Question on Language

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I have come to the (perhaps naive) conclusion that language is used to direct our attention to some aspect of reality. Therefore, if I use the word "time" your attention will be directed to the relatively constant motion of matter, and our measurement of such motion.

All of this rests on the foundation that language develops as we recognize patterns in reality. Therefore, it is based upon memory and past experience (or from our central nervous systems, if you will).

I assume that there are other functions of language that will probably refute such an assertion, but I am hoping somebody may be able to direct me to literature or web pages that may be in accordance with what I have set out above. Thank you.

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I found this (http://pub141.ezboard.com/fbooktalkfrm36.showMessage?topicID=87.topic) article at another forum, which I found quite interesting. I'm not sure how closely it relates to my original topic, but I'm hoping it may generate some discussion:
By Christine Kenneally, 1/5/2003

YOU'RE AN ANIMAL. You're a land-based mammal, a vertebrate, and a primate. Indeed, there are a thousand ways in which you resemble other animals. There are also a thousand ways in which you differ from them.
Over the centuries scientists and natural philosophers have tried to draw lines in the sand between human and beast, only to watch the tide sweep in and wash each of these lines away.

Culture was once thought to be a particularly human trait. But careful observation of apes demonstrated that they have culture, too. Groups of
chimps transmit learned behavior across generations; for example, some chimp groups clasp hands while they groom one another, while other groups go hands-free. Just this week, researchers at Duke University announced in the journal Science that some orangutang bands are in the habit of blowing a "raspberry" sound, like a goodnight kiss, before they go to sleep at night, while others retire more quietly.

Before culture, tool use was considered a distinctively human capacity. Again, merely watching other creatures shows that this is not the case. Chimpanzees crack nuts with a hammer and anvil; they also "fish" for ants with sticks. New Caledonian crows build tools from diverse materials like twigs, pieces of wire, and leaves, and each tool is cleverly specialized to its task. OK, they're not building jet engines. But the fact that even non-primates use tools proves that there's nothing distinctively human about the practice.

One of the last refuges of the species exceptionalist is language, and indeed, human language does seem to be unique. By combining some words with others, human beings can describe any object in the world or in our minds. We can harangue, persuade, and seduce without a touch. No other animal's communication system uses complicated syntax and a large set of words; we'd probably be talking to them already if they did. What remains controversial is this: Does our use of language stem from some innate mental capacity that only humans possess-as linguists inspired by MIT's Noam Chomsky tend to believe? Or do we talk the way we do simply because our brains happen to be bigger than those of animals - as scientists who question the innateness of human language suggest?

In November, Chomsky himself addressed this debate when he co-published a paper in Science with Harvard biologists Marc Hauser and W. Tecumseh Fitch. And when Chomksy speaks, people listen. Ever since he set forth his key thesis that language is a unique and innate property of the human mind in "Aspects of the Theory of Syntax" in 1965, Chomsky has dominated his field. But if his views on language are bold, his approach to the evolution of language has been rather cautious. To the frustration of admirers and critics alike, he has often sidestepped the heated debate over whether our language capacities are the result of natural selection. This article in Science, "The Faculty of Language: What Is it, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?", is Chomsky's first published paper on language evolution.

In the article, Chomsky endorses the comparative method used by Hauser and Fitch in their research at Harvard, which involves comparing humans and animals to see which elements of the human language system animals might also possess. The authors use their results to test various evolutionary arguments about the origins of language. If an animal seems to share an element of the language system with us, a common but now extinct ancestor may also have had that trait. If an accumulation of data shows that no other animal possesses a particular element, it can be inferred that this element is unique to humans.

For years, Chomsky's critics have complained that his theories have enjoyed great influence without being empirically testable. But Hauser and Fitch's studies on animals ranging from tamarin monkeys to swans make the idea of a uniquely human language mechanism testable in a way it hasn't been before. While the interdisciplinary marriage between biology and linguistics began more than 50 years ago, Hauser and Fitch point out, it hasn't yet been "fully consummated." Applying the comparative method to linguistic theory will move the field beyond "unproductive theoretical debate" and more firmly into the empirical domain.

A recent study by Hauser and Fitch, for example, clearly shows that humans aren't the only species with one aspect of language ability: rhythm. Tamarins, tiny primates that roam the forests of the Amazon basin, can tell the difference between languages like Japanese and Dutch based on different rhythmic cues. Of course, tamarins have no real need to distinguish between Japanese and Dutch. If we share a sensitivity to linguistic rhythm with these monkeys, then we probably didn't evolve that sensitivity for the specific purpose of understanding or producing speech, even though that's what we now use it for.

A classic 1980 study on vervet monkeys in Africa suggested that humans aren't the only species to use "words"-or at least, to employ distinct vocalizations that seem to refer to discrete entities. For example, when a vervet uttered one cry, dubbed eagle, its companions would scan the skies. At the cry for leopard, they would scramble to the top of a nearby tree. Since then, researchers also claim to have discovered animal "words" in use among other kinds of monkeys, as well as among meerkats, prairie dogs, dogs, and even chickens. But in their paper, Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch suggest that recent analysis casts doubt on the suggestion that these word-like cries are precursors to human words. It may be that they are truly referential only in the mind of the listener.

Chomksy and his co-authors distinguish the human from the nonhuman by proposing a two-part model of language, consisting of a broad faculty of language (FLB) and a narrow faculty of language (FLN). The broad faculty of language consists of features we share with other animals, such as the motor-sensory system-the collection of nerves, muscles, and organs that enable us to see, hear and touch the world around us and move within it. The physical characteristics we use to create and interpret speech, from our agility of tongue to our ability to interpret stress and pitch, have an analog in at least some other animals.

The broad faculty of language also includes what Hauser and colleagues call the conceptual-intentional system. This system is made up of a creature's knowledge of the world and its capacity to use that knowledge to form intentions and act upon them. Animals are not just unthinking bundles of nerves and muscle. Recent experiments have shown that they understand the world in complicated ways-some birds use the sky and landmarks to help them navigate complex paths; other animals, like monkeys, recognize and can use in varying degrees abstract ideas like color, number, and geometric relationships. Many different species can use mirrors to locate objects, and some, like chimps, bonobos, and orangutans, appear to recognize their own reflections. Chimpanzees even appear to have what psychologists call a theory of mind; that is, they can infer from a person's or a fellow chimp's actions what that creature is thinking-another capacity that has long been held to belong to humans alone.

By contrast, Chomsky and his coauthors argue that the narrow faculty of language is indeed uniquely human, and in its barest form, consists of a single syntactic mechanism, called recursion. Recursion is the process by which any sentence can be made infinitely long by being embedded in another sentence. "Chomsky thinks that Hauser thinks that Fitch thinks that language is unique" may be a long and ultimately pointless kind of sentence, but it can be made longer still by putting "Mary thinks that..." before it. This process of embedding could go on forever.

The fact that human brains can take a set of entities, like words, and create an open-ended pattern with them, like a sentence, makes human language limitless. Most important, this recursive mechanism allows us to express complicated thoughts. We're not just stuck at one level of observation or knowledge; we can see-and say-not just that "He knows," but that "She knows that he knows." Each level of recursion is a step upward in complexity.

