Is morality relative or objective? Holy Heretic vs. Alonzo Fyfe

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Ladies and Gentleman,

This is a formal debate between Holy Heretic and Alonzo Fyfe based on the following topic:

The Relativity vs. The Objectivity of Morality.

To clarify the scope, the debate will concern whether or not morality is relative and subject to individual perspective or remains objective regardless. The debate will last 8 rounds and Holy Heretic will go first.

A Peanut Gallery (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&postid=1113345#post1113345) has been set up in MF&P for the rest of us to comment on the debate.

Best of luck to both participants! :)

Jason

[Holy Heretic]

Thanks to Alonzo Fyfe for participating in this discussion. I hope it will be productive.:)
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All morality is brought into existence by human will. It is open to be changed or disobeyed by that very-same will. Morality, as such, is an emotive judgment, that is, a measurement of personal sentiment, varying from person to person. All factors which induce moral sentiment are physical, subject to, and relative to the situation at hand. This stance of moral relativism holds that moral judgment is a measurement of one's own regard (or the regard of a particular doctrine) towards the subject, and that is not an evaluation of intrinsic non-material or natural law.

This does not imply that any and all actions are of equal moral merit, or are equally permissible; it implies that equivalency and permissibility are not established outside the confines of human sentiment. It does not suggest that it is "okay" to do whatever one wishes- because there are no standards by which an "okay" action is determined universally- nor does it imply that "it is wrong to judge people," because no such intrinsic maxim exists.

What it does is describe the nature of moral systems- which like all systems (computer or sewage, for instance) are conceptual and established according to the intentions of their founders. The assertion that moral systems are subjective and naturalistic does not imply one should go on a hedonistic rampage any more than an explanation of how a sewage system works implies that one should flood it. What you do with these facts is up to you.

The most common method of displaying the supposed horror of moral relativism is to discuss a particularly gruesome act. For example: Does the relativist think that torturing children is fine just because the torturer thinks so? To take the question literally: no. There is no universal framework in which torture becomes fine once someone decides it’s so- the is no universal framework. It’s enough to say that the perpetrator finds that his deeds are good, just as he may find a particularly horrendous French dish tasty- but his opinion is of no necessary relevance to us. We don’t need to start eating bad French food because he likes and we don’t need to accept his acts as being permissible. The preferential nature of our opinion is only detracting if we assume preference is of no intrinsic value- but in our denial that intrinsic values exist, this doesn’t come as a problem.

In the following I will review what I believe the be the nature of moral choice and morality itself.

A Slight Confusion of Context

Bertrand Russell wrote:

"We judge, for example, that happiness is more desirable than misery, knowledge than ignorance, goodwill than hatred, and so on. Such judgements must, in part at least, be immediate and a priori. Like our previous a priori judgements, they may be elicited by experience, and indeed they must be; for it seems not possible to judge whether anything is intrinsically valuable unless we have experienced something of the same kind. But it is fairly obvious that they cannot be proved by experience; for the fact that a thing exists or does not exist cannot prove either that it is good that it should exist or that it is bad."

One may notice that when discussing moral values, Russell uses terms such as judgment and desire as being key to our perception of value. Yet at the same times he denies any experiential motive for such things- as if judgment and desire could not possibly by themselves elicit worth of any kind. However, proclamations of desire are just that- announcements of one’s personal preferences, which are substantiated, empirically, by the announcement itself. Russell in the attempt to portray such judgments as being imposed by universal dictums and not by biology. I am happy to proclaim that modern science is enjoying progress in its efforts to prove the opposite.

Thus to demand evidence for the universality of judgment is an error in terms. Happiness is desirable because there is someone who desires it. Separate the man from the value and you have a confusion of context. Imply that one takes place without the other and you are simply wrong.

Reason and Emotion Agree on Decision Making

Let’s take the average morning dilemma. I have to get up and receive my education. My immediate mood doesn’t consider this an agreeable option; I’m still half-asleep, the pillow feels comforting, and I don’t want to hear the same mundane lecturing I do everyday. It’s not too long before some element of reason within my head objects. I know that I need to go to class, earn a passing grade, and receive an education which will without a doubt be of use to me in my life. So, in the case where I follow the advice of my intellect and go to class- am I performing the ritual of surrendering my desires and following a path of pure reason?

The answer to that question lies within a simple means of inquiry: if going to class means absolutely nothing to me, can I get up and go anyway? The obvious answer is no. Education is a good thing. But it is good not in itself but because what it offers is important to me. If it wasn’t I would have no motive to pursue my education- it would make no distinguishable difference to me. What then, is the value of education without my valuation? Nil.

Now say that there is one Joe who does not see it as important to go to college and earn a degree. Isn’t it rationally recommendable for him to do so regardless of his desires? The only way to substantiate the affirmative is to say that there are values which maintain worth outside and beyond what Joe or anyone else might want. Education can be “good” even if no one give a damn about it. Good to or for whom? Good in itself. However, as it was earlier mentioned: conceptions of those things performed by human evaluation outside of human values and desire could not exist- and if they did- they would be irrelevant when the time for discussion making came around.

So, why do I get up in the morning? Because I want to. Even if I want some other things at the same time, the possibilities and conclusions my intellect offers are more enticing. Thus, there is no place for Vulcan-like logic, or transcendent reason, in our picture of human behavior.

Relativists Can be Idealistic People

I am an ethical relativist. I also happen to be a staunch Libertarian, and more radical in that aspect than the radicals themselves. This being said, as an ethical relativist, I deny that things have the intrinsic or objective worth Libertarians claim many things have- such as life, man, property, free trade, rationality, etc. Nor do I claim that Libertarian principles of conduct have any value of their own. Like all absolutist principles, they lead to several amusing hypothetical situations and questions. For example: Why is blasting your door with a ray gun a violation of your property while shining a flash light at it isn’t? Or- can I steal your rifle if I need it to save hundreds of people from a mad man on a killing spree? (Friedman).

Not only do I deny that the values and principles of Libertarianism are objective, but do not grant any of its supposed fruits as being inherently worthy: that includes the utilitarian or “man qua man” arguments. I don’t believe, for instance, that the benefits of Capitalism are intrinsically better than the millions of lives slaughtered by the Communist regime in Soviet Russia. Why then, do I support Libertarianism, and how could I possibly advertise it to anyone?

The moral absolutist believes that human judgment without transcendent morality is impossible. So he implies that all men who assert that judgment involves preference should abstain from it, and proclaims a contradiction when they don’t fall for his own proclivities. Such maxims are nonexistent. Nothing within the relativist doctrine demands the suspension of sensibility or value. An act of injustice exists as an impracticality amidst men, and it is wholly consistent that they withhold their tolerance. Such impracticalities are not of matching moral merit -they are what people deem them to be- and there is no intrinsic obligation of forbearance. The action is simply offensive; and sensible men act to prevent offense.

An effectual mind recognizes that human preferences are of critical importance amidst the affairs of men; so he reasons and acts to abide by or manipulate such preferences, as his own reasoning and disposition demands. This course of action is not doomed to result in suffering, aggression, savagery, and relentless hedonism (these are the ironic results of most absolutist doctrines, namely Christian), but contrarily, like getting up in the morning even if it causes some temporary discomfort- morality as dictated by preference is fully capable of achieving peace and order.

It is also capable of achieving the opposite. Those negative “achievements” listed above are not likely to attract people, and I don’t hesitate to educate others on how to avoid them. Each person for his/her own reasons is welcome to accept my political theory, and each person who has no reason to accept it is welcome to disdain that same theory. I do not offer any universal justifications. I offer results, and you are free to like or dislike them accordingly. It is my preferred goal to prevent the latter from happening. Which is why I hold the political and moral position that I do.

Citations

David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom, Open Court Publishing 1989.

Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press 1997.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Argument 1: Reductio ad Absurdum of Arguments from the Subjectivity of Language.

I am going to prove that all propositions in the field of geometry are subjective.

First, a triangle is a four-sided figure. You might be tempted to disagree with me, but all you can really offer in the form of 'proof' is that there is some convention to use the word 'triangle' to refer to three-sided figures. But arguments grounded on social convention are all subjective. Somewhere, perhaps on a distant planet, there may be people who use 'triangle' to refer to four-sided figures. You can give me no objective argument proving that one way of using the word is correct and the other way is incorrect.

If the number of sides in a triangle is subjective, then all things that depend on this is subjective. And, indeed, all propositions in the field of geometry are subjective.

Obviously, this argument contains a mistake, because geometry certainly is not subjective.

The mistake rests in the fact that the argument pretends to be talking about one thing (triangles), when in fact it is talking about two things (triangles and the word 'triangle').

A triangle has three sides and the sum of the interior angles equals 180 degrees. 'Triangle' is an eight letter word that starts with the letter 'T' (or, sometimes, 't') and contains 5 consonants. Many of the things true of 'triangle' are subjective, like it's spelling. We could easily have decided to add a silent 's' at the end of the word, or made the third letter a 'y'. But the properties of three sided figures are not so easy to change. That the sum of their interior angles equals 180 degrees remains a fact independent of social convention.

So, in discussing whether morality is subjective, we must take care to distinguish this from a discussion of whether 'morality' is subjective.


Common Usage

Allow me to pretend that I encounter somebody who seriously wants to claim that triangles can have four sides. I answer, the word 'triangle' can certainly be redefined so that it refers to four-sided things, but three-sided figures cannot contain four sides.

Now, I must make good on my claim that triangles have three sides.

I could say, "I hereby define the word 'triangle' so that it refers to closed figures comprised of three line segments that meet at their end points . . . yadda . . . yadda . . . yadda. And since three sided figures have three sides by definition, I win. So there. <Sticks tongue out at opponent.>"

But the answer is empty. If a person arbitrarily claims that "triangles can have four sides" or "morality is subjective", my equally arbitrary definitions are not relevant. What do we really care about? The real question is whether the term as it is commonly used refers to something having four sides or is subjective.

The as commonly used meaning of a word is the meaning that best explains and predicts its use. What 'triangle' means, in any meaningful way, is determined by whatever theory of meaning that can best explain and predict how people use the term. The best meaning-theory for the word 'triangle' holds that it refers to three-sided figures, and from this any claim that triangles have four sides can be dismissed. If the best meaning-theory of moral terms refers to something that is objective, then statements of the form 'morality is subjective' can be dismissed in the same way.

"God likes" Theory

I am going to start with "God likes" theory as a way of illustrating how we evaluate different meaning-theories of moral claims. This theory links moral value to what "god likes" and what "god does not like."

Plato attributes to Socrates (in a discussion with Euthyphro) a significant objection to the "God likes" meaning-theory. "Is X good because God likes X? Or does God like X because it is good?" If we go with the first option, then anything God likes would be good -- and God himself has no reason to prefer one option over the other. Imagine God sitting in his workshop. "Let's see, 'Thou shalt torture young children for pleasure'? Yes? No? <flips coin> No. Shucks." Until God flips his coin and makes a decision, one is as good as the other.

This is, at best, odd. It makes more sense to say that torturing young children for pleasure is wrong in a sense that even God ought to disapprove of it. But, if this is true, then torturing young children for pleasure has a badness that is independent even of God.

"I like" Theory

The next meaning-theory says that moral claims take the form "I like"/"I do not like". Terms such as "approve" and "judge" can be substituted for "like."

