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B. H. Manners
August 17, 2003, 09:57 PM
RED DAVE posted this in the Socialism thread:


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Objectivism premise: A=A

The famous Objectivist's operative phrase is: "It is what it is."

Now, can that statement stand logically, without contradiction? No.

If we have the object, A, what can we say about it? That it exists. Fine, but we've said nothing. Everything that is a conceivable object exists in some sense. The question is not existence. The question is: what are the qualities that an object has that set it apart from other objects so that we can know its existence. It is these qualities that give it its existence. (Existence is not, itself, a recognizable quality because its opposite quality, nonexistence, is not recognizable as a quality because it doesn't exist and, therefore, has no qualty to identify it by. And since nonexistence has no quality, existence has no quality.)

An object, then, exists because of its qualities. However, it isn't possible to stop there. If an object, A, has quality A1, which gives it existence, we may also say that there is quality -A1 (not A1), which also exists as a quality. How else would we recognize quality A1 except in the context of a least one other observable quality which we can distingish it from? (That's why, again, existence isn't a quality: it has no observable quality to distinguish it from and, therefore, is not, itself, distinguishable.)

And, if we posit an object, B, which is not A and which has the quality -A1, which distinguishes it from A, we may say that the existence of A, with its quality A1, is verifiable only because of the possible existence of B, with its quality, -A1. Therefore, we may say that the existence of A is only possible because of B, to which it may be compared.

So, what's left of A=A? Nothing. Because the existence of the great A can only occur if there is a B. A cannot verify itself because it has no qualities, in and of itself, to verify its existence.

I'm not a philosopher or even a student of philosophy, so anyone who really knows about this shit: please help me out here. I have a feeling that I need to be sharper with categories like "distinction."

RED DAVE
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I think RED DAVE is on the right track so far. Does anyone else agree or see a problem?

B. H. Manners
August 18, 2003, 12:19 AM
RED DAVE wished I had left this in another thread and not started a new thread with it. Would the moderators of this forum lock this please?

John K. Fitzpatrick
August 18, 2003, 12:27 AM
Though our thought processes like to latch onto objects as units of perception, I could deny the existence of objects themselves, which we can be 'objective' about. It's only when things stop being what they were, come into contact, change and flow can we actually tell any 'thing' had reality.

- John

Adrian Selby
August 18, 2003, 07:10 AM
An object, then, exists because of its qualities.
A minor quibble with this comment, doesn't an object exist because of the causal factors, I mean, I have various qualities, but I do not exist because of them, I am merely differentiated by them.

RED DAVE
August 18, 2003, 09:13 AM
From Adrian Selby:

A minor quibble with this comment, doesn't an object exist because of the causal factors, I mean, I have various qualities, but I do not exist because of them, I am merely differentiated by them.

It's tricky, and, as I said in the post, I'm no philosopher. It seems to me that what causes something to exist, at least in differentiation from other objects, are its qualities. Now, that works, at least, in perception. As to existence itself, I can't see how an object could be said to exist other than by its qualities. Change its qualities, or the dimensions of its being, and you change the object.

I don't think your quibbling, Adrian, and I'm not sure I've got it right. the point I'm trying to make, which is covered in your approach and mine, is that an object is never in existence because of itself. A=A is a meaningless statement.

RED DAVE

Alonzo Fyfe
August 18, 2003, 09:27 AM
Originally posted by RED DAVE
A=A is a meaningless statement.

Not quite meaningless, but easily misused.

Leibniz's Law states that "A is identical to B if and only if all of the properties of A are identical to all of the properties of B."

And there is Tarsky's Theory of Truth. "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white.

In these forms, the statement makes sense. But note that the first is a statement about things, and the second is a statement about words.

There is a problem when one tries to mix ontology and language. We bundle different properties under concepts as a matter of social convention -- we speak of those bundles of properties that are important to us, and ignore an infinite number of other property bundles that are not important to us.

It is a mistake to make inferences about existence from the subjective choices about how we design our language. The problem with A = A is when it is used to equivocate between 'A' -- the thing in the universe, and 'A' -- our word for that thing.

It may be the case that Earth = Earth. But it is not the case that Earth = 'Earth'. The first is a planet that exists independent of human perception, the second is a word -- a set of squiggles assigned a meaning (a reference to a bunch of property buncles) through the subjective convention of a subset of humans.

A mistake among some objectivists is that they take our arbitrary definition of a term and call it an essence, and they then argue that everything in nature that we might apply that term to has some sort of natural obligation to have those properties that we bundle together with that term.

No such inference is valid.

It is not the case that nature has an obligation to conform itself to our language. Rather, our language must conform to facts of nature.

99Percent
August 19, 2003, 08:55 AM
Off to Philosophy Forum.

RED DAVE
August 19, 2003, 11:01 AM
Now that we're here on Mount Philosophy, 99, let's here your refutation.

RED DAVE

Magic Primate
August 19, 2003, 11:15 AM
A related thought:

There exists nothing which does not exist. The way that we use the concepts of existence and non-existence actually distinguish between things which exist as mental constructs and things which exist outside of our mental model of the world (they may exist in our mind too of course and in all instances where this is discussed/conceived, they will).

Clutch
August 19, 2003, 02:27 PM
Identity is tricky, just because the syntax forces one to write it as a two-place relation when of course identity can only be the relation between an object and itself. (See there? Nasty old syntax).

This is what makes use-mention errors so very, very tempting when strict identity is under discussion. Feeling the natural wish to make an apparently two-place relation relate two different things, you might think that what are related are two different names -- types or tokens, for that matter, depending on whether you're wresting with a=a or a=b. But as Alonzo points out, this is all wrong. It's not the names that are identical.

Personally I prefer the formal mode to the material mode, here. Talking in terms of the co-reference of two name-tokens eliminates at least many of the awkward properties of identity-talk.

