for evil not to exist?

You claim Plantinga would deny my premise 2 (People only have one leg), because it is not a necessary truth, and that is why my analogy is false , because 'evil exists' is a necessary truth.

Please tell us what a 'necessary truth' is, and why 'evil exists' is held to be a 'necessary truth' by Plantinga.

1) An all-good, all-powerful God exists who would eliminate evil
2) Evil exists

My analogy does work.
Just as you deny premise 2 (People only have one leg). I deny Premise 1 (an all-good, all-powerful God exists)

Nor is your above, consistent to Plantionga's argument or the logical problem of evil. More properly stated, your argument should say:

(I) Almost everybody has two legs.

(II) People generally have only one leg.

In which a reductio can be drawn.

The logical problem of evil argues from the fact of (ii) 'evil exists' to attempt a reductio. Your argument cannot argue from the fact of (ii') 'People generally only have one leg'.

Only by your use of a false analogy, and a fasle premise.

So Ghost rewrites my analogy , simply so he can claim that it is false. Truly desperate.

My analogy contained a known fact
(I can see people have two legs), and a dubious proposition, apparenly contradicted by the known facts (people only have one leg)

The argument from evil also contains a known fact (evil exists) and a dubious proposition, apparenly contradicted by the known facts (an all-powerful, all-good God exists)

So my analogy is very exact, despite Ghost's claims to the contrary.

To recap, Ghost cannot prove a logical contradiction between
1) Ghost can see that people have 2 legs
2) People only have one leg

and he is unwilling to admit that simply showing that there is no LOGICAL problem of legs is really unconvincing.

Just as Plantinga's (dubious) demonstration that there might be a world in which he can just about make consistent the premises

1) An all-good, all-powerful God exists would eliminate evil
2) Evil exists

is also unconvincing.

Ghost claims my analogy is totally absurd because I am using a false premise. Exactly! He is beginning to grasp the logical problem of evil!

He is getting close to admitting that his 'an all-good, all-powerful God exists' is also a false premise.

Steven Carr

August 8, 2003, 12:13 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
[B]A bit sensitive. I see no lack of insults towards theists here at infidels. Most often, it seems arguments are dismissed as 'slight of hand' arguments, or big 'so whats'. I apologize if you felt insulted, but I found your analogy to be disingenious and absurd.

First, you are making a category error. These are the propositions that are question:

(i) God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.

(ii) Evil exists.

.......

Great! But this has nothing at all to do with the logical problem of evil, and Plantinga's refutaion of it. As mentioned, you have already worded it so there is no contradiction. Plantinga argued from necessary truths, your second premise is not true at all.

I do like this.

(i) God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.

(ii) Evil exists.

are the premises that Ghost says Plantinga was working from, and Ghost now claims these are 'necessary truths'.

Is it really a necessary truth that God exists?

I am sure that you do find these arguments to be more plausible than Plantinga's.

I like this as well. Ghost concedes that my arguments that there is no logical problem of legs are very convincing (there is no contradiction, he says), and then chastises me for finding these arguments more plausible than Plantinga's dubious creation of transworld depravity, where Plantinga claims to know what would happen in every conceivable, and inconceivable universe, in all possible circumstances.

Can Plantinga really tell us what would happen in all possible universes?

You have your atheist blinds on really tight. Most philosophers (including your atheist philosophers) would disagree with you. Are you more trained in philosophy, logic, and modalities than they are?

You mean atheist philosophers have never queries 'transworld depravity'? This is getting dangerously close to you spreading false witness.

But you can demonstrate the plausibility of transworld depravity for me if you wish.

How plausible is it that all creatures suffer from transworld depravity when there are supposedly creatures like Gabriel and Michael who have free will and who have never chosen evil (unlike Satan, an angel who also had free will and chose evil)?

Steven Carr

August 8, 2003, 01:04 AM

Originally posted by Xeno
This is another question a Christian apologist would have a better answer for. A Christian theist could claim:

1. God does good necessarily only in the context of our world.
2. God, being omnipotent, has the power to do evil, but the omnibenevolence of his nature prevents him from doing so. In this way he also necessarily does good.

I don't think Christian theists would have a problem with this definition, as they usually equate God to mean good anyway.

So Xeno's logic is that we don't do good if we live in a morally perfect world where we are necessarily good, but God does good because he is necessarily good.

