Plantinga and counterfactuals

[Steven Carr]

It is part of Plantinga's defense to the problem of evil that there are true conterfactuals.

Ther Christian philosophers like William Lance Craig agree

eg in
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/grounding.html

Craig writes :-
'Thus, we have strong prima facie warrant for holding that there are true counterfactuals concerning what creatures would freely do under various circumstances.'

What does Plantinga mean by a true counterfactual?

It is explained here :-

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_and_the_problem_of_evil

'On Plantinga's example, where S is a situation in which Curley is free to take or refuse a bribe, it is either true that "If Curley were to be free in S, he would take the bribe" or "If Curley were to be free in S, he would refuse the bribe" (note that only one can be true). These truths about what we would freely do in possible situations help make us what we are, and are timelessly and necessarily true -- and so, crucially, out of God's hands.'

So in the situation 'S' it is , according to Plantinga, a timeless and necessary truth that Curley will take the bribe (or refuse the bribe - we don't know which one actually is true, just that one of them is).

Can this truth ever be falsified? Obviously not. It is a timeless, necessary truth.

http://www.geocities.com/Athens/8160/logical.htm presents Plantinga's argument nicely (F1 If Peter were in C, he would deny Christ three times.

F1 is a true proposition about what would happen, were God to create Peter in circumstance)


However, just to illustrate the total confusion, Christian apoloegtics is in in their defences to the problem of evil, other Christian philosophers take EXACTLY the opposite approach.

Peter van Inwagen has what he calls a consequences argument for moral responsibility. You can only be responsible for (say) taking a bribe, if you could render false the statement that in situation 'S', you will do action X (taking a bribe in this case)



Details of Inwagen's argument can be found at

http://www.unl.edu/philosop/freewill&moralresponsib.htm
and http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~srm9778/van.htm


So to sum up, one Christian philosopher claims that it is necessarily true that in one situation somebody will freely choose one particular course of action, while another claims that this destroys moral responsibility.

Plantinga says it is necessarily true that if Peter were in C, he would deny Christ three times, while Inwagen claims that Peter has the ability to render false this supposedly 'true' proposition.


Such is the confusion in Christian thought....

[Clutch]

Steven, I don't see the problem.

Some atheists here conjecture about evidence that would lead them to believe in the supernatural. I believe such conjectures are deeply confused. Is atheism in disarray?

Some counterfactuals are true, surely. Had I been standing in the street, the bus would have hit me. Am I selling snake oil when I make this claim? Of course not. It's straightforwardly correct.

Explaining in what its truth consists is a trickier business, and not just for counterfactuals, but for all subjunctive conditionals (of which counterfactuals are a subset). But that's a different matter.

It's hard to see exactly what you complaint is, in short.

[Steven Carr]

So do you think Inwagen is wrong to say that there can be no moral responsibility if counterfactuals are true ie if it is a necessary truth that a person will do X in situation A?

[ComestibleVenom]

Originally posted by Steven Carr
So do you think Inwagen is wrong to say that there can be no moral responsibility if counterfactuals are true ie if it is a necessary truth that a person will do X in situation A?

Daneil Dennett has the single most coherent view of freedom I have seen.

The fact is that when we ask about whether a person HAD to do something in situation X, it is not meaningful to speak of one particular X. Dennett takes the example of a skilled golfer who narrowly misses a shot.

It may be true that under those exact physical circumstances, he had to miss the shot. But when you think about it, under many highly similar but nonidentical circumstances, he WOULD have made the shot. In that sense, and that sense alone he could have made the shot.

[Clutch]

Originally posted by Steven Carr
So do you think Inwagen is wrong to say that there can be no moral responsibility if counterfactuals are true ie if it is a necessary truth that a person will do X in situation A? PVI's position has nothing to do with whether there are, in general, true counterfactuals. That's my point, Steven -- you are confusing things badly by supposing that some disagreement about counterfactuals amounts to theism's being in disarray.

