God and the Best Possible World

[Morpheus]

i think that, given the attributes assigned to god by christianity, a christian must postulate that the world in which we live is the best possible world; this fact, i believe, is good evidence that the god of christianity does not exist.

god's omniscience entails that, "before" god created the universe, he knew absolutely everything that would transpire in a certain possible world based on the "starting materials" god would instantiate if he chose that possible world over all others. god had an infinite number of possible worlds from which to choose: the one we currently inhabit, one where there were originally 5 human beings as opposed to 2, one where the dominant species was something wholly unlike human beings, and so on ad infinitum.

man's moral free will also comes into play here. if christianity is correct, then man is truly free to act morally or immorally, and this is reconciliable with god's exhaustive divine foreknowledge. so, before god instantiated this possible world to the exclusion of all others, he knew exactly how any possible free will creature would choose in any possible world, and this would not detract from that creature's free will if said world was actualized. iow, god knew that in possible world W, free-willed being B would choose C if W was actualized. if B was placed in possible world W2, god also would have known whether he still would have chosen C (or, perhaps, not-C) should that world have been actualized.

if god is omnipotent, then he had the ability to instantiate any of the possible worlds. this makes one wonder why god, also being omnibenevolent, did not instantiate a world with the starting materials such that adam and eve (or whomever the original free-willed beings would be in a different possible world) would have made the correct moral decision regarding eating the fruit. a possible objection may be "but if god had decided beforehand that they would have not eaten from the tree, then he strips them of their free will." but this objection fails, because any world, including the one we inhabit, had to be chosen by god to the exclusion of the other possibilities. and the christian position is certainly that god does not strip us of our free will simply because he decided to actualize this world. why wouldn't the same apply if god had actualized a world in which adam and eve made the correct moral decision?

so, why didn't an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent god actualize a world in which adam and eve (or some other free-willed being with a different nature/essence)chose not immorally in the garden of eden? given their (supposedly libertarian) free will, there was surely a possible world identical to this one in which they made the correct moral decision. and so on and so forth for all moral decisions past that point. given libertarian free will, there is a possible world in which adam and eve make the correct moral choice regarding the tree, and the correct moral choice in their next predicament, etc., etc., such that the correct moral choice is always made by every free-willed being that comes into existence in that world. it would have been just as easy (given his omnipotence) for god to actualize this latter possible world as opposed to the one we currently inhabit (where adam and eve did choose immorally, and countless other immoral decisions have been made).

the christian view is that god created this world to fulfill certain wants and purposes (i.e., he didn't just do it randomly or whimsically). given his omnimax attributes, god could have and would have wanted to actualize the possible world which maximally fulfilled these purposes, taken as a whole. since god is also supposedly a perfectly rational being, this means that god (supposing he exists) did actualize the possible world that accomplishes this feat. but considering the world we live in, i think this leads to a rather strong inductive argument against god's existence.

1) if the god of christianity exists, he would have actualized the best possible world.

since what is best for god would no doubt be best for us, the possible world that would be the best from his perspective (i.e., one that would maximally fulfill his wants/purposes) would also be the best for his creatures.

2) but the actual world is, with high probability, not the best possible world.

the world i described above where all free-willed beings make the correct moral decision in all situations is more than likely a better possible world. a heaven-like world is more than likely a better possible world. one possible response could be that this really is the best possible world, and that the hypothetical worlds just mentioned, despite having much more moral goodness than this one, don't fulfill other purposes/wants of god as well as this one does. however, until relevant and specific examples of these purposes/wants are brought forth, the obvious and intuitive position is that there really are better possible worlds than this one.

the christian could also take a compatibilist position, and say that given the circumstances immediately prior to adam and eve's disobedience, they really could not have chosen differently; yet given the compatibilist view of freedom, they were still free. but why wouldn't god set up the circumstances themselves, then, so that the correct moral decision is made? one possible objection to this point (i think from craig) is that there might not have been a compossible (i.e., non-mutually exclusive) set of circumstances at god's disposal (given his other wants and purposes) that led to a possible world where only correct moral decisions were made. but given god's omnipotence and the fact that there were infinite possibilities from which to choose, this seems highly implausible. the most obvious and intuitive position is still that this is not the best possible world, and that a better set of circumstances could have been picked.

3) therefore, with high probability, the god of christianity does not exist.

regards.

[Jobar]

so, why didn't an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent god actualize a world in which adam and eve (or some other free-willed being with a different nature/essence)chose not immorally in the garden of eden? given their (supposedly libertarian) free will, there was surely a possible world identical to this one in which they made the correct moral decision. and so on and so forth for all moral decisions past that point. given libertarian free will, there is a possible world in which adam and eve make the correct moral choice regarding the tree, and the correct moral choice in their next predicament, etc., etc., such that the correct moral choice is always made by every free-willed being that comes into existence in that world. it would have been just as easy (given his omnipotence) for god to actualize this latter possible world as opposed to the one we currently inhabit (where adam and eve did choose immorally, and countless other immoral decisions have been made).

Well stated. We have had any number of threads on free will in this forum; you have condensed the atheist view of the paradox of free will and omniscience quite succinctly.

[Morpheus]

i'm gonna bump this up once, just in case anyone else is interested (hint hint, theists).

[EGGO]

I like it I like it...with your permission, I'd like to post this in my journal.

[Gothic_J]

the best possible world would be one without god.

or, to quote david gerrold, of course this is the best of all possible worlds. Im in it.