First, I would like to make note of is that the Euthyphro argument applies here, too. "Is torturing young children wrong because I disapprove of it, or do I disapprove of it because it is wrong?" "I like" theory goes with the first interpretation, in which case I can turn torturing young children into the highest of all virtues simply by learning to like it. The more I get off on having children tortured, the more virtuous it becomes.

Second, "I like" theory cannot handle debate.

Person 1: I judge X to be good.

Person 2: I judge X to be bad.

Person 1: But that's wrong, I judge X to be good.

Person 2: No I don't. I judge X to be bad!

It may be true, moral debates may well consist of nothing more than shouting matches between mentally deficient individuals. Or, perhaps, it's the 'I like" meaning theory that is deficient. Perhaps, if we looked a little further, we can find a better alternative.

"We like" Theory

"we like"/"we do not like" theory handles the problem of debate. It refers to things about which different people can meaningfully disagree. However, there is a very easy way to resolve this type of dispute. Take a vote. If we find out that 80% of the people approve of X, and 20% of the people disapprove, we can show the results to the 20% so that they can immediately surrender. "I'm sorry. I was wrong. We do not approve of X."

Yet, when we show these polls to those who belong to the 20% minority, they don't surrender. They simply look at the poll and say, "How depressing, 80% of the people are idiots." But they can’t be idiots about “We like X”. So, the minority’s claim must be about something else.

Even the members of the majority don't think that polls provide decisive evidence that they are right. If they did, they would greet minority representatives with mocking laughter and say, "Here you go, claiming that on the whole we generally disapprove of X -- because that is what it means to call X wrong -- when, in fact, the polls clearly say we generally approve of X." Even members of the majority faction recognize that being in the majority does not make one right by definition.

"Good for me" Theory

In our value vocabulary, the concepts of "like" and "dislike" are often found in conflict with the concepts of "good for" and "bad for." I do not like to exercise, but it is good for me. Holy Heretic does not like to go to class in the morning, but recognizes that it is good for him. So, perhaps moral claims are not "like/dislike" claims at all. Perhaps we they are "good for me/bad for me" claims.

If I can murder my boss and take her job, that would be good for me. So, it must be right. Somebody may protest, "But it is too risky, it can't possibly be good for you." Yet, a "good for me" theorist would still have to agree that If I can murder my boss and get away with it, then it would be the right thing to do. All I need to do to turn murdering my boss into 'the right thing' -- maybe even an obligation! -- is to come up with a sufficiently risk-free plan.

Again, this is just a re-application of the Euthyphro argument. The Euthyphro argument against "God likes" theory does not depend on God actually approving on torturing young children. It is a sufficiently strong objection to note that "If God liked torturing young children, then it would be good." Similarly, "If I can murder my boss and get away with it, then it would be good," is a sufficiently strong problem for "good for me" theories.

"Good for me" theories also run into the problem of nonsensical debates.

Person 1: X is good for me.

Person 2: No it's not. It's bad for me.

Person 1: I tell you it's good for me, you moron!

Person 2: Somebody must have dropped you on your head as an infant, Person 1, because anybody with an undamaged brain can plainly see that X is good for me.

Actually, I would suspect both individuals involved in such a debate as suffering from some sort of mental defect.

"Good for us" Theory

Okay, let's try "good for us" theories. Well, it does make sense to have people debate issues about what is "good for us". My wife and I do it all the time – sometimes quite loudly. Furthermore, it is possible for a person to be right, even if he is the only person on the planet who believes “X is good for us.” I may be the only person on the planet who knows that aliens will blow the planet to bits unless we get rid of all of our nuclear weapons. My claim that "we ought to get rid of our nuclear weapons" would be true even if everybody else thought I was nuts.

And we can't settle the issue with a vote.

EUREKA!

Moral disputes are disputes about what is "good for us". Is the institution of capital punishment "good for us?" Is separation of church and state "good for us?" Is homosexuality "bad for us?" Is a right to abortion "good for us?" Is slavery "good for us?"

Now that we know what moral terms mean, we can now go on to the next part of the question. Are answers to questions about what is "good for us?" objective or subjective?

Oh, happy days.

When Socrates shows up and asks, "Is this good because it is good for us, or is it good for us because it is good?" I can put my arm across his shoulder and say, "Socy, baby, have you been sampling the ouzo again?"

Unfortunately, Socrates might respond by darkening the room and saying in a most menacing voice, "Do not take me for a conjurer of cheap logic, Alonzo Fyfe." Then, he may well ask, "Are you saying that the only reason torturing a child for pleasure is wrong is because people generally do not get enough pleasure from it?"

"Well . . . um . . . (gulp) . . . no."

Even more refinements are necessary. But, I see by the word count that I am running out of room, so let's just fast forward to the end.

[fast forwarding noises]

bd-from-kg defends the alternative "what I would like if I had sufficient knowledge and understanding" in the thread
The Answer: Subjective/Objective Morals (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=56623).

I discuss a number of other options in my series Ethics without God: A Presonal Journey (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=46876)

[/fast forwarding noises]


"Good for us to like"

Here is where I think we would end up if we followed this line of reasoning. Morality is concerned with what it would be good (or bad) for us to like.

[An annoying person sitting off in the back snickers loudly.] "Um, Alonzo, when you say, 'good for us to like', what do you mean by 'good'?"

I mean, by this, the only way that things can be good in the real world. To be good something must have the capacity to fulfill desires, either directly (as in, beauty or pleasure) or indirectly (as in, exercise, education, or a visit to the dentist).

There is no mystery in evaluating things according to their capacity to fulfill desires. We do it all the time. No mysterious supernatural entities or semi-magical value properties are required. All we need is the thing being evaluated, a set of desires, and some way to relate the thing to the desires.

But, then, desires themselves are things. They exist in the real world, sitting right there between your left ear and your right ear, and behind your eyebrows. Statements about desires are statements about how the brain is wired, postulated on the basis of their capacity to explain real-world observations (human actions).

So, when we talk about a relationship between a desire and an object, we are talking about a relationship between two real things. This type of relationship is as real as, let's say, the relationship between the earth and the sun. "The earth orbits around the sun at an average distance of 93 million miles." It's a fact, perfectly appropriate for any science textbook. “Jimmy wants to have sex with Susan.” is a fact. Well, it depends on how Jimmy’s brain is wired and what is true of Susan. Still, this is a proposition that is also capable of being true, or false.

If objective, factual statements can be made about the relationships between desires and objects, and desires are also objects, we can make factual claims about the relationship between desires and other desires. That is to say, we can ask and answer meaningful questions about what it is good for us to like. And if you and I disagree about what this relationship is, we are disagreeing about a matter of fact.

The moderators might just as well just go ahead and put the Morals forum into the Science forum because that's where we are headed.

The Standard Objections

Would Socrates be satisfied? All I can think of to say here is that I can't think of an objection that Socrates would be able to come up with. The only objections I can think of are objections that postulate the existence of some sort of intrinsic value, and intrinsic values do not exist. Objection overruled.

Does it sanction torturing children? I think that it would be very difficult to make the case that torturing children is something that would be good for us to like.

Does it make sense of debate? Yes, there is something to debate here. And we would not resolve this debate by taking a vote. We would have to bring in evidence. Capital punishment might deter would-be murderers. Then again, we may kill innocent people. A desire to avoid killing innocent people is a good desire, so a person with good desires would want to avoid it. Then again, if we can deter murderers, we can prevent innocent people from being killed. Does any of this sound familiar?

Laws, Actions, Institutions

"So, Mr. Fyfe, you're telling me that we never really talk about just and unjust laws, right or wrong actions, or good or bad institutions. All we ever debate is the value of certain desires."

Yes, and no. "Is capital punishment wrong" becomes "Would a person with desires that are good for us to have favor capital punishment?" And, "Should I tell my boss that my co-worker is using drugs?" becomes "Would a person with desires that are good for us to have tell her boss about the co-worker who is using drugs?"

The Individual

One of the central elements of this debate concerns whether morality is "subject to individual perspective."

I argue that it is not. My "individual perspective" has only the itsiest, bitsiest, teeniest effect on what is "good for us to like". If I should die, what is "good for (the rest of you) to like" continues on without me unchanged. If I should become a psychotic mass murderer, what is "good for us to like" remains the same.

If a person says that morality depends on some sort of 'individual perspective,' it seems to me to be a lot like somebody claiming that triangles have four sides. I can come up with no objective argument saying that it is absolutely wrong to stipulate that 'when I use the word 'triangle', I am referring to four-sided objects.' However, if the person means by the word ‘triangle’ whatever meaning-theory best explains how people actually use the word, then his claim is false. Triangles have three sides. I can prove it, simply by showing that the four-sided figure theory makes nonsense of the claims made by people when they generally talk about triangles.

If somebody wants to claim that morality depends on individual perspective, I can prove that this is wrong as well, by showing that this meaning-theory makes nonsense of the claims made by people when they talk about things being right and wrong. The theory that makes sense of those claims shows that they are talking about something that is quite far removed from individual perspective. They are talking, ultimately, about what it is good for us to like.

[Holy Heretic]

The Difference Between what is Triangular and what is Good

Alonzo uses the notion of a triangle to demonstrate that opinion does not change objective fact. The word triangle may be used to denote countless things, yet the meaning remains selfsame at any given moment remains the same regardless of the term's usage. Alonzo hopes to apply the same principle to the word good, claiming that the word means something in conventional language which isn't troubled by subjective inconsistency.

What Alonzo fails to recognize is that a term may definitively denote something which varies in detail. A triangle refers to a three-sided geometrical shape- but the length of each side and degree of each angle may vary. Something which is "tasty" refers to that which is pleasurable to eat- but what is tasty and how tasty it is depends on the person doing the eating. Good refers to- qualities that are desirable or distinguishing in a particular thing- but just which qualities are desirable or distinguishing depends on who is doing the desiring and distinguishing.

I suppose that if the concept of good referred to something more concrete like "intrinsic value" or "popular opinion" or "what God wants"- we wouldn't be having the discussion. I would simply say that I don't care for any of these things, doubt their worth or existence, and prefer to follow something else (not related to being good) which I call my preference. But the definition is not that precise- it refers to general passions and considerations, and hence it is open to evaluation from a countless number of perspectives- just as "tasty" is.

The Universal Goodness Standard

Nine people are marooned on an island. Eight of them want to get off but one lazy idiot doesn't want to bother with all the trouble. Alonzo argues, "since his opinion is just a fraction of the group's viewpoint, he doesn't really have an influence on what's 'good for them to want'." However, "what's good for them to want" seems not to apply simply to the eight agreeing individuals but also to the uncooperative ninth as well. The problem is that conflicting evaluations cannot be averaged out, so to speak, to produce a cumulative "universal good". It may be good for the majority to like, or it may be good for the minority to like- but it can't be good for everyone to like unless everyone actually likes it.

What is good may be the result of individual or cumulative evaluation. The fact remains that it still subject and relative to particular review and cannot be imposed as a valid model for dissenting individuals or parties. So I deem "what is good for us to like" is nonsensical unless we all like the same thing. We don't.