Other animals may have a rich understanding of the world but no way to convey it. It was when humans connected their internal understandings with a means to express them-when they began using recursion to communicate -that they gained their unique form of language. "When those things got married," says Hauser, "the world was changed."

Chomsky has been talking about the construction of infinitely long recursive sentences from the beginning. He has also long emphasized a kindred notion that recursion probably goes beyond language and is vital to human cognition more broadly. After all, as the Science article points out, recursion is characteristic of the number system as well as the grammatical system. Just as "Mary thinks that..." could be added to any sentence, "2 x" could be added to any equation, no matter how long it already is.

But where did this capacity come from? If recursion isn't specific to language, then it's possible that our brain's ability to use recursion did not first evolve in order to improve our ability to communicate. Perhaps, Chomsky and his coauthors say, it was initially used for navigating social relationships and was then co-opted by language. Chimpanzees have highly complicated social systems; so they must remember-without the help of language-who among them is dominant and who is not. Prelinguistic humans may have faced similar challenges and solved them with mental recursion. Chomksy, Hauser, and Fitch do not suggest when these abilities may have first come together to create language, but one popular theory suggests it may have been sometime in the last 50,000 to 100,000 years.

Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch further suggest that certain components of the faculty of language may have arisen as spandrels, a term first used by Stephen Jay Gould to mean a byproduct rather than an end product of natural selection. In this scenario, language may be what makes us special, but its creation was no more purposeful or adaptive than a poodle's floppy ears.

Steven Pinker, a psychologist and linguist at MIT and the well-known author of "The Language Instinct," describes himself as basically sympathetic to the idea of a narrow and broad faculty of language, but he finds the notion of language as a spandrel "quite eccentric." "If language was really just a by-product," says Pinker, "one wonders why there would be such an amazingly good fit between it and the rest of what makes us so unique"-for example, the fact that we learn a lot, know a lot, and are a highly social species.

Other researchers are more critical of the Chomskian position in general. Philip Lieberman, a linguist at Brown University who has written many books on language evolution, questions the notion that recursion itself is
distinctively human. Lieberman believes that motor control, rather than an abstract mental mechanism, is the foundation of recursion. In his view, walking is fundamentally related to talking. "When we take a step, we execute a sequence of discrete motor commands that are each represented in the brain by a pattern-generator," he says. "We could reiterate a novel sequence of steps if we dance on to eternity-producing novel dance 'sentences' that had the same property as the infinitely long sentences that linguists take to be the mark of creativity of human language."

Rather than being a recent innovation without precedent in animal behavior, basic recursion in this model is an ancient trait common to many animals. After all, neural circuits that regulate walking, manual movements, and speech share common brain structures in humans. These structures are in the subcortical basal ganglia, antique parts of the brain that were present in the first mammal, and go back as far as our reptilian forebears.

Irene Maxine Pepperberg, a visiting professor at the MIT Media Lab who has taught a language-like code to an African gray parrot named Alex, also suspects that recursion has more ancient roots. She describes Alex as "a creature whose connections with humans likely go back to the dinosaurs," and points out that he can comprehend and respond to sentences that use recursion. Experiments with dolphins and sea-lions have shown similar abilities.

According to Hauser, these animals have never been shown to produce recursion. But this, says Pepperberg, may just be a matter of time. As any parent knows, understanding language comes before speaking, so whether animals will one day become capable of producing recursive statements remains to be seen.

It's going to be a while before the mounting evidence for and against these theories can be called conclusive. A complete definition of language has been notoriously elusive, and the field of language evolution is not one burdened by empirical evidence. There are no nouns trapped in amber, and ancient recursive sentences don't fossilize. "The fossil record is too limited, too weak," says Hauser. "The only way to get at these answers is comparative."

There are few goals that will prove more enticing to researchers in the coming years than working out whether language truly is both innate in and unique to humans: Proving Chomsky's ideas of the 1960s have become a modern linguistic holy grail. Lieberman believes the quest to prove a uniquely human language mechanism will fail. But what if it succeeds? The true import may be more emotional than scientific. For some it will mean that our hubris is justified, that we humans are as special as we think we are. But for others, it will mean something quite different: we'll never have a sophisticated conversation with an animal, and are therefore more alone in our own minds than we think.

This story ran on page D1 of the Boston Globe on 1/5/2003.
© Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.

[CJD]

All of this rests on the foundation that language develops as we recognize patterns in reality. Therefore, it is based upon memory and past experience (or from our central nervous systems, if you will).

It seems to me that if you agree with Chomsky, then "memory and past experience[s]" are not at all satisfactory when discussing a universal theory of grammar.

If you disagree with Chomsky on this basic principle, well, then, you're just begging the question.

From page D1 of the Boston Globe on 1/5/2003
The true import may be more emotional than scientific. For some it will mean that our hubris is justified, that we humans are as special as we think we are. But for others, it will mean something quite different: we'll never have a sophisticated conversation with an animal, and are therefore more alone in our own minds than we think.

I think there is a third option here that actually rebukes #1's grasp at autonomy and #2's nihilism. 3) for some [this success] will confirm the notion that humankind has an inherent dignity, that we humans are the crown of God's creation, being created in his image, and that we should be thankful to him for something as basic as being able to speak.

Regards,

CJD

See this (http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/chomsky.htm) article from Chomsky's Language and Mind.

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CJD,
It seems to me that if you agree with Chomsky, then "memory and past experience[s]" are not at all satisfactory when discussing a universal theory of grammar.
It's a good thing that we are not "discussing a universal theory of grammar", then.
If you disagree with Chomsky on this basic principle, well, then, you're just begging the question.
I don't think I do agree with Chomsky, but which question do you see me as begging?
I think there is a third option here ... that humankind has an inherent dignity, that we humans are the crown of God's creation, being created in his image, and that we should be thankful to him for something as basic as being able to speak.
I guess we shouldn't ask how God did it, either, eh? :rolleyes:

[CJD]

I don't think I do agree with Chomsky, but which question do you see me as begging?

The observable fact that children are soon able to speak and write new sentences unlike any they have ever heard or read. The notion that language develops as we recognize patterns in reality is faulty for one major reason: that the use of language is far more complex than the accumulated total of input experience. If the human mind at birth is tabula rasa, then in principle every feature of human language should be explicable in terms of what human beings acquire through their experiences of the world.

"Memory, past experience," etc., just do not cut it. Again, why? Because the actual use of language contains many characteristics that cannot be accounted for on the basis of stimulus and response. The natural conclusion, then, is that the use of language that exceeds the accumulated total of input experience must be a result from what was already there to begin with, i.e., innate knowledge of the rules of language; hence, we are discussing the "universal theory of grammar," because there is a fundamental similarity of all human languages. This leads me to think there is an innate disposition to build grammar. It is seemingly inescapable.

I guess we shouldn't ask how God did it, either, eh?

Granted, I gave you just a statement. It might have come across as a dogmatic assertion. Really, though, the statement was just the conclusion of an inductive (or probabilistic) argument.

