Plantinga's refutation of problem of evil 'absurd' [Archive I]

Pyrrho

August 22, 2003, 06:22 PM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
'When Plantinga proposed this defense, for example, he said, "Maybe all natural evil is the result of demons," so that all evil is really moral evil. Now that's an absurd hypothesis, but as long as it's logically possible, it shows there's no logical incompatibility between God and harm.' - William Lane Craig

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/washdeba-question.html

Christians freely admit they have absurd hypothesis simply to try to get around the logical problem of evil.

Is it really convincing to claim that you have refuted atheists logic by producing absurdities?

No, it is not convincing, unless one is a moron. One problem with the hypothesis is the fact that a good, omnipotent God would stop the demons from doing evil.

C.S. Lewis once said, "What do people mean that if God is all-good, He won't allow any harm? Have they never been to a dentist?" Clearly, sometimes we do allow harm or pain in people's lives in order to achieve greater goods, and God may well do that.
Dr. Craig at: http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/washdeba-question.html

The problem with this line of thinking is that a dentist may not be able to perform a needed procedure painlessly. That is because the dentist is not omnipotent, and must use available means to achieve the desired goal. An omnipotent being would not have to cause pain to bring about a change in one's teeth. (After all, God is supposed to have created an entire universe out of nothing, so fixing someone's teeth ought to be extremely easy for it.)

An omnipotent being could just make things different, with no effort, and without the intermediary steps that humans require.

beyelzu

August 22, 2003, 09:34 PM

I thought that the logical poe is refuted by such absurdities as greater good.

on the other hand, the inductive problem of evil is alive and kicking and not so easily answered.

or did I miss something at my last evil atheist conspiracy meeting?

Bilbo

August 22, 2003, 11:44 PM

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'When Plantinga proposed this defense, for example, he said, "Maybe all natural evil is the result of demons," so that all evil is really moral evil. Now that's an absurd hypothesis, but as long as it's logically possible, it shows there's no logical incompatibility between God and harm.' - William Lane Craig

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/bill...a-question.html

Christians freely admit they have absurd hypothesis simply to try to get around the logical problem of evil.
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I think you've missed the point, Steven. The issue here isn't whether christians jump at the opportunity to add 'absurdities' to the things they believe, but rather, whether certain argumentative strategies become available to them when pressed with *deductive* problems that supposedly attend their beliefs.

A deductive argument will typically involve a claim that a proposition is (in some sense) *entailed* by, or *necessarily follows* from others that the theist is inclined to grant. Clearly then, one way of assessing an entailment relation of this sort, is through the analysis of counterpossibles; which of course, is exactly what Plantinga has done.

So, with regard to your retort above, I think it would be worthwhile for you to reconsider the ways in which Christians might sensibly be said to 'admit' such absurdities (and just what they mean by "absurd"), when faced with arguments of this kind. This effort in turn, would be aided considerably by actually consulting the source material of the writers you've been relentlessly campaigning against.

The statement that Craig alludes to can be found in Plantinga's God and Other Minds (Cornell University Press, 1967), where it was made in response to an objection by Anthony Flew. You can pick up the discussion on pgs 149-151.

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Is it really convincing to claim that you have refuted atheists logic by producing absurdities?
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Of course it is. If the atheist doesn't want his 'logic' negated by propositions that are not provably contradictory or incoherant, then he should tone down his claims from talk about 'deductions' and 'entailment', to something more sensible and difficult to deal with. Indeed, most reasonable atheists have done precisely that.

Regards,

Bilbo

Steven Carr

August 23, 2003, 12:50 AM

Originally posted by Bilbo

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Is it really convincing to claim that you have refuted atheists logic by producing absurdities?
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Of course it is. If the atheist doesn't want his 'logic' negated by propositions that are not provably contradictory or incoherant, then he should tone down his claims from talk about 'deductions' and 'entailment', to something more sensible and difficult to deal with. Indeed, most reasonable atheists have done precisely that.

Indeed, most *reasonable* people have realised there is no logical problem with believing in a flat Earth when they see pictures from space of a round Earth.

These pictures might be part of a world-wide government conspiracy.

Now that's an absurd hypothesis, but as long as it's logically possible, it shows there's no logical incompatibility between a flat earth and all evidence pointing to a round Earth.

I think all *reasonable* people will agree to that, and conclude that round-Earthers logic has been refuted by the production of absurdities.

Bilbo

August 23, 2003, 11:17 PM

Steven,

I really don't see what the point of your last post was suppose to be. I thought your rant against Craig and Plantinga was directed at their respective handling of the *logical* problem of evil. Is there still a logical problem that needs to be addressed, or have you set it aside and moved on to other matters?

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Indeed, most *reasonable* people have realised there is no logical problem with believing in a flat Earth when they see pictures from space of a round Earth.

These pictures might be part of a world-wide government conspiracy.

Now that's an absurd hypothesis, but as long as it's logically possible, it shows there's no logical incompatibility between a flat earth and all evidence pointing to a round Earth.

I think all *reasonable* people will agree to that, and conclude that round-Earthers logic has been refuted by the production of absurdities.
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And this charming bit of sarcasm is supposed to show what? Unless the round-earther is making the audacious claim that the truth of his thesis is simply a matter of logic, your attempted analogy bears no relevance to the initial complaint.

Furthermore, your apparent disdain for improbable yet logically possible "absurdities", suggests that you misunderstand the function they serve in the analysis of entailment and logical validity. One gestures at them not to honour them as objects of belief, but because they are sufficient for the task of refutation.

Regards,

Bilbo.

B. H. Manners

August 24, 2003, 01:14 AM

I guess this sums it up::rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

ComestibleVenom

August 24, 2003, 02:20 AM

Steven Carr

August 24, 2003, 03:23 AM

Originally posted by Bilbo

Furthermore, your apparent disdain for improbable yet logically possible "absurdities", suggests that you misunderstand the function they serve in the analysis of entailment and logical validity. One gestures at them not to honour them as objects of belief, but because they are sufficient for the task of refutation.

Does Plantinga not believe what Craig described as 'absurd'?

This absurdity is an 'honoured object of belief'.

It says a lot for the strength of the logical problem of evil, that , like flat-earthers. Christians must believe absurdities to refute it.

Are there refutations of the logical problem of evil that do not involve believing absurdities?

theophilus

August 27, 2003, 02:32 PM

theophilus

August 27, 2003, 02:34 PM

Originally posted by ComestibleVenom
Indeed they do Bilbo. As Emerson said, "When you take in a lie, you must take in all that belongs to it."

Certainly, evolution is a good example of this.

Steven Carr

August 27, 2003, 02:39 PM

Originally posted by theophilus
Stephen, you need to check your dictionary and learn to read more carefully.
Absurd does not imply "illogical," and Craig stipulated that the argument is "logically possible."
Now, unless you can demonstrate that it is not "logically possible," your criticism is pointless.

I know 'absurd' does not mean 'illogical', but Christians have to believe what they themselves call absurdities to get around the logical problem of evil.

Flat-Earthers also believe in absurdities, which is why people have abandoned photos from space as proof of a round Earth. It is logically possible that they are part of a government consipracy, so criticism of the flat-Earth position is pointless.

Biff

August 27, 2003, 06:52 PM

It seems like Bilbo and theophilus are retreating to the disingenuous but technically accurate defense that since the "absurdity" cannot be logically refuted it suffices as a defense in a purely logical argument.

Unfortunately, we do not function in a purely logical system, much as we try to seperate logical argument from practical considerations. The reality is that using an absurdity to rescue a possibly weak argument entails accepting all that is implied. To "bite the bullet", so to speak.

I must say, and this is merely an observation, and hopefully will not be taken as an attack, but this tactic, of defending a logical absurdity as "technically" accurate without considering real world implications is truly the last refuge of the nearly defeated.

Biff

Bilbo

August 27, 2003, 10:46 PM

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It says a lot for the strength of the logical problem of evil, that , like flat-earthers. Christians must believe absurdities to refute it.
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Steven, these issues appear to be causing you serious confusion. The point of Craig's (and Plantinga's) allusion to logical possibilities in this context, is that they are sufficient for refuting (allegedly) *deductive consequences*, regardless of whether or not one believes those possibilities to be actual. So it doesn't matter whether we take these possibilities as probable, or prima facie absurd; the *logical* problem is rendered impotent in either case.

Ask yourself: Why have atheists have been so concessive on this point over the last few decades?

If you're convinced that they're wrong, and that its worthwhile to exhume this old war-horse, then you should provide some more evidence that you understand what the deductive argument is, what logical validity amounts to; how the deductive problem differs from other kinds of argument; and what sorts of analytical tools are acceptable for testing sets of statements for cogency.

Your attempt to draw an analogy between the logical problem of evil and flat-earth theorizing suggests that you don't adequately grasp the sense in which the former is supposed to be a *logical* problem. There's no analogy to be drawn unless the round-earther has embraced his own brand of madness by claiming that the roundness of the earth is a purely logical exercise.

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Are there refutations of the logical problem of evil that do not involve believing absurdities?
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You don't need to be believe that the counterexamples proposed are true in fact (indeed, Craig & Plantinga dare you not to); you merely need to lack a formal mechanism for proving the counterexample incoherant. Since atheologians have not had much luck with the latter, they have (for the most part) wisely abandoned this argument, and sought out greener pastures.

Regards,

Bilbo.

Bilbo

August 28, 2003, 12:06 AM

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It seems like Bilbo and theophilus are retreating to the disingenuous but technically accurate defense that since the "absurdity" cannot be logically refuted it suffices as a defense in a purely logical argument.
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It should go without saying that this discussion is situated in the context of the *logical problem of evil* - that's the context in which Plantinga and Craig expected their remarks to be taken, and presumably, the context in which Steven's criticism of their remarks was to be understood. Lets review:

"Christians freely admit they have absurd hypothesis simply to try to get around the logical problem of evil....Is it really convincing to claim that you have refuted atheists logic by producing absurdities?"

Now, if Steven is talking about something other than the logical problem of evil, then he has grossly misunderstood the remarks and intent of the writers he's criticizing.

There's nothing like context to secure relevance.