[Steven Carr]

Daniel Dennett's books 'Elbow Room' and 'Freedom Evolves' are compulsory reading on the subject. I can't recommend them too highly, and if I were in the situation of writing this reply again, I would still recommend them.

I was trying to get to grips with Christian thoughts on this subject, though.

[Steven Carr]

Originally posted by Clutch
PVI's position has nothing to do with whether there are, in general, true counterfactuals.

Could you explain it to me please?

Surely PVI's claim that we only have moral responsibility if we can render false the proposition , in situation X, we would do Y, depends upon it not being necessarity true that in situation X we would do Y.

Am I missing something?

[Clutch]

Steven, I suspect you're missing the word "freely" in the quote from Craig. PVI is showing what happens if you assume determinism; if you hold that one is only responsible for what one could have prevented, then on determinism nobody is responsible for anything because it will never be true that one could have done otherwise. (Is his argument.)

Of course, if the counterfactuals instead make reference to something over and above physical facts plus laws -- namely, some "contra-causal" (yuck) notion of free will like that mentioned by Craig -- then it could indeed be true that, in that very situation, one could have done otherwise. Hence (PVI could say) there would be moral responsibility in that circumstance.

I think that's all that's going on.

[Steven Carr]

Originally posted by Clutch
Steven, I suspect you're missing the word "freely" in the quote from Craig. PVI is showing what happens if you assume determinism; if you hold that one is only responsible for what one could have prevented, then on determinism nobody is responsible for anything because it will never be true that one could have done otherwise. (Is his argument.)



I know PVI uses it to dispute determinism.

But if there are true counterfactuals of freedom, then this is irrelevant. A person is not able to render false the statement 'In situation X, he would do Y' if this is a truth, (no more than he can render false any other true statements).

The fact that the person would do Y freely rather than deterministically is irrelevant to PVI's claim that people can make counterfactuals false , especially as he is using this to attack compatibilism - the idea that free will is quite compatible with determinism.


Of course, if the counterfactuals instead make reference to something over and above physical facts plus laws -- namely, some "contra-causal" (yuck) notion of free will like that mentioned by Craig -- then it could indeed be true that, in that very situation, one could have done otherwise. Hence (PVI could say) there would be moral responsibility in that circumstance.



PVI would, but Craig and Plantinga maintain that there are true counterfactuals.

How then can people 'do otherwise' if it is a truth that in situation X, they would freely chose to do Y?

To quote the web page I gave :- 'These truths about what we would freely do in possible situations help make us what we are, and are timelessly and necessarily true -- and so, crucially, out of God's hands.'

In that case I could reword your statement as follows :-

'PVI is showing what happens if you assume free will; if you hold that one is only responsible for what one could have prevented, then on Plantinga's freewill nobody is responsible for anything because it will never be true that one could have done otherwise.'

[Ottman Out]

At the risk of getting in way over my head, this question reminds me of the Calvinists (Plantinga) vs. the non-determinists (PVI). The Calvinist logic does make sense to me, if one assumes omniscience.

What is the difference between saying God knows all these counterfactuals and saying God is omniscient? I wonder how much information it would take to specify a "situation" with enough accuracy to be able to say with certainty that the person would behave in the predicted way? Vast, vast quantities, obviously.

[wiploc]

Originally posted by Ottman Out
What is the difference between saying God knows all these counterfactuals and saying God is omniscient? I wonder how much information it would take to specify a "situation" with enough accuracy to be able to say with certainty that the person would behave in the predicted way? Vast, vast quantities, obviously.

When Plantinga says, "If you had offered Mo $15,000 instead of $25,000, he would have taken it," he is saying that Mo would have taken the lesser amount of money in the world most like Kronos (our world, the real world) except that the amount of money offered was $15,000. In other words, there are infinite possible worlds in which Mo takes the $15,000, and infinite possible worlds in which he does not, but we are concerned only with the one world that is most like our own.

I don't think there is any such world. There is no number closest to 3 on a line of real numbers, why should we think there is a world closest to Kronos among the possible worlds in which $15,000 was offered?

