FDD Peanut gallery: Is morality relative or objective?

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

This thread is intended to be a peanut gallery for a formal debate (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=59835) between Holy Heretic and Alonzo Fyfe that has been set up in FDD based on the following topic:

The Relativity vs. The Objectivity of Morality.

Jason

[Peter Kirby]

I found Fyfe's post on the anatomy of "good" to be quite helpful. A major philosophical tradition declares the idea of "good" to be inscrutable and posits the naturalistic fallacy, i.e., one can never go from is to ought. I used to believe that, but Fyfe's catalogue of options shows that there are many different ways in which people attempt to go from is to ought--and then Fyfe attempts to show that many of these ways are based on an incomplete understanding of what people generally mean by "good" (e.g. with the Euthyphro dilemma, etc.). And I think that this is a central question in the debate--when people carry on in moral discourse, are they arguing whether "God likes X" or "I like X" or "X produces maximal pleasure distributed over the population" or what?

Obviously, "God likes X" is the wrong answer. ;) HH seems to think that the answer is "I like X," when he says "just as he may find a particularly horrendous French dish tasty" and "I would simply say that I don't care for any of these things."

Let's take 'tasty' for a diversion. There are things that are not tasty to anyone--obviously, nobody likes the taste of feces. That's part of the biological programming behind our taste buds. And, I think that Fyfe could argue that it is not "good for us to like" the taste of feces--such a generalized desire would frustrate the general goals of people, such as living a pleasurable and healthy life. When people say that "crap tastes bad," this is not true on a purely individual basis; it follows from the nature of people and their ends.

And moral claims are something we can argue about, and do argue about. Fyfe explodes the idea that "X is good" means "I think X is good" with "the problem of nonsensical debates." People are trying to say something more than that they have an opinion when they make ethical assertions--and perhaps the only way to deal with that is Mackie's error theory, i.e., that ethical claims have meaning (beyond personal opinion) but are false. However, HH hasn't taken that tack, and in general his thoughts do not seem to be as systematic as those of Fyfe; perhaps that is due to experience with the subject.

In any event, I am genuinely interested in this debate because I haven't completely worked out my own position on the subject of discussion. And it seems decent so far.

best,
Peter Kirby

[Normal]

I think Alonzo makes a fatal error with the triangle analogy. We all recognize intersubjectively that triangle is to refer to a 3 sided shape. The argument isn't against the definition of triangle but that the definition itself is unchanged from person to person. In terms of "good" however, the definition does change from person to person. What one person defines to be "good" might seem selfish to another, or unreasonable to another, or unacceptable to another. There is no objective thing to be pinned down by the word "good", making the triangle example a false analogy.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

I must ponder an ethical question.

Would it be permissible for me to respond to a point made in the peanut gallery? Or must I let it slide and allow would-be readers think that it has merit, when an easy response is available?

And if I respond, should I do so here, or in the debate?

I have ruled it impermissible to respond in the actual debate. The debate is between me and Holy Heretic. Besides, the Peanut Gallarian cannot respond in the debate, so it would be a bit unfair.

So, if it is permissible to respond, then the response must exist here.

But should I respond at all? To say 'no' risks having people think that the objection has merit, and dismissing the rest of the debate, thinking that a 'fatal error' has been scored. That is unfavorable.

I have opted to respond.

Well, perhaps not so fatal.

It is easy to explain why the problem cannot be dismissed through involking "different meanings" by inventing a little game.

For this game we are going to create a word, "Skvorkyl." Now, every player in this game gets to decide for themselves what Skvorkyl means.

Okay, Ready?

Do Skvorkyl have horns?

Player 1: Of corse Skvorkyl have horns. Here's a picture of a whole bunch of Skvorkyl, and they all have horns.

Player 2: No they don't. Here's a picture of a basket of Skvorkyls and they don't have horns.

Player 1: My Skvorkyl has horns!

Player 2: Mine doesn't!

Spoil Sport: We can deal with this easily enough. Player 1, we'll call your thing a Skvorkyl, and Player 2, we'll call your thing a Skvarkyl. Skvorkyl have horns. Skvarkyl don't have horns. Problem solved. Let's move on.

If the problem was truly with different meanings, we would in fact have an easy solution. All we would need to do is assign a different word to each different meaning, then we can move on. Fight's over. Everybody can go home now.

But, this easy solution doesn't work. It doesn't work because the problem is NOT with multiple meanings. The problem is that there is a disagreement over the real properties of real things -- a problem that can't be solved merely by inventing a couple of new words.

In conversation and debate, we assume common definitions as a ground rule. If we should ever discover that this assumption is false, we simply say, "never mind" and sheepishly move away, hiding our embarrassment. But that's not what people seem to be doing in these types of disputes -- suggesting that the 'different meanings' hypothesis has a serious flaw.

[Jack Kamm]

When Alonzo tries to debunk "Good for me" theory, he presumes what he's trying to prove.

This is his argument:

1) There are things which are good for me.
2) Things which are good for me can be bad for others.
3) Thus "good for me" can't be the basis of morality, because then something could be both good and bad.

The "because" in #3 leads to the fallacy. In the debate, what they're trying to determine is whether morality is objective or relative -- whether something can be both good and bad, from different frames of reference. Alonzo here presumes morality is objective (something can't be both good and bad), uses this to support statement three, then uses statement three to later on show morality is objective.

He also uses this argument:

1) There are things which are good for you (murdering your boss).
2) I disapprove of some of these things (murdering your boss).
3) Therefore, "good for me" can't be the basis of morality, because I disapprove of it.

I don't think I need to show what's the problem with this argument.

**Edited for clarity**

[Normal]

You're right Alonzo, this is not a word game; it is a perception game. The reason your triangle analogy fails is because we all perceive 3 sided shapes to be the same: They have 3 sides. This is not the same for "good" actions. A person can look at the same action as another; one can see "good" and the other "not good". There is no "good" in the action beyond the independent perception of the action, unlike the triangle.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
I must ponder an ethical question.

Would it be permissible for me to respond to a point made in the peanut gallery? Or must I let it slide and allow would-be readers think that it has merit, when an easy response is available?


What you do in the peanut gallery is pretty much fair game. Outside the FD fora, the FD mods like me don't have any jurisdiction. What's allowed in this peanut gallery is up to the wisdom of the MF&P mods: 99Percent, AquaVita, brighid, Grizzly, & The Other Michael.

I personally don't see any problem with debaters responding to the peanut gallerians. Though I would strongly discourage the formal debate participants from debating each other in here as it would spoil the whole purpose of having a formal debate. I don't have jurisdiction here to stop that, but I can make requests to the MF&P mods to intervene. :)

Jason

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Nightshade
I personally don't see any problem with debaters responding to the peanut gallerians. Though I would strongly discourage the formal debate participants from debating each other in here as it would spoil the whole purpose of having a formal debate. I don't have jurisdiction here to stop that, but I can make requests to the MF&P mods to intervene. :)

Upon further contemplation, I decided it is a bad idea.

Who knows what my debate opponent is conjuring up as we speak? I should, at least, be giving him first shot at me.

Once he has finished up all of his shots, assuming that I am not too badly wounded (or worse), I will likely show up here to answer any unanswered objections. Until then, I will leave it to the peanut gallarians to debate the merits of different positions among themselves.

Pardon the interruption.

[Holy Heretic]

Since I'm not posting any arguments, but merely clarifying my position, please excuse this venture:

HH seems to think that the answer is "I like X,"

No, it's more along the lines of:

1. A believes X is good.
2. A approves of X.
3. To A- X is good.

"A" may represent any quantity of individuals/doctrines- but liking/desiring/approval are key to X being good for/to anything/anyone.

As I posted in the debate:

What is good may be the result of individual or cumulative evaluation. The fact remains that it still subject and relative to particular review and cannot be imposed as a valid model for dissenting individuals or parties.

[Peter Kirby]

I can't respond because I don't want to force HH to make further posts in this thread.

best,
Peter Kirby

[the_cave]

Originally posted by Normal
You're right Alonzo, this is not a word game; it is a perception game. The reason your triangle analogy fails is because we all perceive 3 sided shapes to be the same: They have 3 sides. This is not the same for "good" actions. A person can look at the same action as another; one can see "good" and the other "not good". There is no "good" in the action beyond the independent perception of the action, unlike the triangle.

I feel the problem is merely that good actions are not as simple as triangles. Good actions have effects which cannot be measured and observed all at once, or even by any one individual. This doesn't mean they can't be objectively good, though it might mean that the fact of their objectivity might simply escape us. This is possible because it might be the case that a good action might have good consequences for everyone who encounters its effects, and yet they would not know whether it did or not for anyone else besides themselves.

[Farren]

No, I think good itself ultimately has to be subjective. There are people alive who consider humanity a plague on the planet and a menace to other life forms, groups that go way beyond the Animal Liberation Front.

For them, good would be to wipe out most of humanity. To most of us that's pretty bad but one can understand how someone can see this as "good". It extends natural rights to other species and in that sense is more altruistic than a humanitarian but human-are-superior based moral system.

This good will clearly come into conflict with many other conventional goods.