I think Xeno is just playing word games......

wiploc

August 8, 2003, 08:06 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
You have your atheist blinds on really tight. Most philosophers (including your atheist philosophers) would disagree with you. Are you more trained in philosophy, logic, and modalities than they are?

Be nice.

crc

wiploc

August 8, 2003, 08:36 AM

Originally posted by Xeno
I fail to see how the problem of legs relates to the problem of evil at all. The problem of legs has nothing to do with necessity nor logically possible worlds.

I think I have to take your side here. The problem of legs strikes me as a good move for proponents of the evidential problem of evil. We could be deceived by the appearance of excess evil, but that is no more likely than that we are deceived by the appearance that most people have two legs.

But I don't see how the problem of legs can help with the logical problem of evil.

Atheist proponents are questioning the existence of moral evil in the world an omnibenevolent god created, there is no strawman. Plantinga's argument shows how a morally perfect world and free will are inconsistant. If you cannot logically deduce how Plantinga's argument fails to offer compatibility between moral evil and an omnibenevolent god, the logical problem of evil fails for the atheist.

But the issue is a morally perfect world. It is not logically possible for a being to commit evil in a morally perfect world. If you admit this, then you admit that moral evil has to be possible in the world to allow free will. If you admit moral evil has to be possible, the problem of evil fails for the atheist.

Am I right that you are making each of these three moves:
1. It seems to me that you call any world with no sin a "morally perfect world."
2. A morally perfect world is morally perfect because of necessity.
3. Perfection due to necessity isn't really moral at all.

If I am not misrepresenting you, it seems that you are apply the lable "morally perfect" only to worlds which are morally neutral.

Also, when we posit the posibility of worlds with freewill but without sin, we are suggesting that people could be good out of a desire to do good, not out of necessity. It seems to me your responses assume that perfect goodness is always due to necessity rather than free will. Is that your position? If so, why is that your position?

If that is not your position, then can we set aside all this talk about moral necessity, and focus on our actual question: Why didn't god make a world in which people havef free will but don't commit sins?

crc

Wyz_sub10

August 8, 2003, 10:02 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
A bit sensitive. I see no lack of insults towards theists here at infidels. Most often, it seems arguments are dismissed as 'slight of hand' arguments, or big 'so whats'.

This is a general reminder to everyone who participates in this forum.

If you see a post that you feel is inappropriate or insulting, please use the "Report this post to a moderator" function to alert the moderators of thie potential problem.

Personal insults are never appropriate and will not be tolerated - not to theists or atheists or anyone.

Dismissing arguments or attacking ideas is not the same as insulting an individual. The latter is not acceptable.

The moderators do try to catch insults on their own, but with an open forum such as this one, there will always be comments seen by others before they are seen by us. Again, if you see any instances of personal insults or attacks, please advise us as soon as possible.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Wyz_sub10,
EoG Moderator.

Steven Carr

August 8, 2003, 12:22 PM

Originally posted by wiploc

But I don't see how the problem of legs can help with the logical problem of evil.

It doesn't. It is simply a parody of the idea that by proposing absurd worlds, we can create the logical possibility of making two seemingly contradictory positions non-contradictory, as though that were an acheivement.

Steven Carr

August 10, 2003, 02:35 AM

Originally posted by wiploc
I think I have to take your side here. The problem of legs strikes me as a good move for proponents of the evidential problem of evil. We could be deceived by the appearance of excess evil, but that is no more likely than that we are deceived by the appearance that most people have two legs.

But I don't see how the problem of legs can help with the logical problem of evil.

Perhaps I can rephrase it as the logical problem of a round-Earth

Is there any logical contradiction between the following statements?

1) Photos from space show a round Earth
2) The Earth is flat.

Clearly not, as it is logically possible that these photos are part of a government conspiracy.

Now that I have disposed of the logical problem of a round Earth, should we start believing the world is flat?

Should flat Earthers start boasting on Internet forums that the logical problem of a round Earth has been discredited?

rainbow walking

August 10, 2003, 05:31 AM

Ghost: (i) God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.

(ii) Evil exists.

Evil, as Christian theists view it, is the privation of good. These are your propositions:

rw: The privation of good is evil?