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Unfortunately, we do not function in a purely logical system, much as we try to seperate logical argument from practical considerations. The reality is that using an absurdity to rescue a possibly weak argument entails accepting all that is implied. To "bite the bullet", so to speak.
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I don't really know what you're trying to say here, or what implication you think should be drawn. The "argument" in question is the logical problem of evil. So then, the positing of non-incoherant counterpossibles is not an attempt to salvage a feeble argument, but to put one out of its misery.

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I must say, and this is merely an observation, and hopefully will not be taken as an attack, but this tactic, of defending a logical absurdity as "technically" accurate without considering real world implications is truly the last refuge of the nearly defeated.
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The question here isn't whether there is a general problem of evil that deserves to be addressed. The question is whether there is a logical problem of evil that deserves to be addressed. I don't know why you suppose that a christian attempt to silence the boast of the latter entails a dereliction of duty in addressing the former.

Since the deductive problem is more or less a dead issue these days, most attempts at theodicy are specifically directed towards non-deductive accounts of the problem; presumably the 'real world' you're refering to above.

As for the noise and fuss about last refuges and near defeats; while no doubt providing comforting imagery for those who require it; it hardly reflects the current state of affairs in philosophy of religion. Nor has there been anything presented in the context of this argument to suggest that the battle (this battle at least) hasn't already been resolved in the theist's favor.

Regards,

Bilbo

Steven Carr

August 28, 2003, 12:33 AM

Originally posted by Bilbo

Steven, these issues appear to be causing you serious confusion. The point of Craig's (and Plantinga's) allusion to logical possibilities in this context, is that they are sufficient for refuting (allegedly) *deductive consequences*, regardless of whether or not one believes those possibilities to be actual. So it doesn't matter whether we take these possibilities as probable, or prima facie absurd; the *logical* problem is rendered impotent in either case.

But only rendered impotent if you believe absurdities.

Craig and Plantinga cannot produce non-absurdities to refute the logical problem of evil.

Once again, you claim 'regardless of whether or not one believes those possibilities to be actual'. But Plantinga DOES believe in what Craig calls 'absurd'.

You can imagine the ridicule Christians would heap upon atheists if we tried to claim that the fine-tuning problem is rendered impotent if we can produce a totally absurd scenario that we didn't even believe in ourselves simply to 'solve' the problem.

Ask yourself: Why have atheists have been so concessive on this point over the last few decades?

Because Craig and Plantinga are hitting strawmen and refusing to deal with what you yourself say is a much stonger case for atheists?

Craig gave the impression in his debate that by dealing with the logical problem of evil, he had refuted everything. Even you agree that this is not the case. A little deceptive on Craig's part?

Your attempt to draw an analogy between the logical problem of evil and flat-earth theorizing suggests that you don't adequately grasp the sense in which the former is supposed to be a *logical* problem. There's no analogy to be drawn unless the round-earther has embraced his own brand of madness by claiming that the roundness of the earth is a purely logical exercise.

No, not even the flat-Earthers are so devious that they try to make a case by logic-chopping.

They at least attempt to show that pictures from space of a round Earth really are part of a government conspiracy, while Plantinga never makes any attempt to show that transworld depravity is a fact (How can it be when Christians claim the angels Gabriel and Michael do not suffer from trans-world depravity)

Christian responses to the problem of evil are less respectable than the flat-Earthers.

Wyz_sub10

August 28, 2003, 10:10 AM

Originally posted by theophilus
Certainly, evolution is a good example of this.

I think it amusing that you find ways to slip in jibes to evolution, yet you never seem willing to discuss specifics. I don't spend much time in E/C - do you take any of your positions into that forum?

Mullibok

August 28, 2003, 10:14 AM

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
I think it amusing that you find ways to slip in jibes to evolution, yet you never seem willing to discuss specifics. I don't spend much time in E/C - do you take any of your positions into that forum?

Of the last 400 posts theophilus made, exactly 0 have been in E/C. I didn't really feel like checking back further than that. ;)

Biff

August 28, 2003, 01:09 PM

Originally posted by Bilbo
It should go without saying that this discussion is situated in the context of the *logical problem of evil* - that's the context in which Plantinga and Craig expected their remarks to be taken, and presumably, the context in which Steven's criticism of their remarks was to be understood. Lets review:

"Christians freely admit they have absurd hypothesis simply to try to get around the logical problem of evil....Is it really convincing to claim that you have refuted atheists logic by producing absurdities?"

Now, if Steven is talking about something other than the logical problem of evil, then he has grossly misunderstood the remarks and intent of the writers he's criticizing.

There's nothing like context to secure relevance.
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This is where the "disingenuous" part comes in. By severing the so-called "logical" problem from any practical considerations, the "logical" arguer can put forth any number of absurd justifications which "technically" satisfy the task of defending the argument.

Bilbo, what you have done here is to win a trivial but true point. Yes, agreed, a possible counterexample may defeat a logical problem, but if the end result of that defense is to be left with either accepting the problem, or accepting an absurd theory to defend it, you've really won nothing. You are still left biting a bullet.

The reason I replied was not to dispute that the "logical" point was yours, but rather to emphasize that winning the logical point does not carry the day as far as the whole argument is concerned.

You cannot, and should not, mentally sever the logical from the practical problem of evil. To seperate any logical problem from its practical considerations will often allow you to create a "logical" defense which does not bear up under practical scrutiny.

Please, do not reply again, at length, about how Stephen and I do not understand how a possible counterexample defeats a deductive problem. Accept as stipulated that I, at least, agree with this point. Now, if you would, Bilbo, please address the PRACTICAL implications of positing an admitted absurdity as the ONLY reasonable answer to a logical problem. As far as I can see, any rational person will most likely respond that if your only way out is to resort to winning an argument on a logical technicality, the force of the argument from a holistic (that is, logical AND practical) standpoint, is apparently weak.

Roller

August 28, 2003, 02:46 PM

Originally posted by Mullibok
Of the last 400 posts theophilus made, exactly 0 have been in E/C. I didn't really feel like checking back further than that. ;)

Here's a thread (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=47824) from E/C forum dedicated to theophilus. Too bad he never responded to it... I'm sure people over at E/C will be more than happy to discuss evolution with him.

Bilbo

August 30, 2003, 06:12 PM

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Originally posted by Bilbo

Steven, these issues appear to be causing you serious confusion. The point of Craig's (and Plantinga's) allusion to logical possibilities in this context, is that they are sufficient for refuting (allegedly) *deductive consequences*, regardless of whether or not one believes those possibilities to be actual. So it doesn't matter whether we take these possibilities as probable, or prima facie absurd; the *logical* problem is rendered impotent in either case.
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But only rendered impotent if you believe absurdities......Craig and Plantinga cannot produce non-absurdities to refute the logical problem of evil.
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I see. If at once you don't succeed, crank up the volume and try again. Very entertaining I'm sure, but its a game I'll leave you to play by yourself.

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You can imagine the ridicule Christians would heap upon atheists if we tried to claim that the fine-tuning problem is rendered impotent if we can produce a totally absurd scenario that we didn't even believe in ourselves simply to 'solve' the problem.
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Like your flat-earth musings, there's no analogy to be drawn here. All sensible parties realize that fine-tuning arguments (and round-earth arguments) are not presented as simple logical deductions. In that sense they differ drastically from the argument that Craig and Plantinga *are* assessing. If you want commentary directed specifically to evidential, or religious arguments from evil, then consult the appropriate passages in their published work. Plantinga for example, has commented extensively on the problem of evil; both in its logical form, as well as the more recent non-deductive efforts (such as those of William Rowe and Paul Draper) . Whining that they haven't addressed all issues when they're addressing one, tells us more about your own sensibilities and contentiousness, then whether or not these philosohers are being evasive.

As for the idea that atheists are generally unwilling to rebut arguments by producing counterexamples that they "don't even believe in themselves"; it seems that you're not very familiar with standard strategies for dealing with the ontological argument (an argument that unlike your examples, *does* parallel the Logical Problem of Evil in a relevant way). Perhaps the most common tactic for dealing with that argument is to complain that it allows for the derivation of absurd counterexamples; counterexamples that if true or possible, *would* render that argument unsound.

Would anyone suggest that the flood gates of the ontological argument are held back only so long as atheists make a concerted effort to believe in the existence of perfect islands or maximally-evil daemons? The answer to this question provides an important clue for solving your own riddle.

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Ask yourself: Why have atheists have been so concessive on this point over the last few decades?
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Because Craig and Plantinga are hitting strawmen and refusing to deal with what you yourself say is a much stonger case for atheists?
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In what sense does charging one's opponent with engaging strawmen amount to a "concession"? Your hasty attempt at witty retort leaves much to be desired.

The reason that christian writers have gone to some length to address the logical problem of evil, is because it used to have greater currency in academic circles. The refutation of christian theism (or the rationality of believing in it) was considered a simple matter of conceptual analysis and *logical* inconsistency, rather than a complicated affair involving questionable probability judgements made on disputable evidential data. As for myself, let me make it clear that in no way do I grant that such arguments provide a "stronger case" for atheism; just a messier one.

So your judgement that these writers "refuse" to deal with other arguments is little more than a declaration of ignorance. I recommend that you do some primary research and start exercizing abit of restraint in your claims about what people have or haven't done.

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Craig gave the impression in his debate that by dealing with the logical problem of evil, he had refuted everything. Even you agree that this is not the case. A little deceptive on Craig's part?
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I do not agree that Craig gave this impression. A word search on the term "logical" in the link you provided makes it farily clear how his comments should be taken. We shouldn't hold him accountable for trying to decieve people just because some of his more militant detractors are intent on maligning his character.

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Your attempt to draw an analogy between the logical problem of evil and flat-earth theorizing suggests that you don't adequately grasp the sense in which the former is supposed to be a *logical* problem. There's no analogy to be drawn unless the round-earther has embraced his own brand of madness by claiming that the roundness of the earth is a purely logical exercise.
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No, not even the flat-Earthers are so devious that they try to make a case by logic-chopping.
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Steven, this is just another senseless rant. Drawing correct distictions when rebutting arguments is hardly "logic-chopping", its just responsible analysis. Maybe you're happy to wallow in the confusion caused by conflating a host of remotely related issues, but that doesn't mean christians (or even non-christians) shouldn't seek clarity on just what the arguments are, or what response they deserve.