To summarize this clearly: Given the non-empiricist theory of language alluded to above, and since a naturalistic account for our complex use of language is entirely unsatisfactory, it is quite probable from an Xian perspective that as rational creatures created in the image of God, humans possess innately a priori categories of thought and the ability to use and understand language. Thus, I thank him for the gift of speech.

My conclusion (God is the giver of language) is not found in my premises (that our complex use of language cannot be accounted for from a naturalistic perspective). This is one among many features of reality that I think are signals of transcendence.

A direct and concise rebuttal by anyone will be welcomed.

Regards,

CJD

[mike_decock]

Originally posted by spacer1
I have come to the (perhaps naive) conclusion that language is used to direct our attention to some aspect of reality. Therefore, if I use the word "time" your attention will be directed to the relatively constant motion of matter, and our measurement of such motion.

I think your conclusion here is similar to the hypothesis I read in Julian Jaynes' The Origin Of Consciousness In The Breakdown Of The Bicameral Mind (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0618057072/qid=1061564889/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_1/103-0757548-7926242?v=glance&s=books&n=507846). His conclusion is that all language acts as metaphors to create images in the mind of the listener:

"The most fascinating property of language is its capacity to make mataphors. But what an understatement! For metaphor is not a mere extra trick of language, as it is so often slighted in the old schoolbooks on composition; it is the very constituitive ground of language."

He also discusses the evolution of language:

"Previously in the evolution of primates, it was only postural or visual signals such as threat postures which were intentional. Their evolution into auditory signals was made necessary by the migration of man into northern climates, where there was less light both in the environment and in the dark caves where man made his abode, and where visual signals could not be seen as readily as the bright African savannahs. This evolution may have begun as early as the Third Glaciation Period or possibly even before. But it is only as we are approaching the increasing cold and darkness of the Fourth Glaciation in northern climates that the presence of such vocal intentional signals gave a pronounced selective advantage to those who possessed them." ... "The central assertion of this view, I repeat, is that each new stage of words literally created new perceptions and attentions, and such new perceptions and attentions resulted in important cultural changes which are reflected in the archaeological record."

-Mike...

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CJD,
If the human mind at birth is tabula rasa, then in principle every feature of human language should be explicable in terms of what human beings acquire through their experiences of the world.
I don't believe that the mind is a blank slate at birth, due to a little thing called evolution. The propensity for grammar may be "innate" for an individual born today, after evolution has allowed for such a propensity. Hopefully, this highlights my distaste for the use of the word "innate". Have humans always had such an "innate" ability (which I believe is your position), or has this ability evolved in us (become "innate") because it provides a survival advantage?
"Memory, past experience," etc., just do not cut it. Again, why? Because the actual use of language contains many characteristics that cannot be accounted for on the basis of stimulus and response.
A Xian who doesn't believe in free-will?
This leads me to think there is an innate disposition to build grammar. It is seemingly inescapable.
I agree, but this "innate" ability has evolved, IMO, just as our language does, where we have make ever finer discriminations among the concepts we inherit.
....it is quite probable from an Xian perspective that as rational creatures created in the image of God, humans possess innately a priori categories of thought and the ability to use and understand language. Thus, I thank him for the gift of speech.
So God also "possesses innately a priori categories of thought and the ability to use and understand language", I presume? And you arrive at this conclusion because you have the unfounded belief that we are created in God's image? It all seems ass-backwards to me.

[spacer1]

Mr. Decock,
I think your conclusion here is similar to the hypothesis I read in Julian Jaynes' The Origin Of Consciousness In The Breakdown Of The Bicameral Mind.
Thank you very much for the link!

[CJD]

spacer1, thanks for your response.

Have humans always had such an "innate" ability (which I believe is your position), or has this ability evolved in us (become "innate") because it provides a survival advantage?

Yeah, that's my position. But consider that your adopted theory of a gradual evolutionary development of animal sounds is difficult to assess based on your criterion because its supposed stages have not been exhibited; besides this, there are striking differences between non-human utterances. The sounds of birds and beasts are constant and instinctive, and can hardly be deemed descriptive sentences (in contradistinction to human language, which does communicate a descriptive content and changes from time to time and place to place). If words are primarily sensuous as your theory contends (and to which your OP made reference, assuming that "reality" meant "reality based on naturalistic priniciples"), and if those words are not to be considered signs of a mental concept, or are not to be correlated to innate categories found in the intellect, then you should at least admit that your explanation of language is not verified by the empirical criteria that your theory cherishes.

A Xian who doesn't believe in free-will?

Not in the philosophically libertarian sense. No.

I agree, but this "innate" ability has evolved, IMO, just as our language does, where we have make ever finer discriminations among the concepts we inherit.

But this is a stab in the dark.

So God also "possesses innately a priori categories of thought and the ability to use and understand language", I presume?

It would be more correct to say that those innate categories imparted to us exist in him as part and parcel of who he is (which would be a thinking, talking and communicating Thou).

And you arrive at this conclusion because you have the unfounded belief that we are created in God's image?

We all assume things, spacer1. But you have not correctly pointed out what the main premise is of this inductive argument: because there is a fundamental similarity of all human languages, we should not be surprised at the suggestion that there is an innate disposition within humankind to build grammar. Evolutionary development is not a valid conclusion because it cannot shown via its own criterion. At least mine is consistent with what it purports epistemologically.

My conclusion (that God is the giver) is not found in the above premise. Further, I admit that my conclusion is far more detailed than what my premises allow. But the premises do lead us to posit something beyond or outside of ourselves that can account for our use of language. That crack, though small, is all I need to fit the Xian God in. Thus it is called a "signal of transcendence."

We can bracket the imago Dei, since that only acts as a confirmation for me (i.e., making sense of the empirical world and the world revealed in Scripture). But what you have to deal with, I believe, is the idea that my premises demand something "other".

Regards,

CJD

[mike_decock]

Originally posted by CJD
Evolutionary development is not a valid conclusion because it cannot shown via its own criterion.

I think you have failed to make a case here. Our written history is evidence that language has evolved and continues to evolve. To retrace the evolution of language further back than the written records alongside our fossil record is a perfectly valid logical step.

My conclusion (that God is the giver) is not found in the above premise. Further, I admit that my conclusion is far more detailed than what my premises allow. But the premises do lead us to posit something beyond or outside of ourselves that can account for our use of language. That crack, though small, is all I need to fit the Xian God in. Thus it is called a "signal of transcendence."

I think your conclusion is simply a leap of faith from a foothold of current non-falsifiability. If the premises do lead us to posit something beyond or outside ourselves (which I don't agree with), there is no criteria by which to determine the "outside" help we got: be it the Christian God, little green men or a freak mutation caused by a will-timed lightning bolt.

-Mike...

[CJD]

. . . there is no criteria by which to determine the "outside" help we got: be it the Christian God, little green men or a freak mutation caused by a will-timed lightning bolt.