There is the "good" of removing yourself from the gene-pool in the interests of society, a la Seppuku, which is clearly at odds with the good of preserving life.

There is the good of telling a lie to stop a great harm (which is advocated by buddhists, for instance), which is at odds with the good of always telling the truth to ensure that humans don't have to treat each other with suspicion.

There is the good of pacifism, refusing to fight even in a life threatening situation, in the belief that ultimately defending yourself only fuels broader social conflict, versus the good of putting bullies in there place and protecting the weak.

[sodium]

Originally posted by Normal
I think Alonzo makes a fatal error with the triangle analogy. We all recognize intersubjectively that triangle is to refer to a 3 sided shape. The argument isn't against the definition of triangle but that the definition itself is unchanged from person to person. In terms of "good" however, the definition does change from person to person. What one person defines to be "good" might seem selfish to another, or unreasonable to another, or unacceptable to another. There is no objective thing to be pinned down by the word "good", making the triangle example a false analogy.

So are you saying that the difference is that there is more general agreement on what is a triangle than on what is good? But why should that matter?

My view is that if you say a triangle has four sides, all I can really say is that that isn't how I use the word. If you say that Good is just what God likes, I'm in the same situation. I can say that that isn't what I mean by good.

Whether or not there is something objective to be pinned down by the word "good" depends on how it is defined. By some definitions, it may very well refer to something objective.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Farren
No, I think good itself ultimately has to be subjective. There are people alive who consider humanity a plague on the planet and a menace to other life forms, groups that go way beyond the Animal Liberation Front.

For them, good would be to wipe out most of humanity. To most of us that's pretty bad but one can understand how someone can see this as "good". It extends natural rights to other species and in that sense is more altruistic than a humanitarian but human-are-superior based moral system.


Mmmpff Aghaa Gessssss <Girgling noises caused by somebody trying not to say something.>

[Voice in back of head.]

You promised, Alonzo. No comments until after the debate is done.

[/Voice in back of head.]

AAAAAAAAAAARRRRRRRRRRRRGGGGGGGGGGGHHHHHHHHHH!

Think about it!

Later.

Alonzo.

[Normal]

Originally posted by sodium
So are you saying that the difference is that there is more general agreement on what is a triangle than on what is good? But why should that matter?

The definition of good is irrelevent to the question of "Does good exist objectively". Triangles themselves are not dependant on people to have their three sides, trianlges are not dependant on people to recognize that they have three sides, the three sides of the shape exist objectively, seperate from the perception. The same cannot be said of "good", there is no "good" in any action beyond perception.

[Normal]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
So, if one wants to say that morality is like taste, one still needs to say why morality differs from taste.

Why? Why is the difference necessary? Liking peanut butter on toast is a value judgement. All value judgements are moral claims. If you mean the difference is "Why should someone else act the way you say, if they don't have to have peanut butter on toast?", the answer is obvious. Someone shouldn't act the way I say, but if my value for peanut butter on toast is strong enough, I'll say you ought to eat it.

[sodium]

Originally posted by Normal
The definition of good is irrelevent to the question of "Does good exist objectively".

So are you saying,

1) No matter how we define good, it still can't be objective. Even if we definined "good" to mean "having three sides", it still wouldn't be objective.

or

2) Based on how we actually define good, it is a subjective question. There may be ways to define good objectively, but they aren't what we actually mean by good.

or some third option? And if number 2, then how do you define "good"?

[Normal]

Originally posted by sodium
1) No matter how we define good, it still can't be objective. Even if we definined "good" to mean "having three sides", it still wouldn't be objective.

"Good" is usually defined as the "best possible case as preceived by the individual", without that individual, the "good" would not exist.

Originally posted by sodium
2) Based on how we actually define good, it is a subjective question. There may be ways to define good objectively, but they aren't what we actually mean by good.

All the ways to define good objective (and these do exist, as there are triangles with three sides objectively), that individual conception of good does not exist without the individual. The perception is dependant on the perceiver, unlike the triangle.

[wiploc]

Originally posted by Normal
"Good" is usually defined as the "best possible case as preceived by the individual", without that individual, the "good" would not exist.

If I say, "Rape is bad," according to your way of thinking, I must be saying, "I don't like rape." I think Fyfe has a compelling argument that this is not how such a phrase is usually received or intended. It's not how people talk.




All the ways to define good objective (and these do exist, as there are triangles with three sides objectively), that individual conception of good does not exist without the individual. The perception is dependant on the perceiver, unlike the triangle.

I grant you that the badness of rape is subjective in one sense: it wouldn't be bad if women liked being raped. But it is still objectively true that most women don't like being raped. If we assume that the phrase, "'Rape is bad," means something like, "Rape causes a net increase in unhappiness," as opposed to, "I don't like rape," then the badness of rape is an objective fact.

If I say, "Coffee is bad," people will take me to be be saying that I don't like it. (And, boy, will they be right!) If I say, "It is bad for priests to have sex with altar boys," people will take me to be saying something else, and, again, they will be right.

It may be your perception that people who make moral claims are basing their claims on nothing more than their personal subjective preferences. But can you grant us that those people are making, however falsely, different claims, about something other than their personal perceptions?

crc

[Normal]

Originally posted by wiploc
If I say, "Rape is bad," according to your way of thinking, I must be saying, "I don't like rape." I think Fyfe has a compelling argument that this is not how such a phrase is usually received or intended. It's not how people talk.

But the only difference between "Rape is bad" and "I don't like rape", is that "Rape is bad" implies you don't want other people to do it. But what is this based on? That you consider rape to be sufficiently harmful, so much as that you would prefer other people not doing it. I assume you value this, because you value that people should not be harmful towards one another. And you value people should not be harmful towards one another, because if people were acting harmful towards one another, it might impede your quest of happiness. All these are moral value judgements, however, and no not exist without the individual.

Originally posted by wiploc
I grant you that the badness of rape is subjective in one sense: it wouldn't be bad if women liked being raped. But it is still objectively true that most women don't like being raped. If we assume that the phrase, "'Rape is bad," means something like, "Rape causes a net increase in unhappiness," as opposed to, "I don't like rape," then the badness of rape is an objective fact.

But there are some people who do like rape, that is, there is a section of the population who think rape is good. What gives you the authority on the objective judgement of rape over these people?

Originally posted by wiploc
If I say, "Coffee is bad," people will take me to be be saying that I don't like it. (And, boy, will they be right!) If I say, "It is bad for priests to have sex with altar boys," people will take me to be saying something else, and, again, they will be right.

Again, the only differance I see is that coffee triggering a bad taste in your mouth is not sufficiently harmful to cause you not want other people drinking coffee. You do however consider sex with alter boys sufficiently harmful to prevent it's happening. There is a wide degree of harm, where the greater harms will trigger a greater reaction from your moral judgements. The question is does that judgement exist objectively? Can you say that sex with alter boys is objectively wrong?

Originally posted by wiploc
It may be your perception that people who make moral claims are basing their claims on nothing more than their personal subjective preferences. But can you grant us that those people are making, however falsely, different claims, about something other than their personal perceptions?

crc

I contest it is a matter of degree of harm, and not some kind of seperate claim. A value judgement is a value judgement.

[wiploc]

Originally posted by Normal
But the only difference between "Rape is bad" and "I don't like rape", is that "Rape is bad" implies you don't want other people to do it.

That's not how people use the language. I can sincerely say, "Gluttony is bad," even as I overeat, and even as I push more food towards you.



But what is this based on? That you consider rape to be sufficiently harmful, so much as that you would prefer other people not doing it. I assume you value this, because you value that people should not be harmful towards one another.

Touche. But this is the subjective basis of morality; it doesn't mean that no objective claims can be made based on this subjective claim. Example: "If hurting other people is bad (subjective basis) then rape is bad (objective conclusion). That is a sentence with truth value. You may not agree that hurting other people is bad, but you must still agree that the sentence is objectively true.

Suppose we assume that moral claims are objective statements about the implications of subjective assumptions. Example: "Rape is bad," would be read to mean "(On the assumption that human happiness should be maximized, and that hurting other people works contrary to that goal, we may conclude that...) Rape is bad."

Is this really descriptive of actual moral claims? You'll have to wait until my next interjection. :)



And you value people should not be harmful towards one another, because if people were acting harmful towards one another, it might impede your quest of happiness.

Let's contrast my version of a moral claim with yours. Suppose Joe says that president Clinton shouldn't have had sex with an underling. Your position is that this means Clintonian sex tends to reduce Joe's chance of happiness. My position is that it means Clintonian sex tends to reduce happiness generally. In the one case, this is an appropriate response: "You are wrong, Joe, because your own secretary gives great head, and you cannot benefit from that without engaging in Clintonian sex." In the other case, this would be a more appropriate response, "You are wrong, Joe, because concenting adults should be free to screw who they want without regard to social convention."

The second response is more typical of what you would hear in actual conversation. If you heard the first response at all, it would be said with a wink, as a joke, as a deliberate turning of the topic from what is moral to what is of personal benefit.

Thus, when people make moral claims, their meaning is more like what I have described than what you have described.




All these are moral value judgements, however, and no not exist without the individual.