Bilbo.

theghostinthemachine

August 30, 2003, 06:39 PM

Well said Bilbo! I have followed your comments throughout this thread and agree 100%. Great job on reminding your objectors to stick with context - the logical problem of evil - and as such, deal with it's conclusions (that have long since been put to rest, at least in academia). Again, great job, keep up the good work, and please come to CARM and visit the forums

http://new.carmforums.org/dc/dcboard.php

Bookwyrm

August 30, 2003, 07:46 PM

Originally posted by Bilbo
As for the idea that atheists are generally unwilling to rebut arguments by producing counterexamples that they "don't even believe in themselves"; it seems that you're not very familiar with standard strategies for dealing with the ontological argument (an argument that unlike your examples, *does* parallel the Logical Problem of Evil in a relevant way). Perhaps the most common tactic for dealing with that argument is to complain that it allows for the derivation of absurd counterexamples; counterexamples that if true or possible, *would* render that argument unsound.

I don't intend to get involved in this discussion beyond this post, but I would like to have this point clarified, as I don't see how atheist responses to the ontological argument is analogous with theist responses to the logical problem of evil. The atheist rebuttal to the ontological argument takes this form, if I recall correctly:

P = The logic of the ontological argument is sound
A = an absurd thing

P => A
~A
therefore ~P

Whereas Carr seems to be stating that the theist rebuttal to the Logical Problem of Evil looks like this:

E = the existance of evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnibenevolent being
A = an absurd thing

A => ~E
therefore ~E, even though I also think ~A

Not being particularly familiar with the logical problem of Evil I don't know if theist responses do take that form, hence my reluctance to contribute more to this discussion than this post, but if they do my memories of Formal Logic from high school suggest Carr has a point in questioning the theist arguments.

Although on the other hand I can't even remember whether my symbolized version of the rebuttal to the ontological argument is using modus tollens or modus ponens, so it's quite possible I'm missing something obvious which will be pointed out to me and make me wish I hadn't bothered to post this.

Calzaer

August 30, 2003, 09:23 PM

So is evil caused by icky mean nature spirits?

Hell, Bilbo, keep that up and we'll have to make you an honorary Pagan!

Biff

August 30, 2003, 09:28 PM

I think that it is important to understand why atheologians may have abandoned attacking the logical problem of evil.

It does not seem, as Bilbo would seem to be saying, that the logical problem of evil became unassailable, so atheists needed to create a new, evidential problem of evil. At the very least, it is by no means a victory to say that the logical problem of evil has been saved by appealing to absurd counterexamples.

Consider this: In the realm of apologetics, the field of discussion is midway between the atheist and theist worldviews. Thus, both sides must implicitly accept the propositions the other holds, just to have a discussion. So the atheist must accept, at least provisionally, that there even ARE demons, much less that their actions can be analyzed. If the atheist cannot at least accept this possibility, then there can be no further discussion.

That being said, when the theist apologist is only able to salvage a logical argument by appealing to a possible counterexample, AND (and this is the important part) that counterexample NOT ONLY involves beings whose existence is not accepted implicitly by the atheist, NOR can the actions of those beings (OR THEIR VERY EXISTENCE) be independently verified, then what you have there is an extremely weak argument, even in the realms of logic.

One thing you have to remember, Bilbo, is that not all possible counterexamples are (ahem) created equal. A weak counterexample, populated by beings whose reality is both disputable and not verifiable, is worse than useless.

In the end, I think the atheologian is wise to move on to the evidential problem of evil, if only because the theist is willing to resort to glorified arguments from ignorance to win their case.

Biff

theghostinthemachine

August 31, 2003, 12:15 AM

Originally posted by Biff
I think that it is important to understand why atheologians may have abandoned attacking the logical problem of evil.

Great idea. The biggest reason why is because it fails to prove that God does not exist.

It does not seem, as Bilbo would seem to be saying, that the logical problem of evil became unassailable, so atheists needed to create a new, evidential problem of evil. At the very least, it is by no means a victory to say that the logical problem of evil has been saved by appealing to absurd counterexamples.

Yes, the logical problem of evil was put to rest. Seeing the dilemma, atheists soon abandoned their cherished argument, lamented for some time, and then moved on to the evidential problem of evil.

Consider this: In the realm of apologetics, the field of discussion is midway between the atheist and theist worldviews. Thus, both sides must implicitly accept the propositions the other holds, just to have a discussion. So the atheist must accept, at least provisionally, that there even ARE demons, much less that their actions can be analyzed. If the atheist cannot at least accept this possibility, then there can be no further discussion.

Atheists are under no such obligations. And demons are not needed to defeat the logical problem of evil.

(i) God is omnipotent.
(ii) God is omniscient.
(iii) God is morally perfect.
(iv) Evil exists.
(v) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.

Premise (v) stops the logical problem of evil dead in its tracks.

That being said, when the theist apologist is only able to salvage a logical argument by appealing to a possible counterexample, AND (and this is the important part) that counterexample NOT ONLY involves beings whose existence is not accepted implicitly by the atheist, NOR can the actions of those beings (OR THEIR VERY EXISTENCE) be independently verified, then what you have there is an extremely weak argument, even in the realms of logic.

Then you don't understand logic very well. What the atheist is offering is a deductive argument where the conclusion must follow necessarily from the premises. Don't blame theists when 'absurd' examples refutes your argument.

One thing you have to remember, Bilbo, is that not all possible counterexamples are (ahem) created equal. A weak counterexample, populated by beings whose reality is both disputable and not verifiable, is worse than useless.

We are dealing with logic, necessity, possibility, and actualization. The consequences of the logical problem of evil are that it fails on both reasonable premises (that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil) and 'absurd' premsies. Again, don't balme theists because your argument fails.

In the end, I think the atheologian is wise to move on to the evidential problem of evil, if only because the theist is willing to resort to glorified arguments from ignorance to win their case.

Biff, Biff, Biff. The argument fails because it does not demonstrate a conclusion that is logically necessary from the premises (which is what it claims to do). It amazes me that even in defeat, you are willing to implie it is no defeat, but rather giving in to the theists 'arguments from ignorance'. How arrogant. In the end, the atheologian is wise to move on because the argument fails. If it did not, atheists who have their Ph.D's in philosophy, and trained in logic, would not have given up on the argument - but most have. And the ones who have not, like Gale, are failing to prove that God's existence is logically inconsistent with the existence of evil. Let it go man, God exists.

Calzaer

August 31, 2003, 12:57 AM

(v) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.

Prove it.

"How do we know God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil? Because God is perfect, yet evil exists". Jesus Christ on a pogo stick, how circular can you get?

premjan

August 31, 2003, 01:35 AM

cannot be proved to be anything more than a "concept" and the notion of choosing good over evil is just a primitive view of the process of simulated annealing.

theghostinthemachine

August 31, 2003, 02:06 AM

Originally posted by Calzaer
Prove it.

"How do we know God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil? Because God is perfect, yet evil exists". Jesus Christ on a pogo stick, how circular can you get?

While your caricature is impressive (wink, wink), it has little to do with the logical problem of evil. Theists do not have to 'prove' that God does have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, it only has to be logically possible. If God is morally perfect, and evil exists, it is plausible (as plausible as God's non-existence) that He does in fact have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. This alone shoots the logical problem of evil right where it hurts. But why are you letting it suffer any longer?

Just a word of humble advice:

Asking theists to 'prove it' is not a be all end all reply to arguments. It can quickly be retorted right back. God exists my friend, so be nice to Him.

Pyrrho

August 31, 2003, 02:53 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
...
Atheists are under no such obligations. And demons are not needed to defeat the logical problem of evil.

(i) God is omnipotent.
(ii) God is omniscient.
(iii) God is morally perfect.
(iv) Evil exists.
(v) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.

Premise (v) stops the logical problem of evil dead in its tracks.

...

You are very funny! Adding an additional premise to an inconsistent position does not remove the inconsistency.

Steven Carr

August 31, 2003, 02:59 AM

Originally posted by Bilbo

As for the idea that atheists are generally unwilling to rebut arguments by producing counterexamples that they "don't even believe in themselves"; it seems that you're not very familiar with standard strategies for dealing with the ontological argument (an argument that unlike your examples, *does* parallel the Logical Problem of Evil in a relevant way). Perhaps the most common tactic for dealing with that argument is to complain that it allows for the derivation of absurd counterexamples; counterexamples that if true or possible, *would* render that argument unsound.

The fact that atheists produce 'reductio ad absurdum' refutations of the ontological argument is because the ontological argument is invalid, and the easy way to show that , is to show that it leads to absurd conclusions.

For example, the easiest way to refute

1) All American Presidents were born in the USA

therefore :-

2) All people born in the USA are American Presidents

is to show that it leads to the absurdity that 250 million people are President at the same time.

Now, I agree I don't believe there are 250 million people who are all President, but that does not mean by producing absurd counterexamples I am doing anything analogous to what Plantinga is doing, I am simply clarifying the logic.

Plantinga is producing something Craig calls 'absurd', and Plantinga HAS to believe it to produce a defence to the problem of evil.

Plantinga is producing something far more analogous to the 'defence' flat-earthers produce - ie showing that it is logically possible that pictures of a round Earth are part of a government conspiracy.

But as it happens, Plantingas Transworld Depravity really is absurd.

How can it be possible that all creatures suffer from Transworld Depravity when Christians insist that the angels Gabriel and Michael have free will and have never chosen evil ie they do NOT suffer from Plantinga's Disease?

It is like claiming that it is logically possible that all people are less than 4 feet tall. Yes, it is logically possible. But it is untrue.

Steven Carr

August 31, 2003, 03:07 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine

(i) God is omnipotent.
(ii) God is omniscient.
(iii) God is morally perfect.
(iv) Evil exists.
(v) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.

Premise (v) stops the logical problem of evil dead in its tracks.

(i) Steven Carr is morally perfect.
(ii) Steven Carr is often seen to do bad things

(iii) Steven Carr is often compelled by demons to do bad things against his will

Premise (iii) stops the logical problem of Carr's bad deeds in its tracks.