That's bullshit, mike. We have an ability to determine probability. In this case, all it takes is a little common sense. Little green men or a freak mutation caused by a well-timed lightning bolt do not have the attributes (as they are commonly understood) necessary to impart innate categories of thought and the ability to use and understand language. [*Edited to add: Besides, I have already noted that human language shifts and changes from time to time and place to place. No one is denying that. Let me say it more clearly: the empiricist theory of language adopted by you and any other naturalist cannot account for the supposed bridge between non-human utterances and complex human language.]

Your "perfectly valid logical step" is the only leap of faith here, confirmed by your very own criterion.

Disprove a rationalist theory of language and maybe then you'll have said something worthwhile.

Regards,

CJD

[Clutch]

Originally posted by CJD
That's bullshit, mike. We have an ability to determine probability. In this case, all it takes is a little common sense.Which is it: probability, or "common sense"? The latter is notoriously open to confusion with one's prejudged conclusion. But the former requires, at least in principle, some means of generating a number or interval, which can then be compared to the number or interval of a competing explanation. Do you have some probability of a god's existence in mind? How do you plan to compare it favourably to the probability of aliens? Little green men or a freak mutation caused by a well-timed lightning bolt do not have the attributes (as they are commonly understood) necessary to impart innate categories of thought and the ability to use and understand language.No, actually we're talking about aliens that do have those attributes.
Let me say it more clearly: the empiricist theory of language adopted by you and any other naturalist cannot account for the supposed bridge between non-human utterances and complex human language. Wow! Absolutely no evolutionary account of language could succeed, am I getting that right?

Is there an argument for this, too?

[CJD]

Clutch, you know the details are beside the point. I cannot prove them one way or another. What I think can be proven, however, is a rationalist account—over against an empirical account—of language. Whether it is little green men or the BibleGod is not the real point, the fact that such things are viable alternatives in this discussion (via a ratonalist theory of language), however, is the point, and all I need to continue claiming that my beliefs are entirely warranted.

No, actually we're talking about aliens that do have those attributes.

Oh! You meant those aliens. Mea culpa.

Wow! Absolutely no evolutionary account of language could succeed, am I getting that right?

No (I mean yes). My overstatement. "An evolutionary account of language has yet to succeed." Do I think it ever will? No. But hell, I've been wrong a-plenty.

Regards,

CJD

[mike_decock]

Originally posted by CJD
That's bullshit, mike. We have an ability to determine probability. In this case, all it takes is a little common sense. Little green men or a freak mutation caused by a well-timed lightning bolt do not have the attributes (as they are commonly understood) necessary to impart innate categories of thought and the ability to use and understand language.

Well, the lightning bolt comment was a bit fecatious but how are you going to calculate the probability of the existence of God? There are calculations which determine the probability of intelligent life on other planets and you could further calculate the probability that they genetically engineered the first humans to be capable of language and subjective consciousness. Not that I'm an advocate of that theory, but I certainly find it more plausible than the existence of God since it fits within our current scientific knowledge.

Let me say it more clearly: the empiricist theory of language adopted by you and any other naturalist cannot account for the supposed bridge between non-human utterances and complex human language.

Those theories do account for the bridge between non-human utterances and complex language. Whether or not language evolved exactly as proposed is simply an area which requires further study.

Your conclusion is really nothing more than yet another example of "God-of-the-gaps" reasoning. I simply don't accept ignorance as evidence for the non-falsifiable.

Your "perfectly valid logical step" is the only leap of faith here, confirmed by your very own criterion.

It has been widely demonstrated that our abilities in language are directly related to physical attributes (brain structure, etc.). It is no "leap of faith" to conclude that the evolution of our physical attributes is then directly related to the evolution of our abilities to use language.

-Mike...

[spacer1]

CJD,
But consider that your adopted theory of a gradual evolutionary development of animal sounds is difficult to assess based on your criterion because its supposed stages have not been exhibited; besides this, there are striking differences between non-human utterances.
What would you consider to be a "stage" of development, with regards to language, though? The differentiation of nouns and verbs? Would you say that there are "striking differences" between the utterances of a non-human species?
The sounds of birds and beasts are constant and instinctive, and can hardly be deemed descriptive sentences
Well, I don't think that communication consists only of descriptive sentences.
(in contradistinction to human language, which does communicate a descriptive content and changes from time to time and place to place)
How do you explain the changes in language, given your view that we have been given the ability for such language by a perfect God? If such a perfect God had given us language, why would He have not made it perfect to begin with, such that it wouldn't require any changes? Also, if we are created in God's image, shouldn't, firstly, His ability for language be perfect, and secondly, therefore, our language should be reflective of such perfection, with no need for any change.
If words are primarily sensuous as your theory contends (and to which your OP made reference, assuming that "reality" meant "reality based on naturalistic priniciples"), and if those words are not to be considered signs of a mental concept, or are not to be correlated to innate categories found in the intellect, then you should at least admit that your explanation of language is not verified by the empirical criteria that your theory cherishes.
Yes, I do mean reality based on naturalistic principles. I do consider words to be signs of a mental concept, as I think my OP clearly exhibits. No, I do not consider words to be "correlated to innate categories found in the intellect" (using your definition of "innate"). Lastly, I think that the article I reposted above, does offer some good empirical evidence to support my belief. The same cannot be said for your beliefs, however, and if we cannot even agree on how we should verify that an explanation is true, then we won't get very far simply firing insults at each others' belief systems.
Not in the philosophically libertarian sense. No.
In what sense, do you believe in free-will, then?
But this is a stab in the dark.
No doubt. However, I began this discussion very tentatively, only asking for information regarding my current conclusion on language. Following this, I posted an article which seemed to me mostly unbiased, but perhaps somehwat relevant to my OP. From here you launched your assault on my "position", when I had never substantially offered one.
It would be more correct to say that those innate categories imparted to us exist in him as part and parcel of who he is (which would be a thinking, talking and communicating Thou).
But they don't equally exist in us as part and parcel of who we are?? I don't see your distinction.
At least mine is consistent with what it purports epistemologically.
Coherence and correspondence are two different kettles of fish.
...because there is a fundamental similarity of all human languages, we should not be surprised at the suggestion that there is an innate disposition within humankind to build grammar.
As I have tried to explain in this post, I do not claim to be an expert on the matter. Perhaps you could explain to me what those similarities between all languages are?

[Clutch]

Thanks for your reply.Originally posted by CJD
Clutch, you know the details are beside the point. I cannot prove them one way or another. What I think can be proven, however, is a rationalist account—over against an empirical account—of language. Whether it is little green men or the BibleGod is not the real point, the fact that such things are viable alternatives in this discussion (via a ratonalist theory of language), however, is the point, and all I need to continue claiming that my beliefs are entirely warranted.What is your "rationalist" argument? There's one lurking in the cognitive neighbourhood that runs: There's no non-design explanation I'll accept; therefore our language faculties were designed.

But it can't be that. So I'm missing something.Oh! You meant those aliens. Mea culpa.Repeat "I will not assert my preferred story as a matter of mere legerdemain" twenty times, and you are forgiven. ;)
My overstatement. "An evolutionary account of language has yet to succeed." Do I think it ever will? No. But hell, I've been wrong a-plenty.My world and welcome to it.