Oh, I'll agree that morals are, at bottom, based on subjective values. If you don't care about human happiness, then you don't care whether some strangers rape other strangers. If you don't care about morality, then you don't care about violations of morality. But that doesn't change what people who do care about morality are talking about when they talk about morality.

There can be moral claims based on rights, duty, fairness, divine command, etcetera, but I think that almost all of them ultimately are based on the belief that people would be generally happier if we followed the rule in question.



But there are some people who do like rape, that is,

True.



there is a section of the population who think rape is good.

Say what?



What gives you the authority on the objective judgement of rape over these people?

I don't claim authority over objectivity. I do claim it is an objective fact that rape reduces net human hapiness.




Again, the only differance I see is that coffee triggering a bad taste in your mouth is not sufficiently harmful to cause you not want other people drinking coffee. You do however consider sex with alter boys sufficiently harmful to prevent it's happening. There is a wide degree of harm, where the greater harms will trigger a greater reaction from your moral judgements. The question is does that judgement exist objectively? Can you say that sex with alter boys is objectively wrong?

Suppose I wanted to make such an argument. Would saying, "I really don't like it," accomplish my goal? Obviously not. Suppose then I said, "I really really violently dislike it." That puts me no closer to establishing an objective wrong. Suppose I say, "I don't like priests screwing little boys because that increases the chances that my own little boys will get screwed, and if that happens I'll be unhappy." That is still the expression of a preference rather than an objective moral wrong.

But suppose now I say this: "Priests shouldn't screw altar boys because people generally will be happier if sex is between conscenting adults neither of whom is in a position of great power over the other." Now we have an objective claim; and now we have a claim that is plausibly what people actually mean when they make a moral claim. (Oh, some of them will get to the conclusion by a slightly different route, for instance, "Priests shouldn't screw altar boys because that is a homosexual act, and god forbids homosexual acts, and people generally, would be happier if we all did what god told us.")





I contest it is a matter of degree of harm, and not some kind of seperate claim. A value judgement is a value judgement.

And a moral claim is usually a claim about the objective implications of a particular value judgement. If we think people should act to maximize happiness, then we get to conclude that conclude that rape is an objective moral wrong.

crc

[Normal]

Originally posted by wiploc
Touche. But this is the subjective basis of morality; it doesn't mean that no objective claims can be made based on this subjective claim. Example: "If hurting other people is bad (subjective basis) then rape is bad (objective conclusion). That is a sentence with truth value. You may not agree that hurting other people is bad, but you must still agree that the sentence is objectively true.

I agree with the first part of course. Objective observations can be made from subjective claims. For example, if I say I think women with blue eyes are beautiful, and then you see a women with blue eyes tomorrow, you can objectively claim that I would consider that women beautiful. But is there objective beauty in that women? Would that women be beautiful without me? The same can be said of good and bad moral claims, that is: They are relative and not objective.

Originally posted by wiploc
When you say "rape is objectively bad", what you are really saying is "I think hurting people is bad, rape hurts people, therefore rape is bad". That is not an objective statement in any sense of the word I'd use it, because it's based on a value judgement on your part (The I think). A triangle having 3 sides is not a value judgement, it is a cold hard fact.

Oh, I'll agree that morals are, at bottom, based on subjective values. If you don't care about human happiness, then you don't care whether some strangers rape other strangers. If you don't care about morality, then you don't care about violations of morality. But that doesn't change what people who do care about morality are talking about when they talk about morality.

Saying something like "I don't care about morality" seems to me to be just ridiculous, because it itself is a moral claim. I might not care about your morality, but it is impossible for me not to have a moral system myself. That is the glaring indicator that morality is indeed relative and not objective.

Originally posted by wiploc
I don't claim authority over objectivity. I do claim it is an objective fact that rape reduces net human hapiness.

But can you not imagine a possible world where forced sex acts were encouraged and actually enjoyed? It seems ridiculous from this world, but it doesn't seem impossible.

Originally posted by wiploc
But suppose now I say this: "Priests shouldn't screw altar boys because people generally will be happier if sex is between conscenting adults neither of whom is in a position of great power over the other." Now we have an objective claim; and now we have a claim that is plausibly what people actually mean when they make a moral claim. (Oh, some of them will get to the conclusion by a slightly different route, for instance, "Priests shouldn't screw altar boys because that is a homosexual act, and god forbids homosexual acts, and people generally, would be happier if we all did what god told us.")

Ah, but that you don't think priests should screw alter boys is still based on an internal moral judgement. You see it as an unnecessary and brutal situation for the alter boy, so that triggers your moral response to want to prevent it. Is it not possible someone could have the moral system that says "What is unnecessary is irrelevent as long as it doesn't affect me?". I'd say it's possible, and I'd say that was a different moral claim, although it is more useful to society to not have that moral.

Originally posted by wiploc
And a moral claim is usually a claim about the objective implications of a particular value judgement. If we think people should act to maximize happiness, then we get to conclude that conclude that rape is an objective moral wrong.

But the argument isn't about whether moral claims can have objective implications, it's about whether morality is relative.

[the_cave]

Originally posted by Normal
And you value people should not be harmful towards one another, because if people were acting harmful towards one another, it might impede your quest of happiness.

But it would also impede their quest of happiness. It so happens that our mutual quests for happiness tend to reinforce one another (I'm happy when others are happy, etc.) The point is, it's not just about me--I rely on the judgments of others as well, and so does the concept of morality. This suggests to me that it isn't individually relative--it's relative to groups, even if each individual must judge for themselves what is moral and what isn't. That is, those who make empathetic judgments will be more objective than those who don't.

All these are moral value judgements, however, and no not exist without the individual.

True, but again, we're not just talking about individuals operating without awareness of one another--we're talking about groups. Morals might not exist without individuals, but that doesn't mean they don't exist--because, after all, individuals exist! Here we are. So morals first of all objectively exist.

But there are some people who do like rape, that is, there is a section of the population who think rape is good. What gives you the authority on the objective judgement of rape over these people?

Turn that around and ask; what gives them the authority on the objective judgement of rape over me?

I'll tell you what gives me the authority; my empathetic judgement versus their sociopathic judgement, that's what!

My judgement is superior, and more objective, simply because I also take into account the desires of others. Indeed, I can even take into account the desires of those who desire to rape--yet their desires are clearly inferior to others who judge empathetically as well as for themselves that rape is clearly evil. In other words, by not taking into account the desires of others--i.e. the desires of those who would be their victims--they are being far less objective than me, and everyone else who realizes rape is wrong. They have only one perspective; their own. We, on the other hand, have one another's perspective. As such, our judgement is better than theirs.

If you're going to claim that we're just imposing our standard of objectivity on others unfairly, you're in a heap of trouble, since abandoning the standard of multiple-perspective objectivity would would wipe out most of the facts of science. It seems to me, anyway.

The question is does that judgement exist objectively? Can you say that sex with alter boys is objectively wrong?

It's at least more objectively wrong than many other actions. I think we can at least talk about degrees of objectivity, even if we can't speak of absolute objectivity.

I contest it is a matter of degree of harm, and not some kind of seperate claim. A value judgement is a value judgement.

See? We agree. Almost.

Because I think that even if moral objectivity remains relative to human beings generally, in an abstract sense, what standard could there be to compare it to? None--we're the only moral beings in the universe that we know of (leaving aside God for now). So who could possibly do us better? No one--so therefore, our moral objectivity is the most objective morality that there could be. Therefore, it's not relative at all--it is a simple, objective fact. We are moral creatures, and there is a highest degree of morality that we can achieve (even if we haven't achieved it yet).

Think about it this way. Let's say there are three apples on the ground, and I ask you how many apples there are. You reply "three". I ask you if this is an objective fact, and you reply "No, because there needn't be three. It's relative to how many apples there are."

...

Do you see how it's true that the fact that there three apples is indeed relative to how many apples there are, and yet this fact is wholly objective in every sense desirable? You could do the same with the sides of the triangle. My point is morals are the same way; we have the morals that we have by nature. I suppose we could have others, but we don't; we have the ones we have. There is some maximal consideration of our desires and attitudes which sums up into a greatest possible morality. And, because we do in fact have the desires and attitudes that we have, this greatest possible morality is wholly objective.

[the_cave]

Originally posted by the_cave
Do you see how it's true that the fact that there three apples is indeed relative to how many apples there are, and yet this fact is wholly objective in every sense desirable? You could do the same with the sides of the triangle. My point is morals are the same way; we have the morals that we have by nature. I suppose we could have others, but we don't; we have the ones we have. There is some maximal consideration of our desires and attitudes which sums up into a greatest possible morality. And, because we do in fact have the desires and attitudes that we have, this greatest possible morality is wholly objective.

AND let me add that the other point (which is actually central to my claim) is that those who consider morals objectively, from an empathetic perspective, contribute more to the greatest possible morality than others. They're like apples that count more than others ;)

[Normal]

the_cave: I take it your argument revolves around this key point:

Morality is concerned with what is good for the whole.

And the issue we are talking about right now is that tiny little word there "good".

Is morality objective?

Is "what is good for the whole" an objective concept?

Is what is good for you necessarily the same as what is good for the whole?