In order for (i) to have created a state of affairs where(ii) obtains by volitional choice, three conditions must be shown:

1. A basis for knowledge from which truth obtains.

2. A justifiable objective foundation for morals.

3. A consistant consequential expectation from either moral choice.

For "1" to be factual, "2" and "3" must obtain.

For "2" to obtain, "1" and "3" must be demonstrable

For "3" to be consistant, "1" and "2" must obtain.

In our current state of affairs:

"1" is defeated by relativity.

"2" is defeated by "might makes right"

"3" is defeated by the "inconsistency" inherent in the failure of "1" and "2" to obtain.

Thus (i) cannot be a logical derivative from this state of affairs.

This is further augmented by the following logic:

In any given state of affairs where "1", "2", or "3" are subject to TME and/or CHANCE, then "freewill" is not a justifiable argument for the existence of said state to have been created by (i).

In such a state of affairs where "1" is subject to CHANGE, relative to TIME and/or CHANCE, then "2" is not justifiable and "3" is not consistant.

In such a state of affairs where "3" is not CONSISTANT, then "1" is not obtainable and "2" is not justified.

In such a state of affairs where "2" is not TRUE, the "1" and "3" is not obtainable.

Conclusion: Platinga's argument fails.

A classic example demonstrating this failure: Bob's wife hasn't been sleeping good lately. Bob has to get up in the middle of the night to go to the bathroom. Bob, for the benefit of his wife, elects not to turn on a light so as not to wake her up, (as she happens to be sleeping at this particular moment). On the way back from the bathroom Bob stumps his toe on the bedpost and awakens his wife who cannot go back to sleep. Now both Bob and his wife are suffering due to Bob's initial morally good choice not to turn on a light.

In this example "3" did not obtain, thus "1" and "2" are contingent on TIME and/or CHANCE. Platinga's freewill justification is useless. Bob made a morally good choice and both he and his wife suffered for it. Accidents happen and this state of affairs is relative to TIME and/or CHANCE.

According to Ghost and christian theists, the privation of good is evil. So evil occured here in spite of a volitionally made choice based on the good of another. Bob's wife was deprived of her sleep, a condition that existed prior to Bob's moral choice. Further, Bob was deprived of a pain-free set of toes, a condition which existed prior to Bob's moral choice. Here we have a good moral choice leading to evil deprivation of good. This sort of inconsistency occurs every day in this state of affairs.

wiploc

August 10, 2003, 09:54 AM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
Perhaps I can rephrase it as the logical problem of a round-Earth

Is there any logical contradiction between the following statements?

1) Photos from space show a round Earth
2) The Earth is flat.

Clearly not, as it is logically possible that these photos are part of a government conspiracy.

Now that I have disposed of the logical problem of a round Earth, should we start believing the world is flat?

Should flat Earthers start boasting on Internet forums that the logical problem of a round Earth has been discredited?

You are still doing induction from evidence rather than deduction from premises; therefore your analog is still the evidential problem of evil rather than the logical problem of evil.
crc

wiploc

August 12, 2003, 11:45 AM

Originally posted by wiploc
You are still doing induction from evidence rather than deduction from premises; therefore your analog is still the evidential problem of evil rather than the logical problem of evil.
crc

I note that the "logical problem of evil" is badly named. The fact that you are doing inductive logic doesn't mean you aren't doing logic.
crc

Steven Carr

August 12, 2003, 12:18 PM

Originally posted by wiploc
I note that the "logical problem of evil" is badly named. The fact that you are doing inductive logic doesn't mean you aren't doing logic.
crc

I would still like to know if flat Earthers should start boasting on Internet forums that the logical problem of a round Earth has been discredited, and what response round Earthers should make, once they have conceded that the logical problem has been discredited.

wiploc

August 12, 2003, 12:42 PM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
I would still like to know if flat Earthers should start boasting on Internet forums that the logical problem of a round Earth has been discredited, and what response round Earthers should make, once they have conceded that the logical problem has been discredited.

I don't think anybody would take such a flat earth argument seriously nowadays, but it was critical when Galileo turned hes telescope on the heavens. The Pope had to defend the position that the appearance of motion in the heavens didn't matter when we knew from the bible (as interpreted by the Popes) that there is no motion in the heavens.

crc

rainbow walking

August 12, 2003, 07:53 PM

Originally posted by wiploc
I note that the "logical problem of evil" is badly named. The fact that you are doing inductive logic doesn't mean you aren't doing logic.
crc

rw: And conversely if you argue a deductive argument of evil that doesn't mean it's any less evidential. I've ran into this convention also.