So less talk from God about my sins, please......

And the good thing about Plantinga's defense is that it doesn't even have to be TRUE that I am compelled to do bad things by demons.

It just has to be logically possible. Not bad eh. I can produce absurdities and use them in arguments to reach conclusions everybody finds ridiculous.

It is not even circular reasoning on my part.

Ghost wrote 'If God is morally perfect, and evil exists, it is plausible (as plausible as God's non-existence) that He does in fact have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.'

So if I am morally perfect, then it is plausible that my bad deeds are caused by demons forcing me to do them.

Circular perhaps, but then is Ghost's reasoning circular?

But boasting of my moral perfection while producing absurd sophistries as justification is not my style.....

In fact, Ghost can actually simplify his premises.

(i) God is omnipotent.
(ii) God is omniscient.
(iii) God is morally perfect.
(iv) Evil exists.
(v) It is logically possible somebody might think of a way out of this.

Even this premise (v) stops the logical problem of evil dead in its tracks.

HRG

August 31, 2003, 03:49 AM

Steven Carr

August 31, 2003, 04:12 AM

Originally posted by Bilbo

Like your flat-earth musings, there's no analogy to be drawn here. All sensible parties realize that fine-tuning arguments (and round-earth arguments) are not presented as simple logical deductions. In that sense they differ drastically from the argument that Craig and Plantinga *are* assessing.

Let me draw up a syllogism

1) Pictures from Space show a round Earth
2) Therefore, the Earth is round.

According to Bilbo, all sensible people will realise that this is not a simple logical deduction.

Steven Carr

August 31, 2003, 05:22 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
Again, great job, keep up the good work, and please come to CARM and visit the forums

http://new.carmforums.org/dc/dcboard.php

CARM is an irritating format.

Calzaer

August 31, 2003, 10:24 AM

If God is morally perfect, and evil exists, it is plausible (as plausible as God's non-existence) that He does in fact have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.

That makes the entire argument a tautology, provided I suddenly forgot that god is supposed to be OMNIPOTENT, and therefore could accomplish any goal (why does an omni-being have goals?) without creating any nasty by-products in the process.

theghostinthemachine

August 31, 2003, 02:55 PM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
The fact that atheists produce 'reductio ad absurdum' refutations of the ontological argument is because the ontological argument is invalid, and the easy way to show that , is to show that it leads to absurd conclusions.

Once again, you are showing ignorance towards logic. The ontological argument is not invalid. The form of the argument is correct, so the argument is valid.

See:

http://mally.stanford.edu/abstracts/ontological.html

Most atheists object to one or more of the premises and claim that the argument is unsound.

You are once again, incorrect on points of logic.

theghostinthemachine

August 31, 2003, 03:31 PM

Originally posted by HRG
And the fact that premise (v) contradicts premises (i) and (ii) immediately revives the logical problem of evil. For an omniscient and omnipotent being, there cannot be a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, since it can always achieve any desired result without any negative side effect (aka "evil").

In fact, an omnipotent and omniscient being has intended everything which happens; as Dante puts it in the Divina Commedia, for such a being "willing" and "acting" are identical.

In any case, as I see it, the Problem of Evil is more a consequence of the logical problems which are connected with dubious concepts like "omnipotence" and "omniscience", than of "moral perfection".

Regards,
HRG.

Premise (v) does not contradict premise (i) and (ii). Plantinga already demonstrated that it is possible that:

"God is omnipotent adn it was not within His power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil."

By appealing to transworld deprevity, Plantinga argued (and it has been conceded by most philosophers of religion that he is correct) that it was not within:

"...God's power to actualize a possible world W such that E always contains the properties is significantly free in W adn always does what is right in W.

So we are left with:

God has a morally compelling reason for permitting evil - a greater good.

and

Free will is "either (intrinically) that greater good, or the necessary intrumental means to that greater good.

http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/welty/probevil.htm

No atheist has shown that it is logically impossible (or even unlikey) that a morally perfect God has a morally compelling reason for allowing evil.

In fact, humans, compelled to do morally good acts, often allow evils to attain a greater good, so it seems all the more plausible (and most certainly logically possible) that a morally perfect God woudl have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. If you, or any other atheist, don't like that - too bad. It is your argument that fails. Blaming it on theists (implying that it does not really fail, that it has just been conceded for definitional purposes, or for the sake of argument) is arrogant and dishonest. I am surprised that you don't understand important points in logic (as was the case with your misunderstanding of modal logic in our debate on free will)with your impressive background in mathematics. But I guess that goes without saying...those atheist blinders certainly don't help.

Steven Carr

August 31, 2003, 03:33 PM

I see Ghost never attempted to defend any of his arguments, such as how Plantinga transworld depravity can be possible, when Christians insist that God has created creatures with free will who have never chosen evil....

Instead of discussing the issues, he prefers to nitpick on my knowledge of philosphical terms , apparently using the
syllogism
1) Carr is sometimes inexact when posting on an Internet discussion forum
2) Therefore, God exists

http://www.update.uu.se/~fbendz/nogod/ontology.htm shows that the ontological argument is invalid.

As it happens, Ghost really is nitpicking.The web page discussing the ontological argument also gives an example of a false syllogism (just like I did!) when talking about a refutation of the argument.

'The best illustration of this is perhaps this pseudo-syllogism: "Men exist, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates exists".'

So if I was wrong to say that the ontological argument implicitly uses an invalid syllogism, then some professional philosophers seem to have followed my lead.

http://www.courses.rochester.edu/wierenga/REL111/!onto.html is another person who is not hostile to the idea that the logic of the ontological argument is invalid - ie the conclusions do not follow from the premises. If I have blundered, then others have too....

Perhaps Ghost can now get back to discussing if there is a logical problem of my being seen to do bad things, when I happen to be morally perfect. I shall be using Ghost's arguments to show that he cannot logically prove that I am not morally perfect.

Xeno

August 31, 2003, 03:41 PM

Steven Carr

August 31, 2003, 03:43 PM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine

By appealing to transworld deprevity, Plantinga argued (and it has been conceded by most philosophers of religion that he is correct) that it was not within:

"...God's power to actualize a possible world W such that E always contains the properties is significantly free in W adn always does what is right in W.

Has God created creatures called Gabriel and Michael such that they have free will and have always done right?

Hint. Christians say angels have free will.
Christians say some angels chose evil.
Christians say that other angels did not choose evil.

Can God create a possible world W such that E (the angel Gabriel) is free and always does what is right in W?

And not forgetting that Plantinga's free will defense destroys libertarian free will, as what any creature will choose to do is laid down in any possible circumstance before the world was even created , even if the creature happens never to exist to make that choice, or if the creature happens never to find itself in those circumstances?

Unless Ghost wants to argue that the truth values of Plantinga's counterfactuals are contingent on non-existent entities in circumstances which never come to pass?

Steven Carr

August 31, 2003, 03:50 PM

Originally posted by Xeno
Carr, I think one of the main problems in this thread is that you are overlapping and exchanging evidential arguments with logical arguments. Concepts like pictures from space, etc. have to do with evidential claims.

It is true the evidential argument from evil is very alive and kicking (and very strong), and the logical argument is very dead in the water and abandoned.

The two do overlap surely?

After all, we need evidence of evil, just as we need evidence of a round Earth.

Is there no logical deduction possible from seeing pictures of space?

Anyway, as people have often said on this thread, 'refuting' the logical problem of evil by believing what Christians themselves call 'absurd' is a Pyhrric victory, analogous to flat-Earthers claiming that there is no logical proof of a round Earth. True, but.....

The logical problem is dead , only if you believe 'absurdities', such as an omnipotent God having to use evil to acheive his ends.

HRG

August 31, 2003, 03:54 PM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
[B]Premise (v) does not contradict premise (i) and (ii). Plantinga already demonstrated that it is possible that:

"God is omnipotent adn it was not within His power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil."

An obvious contradiction to omnipotence.

By appealing to transworld deprevity, Plantinga argued (and it has been conceded by most philosophers of religion that he is correct) that it was not within:

... and it has demonstrated on this board by Steven Carr that he is wrong.

"...God's power to actualize a possible world W such that E always contains the properties is significantly free in W adn always does what is right in W.

Note the weasel word "significantly free". Apparently we are not significantly free without the ability to kill our fellow human beings.

And what about actualizing a possible world in which at least one single E does just a bit more often what is right than in our world ?

So we are left with:

God has a morally compelling reason for permitting evil - a greater good.

Free will to maim, torture and kill is not a greater good. Your argument fails. It is sufficient for free will to exist that we have a choice of strawberry vs. orange jam for breakfast, to post or not to post etc. See the excuse of Vuletic' First Officer.

In any case, God does not have a morally compelling reason for permitting the current level of evil - which also makes him morally imperfect.

No atheist has shown that it is logically impossible (or even unlikey) that a morally perfect God has a morally compelling reason for allowing evil.

I've just done it - for instance by pointing out the curious redefinition of "morally perfect" which values the free will of the rapist higher than the avoidance of suffering of the victim.

In fact, humans, compelled to do morally good acts, often allow evils to attain a greater good, so it seems all the more plausible (and most certainly logically possible) that a morally perfect God woudl have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.

Ridiculous. We are not omnipotent or omniscient. God allegedly is. He can achieve any desired state without nasty side effects.

If you, or any other atheist, don't like that - too bad. It is your argument that fails. Blaming it on theists (implying that it does not really fail, that it has just been conceded for definitional purposes, or for the sake of argument) is arrogant and dishonest. I am surprised that you don't understand important points in logic (as was the case with your misunderstanding of modal logic in our debate on free will)

I did not misunderstand it. I pointed out exactly where it failed.

OTOH, you never answered my argument, which uses ordinary logic. It has the significant advantage over modal logic that its consistence has been shown (G�del's Completeness Theorem).

Regards,
HRG.

Biff

August 31, 2003, 03:56 PM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
The two do overlap surely?

After all, we need evidence of evil, just as we need evidence of a round Earth.

Is there no logical deduction possible from seeing pictures of space?