John Page
August 20, 2003, 08:24 AM
RED DAVE: An object, then, exists because of its qualities.

I have the same minor quibble as before mentioned by Adrian. How about: "We come to know of an object's existence, then, through its qualities"?

I think what we generally refer to as an object is a persistent set of qualities. Thus we can observe a ball flying through the air, for example.

Cheers, John

John Page
August 20, 2003, 08:41 AM
Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
But it is not the case that Earth = 'Earth'. The first is a planet that exists independent of human perception, the second is a word -- a set of squiggles assigned a meaning (a reference to a bunch of property buncles) through the subjective convention of a subset of humans.
Nicely put. However, isn't there a problem in that the concept (refered to by the word earth) only exists in the human mind?

The (real, actual) earth is related to our (mental) concept (of the earth) through the senses and it is only by repeatable scientific experimentation we can prove that it is a physical object rather than a mirage of some sort. In this, I'm agreeing that we perceive the earth by matching sense data with a bundle of properties.

And yes, essence is subjective (w.r.t. any observer including an objectivist).

Cheers, John

John Page
August 20, 2003, 08:53 AM
Originally posted by Clutch
Identity is tricky, just because the syntax forces one to write it as a two-place relation when of course identity can only be the relation between an object and itself. (See there? Nasty old syntax).
Hi clutch!

Isn't unique identity (for human perception) just form + spacetime coodinates?

How can something refer to itself if cannot extend beyond itself? (I see this as the same problem as being objective about the totality of existence, within which one exists therefore I can only be subjective about).

Cheers, John

Keith Russell
August 21, 2003, 04:29 PM
John, doesn't that depend on what you mean by 'objective'?

Yes, if 'objective' means a non-individual, non-subjective point of view, then 'objectivity' isn't possible.

If 'objective' means something other than that, then 'objectivity' might be possible, after all...

K

John Page
August 21, 2003, 04:54 PM
Hi Keith!
Originally posted by Keith Russell
Yes, if 'objective' means a non-individual, non-subjective point of view, then 'objectivity' isn't possible.
Absolute objectivity, yes, but then we have degrees.

Cheers, John

Jane Bovary
August 21, 2003, 08:02 PM
Man, every man is an end in himself, not the means to the ends of others. He must exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself. The pursuit of his own rational self-interest and of his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his life.

Ayn Rand

This might be viewed as a stupid question, but I'm having problems understanding Randian Objectivism. Why is this called Objectivism? According to my [admittedly puny]reading of Philosophy, Ayn Rands statement is the classic Egoistic Argument of Subjectivism. As I understand it, objectivism is based on the premise that there is some kind of objective "reality" which exists irrespective of the person looking at it...that moral statements can be analagous to scientific thinking and that such statements do not apply to the individual alone, but rather to a wider group. Therefore it is more akin to utilitarianism than individualism.

A third argument in favour of subjectivism is the Egoistic Argument. This is used to reject objectivist theories such as Utilitarianism. What is the point of working for the greatest happiness of the greatest number if you personally become unhappy by doing so? In the final analysis, who can be more important than you? If a course of action leads to the well being of others but not to yours, can it really be good? The subjectivist answer is a firm 'NO'!

From Philosophy Made Simple
Popkin, Stroll and Kelly.

What's the difference between this and Ayn Rands statement? So why isn't her philosophy called Subjectivism? How can Utilitarianism and Randian philosophy both be called Objectivism? I don't get it.

RED DAVE
August 22, 2003, 10:47 AM
From Jane Bovary:

What's the difference between this and Ayn Rands statement? So why isn't her philosophy called Subjectivism? How can Utilitarianism and Randian philosophy both be called Objectivism? I don't get it.

Rand's so-called philosophy is called Objectivism because she called it so. the rest of the world has other names for it, many of them unprintable. Rand felt that, somehow, her philosophy was based on "objective truth" (the famous A=A proposition, which is being debated elsewhere, currently). Actually what it was based on was her hysterical fear of change.

Have you ever noticed that she NEVER mentions child raising in her work. From her novel "Anthem," I suspect she had a traumatic childhood (not because of the Bolshevik Revolution and Stalin's counter-revolution). SInce she was incapable of loving someone ese at her own expense, she evidentally could not understand the sacrifices necessary to raise children.

Her philosophy is, properly understood, a psychopathology. Have fun, Randies.

RED DAVE

99Percent
August 22, 2003, 01:23 PM
Originally posted by Jane Bovary
What's the difference between this and Ayn Rands statement? So why isn't her philosophy called Subjectivism? How can Utilitarianism and Randian philosophy both be called Objectivism? I don't get it. Your questions aren't stupid at all Jane Bovary.

I would venture to say that the difference between the two statements reside in the pursuit of rational self interest. In the latter statement there is no mention of rationality which comes from an objective view and understanding of reality. "Objective" here meaning that we can agree and communicate rationally and meaningfully on the reality that surrounds us.

If you pursue your own happiness irrationally you stand to be immoral, say by pursuing the pleasure of killing someone else, because in the end these types of non-rational egoistical actions leads to a state of irrationality, violence, unhappiness, pain or even death.

Thomas Ash
August 22, 2003, 02:23 PM
What Red Dave said is exactly what Kant said, in response to the Ontological Argument for God's existence: "existence is not a predicate." I'm sure he'll be flaterred to be in such illustrious company ;) .

B. H. Manners
August 23, 2003, 05:20 PM
quote:
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Originally posted by Jane Bovary
What's the difference between this and Ayn Rands statement? So why isn't her philosophy called Subjectivism? How can Utilitarianism and Randian philosophy both be called Objectivism? I don't get it.
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99Percent's words are in qoutes:

"Your questions aren't stupid at all Jane Bovary.

I would venture to say that the difference between the two statements reside in the pursuit of rational self interest."