Steven Carr

August 14, 2003, 05:44 PM

Originally posted by wiploc
I've just finished reading God, Freedom, and Evil, and it turns out to be non-persuasive.

Plantinga uses a convoluted argument to show that god cannot create a world in which we have free will. He's right about this, but only if we use his particular not-obviously-useful conception of free will.
Plantinga's argument cannot be useful to anyone who believes in freewill.

I agree.
Plantinga says there are true counterfactuals ie God knows what all creatures would do in all situations.

And I mean all creatures!

God has chosen not to create Superman, Santa Claus, and the Tooth Fairy in this particular universe, but according to Plantinga, God knows for a definite fact what Superman , Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy would choose to do in every conceivable situation.

This is too bizarre to be believable.

wiploc

December 22, 2003, 11:28 AM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
As I have already pointed out, Plantinga's claim that it is logically possible that all creaturely essences suffer from Transworld Depravity (TM) fails if there are creatures such as Gabriel and Michael who clearly do not.

It is like claiming that it is logically possible that God could only create humans with white skin, when we know for a fact that there are black people.

Plantinga's claim is contradicted by the (alleged) facts, even on a Christian view.

There are Christians who don't believe in Hellfire, and Christians who don't believe in Adam and Eve. Maybe Craig is a Christian who doesn't believe in Gabriel and Michael. Or maybe he doesn't believe they have free will. Or maybe he doesn't believe they are sinless.

It seems to me that Craig's free will defense can be better refuted by pointing out internal contradictions rather than pointing out disavowable external contradictions.

crc

Steven Carr

December 22, 2003, 02:57 PM

Originally posted by wiploc

It seems to me that Craig's free will defense can be better refuted by pointing out internal contradictions rather than pointing out disavowable external contradictions.

But Craig has not only to disavow Gabriel and Michael, but also prove that it is logically impossible for them to exist, if he wants to show it is logically impossible for God to create beings with free will who happen never to choose evil.

Proving that Christian doctrines are logically impossible is rather unpleasant for Craig, who might like to reflect upon the fact that Gabriel and Michael are both mentioned in the Bible.

wiploc

December 22, 2003, 06:26 PM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
But Craig has not only to disavow Gabriel and Michael, but also prove that it is logically impossible for them to exist, if he wants to show it is logically impossible for God to create beings with free will who happen never to choose evil.

Proving that Christian doctrines are logically impossible is rather unpleasant for Craig, who might like to reflect upon the fact that Gabriel and Michael are both mentioned in the Bible.

Good point. Since he's an old earth creationist, he may not believe in Adam and Eve either. He would hate to have to admit that on stage.

crc

Vorkosigan

December 23, 2003, 10:53 PM

Goddam Steve. I never knew. Is Plantinga's argument really so bad? He's perfect -- I've never run into a Plantinga argument that wasn't ridiculous when you really thought about it.

Really, next year I got to get that anti-Plantinga site up and running.

Vorkosigan

spinoza

December 24, 2003, 01:28 AM

What exactly is wrong with the "logical" POE? Is it that the argument presumes God is omnipotent, and omniscient, and omnibenevolent? I.e., the POE defeats the concept of God only if all three things are true? Such that, if God is not quite omnipotent, or not completely benevolent, then the argument doesn't work?

How can we tell if we are exercising free will? The Christian God supposedly created both earth and heaven. Is there no free will in heaven because it's "necessarily" moral? If so, does that make a circular statement to contend that heaven is "good"?

Is there anything to be said about the amount of evil in the world? Why couldn't God create a world with the possibility of evil, but only a little bit of evil? Is the thesis that moral good can only exist if there is a possibility of moral evil like the Buddhist notion of opposites? If you have no contrasts, then you can't tell what is. You only know what pleasure is, because it's contrasted with pain. If you were "happy" all the time, with no variations, it wouldn't count as happiness because you would never be aware that things could be different. Being contains the idea of nothingness. Is it like that?

wiploc

December 24, 2003, 08:50 AM

Originally posted by spinoza
What exactly is wrong with the "logical" POE? Is it that the argument presumes God is omnipotent, and omniscient, and omnibenevolent? I.e., the POE defeats the concept of God only if all three things are true? Such that, if God is not quite omnipotent, or not completely benevolent, then the argument doesn't work?