A key subject that should be brought up is abortion. Some feel that abortion is "good for the whole". Some feel abortion is "bad for the whole". Where is the objective resolution of this issue? How is one who values every unborn life going to be proven "wrong" by someone who only values children who are born?

Unless you can determine an objective resolution, objective morality fails, and is necessarily relative.

[wiploc]

Originally posted by Normal

Unless you can determine an objective resolution, objective morality fails, and is necessarily relative.


That's not a fair test. Lots of objective things can't be resolved. For instance, "There are currently an odd number of stars in the universe," is objectively either true or false, but we'll never know which.

At issue is what moral claims mean, not whether they can be resolved.

crc

[Peter Kirby]

Suppose that we found certain desires are built into the biology of the human being and the reality of the world we live in, such as the desire for self-preservation. Could we define "objectively good" as applying to those rules that best allow these human desires to be fulfilled for humans? Where "objectively good" means "truly good relative to the human race," not hypothetical alien civilizations in parallel universes.

best,
Peter Kirby

[Normal]

Originally posted by wiploc
That's not a fair test. Lots of objective things can't be resolved. For instance, "There are currently an odd number of stars in the universe," is objectively either true or false, but we'll never know which.

At issue is what moral claims mean, not whether they can be resolved.

crc

But the even/odd state of there being a certain number of stars in the universe is not relative to anything. It is an objective fact that there are either an even number of stars, or it is an objective fact that there are an odd number of stars. If everyone woke up tomorrow and saw that rape was a "good" thing, morality would change, it is relative to the views of society. If we found one more star in the sky, our observations would switch from even to odd, but the objective fact of there being an even number or odd number of stars would remain unchanged.

It's not a "fair test" because one of them is relative, and one of them is objective, which is precisely the issue at hand.

[Normal]

Originally posted by Peter Kirby
Suppose that we found certain desires are built into the biology of the human being and the reality of the world we live in, such as the desire for self-preservation. Could we define "objectively good" as applying to those rules that best allow these human desires to be fulfilled for humans? Where "objectively good" means "truly good relative to the human race," not hypothetical alien civilizations in parallel universes.

best,
Peter Kirby

Then morality is relative to the adaptive biology of the human being, and not objective. We can make objective claims about morality, just like we can make objective claims about beauty. But beauty and morality do not exist without observers of those things. A triangle has three sides with or without observers.

[Peter Kirby]

Originally posted by Normal
Then morality is relative to the adaptive biology of the human being, and not objective. We can make objective claims about morality, just like we can make objective claims about beauty. But beauty and morality do not exist without observers of those things. A triangle has three sides with or without observers. I basically agree. When I think about the objectivity debate, I think about the question, does my moral opinion refer to how I feel or what I think that certain rules would mean for allowing human beings generally to fulfill their desires? Is it something we can argue about rationally or is it like debating the merits of Pepsi versus Coke? And can a person who says "this is good, because I think it is good" be wrong? I don't think it has much to do with a higher-dimensional plane where eternal truths sit. (At least on that last sentence, I think that Fyfe would agree--he hasn't argued for transcendental morality.)

Morality would be different among alien beings. I once wrote a science fiction story about that, in this post to the (former Infidels) Xtianity list:

I can think of two thought experiments that might help someone distinguish
this position from the "Absolute" type of objective ethics favored by
Christian apologists. The term "thought experiment," following common
usage, is an imagined scenario whose result is only to clarify one's own
intuitions.

The first thought experiment is simple. Imagine the time of ten billion
years ago, when all that exists in the universe are stars and space dust.
Imagine a time when there is absolutely no life, not even the smallest
single-celled organism, stirring any corner of the universe. In a universe
in which nothing is even alive, is there a moral imperative against the
killing of newly born members of the species homo sapiens? Are human ethics
so universal, that they exist in a universe without humans, a universe which
will only contain humans ten billion years later on a the tiny fourth planet
of a sun on the outskirts of the Milky Way? Are our laws so absolute, that
twenty billion years later, when human beings no longer exist and never will
be, that they continue to apply everywhere from the great empty stretches of
space approaching zero kelvin to the unimaginably hot inner core of an
exploding supernova? What would it mean to say that it is immoral to steal
when there is no longer anybody around to have possessions or to consider
the act?

The second thought experiment is to imagine an alien race of conscious,
intelligent critters. Is it possible that they are justified in accepting
different rules than human societies, indeed inhumane rules, based on their
own nonhuman nature? Please forgive this, ahem, clinical treatment which I
know offends my own sensibilities and those of other human beings, as is
necessary for the purpose of the thought experiment. Imagine, for unknown
causes, that it is necessary to each person's survival that the person eats
the vital organs of another on some periodic basis. Perhaps the period is
the equivalent of once every ten years, with an average fifteen year period
of development and seventy year life. This is a logically possible
scenario, if not a scientifically feasible one. In accordance with this
fact about these people, it seems that they would be most easily swayed to
accept Jonathan Swift's modest proposal. If the people were to abstain from
cannibalism altogether, they would soon perish. If the people were to
regularly find their necessary food in other people of the same age, there
would be needless waste on the species level, as well as perhaps difficult
relations for fear of safety on the individual level. It would be expected
that many newborns would be killed by this society. It might be imagined
that the society would honor those newborns sacrificed are to be honored as
unwitting heros, performing their sacred duty necessary to the society as a
whole, perhaps lucky to be guaranteed a place in the equivalent of heaven.
There would need to develop some system to regulate the selection and
distrobution of these sacrifices. One possible system is that any
procreating couple must contribute to the community a certain number of
infants before being permitted to raise their own child. In order to
encourage the success of the communal system, there may be a deep-seated
taboo on eating your own offspring, and those who are discovered to have
hidden children may be punished in some way. In this society, not all
people are "born equal," because it would not be possible to use the point
of birth as a practical entrance point as a member of society. There would
likely be a ritual in which a young child is presented and accepted as a
member of the community. It would be wrong to think that these people would
generally have a callous opinion towards killing others. It would hardly be
helpful to the society at large, or the welfare of the individuals in it, to
be killing other members of it. Indeed, perhaps one wise philosopher had
observed to be careful about harming your neighbor, because you may then be
dishonoring the sacrifice of your infant. Because of the amount of
cooperation necessary to keep people alive, it is reasonable to imagine that
the society would have an even deeper sense of the value of a person's life.
Because of the ritual practice of sharing infants in the society, there is
probably a very rich understanding of each person as being a brother. One
may speculate on further consequences of the species' nature. Would the
respect engendered for other members of the society prevent them from eating
those who died of accidental or natural causes, or would they consider it to
be the final right and obligation fulfilled to their society which was
denied to them at birth? If there were separate societies or nations, would
they consider the flow of life within their own society to be so sacred as
to extend the same rights to other societies, or would those who die in
international conflicts be readily consumed by the winners of each battle?
But beyond these speculations, is it correct to say that the ethical beliefs
and practices of this alien society are absolutely wrong? Is it correct to
say that these people are objectively immoral? Is there a true ethical
mandate that the species discontinue entirely the practice of cannibalism
and disappear forever from the universe? Or, perhaps, does a justified
ethical system result from their nature?

Sarah lives in an average size town on this planet. She was raised in a
devout home as a girl and chose to enter the temple life and prepare for the
priesthood at the age of seventeen. For the next three years, she studied
carefully under the tutelage of the ten priests currently at the temple. As
the younger trainee, she had to serve as the assistant on the night watch,
as women in labor had to be taken to the temple to give birth if possible.
She knew the process by heart. The woman was set upon a consecrated birth
bed, and she or her husband was required to provide identification if she
intends to keep the infant, in order to prove that she has served her first
duty. She is traditionally blind-folded, but this practice may go back to
times, some speculate, when infant corpses were distributed whole. After
giving birth, she is taken to a separate part of the temple for the recently
pregnant to recuperate. Fortunately, giving birth is an exhausting but not
an entirely painful experience, and one which women have been conditioned
all but to relish (the problem of the insufficiently wide passage for an
increased cranium size being somewhat particular to primate anatomy). The
newborn is taken to the sacrificial table, where it is quickly and
mercifully executed in the customary manner. The body's vital organs are
removed, cured, and placed in a holy jar upon the altar. It will later be
placed in the large tabernacle under the temple by the high priest, who
alone may enter the most holy place. The rest of the flesh is burned in the
furnace which is at the apex of the temple, so that the creator is pleased
with this sacrifice to Her. Like everyone else, Sarah's favorite holiday is
the first of the new year. Following ten weeks of fasting, wherein everyone
but currently pregnant women symbolically share in their forbearance through
ten labors by accepting this relatively small sacrifice, there are ten days
of great celebration. On the first day, which is everyone's symbolic
"birthday," those who were born during the previous year are presented at
their temple to be baptized as a group into the community. On the last day,
the feasting culminates in a special ceremony for only those in their decade
year, in which they have the most sacred meal.