[xorbie]

The Christian view of the world is clearly wrong, the bible itself is full of too many logical contradictions and plainly false statements.

However, this has nothing to do with theism, which is a metaphysical belief and not a worldview/comprehensive philosophy such as the religions are.

[the_cave]

Originally posted by Morpheus
god's omniscience entails that, "before" god created the universe, he knew absolutely everything that would transpire in a certain possible world based on the "starting materials" god would instantiate if he chose that possible world over all others.

....

if christianity is correct, then man is truly free to act morally or immorally, and this is reconciliable with god's exhaustive divine foreknowledge.

Not all omnimax theories hold this, however. Well, anyway, mine doesn't...

this makes one wonder why god, also being omnibenevolent, did not instantiate a world with the starting materials such that adam and eve (or whomever the original free-willed beings would be in a different possible world) would have made the correct moral decision regarding eating the fruit.

There is no such world to instantiate. God can only instatiate worlds which do not contradict the good of freedom. A world in which humans never chose evil would in fact look exactly like this one, except for the times when humans chose evil in this world. That's what makes it freedom--the outcome cannot be known. I admit I'm starting to feel like I hold a minority position in this...

why wouldn't the same apply if god had actualized a world in which adam and eve made the correct moral decision?

I don't understand how the word "actualized" is compatible with freedom.

given their (supposedly libertarian) free will, there was surely a possible world identical to this one in which they made the correct moral decision.

Very true.

it would have been just as easy (given his omnipotence) for god to actualize this latter possible world as opposed to the one we currently inhabit (where adam and eve did choose immorally, and countless other immoral decisions have been made).

But...we're talking about the same world here. As you just said, this other world is "identical to this one." To be more precise, both worlds appear identical at the moment of creation--indeed, they are the same world at the moment of creation. Different worlds are only then created from it when humans freely choose. And god does not have foreknowledge of the outcomes of those decisions. Or so I hold...

since what is best for god would no doubt be best for us, the possible world that would be the best from his perspective (i.e., one that would maximally fulfill his wants/purposes) would also be the best for his creatures.

Well, yes, but I detect an equivocation on the rise...

2) but the actual world is, with high probability, not the best possible world.

Here's where I think it is: in the word "possible". No, it's not the best possible world that could have resulted from creation. But it is the best possible world that could have been created. Strange, but true--I think that there are two different kinds of possibility going on here--at least from my perspective...the possibilities available to god, and those available to humans--which god cannot control, because he is morally obliged to give us free will. See, this is where I think I enter into a minority position...

[i]the world i described above where all free-willed beings make the correct moral decision in all situations is more than likely a better possible world.

Yes except that believe it or not god is powerless to create that world. He can only create the world where that world is a possibility!

a heaven-like world is more than likely a better possible world.

Not if you can't choose to be there. Or so the argument goes, anyway (this is where it gets tricky--I think you could actually press this point.)

[long winded fool]

I also think "free will" puts limits on an omnimax God in human understanding. I think that in order to postulate truly free will, a human must first reject the premise of omnimax. Did God create us with foreknowledge of our behavior, or did he give us the choice to choose outside of his own will? These two things seem mutually exclusive, but they are both present in Christian doctrine. If God is omniscient, then free will is illusory. If free will is illusory, then it could be argued (this thread does a good job) that God is not omnibenevolent. Free will, omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence seem to create conflicts with each other.

That said, the omnimax aspects of God are extremely difficult to understand due to the nature of infinity. We often come to erroneous conclusions by assuming an "omni" variable as a particular when it is always solely a universal. To put infinity into the subject of a comparitive argument necessarily makes the thing being compared the actual subject. The so-called "big rock paradox" is a testament to this. "God can't make a rock he can't lift" translates to "no power exists beyond an infinite level of power." The infinite premise places limits on everything else in the universe except for the infinite thing.

It could be that God (existing outside of time, mind you) has knowledge of every choice that can be made. There are an infinite number of outcomes and he knows them all. We could still have free will to choose any one of these outcomes, some desirable, most not. God knows what we will choose because every single choice is in his immediate knowledge. There is no cause and effect because this requires space and time, which are created things. Only by confining God to something less than infinity does a problem occur. To say that God has a plan for humanity is to limit the unlimited. The same goes for the claim "God can see the future." There is no future outside of time. ;)

So: God could, disregarding limited knowlege and the boundaries of time, know every choice you will ever make without hampering your freedom to make it at any time. Will you choose Him or not? Only God knows. He didn't create you not to choose Him, he created you with the ability to make any of the infinite number of choices, knowing the consequences of each. He also knows exactly who will choose what. This makes (albeit unproven) sense when time is not a factor. Time is not a factor because God is infinite. If we assume all of the Christian premises, then I think the problem does not necessarily appear. Though we can't exactly postulate something not bound to time, (which is why we always assume God is, even though he cannot be,) if we make the admittedly unfounded assumption there were such a thing, the Christian arguments, IMHO, would follow.

In other words, "If there were a God, then..." arguments actually strengthen Christianity if they're argued logically. "Prove there is a God..." is the unbeatable atheist argument.

[xorbie]

I just thought of this, so I am wondering if omniscience could possibly refer to metaphysical, philosophical conclusions only. For instance, could one argue that God is omniscient in the sense that it knows what is Good, ie God is in perfect understanding of morality and has metaphysics? Would such a definition be so removed that it would no longer be considered close enough to be called a "generic" God?