Anyway, as people have often said on this thread, 'refuting' the logical problem of evil by believing what Christians themselves call 'absurd' is a Pyhrric victory, analogous to flat-Earthers claiming that there is no logical proof of a round Earth. True, but.....

The logical problem is dead , only if you believe 'absurdities', such as an omnipotent God having to use evil to acheive his ends.

Absolutely, Stephen. This is the most important point to get, and it seems like by adhering to a strict and narrow "logical" construction, people like ghost and Bilbo are literally refusing to see the forest for the trees. Here's a hint, fellas. If the only way to win the argument is by turning off your common sense and ignoring logical implications, you may appear to win the battle, but everyone else notices that you're not wearing any clothes.

Biff

Xeno

August 31, 2003, 04:00 PM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
The two do overlap surely?

After all, we need evidence of evil, just as we need evidence of a round Earth.

Is there no logical deduction possible from seeing pictures of space?

That evil exists is an objective fact that no one is denying. When you bring in the concept of pictures from space, you are bringing in evidential claims about the earth. For logical arguments, the premises must be objective facts.

Biff

August 31, 2003, 04:08 PM

Originally posted by Xeno
That evil exists is an objective fact that no one is denying. When you bring in the concept of pictures from space, you are bringing in evidential claims about the earth. For logical arguments, the premises must be objective facts.

In what sense can any premise be said to not be based on at least some evidential claim? For a "true" logical argument, you must accept the objective truth of the premises, but that doesn't mean that you can dissect the actual truth contained in the premise.

After all, one of the key ways to cast doubt on the logical problem of evil is to unpack the concept of "omnipotence" and contrast that with the idea of "necessary evil" on God's part. How can you discuss the logical problem if you can't dispute the factual basis of the premises, and how can that be done unless you can consider evidential claims?

Biff

Steven Carr

August 31, 2003, 04:12 PM

Originally posted by Xeno
That evil exists is an objective fact that no one is denying. When you bring in the concept of pictures from space, you are bringing in evidential claims about the earth. For logical arguments, the premises must be objective facts.

Flat earthers do not deny that these pictures exist. They are objective facts. They point out that no logical conclusion is possible from them, as they may be part of a government conspiracy.

Analogy. Evil does not allow the conclusion that God is not omnibenevolent is equivalent to pictures do not allow the conclusion that the earth is round.

I do think the logical and evidential arguments overlap, although I appreciate your point that there is also a separation.

Xeno

August 31, 2003, 04:32 PM

For a "sound" logical argument you must accept the objective truth of the premises. When you attack a specific premise for it's truth value you are challenging the soundness of the argument.

Concepts such as omnipotence and evil are objective facts taken within the context of the argument.

1. God is omnipotent.
2. God is omniscient.
3. God is omni benevolent.
4. Evil Exists.
Therefore,
5. God does not exist.

The refutation denies 5, by positing that an omni benevolent god would value free will over the possibility of evil, so it works in free will into the definition of omni benevolent.

1. An omni benevolent god values free will over evil (implicit in definition).
2. Free will is the sufficient cause of evil.
3. Of all possible worlds where creatures have free will, in the majority of the worlds, creatures sin in at least one of the worlds in which they are given free will (transworld depravity).
Therefore,
4. It is consistent (and plausible) with god's omnipotence, omniscience, and omni benevolence for him to actualize a world with evil.

theghostinthemachine

August 31, 2003, 05:44 PM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
I see Ghost never attempted to defend any of his arguments, such as how Plantinga transworld depravity can be possible, when Christians insist that God has created creatures with free will who have never chosen evil....

Here we are talking about your use of a afalse ananlogy, an your incorect use of logic. I made comments about Plantinga and the logical problem of evil in another post. Go there.

Instead of discussing the issues, he prefers to nitpick on my knowledge of philosphical terms , apparently using the
syllogism
1) Carr is sometimes inexact when posting on an Internet discussion forum
2) Therefore, God exists

There is a very good reason why I am nitpicking at your 'knowledge of philosophical terms..." Because you use them incorrectly and then claim a philosophical victory. That is not very nice Steven, so stop being mean.

http://www.update.uu.se/~fbendz/nogod/ontology.htm shows that the ontological argument is invalid.

It does? Point out where the form is incorrect:

(i) When someone thinks of T, that being exists in his mind.

(ii) If T does not exist in reality as well as in the mind, then T is not T, since there exists something greater, and that greater thing can be thought of.

(iii) But if T = T, then T exists in reality as well.

(iv) Thus God must necessarily exist.

When this particluar author says, "A logical argument about ultimate reality must be the same for all people, and hence the argument is invalid" he is incorrect. The author even went on to point out why he felt the premises were unsound.

"Thus, a valid deductive argument is an argument such that it is impossible for the conclusion to be true and the premsies to be false...an immediate consequence of these definitions is that there is no middle ground between valid and invalid."

This argument is valid:

(i) All wines are whiskeys.

(ii) Ginger ale is a wine.

(iii) Therefore, ginger ale is a whiskey.

Like the ontological argument, the above form cannot be touched. It is valid, adn if all the premises are true, the conslusion would be as well. But the premises are not true, so the argument is unsound.

As it happens, Ghost really is nitpicking.The web page discussing the ontological argument also gives an example of a false syllogism (just like I did!) when talking about a refutation of the argument.

See above. Don't say I am nitpicking when I am the one correcting your mistakes. We are talking about logic, so why should I have to worry about be labeled a nitpicker when I point out important mistakes that you are making? Your problem Steven is that you don't believe in God.

'The best illustration of this is perhaps this pseudo-syllogism: "Men exist, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates exists".'

(i) Men exist.
(ii) Socrates is a man.
(iii) Therefore Socrates exists.

the argument is valid:

(i) (x)(Mx Ex)
(ii) Ms /Es

Obviously however, the argument is not sound.

So if I was wrong to say that the ontological argument implicitly uses an invalid syllogism, then some professional philosophers seem to have followed my lead.

What 'professional philosophers' would that be? The author from the above link you gave is not a philosopher -

http://ftp.update.uu.se/~fbendz/me.htm

Had you taken the time to look at your sources, you might have realized that the author earned his degree in "pharmacy" He is studying to be a pharmacist!

If they claim that the argument is invalid as opposed to unsound (of which I have not seen claimed), then they are wrong.

tp://www.courses.rochester.edu/wierenga/REL111/[/url]!onto.html is another person who is not hostile to the idea that the logic of the ontological argument is invalid - ie the conclusions do not follow from the premises. If I have blundered, then others have too....

More than likely your blunder. You have only named one philosopher. If the conslusion does not follow from the premises, then the argument is both invalid and unsound. But if thatis teh case, then why attack the truth of the premises? The answer is because if the premises are true, then the conclsuion follows necessarily. The ontological is a deductive argument that is valid in form - if not show me:

(i) When someone thinks of T, that being exists in his mind.

(ii) If T does not exist in reality as well as in the mind, then T is not T, since there exists something greater, and that greater thing can be thought of.

(iii) But if T = T, then T exists in reality as well.

(iv) Thus God must necessarily exist.

Or we formalize teh argument if you insist that it is invalid.

Perhaps Ghost can now get back to discussing if there is a logical problem of my being seen to do bad things, when I happen to be morally perfect. I shall be using Ghost's arguments to show that he cannot logically prove that I am not morally perfect. [/B]

Yes, just as soon as you admit that you were wrong about the ontological argument (which apparently Steven thinks I am defending) being invalid. When you admit that, then I guess we can continue. God loves you Steven, lighten up! And stay away from those pharmacies - they are dangerous to philosophy.

Bilbo

August 31, 2003, 05:58 PM

Biff writes:

-------------------------------------------------------------------
I think that it is important to understand why atheologians may have abandoned attacking the logical problem of evil.

It does not seem, as Bilbo would seem to be saying, that the logical problem of evil became unassailable, so atheists needed to create a new, evidential problem of evil. At the very least, it is by no means a victory to say that the logical problem of evil has been saved by appealing to absurd counterexamples.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

Biff; these statements reveal a very fundamental misunderstanding concerning the problem of evil. First, you don't seem to realize that the logical problem of evil is an *atheological* argument. Its not an argument for the existence of God. The argument is not a theistic attempt to show the atheist that God exists, but rather, its an atheist attempt to show the theist that God doesn't exist. As such, you misconstrue the general burden of proof, and consequently fail to grasp why the theist's response has been sufficient to depose the argument from its (formerly) exalted state.

To give you a better idea of just what is being claimed on behalf of this argument in its historical context; consider the memorable opening paragraph from J.L.Mackie's influential essay "Evil and Omnipotence" (an essay to which Plantinga's work in this area was specifically directed):

--------------
"The traditional arguments for the existence of God have been fairly thoroughly criticized by philosophers. But the theologian can, if he wishes, accept this criticism. He can admit that no rational proof of God's existence is possible. And he can still retain all that is essential to his position, by holding that God's existence is known in some other, non-rational way. I think, however, that a more telling criticism can be made by way of the traditional problem of evil. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another, so that the theologian can maintain his position as a whole only by a much more extreme rejection of reason than in the former case. He must now be prepared to believe, not merely what cannot be proved, but what can be disproved from other beliefs that he also holds". (Mind, LXIV, #254 (1955))
--------------

So as you can see, this is a strong claim made about the *consistency* of the *theist's* beliefs. To say that someone's beliefs are inconsistent is a very different sort of claim then to say that their beliefs (or some of them) are probably false, or deficient with regard to evidences, or implausible from a non-theistic perspective. Its to this claim of *inconsistency* that Plantinga's (and subsequently Craig's) remarks were directed.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
Consider this: In the realm of apologetics, the field of discussion is midway between the atheist and theist worldviews. Thus, both sides must implicitly accept the propositions the other holds, just to have a discussion. So the atheist must accept, at least provisionally, that there even ARE demons, much less that their actions can be analyzed. If the atheist cannot at least accept this possibility, then there can be no further discussion.