--->BH: You still have a problem, since what is considered rational may differ from one person to another.


""In the latter statement there is no mention of rationality which comes from an objective view and understanding of reality. ""

--->BH: Point to me where an absolute objective source of deciding what is rational or not exists seperate from the human mind so I can go study. There is not one as far as I can tell.

""Objective" here meaning that we can agree and communicate rationally and meaningfully on the reality that surrounds us."

---->BH: But the conclusions formed are opinion and diffeent people will form different opinions.

"If you pursue your own happiness irrationally you stand to be immoral, say by pursuing the pleasure of killing someone else, "


Bh: But who are you to tell me that pursuing my own happiness is immoral if it doesn't meet your approval of what is "rational?

"because in the end these types of non-rational egoistical actions leads to a state of irrationality, violence, unhappiness, pain or even death."

BH: It is just your subjective opinion that such are irrational actions. Just because something may lead to violence, unhappiness, pain or even death does not mean it is irrational, if such a term can in fact be defined objectively and absolutely.

student738
August 23, 2003, 06:59 PM
Whatever we mean by "rational", I suspect there is widespread agreement it is true that, "Normal human beings have the capacity to think and to action rationally."

Similarly that it is false that, "Normal earthworms have the capacity to think and to act rationally."

And that we can identify differing degrees of rationality.

Suppose that in response to you posing me a legitmate question, I, on a whim, cock my head at a bit of an angle, dangle my tongue out of my mouth, and in a childish, gutteral manner exclaim, "zegger BLAT, ugh, ugh, po POW," where these clumsy locuations have no meaning at all to myself or to you. I have no conscious intent to communicate anything at all to you by my behavior.

Surely this behavior is decidedly less rational than many other ways I could have responded to your posing me a question, is it not?

As another example, suppose that I am wandering in a desert, lost, and stumble upon a pool of water which I have every reason to believe is perfectly safe to consume. Suppose that my situation is dire indeed; if I do not get water soon, I will die. I do not want to die. I want a drink of water, and I know just how to get it.

Yet, suppose that on a whim, I bolt off into the desert in no direction in particular, putting the pool of water, my sole means of surving, out of reach. Surely this behavior is decidedly irrational, is it not?

It seems fair that even the most "primitive" of beings or societies having an understanding of the need for water, the desire to live, and the means of satisfying the need for water, would find this behavior to be irrational, yes?

student738
August 23, 2003, 07:10 PM
Note, I do not mean that a witness to the behavior would certainly find it to be irrational. It may be, we might imagine, that there is a culture which believes for perfectly legitimate reasons that the correct course of action to be taken when confronted by a pool of water in the desert when in need of water, is to run in any direction as fast as one can from the pool of water. Perhaps doing so in the past has proved to successfully summon the elusive "desert pixie", a being which will both provide for your thirst to be satisfied and give you a map. I do not know, but again, there would appear to be many similar cases.

Instead what I mean is that any culture which could be made to understand on their terms, "the need for water", "the desire to live", and "the means of satisfying the need for water", would consider this behavior to be irrational. As, "the means of satisfying the need for water" is successfully explained only if it is succcessfully explained that the pool of water is the sole means of satisfying this need, excluding the possibility that this need can be satisfied by the "desert pixie".

RED DAVE
August 23, 2003, 08:33 PM
Hey 99Percent:

You still haven't responded to my original post which began this thread. Please do so, so we can continue this debate.

RED DAVE

Jane Bovary
August 24, 2003, 08:24 PM
I would venture to say that the difference between the two statements reside in the pursuit of rational self interest.

99

But what difference does that really make? What's rational for you may not be rational for a wider group, therefore you are still acting in Subjective mode. For example, if you are hopelessly stranded in the desert with five others and stumble upon a bottle of water, according to Rands notion of noble self-interest, it would be your moral duty to keep the water for yourself to increase your chances of surviving longer. But an objective observer might conclude it would be moral to give all six of you a greater chance of surviving longer by sharing the water.

An objective view would have no rational reason to favour one individual over another. To aim for a truly objective morality, we have to stand outside ourselves and view the world from a detached distance. Or at least try to...which is probably the closest we can get to objectivism.

Rand says, "neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself". But if self-interest, rational or not, is to be your highest moral purpose, often it just has to involve the sacrifice of others? What happens when the interests of the many don't coincide with the interests of an individual? According to Rand, the interests of the many would have to be sacrificed since a mans own self-interest must be his moral purpose...but in so doing he is "sacrificing others to himself" and so is doing what Rand says NOT to do. [getting dizzy]


Thus her philosophy doesn't add up. It's just not always possible to act out of self-interest and NOT sacrifice others to your "highest moral purpose"...ie:yourself. She should call a spde a spade and not pretend that self-interest doesn't involve the sacrifice of others, nor that acting out of that self-interest is objective in any true sense. Hers is really the Subjective Egoist argument wearing a fancy "rationalist" skirt.