[bd-from-kg]

the_cave:

The notion that an omniscient being might not have foreknowledge of the future seems weird at first glance, but on a second look it appears to make sense. To clarify this idea, consider a proposition which is (currently) about the future. We want to express it in a “time-independent” fashion, but this is a bit slippery in English; because the same event is described differently depending on whether it is in the past, present, or future. But let’s agree that “Smith kills Jones at 4 PM on May 11, 2004” means that Smith will kill Jones at that moment if the current time is before 4 PM on 5/11/04, or that he did kill Jones on that day if the current time is later than that. Also, let P be the proposition expressed by “Smith kills Jones at 4 PM on 5/11/04”. Then the idea is that God does not know whether P is true prior to 4 PM, 5/11/04, not because He is not omniscient, but because the proposition is neither true not false prior to that time (presumably because of Smith’s free will). Even an omniscient being cannot know the truth value of a proposition that does not have a truth value, any more than He can know the value of X in the expression “X + 17”.

This seems straightforward enough. But it has some problems. Here are a couple of severe ones.

1. Imagine two points A and B 100 light years apart. Also, let’s consider two coordinate frames X and Y. Consider two events that occur at about the same time according to both frames, one at A and the other at B. For example, suppose that Smith kills Jones at A and Edwards kills Forester at B. In frame X the S/J killing occurs a second before the E/F killing, but in frame Y the E/F killing occurs first.

So far, no problem. But now look at God’s knowledge of the two events according to your theory. According to the perspective of frame X, there is a time when God knows that Smith kills Jones but doesn’t yet know that Edwards kills Forester, but according to the perspective of frame Y, there is a time when God knows that Edwards kills Forester but doesn’t yet know that Smith kills Jones.

Bottom line: Temporal order of distant events can be relative; this poses no problems for physics. But the temporal order of God’s knowledge cannot be relative: it cannot be true that God comes to know P first and Q later, and also true that He comes to know Q first and P later.

This problem alone is enough to demolish this theory. One can only surmise that the theologians who espouse it simply do not understand the implications of General Relativity.

2. The second problem is that this theory reduces God’s supposed omnipotence to a meaningless mush. As I wrote in another thread:

This leads to epistemological chaos for God. For example, suppose that God is considering whether to create (or “actualize”) world A or world B. According to you, at every point where a free agent makes a free decision, God doesn’t know which decision he’ll make. To be sure, if He decides to actualize world A, He’ll know this with respect to all free decisions in world A after actualizing it. But He won’t know beforehand. And He won’t ever know these things with respect to world B.

Since this is true for all of the worlds that God might actualize, He really has no idea which world will best fulfill His purposes. He won’t even know after making the decision whether He made the best choice, or even that the world He chose wasn’t in the bottom 1% in terms of fulfilling His purposes. For practical purposes He’s completely in the dark; He’s forced to choose blindly. Thus it might be that God had no intention of creating a world in which Satan would rebel and consequently Adam would sin, resulting in the Fall. According to your theory, it might simply have turned out that way, much to God’s chagrin.

But perhaps God can mend things if He really messes up? Well, to be sure, if He really botches thing up He can simply destroy the world He made and start over. But suppose that He tries intervening to fix things. Then He’s faced with a major problem: the world that results from His intervention is a different possible world than the original one, so all free choices might turn out differently than in the original one. For example, take Sally’s decision to accept John’s proposal. Let’s assume that this occurs at a point in time before the first time directly affected by God’s intervention. If this was truly a free decision, she could have chosen differently under the exact same conditions. If this means anything at all, it means that there are possible worlds in which the exact same conditions occur and she does choose differently. But now that God has intervened, we have a different possible world in which the exact same conditions occur, so by the definition of free will Sally might choose differently in this different possible world!

Thus any intervention at any point in time will have enormous repercussions through the entire “time line” of the universe, including times before the point where the intervention occurred. And since (on your theory) God does not know the truth values of counterfactuals of freedom, He’ll have no idea what these repercussions will be. Thus any attempt to intervene to “fix” things will have radical effects that are unpredictable even to God. It might well make things even worse than before. We can picture God, on an especially unlucky day, making one change after another to clean up the mess that He’s made, but each time making things worse than ever.

Needless to say, it would be ridiculous to call such a God “omnipotent”. If His every move is fraught with uncertainty; if He has no idea whether anything He does will further His purposes or not, He’s a helpless, pitiful giant.

[Note: Since you apparently object to the term “actualize” for some obscure reason, feel free to substitute the term “instantiate” for it in this passage. ]

It should be clear from these objections alone that this theory is untenable. Perhaps that’s why it’s a minority view among theologians.

[the_cave]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
the_cave:
Temporal order of distant events can be relative; this poses no problems for physics. But the temporal order of God’s knowledge cannot be relative: it cannot be true that God comes to know P first and Q later, and also true that He comes to know Q first and P later.

This problem alone is enough to demolish this theory. One can only surmise that the theologians who espouse it simply do not understand the implications of General Relativity.

Well, but hang on a minute--in examples such as the ones you have given, there does in fact appear to be a presupposition that two distant events nevertheless do both occur at some time t. At least, that's always been my understanding with such examples.