Anyhow, I don't know what failed accounts you have in mind, nor what you think the desiderata for a successful account are. In general, the more unified, specialist, cognitively encapsulated and unique one takes our language faculty to be, the more inclined one is to see its origin as mysterious.

For my part, and the empirical evidence is all on my side here, I think our language faculty is all of those things to varying degrees. And degrees are what evolutionary processes produce par excellence. I don't really see the grounds for pessimism. (Yet.)

[CJD]

Good responses, all.

Starting from the top:

Mike wrote:

. . . I certainly find more plausible than the existence of God since it fits within our current scientific knowledge.

My unfortunate choice of words here was "probable." I, for one, completely disdain mathematics, and no amount of calculations regarding beings that are not empirically verifiable at present do the "man on the street" any good whatsoever. If numbers don't lie, why are there so many varied outcomes in theistic/atheistic arguments that lean on probability? I should have said "plausible." ". . . it is quite [i]plausible from an Xian perspective that as rational creatures created in the image of God, humans possess innately a priori categories of thought and the ability to use and understand language," & co.

Mike wrote:
Your conclusion is really nothing more than yet another example of "God-of-the-gaps" reasoning. I simply don't accept ignorance as evidence for the non-falsifiable.

You miss who I am in this quote. I am not here to make a case or prove anything. My conclusion is a confirmation, not a proof. I start with God as Creator. It's who I am. Take that away, and I might as well be an atheist. Like Aquinas argued, it doesn't take one to recognize that God's grace makes mathematics possible for mathematics to succeed, but an Xian can do nothing less: "I believe in order to understand" (Augustine? Anselm? I forget). What I dislike are all attempts to say the opposite, as if we all don't "believe" something in that very first step on our way to knowledge.

Those theories do account for the bridge between non-human utterances and complex language.

Yeah, right. Reminds of the time I ran into a parrot in a remote Chilean forest and he quipped, "Yo, CJD, want a cracker?" The fact is, there have been no exhibitions of the supposed stages of development, nor are there any today. Why? Theories of this nature are equally based on ignorance, yet another example of "naturalism-in-the-gaps" reasoning.

Mike wrote:
It has been widely demonstrated that our abilities in language are directly related to physical attributes (brain structure, etc.).

It has also been widely demonstrated that our abilities in language are directly related to human thought. Note that we are not saying the same thing here. Whatever you say re: what language is directly related to, it boils down to human experience. IF you do not agree, then you have agreed with me, i.e., that some bits of knowledge do NOT arise from sense experience. Included in this, it seems to me, is the innate knowledge utilized by children, for example, when they learn the grammar of their own language.

I admit that there is a simplicity here: evolutionary development of physical attributes necessarily leads to the evolutionary development of language. But included in this theory is the notion (at least in principle) that every feature of human language should be explicable in terms of what human beings acquire through their experiences of the world. This, empirical theories of language have failed to do. I simply do not see an adequate foundation for a bridge between non-human utterances and complex human language (yet).

Regards,

CJD

[mike_decock]

Originally posted by CJD
I should have said "plausible." ". . . it is quite [b]plausible from an Xian perspective that as rational creatures created in the image of God, humans possess innately a priori categories of thought and the ability to use and understand language," & co.

Well, obviously. It's also quite plausible from the perspective of a believer in UFOs that intelligent creatures from another planet genetically engineered the human race and taught them language.

I start with God as Creator. It's who I am.

Which is why you consider the "innate" categories of thought and language as "God-given" to be more plausible than a naturalistic explanation. I'm just disagreeing your previous statement that:

My conclusion (God is the giver of language) is not found in my premises (that our complex use of language cannot be accounted for from a naturalistic perspective).

You conclude the God is the giver of language because you believe in a Creator-God. Restricting yourself to your premises, the only intellectually honest conclusion would be to admit ignorance.

We're looking at the same natural phenomenon and we're faced with the same ignorance. The naturalist assumes a natural cause and the Christian assumes a supernatural cause. Since there is an overwhelming amount of evidence for the existence for the natural world and no evidence for the existence of the supernatural, I'll stick with the former rather than the latter.

Whatever you say re: what language is directly related to, it boils down to human experience.

Directly related rather than inversely related. Not exclusively related.

IF you do not agree, then you have agreed with me, i.e., that some bits of knowledge do NOT arise from sense experience. Included in this, it seems to me, is the innate knowledge utilized by children, for example, when they learn the grammar of their own language.

I don't know if I can call it innate knowledge. Innate ability or instinct, perhaps. Having learned 3 language by the age of five, I noticed that grammar is rhythmic, it's the song that they sing. Once you catch on to the rhythm, the grammar will flow naturally without having to consider how sentences are structured.

I simply do not see an adequate foundation for a bridge between non-human utterances and complex human language (yet).

Yet ;). I think the basic building blocks are there. It's just a matter of finding the missing pieces and getting the order right before it's a solid theory. If you want to call that faith, we'll just have to agree to disagree. I'll just call it probability ;).

-Mike...

[CJD]

spacer1 wrote:
What would you consider to be a "stage" of development, with regards to language, though? The differentiation of nouns and verbs?

I suppose just an example of (progressive) deviation within a species (like if a parrot, without any contact with a human, began uttering speech—not instinctive but descripitive).

Would you say that there are "striking differences" between the utterances of a non-human species?

Not in the sense that they are both instinctive and constant. Of course, there are obvious differences in utterances between non-human species, and the complexity of a given animal's utterance is directly correlated to the complexity of its physical attributes. Further, all the features of an animal's use of utterance is entirely explicable in terms of what it has acquired through its response to environmental stimuli.

Well, I don't think that communication consists only of descriptive sentences.

Well, I never said that anyway. The point was that only humans communicate descriptive content.

How do you explain the changes in language, given your view that we have been given the ability for such language by a perfect God? If such a perfect God had given us language, why would He have not made it perfect to begin with, such that it wouldn't require any changes? Also, if we are created in God's image, shouldn't, firstly, His ability for language be perfect, and secondly, therefore, our language should be reflective of such perfection, with no need for any change.

If you ask a theological question, you're going to get a theological answer:

1. He did make it perfect.

2. He did not make binary robots, but reflective, mutable, and complex human beings.

3. Given the Xian perspective, entertain the idea that before the re-introduction of chaos (as a substantial and overpowering force) into the world, language was perfect, but as a result of this breakdown, language continually evolves and devolves.

4. Also entertain that from the Xian perspective, God did not create as perfect as he could have. What his reasons would be for this, I do not know (remember, creation was veeerrrrrry good! That is, not without the possiblity of becoming bad, Gen. 1:31).

Yes, I do mean reality based on naturalistic principles. I do consider words to be signs of a mental concept, as I think my OP clearly exhibits.

If you allow that "words [are] signs of a mental concept," then you must also allow me to say things using human language that apply literally to things that are spiritual and non-spatial. You can slide on this, of course, if by "mental concept" you meant something entirely physical.

Lastly, I think that the article I reposted above, does offer some good empirical evidence to support my belief. The same cannot be said for your beliefs, however, and if we cannot even agree on how we should verify that an explanation is true, . . .