That being said, when the theist apologist is only able to salvage a logical argument by appealing to a possible counterexample, AND (and this is the important part) that counterexample NOT ONLY involves beings whose existence is not accepted implicitly by the atheist, NOR can the actions of those beings (OR THEIR VERY EXISTENCE) be independently verified, then what you have there is an extremely weak argument, even in the realms of logic.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

I think pretty much everything said here is irrelevant since you misunderstand what kind of argument the logical problem of evil is, and more importantly, *whos* argument it is. Since the argument is directed at the internal consistency of the *theist's* beliefs, it matters little whether the consistency ensuring proposition(s) appealed to by the theist are granted as true *in fact* by atheists. So the subsequent quibble about the implausibility or evidential "absurdity" of the theist's appeal tells us some pretty banal and obvious facts about the atheist's beliefs and mindset, but it certainly doesn't show us that theist's beliefs are logically inconsistent.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the end, I think the atheologian is wise to move on to the evidential problem of evil, if only because the theist is willing to resort to glorified arguments from ignorance to win their case.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

Biff, these little jabs are misplaced. No one is glorying in the failure of the deductive problem. Informed atheists are (generally) embarrased that it was ever offered up on their behalf in the first place. They recognize it as a bad argument; and are content to set aside both it, and the saucy rhetoric that goes with it.

But there are some who are not willing let the argument lie; who are seduced by its tantalizing rhetoric, and its on *their* account that the criticisms and counterarguments continue to be made.

Bilbo.

Biff

August 31, 2003, 06:50 PM

Bilbo, I think again you have missed the forest for the trees. You are correct that the logical problem of evil is an atheological argument, and I should have been more clear in saying that what atheologians are contesting is the varied defenses put forth by philosophers such as Platangina.

That being said, you seem to have spent a lot of energy disputing burdens of proof, which does not make much difference once it becomes clear that what I was referencing was defenses, rather than the actual problem, as I misspoke earlier.

It still doesn't seem that you or ghost have adequately addressed the implications of the logical defenses put forth. The more you claim that certain arguments are "logically valid", etc, and then neglect to actually discuss what the arguments mean and imply, the more it seems like you're sticking to empty rhetorical points you can win to avoid the true philosophical arguments, which you apparently cannot win.

Bilbo: I think pretty much everything said here is irrelevant since you misunderstand what kind of argument the logical problem of evil is, and more importantly, *whos* argument it is. Since the argument is directed at the internal consistency of the *theist's* beliefs, it matters little whether the consistency ensuring proposition(s) appealed to by the theist are granted as true *in fact* by atheists. So the subsequent quibble about the implausibility or evidential "absurdity" of the theist's appeal tells us some pretty banal and obvious facts about the atheist's beliefs and mindset, but it certainly doesn't show us that theist's beliefs are logically inconsistent.

I think you're missing a fundamental truth about philosophy and logical arguments when they are presented for public thought and discussion. It is hardly enough for an arguer to win a logical discussion on a purely technical distinction. The arguments are READ and DISCUSSED in wider circles, and such technical victories are invariably discussed and dissected. It is often the case that the cost of a victory won by biting a bizarre bullet is worth less than simply conceding. I doubt that you will acknowledge this, since you seem wedded to pure technicalities, but I trust the outside observers will judge where the real value and meaning lie.

Biff

Calzaer

September 1, 2003, 12:25 AM

Ok, Ghost, you lost me. How can something be both omnipotent AND "unable" to do something?

If this is a "god can only do that which is logically possible" scenario, can you show that it would be logically impossible for an omnipotent being to create a world without evil in it?

theghostinthemachine

September 1, 2003, 01:21 AM

Originally posted by Pyrrho
You are very funny! Adding an additional premise to an inconsistent position does not remove the inconsistency.

My atheist friend, what you are calling "an inconsistent position" is the atheistic logical problem of evil. Indeed, it is very funny.

Steven Carr

September 1, 2003, 02:40 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine

Yes, just as soon as you admit that you were wrong about the ontological argument (which apparently Steven thinks I am defending) being invalid. When you admit that, then I guess we can continue. God loves you Steven, lighten up! And stay away from those pharmacies - they are dangerous to philosophy.

Ghost, of course, refuses to even touch the question at hand, preferring to nitpick on another issue.

His evasions are obvious to all. He does refer to another thread, hoping people will not read that thread and realise how he also failed to answer the question there.

Do the angels Gabriel and Michael suffer from Transworld Depravity? If they have chosen evil, why are they still in Heaven?

Steven Carr

September 1, 2003, 03:12 AM

Originally posted by Bookwyrm
I don't intend to get involved in this discussion beyond this post, but I would like to have this point clarified, as I don't see how atheist responses to the ontological argument is analogous with theist responses to the logical problem of evil. The atheist rebuttal to the ontological argument takes this form, if I recall correctly:

P = The logic of the ontological argument is sound
A = an absurd thing

P => A
~A
therefore ~P

Whereas Carr seems to be stating that the theist rebuttal to the Logical Problem of Evil looks like this:

E = the existance of evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnibenevolent being
A = an absurd thing

A => ~E
therefore ~E, even though I also think ~A

You are quite right.

The ontological argument is sound if absurdities are true
The logical problem of evil fails if absurdities are true (and it was Craig who said Plantinga's defense was absurd)

These are not analogous, as even Bilbo can see.

I gave a better analogy than Bilbo's.

1) Steven Carr is morally perfect
2) Steven Carr is sometimes seen to bad things.

These are not logically inconsistent (ask Ghost!), if the following is logically possible (even if 'absurd')
3) Steven Carr is often forced by demons to do bad things against his will

This is a very close analogy to theistic refutations of the logical problem of evil.

But does anybody think I have even halfway defended the claim that Steven Carr is morally perfect?

Steven Carr

September 1, 2003, 06:03 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
The consequences of the logical problem of evil are that it fails on both reasonable premises (that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil) and 'absurd' premsies. Again, don't balme theists because your argument fails.

Mackie was the most famous proponent of the logical problem of evil, and he allowed that there could be some evil in the world.

He pointed out that there was what he called 'unabsorbed' evil - ie evil that was not necessary for a greater good. He claimed that Christians conceded that there was gratuitious, unnecessary evil in the world - evil that should be eliminated, evil that Christians were actually trying to eliminate.

It is this 'unabsorbed' evil that poses a problem for people saying that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. By the definition of 'unabsorbed' evil, it does not lead to a greater good.

And it was not just atheists who hold that there is 'unabsorbed' evil - ie evil which does not lead to a greater good.

For those interested, there is a transcript of Mackie's thoughts at

http://www.errantyears.com/1998/sep98/000292.html

http://www.errantyears.com/1998/sep98/000301.html

http://www.errantyears.com/1998/sep98/000343.html

http://www.errantyears.com/1998/sep98/000387.html

theophilus

September 1, 2003, 01:23 PM

Originally posted by Biff
It seems like Bilbo and theophilus are retreating to the disingenuous but technically accurate defense that since the "absurdity" cannot be logically refuted it suffices as a defense in a purely logical argument.

Unfortunately, we do not function in a purely logical system, much as we try to seperate logical argument from practical considerations. The reality is that using an absurdity to rescue a possibly weak argument entails accepting all that is implied. To "bite the bullet", so to speak.

I must say, and this is merely an observation, and hopefully will not be taken as an attack, but this tactic, of defending a logical absurdity as "technically" accurate without considering real world implications is truly the last refuge of the nearly defeated.

Biff

Well, I was also making an "observation," which I pointed out in my last sentence.

However, everyone is so eager to accuse Christians of being illogical or believing absurdities that careful reading becomes an obstacle.

Spenser

September 1, 2003, 03:03 PM

The logical problem of evil can be put to rest by absurdities. What a hollow victory. Who cares if God is logically possible (which I do not believe he is) if he doesn't exist??? Isn't the point of this whole forum to discuss reality? If you avoid an argument's implication to reality simply to win a logical argument what have you really done? If the only way to avoid the logical problem of evil is to resort to absurdities then you merely suggest exactly what I believe. In order to believe in God you must be willing to believe in the absurd. This only makes the concept of God absurd, but luckily you are already willing to believe in absurdities.:rolleyes:

Further more I still see no demonstration of how the logical problem of evil has been laid to rest. Its simple, God is morally perfect, God created everything. How exactly is it logical that something morally perfect could create evil? You claim it is for the 'greater good' but I can logically conceive of a 'greater good' that doesn't contain evil over your 'greater good' that does. Since my 'greater good' doesn't contain evil and yours does, I have a 'greater greater good' and God being omnipotent can obviously create such a thing and should prefer it being morally perfect and all. Notice there is nothing absurd in my logic...

Steven Carr

September 1, 2003, 03:44 PM

Originally posted by theophilus

However, everyone is so eager to accuse Christians of being illogical or believing absurdities that careful reading becomes an obstacle.

It was the Christian philosopher William Lane Craig who called one of Plantinga's beliefs 'absurd'. Check the opening post for the URL

bd-from-kg

September 1, 2003, 05:25 PM

Perhaps I can introduce some clarity into the discussion by talking about a famous �consistency proof� in mathematics: Cohen�s proof of the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis from the Zermelo-Frankel axioms for set theory.

Fortunately it doesn�t matter for present purposes what the Zermelo-Frankel axioms (ZF) are or what the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) is. The salient points are these:

(1) What �independence� means here is that adding CH to ZF yields a consistent set of axioms, and adding the negation of CH (~CH) to ZF also yields a consistent set of axioms.

(2) The consistency of a set of axioms of this sort cannot be directly proven (or more precisely, given Godel�s Incompleteness Theorem, any such proof would paradoxically really be a proof that the axioms are not consistent). Consistency is shown by �displaying� a model for the axioms � i.e., a bunch of entities of the relevant type (in this case sets) that satisfy the axioms. This typically involves adding still more axioms (for purposes of the proof only).

(3) It�s pretty easy to prove that ZF + CH is consistent, but it turned out to be really hard to prove the consistency of ZF + ~CH. This was odd, because well before Cohen�s proof came out practically all professional set theorists were thoroughly convinced not only that ZF + ~CH is consistent, but that it was true in a certain hard-to-define sense (basically that the intuitive concept of �set� that the ZF axioms were based on entailed ~CH).