I argue (and I'm pretty sure that my physics is correct) that we do have a common reference frame for measuring the time of events; time elapsed from the Big Bang. That is, an observer in any reference frame can always date an event relative to the time elapsed between it and the creation of the universe. Should another observer someday come across the first observer's notebook, he can compare notes (up to a point, of course) to see which events in his frame and the other observer's frame did in fact happen "at the same time." I suppose some pantheists might insist that god only thinks at the speed of light as it were, but surely the traditional god's thoughts move instantaneously from our perspective--hence, he could be aware of distantly related events at the same time. In this, his knowedge does exceed ours.

Yet it need not imply that his knowledge is limitless--it could still be the case that his knowledge does not extend to the future, or at any rate to the effects of free choices. (Perhaps he does not, or simply cannot, observe quantum states? For example. A hypothesis...who knows, really...)

2. The second problem is that this theory reduces God’s supposed omnipotence to a meaningless mush. As I wrote in another thread:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This leads to epistemological chaos for God. For example, suppose that God is considering whether to create (or “actualize”) world A or world B. According to you, at every point where a free agent makes a free decision, God doesn’t know which decision he’ll make. To be sure, if He decides to actualize world A, He’ll know this with respect to all free decisions in world A after actualizing it. But He won’t know beforehand. And He won’t ever know these things with respect to world B.

Since this is true for all of the worlds that God might actualize, He really has no idea which world will best fulfill His purposes. He won’t even know after making the decision whether He made the best choice, or even that the world He chose wasn’t in the bottom 1% in terms of fulfilling His purposes. For practical purposes He’s completely in the dark; He’s forced to choose blindly. Thus it might be that God had no intention of creating a world in which Satan would rebel and consequently Adam would sin, resulting in the Fall. According to your theory, it might simply have turned out that way, much to God’s chagrin.

Well, you are quite right--and thank you for pointing it out to me, it's a very interesting implication. And yet, somehow I like it! I freely admit the omnipotence of my god is not quite what some have made it out to be. I kind of like the idea that he really did his best, but this free will thing has a tendency to muck things up...

But suppose that He tries intervening to fix things. Then He’s faced with a major problem: the world that results from His intervention is a different possible world than the original one, so all free choices might turn out differently than in the original one....Thus any intervention at any point in time will have enormous repercussions through the entire “time line” of the universe, including times before the point where the intervention occurred. And since (on your theory) God does not know the truth values of counterfactuals of freedom, He’ll have no idea what these repercussions will be. Thus any attempt to intervene to “fix” things will have radical effects that are unpredictable even to God. It might well make things even worse than before. We can picture God, on an especially unlucky day, making one change after another to clean up the mess that He’s made, but each time making things worse than ever.

Well, clearly this is no good, so I don't believe god does this often or at all, but then I don't think he does much intervening, period.

Needless to say, it would be ridiculous to call such a God “omnipotent”. If His every move is fraught with uncertainty; if He has no idea whether anything He does will further His purposes or not, He’s a helpless, pitiful giant.

Oh, I don't know that he's not anything we can call "omnipotent". I mean, surely he's no less omnipotent than, say, an atheistic cosmos. Now that is a pretty powerful entity--I certainly don't deny the power that the cosmos itself wields. After all, I am its product...so my god is at least no less powerful than that. Since if I were an atheist, the power that the cosmos wields is all the power that there would be, I have no problem calling my god "omnipotent" in the same way.

[Note: Since you apparently object to the term “actualize” for some obscure reason, feel free to substitute the term “instantiate” for it in this passage. ]

Well, I just didn't understand how one could actualize a world where free choices were determined. It seems to me that creating a world where individuals are destined to make certain free choices is the same things as predetermining those choices. That seems to me to be a logical contradiction. For that reason, I don't understand how one could instantiate it, either.

So as you can see, my god is even more of a minority position than one might have expected. And yet I'm comfortable with that.

[Morpheus]

hopefully i can get back to this thread tomorrow, though if not it may be a couple of days because i am moving back to school (which is 6 hours away).

oh yeah, and to whomever asked for my permission to put this in his/her journal, go for it.

regards.

[bd-from-kg]

the_cave:

I argue (and I'm pretty sure that my physics is correct) that we do have a common reference frame for measuring the time of events; time elapsed from the Big Bang.

Um, no - at least not in a sense that would answer my argument.

According to GR all reference frames (not just inertial ones) are valid. A type of reference frame that makes sense for certain purposes is one that expands everywhere with the universal expansion, and thus in which the microwave background radiation is isotropic (i.e., uniform in all directions). The problem (so far as answering my argument is concerned) is that this is far from being precisely defined. There is no reference frame in which the MBR is precisely isotropic everywhere. There's not even an inertial reference frame in which this radiation is exactly uniform at a given point.

In fact, any such frame will be very close to being inertial over short distances (such as a few hundred light years), but two such frames will typically "reduce locally" to slightly different inertial frames with velocities that differ by at least a few feet per second. (This is well below the "resolution" provided by the MBR). This is enough to produce just the kind of discrepancy in the temporal order of events cited in my example.

And it must be kept in mind that GR provides no justification for treating reference frames of this kind as "special" or "privileged" anyway; the results that would be obtained in any other reference frame are just as valid. There's a reason why this theory is called the theory of relativity. Looking for some sort of absolute time (or distance, or velocity) in the context of GR is hopelessly misguided.

As for your other comments, the question is not whether a God lacking foreknowledge is one that you'd "kind of like" or that you "have no problem calling 'omnipotent'", but whether the properties I described are consistent with the God of Christianity, as described by countless Christian theologians. The term "God", like any other term, can be used to mean anything at all; we have to settle on some reasonably clear, unambiguous definitions of terms before we can even have a meaningful discussion.