Well, I'm not an empiricist! Did I mention that I am not empiricist? Hi, I'm CJD, and I am not an empiricist. Empiricism and I do not get along. Empirical evidence cannot be used to explain to me, for example, why almost every known culture to have ever existed has portrayed some form of religiosity or another. Empiricism is, to use an analogy from my youth, like picking shrooms in a cow field, eventually, and without any intent whatsoever, you're going to step in a fresh pile of shit.

In what sense do you believe in free-will, then?

At the risk of oversimplification, the history of philosophy has fought over basically two positions regarding the will—"libertarian" and "compatibilist." The following briefly summarizes both:

John Frame defines compatibilist freedom simply as the "freedom to do what you want to do." He elaborates further that it is called thus because it is compatible with determinism (or anything else for that matter), and that "even if every act we perform is caused by something outside ourselves (such as natural causes or God), we are still free, for we can still act according to our character and desires" (John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God, (Philipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 136).

R. K. McGregor Wright defines libertarian freedom as "the belief that the human will has an inherent power to choose with equal ease between alternatives. . . . This belief does not claim that there are no influences that might affect the will, but it does insist that normally the will can overcome these factors and choose in spite of them. Ultimately, the will is free from any necessary causation" (Wright, No Place For Sovereignty, 43-44; quoted in Frame, 138). Frame goes on to explain the libertarian’s principles: "if our decisions are caused by anything or anyone (including our own desires), they are not properly our decisions, and we cannot be held responsible for them. To be responsible, we must be able to do otherwise" (Frame, 138).

All this to say that does that freedom of the will does exist—just not in the "libertarian" sense.

However, I began this discussion very tentatively, only asking for information regarding my current conclusion on language. Following this, I posted an article which seemed to me mostly unbiased, but perhaps somehwat relevant to my OP. From here you launched your assault on my "position", when I had never substantially offered one.

I am not looking for a fight. I picked up on your tentativeness, and wanted to basically yell, "Look out for that train!" Please don't let my being an Xian cause you to go down the empiricist's path. Many non-believers are not empiricists—especially with regards to the philosophy of language. I urge you to study as many alternatives as you can find.

But they don't equally exist in us as part and parcel of who we are?? I don't see your distinction.

Yes, they do. The distinction made was just to distinguish between the giver and the many receiving.

Coherence and correspondence are two different kettles of fish.

Nonetheless, can you say that your views are consistent with what it purports epistemologically? Besides, while "coherence and correspondence" are distinct, they cannot be separated.

As I have tried to explain in this post, I do not claim to be an expert on the matter. Perhaps you could explain to me what those similarities between all languages are?

Nor am I an expert. The fundamental similarities between human language that I was referring to are 1) It has a complex grammar; 2) It changes from time to time and place to place; 3) It communicates descriptive content. All of these are in contradistinction to non-human utterances.

Regards,

CJD

[ftorresgamez]

Originally posted by CJD

The observable fact that children are soon able to speak and write new sentences unlike any they have ever heard or read.

How soon is "soon" for you? I have been around children a lot, and none of them go from babbling to quoting Milton in any reasonable short time.

The notion that language develops as we recognize patterns in reality is faulty for one major reason: that the use of language is far more complex than the accumulated total of input experience.

"Far more complex"? How complex? To what degree? How did you compare both? I believe you are just making a statement without basis on fact.

If the human mind at birth is tabula rasa, then in principle every feature of human language should be explicable in terms of what human beings acquire through their experiences of the world.

Since there is something called "instinct", then the human mind cannot be a tabula rasa (clean slate) as you think.

"Memory, past experience," etc., just do not cut it. Again, why? Because the actual use of language contains many characteristics that cannot be accounted for on the basis of stimulus and response.

How do you base this assumption? Could you be mistaken sophistication with basic language skills?

The natural conclusion, then, is that the use of language that exceeds the accumulated total of input experience must be a result from what was already there to begin with, i.e., innate knowledge of the rules of language; hence, we are discussing the "universal theory of grammar," because there is a fundamental similarity of all human languages. This leads me to think there is an innate disposition to build grammar. It is seemingly inescapable.

"Seemingly" is the word. It is not fact. Unless you have made an exhaustive, comparative investigation on grammatical forms for EACH and ALL languages currently used, you have no factual basis on which to base your assumption. Your conclusion thus begs the question.


Granted, I gave you just a statement. It might have come across as a dogmatic assertion. Really, though, the statement was just the conclusion of an inductive (or probabilistic) argument.

I would not presume as much, if I were you.



To summarize this clearly: Given the non-empiricist theory of language alluded to above,

Are you kidding? You based your assumptions in the OBSERVABLE fact that children are soon to speak and make sentences with ease, and you say your theory is non-empirical? No, sir. Your conclusion is non-empirical - it is just guessing. You have not stated a single theory yet.

[...] and since a naturalistic account for our complex use of language is entirely unsatisfactory,[...]

Unsatisfactory for you, maybe: You made that point pretty clear. Unfortunately, you do not base your assumptions on testable facts, only on other preconceived assumptions.

[...]it is quite probable from an Xian perspective that as rational creatures created in the image of God, humans possess innately a priori categories of thought and the ability to use and understand language. Thus, I thank him for the gift of speech.

Now, THAT is begging the question! You assume a language-giving Creator in order to conclude we were given language by a Creator!

[CJD]

I need to start (for ftorresgamez's sake) with the clear admission that I am not a linguist, scientist, or philosopher, nor have I, in scientific fashion, held numerous experiments to come to a conclusion.

Clutch, greetings.

You wrote: What is your "rationalist" argument? There's one lurking in the cognitive neighbourhood that runs: There's no non-design explanation I'll accept; therefore our language faculties were designed.

But it can't be that. So I'm missing something.

Well, I don't want to shirk from the notion that epistemologically, I think we all treat some explanations as completely untenable.

But I think of this issue in much the same way Chomsky did. Keep in mind that it is not his theories so much as his critique of empiricism that I enjoy. Also, I find his theories relational to my own Christian theory regarding language.

First, imagine a box with two openings marked respectively "input' and "output." Suppose that on a regular basis, far more leaves the box as output than enters the box (ftorresgamez's hair-splitting notwithstanding). Thus, we are left with the conclusion that the additional output must result from what was already in the box to begin with. In Chomsky's view, human language corresponds to this box: far more comes out than ever goes in.

Obviously, many features of language are direct output that reults from information fed into the "box." But the actual use of language is far more complex than the accumulated total of input experience, etc., etc.

I guess it is just that I find a non-design argument unsatisfactory, as opposed to denying it outright from the very beginning. But it should also be obvious that where I lean on language stems naturally from my views on epistemology.

In general, the more unified, specialist, cognitively encapsulated and unique one takes our language faculty to be, the more inclined one is to see its origin as mysterious.

Yes, mysteriously divine.

Anyhow, I don't know what failed accounts you have in mind, nor what you think the desiderata for a successful account are.

This is, in the end, the one question here that could go on ad infinitum et nauseum.