Good refers to a particular product of emotive review. It can refer to a collection of such products (cumulative opinion), a supremacy of similar products (majority opinion), or their negatives (minority opinion). But it can never exist without or in negligence of those respective judgments, that is, one can neither think of one's own objective good as being an intrinsic value or the alien opinion of a majority.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Life is a Bowl of Triangles

It is true that the definition of a triangle still allows an individual a range of "free choice" with respect to the area enclosed by the triangle, the length of the sides, and the size of the angle. Yet, it does place limits even on these things. The sum of the angles must equal 180 degrees, so, if you make one angle larger the sum of the remaining two must decrease by the same amount. The length of no side can exceed the length of the other two.

More important, morality also gives us a realm of free choice. In most of the decisions we make, morality is simply not relevant except insofar as defines some distant barrier. "Should I put chocolate on my steamed spinach this evening, or maple syrup?" Where morality has nothing to say on the issue, individual preference has free reign.

In fact, this leads to another problem with the "individual perspective" conceptions of morality. A complete account must not only account for how moral claims are like taste or some other form of preference that is subject to individual judgment. It must also explain how it differs from these. Otherwise, matters of food choice become moral questions. Putting relish on a hot dog might become a sin against nature. In fact, morality seems to have nothing to do with what we eat -- unless, of course, picking up a meal on the way home involves kidnapping hitch hikers and butchering them in the garage.

So, if one wants to say that morality is like taste, one still needs to say why morality differs from taste.


A Robust Theory

A robust theory is one that you can take home, look at, see how many things one can do with it, and end up saying, "I have GOT to get me one of THESE!"

So, a theory that works not only for moral statements, but all value statements (including 'tasty') would have something to recommend it.

In my previous post, I said that "All true value statements relate a set of objects of evaluation to a set of desires." This means that all value terms explicitly or implicitly refer to three things.

(1) An class of objects to be evaluated.

(2) A set of desires to evaluate them against.

(3) A relationship between them.


Addendum:

I've been defending these "three elements" for years. Half way through this posting and I realize I had skipped one.

(4) Whether the object to be evaluated thwarts or fulfills the desires. Terms that identify "bad" things refer to objects that thwart desires, and terms that identify "good" things refer to objects that fulfill desires.

Now I am going to have to go back and re-write my book.


Tasty

Just as a rough initial guess I would say that the class of objects to be evaluated by the word 'tasty' is 'things you put in your mouth.' You don't have to eat them or swallow them -- even things that you spit out (like tooth paste) can be tasty (or not).

Which set of desires are relevant in making true 'tasty' statements? It seems that the desires of the person who puts the things in his mouth. The inference that is so strong that, if we want to relate a food to somebody else's desires, we have to explicitly say so.

What type of relationship?

Generally speaking, there are two types, direct "like" type relationships, and indirect "good for" relationships (like visiting the dentist).

Specifically focusing on the subject of 'tasty', indirect (good for) relationships are not relevant. The fact that a good steak is bad for me does not detract in any way from its tastiness. This, by the way, is the most telling proof that there is no God. A loving God would have made broccoli taste good and steaks taste like tree bark. Anyway, only direct relationships of the "I like" variety (as opposed to indirect relationships of the 'good for me variety) are relevant when one uses the word 'tasty'.

Relative to the new fourth item -- tasty things fulfill desires.


Beautiful

'Beautiful' is a lot like 'tasty' . . . EXCEPT . . . the object of evaluation is slightly different. Instead of evaluating 'things you put in your mouth' it evaluates 'things seen and heard'.

It is great for illustrating the major point of this section. Every value-laden term is distinguished from another by how it answers one or more of these four questions. That they have to provide an answer to these four questions explains why they are all alike. The different answers they come up with accounts for the differences between the terms.


Harm/hurt

I actually don't have to dream up an analysis of harm myself. A very influential definition can be found in the works of Joel Feinberg, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW. Feinberg tells us that harm is the thwarting of a strong and stable desire.

So, what is the object of evaluation? Really, there are no limits. Slashing a painting can be harmful to somebody, not harmful to another. Here, the answer to the first question is open.

What are the relevant desires? Those of the person to whom 'harm' is being attributed. But not all of his desires, according to Feinberg. Harm requires the thwarting of a strong and stable desire. Thwart some minor desire, and the agent is only hurt, not harmed.

What type of relationships link the objects of evaluation to the desires of the individual? It seems that both types of relationships are relevant. Cause somebody extreme pain, and you have harmed him; the pain is something to which he has an immediate and direct aversion. Tkae his money and you have harmed him, because you have deprived him of something that is useful.

Since "harm" and "hurt" are negative terms, we are talking about objects of evaluation that thwart desires.


Illness

We only call something an 'illness' if there is a reason to recommend avoiding it. If we discover that there is no reason to avoid it, we cease to classify it as an illness. If you have a bunch of microbes running around inside of you that give you added strength, you're not 'ill'. Only if they make you weaker are you called 'ill.' This shows that 'illness' is a value-laden concept. Now, let's break 'illness' down into its four components.

The class of objects to be evaluated is mental or physical functioning of the person to whom illness is being ascribed. This, of course, distinguishes mental and physical illness (though the line between these two is becoming increasingly fuzzy).

The set of desires that functioning is evaluated against are those of the being to whom the illness is ascribed. I am not sick in virtue of suffering symptoms that you don't like; I am sick in virtue of feeling symptoms that I do not like. Those who might want to call homosexual desires an illness might want to take note of this.

Which relationships are relevant? Again, just like with harm, both direct and indirect relationships are relevant here. If it causes one great pain, or if it merely makes one weak or tire easily, it can qualify as an illness.

And, of course, illnesses thwart desires. That is to say, they are bad things.


Useful

Useful is good, isn't it? The first question, what can be useful? Well, no limits. We have to let the context in which the claim of usefulness is being made determine what we are talking about, because (unlike 'illness' or 'tasty') the word itself does not provide us with any clues.

What desires are relevant? Again, the word gives no clues whatsoever. We can't even assume that the 'useful' thing is being put to good use. A torture rack, or a slave, can be useful.

What types of relationships are relevant? Here, we have a limit. Only indirect (good for) relationships are being considered by the person who is using the term 'useful'. Useful things can be quite ugly, and the most beautiful pieces of art are often quite useless. But useful things can bring about other things, and it's those other things that are desired.

Useful things fulfill the desires that are implicitly or explicitly made reference to in whatever context the term "useful" is being used. But those desires being fulfilled need not be good desires.


Virtue

Every value-laden term follows this same pattern. They pick out an object of evaluation, a set of desires, and a relationship between them, and identify the object as fulfilling or thwarting those desires.

Moral values are no different.

What is being evaluated? Desires themselves. A virtue is nothing more or less than a good desire.

What desires are relevant in determining whether a desire is a virtue? All other desires, actually, regardless of who has them. Honesty tends to fulfill other desires. So does compassion.

Which types of relationships are relevant? Both direct and indirect relationships are used in determining if a desire is to count as a virtue. Honesty is good not only because an honest person is a wonder to behold, but honesty is generally useful to people generally.

It counts as a part of this that a virtue must fulfill desires.

By the way, this analysis does not come from me, but from the 18th Century Scottish philosopher David Hume. He wrote that the criteria for a virtue are (1) Pleasing to self, (2) Useful to self, (3) Pleasing to others, (4) Useful to others. I have just rewritten the same idea in more contemporary language.


Obligatory/Permissible/Prohibited

Morality ranks actions in three different categories. Obligatory actions are those that one may not refuse to do. "You have an obligation to do X" means "It would be wrong of you not to do X." Permissible actions are those about which morality does not care, such as whether to put chocolate or maple syrup on one's steamed spinach. Prohibited actions are those that morality says you ought not do.

What are the objects of evaluation? Well, intentional actions, of course.

Which desires are relevant in evaluating actions as obligatory, permissible, and prohibited? These actions are evaluated according to their relationship to good desires that can be universally recommended.

Using one value in describing another introduces no added mystery. Since the original relationship between a state of affairs and desires is a real thing, then a relationship between a state of affairs and [a relationship between a state of affairs and desires] may be a bit more complex, but no more mysterious.

It is important to note that this relationship between an intentional action and good desires is significantly different from a common conception of right acts as those that produce the best consequences. There are two reasons for this.

First, it is difficult at best to determine the consequences of each act.

Second, and much more important, intentional actions do not appear out nothing. They are caused. Ultimately, claiming that every action must aim at the maximum fulfillment of everybody's desires means that agents can have only one desire -- a desire for the maximum fulfillment of everybody's desires. Agents would not be permitted an aversion to pain, a desire for sex, a preference for classical music, or any other desire. Because these desires would do nothing but divert the individual from performing the act with the best consequences. Simply recognizing that actions are caused leads us to say that a statement that an agent 'ought to have done X' means 'the agent ought to have wanted to do X.'

What are the relationships that are important? Obligatory actions are those actions that would fulfill good desires -- they are the actions that a person with good desires would perform. Prohibited actions are those that a person with good desires would not perform. Permissible actions (returning again to the steamed spinach example) are those that the person with good desires would not care about one way or the other.


Summary

The purpose of this section has been to present an account that distinguishes different value-laden terms -- explaining how they are the same, and how they are different. In particular, the focus is on the difference between 'tasty' and moral claims. The word 'tasty' certainly refers to values that relate an object of evaluation to the desires of the taster, and are 'subjective' in this sense. But it is fallacious to argue that because 'tasty' works this way, that all value claims must -- that relationships between objects of evaluation and different desire sets simply do not exist. The above account shows a number of different ways in which one can draw relationships between states of affairs and desires.

A central component of this argument is that relationships between states of affairs and desires are the only types of values that exist. Desires exist in the real world. The objects of evaluation exist in the real world. And the relevant sorts of relationship exist in the real world. Everything having to do with making value claims is real.

In addition, any value statement that cannot be analyzed in the manner described above, by relating a state of affairs to a set of desires, is objectively false. It is not 'merely a matter of opinion', it is 'merely a matter of making things up and pretending they are real.'


Evaluating Desires Relative to Other Desires

One of the objections raised against this account is the charge that it makes no sense to talk about a desire being good or bad for everybody to have unless everybody already has it.

I will answer this by first providing an example in which it is clearly possible to evaluate the merit of a desire under circumstances where nobody has that particular desire. Then, I will apply the analysis to the real world.

To simplify the situation, let us wipe the universe of all individuals except one, whom we will call Kree. Kree has only one desire -- a desire to scatter stones.

There is an important distinction to keep in mind here. A desire to scatter stones is not the same as a desire to have stones scattered about -- in much the same way that a desire to have sex is not the same as a desire to be a parent. We are talking about a desire to scatter stones, not a desire for the outcome of stone scattering.

Now, let us introduce a second individual, named Sec, into this universe. We have a small set of possible desires for Sec. One possible desire is that Sec can also have a desire to scatter stones. Of course, with both individuals having a desire to scatter stones, we had better hope that the there are a lot of stones to scatter. Otherwise, Kree and Sec will find themselves in competition -- maybe even at war -- over the scarce resources of unscattered stones.

But, let us consider giving Sec a different desire; a desire to gather stones together. If Sec acquires this desire, Sec and Kree's desires are now in harmony. Sec scatters stones, and Kree gathers the stones together, so Sec can scatter them again.

Note that we can know the best desire for Sec to have (relative to the other desires that exist) prior to Sec having any desires. All we need to know is how the objects of the different desires relate. Sec's desire to gather stones is best because it creates a situation where Kree has a greater opportunity to fulfill his desire to scatter stones.