Same subject, different point: there is not even a number closest to 3 on a line of intgegers. 2 and 4 tie, and there is no way to judge between them. In this example, there are only two ways to be different than 3 (you can be larger or smaller) and the differences are objective, and yet still one cannot say that there is a number closest to 3. Yet in Plantinga's exmple, there can be infinite different ways to diverge from Kronos, and no objective way to choose between them. (Example: Which of these possible world s is more like Kronos? World A: You offered $15,000 because the room was a little darker, and Mo took the offer. World B: You offered $15,000 because you had more of a sweet tooth, and Mo declined the offer.)

crc

[Clutch]

Originally posted by Steven Carr
if there are true counterfactuals of freedom, then this is irrelevant. A person is not able to render false the statement 'In situation X, he would do Y' if this is a truth, (no more than he can render false any other true statements).Again, what do you think the word "freely" is doing in the WLC version of the counterfactual? Just how one is to fill in the blank cheque of contingency that Craig's writing is unclear, of course. But given that he means freedom to be this contra-causal, self-decided thing, it's clear that his true counterfactuals are supposed to express facts about the character of the agent -- facts that are by their nature contingent.

Notice that Craig is distinguishing the necessary truth of the counterfactual from the necessary truth of its consequent. That the whole thing is necessarily true does not impugn the freedom of the act described in the consequent -- always assuming that such a notion of freedom can be motivated.

[Steven Carr]

Originally posted by Clutch
Again, what do you think the word "freely" is doing in the WLC version of the counterfactual? Just how one is to fill in the blank cheque of contingency that Craig's writing is unclear, of course. But given that he means freedom to be this contra-causal, self-decided thing, it's clear that his true counterfactuals are supposed to express facts about the character of the agent -- facts that are by their nature contingent.



I disagree. Essences are necessary beings and these particular facts are necessary truths about these essences (or else it would not be an essence)

http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/archives/win2000/entries/actualism/Plantinga-background.html

'Plantinga is a platonist --- properties, propositions, and states of affairs are as real as any concrete particular, it’s just that they are abstract. Hence, they can be quantified over no less than their concrete counterparts. The advantages of this move are clear. As noted above, Kripke’s account fails to be actualist because it quantifies over possibilia in the metalanguage. By replacing possibilia with individual essences, quantifiers range over essences, and hence only over actually existing things.
(P3) Properties, propositions, and states of affairs all exist necessarily.


As noted in the main document, unlike (most, at least) concrete particulars, properties are necessary beings for Plantinga; it is not possible that there be a property that might fail to exist

........
It follows, in particular, that individual essences are necessary beings.'

End quote from web page.

So the 'state of affairs' , that Santa Claus (if God actualised Santa Claus) would do X in situation S exists necessarily.

Individual essences are necessary beings (in Plantinga's view), and their properties (freely doing X in situation S) exist necessarily.

How can this be otherwise? If it is a truth that Santa Claus would freely do X in situation S, then this must be a necessary truth, as there has never been a real Santa Claus who determined himself the truth-value of this knowledge of God of what Santa Claus would do.


http://home.nwciowa.edu/~wacome/omni.htm also takes this viewpoint

'It is, I believe, at least quite natural to regard properties of the form: doingA in C if instantiated as contingent properties of the essences to which they belong. But if they are contingent properties God does not know whether or not the essencehas them unless and until it is instantiated and the relevant conditions obtain. Then if the individual who instantiates the essence does A God knows the corresponding subjunctive of freedom is true; otherwise he knows it is false. It appears that the subjunctive property must be a necessary property of the essence if middle knowledge is to ground divine foreknowledge of free human actions. '

End Quote

So if Plantinga says God knows that A will happen in situation C, then this is a necessary truth about the essence of that individual, and essences are necessary beings for a Platonist like Plantinga.

[Clutch]

Steven, I just can't get a grasp of what your complaint is. If I'm being obtuse, I promise that I'm not being deliberately obtuse!