For my part, and the empirical evidence is all on my side here, I think our language faculty is all of those things to varying degrees. And degrees are what evolutionary processes produce par excellence.

But isn't this the same, tired empiricist mistake of reversing cause and effect? (i.e, the par excellence degree produces the "evolutionary processes"?).

Finally, Clutch, one question. You wrote: . . . "common sense"? The latter is notoriously open to confusion with one's prejudged conclusion.

Agreed. But are you suggesting that we can evade this?— that is, the ideas that are latent within our culture that we all "take for granted"? Is this not what we often base our "common sense" on? As such, will there not be certain things that we all "take for granted" as "common sense"? Further, how can we escape the notion that what we all "take for granted" affects even our most academic or scientific conclusions? Nonetheless, can we not still use "common sense" to argue positively for something?

Regards,

CJD

— from John Milton's Paradise Lost, 3.1–6

Hail holy light, ofspring of Heav’n first-born,
Or of th’ Eternal Coeternal beam
May I express thee unblam’d? since God is light,
And never but in unapproachèd light
Dwelt from Eternitie, dwelt then in thee,
Bright effluence of bright essence increate.

[Clutch]

CJD, my apologies -- I missed that you had replied to me.
Originally posted by CJD
I need to start (for ftorresgamez's sake) with the clear admission that I am not a linguist, scientist, or philosopher, nor have I, in scientific fashion, held numerous experiments to come to a conclusion.This hardly excuses you from the obligation to back up your blanket rejection of naturalistic theories of language. It only makes it quite mysterious why you would have issued it.
Clutch, greetings.

You wrote: What is your "rationalist" argument? There's one lurking in the cognitive neighbourhood that runs: There's no non-design explanation I'll accept; therefore our language faculties were designed.

But it can't be that. So I'm missing something.

Well, I don't want to shirk from the notion that epistemologically, I think we all treat some explanations as completely untenable.How, exactly, does this differ from unargued assertion?
But I think of this issue in much the same way Chomsky did. Keep in mind that it is not his theories so much as his critique of empiricism that I enjoy. Also, I find his theories relational to my own Christian theory regarding language.You seem to be confusing empiricist accounts of language acquisition with empirical theories of the etiology of the language faculty.

Chomsky is neither here nor there with respect to the evolution of language. Indeed, his views on innately 'cognized' grammar -- supported by the factors you briefly adduced -- are typically drawn in terms of analogies with other "intrinsically determined process[es]", like the growth of limbs. He argues that "we take for granted that the organism does not learn to grow arms or reach puberty... When we turn to the mind and its products, the situation is not qualitatively different from what we find in the case of the body" (Rules and Representations, BBS 1980). Should we conclude on Chomskian grounds that arms did not evolve?!

Chomsky's view commits you to the idea that important language faculties are innate. It does not tell you how they got there; no more than it tells you how the innate disposition to grow arms got there.
I guess it is just that I find a non-design argument unsatisfactory, as opposed to denying it outright from the very beginning. But it should also be obvious that where I lean on language stems naturally from my views on epistemology.I don't see how adducing irrelevant data and shoring it up with sentiments of dissatisfaction with naturalistic explanation is any better than, or indeed any different from "denying it outright".
In general, the more unified, specialist, cognitively encapsulated and unique one takes our language faculty to be, the more inclined one is to see its origin as mysterious.

Yes, mysteriously divine.Huh? A more explicit instance of unargued assertion and god of the gaps could not be wished for. Why even put on a show of providing some rational force to your views, then?
Anyhow, I don't know what failed accounts you have in mind, nor what you think the desiderata for a successful account are.

This is, in the end, the one question here that could go on ad infinitum et nauseum.But I'm not expecting you to go on ad nauseum. I'm simply asking for you to explain what you could possibly mean when you allude to unnamed "failed theories" and the standards by which you judge them to have failed. This is a bog-standard request for you to provide at least a degree of support for you central contentions.
For my part, and the empirical evidence is all on my side here, I think our language faculty is all of those things to varying degrees. And degrees are what evolutionary processes produce par excellence.

But isn't this the same, tired empiricist mistake of reversing cause and effect? (i.e, the par excellence degree produces the "evolutionary processes"?).Truly, I have no idea what you mean by this. That "degrees" produce evolutionary processes? That this weird claim is somehow characteristic of empiricism? Eh?
Finally, Clutch, one question. You wrote: . . . "common sense"? The latter is notoriously open to confusion with one's prejudged conclusion.

Agreed. But are you suggesting that we can evade this?— that is, the ideas that are latent within our culture that we all "take for granted"? Is this not what we often base our "common sense" on? As such, will there not be certain things that we all "take for granted" as "common sense"? Further, how can we escape the notion that what we all "take for granted" affects even our most academic or scientific conclusions? Nonetheless, can we not still use "common sense" to argue positively for something? Only when it's shared. Premises claimed as "common sense" can be invoked when they are agreed upon, that is, when they are not themselves the immediate question at issue. But when your "common sense" amounts to some mysterious intuition that non-design explanations necessarily fail in cases and by standards and for reasons that cannot be produced... then it amounts to a poor cover for a complete hiatus in reasoning.

[CJD]

Hello, Clutch. There is no time-frame for casual conversation, though I am glad you responded.

My beliefs are not a sum total of empirically verifiable bits of information. If that is how I treated knowledge, then I would not be a theist. Can I say it any more clearer? My rejection of a naturalistic theory for language does not stem from my conviction that Chomsky is largely right, but from my belief in the supernatural. I am quite aware that Chomsky's views do not tell me how the innate disposition got there. It is just that his views are a mere example of how, to use your own words, an "empiricist account of language acquisition" is not exactly a closed case. You must forgive me, being a theist on this forum, I have etiology on the brain. It does not truly relate to the discussion at hand, except for me to say in passing that from a rationalist perspective, my etiological assertions are plausible.

I honestly think that we all treat at least one explanation of something or other as completely untenable. I deny that anyone can escape this epistemological fact: that each one of us in our quest for knowledge takes the first step in belief, that is, as an "unargued assertion." No matter how long the line of empirically verifiable data bits leads, at its beginning there is a reliance on a source, or on a basis of authority (like the testimony of a person or a document, etc.). This is why I say that my commitment epistemologically naturally determines my views on the etiology of language. I suppose, then, that it would be correct to say that I deny outright naturalistic explanations of epistemology, which has an obvious domino effect (one which, I say again, none of us can escape).

In the end, the "failed theories" I had in mind were those that attempted to explain the acquisition of language from an empiricist point of view. It is a general designation and can be summed up as follows:

Just like human knowledge, so, too, (for the empiricist) does language arise from sense experience. Often it is argued that language grows out of children's imitation of their parents' use of language. Words therefore have their origin in sense experience, and as such, the original referent for any word must be something physical (see the OP). Even words that denote relations, for example, are supposed to have arisen from an experience of spatial relations (naturally, advocates of such a theory have every right to conclude that language cannot apply literally to things that are spiritual or non-spatial). The problem I have with this generalized view is what I attempted to explain in the box analogy. This comes not only from my personal experience with children but, of course, from reading what others have said (e.g., Chomsky) regarding children and their use of language. This is the only degree of support I can offer. I think that is valid enough. But my disdain for naturalism results from my disdain for anything that precludes God. How is this any different than the atheist's argument that he or she has yet to see positive proof of his existence? There is little difference because he/she will never see the "proof" looked for. I have yet to meet an Xian who became an Xian as a result of some propositional or logical or scientific "proof." First faith, then the propositional, logical, scientific, etc., merely confirms that faith. If someone here acts as if that is not case for the atheist, well, nevermind, that thread has been beaten to death.