Now, during this time of fasting before Sarah's twentieth birthday, she had
been talking with her friend Jacob, whom she had known since only a child.
Although his birthing took place only a month before hers, Jacob was a full
year her senior, approaching 21. Jacob was a student at the university at
the large city a bit away, but during the break he returned to his home
community as was the custom. Jacob was a bright young male who was studying
biology at the university so that he might become a doctor. Sarah often
teased him for his choice, because medicine was traditionally practiced only
by women priests, but a few secular hospitals in the large cities had begun
to employ men. On this visit, Jacob looked a little concerned to Sarah, who
asked what was the matter. Hesitating, but knowing he could trust her, he
confessed that he had begun to doubt in the Creator. He explains: "I heard
in one of my lectures that experiments were being done on another continent
in cloning organs. They had succeeded in cloning other animals, and they
believe that the same principles could be used to clone our organs. Some
Infidels have proposed that this could be the death knell for Religion,
which they say was needed by primitive people to organize their society but
which now can be cast away. They explained that the reason that we consume
infants is not because they are imbued with a primal life force which feeds
our soul, but because evolution predicts that we would eat newborn organs
because it is more efficient to our survival. Until now, they say, religion
may have served a utilitarian purpose but it can go. They say that it was
indeed the most ethical thing that we could do to consume infants in order
to propagate the race, but now that we have an alternative it is reasonable
to change our way of life altogether. As much as I hate to say it, it does
make some sense to me. I never understood how the Goddess could decide that
just certain infants were meant to be sacrificed and certain others were
meant to become citizens. What makes any one deserve a certain fate rather
than the other? I am beginning to doubt that there is a 'life force' and a
'soul' which depends upon it. After all, surely you would say 'life force'
is transmitted only though the soul of a woman who has an infant, an act of
creation assisted by the Goddess. But if women and men can find vital
nourishment in the form of cloned organs, then there is no 'life force' and
there is no 'soul'. And the Goddess is then only a myth, the Bible only a
story. In order to explain the origin of people and the cycle of
procreation, our ancestors invented the story of Eve and Adam, but we now
are able to explain things in scientific terms... even to explain how we got
these stories."

Sarah, who was much disgusted by the things which Jacob was telling her, had
nonetheless been trained in some apologetics and thought she could employ
them most profitably now. "I am sorry to hear that you feel that way,
Jacob. But are you completely sure of your faith in science? Although
people in the city might be all liberal and tolerant, with their own brand
of 'secular' new year festivals, you know that if you make your doubt known
about the town you will be cast out for good. While you could survive with
these people, their life force is tainted. If She exists, the Goddess will
know that you have broken with your community, and after your death you will
burn along with the Devil, the old serpent who thought that he could be
independent himself. Is that a risk that you want to take? It seems like a
bad wager to me. Also, as an atheist how are you supposed to say that
morality is anything other than subjective? What keeps you from going
around and killing people, if you believe that they are just physical stuff
with no soul? How can you say that something is wrong and another thing is
right, unless you have an objective standard? As believers, we have the
objective standard which is the nature of the Goddess, and the rules for
living She has put down for us in the good book. Without this objective
standard, you have no way for judging what is wrong and what is right. That
is why you can think about such perversions as eating raw parts cloned in a
lab, like some animal, instead of the vitals sanctified in the manner
explained by our Goddess."

I will leave the story of Jacob and Sarah here. (As an aside, I wonder if
this particular kind of science fiction has been explored much by better
writers.) I hope that the parallels are apparent, but in case their force
is missed, I will expound on them a little.

In this society, rules had developed which were appropriate to the nature of
the people. In order to provide some cultural basis for their evolved
customs, the myths about the will of the Goddess came about, which provided
a poweful cohesive worldview in the community. This served its purpose of
reinforcing the authority of the priesthood and giving some kind of answer
to the question about why things should be done a certain way. However,
when perhaps it was no longer as useful to the society to continue to
believe in these religious myths, due in part to an expanding understanding
of the actual origin of people and of ethics, the religious belief becomes a
hindrance in two ways. First, the concepts used in the religious
understanding of the world (in this case, 'life force' and 'soul')
discourage certain lines of research (in this case, cloning people parts).
Of course, one can imagine a revision in theology when it is discovered that
the cloned parts work just as well for nourishment, with people scoffing
that it should ever have been thought that science and religion could be in
conflict. But, second, as shown in Sarah's reply, the religious
justification for ethics clouds our ability to reason about ethics because
the religious basis is false, a front. That these people would find it
ethical to consume some infants and find it unethical to be killing each
other follows from their nature. The religious justification evolved in
order that people would more efficiently be doing what is ethical, but that
should not be confused with the rational basis for ethics, which is to allow
these people to exist together in a society in a way that would most
equitably preserve their interests. While the issues of how to compromise
when individual interests collide are notoriously thorny (equally for the
religionist and the skeptic I might add), the basic fact remains that ethics
is ethics for people. The ethics of these people is not dependent on the
eternal unchanging nature of their Goddess. The ethics of this people is
dependent on the nature of this people and nothing else, and no other beings
have a say in it; not an imaginary Goddess nor even a real one can change
that.

Likewise, human ethics is no more dependent on the nature of an imagined God
than it is on the nature of an alien society, or anything else that has
nothing to do with being a human person. Logically, why should it? To live
as a human, study humans.

best,
Peter Kirby

[Normal]

I tend to agree with everything you said. Religion is an attempt to tie together the worldviews of a population to form a somewhat cohesive system of morality (well, I think that's about the best light that it could be shown it).

It's all relative to nature, how could anyone not see that? What if we evolved as a bigger version of the black widow spider? Would killing still be so morally offensive?

[Alonzo Fyfe]

I just thought it would be interesting to mention:

One of my favorite past times is to write up stories involving truly alien races -- races with characteristics that we may find . . . distasteful. -- specifically for the purpose of illustrating how moral values can be objective.

These include stories about vampires, werewolves, intelligent lions, orcs, a somewhat atypical species of elves (who must not wear clothes because their skin is photosynthetic and must remain exposed to sunlight), and even gods.

[Dr. Retard]

Normal wrote:
In terms of "good" however, the definition does change from person to person. What one person defines to be "good" might seem selfish to another, or unreasonable to another, or unacceptable to another. There is no objective thing to be pinned down by the word "good", making the triangle example a false analogy.

I really doubt that the definition of "good" changes a lot from person to person. People generally share the same definition of "good", I'd think. They just disagree about what is in fact good. The same sort of thing can be illustrated with the word "true". People generally share the same definition of "true". They just disagree about what is in fact true. So, for example, pro-lifers and pro-choicers typically agree about the definition of "good", they just disagree in their moral opinions. Evolutionists and creationists typically agree about the definition of "true", they just disagree in their scientific opinions. So the widespread disagreement is not about the definitions of words, but instead about substantive claims.

Of course, when it comes to meta-ethical debates like "Is morality objective or relative (or whatever)?", then the definition of "good" does change a lot from person to person. These disagreements are either (i) disagreements about prevailing usage of the word "good", (ii) disagreements about how we ought to use the word "good", or (iii) empty verbal disputes. The first kind of disagreement is for lexicographers; they're concerned to find out how real people tend to use the word. The second kind is an evaluative debate in itself, about which uses of "good" are appropriate and commendable, and which uses ought to be abandoned. The third is the most common kind and the most depressing kind; subscripts exist for a reason -- just talk about good1, good2, good3, etc. and be done with it.

I think it's wise for disputants to spend less time coming up with their own personal definitions for label-words, and more time talking about the facts. For example, instead of saying "'Good' is defined in terms of the attitudes and customs of humans and their societies", just say "When it comes to morality, the only facts are those reporting the attitudes and customs of humans and their societies. There are no other facts, apart from these anthropological facts." This gets right to the point. There's no need to make claims about the definition of "good", as (again) that only leads to lexicography debates, evaluative debates about how we ought to use words, or empty verbal disputes. And those debates don't address the core issues of meta-ethics.

[wiploc]

Originally posted by Dr. Retard
I really doubt that the definition of "good" changes a lot from person to person.


> Conan the Barbarian on the good:
> Q. What is best in life?
> A. To crush your enemies. To see them driven before
> you, and to hear the lamentations of their women.

Sorry, I'm not disagreeing; I just couldn't help myself.
crc

[B. H. Manners]

The only objective moral standard is that all morality is subjective.

[Normal]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
Black Widow Morality

Alonzo, I'm expecting my check in the mail.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Normal
Alonzo, I'm expecting my check in the mail.

I'll give you 15% of the gross -- as soon as I get the gross.

[Clutch]

There is an occasional tendency, here and elsewhere, to equate morality's being subjective, in some sense, with its being relative, in a very strong sense.

Morality's being subjective is a much broader prospect than its being conventional, or arbitrary, or a matter of personal taste.

There is a very clear sense in which colour is subjective; our colour judgements are functions of our particular biopsychology, and a small class of people with importantly distinct biopsychologies reach systematically different colour judgements.

Therefore, there is no fact of the matter about whether ripe tomatoes are red, or whether a cloudless daytime sky is blue? Our colour judgements are arbitrary? The sentence "Ripe tomatoes are red" is not true?

Well, no. That a discourse is in some sense subjective does not entail that it is conventional, arbitrary, or a matter of personal taste.