PVI's point: If there's only deterministic physical laws, then for any action of mine, I could not have done otherwise. Were I in that very situation again, I would as a matter of nomological necessity perform that very action again. But (he asserts) we can only blame someone if they could have done otherwise.

WLC's point: The independence of human action from God's will is expressed in the fact that, for at least a wide range of actions, my doing them is a matter of my choosing, in accordance with my character. Hence my acting as I do is not contingent upon any outside will or law; were I in that very situation again, I would as a matter of choice perform that very action again. I could choose otherwise, of course -- that's what it means to be free. But I wouldn't -- that's what it means to have my character.

That the truth of such subjunctive conditionals is underwritten by two different things in the two cases is very important. It's not just a matter of there being true counterfactuals. It's a matter of what makes them true. This hardly amounts to an equivocation, though, since PVI is not replying to or otherwise responsible for WLC's phrasing, nor vice-versa.

[Steven Carr]

Originally posted by Clutch

Hence my acting as I do is not contingent upon any outside will or law; were I in that very situation again, I would as a matter of choice perform that very action again. I could choose otherwise, of course -- that's what it means to be free. But I wouldn't -- that's what it means to have my character.




Sounds like a law to me, a law of psychology.


Compatibilism is the view that people make choices which are not contingent upon any outside will or law, choices which are determined by their character and desires at that time.



Originally posted by Clutch


That the truth of such subjunctive conditionals is underwritten by two different things in the two cases is very important. It's not just a matter of there being true counterfactuals. It's a matter of what makes them true.

Why is it a matter of what makes them true? If one is determined by physical laws, and one is determined by the brute fact of my character being the way it is, then this is still determinism.

The state of affairs dictates what will happen.

Indeed, Craig appears to be even a more hard-line determinist than is conceivably possible, as he says the actions of all possible beings in all conceivable situations in all conceivable worlds are determined by their fixed characters - essences are fixed.

As though God had a film library showing him what would happen for every set of creatures he chose to create, and he simply pulled out the film he liked and decided to watch that one.

A bit like Borge's famous library where all combinations of letters appear in the books, analogus to all combinations of characters and situations appearing in God's knowledge of what they will do.

How then can the characters in the books have real lives, without subscribing to some form of compatibilism?


To quote PVI himself

http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwvanInwagen1.htm

'The situation is similar with the problem of divine knowledge of future human actions. We are often told that there really is no problem about this, since the fact that God knows that one is going to tell a lie (for example) in no way forces one to lie. Since God’s knowledge does interfere with the exercise of one’s will, since the false words that issue from one’s mouth are the words that it was one’s will to speak, God’s knowledge that one was going to lie is consistent with the lie’s being a free act.

All this can sound very sensible. And yet one is left with the feeling that the freedom this leaves us with is, in Kant’s words, a "wretched subterfuge." '

PVI continues
'But the only additions to the actual past that conform to a deterministic set of laws are the additions that are actually made, the additions that collectively make up the actual present and the actual future. This is simply a statement of what is meant by determinism, which is the thesis that the law of nature and the past together determine a unique future.'

This does sound rather like Craig's contention that God knows what , at any time, we will actually add to the present to make the future.

http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwvanInwagen2.html

PVI writes :-
'Suppose God were miraculously to return the world to precisely the state it was in, say, one minute before Marie raised her hand, and that he then allowed affairs once more to proceed, without any further miracles. What would happen? What would Marie do? Well, if her raising her hand was a free act, and if free will is incompatible with determinism, then we can’t say. We can say only that she might have raised her hand and might not have raised her hand. '

Is PVI's view here really compatible with Craig's and Plantinga's view that Marie will always raise her hand in that situationm because that counterfactual is true?

You wrote 'PVI's position has nothing to do with whether there are, in general, true counterfactuals.'

PVI writes , in my understanding of him, 'If free will is incompatible with determinism, then we can't say what the truth of this counterfactual is'.

But if we can say what the truth of this counterfactual is, then free will IS compatible with determinism.