[Oh, I just couldn't resist: People cannot know anything unless they first believe something. The scientist and the historian necessarily begin by believing things not provable via their empirical methods. A scientist must assume, for example, that she (and others before her) must tell the truth, that they all should be honest, that the universe is orderly, etc.]

Let it be known that my etiological assertions are just that—mere assertions. But I must point out at least that from an empiricist point of view on language, that references to etiology are unwarranted, based on its own criterion. At least from my rationalist perspective, not only do I have the capability to assert, but I am justified in doing so. It's not as if I am trying to get others to buy into it, I am trying to get others to get off their damned (epistemological) high-horse.

One final note: "That "degrees" produce evolutionary processes? That this weird claim is somehow characteristic of empiricism?"

No, it is not characteristic of empiricism; it is characteristic of non-empiricism. You wrote that "degrees are what evolutionary processes produce par excellence." And I merely stated that you have done what the wide world of empiricists have done before you—confused cause and effect. The Par Excellence Degree is He who has produced the "evolutionary processes." They point to him, just like every prototypical human gesture points to him, just like nature points to him, etc., etc. I am not suffering under the delusion that you will agree with me, but I expect you to see that from a rationalist perspective I am not convinced that all knowledge arises from sense experience. And this includes our knowledge and use of language.

Regards,

CJD

[Clutch]

CJD, again I must note that the topic has been -- at least since the point just before I jumped in -- the prospect for evolutionary explanations of the language faculty.

Your tangents on empiricist views of language ontogeny are simply not relevant. You agreed with my observation of this, but then rehearsed the whole line yet again.

In any event. Your basic premise, you now say explicitly, is your commitment to our ultimately supernatural origins. This being the case, it's hard to see what language has to do with any of this. It's not that there are specific facts about our language faculties that positively support the case for supernatural origins; at least, you have been unable to identify any. It's that you find any other etiology of language unpersuasive, since you find any other etiology of anything unpersuasive, on account of your default "basic belief" in a creator god.

It seems, in retrospect, that your participation on the language thread amounts to a large epicycle. You might just as well have interjected: I just intuitively think all things come from God, and saved the effort of diagnosing your unsupported complaints against naturalist theories of language faculties.

[CJD]

It seems, in retrospect, that your participation on the language thread amounts to a large epicycle. You might just as well have interjected: I just intuitively think all things come from God, and saved the effort of diagnosing your unsupported complaints against naturalist theories of language faculties.

I can appreciate your criticism, save one minor flaw: I am a living, breathing human being who would much rather engage another living, breathing human beings in thoughtful conversation as opposed to just posting interpolated statements about the very core of my belief system. We all could do that, and what a boring place this would be if that were so.

My main contention, and I am not sure it is unsupported, is that the supposed evolutionary processes involved in language development are clearly not empirically verifiable (which I though was the basis for making a more-than-plausible explanation). Generally speaking, gradual evolutionary development cannot be shown. The closest we have is what Mike wrote earlier: "I think the basic building blocks are there. It's just a matter of finding the missing pieces and getting the order right before it's a solid theory."

In the meantime, Clutch, I'll continue holding a rationalist view of language. I am now not even sure a "naturalist" view (given its etiological connations) is even appropriate here. I guess what I am saying is that the prospect for evolutionary explanations of the language faculty is possible, but that has never been my main concern in this thread, as you have noted a few times already. It seems to me that it is one thing to say that evolution can account for our language faculty and quite another to say that all language arises from sense experience. I might have assumed the opposite earlier in this thread, and so took aim at the two, while I should have articulated my disdain for the latter. Surely both aspects are up for debate here.

At any rate, despite my "basic belief", I think I have learned something this time around.

Regards,

CJD

[kennyminot]

CJD:

I agree (with a few minor quibbles) about the necessity for unargued assumptions (or presuppositions). I don't really care that you believe in God.

"Memory, past experience," etc., just do not cut it. Again, why? Because the actual use of language contains many characteristics that cannot be accounted for on the basis of stimulus and response.

Open and shut. The argument does seem unescapable. But it also ignores a great deal of philosophical work done by those wonderful fellows across the Atlantic. You have taken a purely individualistic approach. But language is a social phenomenon: it comes from interactions among people, and the so-called "knowledge" of "grammatical rules" is passed on between generations by parents, not by some gene housed inside our cerebrum. It can be accounted for purely by reference to sense-experience. Children watch people use words. They slowly grow to have an understanding of various linguistic conventions. Shall we call this "inherited knowledge?"

The problem here: Chomsky and his ilk want to make language something unique. They want to point at human beings and say: "Ah, ha! That's why we're so much better than animals! That's why we can eat cows and pigs without guilt!" But, as the article noted, animals DO have the ability to use descriptive words. They utter cries that indicate color, shape, and other such things. The difference between animals and humans is simple: we gots da big brains, so we gots da bigger sentences. Our linguistic capability is ENHANCED rather than UNIQUE. Like most other animals, the features that make us distinctive are merely biological. We have brains in such and such places, with such and such sizes, and we have penises in such and such places, with such and such sizes, and that's about it. After all, we don't look at parrots and say: "By gollee, what's the one feature, the one over-arching characteristic, that makes them unique?" We only do that with humans.

The natural conclusion, then, is that the use of language that exceeds the accumulated total of input experience must be a result from what was already there to begin with, i.e., innate knowledge of the rules of language; hence, we are discussing the "universal theory of grammar," because there is a fundamental similarity of all human languages.

I work in an ESL department. We teach students (mostly those who speak Spanish) the English skills necessary to pass high school. The "fundamental" similarity between languages such as Chinese, Sudanese, and Arabic seems to boil down to one feature: they all use some sort of auditory and visual symbols to communicate.

As for the "evolution of language" . . . I'm not really an empiricist, so I don't feel compelled to squabble about an "evolutionary" theory of language. But it seems to me that you are expecting the kind of "knock down" support that scientists have found for the laws of thermodynamics. A great deal of theories are based on sketchy (and sometimes even non-existent) evidence. For example, look at Einstein's Theory of Relativity. Or check out the many historical claims made about ancient empires. It seems that an "empiricist" has plenty enough support to rule out the need for a miraculous explanation. They could say:

(1) There is already plenty of support for evolutionary theory, so there is no strangeness about extending it into our linguistic capabilities

<-AND->

(2) There is comparative studies with other animals

What's the big deal about this? Seems like scientists have plenty of evidence to believe in AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION, even if they are not exactly sure how the mechanism works.

Peace out,
Kennie Smith