You say:

Oh, I don't know that he's not anything we can call "omnipotent". I mean, surely he's no less omnipotent than, say, an atheistic cosmos. Now that is a pretty powerful entity--I certainly don't deny the power that the cosmos itself wields. After all, I am its product...so my god is at least no less powerful than that. Since if I were an atheist, the power that the cosmos wields is all the power that there would be, I have no problem calling my god "omnipotent" in the same way.

Well, atheists do not call the cosmos "omnipotent". And the term "omnipotent" as it is ordinarily used does not mean "more powerful than some specific finite entity". Of course you're free to make up your own definitions, but in that case you'll have to forget about communicating with the rest of us. I could define "omnipotent" as "more powerful than my three-year-old grandson" and point out that by this definition I'm omnipotent, but what's the point?

[the_cave]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
the_cave:According to GR all reference frames (not just inertial ones) are valid.

Well, yes, I admit you are right. However:

two such frames will typically "reduce locally" to slightly different inertial frames with velocities that differ by at least a few feet per second. (This is well below the "resolution" provided by the MBR). This is enough to produce just the kind of discrepancy in the temporal order of events cited in my example.

There must either be something wrong here, or I am misunderstanding something, because there appears to be a causal paradox that I'm not aware actually exists in GR. Let's take your earlier example:

1. Imagine two points A and B 100 light years apart. Also, let’s consider two coordinate frames X and Y. Consider two events that occur at about the same time according to both frames, one at A and the other at B. For example, suppose that Smith kills Jones at A and Edwards kills Forester at B. In frame X the S/J killing occurs a second before the E/F killing, but in frame Y the E/F killing occurs first.

But let's say that Smith will not kill Jones if he sees Edwards killing Forester--but Edwards will not kill Forester if he does not see Smith killing Jones!

So who kills whom? If Edwards does not kill Forester, that means he did not see Smith killing Jones. But that means Smith saw Edwards killing Forester!

And if Edwards does kill Forester, then he saw Smith killing Jones. But if Smith killed Jones, that means he saw Edwards sparing Forester's life!

So forget omniscience--we're still talking about the ontological status of cause and effect! I'm not saying this means there is a priveleged reference frame, I'm just saying the lack of a priveleged reference frame shouldn't mean that causality itself is out the window. This is important for other reasons besides theology.

As for your other comments, the question is not whether a God lacking foreknowledge is one that you'd "kind of like" or that you "have no problem calling 'omnipotent'", but whether the properties I described are consistent with the God of Christianity, as described by countless Christian theologians. The term "God", like any other term, can be used to mean anything at all; we have to settle on some reasonably clear, unambiguous definitions of terms before we can even have a meaningful discussion.

I agree wholeheartedly. I'm only trying to define "omni-" in the sense of "maximally", which as I have understood it so far is a recent but valid way of understanding the meaning of "omni-" in this (theological) context. I admit that the meaning of "maximally" may itself be subject to some debate, but this is not surprising.

Well, atheists do not call the cosmos "omnipotent". And the term "omnipotent" as it is ordinarily used does not mean "more powerful than some specific finite entity". Of course you're free to make up your own definitions, but in that case you'll have to forget about communicating with the rest of us. I could define "omnipotent" as "more powerful than my three-year-old grandson" and point out that by this definition I'm omnipotent, but what's the point?

Well, again, it's in terms of "maximally". To your three-year-old grandson, you may indeed appear to be "omniscient." As he grows older (as do we all), we discover that there are powers greater than those of our elders. And yet there is a highest power. If there are no other powers than that power, what else could that power be but "all the power that there is"? Sounds like "omni-" to me.

[bd-from-kg]

the_cave:

There must either be something wrong here, or I am misunderstanding something, because there appears to be a causal paradox that I'm not aware actually exists in GR.

... let's say that Smith will not kill Jones if he sees Edwards killing Forester--but Edwards will not kill Forester if he does not see Smith killing Jones!

The kind of causal paradox you describe cannot arise because in cases where temporal order is relative, the events in question must be far enough apart in space and close enough in time that light (and hence, according to GR, information in any form) cannot travel from one event to the other. (By the time it gets there the other event is in the past.) It turns out that whether the events are causally separated in this sense is frame-independent.

Thus, in your example, Smith won’t be able to see whether Edwards kills Forester before he kills Jones, and vice-versa. The events cannot causally affect one another.

In order for this kind of temporal order ambiguity to exist in frames that are moving at very moderate speeds relative to one another the spatial separation must be much greater than this and the temporal separation much smaller, which is why my example specified a separation of 100 light years in space but only a second in time.

I agree wholeheartedly. I'm only trying to define "omni-" in the sense of "maximally"...

Fine, as long as you mean “maximal conceivable” or “maximal possible” in some reasonable sense rather than “maximal actually existing”. Otherwise your definitions are far out of the mainstream.

Well, again, it's in terms of "maximally". To your three-year-old grandson, you may indeed appear to be "omniscient."

A three-year-old couldn’t understand the concept of “omniscient”, but if he did he’d know immediately that I’m not omniscient. He might think a lot of me, but he’s not mad enough to think that I know all the details of what he does in his room when I’m not there, much less that I know all about every detail of what’s in the attic of the people who live down the street (including the current location of every bug). Much less that I know exactly what he’s thinking and planning at every moment.