(Same logic as If Socrates is human, then he is mortal. Socrates is not mortal. Therefore, he is not human)

[bd-from-kg]

Steven Carr:

I think you have more of a point than Clutch seems to believe. Of course there’s nothing surprising about the fact that Christians disagree about something that seems very abstruse and theoretical; after all, they disagree about things much easier to understand and of far more immediate practical importance. But in this case the disagreement is a sign of an insoluble dilemma: it’s impossible to make develop a coherent Christian theology without the concept of metaphysical free will, but the concept of metaphysical free will is logically incoherent.

Plantinga’s “Free Will Defense” (which is widely considered the best available counter to the “Problem of Evil” argument) absolutely requires that “counterfactuals of freedom” have truth values. But it seems to be clearly impossible that they should have truth values if there is such a thing as metaphysical free will (MFW). To see this, consider Marie, who might or might not raise her hand at a certain moment. In order for this to be a metaphysically free choice, it must be actually possible that she will raise her hand and actually possible that she won’t. That is, there must be an actually possible future in which she has raised her hand and an actually possible future in which she hasn’t. But in that case there are possible worlds exactly like this one up to the moment she makes her choice in which she raises her hand, and other possible worlds exactly like this one up to that point in which she doesn’t. God, being omnipotent, can choose to instantiate one of the worlds in which Marie raises her hand, or one of the worlds in which she doesn’t. And in making this choice, He determines whether Marie raises her hand at that point in the actual world.

But Plantinga’s argument requires that this not be so. That is, let the total situation at the time when Marie makes the crucial choice (i.e., up to which it is actually possible for her to raise her hand and also actually possible for her not to, but after which she is committed to one choice) be S. (Note that S includes a complete specification of Marie’s state, including the state of her soul assuming that she has one, at the moment in question, as well as a complete specification of the history of the world up to that point.) For Plantinga’s argument to work, it must be true before the fact – i.e., completely a priori – that in situation S Marie would raise her hand, or else true that in situation S she wouldn’t. But how can that be so if God is free, and has it in His power, to make it either true or false that Marie raises her hand at this point? If He chooses to instantiate one of the possible worlds in which she does, it couldn’t have been true a priori that she wouldn’t, and vice versa.

To recap:

(1) Metaphysical free will logically requires that it be actually possible that Marie will raise her hand in situation S and also actually possible that she won’t.

(2) This means that the counterfactual of freedom “Marie would raise her hand in situation S” is neither true nor false – i.e., that it does not have a truth value – prior to God’s choosing which possible world to instantiate.

(3) But this is incompatible with Plantinga’s argument.

I gather that this is essentially Gale’s point: that Plantinga’s “free will defense” amounts to a denial of the existence of free will (in the requisite sense). Ironic, no?

Note: PVI seems to be remarkably clear about all this; in fact he seems to see clearly that MFW is impossible regardless of whether determinism is true or not. But it seems that he simply refuses to accept the conclusion for no better reason than that he doesn’t like it.

[Steven Carr]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg

Plantinga’s “Free Will Defense” (which is widely considered the best available counter to the “Problem of Evil” argument) absolutely requires that “counterfactuals of freedom” have truth values. But it seems to be clearly impossible that they should have truth values if there is such a thing as metaphysical free will (MFW).



I agree with your analysis. And Plantinga's talk of essences and posisble worlds, and counterfactuals which are true is very Platonic and implies that these essences are necessary beings with properties that appear to be brute facts.

And yet Christian philosophers like Craig deny totally that any of these things can exist.

Craig writes ''Platonism is theologically unacceptable. The abstract objects posited in a Platonist ontology exist, to borrow Plantinga's phrase, just as serenely as your most solidly concrete object......... Platonism thus entails a metaphysical pluralism which compromises the aseity of God'

and we learn in

http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/archives/sum2000/entries/actualism/Plantinga-background.html

'Plantinga is a platonist --- properties, propositions, and states of affairs are as real as any concrete particular, it's just that they are abstract. '