[wiploc]

Originally posted by Clutch
There is an occasional tendency, here and elsewhere, to equate morality's being subjective, in some sense, with its being relative, in a very strong sense.
<snip>
Well, no. That a discourse is in some sense subjective does not entail that it is conventional, arbitrary, or a matter of personal taste.

Very nice post, Clutch.
crc

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Clutch
There is an occasional tendency, here and elsewhere, to equate morality's being subjective, in some sense, with its being relative, in a very strong sense.

Morality's being subjective is a much broader prospect than its being conventional, or arbitrary, or a matter of personal taste.

There is a very clear sense in which colour is subjective; our colour judgements are functions of our particular biopsychology, and a small class of people with importantly distinct biopsychologies reach systematically different colour judgements.

Therefore, there is no fact of the matter about whether ripe tomatoes are red, or whether a cloudless daytime sky is blue? Our colour judgements are arbitrary? The sentence "Ripe tomatoes are red" is not true?

Well, no. That a discourse is in some sense subjective does not entail that it is conventional, arbitrary, or a matter of personal taste.

I think that I should comment on this -- for the sake of avoiding confusion in the future.

In the taxonomy of value theories used in moral philosophy, the theory of value as a secondary quality (like color) is classified as a member of the family "moral realism".

Subjectivism is classified in the family of "moral anti-realism" and is very much tied to the idea that right and wrong is a matter of opinion.

Perhaps there are reasons to dismiss this traditional taxonomy.

However, at least in the field of moral philosophy, if an author uses the word 'subjectivism' he is using it in a sense that excludes secondary property theories. If he talks about value as a secondary property, he takes as his opposition all subjectivist theories that hold that value is a matter of opinion or arbitrary.

Confusing these two terms would make a lot of conventional moral philosophy very difficult to understand.

Also, since I am supposed to be the defender of objective morality in this debate, and secondary-quality theory is a form of objectivism, it is not a theory that my opponent can bring up against me. Therefore, I feel free to respond to it. It is not a form of objective theory that I will have any intention of using.

[Note: Clutch, I recognize that it may not have been your intention to advance the theory of value as a secondary property. Yet, it is the mantra of this family of theories that 'good is like red'.]

The most significant problem with the theory of value as a secondary property rests on the fact that we can reduce color concepts to natural properties -- energy levels of photons, the physical structure of our photon-detection equipment (eyes).

What are the comparable components of value as a secondary property? What is our value-sensing organ? What are we sensing?

Furthermore, culture has no impact on our sense of color -- red is red regardless of what culture one is raised in. However, culture has a great deal of impact on our sense of right and wrong. This strongly suggests that value is NOT a secondary property.

In addition, what should we do when I 'sense' that it is okay for you to die a slow and painful death and you 'sense' that it is not okay?

These represent the more significant problems with the idea of value as a secondary property.

[Clutch]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
I think that I should comment on this -- for the sake of avoiding confusion in the future.

In the taxonomy of value theories used in moral philosophy, the theory of value as a secondary quality (like color) is classified as a member of the family "moral realism".

Subjectivism is classified in the family of "moral anti-realism" and is very much tied to the idea that right and wrong is a matter of opinion.

Perhaps there are reasons to dismiss this traditional taxonomy.Calling subjectivism, in the broad sense I sketched, a form of antirealism is okay by me. (Though it is, or can be, a pretty mild form.) The real non-sequitur is the next move, to "the idea that right and wrong is a matter of opinion". What argument mediates this?
However, at least in the field of moral philosophy, if an author uses the word 'subjectivism' he is using it in a sense that excludes secondary property theories. If he talks about value as a secondary property, he takes as his opposition all subjectivist theories that hold that value is a matter of opinion or arbitrary.

Confusing these two terms would make a lot of conventional moral philosophy very difficult to understand.I am aware of the received usage. That's why I'm advising greater care in the use of these terms. I'm suggesting that it's more important not to draw and quarter the conceptual terrain in a Procrustean manner, placing views in camps to which they need not be allied, than it is to follow a philosophical facon de parler, however deeply entrenched.
[Note: Clutch, I recognize that it may not have been your intention to advance the theory of value as a secondary property. Yet, it is the mantra of this family of theories that 'good is like red'.]It was not my intention. The notion of a secondary property has enormous baggage in its train; this is a good example of why argument from established associations can be unrewarding.
The most significant problem with the theory of value as a secondary property rests on the fact that we can reduce color concepts to natural properties -- energy levels of photons, the physical structure of our photon-detection equipment (eyes).As I understand it, this is false. Who has performed such a reduction? Colour judgements -- red, for instance -- are associated with ranges, sometimes discontinuous ranges, of reflectances, and are also affected by relative motion, ambient light, and the state of the receptors. In short, attempts to "reduce" redness have a very hard time avoiding the inclusion of the proviso, "...or is otherwise judged to be red".
What are the comparable components of value as a secondary property? What is our value-sensing organ? What are we sensing?The claim -- my claim, at least -- was not that moral properties are colours. It was an argument by example showing that the following inference is invalid:

D is a partially subjectively dependent discourse --> Characteristic statements of D are not truth-apt.

Colour discourse seems a counterexample to this. Hence it is reasonable to think that an argument is owed if one wishes to claim that morality's being subjective means that there are no moral truths.
Furthermore, culture has no impact on our sense of color -- red is red regardless of what culture one is raised in. However, culture has a great deal of impact on our sense of right and wrong. This strongly suggests that value is NOT a secondary property.It contributes to the mounting evidence that morality is not colour. The non-moral properties associated with moral judgements (as properties like ambient wavelength are associated with colour) are no doubt themselves social and psychological, in part; differences in society and psychology may well be reflected in moral facts.
In addition, what should we do when I 'sense' that it is okay for you to die a slow and painful death and you 'sense' that it is not okay?If moral judgements were purely perceptual, this would be a great worry. If they are open to rational influence, this is less of a worry. The answer to your question is eminently practical, and is provided daily millions of times over: people's moral judgements differ constantly, and "what we do" is to draw analogies, adduce relevant facts, solicit empathy, appeal to principle and in short chivvy one another around to "reboot" the judgement.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Clutch

Many of your comments show that I was correct to be cautious in saying that you were proposing a traditional "value as a secondary property" theory -- that you meant something more general.

Let's say, instead of a narrow interpretation of your comments, we broaden it. There is, indeed, a family of real-world entities, that are relationships between human physiology and the outside world, that is fully objective though -- ex hypothesi -- not fully independent of some set of relevant human properties.

Such a view would be consistent with what I have been arguing for -- that value claims describe relationships between states of affairs and desires, where desires are brain states -- descriptions of the wiring of brain.

In this context, I agree that we are dealing with a realm where the concept of "objective" and "subjective" are blurred -- which I acknowledge in my most recent posting in the debate. There is a sense in which I agree that the theory that I advance is "relativistic". What I disagree with is not "relativism" per se, but with "individual perspective relativism" in specific.

[Clutch]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
Clutch

Many of your comments show that I was correct to be cautious in saying that you were proposing a traditional "value as a secondary property" theory -- that you meant something more general.

Let's say, instead of a narrow interpretation of your comments, we broaden it. There is, indeed, a family of real-world entities, that are relationships between human physiology and the outside world, that is fully objective though -- ex hypothesi -- not fully independent of some set of relevant human properties.

Such a view would be consistent with what I have been arguing for -- that value claims describe relationships between states of affairs and desires, where desires are brain states -- descriptions of the wiring of brain.

In this context, I agree that we are dealing with a realm where the concept of "objective" and "subjective" are blurred -- which I acknowledge in my most recent posting in the debate. There is a sense in which I agree that the theory that I advance is "relativistic". What I disagree with is not "relativism" per se, but with "individual perspective relativism" in specific. I never thought that your adoption of the common usage of these categories was leading to poor reasoning on your part, but I think your recent post in the debate does make things clearer.

For my part, I think that "morality is like red" is much more defensible if understood to mean just that both moral talk and colour talk are subjectively inflected yet express truths. The sharp dividing lines imposed by the trilemma of primary property, secondary property, or nothing at all, strike me as obscuring the matter of degree between the (pre-theoretic) truth-aptness of subjective discourses. (My views have been greatly influenced, I should say, by the more general antirealism of writers like Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright, the latter's Truth and Objectivity being particularly stimulating, though it offered more questions than answers.)

For instance, I think the subjective discourse of etiquette is conventional, arbitrary, a matter of mere opinion. Comic discourse is less so -- notice that we often appeal to relevant facts to shift someone's judgement about whether something was actually funny -- but still (again pretheoretically) not a good candidate for expressing very robust truths. Moral discourse? I don't pretend to know. More stable than the comic, less stable than colour discourse, I conjecture. What I am convinced of is that sensitivity to these nuances is important for understanding just what we're doing when we make moral assertions. The received categorization of positions is often simply blind to these subtleties.

[bd-from-kg]

Clutch:

Moral discourse? I don't pretend to know. More stable than the comic, less stable than colour discourse, I conjecture. What I am convinced of is that sensitivity to these nuances is important for understanding just what we're doing when we make moral assertions.