As he grows older (as do we all), we discover that there are powers greater than those of our elders. And yet there is a highest power. If there are no other powers than that power, what else could that power be but "all the power that there is"?

Well, that’s not “all the power that is”, but even if it were, it wouldn’t be omnipotent if an entity with even more power could be conceived of (again, unless you don’t care whether your definitions have anything to do with anyone else’s).

[Xeno]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
[Bottom line: Temporal order of distant events can be relative; this poses no problems for physics. But the temporal order of God?s knowledge cannot be relative: it cannot be true that God comes to know P first and Q later, and also true that He comes to know Q first and P later.

With respect to each reference frame God has temporal knowledge relative to his omniscience, why does it matter if two reference frames with respect to each other do not line up? In other words, God knows by way of omniscience the truth value of each statement, Smith will kill Jones, Edwards will kill Forrester, as they occur within their respective reference frames. The relative speed of light seems to be irrelevent to his knowledge.

Besides that, assuming God is omniscient, he knows all possible reference frames for time, and knows each frame's relation to each other frame. God can measure by either frame of reference and still come to know the truth value of said statements both with respect to each frame of reference involved, and indeed, with respect to every frame of reference possible.

[bd-from-kg]

Xeno:

You're right, of course, that none of this presents a problem for the classical concept of God as knowing the truth value of all propositions about the future as well as the past. This was an objection to so-called "open theology" which posits that God doesn't know the future, at least to the extent that it's affected by the acts of creatures with free will. The idea is that if someone has free will, his actions are not determined by the present, so propositions about what he's going to do have no truth value at present. Even an omnipotent God cannot know the truth value of propositions that have no truth value. My objection is basically that the term "future" is fuzzy (or more precisely, relative). On this proposal, whether there's time when God knows that Smith kills Jones but not that Edwards kills Forester, or instead a time when He knows that Edwards kills Forester but not that Smith kills Jones, depends on the reference frame. But this sort of thing cannot be relative. The order in which God comes to know certain propositions cannot depend on which reference frame one happens to be using.

[Xeno]

But why, if one frame of reference does not affect another, does it matter whether God knows of the E/F killing "first" or of the S/J killing "first". To speak of which happened "first" is kind of meaningless in a sense anyway, right? Wouldn't it be enough for God to know the truth value of the events with respect to their own frames of reference, and again, with respect to any frame of reference possible, to know their truth value?

Couldn't the same argument be made with Newtonian relativity? God doesn't know for sure whether the gun that Smith used to kill Johns was the result of the gun moving with respect to Smith's finger, or Smith's finger moving with respect to the gun, as there is no absolute frame of reference God can use to determine whether Smith's action was his fault or the gun's fault. Looking back, that sounds like a bad example, but hopefully you get the idea.

I admit I am partially ignorant of open theology.

[bd-from-kg]

xeno:

But why, if one frame of reference does not affect another, does it matter whether God knows of the E/F killing "first" or of the S/J killing "first".

It's not a question of whether it matters, it's a question of whether it's logically coherent to say that God knows of Jones's death before he knows of Forester's , and also that He knows of Forester's death before He knows of Jones's.

To speak of which happened "first" is kind of meaningless in a sense anyway, right?

Yes. That's why it's meaningless to speak of God's coming to know of events "when they happen".

Wouldn't it be enough for God to know the truth value of the events with respect to their own frames of reference, and again, with respect to any frame of reference possible, to know their truth value?

You're still thinking in terms of a "timeless" God. Sure, if God's knowledge is timeless (i.e., if he "always" knew of Jones's and Forester's deaths, and exactly how they related spatiotemporally) there's no problem. The problem comes in when we say that His knowldge is not timeless. In other words, the problem isn't that He doesn't know who died "first", but that if He comes to know of events "when they happen", we're forced to say that He knew of the first before He knew of the second and also that He knew of the second before He knew of the first.

[the_cave]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
xeno:It's not a question of whether it matters, it's a question of whether it's logically coherent to say that God knows of Jones's death before he knows of Forester's , and also that He knows of Forester's death before He knows of Jones's....In other words, the problem isn't that He doesn't know who died "first", but that if He comes to know of events "when they happen", we're forced to say that He knew of the first before He knew of the second and also that He knew of the second before He knew of the first.

This doesn't seem right somehow--though perhaps I am still confused. I may be misstating the case, but let me try to put it this way.

Imagine a being that is aware of all events in every reference frame, in their temporal order. Awareness of each event, in order, in its respective frame, comes simultaneously.

At some point, the being must come across Forester's death, in some temporal order of some reference frame. At that moment, that being knows Forester is dead, in every reference frame. Even if the denizens of some other reference frame don't know it yet, the being knows it.

And then the same is true of Jones. So although some denizens with more limited knowledge than that being may have contradictory relative knowledge of the order of the deaths, the being has no such confusion.

[the_cave]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
the_cave:The kind of causal paradox you describe cannot arise because in cases where temporal order is relative, the events in question must be far enough apart in space and close enough in time that light (and hence, according to GR, information in any form) cannot travel from one event to the other. (By the time it gets there the other event is in the past.) It turns out that whether the events are causally separated in this sense is frame-independent.

Thus, in your example, Smith won’t be able to see whether Edwards kills Forester before he kills Jones, and vice-versa. The events cannot causally affect one another.

I think I may need the example spelled out, or at least a helpful reference in the literature. I simply can't imagine a situation so ambiguous that thoughtful observers in two different reference frames would always determine conflicting orders to the two events. I can imagine two naive, or misinformed observers coming to contradictory conclusions, but not two cosmologists, for example.