Now, let us return to the real world populated with real humans. In the real world, I feel confident in claiming that a very large percentage of the things that people desire require that they be alive. Therefore, an aversion to things that take life (e.g., driving while intoxicated) would easily qualify as good desires for everybody to have.

Another very useful tool for fulfilling our own desires, in addition to life, is the truth. For this reason, a good aversion to have is an aversion to lying. To fulfill our own desires, we can benefit from some stability in the tools that we have available, so it makes sense to give everybody an aversion to taking things that belong to others. (This latter aversion is a bit more complex than I have presented it here, but the main points are clear enough.)

What it means to have an aversion to these things is, simply enough, the agent will not want to do them. The agent is not going to ask complicated questions about which choice of action will have the best consequences. Instead, the person with a good desire will simply not want to drive while intoxicated, lie, or take things that do not belong to him in most typical day-to-day circumstances.

These examples are meant to illustrate how, at least in a few obvious cases, it is possible to have a very good idea of how a particular desire relates to other desires. It is not such a mysterious process.

[Holy Heretic]

The Good, Bad, and the Bittersweet

Tasty is like good in the sense that it refers to judgment. It is unlike good in the sense that different affairs are being judged. Murder is not spicy and ice cream is not morally wrong. Actions and behaviors are open to moral criticism; food is open to culinary criticism. Moral criticism concerns the subjective impact of actions and behaviors on people; culinary criticism concerns the subjective impact of food on the taste buds. Both concern concrete matters which are subject to opinion.

There is, of course, a distinction to be made in the category of action and behavior. Burping at the table is not morally wrong, though it's certainly ill mannered. In fact, what concerns morality distinctively follows what concerns its founders. Issues of great moral magnitude are issues of great emotional magnitude. The rest is merely a matter of refinement. Thus the difference between ethics and etiquette. Morality and what constitutes morality- are both open to respective judgment.

How to Apply Values to People

I have no objections to Alonzo's prose concerning value. However, I should bring it to attention that just as objects to be evaluated are particular to a set of desires- sets of desires are particular to their worldly proponents. Accordingly, you cannot speak of one evaluative set as being the model for another set of desires (or proponents). This would be nonsensical- and this is exactly what Alonzo has done.

In answer to my pervious complaint that a moral standard cannot be applicable to dissenters- Alonzo provides an example of two individuals who both agree on an ultimate necessity. The example is a non sequitur.

An accurate articulation by analogy requires me to edit his hypothetical. In addition to Kree and Sec there is a third individual, Han, whose chief purpose it to eliminate the other two- or die trying. If we were to apply Alonzo's logic consistently: since Kree and Sec make up for the majority of the population, they determine what is good for "all of them to want," despite of Han's meddling existence.

In reality, any fraction of the total population constitutes a distinct and judgmental party- hence the prevalent moral standard, no matter how widely accepted, still pertains only to its proponents; it never attains the status of universality, and never transcends its bounds to impinge on dissenting individuals. It does not become universal unless universally agreed upon- otherwise remaining localized.

How to Pull Meanings Out of a Hat

We now return to review what the term good means. As before, I will point out the term only signifies general dispositions: the formal definition does not prioritize according to popular consent. Hence there is no warrant for associating good with the good of the majority. What is good still follows from the judgment of its respective founders.

Propositions which characterize good as being "intrinsic", "divine", or what "is good for the majority of the population"- are non-evidential, imaginative, and (in my opinion) faith-based. Such moral criteria are without foundation. If we are to examine the nature of what is desirable and acceptable- then we will find that desirability and acceptability belong solely in the realm of individual sentiment- and cannot exist without or in negligence of its verdicts.

Relativism Stands

On a more critical point, even Alonzo's moral philosophy does not escape relativism. No one disagrees that desires are real and objective things. However, it still stands that such desires are subject and relative to their human advocates. It is only a critical error to disregard the individual character of these desires and prioritize them (without basis) according to majority disposition. In either case, those desires still remain subject to respective judgment.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

A Cause of Relativism

OUCH!

Excuse me, I’m trying to rewire my brain so that I think like a subjectivist.

<twist> <turn> <snip> <tie>

One moment.

<yank> <push> <pull>

There, done.

What do I see? I see a world in which, at first glance, nobody really calls things good unless they endorse it in some way – unless they have a positive attitude toward it. So, I think to myself, “Self, at least part of what ‘X is good’ means is ‘I have a positive attitude towards X’. Simple.

I also see a flat earth around which everything in the universe revolves. Hmmmm. It appears that the universe is not always as it appears. As I sit here, it appears as if the universe revolves around me. I am standing still. (Or, sitting still, if you prefer), and anything else that moves, is moving relative to me.

I also notice that, just as nobody calls something good unless they have a positive attitude towards it, I also notice, that nobody calls something true unless they believe it. (Liars and politicians – however redundant that may be, notwithstanding.) And, yet, we do not hold that part of what “X is true” means is that “I have a positive belief-attitude toward X.”

Oh, my head is starting to hurt.

Why treat one set of attitudes one way, and the other a different way? Can’t we just do a ‘one size fits all’ kind of thing and avoid all this?

Okay, another thing that I notice is there is no value without a valuer. Yet, there is an age of the earth, for example, without an ager. (Is there?)

But, hold on a second. There is no pulse without a beating heart.

I have a pulse. I . . . um . . . had a pulse. It was here a minute ago. WHERE’S THAT CAT! Bring that back here! Pardon me a moment.

Okay, I have a pulse. It’s 75.

You have a pulse. (I assume.) Let’s say it’s 60.

We don’t have the same pulse. And there is nothing about my having a pulse of 75 that says that you ought to have a pulse of 75 as well. Nobody pretends that it does. Yet, nobody pretends that our pulse is merely a matter of opinion either.

I can talk about your pulse. ‘Your pulse is 60’ is an objectively true or objectively false statement. It does not matter what I believe, or want to believe, or believe that I want, or want to want, none of this has an impact on the truth or falsity of the statement ‘your pulse is 60.’

The same can be said about the statement, ‘You like chocolate ice cream.’ This is an objective fact. Yes, it’s relative to you in the same way that your pulse is relative to you. But, if we can talk about value as objectively as we can talk about pulse, does relativism say anything significant?

Now, my head is really starting to hurt.

Even though our pulse rates are not identical, we can make statements about both of our pulse rates together. Our average pulse rate is 67.5. Together, our hearts beat 135 times each minute. Your heart bests 15 times fewer than mine in a given minute. These are all objectively true statements. Yes, their truth depends, in part, on what my heart beat is. But, the statements are no less objective.

Can’t we do the same thing with value? “Neither of us want to die just yet, and we both hate pain. You like action adventure movies more than I do. On average, we put 10% of our income into savings.”

Perfectly good, objectively true statements.

<Sproooiiinnngggg>

OUCH!

Sorry, my brain just sprang back to it’s old state.


There Is No Value with a Valuer

The honorable Heretic seems not to question my general principles for value-laden terms.

All true value-laden statements describe relationships between states of affairs and desires. In other words: No desires means no value.

Specifically, all evaluations contain four elements:

(1) The standard objects of evaluation for the term.

(2) The relevant desires.

(3) Whether the relationship between objects and desires is direct (beautiful) or indirect (useful) or both.

(4) Whether the objects fulfill the desires (good) or thwart the desires (bad).

Moral terms, I argue, address these elements as follows:

(1’) They ultimately evaluate desires (all other moral evaluations being derived from an evaluation of desires)

(2’) Desires are evaluated relative to all other desires.

(3’) Both direct and indirect relationships apply.

(4’) Positive moral terms (e.g., 'virtuous') refer to desires that fulfill other desires while negative moral terms (e.g., 'evil') refer to desires that thwart other desires.

Heretic appears to object to (1’) and (2’).

Against (1’), Heretic says that Moral criticism concerns the subjective impact of actions and behaviors on people.

Against (2’), he says that If we are to examine the nature of what is desirable and acceptable -- then we will find that desirability and acceptability belong solely to the realm of individual sentiment -- and cannot exist without or in negligence of its verdicts.


Desires vs. ‘Actions and Behaviors’

I remember the instant I gave up on action-centered theories of ethics. In an undergraduate ethics course, I heard about McCloskey's Sheriff Example. McCloskey wrote of a sheriff with a prisoner he knows is innocent. Yet, if the prisoner is declared innocent, the city will riot. Think, LA after the Rodney King verdict. To prevent a riot, he frames the prisoner. On utilitarian grounds, this act has the best consequences. He ought to frame the prisoner.

WRONG!

Why wrong?

I could say that I just didn’t like that particular implication. But I knew a lot of people who just didn’t likethe idea of whites and blacks interbreeding. Saying that I did not like that outcome put me on no better standing than the racist. Somehow, we had to have a way to justify the liking as ought to be liked.

But this ought to be liked couldn’t have anything to do with intrinsic value, because intrinsic value does not exist.

If we can reasonably speak of justifying actions by their consequences, it makes sense to speak about justifying likings and dislikings by their consequences – without referring to intrinsic value.

The sheriff can only frame the prisoner if he does not have an aversion to framing people. However, if he had no aversion to framing people, we would never be safe. We want our sheriffs to have an aversion to framing people. Besides, we can do something else to prevent riots – like promoting an aversion to violent responses to verdicts one does not like. So, we want a sheriff with an aversion to framing people, and a public with an aversion to rioting when a person is declared innocent. In case of riot, it’s the rioters that are evil, not the sheriff.

It all has to do with what it is good for us to WANT.

Our desires determine what we do. To say that an agent ought to have done something else necessarily implies that he ought to have had the desires that would have caused him to do something else. Otherwise, we are demanding what is causally impossible – that an agent have the desires that would cause him to do X and do not-X. We might as well demand that he 'use the force' to rescue a child from a burning building.

Evaluating actions independent of evaluating the desires that cause them is absurd.


Individual vs. Group

This is the major bone of contention in this debate.

Right and wrong depends on the individual’s judgments? Um . . . no.

I have already given my primary reason – the nonsense of moral debate.

Person1 says, "Jim's car is red." Person2 says, "Jim's car is not red." These two are in disagreement. If these three statements are true, we know that Person1 and Person2 are talking about about the same Jim, the same car, and the same red. This is a basic assumption of language – without this, there cannot be communication, let alone debate.

Accordingly, if Person1 says, "Church and state ought to be separate," and Person2 says, "Church and state ought not to be separate," and they take themselves to be in disagreement, we must assume that the words 'Church', 'State', and 'Separate' mean the same thing for both of them.

And we must assume that they are talking about the same 'ought'.

Without this assumption, a debate over whether church and state ought to be separate is as nonsensical as a debate in which Person 1 insists "My pulse is 75” and Person 2 answers, "The depths of stupidity in a person who does not realize that my pulse is, in fact, 60 is unimaginable.”

Either everybody in the Moral Foundations and Principles forum is talking about the same ‘ought’ and ‘ought not,’ or every thread in that forum is nothing but a poorly written Abbott and Costello skit where nobody understands that it’s just a joke.


Summary

Moral evaluations are primarily concerned with desires rather than action because it is nonsensical to say that a person ought to have done something without implying that he ought to have wanted to do that thing.

Moral evaluations are primarily concerned with groups rather than individuals because debate and disagreement are nonsensical without the assumption that all people are referring to the same thing -- the same set of sentiments.