That can't be the problem. If the PoE somehow attempted to prove that no gods exist because that particular god can't exist, then that would be a problem. But it doesn't. The PoE only undertakes to prove that a god cannot be omnipotent and omniscient and omnibenevolent.

Is there anything to be said about the amount of evil in the world? Why couldn't God create a world with the possibility of evil, but only a little bit of evil?

This sounds more like the evidential PoE. The logical PoE proves there shouldn't be any suffering.

Is the thesis that moral good can only exist if there is a possibility of moral evil like the Buddhist notion of opposites? If you have no contrasts, then you can't tell what is. You only know what pleasure is, because it's contrasted with pain. If you were "happy" all the time, with no variations, it wouldn't count as happiness because you would never be aware that things could be different. Being contains the idea of nothingness. Is it like that?

I suppose one could raise such an argument as an attempted defense against the PoE. I've run across it often enough on the street, though I doubt whether it happens much in writing.

I might deal with such an argument by pointing out that if you couldn't have pleasure before suffering, and couldn't have suffering before pleasure, then you couldn't ever have either.

And, even if there were some reason to think we couldn't have pleasure without pain in the absense of a miracle, that would not suggest that an omnipotent god couldn't make it so by casting a miracle.

No, the defense against the PoE that people think works is Plantinga's free will defense. Plantinga starts by downgrading god from true-omnipotent to punk-omnipotent, arguing that god is not the master and creator of logic. Even using miracles, Plantinga's god cannot make a square circle or do any other logical contradiction.

Then he goes for a contradiction: God can't both give us free will and force us to be nice to each other. If we aren't nice, some of us will suffer; and if we have free will, some of us won't be nice. Therefore, giving us freewill without suffering would be like giving us squares without corners; not even god could do it.

He executes this "proof" by toying with the idea of free will until it becomes foreign and useless.
crc

rainbow walking

December 24, 2003, 10:29 AM

Originally posted by spinoza
What exactly is wrong with the "logical" POE? Is it that the argument presumes God is omnipotent, and omniscient, and omnibenevolent? I.e., the POE defeats the concept of God only if all three things are true? Such that, if God is not quite omnipotent, or not completely benevolent, then the argument doesn't work?

How can we tell if we are exercising free will? The Christian God supposedly created both earth and heaven. Is there no free will in heaven because it's "necessarily" moral? If so, does that make a circular statement to contend that heaven is "good"?

Is there anything to be said about the amount of evil in the world? Why couldn't God create a world with the possibility of evil, but only a little bit of evil? Is the thesis that moral good can only exist if there is a possibility of moral evil like the Buddhist notion of opposites? If you have no contrasts, then you can't tell what is. You only know what pleasure is, because it's contrasted with pain. If you were "happy" all the time, with no variations, it wouldn't count as happiness because you would never be aware that things could be different. Being contains the idea of nothingness. Is it like that?

rw: The only problem I see with the various versions of the Logical PoE is they fail to make a direct connection between the cause of evil and an omnimax god. They tend to focus on god's non-intervention as being a contributive factor rather than using an example that directly ties into those cases of god's intervention as being directly linked to evil and suffering. When you leave god in a non-interventionist position the theist can come up with any number of semi-logical apologetics to justify his abstinence from involvement in reducing or eliminating evil and suffering. The example you offered is a classic one.

However, if you take the evil to god directly, such as his prejudicial and inconsistent method of introducing his existence to man resulting in competing religions and factional divisions within each religion that result in bloodshed and violence...then you have an ironclad logical PoE that the theist has no credible refutation for.

Normal

December 24, 2003, 11:41 AM

No, the real "problem" with the logical POE is that it fails to establish a necessary connection between the existence of suffering and the non-existence of an omnimax God. If man is responsible for his own suffering through the exercise of his free will, and god values free will above everything, then suffering does not imply god's non-existence, therefore, the logical poe fails.

If Plantinga doesn't convince you, read Aquinas, Augustine, and Leibniz.

rainbow walking

December 24, 2003, 02:20 PM

Originally posted by Normal
No, the real "problem" with the logical POE is that it fails to establish a necessary connection between the existence of suffering and the non-existence of an omnimax God. If man is responsible for his own suffering through the exercise of his free will, and god values free will above everything, then suffering does not imply god's non-existence, therefore, the logical poe fails.