Fine, as long as you mean “maximal conceivable” or “maximal possible” in some reasonable sense rather than “maximal actually existing”. Otherwise your definitions are far out of the mainstream.

Ah, but then what is the definition of "conceivable" and "possible"? ;)

I mean, alright, I freely admit that there are definitions of a Christian god which I do not believe in. I concede that portion of the argument to you, because I agree with you.

Well, that’s not “all the power that is”

Sure it is--in a manner of speaking, anyway. The First Cause is the cause of all the action in the universe, save perhaps only for any actions we might perform which are free (which might be uncaused actions...though the existence of such actions, anyway, is at least ultimately caused by the First Cause...) So its power is total--it has power over everything that is, since it ultimately causd everything.

but even if it were, it wouldn’t be omnipotent if an entity with even more power could be conceived of (again, unless you don’t care whether your definitions have anything to do with anyone else’s).

Alright, if "omnipotent" is too confusing a term, I'm happy to settle for something else. But I argue that whatever else "omnipotent" might mean, it at least refers in some way to all the powers that actually exist (even if in the past it has often meant more than that.)

[bd-from-kg]

the_cave:

Sorry for the delay. Here are my comments on your last two posts.

Imagine a being that is aware of all events in every reference frame, in their temporal order. Awareness of each event, in order, in its respective frame, comes simultaneously.

I have no idea what this is supposed to mean. Events have no objective temporal order. That’s the whole point. Moreover, the phrase “each [event] in its respective frame” is meaningless. There is no particular frame asociated with a given event: all events occur in all frames. And what do you mean by saying that “awareness of each event...comes simultaneously”? This seems to be reverting once again to the notion of a timeless God. If not – if you’re still talking about a God embedded in or operating in this universe’se time – how can His awareness of each event come simultaneously with His awareness of every other event? If this isn’t timelessness, what is? Finally, according to GR “simultaneity” is famously relative, so saying that awareness come simultaneously is meaningless.

At some point, the being must come across Forester's death, in some temporal order of some reference frame.

This is unintelligible. What does “at some point” mean? The picture you seem to have in mind is that God “sees” what time it is in all reference frames an any given time. But this is simply confused. There is no such thing as a “given time” until you’ve arbitrarily chosen a particular reference frame. And even then there’s no objective relationship between the time in one frame and the time in another: you can’t say (even at a particular point) that the time in frame A is (say) six hours (or millenia) behind the time in frame B. All that you can say is that the difference in time between two specific events is (say) six hours less in frame A than in frame B.

At that moment, that being knows Forester is dead, in every reference frame. Even if the denizens of some other reference frame don't know it yet, the being knows it.

Again, this is unintelligible. There is no such thing as “at that moment” except at a specific point. Here you’re trying to apply the concept of “at that moment” to the entire universe.

And then the same is true of Jones. So although some denizens with more limited knowledge than that being may have contradictory relative knowledge of the order of the deaths, the being has no such confusion.

The problem is not “limited knowledge”, but the nonexistence of an objective absolute time reference. The “denizens” do not necessarily have more limited knowledge; they may all have the exact same knowledge. The problem is that even with absolutely complete knowledge there is no objective “now”. If one being at a particular point is the spacetime continuum is asked to specifiy what other points in the continuum are “before” the point he’s at in time and which are “after”, and which are “simultaneous” he will be unable to answer the question, not because he doesn’t know the answer, but because there is no answer.

An analogy would be the position of an electron in the middle of the famous “double slit” experiment. If you ask whether the electron is “really” passing through the first slit or the second, you won’t be able to answer, not because you don’t know the answer, but because there is no answer. In a sense, the electron is passing through the first slit and it is passing through the second slit. It’s not “divided”: if you detect anything it will be the “entire” electron. In something like the same way, if you ask whether one event comes “before” or “after” another (in the kind of scenario I described) you won’t be able to answer, not because you don’t know (limited knowledge) but because the question is meaningless. More generally, the question of what the time difference is between any two events is meaningless: there is no obectively correct anwwer.

I think I may need the example spelled out, or at least a helpful reference in the literature.

What exactly do you need “spelled out”? The temporal order of event is (sometimes) relative to the reference frame, and there is no “preferred” frame. Therefore there is no “objectively true” temporal order of events. What about this do you not understand?

Before leaving this subject I want to remind you of an important point that I made earlier but which you ignored. Gr makes it perfectly clear that time and space are inextricably intertwined, which is to say that time is intrinsically an aspect of this universe. It is not an “absolute”, pre-existing aspect of “reality itself”; it is a part of God’s creation. It is simply impossible that God can be “embedded” in any meaningful way in His own creation. In other words, it’s impossible that He experiences time in the way that we do; that there is a “present moment” for Him in terms of this universe’s time; that He experiences the “river of time”; the slow, continuous transition of the “future” into the “present” and then into the “past”. This would only make sense if this universe’s time existed before this universe did, and what GR makes manifest is that this cannot be so: this universe’s time could no more have existed before this universe did than this universe’s space, or its matter and energy, could have. God could no more operate in this universe’s time than He could be composed of this universe’s matter.

I simply can't imagine a situation so ambiguous that thoughtful observers in two different reference frames would always determine conflicting orders to the two events. I can imagine two naive, or misinformed observers coming to contradictory conclusions, but not two cosmologists, for example.