Maybe you’re approaching the problem the wrong way round. It may be better to ignore (initially) the question of “how objective” moral discourse is, and concentrate instead on trying to understand what people are “up to” when they engage in it – i.e., what its function and purpose is. This could lead to an understanding of whether what they’re “up to” involves stating propositions about the “real world”, and if so, what they are and what role they play. At that point the question of how “objective” it is will answer itself.

I think that where Alonzo’s theory goes wrong fundamentally is in supposing that the objective content of moral discourse is the entire content. While moral statements are indeed intended to assert propositions about the real world (and his theory isn’t too far wrong in identifying them), they are intended to say more than merely that a certain state of affairs obtains, or would obtain if ... The complete meaning of moral language simply cannot be expressed in the form of propositions. And the “non-factual” part of the meaning is essential to its function and purpose.

[Clutch]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
Clutch:
Maybe you’re approaching the problem the wrong way round. It may be better to ignore (initially) the question of “how objective” moral discourse is, and concentrate instead on trying to understand what people are “up to” when they engage in it – i.e., what its function and purpose is. Actually you seem to be reading me the wrong way round. My discussion of "how objective" is a defensive one, fending off that very approach.

My position is precisely: Start with the data. Hence I view moral discourse as a vehicle through which wedraw analogies, adduce relevant facts, solicit empathy, appeal to principle and in short chivvy one another around to "reboot" [moral] judgement[s].And I believe that beginning with a bagful of metaphysical assumptions about objectivity and subjectivity is a poor way to shed light on the nuances of these data.

As to your critique of Alonzo's view, it seems to hinge on an unexplicated notion of "factual content". This has considerable potential to conceal question-begging, though. As it stands I can't really read much out of it.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

On this issue, I may agree and disagree with both of you.

If we are seeking an answer to the question, "Is morality objective?", we cannot answer this question without first determining what morality is. This would be like asking the question, "Do skorkavals have scales?" without knowing what a skorkaval is. So, we have a logically prior question: What is this thing called 'morality?'

Yet, this approach has a trap built into it that we must watch out for. We cannot allow language to dictate reality.

The book, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG by J.L. Mackie illustrates this trap using the word 'atom'.

Transport yourself back in time.

"Is it possible to split an atom?" Well, we can't answer this question until we know what an 'atom' is. If we look at the meaning of the word 'atom' it comes from ancient Greek, where it literally meant 'without parts'. Atoms have no parts as a matter of definition. The question, "Is it possible to split the atom?" becomes "Is it possible to take apart something that has no parts?" Of course not. Don't be absurd.

Another example can be drawn from the word 'malaria'. "Is malaria caused by a bacteria?" Well, the literal meaning of 'malaria' is 'bad air' (mal - aeria). It literally means, 'disease caused by bad air'. A bacteria is not the same as bad air, therefore the idea that bacteria causes malaria can be tossed.

Obviously, there is a problem with both of these examples -- and the problem rests in attempting to use the meaning of words to dictate reality. Language is a human invention, and like all human inventions in contains a few flaws. When we are looking at the meanings of words, we must be wary of the possibility of encountering some of these flaws -- these incorrect built-in assumptions. And where we encounter them, be ready to shift the meanings of our terms.

The view that I defend tries to follow the trail of determining what 'morality' means by looking at the data -- at the way moral terms are used and at what people who use moral language are trying to get at. However, it also attempt to avoid following this trail so intently that it ends up in the trap of using language to dictate reality. Where language clashes with reality, reality always wins, and language must give way.

bd-from-kg seems to see the same trail I do. We follow it side by side for quite some distance. We share a deep contempt for common subjectivist theories and for evolutionary ethics. Yet, there comes a point where I stop short, because I think I see the trap ahead where language is used to infer ontology -- where there is a risk of saying something like atoms can't be split because it violates the meaning of the word 'atom'.

bd-from-kg thinks that I stop too early -- the trap is only in my imagination.

A rather in-depth discussion of this disagreement can be found toward the end of the thread The Answer: Subjective/Objective Morals (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=56623).

Regretably, it is my turn to post -- but while bd-from-kg was on vacation, I stepped into a commitment for a formal debate. I hope to fulfill this obligation in the near future.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

I would like to point out that we made a slight addition to the FD Rules and Procedures (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=56978):

Fifth, a separate peanut gallery thread will be set up in a forum related to the topic of the formal debate. The peanut gallery is intended for the rest of us to discuss and comment on the debate in progress. Though the FD Moderators cannot enforce their will in the peanut gallery thread (this is left to the judgment of the moderators of the respective fora), formal debate participant involvement in the peanut gallery thread is strongly discouraged. Of course, when the debate is over, the participants are welcome to do as they please in the peanut gallery.

Thank you for your consideration,

- Nightshade, FD Moderator

[spacer1]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
I have repeatedly argued that beliefs are irrelevant to value.
How does this square with your assertion that we have beliefs about others' desires, not to mention that what we deem to be "true" states of affairs are beliefs. This seems contrary to your earlier assertion that:
....all value relates states of affairs to desires.

[I'm assuming the debate has ended? Apologies if this is out of place.]

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Originally posted by spacer1


[I'm assuming the debate has ended? Apologies if this is out of place.]

No, the debate is still ongoing. Please keep in mind that Holy Heretic and Alonzo have been asked not to participate in the peanut gallery until the debate's over. If you'd like to interact with him on this debate then I'd recommend private messages for now. :)

Jason

[Alonzo Fyfe]

It appears that the debate has prematurely ended. I would be happy to entertain any questions from the peanut gallery.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Jack Kamm
When Alonzo tries to debunk "Good for me" theory, he presumes what he's trying to prove.

This is his argument:

1) There are things which are good for me.
2) Things which are good for me can be bad for others.
3) Thus "good for me" can't be the basis of morality, because then something could be both good and bad.

The "because" in #3 leads to the fallacy. In the debate, what they're trying to determine is whether morality is objective or relative -- whether something can be both good and bad, from different frames of reference. Alonzo here presumes morality is objective (something can't be both good and bad), uses this to support statement three, then uses statement three to later on show morality is objective.

Actually, this does not adequately describe the argument.

The argument looks at the logic of moral terms, and attempts to derive a meaning that best accounts for that logic. If 'moral' means 'good for me', then we should be able to look at the logic of moral statements and see people shifting their idea of what is right and wrong according to evidence about what is 'good for me'.

But people do not, in fact, shift their conclusions based on this type of evidence. They don't say, "Hey, look, the guy who murdered his boss actually was able to benefit by doing so, therefore it was not wrong for him to do so." Since they do not argue that way, then "good for me" theory fails to account for the meaning of moral terms.

If we were to seek the meaning of the word 'bachelor', for example, we would look at how people use the word -- at what they accept as evidence that somebody is a bachelor, and at the implications they see as legitimately drawn from that use of the word. If somebody were to offer the theory that 'bachelor' means 'married male', it is perfectly legitimate to argue against him that the definition is inconsistent with a large number of instances in which the term is used.

"good for me" implies "permissible for me" simply is not a part of the way moral terms are used. Therefore, "good for me" is a poor theory of the meaning of moral terms.




Originally posted by Jack Kamm
He also uses this argument:

1) There are things which are good for you (murdering your boss).
2) I disapprove of some of these things (murdering your boss).
3) Therefore, "good for me" can't be the basis of morality, because I disapprove of it.

I don't think I need to show what's the problem with this argument.

Let's try this version instead.

(1) Assume "good for me" = "morally good"

(2) If (1), then evidence that X (e.g., murdering my boss) is "good for me" = evidence that X is "morally good"

(3) However, evidence that X is "good for me" is universally not accepted as evidence that X is "morally good".

Therefore, "good for me" <> "morally good".

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Normal
You're right Alonzo, this is not a word game; it is a perception game. The reason your triangle analogy fails is because we all perceive 3 sided shapes to be the same: They have 3 sides. This is not the same for "good" actions. A person can look at the same action as another; one can see "good" and the other "not good". There is no "good" in the action beyond the independent perception of the action, unlike the triangle.

This presumes that morality is a matter of perception. But it is not.

The only thing that we can perceive is whether or not we like something, or dislike it. This, I agree, is subjective. However, it has nothing to do with morality.

Taste provides an excellent example. When we taste something, we can determine if we like it or do not like it. However, we cannot determine from taste whether or not what we are tasting is good for us or not. It could be a deadly poison. If we were to found the science of neutrition on the science of taste, we would certainly make some very significant errors. Fortunately, nature (evolution) created a rough match between what we like and what is good for us -- else our ancestors would have died and we would not be here. But anybody who suggests using our taste as a guide to good health is ignoring some very obvious facts.

The same is true of the person who bases morality on our 'perception' of what we like and dislike. It is reasonable to expect that evolution provided us with a disposition to like what is good for us, yet it is not reasonable to derive conclusions about what is good for us from what we (directly) like. Sometimes, it takes a bit more thought than that.

This, by the way, also explains moral debate. "What is good for us" is something to be debated -- something for which evidence can be sought and presented. 'Perceptions", on the other hand, are very rarely if ever debated.