99Percent
August 25, 2003, 02:37 AM
Red Dave: I will get to your op tomorrow. For now let me just quickly reply to Jane Bovary her post being a bit easier to tackle. But what difference does that really make? What's rational for you may not be rational for a wider group, therefore you are still acting in Subjective mode.You are looking at the "wider group" through your own subjective eyes. There is no one such homogenized point of interaction between you and the whole group because the whole group does not have a mind of its own. Its only you as an individual against the other individuals contained in the group. For example, if you are hopelessly stranded in the desert with five others and stumble upon a bottle of water, according to Rands notion of noble self-interest, it would be your moral duty to keep the water for yourself to increase your chances of surviving longer. But an objective observer might conclude it would be moral to give all six of you a greater chance of surviving longer by sharing the water.Not necessarily. Rationally thinking, the value of extra hands, feets and brains thinking is always more valuable to you than a bit of water. More people alive means more chances of finding more sources of water which will end up benefiting yourself. Of course in such near life or death situations its hard to be rational about such things, and violence is certainly the quicker option "give us your water or else", but when society is more diverse and established such rational trading of values is certainly feasable and in fact the only sane and civilized way of getting the things you want.An objective view would have no rational reason to favour one individual over another. To aim for a truly objective morality, we have to stand outside ourselves and view the world from a detached distance. Or at least try to...which is probably the closest we can get to objectivism.Not necessarily. One only has to consider what the others also want, specially those who have what you want. Then you go about in achieving a trade of value that is agreeable to both parties. Its what capitalism is all about.Rand says, "neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself". But if self-interest, rational or not, is to be your highest moral purpose, often it just has to involve the sacrifice of others? What happens when the interests of the many don't coincide with the interests of an individual?The collective good fallacy. There is no such thing as a collective interest of many, its a falsehood thats been ingrained into us from so much indoctrination from public education and over prevalent statism and patriotism. According to Rand, the interests of the many would have to be sacrificed since a mans own self-interest must be his moral purpose...but in so doing he is "sacrificing others to himself" and so is doing what Rand says NOT to do. [getting dizzy]According to Rand, there is no such thing as "the interst of many". These interests are merely subjective opinions held by mob mentality and "democratic" rule of the majority.[quote]Thus her philosophy doesn't add up. It's just not always possible to act out of self-interest and NOT sacrifice others to your "highest moral purpose"...ie:yourself. She should call a spde a spade and not pretend that self-interest doesn't involve the sacrifice of others, nor that acting out of that self-interest is objective in any true sense. Hers is really the Subjective Egoist argument wearing a fancy "rationalist" skirt.You have to look at rational self interest in such a way that if you can find others to agree to your wants by trading value with them. Also by agreeing in not initiating violence or threat of violence. You see others as valuable assets that can produce the things that you want if you can find a way to produce the things they want. This is achieved by communicating by in turn having the same conceptual knowledge. The other option is to force others to submit to your own interest, or that others force you to submit to their own interest.

RED DAVE
August 25, 2003, 07:45 AM
From 99Percent:

The collective good fallacy. There is no such thing as a collective interest of many, its a falsehood thats been ingrained into us from so much indoctrination from public education and over prevalent statism and patriotism.

One of the things that fascinates me, continuously, about libertarianism, objectivism and conservatism in general is their totally bizarre attitude toward the state.

1) The modern state, as we know it, is a part of capitalism. It arose with capitalism, as a tool of capitalism, and it remains so. It is not a deformation, an excressence or an accident.

2) Positing, as libertarians do, an "ideal capitalism" without a state is an excercise in destructive fantasy. This is a capitalism that never was, never could be and never will be, because capitalism without a functioning state cannot exist.

3) In practice, what libs, objs and cons do is try to eliminate those few, measly aspects of state functioning that help the "common man," while ignoring those that serve the capitalists.

RED DAVE

p.s. Looking forward to the "A=A" debate. RD

spacer1
August 25, 2003, 08:14 AM
Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
The problem with A = A is when it is used to equivocate between 'A' -- the thing in the universe, and 'A' -- our word for that thing.
Originally posted by Clutch:
Identity is tricky, just because the syntax forces one to write it as a two-place relation when of course identity can only be the relation between an object and itself.
I have always wondered what is the purpose of setting A equal to itself? Is it to differentiate it from A=B? Even then A=A seems to me extraneous, since 'A' on its own tells you the same amount of information. Or is it mere convention?

Edited to add: And, as the responses above appear to demonstrate, it only leads to much confusion.

Keith Russell
August 25, 2003, 04:12 PM
spacer, we recognize a 'thing' by the boundaries that separate it from all other 'things'.

Saying that 'A is A' differentiates 'A' from all other entities 'non-A'. We don't 'set' the value of 'A' as equal to 'A', we recognize that the values are identical; a thing is itself...

K

99Percent
August 25, 2003, 06:27 PM
The reason Rand came up with A=A (or at least emphasized it) is that in any discourse between men, there has to be a foundation on which we can agree on. If we take all that we discuss and supposedly know to its ultimate logical conclusion we must arrive at A=A or else there has been an invalid premise somewhere - (the famous "check your premises" phrase). Its not that we first declare A=A and then derive conclusions from it. That would be absurd because as you say, Red Dave, A=A is non descriptive. A cannot describe itself. Merely A=A gives us the truth and validity of more complex knowledge.

Some of the more extreme subjectivist philosphers would go on so far as to claim that not even A=A is true, but then that becomes irrelevant because if we cannot agree on a foundation of knowledge then any further discussion in search of more knowledge becomes useless. Without such a foundation one can always simply claim, well that is your opinion on the matter since A is not necessarily A, etc.

It has happened to me many times when discussing fundamental moral and political philosphies that the relativist or subjectivist come to the end of the discussion and claim for example that the basic premises, whatever they were, continue to rest on an personal interpretation of the matter. So while such an object or concept is A for one person, for another its B. This is a futile because then we can never agree on anything or worse actually know anything. We would be avoiding epistomological responsibility.

Rand then goes on to say that conceptual knowledge completely and foundationally rests on the assumption that A=A. The letter "A" is merely a representation of a concept that doesn't exist concretely. Concepts are categorical generalizations that helps us organize and communicate knowledge. However for this to work there must be always a noncontradiction in progress while developing and deriving new concepts, or else everything falls apart. We must always have in mind the fundamental A=A when we want to go to the ultimate conclusion of where our whole framework of concepts lead us when we break them down and analyze them deeply.