If Plantinga doesn't convince you, read Aquinas, Augustine, and Leibniz.

rw: Been there, done that. None of them address the logical problem of the suffering caused by a prejudicial god. Man had nothing to do with a god's decision to introduce his existence to the world, (assuming a god exists), and man had nothing to do with a god deciding to do so prejudicially by selecting individuals to reveal himself to and then trusting them to convey his revelation in books and sermons. If god is capable of revealing himself to some men, like Abraham or David, Moses or Samuel, then by-god he can do so for all men and cut out the middle man process. That he has not done so, but instead revealed himself to Jews one way, Arabs another, and Christians yet another, all violence and suffering accrued goes to his account and man's freewill had zilch to do with that.

Sensei Meela

December 24, 2003, 02:29 PM

From the Catholic Encyclopedia (NewAdvent.org (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05649a.htm))�How God�s permission of the evil which He foreknew and could have prevented is to be reconciled with His goodness, is not fully considered; St. Augustine states the question in forcible terms, but is content by way of answer to follow St. Paul (in reference to Divine ordination and �unsearchable� judgment).�

The entry continues: ��Thus it will be seen that evil is not a real entity; it is relative. What is evil in some relations may be good in others; and probably there is no form of existence which is exclusively evil in all relations, Hence it has been thought that evil cannot truly be said to exist at all, and is really nothing but a "lesser good." But this opinion seems to leave out of account the reality of human experience. Though the same cause may give pain to one, and pleasure to another, pain and pleasure, as sensations or ideas, cannot but be mutually exclusive. No one, however, has attempted to deny this very obvious fact; and the opinion in question may perhaps be understood as merely a paradoxical way of stating the relativity of evil.

There is practically a general agreement of authorities as the nature of evil, some allowance being made for varying modes of expression depending on a corresponding variety of philosophical presuppositions. But on the question of the origin of evil there has been, and is a considerable diversity of opinion. The problem is strictly a metaphysical one; i.e. it cannot be solved by a mere experimental analysis of the actual conditions from which evil results. The question, which Schopenhauer has called "the punctum pruriens of metaphysics", is concerned not so much with the various detailed manifestations of evil in nature, as with the hidden and underlying cause which has made these manifestations possible or necessary; and it is at once evident that enquiry in a region so obscure must be attended with great difficulty, and that the conclusions reached must, for the most part be of a provisional and tentative character�.

But when the universe is considered as the work of an all-benevolent and all-powerful Creator, a fresh element is added to the problem. If God is all-benevolent, why did He cause or permit suffering? If He is all-Powerful, He can be under no necessity of creating or permitting it; and on the other hand, if He is under any such necessity, He cannot be all-powerful. Again, if God is absolutely good, and also omnipotent, how can He permit the existence of moral evil?�

�The evil from which man suffers is, however, the condition of good, for the sake of which it is permitted. Thus, "God judged it better to bring good out of evil than to suffer no evil to exist" (St. Aug., Enchirid., xxvii). Evil contributes to the perfection of the universe, as shadows to the perfection of a picture, or harmony to that of music (De Civ. Dei,xi).�

And a little tidbit I like to throw out when some presents a claim like 'Free Will screwed up God's Plan':
�St. Thomas also provides explanations of what are now generally considered to be the two main difficulties of the subject, viz., the Divine permission of foreseen moral evil, and the question finally arriving thence, why God choose to create anything at all. First, it is asked why God, foreseeing that his creatures would use the gift of free will for their own injury, did not either abstain from creating them, or in some way safeguard their free will from misuse, or else deny them the gift altogether? St. Thomas replies (C. G., II, xxviii) that God cannot change His mind, since the Divine will is free from the defect of weakness or mutability. Such mutability would, it should be remarked, be a defect in the Divine nature (and therefore impossible), because if God's purpose were made dependent on the foreseen free act of any creature, God would thereby sacrifice His own freedom, and would submit Himself to His creatures, thus abdicating His essential supremacy--a thing which is, of course, utterly inconceivable. Secondly, to the question why God should have chosen to create, when creation was in no way needful for His own perfection, St. Thomas answers that God's object in creating is Himself; He creates in order to manifest his own goodness, power, and wisdom, and is pleased with that reflection or similitude of Himself in which the goodness of creation consists.� God clearly does not value free will above everything; it is His glory that He values most. Suffering exists to bring God glory. God is responsible for the existence of suffering. Free will is only the scape-goat, and we humans (who weild it, ostensibly) are lambs for the slaughter.