Let's see a show of Hans

At one point Holy Heretic overruns my poor defenseless hypothetical universe and introduces a third subject, Han, with a pre-assigned desire to kill the other two. In doing so, Holy Heretic starts his examination past the point where moral questions are relevant.

Morality is concerned with what we should want. This requires a choice among a set of available wants. Heretic provides no list of options for Han’s wants. Consequently, Heretic’s example is not addressing a moral question at all.

Morality requires choice. “Ought” implies ‘can’ and ‘cannot’ implies that moral concepts do not apply. If you are not talking about a choice, you are not talking about morality.

This is a major problem for those who ground morality on evolution. Our hard-wired preferences don’t fall within any moral category. Our aversion to pain is not a moral issue because we have no choice. If our aversion to incest is similarly hard wired, then it is not a moral question either. It is simply a descriptive fact that we don’t do it. If some people do engage in incest, it suggests that there is some measure of choice involved.

Our desires are not strictly determined by nature. Just as we have a capacity to acquire different beliefs through our interaction with the world, we also have the capacity to acquire different desires. Just as we have the capacity to influence the beliefs that others have, we have a capacity to influence the desires they acquire. Every day experience tells us how experience influences our likes, dislikes, fears, ambitions, desires, and aversions.

From this, just as it is rational to ask what believes we should have, it is rational to ask what desires we should seek to bring about in others.

So, the Sec/Kree/Han example requires a choice of desires. Assume that Sec and Kree have a child, Han, and Han’s desires are alterable depending on his experiences, and Sec and Kree can influence those experiences. Causing Han to have a desire to destroy them or die trying is not a rational option. Instead, they have reason to cause in Han an aversion to destroying them.

Sec and Kree can rationally divide Han’s possible desires into three categories. Those that thwart other desires can be categorized as bad (evil). Those that fulfill other desires can be categorized as good (virtuous). And those that have no discernable impact one way or the other get no moral label. This is the ‘moral free zone’. If Han should acquire a desire to take warm baths, for example, this would not impact Sec and Kree at all. Therefore, they have no reason to dissuade or persuade Han from acquiring such a desire.

Can there be circumstances where Sec and Kree are rational to teach Han to desire to destroy them or die trying? Yes – if it is true that such a desire is in fact good.

Assume, as Sec and Kree age, they reach a point where they are in severe, incapacitating, and unending pain. Here, they have reason to cause Han to acquire a desire to destroy them or die trying at this time. It is also objectively true that, "It is good for you to want to destroy us at this point in our lives or die trying."

This is not a case where the desire is good because Sec and Kree call it good Rather, Sec and Kree make observations about the world and call the desire good because it is good in fact.

As the situation gets more complex – introducing more people with more desires -- it is possible for people to call a desire good that is not good in fact, simply because because they are not aware of all of its implications. And they might even get into some rather heated discussions over which desires are good in fact. To resolve the issue, debaters bring all sorts of evidence to bear about the desires that would be thwarted, and the desires that would be fulfilled. Until somebody says, “There is a god who insists that we do things my way or he will destroy us. I no longer need evidence; this we must accept on faith. All who doubt must be destroyed if we are to avoid god’s wrath.”

Of course, god’s wrath would be desire-thwarting if god existed, so an aversion to invoking god’s wrath would be a good desire if such a god existed.


Black Widow Morality

Let’s consider the morality for an imaginary society of black-widowesque creatures. They evolved from a species where the female eats (literally) the male during sex. Evolution was aided by the fact that the female obtains some essential nutrient from eating the male. Without it, procreation does not occur.

Assuming that we are dealing with intelligent creatures that have the capacity to plan, it is reasonable to assume that life has at least instrumental value to the males. It’s useful for executing other plans. Killing the males would be desire-thwarting. Yet, procreation is desire-fulfilling. They have a moral problem, and they need ways to reduce the desire-thwarting and increase the desire-fulfilling aspects of procreation.

Consent is still the best method of ensuring that actions are desire-fulfilling. People consent to that which they have the best reason to believe will fulfill their desires; avoid consenting to that which is desire thwarting. An aversion to nonconsensual sex would be good. Unfortunately, the males have a strong reason not to consent.

What are the moral options?

Call for volunteers. Some males may be suicidal. Some may be at the end of their useful life. Some, though they value life, may value procreation more.

If this is not sufficient, attract more volunteers. Give praise and honors to those who volunteer. Institute social customs that will cause males to have a stronger desire to procreate and aversions to those plans that make life too instrumentally valuable. Provide economic incentives – a donation to their favorite charity.

If this is still not sufficient, call for a draft among those best suited to the task.

Now, is this any different than what we do when we need males (traditionally speaking) to make such sacrifices? For military service, we first seek volunteers. We next attempt to increase the number of volunteers by giving praise, honors, and economic incentives. If that is not sufficient, we institute a draft.

It’s not the moral principles that differ, just the nature of the threat and the type of service that morality requires.


Relatively Speaking

I agree that, in one sense of the word 'relativism', what I argue for is relativistic. All value terms describe relationships between states of affairs (objects of evaluation) and desires. I repeat, value terms describe relationships. They describe how some things stand relative to other things – and desires are among the things relevant in all value relationships.

Yet, the science is fully comfortable with relativistic (relational) properties.

The main issue here is not that moral statements describe relationships, but whether the relevant relationship is between the object of evaluation and the individual.

I often use location to illustrate ‘objective relativism.’ You can’t tell me the location of anything without describing it relative to something else. The keys are on the table.[i], [i]Denver is in Colorado.

‘Individual perspective” relativism limits our relational claims to first-person singular claims. “Individual perspective” location relativism would impose the limit that ‘People may only give the location of things relative to themselves.’ I could say that the keys are at coordinates 10 mark 57, range 4 meters’. However, I cannot say that the keys are on the table.

“Individual perspective” value relativism is just as arbitrary ‘individual perspective’ location relativism. We have no trouble talking about second- and third-person, singular and plural, relationships for the location of things. We have just as little problem understanding second- and third-person, singular and plural value relationships. First-person plural ‘we’ relationships for location and value are also no great mystery.

Nor are first-, second-, and third-person, singular or plural, value relationships any less objective and scientific than location relationships.

A ‘value maker in the sky’ is no more required than a ‘location maker in the sky’. ‘Intrinsic, absolute value’ is as senseless as ‘intrinsic, absolute location.’ A science of value (or location) needs none of these things.

Yet, their absence does not force us into adopting ‘individual perspective’ value or location relativism.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Due to unforeseen difficulties, Holy Heretic has requested a 2 day extension for the deadline for his next statement. Alonzo Fyfe has agreed and I have granted his request.

Nightshade, FD Moderator

[Holy Heretic]

Please forgive the delay, but it was impossible for me to answer sooner.

Let us take for a moment to examine this issue epistemologically. When we perceive we realize that certain qualities are distinctly attached to certain entities, whereas other qualities remain irreverent to those entities. Human beings are not extrinsic to the universe, but neither do they govern all its aspects. As physical objects, they may change some things and they cannot change others, and reversibly, some things are affected by their presence and others remain untouched. Opinion is of physical character and engenders its own particular qualities.

So there is a habit in this debate to make invalid analogies. For example, "A camel isn't blue just because someone it so in someone's opinion; therefore, good isn't subjective." What happens if some item of reality actually was contingent on human opinion (such as opinion itself)? We must only admit that opinion is an actual phenomenon, which evinces several peculiarities and changes. The status of mood is relative to an individual- and any analogy concerning things that aren't would not negate this fact. Good, defined as general passion and disposition, is also open to individual framework. An analogy concerning truth also concerns different subjects and is inappropriate.

Alonzo asks, "Can't we just do a 'one size fits all' kind of thing and avoid all this?" The answer is a concise no. Once cannot universalize something which is by definition a generalization. But he is wholly welcome to create a new term (goof, perhaps), which signifies majority predilection- and ask us to regard it kindly.

Mandatory generality is best demonstrated by example. Take the word important. Ask anyone what makes something important, and you may get a variety of answers: "What generates happiness" or "what humanity needs" or "what one needs to survive" or "that which is important for us to consider". All these answers are in fact expressive of what is important to their articulators, but not what importance itself is. Our problem is solved by a quick glance into the dictionary. Something which is important is carrying or possessing weight or consequence; or is of valuable content or bearing; significant; weighty. So the meaning of importance concerns what is of value or significance- and since values vary from context to context, so does the question of just what is significant, and just what is important. There would be no warrant for attaching importance to majority opinion because it simply refers to a state of evaluation- which exists in many forms, both cumulative and individual, but is always localized- hence being relative.

Alonzo wishes to average out moral values like one does numbers. Well then, what's the average of "I want to kill you"- and "you don't want to die?" A commonality in purpose requires a commonality in value- general or specific. And this does nothing to standardize good- but rather localize it to the accordant group.

Alonzo says that difference of opinion as to what is good should lead to conflict in debate. Understandably, a person who believes in an absolutist evaluation of the term will have a problem discussing it with relativists. But this is not the case if good is recognized as being judgment value of its proponent. There is nothing strange in this. We do not argue over who's taste concerning food represents the ultimate truth of tastiness- rather we accept the mechanics of taste as being personal. Thus there is no conflict in terms. A matter of disagreement should be cause for investigation, not a reason to blindly accept one definition as being a universal standard. A conflict in color perception leads to speculation of one's anatomy- a conflict of morality leads to speculation concerning the nature of moral belief. It is wholly consistent that this speculation engenders the conclusion that moral belief, just like taste, is governed by its advocate.

Alonzo does a good deal to promote a bridge between our hypothetical individuals. But it avoids the absurdity of standardizing good according to the inclinations of Kree and Sec because there are two of them and only one of Han. There is simply no warrant for standardizing good according to these peculiar ideals. Why majority and not minority, why not according to sex, or the number of dimples on one's face? Once again, we must only examine the nature of acceptability- and admit to its personal and restricted nature.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Invalid Analogies

Holy Heretic does not like my analogies. He wrote, So there is a habit in this debate to make invalid analogies. For example, "A camel isn't blue just because someone it so in someone's opinion; therefore, good isn't subjective. He also wrote that, The status of mood is relative to an individual- and any analogy concerning things that aren't would not negate this fact.

With respect to the first statement, I am afraid I am somewhat confused. I never talked about camels and blueness, I do not know which actual analogies he objects to.

As for the second, it is tautologically true that the status of an individual's mood is relative to an individual. However, it is also tautologically true that the mood of a crowd is relative to the crowd; and substantially independent of the mood of any particular individual within it. Consequently, using the mood of an individual to justify individual-dependent mood seems, at best, to beg the very question which is at issue. That argument concerns whether moral value is an individual-dependent concept, or a broader group-dependent concept substantially independent of the state of any given individual within it.

Yet again, with the following question: What happens if some item of reality actually was contingent on human opinion (such as opinion itself)?, it is tautologically true that what is contingent on an individual's opinion is contingent on an individual's opinion, and what is contingent on a group's opinion is not contingent on an individual's opinion (unless we are talking about the smallest possible group).

As an argument for subjectivism, these points are question-begging.

I could interpret these statements as an objection against some argument that I made against subjectivism. If this is the case, I need to explain the roles of these analogies more carefully. They were not offered as arguments against subjectivism. They were meant as illustrations of a concept of non-agent-dependent relationships. The argument that moral values are non-agent-dependent comes elsewhere.