We can also tell from observations that what a person 'perceives' to be good or bad is subject to environmental (cultural) influences. We have the capacity to create in others certain likes and dislikes. Given that we have this power, it is reasonable to ask, 'What likes and dislikes should we create in others? How should we teach them to perceive certain types of acts?"

These two factors: (1) the distinction between 'like/dislike' and 'good for us/bad for us', and (2) the power to influence likes and dislikes through cultural practices, make it reasonable for us to wonder what likes/dislikes are better than others. It also makes it reasonable for us to argue and debate the issue.

That, I claim, is what morality is all about.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Farren
No, I think good itself ultimately has to be subjective. There are people alive who consider humanity a plague on the planet and a menace to other life forms, groups that go way beyond the Animal Liberation Front.

Rather than give such people credit as holding just another world view as viable as any other, my view is that they are wrong.

Wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, objectively, knowable, wrong.

They believe that a planet without humans has some sort of intrinsic value -- an 'ought to be doneness' that rests in the state of affairs itself as a metaphysical supernatural justification for bringing about such a state. But, intrinsic values do not exist.

So, they are wrong.

They are as wrong as the person who says, "I am going to rid the city of prostitutes because God told me to do so." There is no God telling him to do so. There is no justification to his act of ridding the city of prostitutes.


Originally posted by Farren
There is the good of telling a lie to stop a great harm (which is advocated by buddhists, for instance), which is at odds with the good of always telling the truth to ensure that humans don't have to treat each other with suspicion.

Actually, the only way to prevent treating each other wish suspicion is to make it impossible to tell a lie. If lies are possible, even if a lie is not being told, there is reason to be at least a little bit suspicious.

The more general point being: what you are describing here is not a contradiction, but simply an uncertainty of knowing which is best for us. A strong aversion to lying has some benefits. Yet, an aversion to allowing great harm also has some benefits. A good individual would have both of these aversions and, from time to time, may encounter a situation where they come into conflict.

What to do, exactly, when such a situation arises is hard to tell. But the fact that it is hard to tell does not imply that there is no right answer. As was pointed out elsewhere in this thread, it is hard to tell exactly how many stars there are, but this does not prove that the number of stars is nothing other than what we decide it to be.

(Actually, the number of stars in the universe is determined by what we decide them to be -- because it is determined by what we call a 'star' and what we call, for example, a 'large warm planet'. Yet, our capacity to define words one way or another does not affect the actual composition of the universe. Nor does our capacity to alter the definition of the word 'moral' alter value of our actions.)

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Normal
Why? Why is the difference necessary? Liking peanut butter on toast is a value judgement. All value judgements are moral claims. If you mean the difference is "Why should someone else act the way you say, if they don't have to have peanut butter on toast?", the answer is obvious. Someone shouldn't act the way I say, but if my value for peanut butter on toast is strong enough, I'll say you ought to eat it.

First, we must distinguish different types of values.

You may value: "That I (Normal) am eating peanut butter on toast." If this is your value, no matter how much you value it, you would not force others to eat it, because you do not value others eating peanut butter on toast. You value that you are eating peanut butter on toast. On the other hand, if you value it a great deal, you may force others to provide you with peanut butter on toast so that you can eat it. Think in terms of a drug habit.

You may value: "That peanut butter on toast be eaten." If this is what you value, then who eats it is not a part of the value. This can be satisfied by your eating the peanut butter on toast, or by somebody else eating peanut butter on toast.

Now, let's go back to the previous question that I asked.

Is eating peanut butter on toast good for you? It is an entirely different sort of question. And this is the mistake that you keep on making. You fail to distinguish between "tastes/feels good" and "good for you/me/us"

Moral questions are not a matter of perception. Moral questions are questions about what is "good for us."

[lateralus1587]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe

What to do, exactly, when such a situation arises is hard to tell. But the fact that it is hard to tell does not imply that there is no right answer. As was pointed out elsewhere in this thread, it is hard to tell exactly how many stars there are, but this does not prove that the number of stars is nothing other than what we decide it to be.


What this quote tells me is that there is a right answer for every moral dilemna, a nice little equation that we can plug our lives into that gives us the right answer to every problem we face. This idea just seems entirely wrong to me; it factors emotion and personal preference out of it entirely, or at least says that a person who thinks any way other than the 'right' way is naturally 'wrong'

I don't buy the stars analogy; though stars are difficult to count, they can be counted, and an answer exists that can be quantified and written down. But as far as I know, there is no way of quantifying good.

My first post, so feedback is definately appreciated.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by lateralus1587
What this quote tells me is that there is a right answer for every moral dilemna, a nice little equation that we can plug our lives into that gives us the right answer to every problem we face.

First, there is a difference between there being a right answer, and our being able to determine what that answer is. That was the purpose of the post -- the right answer may fall well below our ability to ascertain.

Second, I believe that it is within the nature of morality that counterweighing concerns do not merely disappear simply because they have been outweighed. We ought to have an aversion to killing children. We ought to have a concern with protecting innocent life. Now, what happens if we are in a situation where we must kill a child to prevent him from accidentally setting off a nuclear weapon? Even if we must kill the child, the aversion to killing children should still weigh on us. There should still be this lingering sense of regret. Anybody who does not experience this does not really have the aversion to killing innocent children he should have.

He ought to kill the child, perhaps. He ought not to feel good about it.


Originally posted by lateralus1587
This idea just seems entirely wrong to me; it factors emotion and personal preference out of it entirely, or at least says that a person who thinks any way other than the 'right' way is naturally 'wrong'

"Not right = wrong". I have no trouble with that equation.

Yet, again, we cannot easily determine in many instances where right is. In light of this, there is an argument to be made for a certain degree of liberty -- allowing people a certain amount of freedom to make decisions for themselves in moral matters where the answer is difficult to determine.


Originally posted by lateralus1587
I don't buy the stars analogy; though stars are difficult to count, they can be counted, and an answer exists that can be quantified and written down. But as far as I know, there is no way of quantifying good.

Well, that is a major part of the debate. I think that we quantify good every day . . . every time we make a decision. Our whole life is based around evaluating different possible outcomes. In addition. We even do this for other people -- as when we pick out a present, or decide how best to obtain revenge. In some cases, it may be difficult. But in others, the choice is not that difficult at all.

[lateralus1587]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
First, there is a difference between there being a right answer, and our being able to determine what that answer is. That was the purpose of the post -- the right answer may fall well below our ability to ascertain.


I agree with you here, but this is no more proof for the existance of a 'right' answer than for the non-existance of one. The thing is, it can never be proven what is the right answer. There won't be any bells that go off, nobody to congratulate you for figuring it all out. That's why so many people think they have the 'right' answer. While your definition of 'good for us' is better because it changes based on the group's perception of 'good,' it still has many flaws.


Second, I believe that it is within the nature of morality that counterweighing concerns do not merely disappear simply because they have been outweighed. We ought to have an aversion to killing children. We ought to have a concern with protecting innocent life. Now, what happens if we are in a situation where we must kill a child to prevent him from accidentally setting off a nuclear weapon? Even if we must kill the child, the aversion to killing children should still weigh on us. There should still be this lingering sense of regret. Anybody who does not experience this does not really have the aversion to killing innocent children he should have.

He ought to kill the child, perhaps. He ought not to feel good about it.


I like your point here, because it demonstrates one of the classic moral dichotomies; 'the means justify the ends' vs. 'the ends justify the means.' In this extreme example, almost anyone would agree that the ends justify the means, and that it is worth killing the child to prevent the detonation. However, when you start taking less extreme examples, you can see where a person's personal beliefs shape what is 'right' and 'wrong.' Some less extreme examples, such as switching the nuclear weapon into a smaller bomb that would kill very few, become more debatable.


"Yet, again, we cannot easily determine in many instances where right is. In light of this, there is an argument to be made for a certain degree of liberty -- allowing people a certain amount of freedom to make decisions for themselves in moral matters where the answer is difficult to determine.

Again, I'm close to agreeing with you here...how many moral situations do you believe the answer is 'difficult to determine'? I still defend that there is no 'answer' to a moral problem, but if you want to use the 'good for us' example, I would still say that many moral matters to not have an answer that is easy to determine.



Well, that is a major part of the debate. I think that we quantify good every day . . . every time we make a decision. Our whole life is based around evaluating different possible outcomes. In addition. We even do this for other people -- as when we pick out a present, or decide how best to obtain revenge. In some cases, it may be difficult. But in others, the choice is not that difficult at all.

I should rephrase my original statement...I do not think that there is a universal way to quantify 'good.' I agree, that we all do it, but we all do it differently. If making a moral decision is weighing the 'good' vs. the 'bad,' then many people give different elements different weight. For example, in the child and bomb scenario, some would argue that killing the child is 'good for us' because it saves lives. But killing innocent people is not a good thing, right? Then what does it take to justify killing the child, in this scenario? That, in my opinion, is where personal opinion comes in. You see this in other situations too; debates about liberty vs. control, human nature good vs. human nature bad, and countless others. There is no 'right' answer to such questions, the best we can get is a compromise among different moral values.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Lateralus1587:

I seek to take this discussion over to a different thread in which I posted what would have been my summary argument to the debate.

I have a response for you waiting there.

Overall Objection to Subjectivism (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=63997)