"God judged it better to bring good out of evil than to suffer no evil to exist" makes no sense, as "no evil [existing]" seems to fly in the face of what is usually considered "suffering". Why is a world with evil 'better' than a world without it? It seems to me (to borrow an analogy) to be spilling the milk in order to show how good you are at cleaning it up.

reasoning was at least as inadequate as Platinga's]

Normal

December 24, 2003, 02:38 PM

Originally posted by rainbow walking
None of them address the logical problem of the suffering caused by a prejudicial god.

They are all very concerned with that problem. Revisit Leibniz on the problem of evil (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/).

Originally posted by rainbow walking
Man had nothing to do with a god's decision to introduce his existence to the world, (assuming a god exists), and man had nothing to do with a god deciding to do so prejudicially by selecting individuals to reveal himself to and then trusting them to convey his revelation in books and sermons. If god is capable of revealing himself to some men, like Abraham or David, Moses or Samuel, then by-god he can do so for all men and cut out the middle man process. That he has not done so, but instead revealed himself to Jews one way, Arabs another, and Christians yet another, all violence and suffering accrued goes to his account and man's freewill had zilch to do with that.

Since the above has nothing to do with necessity, I must conclude it is irrelevant to the logical problem of evil. You must realize that when constructing a logical argument, using contingent events (such as revelation, what is written in the Bible Torah, Koran, etc.) is useless.

The claim you need to refute is this:

It is logically possible that in all cases of man's suffering, man committed some action through his freewill either to cause it or to deserve it.

And remember, this is a logical argument, use only valid rules of deduction.

A) The bible says X, therefore the above is false, is a non sequitur
B) My 5 year old brother has cancer and I can't think of any he did to deserve that is an argument from ignorance.
C) People seem to suffer more then other people for no good reason is also an argument from ignorance.

Merry Christmas

rainbow walking

December 24, 2003, 02:39 PM

I found this interesting Sensei: ��Thus it will be seen that evil is not a real entity; it is relative.

But their moral foundation is absolute...give me a break.

rainbow walking

December 24, 2003, 02:58 PM

Originally posted by Normal
They are all very concerned with that problem. Revisit Leibniz on the problem of evil (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/).

Since the above has nothing to do with necessity, I must conclude it is irrelevent to the logical problem of evil. You must realize that when constructing a logical argument, using contingent events (such as relevation, what is written in the Bible Torah, Koran, etc.) is useless.

The claim you need to refute is this:

It is logically possible that in all cases of man's suffering, man commited some action through his freewill either to cause it or to deserve it.

And remember, this is a logical argument, use only valid rules of deduction. The following arguments which I anticipate you might try to use are all invalid:

A) The bible says X, therefore the above is false, is a non sequitir, B) My 5 year old brother has cancer and I can't think of any he did to deserve that is an argument from ignorance.
C) People seem to suffer more then other people for no good reason is also an arugment from ignorance.

Merry Christmas

rw: Please refrain from lecturing me on the logic involved in PoE. If I had intended the above response to be a formal syllogism I would have stated it as such. I was only giving you the bird's eye view...not presenting an actual syllogism.

Now to address some of your objections: Since the above has nothing to do with necessity, I must conclude it is irrelevent to the logical problem of evil. You must realize that when constructing a logical argument, using contingent events (such as relevation, what is written in the Bible Torah, Koran, etc.) is useless.

rw: Am I to infer from this that it is your contention that whatever god decides to do does not obtain to a "Necessity"? How would you be defending the reputation of this god had he not introduced his existence...allegedly...to mankind? Seems to me the knowledge or belief that a god exists is a NECESSARY prerequisite to both our positions...yes?

Oh, and I found Leibnez to be waffling all over the place in his defense and seems to change positions from the start of his career to his final labors. Care to explain this?

Now this: The claim you need to refute is this:

It is logically possible that in all cases of man's suffering, man commited some action through his freewill either to cause it or to deserve it.

rw: Not a problem. It is not logically possible that man would have murdered other men over various interpretations, revelations and institutional religious dogmas had a god not FIRST used prejudicial methodologies to make his existence known. Any suffering incurred from this irresponsible behavior cannot be logically attributed to man. Man's freewill had nothing to do with god's methods of introduction.