I would go on a step further - that concepts are actually moral representations that relate to our consciousness and existence in a deeply and personal way since ultimately existence is or not is. Our whole consciousness is based on our perception that we do indeed exist. But that is going way beyond the discussion here.

spacer1
August 25, 2003, 06:57 PM
Keith Russell,

spacer, we recognize a 'thing' by the boundaries that separate it from all other 'things'.
I agree. And, if we define the 'thing' as 'A', then it follows that 'all other things' implicitly become not-A.
Saying that 'A is A' differentiates 'A' from all other entities 'non-A'. We don't 'set' the value of 'A' as equal to 'A', we recognize that the values are identical; a thing is itself...
I disagree. Defining a 'thing' as 'A' automatically differentiates it from all other entities. I maintain that going on to say A=A is extraneous. We don't, after all, define everything not-A by setting A not equal to everything not-A, i.e., we don't say A != B; A != C; A != D; etc.

Thomas Ash
August 26, 2003, 10:05 AM
Originally posted by student738
Note, I do not mean that a witness to the behavior would certainly find it to be irrational. It may be, we might imagine, that there is a culture which believes for perfectly legitimate reasons that the correct course of action to be taken when confronted by a pool of water in the desert when in need of water, is to run in any direction as fast as one can from the pool of water. Perhaps doing so in the past has proved to successfully summon the elusive "desert pixie", a being which will both provide for your thirst to be satisfied and give you a map. I do not know, but again, there would appear to be many similar cases.

Instead what I mean is that any culture which could be made to understand on their terms, "the need for water", "the desire to live", and "the means of satisfying the need for water", would consider this behavior to be irrational. As, "the means of satisfying the need for water" is successfully explained only if it is succcessfully explained that the pool of water is the sole means of satisfying this need, excluding the possibility that this need can be satisfied by the "desert pixie".

:D Nice example.

But you overlook the fact that in the case of most religious/cultural taboos and superstitions (like that against drinking desert water), the taboo isn't based on such a (supposedly) rational basis as a belief in a desert pixie which will provide you with a water bottle and map. It's more arbitrary than that - for instance you shouldn't drink the water because it's held to be immoral, or you hear whatever pixie you believe in telling you not to (the voices! the voices! :eek: )

Best wishes,

Thomas Ash


____________________
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Keith Russell
August 26, 2003, 11:17 AM
spacer, but there are numerous folks (and philosophies) that teach that everything is 'one', or that all paths lead to the same place. How often have you heard that 'underneath it all, we're all the same', or that 'we all end up in the same place in the end', or some such?

'A is A' not only defines what something is, it defines what something isn't; it serves to reject the mystic notion of 'universal connectedness', the belief that reality is only appearance, etc.

As such, it is far more useful--and powerful--than it may at first appear...

K

Jane Bovary
August 27, 2003, 12:25 AM
You are looking at the "wider group" through your own subjective eyes. There is no one such homogenized point of interaction between you and the whole group because the whole group does not have a mind of its own. Its only you as an individual against the other individuals contained in the group.

Looking at it from an individual perspective is not subjective? Surely it's at least more objective for me to attempt to look at it from the perspective of the group?

I'm wondering why Rand actually bothered to qualify her philosophy of self-interest with that "nor sacrifice others to yourself"[sounds eerily biblical]. It seems superfluous. Was it so people wouldn't think she was a completely selfish bitch?

Not necessarily. One only has to consider what the others also want, specially those who have what you want. Then you go about in achieving a trade of value that is agreeable to both parties. Its what capitalism is all about.

But what's *objective* about it? And if there can be no agreement...? What happens then? It might be what capitalism all about but is it what morality is all about?

You have to look at rational self interest in such a way that if you can find others to agree to your wants by trading value with them. Also by agreeing in not initiating violence or threat of violence. You see others as valuable assets that can produce the things that you want if you can find a way to produce the things they want. This is achieved by communicating by in turn having the same conceptual knowledge. The other option is to force others to submit to your own interest, or that others force you to submit to their own interest.

"assets"..."trade"..."produce". Are we talking morality or econ.IOI?


Call me a nitpicker, but I find it kind of annoying that Rand commandeered the term Objectivism to name her philosophy. Calling yourself an Objectivist pressupposes the theory is objective before even putting that theory forward. It's like saying "I'm a Goodist"...ah! my theory must be good.

Keith Russell
August 27, 2003, 10:09 AM
Jane, well, Rand did believe that her theory was objective.

Do you have the same problem with 'subjectivists'?

Second, wasn't Rand taking a risk, by naming her view 'Objectivism'? I mean, her cards are right there, on the table--she thinks she's 'objective'.

Tells you exactly where to look, if you disagree.

Personally, I'm having a hard time right now with the notion that anything is 'objective'...lol (mainly because no one seems to agree as to just exactly what it means to be 'objective'...

K

99Percent
August 27, 2003, 10:29 AM
Jane - Well your hypothetical (water in the desert) was basically an economic problem, so that is why I was responding in mostly economic terms. You can view trade in non-economic terms too, when dealing with close friends and family.

Your aprehension to Rand seems to come from typical skepticism to any kind of dogma, which is good of course.

Keith Russell
August 27, 2003, 02:56 PM
Red Dave said:
"1) The modern state, as we know it, is a part of capitalism. It arose with capitalism, as a tool of capitalism, and it remains so. It is not a deformation, an excressence or an accident."

Dave, how are you defining a 'modern state'? 'Modern' means contemporary, current...the 'now'. Is 'modern' China a product of capitalism? How about 'modern' Afghanistan, or 'modern' India?

If, by 'modern', you mean only developed, 'Western', capitalist countries--then your argument is circular...

K

Jane Bovary
August 28, 2003, 09:26 PM
Jane, well, Rand did believe that her theory was objective.

Do you have the same problem with 'subjectivists'?

Keith,

Brave? Presumptious I'd say. Is there a single philosophy simply called Subjectivism in the same way Rands philosophy is called Objectivism? Anyway I think objectivity is a special claim, more significant than subjectivity. To say something is objective is to validate it as a truth for all. Unless I've got the whole thing wrong...which is entirely possible!