(4) Cohen proved the consistency of ZF + ~CH by adding axioms such that any model that satisfied them would have to be almost unbelievably weird, and would certainly bear no resemblance to the kind of structure that the ZF axioms were originally intended to apply to; and then proving that there were indeed models for ZF + ~CH + these axioms.

(5) Nevertheless, after the publication of Cohen�s proof, virtually all set theorists were convinced that, since ZF and ~CH were consistent, there were undoubtedly a vast number of reasonably �natural� or �intuitive� models of ZF + ~CH.

In other words, once it was shown that ~CH is not inconsistent with ZF, it became reasonable to believe that ~CH and ZF can coexist comfortably, the utterly weird structure of the particular type of model used to prove this consistency notwithstanding.

The moral: the model used to prove the consistency of a set of axioms (or statements) is normally chosen to make the proof as simple as possible, and not for its �reasonableness� or �intuitive� nature. That�s why the �unreasonableness� or �counterintuitiveness� of the hypotheses used to prove consistency is irrelevant.

In other words, if you want to judge whether Plantinga�s position is unreasonable, you have to look at his defense against the evidential Argument from Evil.

Steven Carr

September 1, 2003, 05:53 PM

Originally posted by bd-from-kg

The moral: the model used to prove the consistency of a set of axioms (or statements) is normally chosen to make the proof as simple as possible, and not for its �reasonableness� or �intuitive� nature. That�s why the �unreasonableness� or �counterintuitiveness� of the hypotheses used to prove consistency is irrelevant.

In other words, if you want to judge whether Plantinga�s position is unreasonable, you have to look at his defense against the evidential Argument from Evil.

Does this mean that the absurdity of my hypotheses used to prove the consistency of
1) Steven Carr is morally perfect
2) Steven Carr is sometimes observed to do bad things
is irrelevant?

Even better! Now not only can theists not prove I am not morally perfect, but I can also dismiss charges that I am merely engaging in sophistries to defend my moral perfection.

I quote from a review of Plantinga's book at

http://enotalone.com/books/ASIN/0802817319.html

'Alvin Plantinga, O'Brien Philosophy Professor at Notre Dame, shook the philosophy of religion world with this book when it was first published in 1978. His debunking of the atheistic evidential argument from evil is strictly a DEFENSE, not a THEODICY. A defense is merely a logical way out. A theodicy would attempt to give the specific reasons God allows evil. Plantinga does not claim to know the thoughts of God, so by offering a defense, he modestly shows that it is logically compatible for God to coexist with evil. His argument is NOT one by analogy (contra another reviewer), rather it is a strict application of the rules of logic.'

So the reviewer is under the impression Plantinga believes a debunking of the EVIDENTIAL argument can be done by showing that the LOGICAL argument has a hole, allowing a logical way out.

Who would have thought that the two overlapped so much?

What impression does bd-from-kg have of Plantinga's theodicy for the evidential argument from evil?

Pyrrho

September 1, 2003, 07:36 PM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
...
No atheist has shown that it is logically impossible (or even unlikey) that a morally perfect God has a morally compelling reason for allowing evil.

In fact, humans, compelled to do morally good acts, often allow evils to attain a greater good, so it seems all the more plausible (and most certainly logically possible) that a morally perfect God woudl have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. If you, or any other atheist, don't like that - too bad. It is your argument that fails. Blaming it on theists (implying that it does not really fail, that it has just been conceded for definitional purposes, or for the sake of argument) is arrogant and dishonest. I am surprised that you don't understand important points in logic (as was the case with your misunderstanding of modal logic in our debate on free will)with your impressive background in mathematics. But I guess that goes without saying...those atheist blinders certainly don't help.

You are completely ignoring the fact that humans are neither omnipotent nor omniscient. Our inability to bring about pure good without evil is why we do things as we do. God does not have that limitation. God, being omnipotent, does not have to use means to bring about ends. God just wills them to be. We, not being omnipotent, do use means to bring about ends. We are limited in ways that god is not supposed to be limited. The only way your argument works is if you give up on God's omnipotence, which is to say that you have given up on refuting the contradiction sometimes called the problem of evil.

theghostinthemachine

September 1, 2003, 09:09 PM

Originally posted by Pyrrho
You are completely ignoring the fact that humans are neither omnipotent nor omniscient. Our inability to bring about pure good without evil is why we do things as we do. God does not have that limitation. God, being omnipotent, does not have to use means to bring about ends. God just wills them to be. We, not being omnipotent, do use means to bring about ends. We are limited in ways that god is not supposed to be limited. The only way your argument works is if you give up on God's omnipotence, which is to say that you have given up on refuting the contradiction sometimes called the problem of evil.

You are ignoring the fact that it is not my argument, it is the logical problem of evil. No one has given up refuting the logical problem of evil - in acedemia it has long been dead. It only needs to possible that God would have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil (which is logically possible) and God is still omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. If you, or Steven Carr, or anyone else cannot accept that, then there is not much left to be said. But it remains that atheistic philosophers have abandoned the logical problem of evil, and the issue has been settled in the theists favor.

Calzaer

September 1, 2003, 09:34 PM

But it's NOT logically possible! GOD IS OMNIPOTENT! Therefore, it's LOGICALLY POSSIBLE that he can create good without an evil by-product!!

theghostinthemachine

September 1, 2003, 11:50 PM

Originally posted by Calzaer
But it's NOT logically possible! GOD IS OMNIPOTENT! Therefore, it's LOGICALLY POSSIBLE that he can create good without an evil by-product!!

Great! Then you won't mind demonstrating it for us. Plantinga already demonstrated (unlike your bare assertion) that it was not possible. And Plantinga's is only one of amny possible arguments that have stopped the logical problem of evil dead in its tracks. Internet atheists, untrained in logic (like Steven Carr) are the only ones trying to say otherwise.

Steven Carr

September 2, 2003, 02:08 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
Great! Then you won't mind demonstrating it for us. Plantinga already demonstrated (unlike your bare assertion) that it was not possible. And Plantinga's is only one of amny possible arguments that have stopped the logical problem of evil dead in its tracks. Internet atheists, untrained in logic (like Steven Carr) are the only ones trying to say otherwise.

Ghost continues to refuse to answer questions, whilst declaring victory (committing the fallacy of argument ad nausuem).

In one last desperate attempt to persuade him to wipe the floor with me, here are questions about Plantinga's transworld depravity :-

Do the angels Gabriel , Michael and Lucifer suffer from Transworld Depravity? If they have chosen evil, why are Gabriel and Michael still in Heaven?

Is Transworld Depravity possible, when Christians insist some creatures do not suffer from Transworld Depravity?

Can he even attempt to prove logically that I am not morally perfect, if I am allowed to produce absurd hypotheses tor reconcile the statements

1) Steven Carr is morally perfect
2) Steven Carr is sometimes observed to do bad things

Steven Carr

September 2, 2003, 02:11 AM

Calzaer
Therefore, it's LOGICALLY POSSIBLE that he can create good without an evil by-product!!

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
Great! Then you won't mind demonstrating it for us. Plantinga already demonstrated (unlike your bare assertion) that it was not possible.

Plantinga demonstrated that it was not possible for God to create Gabriel and Michael????

(or humans with an angelic disposition)

Ghost's argument appears to be

(i) God is omnipotent.
(ii) God is omniscient.
(iii) God is morally perfect.
(iv) Evil exists.
(v) It is logically possible somebody might think of a way out of this.

and v means there is no problem.....

theghostinthemachine

September 2, 2003, 03:00 AM

Originally posted by Steven Carr
[B]Ghost continues to refuse to answer questions, whilst declaring victory (committing the fallacy of argument ad nausuem).

Let me see...tomorrow my four year old daughter has soccer practice, I coach my six year old sons soccer team, I work, I live out of a hotel two weeks per month that is job related...but most importantly, I just like watching you post numerous posts, ranting and raving. I will get to your questions by this weekend if that will make you feel better. Do me a favor though (since I wil answer your questions), try to distinguish between pure logic, and informal fallacies. The only ad nausuem is from you attempting to defend an argument that philosophers much more versed on the issues then you, have long adandoned. It is a foregone conclusion that the argument is dead, it cannot prove what it asserts. But here comes Steven Carr who closes his eyes to the facts, and won't accept the facts, and chooses, out of ignorance, to say the theist is wrong. It is no longer a matter of logic ( the argument fails), it is a matter (with you) of persuasion. And anyone can choose to be unreasonable - you are proof of that.

Steven Carr

September 2, 2003, 05:02 AM

It is such a foregone conclusion that Ghost says he will take 4 days to answer a simple question

Do the angels Gabriel , Michael and Lucifer suffer from Transworld Depravity?

How long does it take to type 'yes' or 'no'?

Days and days apparently, as Ghost has to find the theologically correct answer.

And Ghost continues to ignore the point made by me and other atheists that refuting the logical problem by proposing absurdities is a Phyrric victory.........

And he shouldn't call me unreasonable when he cannot logically prove that I am not morally perfect :-)

HRG

September 2, 2003, 07:01 AM

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
[B]Perhaps I can introduce some clarity into the discussion by talking about a famous �consistency proof� in mathematics: Cohen�s proof of the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis from the Zermelo-Frankel axioms for set theory.

Very good point and an interesting analogy!

Fortunately it doesn�t matter for present purposes what the Zermelo-Frankel axioms (ZF) are or what the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) is. The salient points are these:

(1) What �independence� means here is that adding CH to ZF yields a consistent set of axioms, and adding the negation of CH (~CH) to ZF also yields a consistent set of axioms.

This independence is shown that given a model for ZF - i.e. if ZF is consistent - one can construct models of both ZF + CH and ZF + ~CH.

(2) The consistency of a set of axioms of this sort cannot be directly proven (or more precisely, given Godel�s Incompleteness Theorem, any such proof would paradoxically really be a proof that the axioms are not consistent). Consistency is shown by �displaying� a model for the axioms � i.e., a bunch of entities of the relevant type (in this case sets) that satisfy the axioms. This typically involves adding still more axioms (for purposes of the proof only).