Among those arguments that moral claims belong in the family of non-individual relativistic claims is the fact that two people, who take positions that "X ought" and "X ought not" in a debate, must be assumed to be using the same 'ought'. If, as the subjectivist claims, both oughts have different meaning (X ought~1 vs X ought~2-not) than debate is nonsensical.


A Matter of Opinion

Referring back to the statement, What happens if some item of reality actually was contingent on human opinion (such as opinion itself)?, I think it is important to throw 'opinion' specifically out of the realm of subjectivist options.

Even if morality is subjective, it cannot be opinion-subjective; only some form of desire-subjectivism is actually viable.

Opinion-subjectivity is ruled out because 'opinion' falls into the psychological realm of ‘belief’; and beliefs are descriptive, not prescriptive. Morality is prescriptive, not descriptive. Therefore 'opinion' does not determine morality.

More specifically, mental states are divided up into two types: beliefs and desires.

I believe that I have a million dollars is a statement that reports that I have the mental attitude that the proposition, "I have a million dollars," is true. It describes the world, though it may not describe the world accurately. The family of belief includes 'know', 'understand', 'suspect', and 'opinion' (as in 'It is my opinion that I have a million dollars).

I desire that I have a million dollars is a statement reports that I have the mental attitude that the proposition, "I have a million dollars," is something that I would act to make true. It might not be true today, but if some action of mine could make it true, I would be motivated to take that action. The desire prescribes a world in which "I have a million dollars" is true. Other elements in the family of desire are: 'fear' (as in 'I fear that I have a million dollars'), 'concerned', 'wish', 'worry', 'like', 'hate', 'love'.

In short:

Beliefs describe; they do not prescribe.
Desires prescribe; they do not describe.

'Opinion' concerns belief. If one were to say, ‘In my opinion, the Earth is 6,000 years old’, This is the same as saying, "I believe that the Earth is 6,000 years old". It is not the same as saying, "I desire that the Earth is 6,000 years old".

Values are prescriptive. Value claims must ultimately relate objects of evaluations to desires, not beliefs, if they are to be prescriptive as well.

An opinion that "X is good" can only be understood as an opinion that X stands in a particular relationship to a set of desires. Either that relationship exists, or it does not exist. However, its existence is not contingent upon an individual's 'opinion' that it exists.

At which point, the subjectivist who is not paying attention shouts, "AHA! You just said that value terms relate states of affairs to desires! Thus, you are a subjectivist."

I have never disputed being a subjectivist in this sense. I do not deny that moral claims relate objects of evaluation to desires. I deny that moral claims relate objects of evaluation to the desires of any individual. Instead, they relate objects of evaluation to all desires, regardless of who has them. As such, they are substantially independent of the desires of any person.

And they are also completely independent of anybody's beliefs (or opinions).


Imposter

While I am picking nits, I wish to also address the quote, Alonzo wishes to average out moral values like one does numbers.

Alonzo who?

I want to meet this guy -- and see if I can get him to quit using my name.

I did a search through my posts and could not come up with a claim like this. I have used the concepts of "average" and "total" both as examples of group-relative concepts. Yet, my description of how to handle moral values has not used either of these.

Where I speak about moral values, the relevant concept is neither 'average' or 'total' but 'harmony'. And though the word may sound all soft and mushy and new-agey, it is really just another word for logical or causal compatability. It refers to the logical or causal relationships between the propositions that are the objects of different desires. A desire that P and a desire that Q are in harmony if it is causally possible that ‘P and Q’ is true.

Against the desire to scatter stones, a desire to gather stones together would be in harmony. These two desires are in harmony in virtue of the fact that the two agents, acting on the desires, create a universe in which the fulfillment of the other desire is more easily and efficiently accomplished.

Desires to torture others for pleasure, to kill innocent people, to take things belonging to others, and the like all lack harmony. They are not compatible with the fulfillment of other desires.

Where Holy Heretic protests that a response of mine avoids the absurdity of standardizing good according to the inclinations of Kree and Sec because there are two of them and only one of Han., I remind Holy Heretic that Han was his invention, not mine. I was content to speak only of Kree and Sec -- one on one.

The imposter named Alonzo shows up again when Holy Heretic says, Understandably, a person who believes in an absolutist evaluation of the term will have a problem discussing it with relativists.

So, this imposter named Alonzo is an absolutist. He and I would not get along. There are no absolute values; all values exist as relationships between states of affairs and desires. I do not think I could have made that clearer.


The Subjectivity Traps

I argue that moral claims cannot depend on individual perspective because it makes debates nonsensical. The individual-perspectivist would argue that each individual approaches a discussion with his or her own 'ought'. Yet, the rules of language require that, in a debate, the participants must agree to a common 'ought'. At least within the context of a debate, the subjectivist's claim of 'individual oughts' cannot be correct.

When Holy Heretic discusses the issue of debate, he says, A matter of disagreement should be cause for investigation, not a reason to blindly accept one definition as being a universal standard. A conflict in color perception leads to speculation of one's anatomy- a conflict of morality leads to speculation concerning the nature of moral belief. It is wholly consistent that this speculation engenders the conclusion that moral belief, just like taste, is governed by its advocate.

I am somewhat confused why, if subjectivism were true, different moralities should generate any speculation at all. If one person likes to tie gay people to a fence post and beat him to death, and another likes to drag black people behind his pickup, then this ought to generate no more speculation than the fact that one person likes a ribeye steak (medium rare) with a baked potato, and another likes hominy grits and collard greens.

More importantly, this does not address the way that debate creates a problem for the subjectivist.

(1) The rules of language say that where there is a debate, there must be a common meaning of terms.
(2) Subjectivism denies that there is a common meaning of moral terms.
(3) Subjectivism denies that there can be moral debate.
(4) There can be, and is, a great deal of moral debate.
(5) Subjectivism is false.


Subjectivity Trap 1

Again, Holy Heretic brings up the concept of ‘taste’.

I do not deny that there are value terms that refer to agent-dependent values, and that 'tasty' is one of them. I said as much in my second post.

Yet, an argument to the effect that 'taste is agent-dependent, therefore morality is agent-dependent' would be a fallacy. It makes as much sense as saying, "'apple' refers to a fruit therefore 'bicycle' refers to a fruit.'

The subjectivist correctly points out that there are similarities between 'tasty' and 'obligatory'. Both are value-laden terms. I hold that this similarity is borne out in the fact that both relate objects of evaluation to desires.

But subjectivists accept the similarities, and turn a blind eye to the differences. They ignore the fact that we debate moral issues, we do not debate special orders at Burger King. A dislike of putting ketchup on scrambled eggs is not understood to be universally prescriptive, but 'abortion is murder' is understood to be universally prescriptive. Since (as argued above) prescriptivity is a property of desires, the very idea of universal prescriptivity requires a universal consideration of all desires.

Here’s another example. 'Hypocrisy' is a concept that has no place in agent-dependent values. 'Hypocrisy' involves prescribing for others something that one is not willing to prescribe for oneself. It is not a part of agent-dependent values because such values, by definition, cannot be prescribed for others. There can be no discrepancy between prescribing for others and prescribing for self because prescribing for others does not belong with agent-dependent value.

A person who wants to argue that moral value is, like taste, agent-dependent needs to do more than point out that agent-dependent value terms exist. He needs to argue that there are no differences in the way people regard matters of taste from matters of right and wrong -- or be able to explain those differences in an agent-dependent way.

Simple observation shows that we do not treat the two types of value the same way. And three of the key differences – debate, universal prescriptivity, and ‘hypocrisy’ as a meaningful concept -- are entirely incompatible with agent-dependence.


Subjectivity Trap 2

Where Holy Heretic directs his criticism against absolutists, this suggests a different subjectivity trap -- a false dichotomy.

(1) Either some type of supernatural intrinsic value property exists, or values are agent-dependent.
(2) No supernatural intrinsic value property exists.
(3) Therefore, values must be agent dependent.

This type of argument is often used to try to escape Subjectivity Trap 1. "These differences between moral value and agent-dependent value require some sort of intrinsic value property. No intrinsic value property exists, so we can dismiss all of these differences."

The first premise is false.

Compare this to the following argument:

(1) Either some type of supernatural absolute location property exists, or location is agent-dependent.
(2) Absolute location does not exist.
(3) Therefore, location must be agent-dependent.

Clearly, there is something wrong here. We give the location of things relative to other things than ourselves all the time. "The keys are on the table."

We can also speak of the desire-dependent value of things relative to desires not our own.

We start by recognizing that agent-dependent values relate states of affairs to the desires of the agent, whom I will call Paul. Paul’s desires are not the only desires that exist.

There are other desires in the world, and relationships between states of affairs and those desires. These relationships will continue to exist whether Paul lives or dies, has brain surgery, or changes his opinion on any matter of fact. Thus, there are Paul-independent values. The universe is filled with them.

One of these substantially Paul-independent relationships is the relationship between desires and all other desires that exist. These relationships are real. If we decide to talk about them, we are talking about something real. There is no law of God or nature that prohibits us from creating sets of terms to refer to them. The only question is whether moral terms already do refer to these relationships.

Even if moral terms do not refer to them, they are still real, and we would be advised to invent a term that allows us to discuss them.

The fact that they are real is sufficient to show that the second subjectivity trap is, indeed, a trap.


Subjectivist Trap 3

Subjectivity trap 3 is a failure to distinguish between a belief that something is true, and the thing believed.

We readily recognize that nobody says "X is good" unless they value X. Thus, the subjectivist fallaciously argues, "X is good' means "I value X".

But we also readily recognize that nobody says (literally, speaks the words) "X is good" unless they have a tongue. And, yet, "X is good" when spoken does not mean, even in part, "I have a tongue."

The conditions that are required for a person to make a statement are not a part of what a statement means, and are irrelevant to whether the statement is true or false, or subjective or objective.

Another way of expressing the same argument recognizes that no person asserts that a proposition is true unless he believes it. Yet, what he asserts is NOT that he believes the proposition, but that the proposition is true.

So, when I say, "The Earth is about 4.5 billion years old," I am asserting what I believe to be true. I would not assert it if I did not believe it. However, if we are to ask what the statement "The Earth is about 4.5 billion years old" means, we know it to be a statement about the Earth, not about me. The fact that I would not assert it if I did not believe it does not make its truth dependent on my believing it.

The argument, "Nobody asserts that something is obligatory unless they approve of it; therefore, value is subjective", is no more valid than "Nobody asserts that the Earth is 4.5 billion years old unless they believe it, therefore truth is subjective."

It is essential that we distinguish between the belief itself, and the thing believed.


Subjectivist Trap 4

In the end, Holy Heretic asks, There is simply no warrant for standardizing good according to these peculiar ideals. Why majority and not minority? Why not according to sex, or the number of dimples on one's face?

Notwithstanding the fact that he got the idea of ‘majority’ from the same imposter I spoke of earlier in this post, let me ask my own set of questions.

"Why is it that a triangle can't have four sides? Or two? Why must it be a closed figure? Why straight lines and not curved lines?"

If these types of questions do not create a problem for the objectivity of mathematics, than the first set of questions do not create a problem for the objectivity of morality.