You can have a theory which claims to be objective [like utilitarianism]or subjective[egoism] but aren't objectivity and subjectivity concepts which stretch beyond any single philosophical treatise? For example, if I expouse a theory which claims to be "good" and then call myself a Goodist aren't I just question begging? Rand has taken a philosophical term and made it the name of her theory....so that term then becomes the theory itself. I'm not sure if it's a fair criticism or not but it's just not tasteful...[laughs]. Now It's difficult to say in conversation, "I'm an objectivist"[meaning you believe in the concept of objectivity], without people thinking you're a Randian!


Personally, I'm having a hard time right now with the notion that anything is 'objective'...lol (mainly because no one seems to agree as to just exactly what it means to be 'objective'...

I know the feeling...

99

You've been very polite and reasonable with me, yet I have to say it seems to me that Randian Objectivists want a self-serving philosophy...but they also want to feel good about it, so they wrap it up in terms like "rational" and "objective" and pretend there's something noble about it.

*If we lose the state...or the collective, don't we lose the raison d'etre for shared social values? If individual interest rules supreme...wont we just be reduced to cutthroat competition. It sounds utopian to imagine we'd all manage happily by an exchange of assets. We haven't done very well in the past when we've had small government and the individual took precedent over the interests of many. Isn't that a hint there would be huge problems?

Keith Russell
August 29, 2003, 01:47 PM
Jane, philosophy goes far beyond politics. The more I read, the more I believe that the 'ideal' state will be neither Randian/Lockian nor will it be Marxist/socialist in either nature or character.

(But, I also doubt such an 'ideal' state can be achieved at all...)

I don't choose to accept philosophical ideas because they might suit my political preferences.

Quite the reverse, in fact.

K

RED DAVE
August 31, 2003, 03:23 AM
From 99Percent:

The reason Rand came up with A=A (or at least emphasized it) is that in any discourse between men, there has to be a foundation on which we can agree on. If we take all that we discuss and supposedly know to its ultimate logical conclusion we must arrive at A=A or else there has been an invalid premise somewhere - (the famous "check your premises" phrase). Its not that we first declare A=A and then derive conclusions from it. That would be absurd because as you say, Red Dave, A=A is non descriptive. A cannot describe itself. Merely A=A gives us the truth and validity of more complex knowledge.

If A=A is, itself, nondiscriptive, any chain of reasoning that led to A=A would, itself, be nondescriptive because, essentially, it would have begun with A=A. Otherwise, it wouldn't have led to A=A. This point shows that for Rand A=A is where she begins not where she ends.

Some of the more extreme subjectivist philosphers would go on so far as to claim that not even A=A is true, but then that becomes irrelevant because if we cannot agree on a foundation of knowledge then any further discussion in search of more knowledge becomes useless. Without such a foundation one can always simply claim, well that is your opinion on the matter since A is not necessarily A, etc.

I agree that a foundation of knowledge is necessary, but, I think, that that foundation is not objective in the sense that you believe it to be so. If we take a potential object of knowledge, any object, it's fair to say, I believe, that the potential amout of knowledge in it is infinite. The question becomes, then, which information is relevant? The answer is, I believe, functional. That is, it is a matter what is wanted or needed, or, in other words, VALUES! This is where Objectivism fails.

It has happened to me many times when discussing fundamental moral and political philosphies that the relativist or subjectivist come to the end of the discussion and claim for example that the basic premises, whatever they were, continue to rest on an personal interpretation of the matter. So while such an object or concept is A for one person, for another its B. This is a futile because then we can never agree on anything or worse actually know anything. We would be avoiding epistomological responsibility.

It's not a matter of avoiding responsibility. It's a matter that one man's meat is another man's poison. And one man's information of facts, is another man's irrelevancy.

Rand then goes on to say that conceptual knowledge completely and foundationally rests on the assumption that A=A. The letter "A" is merely a representation of a concept that doesn't exist concretely. Concepts are categorical generalizations that helps us organize and communicate knowledge. However for this to work there must be always a noncontradiction in progress while developing and deriving new concepts, or else everything falls apart. We must always have in mind the fundamental A=A when we want to go to the ultimate conclusion of where our whole framework of concepts lead us when we break them down and analyze them deeply.

But what is that "noncontradiction in progress"? That noncontradication may, itself, rest on a contradiction that is, ultimately, unreconcilable, except in practice, which may mean conflict.

I would go on a step further - that concepts are actually moral representations that relate to our consciousness and existence in a deeply and personal way since ultimately existence is or not is. Our whole consciousness is based on our perception that we do indeed exist. But that is going way beyond the discussion here.

I think that you have, inadvertantly, hit the nerve in Rand's tooth, and it's not going beyond the discussion at all. It is the discussion.

What you call "moral representations that relate to our consciousness and existence in a deeply and personal way" are what I call values. And this perception that you do, indeed, exist, is based on values: a more-or-less organized system of perceptions and experiences (to take an epistomological shortcut).

So, we come, by a psychological route, to a refutation of A=A. This refutation is also being done on this and other threads with regard to semantics and analytic philosophy.

I'll tackle it with regard to metaphysics on another post.

RED DAVE

Keith Russell
August 31, 2003, 02:36 PM
I don't see how a thing can be considered other than it is, even if individual perceptions of it may be different.

If I look at an object, and you look at an object, there remains the object, one; and my perception of the object, two; and your perception of the object, three.

Even if you and I believe that our perceptions agree as to the identity of the object, they remain our perceptions--completely apart from the object itself.

This in no way negates 'A is A', since my perceptions remain what they are, yours remain what they are, and the object remains what it is. The three entities each remain what they are, independent of the others, identical only to themselves.