Consistency of ZF and Peano arithmetics is essentially a matter of mathematical faith ;)
[quote]

(3) It�s pretty easy to prove that ZF + CH is consistent, but it turned out to be really hard to prove the consistency of ZF + ~CH. This was odd, because well before Cohen�s proof came out practically all professional set theorists were thoroughly convinced not only that ZF + ~CH is consistent, but that it was true in a certain hard-to-define sense (basically that the intuitive concept of �set� that the ZF axioms were based on entailed ~CH).
[quote]

While I am not a set theorist, I have read about most of the developments (G�del's constructible sets, Cohen's concept of forcing, ultrafilters etc.), but I did not get the impression that most set theorists believed that ~CH was "true". Hilbert's 1st problem was the proof of CH after all; and in the literature before Cohen, there are a lot of theorems which assumed CH (or even the generalized CH), but few which assumed ~CH.

This of course does not detract from your excellent analogy.

Regards,
HRG.

Wyz_sub10

September 2, 2003, 08:53 AM

Originally posted by theghostinthemachine
Great! Then you won't mind demonstrating it for us. Plantinga already demonstrated (unlike your bare assertion) that it was not possible. And Plantinga's is only one of amny possible arguments that have stopped the logical problem of evil dead in its tracks. Internet atheists, untrained in logic (like Steven Carr) are the only ones trying to say otherwise.

The fallacy is that 'good' is an absolute position on a scale that needs to somehow be offset by "evil" in order to exist.

Rather, good is simply a relative value judgement, as is evil.

Actions that we perceive as 'good' are not dependent on evil to exist. They are onlydependent on evil to be recognized as distinct.

If this disctinction is not necessary, and I'd be interested to see how it is, then neither is "evil".

Spenser

September 2, 2003, 10:32 AM

I have an idea, rather than actually argue the problem how about I posit how philosophers have long laid the issue to rest. This way I won't actually have to deal with any of the core argument and simply appeal to people who aren't here.

Ghost,

It sounds a lot like you are skirting the issue. If it is so obviously been laid to rest then the support for it should be easily demonstrated and you'd have no problem piping us down. No, instead you keep appealing to the philosophical community as if the community as a whole ever agrees 100% on anything.

1. Here is the problem, even if you could reasonably convince us that it is logical for evil to exist and for God to remain omnimax, you must resort to absurdity.

2. It is logically possible for God to have created a universe void of evil.

Of the two possible universes, if God were truly morally perfect, he'd have to choose the 2nd. If he is omnipotent he could make anything he wishes come to bear in that world with out having to resort to the creation of evil. If he can't, he's not omnipotent. This means God creates evil by choice and that makes an omnibenevolent God incoherent.

You claim some mysterious morally sufficient reason, however, being omnipotent God could cause that reason to come to bear with out evil existing. Because this is logically possible God is trapped into doing it this way or not being omnibenevolent. To choose to add evil to a situation that he could make possible anyway makes no moral sense. This is why the logical problem of evil isn't long dead and I'm sure this is why you prefer to avoid the argument...

edited to add:
In fact, to not let you slip out of this one I will ask you directly:

Is it logically possible for God to create any situation he choose's without needing to also create evil?

Clutch

September 2, 2003, 04:35 PM

As I've said before, I don't see any hope for the PoE to be a deductive disproof of an omnimax deity. The prospect of unknown moral facts is always available to the theist.

But the evidential argument is another kettle of fish.

In my view, the force of the PoE is rhetorical. It induces the theist to say utterly crazy things -- to abandon the recitations of John 3:16 in favour of utterances like, "The slaughter of Amalekite women and children was morally perfect", or, "When infants die long deaths in terror and agony as the result of unpredictable natural events, it's all for the best".

These do not amount to logical disproofs. But they put the lie to the touted moral foundations of theism, exposing the moral nihilism at its core.

Pyrrho

September 2, 2003, 05:06 PM

Originally posted by Clutch
As I've said before, I don't see any hope for the PoE to be a deductive disproof of an omnimax deity. The prospect of unknown moral facts is always available to the theist.

But the evidential argument is another kettle of fish.

In my view, the force of the PoE is rhetorical. It induces the theist to say utterly crazy things -- to abandon the recitations of John 3:16 in favour of utterances like, "The slaughter of Amalekite women and children was morally perfect", or, "When infants die long deaths in terror and agony as the result of unpredictable natural events, it's all for the best".

These do not amount to logical disproofs. But they put the lie to the touted moral foundations of theism, exposing the moral nihilism at its core.

The thing is, this "moral nihilism" contradicts the claim that God is "omni benevolent". Thus, if what you say is right, you have a logical disproof of the God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omni benevolent.

Essentially, the theist is saying that "omni benevolence" means that god wants infants to die long and horrible deaths, etc., because that is what actually happens, and God, being omnipotent, always gets everything he wants, as no force can overcome him. But "omni benevolence" means that one does not want such things.

One may as well say that omnipotence means that one has absolutely no power, or that omniscience means that one knows absolutely nothing.

Such is the position of the theist who maintains that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, omni benevolent god, while still there is great suffering in the universe.

theophilus

September 2, 2003, 06:35 PM

Originally posted by Wyz_sub10
The fallacy is that 'good' is an absolute position on a scale that needs to somehow be offset by "evil" in order to exist.

Rather, good is simply a relative value judgement, as is evil.

Actions that we perceive as 'good' are not dependent on evil to exist. They are onlydependent on evil to be recognized as distinct.

If this disctinction is not necessary, and I'd be interested to see how it is, then neither is "evil".

Well, that's your problem, not the Christian.

From an atheistic/materialistic position, there is neither good nor evil. There are only unique phenomenon. There are no categories of phenomenon, i.e., good or bad.
To label something good or bad requires the preexistence of an objective standard.
Otherwise, you're merely expressing your opinion and preference for certain types of phenomenon over others.
So, even engaging in this discussion, you have to assume the theistic position that godd and evil are real, transcendent values.

Biff

September 2, 2003, 06:42 PM

Originally posted by theophilus
Well, that's your problem, not the Christian.

From an atheistic/materialistic position, there is neither good nor evil. There are only unique phenomenon. There are no categories of phenomenon, i.e., good or bad.
To label something good or bad requires the preexistence of an objective standard.
Otherwise, you're merely expressing your opinion and preference for certain types of phenomenon over others.
So, even engaging in this discussion, you have to assume the theistic position that godd and evil are real, transcendent values.

Oh man, not presup again... Where's a bridge I can throw myself off? :rolleyes:

Biff

theophilus

September 2, 2003, 06:44 PM

Originally posted by Mullibok
Of the last 400 posts theophilus made, exactly 0 have been in E/C. I didn't really feel like checking back further than that. ;)

I can't recall if I've ever posted there, but I'm honored that you checked.

Evolution (macro-evolution) is patently unscientific because it falls outside the limits of science, i.e., observation and experimentation. It is, therefore, a religious view and deserves to be included here.

theophilus

September 2, 2003, 06:47 PM

Originally posted by Biff
Oh man, not presup again... Where's a bridge I can throw myself off? :rolleyes:

Biff

I am not arguing presuppositionalism as that is not at issue. However, your unresponsive post is typical of the atheist's idea that ridicule is a meaningful response.

Why don't you do something unpredictible and try to disprove my statements. It shouldn't be hard for one as erudite as you.

Biff

September 2, 2003, 08:39 PM

Originally posted by theophilus
I am not arguing presuppositionalism as that is not at issue. However, your unresponsive post is typical of the atheist's idea that ridicule is a meaningful response.

Why don't you do something unpredictible and try to disprove my statements. It shouldn't be hard for one as erudite as you.

Of course you're not trying to ARGUE presup, as it only baseless assertion. It is the same as any other fruitless metaphysical construct.

Sure, we may ask ourselves if our entire universe is merely a single atom in a blade of grass, but we certainly don't base arguments on that fantasy.

Biff

Xeno

September 3, 2003, 02:19 AM

Originally posted by Biff
Of course you're not trying to ARGUE presup, as it only baseless assertion. It is the same as any other fruitless metaphysical construct.

Sure, we may ask ourselves if our entire universe is merely a single atom in a blade of grass, but we certainly don't base arguments on that fantasy.

Biff

You might consider Peano's Axioms (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PeanosAxioms.html) to be baseless assertions too, but mathematicians base a lot of "fantasy" on them.

Biff

September 3, 2003, 02:32 AM

Originally posted by Xeno
You might consider Peano's Axioms (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PeanosAxioms.html) to be baseless assertions too, but mathematicians base a lot of "fantasy" on them.

I don't see how you can possibly keep a straight face when comparing axioms of number theory, which are, useful as they are, descriptives in a system, to a presup argument which purports to be a true description of reality. :rolleyes:

Steven Carr

September 3, 2003, 05:38 AM

Originally posted by Pyrrho

Essentially, the theist is saying that "omni benevolence" means that god wants infants to die long and horrible deaths, etc., because that is what actually happens, and God, being omnipotent, always gets everything he wants, as no force can overcome him. But "omni benevolence" means that one does not want such things.

Christians do appear to act as if omnibenevolence means tolerating any amount of evil, provided some tiny good comes out of it.

Note that the logical problem of evil says nothing about how much good God should create , but how little evil God should create.

rainbow walking

September 3, 2003, 05:55 AM

Carr, I think one of the main problems in this thread is that you are overlapping and exchanging evidential arguments with logical arguments. Concepts like pictures from space, etc. have to do with evidential claims.

It is true the evidential argument from evil is very alive and kicking (and very strong), and the logical argument is very dead in the water and abandoned.

rw: Why are the inductive and deductive forms labeled as logical and evidential anyway? This is just more confusion. It's just stupid to call the deductive argument of evil "The Logical Problem of Evil" as though it isn't also an evidential argument. Evil is the evidence used, is it not? And to call the inductive argument "The Evidential Argument of Evil" is still a logical argument, is it not?

I just don't get this distinction? Wouldn't it be far less confusing to just call each by its respective form? The way it's designated now it implies that the logical argument is not evidential and the evidential argument is not logical.

The only distinction I see between the two, besides form, is that the deductive argument appeals to evil in a general sense whereas the inductive form appeals to specific examples.

But I can as easily construct a deductive argument of evil using a specific example that the theist cannot refute. So I am still clueless as to why these forms, in the case of arguing evil, have been so designated?