To illustrate the point another way, let us invent a new language. In this language, the term 'moral-af' refers to relationships between objects of evaluation and all desires that exist. Other moral terms. such as 'right-af', 'obligatory-af', 'evil-af' refer to comparable terms within that language. Within this language, 'moral-hh' refers to relationships between objects of evaluation and agent-dependent mental states; and 'moral-dmp' refers to relationships between objects of evaluation and the psychological states of individuals weighted by the number of dimples they have.

Now, we go to the Moral Foundations and Principles forum and attempt to translate the text in any thread into the new language. I am comfortable saying that we would find no terms in any thread that can best be translated into ‘moral-dmp’ in this new language. We will find an occasional term to be translated into 'moral-hh'. However, since these terms are prescriptively valid only for the writer, others will generally dismiss or ignore them. We will find a great many terms that make sense if we translate them into 'moral-af'.

It will not matter what you call this 'value relative to all desires that exist'. Call it 'schmoral'. Call it 'grinkins', call it anything you like. What’s in a name? Whatever you call them, the bulk of what people talk about when they use the word ‘moral’ can sensibly be translated into that family of terms.

Why not moral-hh or moral-dmp? Why don’t triangles have four sides? These types of questions do not point to a problem.

Summary

I would wrap things up in a tight summary here, but I’m already at 2989 words. Oops. 2992 words. No, 2995. Yikes! Help! MUST STOP WRITING!

[Holy Heretic]

The Averaging Persists

Alonzo writes, "what is contingent on a group's opinion is not contingent on an individual's opinion".

The supposed power of group opinion to transcend its bounds and become a general standard is something which I have already addressed, but perhaps not in enough detail to alter Alonzo's outlook on the subject. The means by which Alonzo arrives at his conclusion involves, I will insist again, an inappropriate averaging of beliefs.

We can see no single organ within a group, physiological or otherwise, which functions to produce a group opinion. We do see that the majority of individuals within a group may agree to a certain conviction, and if that majority were to decide that "X is immoral," they would bind "the immorality of X" to themselves- that is, they would produce an opinion which is restricted to the majority within the group. They would not, however, produce a moral standard that pertains to its minority. For while all its members may be bound by a category which unites them according to species or nation, they remain divided under the category of morality.

When we say "crowd", we refer to a collection of individuals which are in close proximity to one another. When we say "Germans," we refer to those who belong to the nation of Germany. If 90% of the people in a crowd are Germans, it would not follow that the crowd as a whole is German, but that 90% of the crowd is German. Notice that we categorize according to respective properties. We acknowledge that there is a uniting category "crowd," under which all subjects fall by way of proximity, but we do not insist that the entire crowd is rendered German because there happens to be many of them.

If it stands that 90% of Americans believe the death penalty is wrong, it does not follow that the death penalty is wrong for all Americans, but rather that the death penalty is wrong for 90% of Americans. The death penalty here is wrong for the majority of Americans, not for the minority of Americans. At this point I will quote my original statement in this regard: What is good may be the result of individual or cumulative evaluation. The fact remains that it still subject and relative to particular review and cannot be imposed as a valid model for dissenting individuals or parties. So I deem "what is good for us to like" is nonsensical unless we all like the same thing. We don't.

Thus when Alonzo says, "[Moral claims] relate objects of evaluation to all desires, regardless of who has them," he proceeds to "generalize desires" in order to create a sort of moral soup, where the desires of one party are universally applicable regardless of the desires of the other party- mostly by way of majority predilection. This method is logically invalid, for the simple reason that desire will remain respective only to its proponent- and if that proponent happens to share some conceptual category (in terms of proximity, nationality, ethnicity, or species) with a dissenter, it does not by that virtue enable the proponent?s desires to transcend their context and become applicable to that dissenter. This is a normal empirical observation: certain moral beliefs within the group are associated solely with certain persons, and relate directly to those persons but not to the group as a whole. As such, generalizing according to majority predilection is not only invalid but conceptually random- since association by freckles is just as intellectually sound.

Alonzo claims he was content with regarding only the two "harmonious" individuals- Kree and Sec. Unfortunately, a hypothetical where circumstances serve to keep Alonzo content differ from those which take place in reality, where desires clash and the environment, morally speaking, is rarely harmonious at all. Han was, for reasons of accuracy, a necessary addition. Thus, Alonzo's method applied to both reality and the hypothetical avoids the absurdity of standardizing good according to the inclinations of whoever makes up of the bulk of a particular group. In this case, what is "good for Han to like" equals what is "good for Kree and Sec to like," merely because the latter party occupies the majority of the same group in terms of "proximity" or "location" or "species". But morally speaking, the only relevant category here is one of moral disposition- a category which in this case allows no harmony.

Moral Speculation

Alonzo raises an entertaining inquiry, "I am somewhat confused why, if subjectivism were true, different moralities should generate any speculation at all. If one person likes to tie gay people to a fence post and beat him to death, and another likes to drag black people behind his pickup, then this ought to generate no more speculation than the fact that one person likes a ribeye steak (medium rare) with a baked potato, and another likes hominy grits and collard greens."

Unless I am a chef, the culinary tastes of other people are not of relevance to me. The same cannot be said of moral opinions- especially if in the above hypothetical I happen to be black or gay. I will once again commit the sin of indolence and re-post an earlier statement: An effectual mind recognizes that human preferences are of critical importance amidst the affairs of men; so he reasons and acts to abide by or manipulate such preferences, as his own reasoning and disposition demands. This course of action is not doomed to result in suffering, aggression, savagery, and relentless hedonism (these are the ironic results of most absolutist doctrines, namely Christian), but contrarily, like getting up in the morning even if it causes some temporary discomfort- morality as dictated by preference is fully capable of achieving peace and order.

More erroneous are Alonzo's interpretations of the Subjectivist position:

(2) Subjectivism denies that there is a common meaning of moral terms.

I know of no terms which retain the capacity to be moral. I assume Alonzo means "terms which concern morality," and they are too numerous to discuss. In any case, Subjectivism does not dispute what any of these terms signify- nor is there really any dispute concerning meaning here at all.

For the term good, Subjectivism embraces the formal dictionary definition: having qualities that are desirable or distinguishing. Subjectivism parts with objectivism concerning the question of how desirable and distinguishing qualities come about- how good comes about. For objectivism desirable qualities are either independent or unrelated to individual judgment, whereas Subjectivism simply holds this as being untrue by virtue of empirical observation.

(3) Subjectivism denies that there can be moral debate.

No. Objectivism assumes there can be no moral debate if morality is not objective. The proposition is bought to question also by the fact that Alonzo is currently debating morality with a Subjectivist.

A Review of Ethics and Etiquette

Alonzo objects to the Subjectivist linking of culinary preference with morality, in that we do not usually have culinary debates. In my third post I provided a brief summery of what divides ethics from etiquette- with the conclusion that the division does not occur because of the absence of opinion and personal sentiment in the former. In fact, quite the opposite is the case.

Burping at the table is not morally wrong, though it's certainly ill mannered. In fact, what concerns morality distinctively follows what concerns its founders. Issues of great moral magnitude are issues of great emotional magnitude. The rest is merely a matter of refinement. Thus the difference between ethics and etiquette. Morality and what constitutes morality- are both open to respective judgment.

We do not debate whether or not Burger King or McDonalds is better (I find both of them revolting) unless the issue is of significance to us. The subject will probably never attain enough personal importance to warrant becoming a moral matter- but it isn?t outside the realm of possibility. Until Christian law came along, for example, issues of polygamy and masturbation were, if anything, more trivial. A more entertaining characterization may be found in Gulliver's Travels, where two societies are divided by a question they believe to be of utmost importance: how to crack an egg. This is fantasy, of course, but reflective of reality nonetheless.

An argument to the effect that 'taste is agent-dependent, therefore morality is agent-dependent' would be a fallacy, unless morality was a matter of taste.:)

Another Bad Allegory

Either some type of supernatural absolute location property exists, or location is agent-dependent. We give the location of things relative to other things than ourselves all the time "The keys are on the table."

So the location of any one object is dependant on all other objects being in their own accordant locations. Alonzo then links this to desire:

There are other desires in the world, and relationships between states of affairs and those desires.

However, there is a difference. That I do not like stealing is not characterized by anyone else's liking or disliking of it. Location concerns the state of an object in relation to other objects. Desire is not a term which describes the relation of one set of wants with another set of wants. While we may certainly construct relations between different desires if we so choose- we do not have to look at the state of one desire to determine the state of another. The comparison is inept.

If we do construct relations between desires, for instance, "Maggie and Billy want different things," it does not invalidate the Subjectivist position in any way.

The only question is whether moral terms already do refer to these relationships.

Which moral terms? A term such as good, solely refers to the question of what the desire is- not what it is in relation to another desire.

Definitions

In my last post I asked: There is simply no warrant for standardizing good according to these peculiar ideals. Why majority and not minority? Why not according to sex, or the number of dimples on one's face?

At first Alonzo claims I got the idea of "majority" from an imposter- or rather that I misconstrued his position. However, since he repeatedly states that dissenting minorities do not define what is "good" because they make up a small fraction of the population, I am reassured that my characterization of his philosophy is accurate.

Alonzo's answer to my question is as follows:

"Why is it that a triangle can't have four sides?

But I will answer with another question: "Why can triangles be only equilateral when the definition clearly allows alternatives?" Confused? Here's another one: "Why must good be a matter only of collective predilection when the definition clearly allows (and even encourages) the alternative of individual judgment?"

For we must only repeat what good means: Having the qualities that are desirable or distinguishing in a particular thing, or serving the desired purpose or end. And as long the individual is capable of desiring and distinguishing, and is capable of setting his own ends, nothing in the world is going to separate the essence of what is good from that individual. Even if a billion strangers desired differently- it would not detract from his own ability to the same- and the desires of those strangers would in no physical way substitute for his- when the issue of what he finds to be good, great, and beautiful is examined.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

It is difficult to form a response to Holy Heretic's last post, because he continues to ignore key distinctions that I argued for in my previous posts. Key among these is the distinction between belief and desire, and the corresponding distinction between description (fact) and prescription (value).

Perhaps Holy Heritic thinks that these distinctions lack merit or relevance. At the very least, I would like to know why they lack merit or relevance.


The Belief/Desire Distinction

In my previous post I argued that value necessarily belongs in the realm of desire, and is independent of belief.

Holy Heretic still makes statements such as, his conclusion involves ... an inappropriate averaging of beliefs," and when he uses an example in which 90% of the people believe that the death penalty is wrong, and when he speaks of group opinion, and to what the majority were to decide, and that certain moral beliefs within the group are associated solely with certain persons.

In that earlier argument, I pointed out how beliefs describe the world, and desires prescribe possible worlds. Values are prescriptive, thus they belong in the realm of desires.

If Holy Heretic had an argument addressing this issue, I could not find it. Perhaps I simply failed to recognize it. Still, without knowing of any problems with the belief/desire distinction and its relevance to value, I can think of nothing to say against this, other than to assert that 'My previous objection to mixing beliefs with value still stands.'


Ethics vs. Metaethics

I have charged that common subjectivism makes nonsense of moral debate. Holy Heretic responded, in part, by saying The proposition is bought to question ... by the fact that Alonzo is currently debating morality with a Subjectivist.

This is false.

We are not debating morality (or ethics). We are debating metaethics. This is a wholly different field of study.