I hate to dissappoint your anticipated expectations of a response but allow me to formally state the syllogism to avoid any further confusion.

If X then Y

~Y therefore ~X

(a). Let X be an omnimax God

(b). Let Y be a state of affairs where X uses fair and impartial methods of making his existence known to all men, everywhere in every generation.

(i). Y has not obtained and is evidenced by the multivarious flavors of competing world religions each claiming to be the truth and product of X's decision to make his existence and will known.

(ii). ~Y is a state of affairs where X has incorporated prejudicial, inconsistent and incoherent revelations of his existence and will to various cultures leading to religious turmoil along with the subsequent violence and suffering that attains as a direct result.

Conclusion: ~Y is a direct route to the negation of omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence therefore ~X.

Season's Greetings.

wiploc

December 24, 2003, 04:55 PM

Originally posted by Normal
The claim you need to refute is this:

It is logically possible that in all cases of man's suffering, man committed some action through his freewill either to cause it or to deserve it.

I don't understand what this has to do with the PoE.

Suppose I claim to be an perfect mechanic, explaining that, by this, I mean two things:

1. I say I can fix your breaks so they can never fail. Nothing can make them fail, not accident, sabotage, wear and tear --- nothing! If I want to fix your breaks like that, I can do it.

2. I want to fix your brakes like that. Really. This isn't a minor whim; it is my obsession, my primary goal. I have no significant conflicting goals.

So, hearing these representations, you hire me to fix your brakes. After which, they fail, causing you injury.

Whereupon you return to me and explain that I must have been wrong. Either I was wrong about my ability to make your brakes so they couldn't fail, or I was wrong about how much I desired to make your breaks so they couldn't fail. Either way, you conclude, I am not a perfect mechanic, as I defined "perfect."

If I respond by arguing that you must have deserved brake failure, or must have incurred brake failure by the exercise of your free will, how does that constitute a rebuttal of your claim that I am not perfect?

crc

Angrillori

December 27, 2003, 12:32 PM

Originally posted by wiploc
The flaw is this. God had a choice of which world to create. He could create one in which people don't sin, or one in which they do. God didn't get to create that world because that would be god chosing that they not sin, thereby negating their free will.

The flaw in this argument is that god had to choose which world to create. If it negates people's free will for god to create one world, then it negates people's free will for him to create the other. Thus, the free will defense simply doesn't work.

Thank you thank you thank you.

This is so often brushed aside. The fact is, that, given an infinite number of possible worlds, God chose this one. This specific one. With these specific choices made. There were worlds where no choices were made that resulted in suffering. As long as there are a finite number of choices made in a finite amount of time in any specific universe, and an infinite number of universes to choose, this is a mathematical certainty. But God chose this one to actualize.

So. A universe WAS chosen. Arbitrarily? Randomly? With foresight? Without? Regardless, one WAS chosen. So, if "to choose a universe" removes free will, then free will WAS removed.

So. Free will was removed AND we got this universe. I feel kinda ripped off.

wiploc

December 27, 2003, 04:39 PM

Originally posted by Angrillori
So. Free will was removed AND we got this universe. I feel kinda ripped off.

:notworthy :notworthy :notworthy

crc

HRG

December 28, 2003, 03:00 AM

Originally posted by Normal
No, the real "problem" with the logical POE is that it fails to establish a necessary connection between the existence of suffering and the non-existence of an omnimax God. If man is responsible for his own suffering through the exercise of his free will,

You are throwing together the attacker and the victim into the big pot "mankind". Actually, B is suffering through A's exercise of his free will.

and god values free will above everything, then suffering does not imply god's non-existence, therefore, the logical poe fails.

If free will implies lots of suffering, then God's valuing the free will of the attackers above everything is incompatible with omnibenevolence. Did he ask the victims for their consent ?

The attempted rebuttal of the logical PoE assumes without any argument that God's personal desire for free will justifies the suffering of others. Let's assume that a playwriter demands that actors do actually suffer in productions of his plays, and he does so in the name of aesthetic verisimilitude - which he values above everything. Is this a justification for making the actors suffer ?

regards,
HRG.