Further, even if subjectivism is true, and there is no 'object', my perceptions ('A') remain what they are, and your perceptions ('B') remain what they are, unless you are a figment of my imagination.

Nonetheless, my perceptions ('A') remain identical only to my perceptions ('A').

K

RED DAVE
August 31, 2003, 08:11 PM
From Keith Russell:

I don't see how a thing can be considered other than it is, even if individual perceptions of it may be different.

. . .

Nonetheless, my perceptions ('A') remain identical only to my perceptions ('A').

You started out with different individual perceptions, and you ended up with your own perception. Therein lies a contradiction.

The point is, that we only know an object,, A, through its qualities, and the qualities that you perceive of A may be different from the qualities I perceive. Therefore, as a useful catefory of identification, A=A is useless, and, therefore, has no real meaning.

RED DAVE

Keith Russell
August 31, 2003, 11:13 PM
dave, you started out with 'A' representing the object, and then tried to state that 'A' now represents your perceptions.

As I explained, though, they are two different things. Your perceptions equal your perceptions, and the object remains the object.

They may or may not have any correspondence to each other, but they are not the same.

'A' remains 'A', whether 'A' represents your perceptions of the object, or the object itself.

You cannot use 'A', though, as a variable to represent two different, and unequal, things--though you tried...

K

RED DAVE
September 1, 2003, 12:09 AM
From Keith Russell:

dave, you started out with 'A' representing the object, and then tried to state that 'A' now represents your perceptions.

As I explained, though, they are two different things. Your perceptions equal your perceptions, and the object remains the object.

They may or may not have any correspondence to each other, but they are not the same.

'A' remains 'A', whether 'A' represents your perceptions of the object, or the object itself.

You cannot use 'A', though, as a variable to represent two different, and unequal, things--though you tried...

I hope I can get this straight:

1. I maintain that "A=A" is a tautology and without usable meaning.

2. Kant, I believe, posited a "thing-in-itself," which was complete, and other than the thing-as-perceived, which is known through its qualities. However, all we can say about the thin-in-itself, as opposed to the thing-as-perceived, is that it has qualities in addition to those of the thing-as-perceived. In practice, then, it would seem that the thing-in-itself is unknowable because as soon as we know it, it becomes the limited thing-as-perceived.

3. The point this seems to lead to is that as soon as "A." presumably a thing-in-itself, of infinite qualities, becomes known, it becomes "not-A" because as a thing-as-perceived, it is limited and therefore cannot be identical to the original "A."

4. What I'm trying to say here is that "A=A." which is another way of positing the existence of a thing-in-itself, is a meaningless statement.We just cannot derive any useful information from it.

RED DAVE

99Percent
September 1, 2003, 08:43 AM
Originally posted by RED DAVE
If A=A is, itself, nondiscriptive, any chain of reasoning that led to A=A would, itself, be nondescriptive because, essentially, it would have begun with A=A. Otherwise, it wouldn't have led to A=A. This point shows that for Rand A=A is where she begins not where she ends.What is so hard to understand here? In order for something to be true it must be determined to its ultimate conclusion that A=A, not that we begin with A=A and derive knowledge from that.I agree that a foundation of knowledge is necessary, but, I think, that that foundation is not objective in the sense that you believe it to be so. If we take a potential object of knowledge, any object, it's fair to say, I believe, that the potential amout of knowledge in it is infinite. The question becomes, then, which information is relevant? The answer is, I believe, functional. That is, it is a matter what is wanted or needed, or, in other words, VALUES! This is where Objectivism fails.You can have subjective values of objects, but you still must be able to communicate what the object is. The existence of the object itself is not subjective, it is not subject to values. The object either exists or not. We need meaningful communication regarding the objects we perceive so they must remain objective.It's not a matter of avoiding responsibility. It's a matter that one man's meat is another man's poison. And one man's information of facts, is another man's irrelevancy.If that is so, then there would be a breakdown in communication, every man is an alien to another man, and the objects they refer to remain uncommunicatable. This is clearly not so because we do indeed communicate with each other. One man can say that this meat is poison to the other and he will understand because they can both point to the object that is meat and understand.But what is that "noncontradiction in progress"? That noncontradication may, itself, rest on a contradiction that is, ultimately, unreconcilable, except in practice, which may mean conflict.Then in that case we are wasting our time on such a supposed noncontradiction when it is in fact a contradiction (eg "God").I think that you have, inadvertantly, hit the nerve in Rand's tooth, and it's not going beyond the discussion at all. It is the discussion.

What you call "moral representations that relate to our consciousness and existence in a deeply and personal way" are what I call values. And this perception that you do, indeed, exist, is based on values: a more-or-less organized system of perceptions and experiences (to take an epistomological shortcut).No. Absolute value is existence itself, and that can either be true or false. You either exist or you don't so ultimately its either A=A or not. There is no in between value subject to interpretation. There is no escaping that.

99Percent
September 1, 2003, 08:49 AM
Originally posted by RED DAVE
You started out with different individual perceptions, and you ended up with your own perception. Therein lies a contradiction.

The point is, that we only know an object,, A, through its qualities, and the qualities that you perceive of A may be different from the qualities I perceive. Therefore, as a useful catefory of identification, A=A is useless, and, therefore, has no real meaning.We may each perceive the object A in different ways, but we are still able to communicate what the object 'A' is, so it is not meanlngless. We are both able to say object 'A' is indeed 'A', even though such an object has a different subjective value to each individual. (and here is where I depart from Randian objectivism, I think).

That object A is A, that it exists, is either true or false. There is no in between.