Ethics concerns questions such as whether capital punishment is wrong or whether there is an obligation to obey unjust laws. Metaethics concerns questions such as the meaning of moral terms (moral language), the logic of moral arguments (deontic logic), whether intrinsic values exist (moral ontology), and how we can know moral facts (moral epistemology).

Ethical subjectivists are metaethical objectivists. They hold that there is a single correct answer to metaethical questions that is independent of the beliefs or desires of the speaker. The objectively correct metaethical position is that ethics is subjective, and that anybody who says otherwise -- any objectivists out there -- are objectively wrong in their belief.

Note: This is sometimes interpreted as a charge that subjectivists are inconsistent. There is no inconsistency here, no problem for the subjectivists to address. Because ethics and metaethics are two different fields, it is completely possible to hold that, as a matter of objective fact, ethical subjectivism is true.

Because ethical subjectivsts are metaethical objectivists, they can meaningfully participate in metaethical debates. In using this as a defense that ethical subjectivists can participate in debates, Holy Heretic commits a category error.


The Meaning of Moral Terms

This brings me back to the core of the issue, which I want to try to express in new words, in the hopes that it makes more sense.

I claim that subjectivism does not allow for moral debate because it does not allow for common definitions of terms, Holy Heretic wrote, For the term good, Subjectivism embraces the formal dictionary definition: having qualities that are desirable or distinguishing.

Here is another way to express the problem. We need to start with a definition of an indexical.

Indexicals are terms that point to something.

• First-person singular indexicals point to the speaker. I, me, myself, mine, are all examples of first-person indexicals or terms that assume a first-person indexical as a part of their meaning.

• First-person plural indexicals point to a group that includes the speaker. Examples include ‘We’, ‘Us’, ‘Ourselves’, ‘Ours’.

• Second-person indexicals include words such as ‘You’, ‘Yourself’, ‘Yours’. There is no clear linguistic distinction between second-person plural and second-person singular indexicals, though in some regions people may use expressions such as 'You all' or "yous' to make the distinction. Generally, the distinction is made in context.

• Third-person singular indexicals include words such as ‘He’, ‘She’, ‘It’, ‘His’, ‘Hers’, ‘Itself’. They point to things other than the speaker.

• Finally, third-person plural indexicals point to groups of others, using terms such as ‘They’, ‘Them’, ‘Theirs’.

Common subjectivism holds that all moral terms contain an implicit first-person singular indexical. They are ultimately statements about the speaker -- about the speaker's attitude toward such things as capital punishment or abortion.

Propositions containting first-person indexicals change meaning depending on the speaker. I have shown this a number of times. If I were to say, "I am 6'2" tall", and my wife were to say, "I am 6'2" tall", it is clear that these two propositions have different meanings when spoken by different people. They do not change meaning in the sense of changing dictionary definitions. They change meanings in the sense that a proposition that is true spoken by one person can be false when spoken by somebody else.

It is also a basic rule of logic that debate is only sensible where two people agree on the meaning of a proposition.

Consequently, either common subjectivism is false, or moral debate is not possible.

Moral debate exists.

Ergo, common subjectivism is false.


Formal Definitions

It is no defense against this problem to argue that "Subjectivism embraces the formal dictionary definition of <whatever>." The subjectivist's definition of moral terms includes an 'I' component, this is sufficient to generate the types of problems I am talking about.

Do the meanings of moral terms contain an implicit first-person singular indexical?

If they do, then subjectivism is true and moral debate is impossible. If they do not, then debate is possible and subjectivism is false.

I deny that moral terms contain a first-person singular indexical as a part of their meaning, and hold instead that they contain a first-person plural indexical.

Moral statements do not contain an implicit ‘I’, but they do contain an implicit ‘we’.

[Note: This also addresses Holy Heretic's claim that Objectivism assumes there can be no moral debate if morality is not objective. The fact that propositions containing first-person singular indexicals have different meanings is not an assumption of objectivism. It is a fact of language. The problem can be found in all instances where a first-person singular indexical is an explicit or implicit component of any proposition.]


Other problems with subjectivism

The possibility of debate is not the only problem with subjectivism. Other problems include:

• The concept of hypocrisy makes no sense in a set of propositions that contain an implicit first-person indexical.

• Statements of the form, "abortion is murder" are seldom of ever understood to mean 'I do not wish to have an abortion'. They are understood to mean 'nobody should want to have an abortion'.

• The Euthyphro Problem (see my opening post for details) shows that moral claims are more consistent with 'I disapprove of X because it is wrong,' rather than 'X is wrong because I disapprove of it.' The torturing of young children for pleasure cannot be made 'right' simply by becoming the type of person who gets off on torturing young children for pleasure.

All of these points combined, and others, argues that subjectivists are nowhere near to providing an accurate theory of the meaning and use of moral terms. At best, common subjectivism can be offered as heavily revisionist; at worst, it is eliminativist (it aims to eliminate moral concepts from language).


Reductionism, revisionism, eliminativism

In attempting to analyze a concept, there are three ways that one can go.

One way is reductionism. Reductionism takes the old concept and shows how it is fully understandable in new terms. A fairly recent example of reductionism is "Water = H2O". The whole of our understanding of water could be fully explained by our understanding of H2O, and then some. The reduction allowed us to carry this understanding farther than we ever had before.

Eliminativism holds that there is no place for the old concept in a new science. It was once thought that one of the jobs of angels was to push the planets. Newton's theories almost fully explained the movement of the planets without any need for angelic planet pushers. Consequently, angelic planet pushers were to be eliminated.

Between these two extremes lies revisionism. Revisionism says that some of the old concepts need to be tossed out, but others can remain and incorporated into the new system. The bacteria theory of disease forced us to revise the former concept of 'malaria' -- throwing out the part that said that it was caused by 'bad air', but reducing what was known about the progression of symptoms and even what was known about where one was more likely to get infected.

Subjectivism is not so much a theory about right and wrong, but a theory that seeks to eliminate the concepts of right and wrong. Take away moral debate, universal prescriptivity, concepts such as hypocrisy, and the practice of justifying approval and what is left has no real resemblance to the concept of morality. So much has been revised, it is like taking a 57 Chevy, removing the engine, tires, wheels, suspension, frame body, seats, drive shaft, and everything else so that all you have left is the rear-view mirror, holding it up, and saying, "Here's my 57 Chevy."

Eliminativism is a drastic step, and only justified if no other options are available. However, "Good for us to like" offers a reductionist alternative that preserves much of the original meaning.

Debate makes sense because all people are talking about the same relationships between the same objects of evaluation and the same set of desires.

Universal prescriptivity is easily captured by the concept "good for us to like."

Hypocrisy makes sense because a person cannot consistently prescribe something as "good for us to like" that is not "good for me to like."

And the Euthyphro problem is sensibly addressed. "I disapprove of torturing young children for pleasure because it is good for us to have an aversion to torturing young children for pleasure. I dislike it because it is bad; it is not bad because I dislike it."

Yet, I am not a full reductionist. Moral concepts contain an element of intrinsic prescriptivity that has to be abandoned; intrinsic prescriptivity does not exist. So, I am a revisionist, but the best revisionist theory is the theory that requires the least revision. "Good for us to like" (or "Good for us to dislike") fits that requirement.


Subjectivists In Debate

I acknowledge that some subjectivists do engage in actual moral debate. In doing so, subjectivists are like most bicycle riders.

Most bicycle riders think that they maintain their balance by shifting their weight, literally, from side to side. In fact, studies show that bicycle riders maintain their balance by turning their front wheels.

Subjectivists in moral debate learned moral language with the rest of us, as children, and are intuitively skilled in using these terms according to their standard non-subjectivist definitions. While their conscious theory disagrees with the facts of the matter concerning the use of the term, it plays as little role in their behavior in debate as the person with the wrong theory on how he maintains his balance on a bicycle does to his riding a bike.

However, the subjectivist will retreat into subjectivism (and its inherent quality that subjectivism is incompatible with debate) when he wants to end a debate prematurely. He will issue the proclamation that 'it is all a matter of opinion anyway', and that will be the end of the matter.

The test of this is, again, what makes the most sense of the way people actually use the terms. The metaethical views of the speaker are irrelevant if their metaethical views do not make sense of even their own use of ethical terms.


Individuality of Desires

Holy Heretic also accuses me of using an argument that somehow requires some sort of 'group' superentity that transcends the existence of the individuals who make up this group. This appears where he writes, We can see no single organ within a group, physiological or otherwise, which functions to produce a group opinion.

It appears that this argument aims to rule out the possibility of first-person plural indexicals as a possible component of value terms.

No such superentity is required. If I were to say, of a group of people, that our average age is 40 years old, I am not saying that there was some sort of superentity that was born 40 years ago. I am in no way denying that age is a property of the individual, nor am I saying that the majority of the people in the group are 40 years old. In fact, it is quite conceivable that not one person in the group is 40 years old; half of the people may be 60 and the other half 20.

If I were to say that, combined, we weigh 5,754 pounds, this certainly does not imply that any one of us weights 5,754 pounds, and certainly would contradict any claim that the majority weighs 5,754 lbs each. Nor can such a claim be proved false simply by pointing out the obvious fact that there is no single organ within the group that has a weight of 5,754 lbs.

These problems with taking data that is true of individuals as input, and deriving true statements about what is true of them as a group, are simply imaginary problems.


Desires and Value

In several of my responses, I made the claim that all value relates states of affairs to desires. I also argued that it is possible to know the relationships between states of affairs and desires not our own (or not exclusively our own). Moral terms, I argue, describe relationships between desires and other desires not exclusively our own (namely, all desires regardless of who has them).

Against this, Holy Heretic wrote, Desire is not a term which describes the relation of one set of wants with another set of wants.

He is correct, desire is not such a term.

'Desire' refers to a brain state -- it is a term that describes the way a brain is wired. A person with a desire that X (e.g., that he have sex with Susan) has a brain that is wired in such a way that the agent is disposed to make it the case that the proposition 'I am having sex with Susan') is true. It makes no necessary reference to any other desire.

But value, on the other hand, does relate objects of evaluation to desires, and moral value evaluates desires according their capacity to fulfill other desires. The general statement is true of all value. The value of a painting is determined by how the painting stands in relationship to certain desires. The value of a friendship, the value of having sex with Susan, the value of all things is determined by knowing the relationship of that being evaluated to some set of desires.

But not, necessarily, the desires of the agent. There is no intrinsic first-person singular indexical in value terms.

We can know the value of things according to how they stand in relationship to desires not exclusively our own. Desires are things. So, we can know the value of desires according to how they stand in relationship to desires not exclusively our own.


Majorities and Minorities

Holy Heretic has continually tried to attribute to me some sort of majority rule. He wrote, At first Alonzo claims I got the idea of "majority" from an imposter- or rather that I misconstrued his position. However, since he repeatedly states that dissenting minorities do not define what is "good" because they make up a small fraction of the population, I am reassured that my characterization of his philosophy is accurate.

I did a search through all of my posts to see if I could find an instance where I made such a claim. I could find no example. I could not even find an example of my having used these terms.

The statement contains a number of ambiguities that confuse the situation.

For example, the phrase ‘dissenting minorities’ relates values to beliefs, and I have repeatedly argued that beliefs are irrelevant to value.

In addition, the phrase ‘define what is good’ suggests that defining a term has some relevance on the real world. A person