99Percent
September 1, 2003, 09:15 AM
Originally posted by RED DAVE
I hope I can get this straight:

1. I maintain that "A=A" is a tautology and without usable meaning.By itself yes, its meaningless. But it serves to illustrate the law of noncontradiction in discourses of reason.2. Kant, I believe, posited a "thing-in-itself," which was complete, and other than the thing-as-perceived, which is known through its qualities. However, all we can say about the thin-in-itself, as opposed to the thing-as-perceived, is that it has qualities in addition to those of the thing-as-perceived. In practice, then, it would seem that the thing-in-itself is unknowable because as soon as we know it, it becomes the limited thing-as-perceived.

3. The point this seems to lead to is that as soon as "A." presumably a thing-in-itself, of infinite qualities, becomes known, it becomes "not-A" because as a thing-as-perceived, it is limited and therefore cannot be identical to the original "A."We have to have a meaningful representaion of the object (thing), because to propose that we can know all the infinite qualities of A is absurd to begin with. This representation is called conceptualizing. We cannot of course resume all the qualities of 'A', but we can indeed meaningfully say the thing is 'A' and there will be no contradiction even with different perceptions of 'A', because we have grasped its essential quality. For example (and I think we need to get to more examples in this thread). When I point to this object and says this is a "cup", you can distinguish what I am pointing at even though its in the middle of a myriad of other objects (pencils, calculator, computer, printer, etc). Why? Because you know what is the essential (ie, distinguishing) characteristic of the object I am pointing at. However if I point to this same direction and say this is a "dinosaur" then you will have to remark that there is a contradiction - there is no dinosaur here, cup=cup and dinosaur<>cup. 4. What I'm trying to say here is that "A=A." which is another way of positing the existence of a thing-in-itself, is a meaningless statement.We just cannot derive any useful information from it. I repeat, we aren't deriving information from it. It is merely an axiom of non-contradiction that helps us determining whether other statements are true or not.

99Percent
September 1, 2003, 10:14 PM
Today's Calvin and Hobbes repeat at ucomics.com:

http://images.ucomics.com/comics/ch/1992/ch920901.gif

http://images.ucomics.com/comics/ch/1992/ch920901.gif

xorbie
September 1, 2003, 10:55 PM
A=A is very necessary from a mathematical standpoint. It is the first axiom, it is important. It means this "both things on the side of an equal sign are equal." Outside of math, it seems unnecessary and fairly non descriptive.

kennyminot
September 2, 2003, 07:50 PM
Ayn Rand is a controversial figure -- not because of her ethical philosophy, but because of her pretentions of greatness. Her ideas are not shockingly original. She was undeniably conservative in her dedication to objectivism, individualism, and the Enlightenment. But she sold books like a common self-help author -- such as L. Ron Hubbard or Richard Bach -- while clothing it in a psuedo-academic jargon that attracted the intelligent side of the public. Her continued popularity speaks to her ability to outlast even the harshest critics. When judging her philosophical ideas, some things are immediately clear to me:

(1) She hated the academy, so it doesn't seem fair to "judge" her ideas by claiming they "misapply elementary concepts" or "misunderstand contemporary philosophy." She had a grasp of minor currents, but probably didn't read any of the major thinkers of the twentieth century. That's probably not a bad thing. Analytic philosophy has a striking resemblence to medieval scholasticism: they both share an abundance of technical concepts, a scorn for the uninitiated, and an elevated sense of their own self-importance. It's important to note that a rag-tag group of non-academics (Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes) rescued the West from scholasticism. Or so the story goes.

(2) Her ideas weren't stupid. The idea of "rational self-interest" seems no more or less wonderful than the idea of the "greatest happiness for the greatest number." Besides: it does seem like, in some situations, we really should make our decisions in this fashion. Take the famous examples made by advocates of "care ethics." If you had to choose between saving your loved ones (wife/husband, children) or twenty unknown individuals, what would be the right choice? Granted, this is a tough decision, but doesn't it seem that you have a greater obligation to those closest to you? And isn't this (for the most part) a decision made purely out of self-interest? Because your family is more important to you?

Now on to the A=A discussion.

Logically, A=A is trivial. It doesn't provide a foundation for anything. It's a tautology: granted, it has meaning, but you can't infer anything from it. 99 Percent says:

If we take all that we discuss and supposedly know to its ultimate logical conclusion we must arrive at A=A or else there has been an invalid premise somewhere - (the famous "check your premises" phrase). Its not that we first declare A=A and then derive conclusions from it.

I think the statement "ultimate logical conclusion" is ambigious. There are no "ultimate" logical conclusions. Logic doesn't have any kind of teleology or any kind of goal: it's just a way to test arguments, and that's about the end of it. Logic doesn't tell you anything interesting or fasicinating about the world, aside from the fact that modus ponens is a valid inference. So I really don't understand what you are saying here.

A=A can't be a foundational principle. Because if you follow the very idea of foundationalism, the idea is that you take a principle, A, and it leads to other principles, such as B and C. But A=A doesn't let you make any further inferences. All it tells you is that A is in fact A. How is this supposed to help us analyze our concepts? Why should we keep it in mind when we are examining all the inferences that we make? So we prevent ourselves from making the following statement: "Dogs are black is equal to dogs are white"? ? ?

Now that's the LOGICAL side of A=A. But that's not what Ayn Rand meant by A=A. She didn't intend it as a LOGICAL foundation. It isn't even a statement about logic. She worried about the "rampant subjectivism" that she felt plagued the academic system. She thought people were denying obvious things: like they were staring at trees, and saying that they could be ants because "everything is subjective." Now this is a gross misunderstanding of philosophical skepticism. But let's ignore that fact for a second. She really wanted to put a halt to those nasty thinkers that said: "What about different perspectives?" or "How does the word tree hook up to the real tree?" I think what she REALLY MEANT is something like this:

If B appears to be A, then it really is A.

She lacked the necessary philosophical equipment to make this problem linguistic. It's similar to G. E. Moore's statements about his hand. I don't agree with it, but it's certainly something worth talking about.

Peace out,
Kennie Smith