What you or anyone else can imagine is irrelevant. Besides, this is an absurd objection coming from someone talking about God. No one can imagine God. No one can imagine what it really would mean for a being to be omnipotent or omniscient or “perfectly good”. No one can imagine how something can be a “necessary” or “self-existent” being or the “first cause” or the “ground of being”. No one can imagine how “creation ex nihilo” is supposed to work. And no one can imagine how one and the same being can be simultaneously “fully man” and “fully God”, or how three persons can be one “personal being”. To accept religion at all is to accept all sorts of unimaginable things as being true.

I mean, alright, I freely admit that there are definitions of a Christian god which I do not believe in.

That’s not the point. The point is that your definitions of terms like “omnipotent” and omniscient” are far out of the mainstream. The purpose of language is communication. If everyone were to invent his own private langauage as you have done, communication would be impossible. Regardless of what your conception of God is, you can’t communicate it to others unless you use words with the same meaning as they do. For example, it’s not helpful agree with someone that God is omnipotent if you mean something entirely different by “omnipotent” than they do. If you want them to understand your concept you have to say that you do not agree that God is omnipotent, or else waste endless hours explaining that you don’t mean the same thing by “omnipotent” as everyone else. Which is more sensible: to use the term “blue” to refer to the color everyone else calls “green” and then explain to everyone that what you mean by “blue” is what they call “green”, or simply adopt the commonly accepted usage?

[the_cave]

Originally posted by bd-from-kg
the_cave:

Sorry for the delay. Here are my comments on your last two posts.

No problem--I have posts several months old still waiting for a reply from me!

what do you mean by saying that “awareness of each event...comes simultaneously”? This seems to be reverting once again to the notion of a timeless God. If not – if you’re still talking about a God embedded in or operating in this universe’se time – how can His awareness of each event come simultaneously with His awareness of every other event? If this isn’t timelessness, what is?

It's simultaneity, but not simultaneous knowledge of events separated from one another in time. Rather, it's simultaneous knowledge of events separated from one another in space. So yes, there is a timeless aspect to it--but I want to distinguish this from knowledge of the future.

Finally, according to GR “simultaneity” is famously relative, so saying that awareness come simultaneously is meaningless.

I disagree to a certain extent. The example is often given that the stellar events we see now "happened" at some time in the past. Were we to see the sun explode, it is claimed that it "actually" expoded eight minutes ago. In other words, we can speak of the existence of distant events simultaneously with events close by, even if we don't yet know of those more distant events.

The picture you seem to have in mind is that God “sees” what time it is in all reference frames an any given time. But this is simply confused. There is no such thing as a “given time” until you’ve arbitrarily chosen a particular reference frame. And even then there’s no objective relationship between the time in one frame and the time in another

Here's the kind of scenario I'm trying to portray. Let's say someone flies from Alpha Centari to Earth in a transparent spaceship at near-light speed, and we have a very big telescope with which to watch his approach. What we see is him moving around his ship very slowly (more and more slowly the faster he travels, and then more quickly as he begins to decelerate) for about four years, until he finally arrives. The actions he takes on the ship are, I argue, in some real sense simultaneous with the events on Earth during the duration of his trip, even if he and we measure different durations due to the relative velocity between our reference frames.

Now, perhaps due to some feature of dilation we would not be able to observe him in this manner or some such--I don't remember my relativity well enough to say, though I believe the dimensions of his ship would appear to be altered from our perspective. Still, we would for example know, if he told us his speed, what time it was on Earth when he left Alpha Centauri. If he gave us a log of his journey and his acceleration rates, we could even construct a correspondence between events on his ship and events on Earth. In this manner, we can figure out which events on his ship were simultaneous, so to speak, with events on Earth.

Just so, I am positing a being who can simultaneously know events which take place abord the ship and events which take place on earth. His awareness of events abord the ship come to him relatively more slowly than those on Earth; still, there is a definite order to both sequences; both sequences can be said to begin at the same time (assuming no relative motion between Earth and Alpha Centauri); there are relative markers in both sequences (there is the moment in our frame when he reaches the half-way point between Earth and Alpha Centauri, for example, and the corresponding event which was taking place on his ship [edit to add: which we can calculate based on his acceleration rates]); until both sequences end at the same time--indeed, in the same place, on Earth.

Now having said all his, I admit the situation is immesurably complictated when you introduce more and more reference frames. Yet all reference frames at least had a common origin--the Big Bang. And, some of them either remain a relative rest with one another, or at some point come to relative rest. (Now, I know that even if some of those frames come to relative rest with one another, there are still those which remain in constant relative motion, but I may have to come back tomorrow to finish this discussion, as it's late and I can't think straight. I apologize. I'll try to address the idea of simultaneous events across all reference frames then. Bit of a promissory note, I know...)

Again, this is unintelligible. There is no such thing as “at that moment” except at a specific point. Here you’re trying to apply the concept of “at that moment” to the entire universe.

I apologize for any inaccuracy. I'm claiming that if an event has happened in our reference frame, it has simply happened--ontologically speaking. It doesn't matter whether light from that event has reached any other frame or not. At that moment--a moment in our frame--that event happens; it becomes real. It doesn't depend upon an observer from any other reference frame to make it real. A simultaneous observer of the manner described above becomes aware of that event, at the moment in our frame which it happens. Because they're a simultaneous observer, it doesn't matter what moment they're on in another frame.

Now I have heard that there may be sectors of spacetime that are effectively accelerating away from us at speeds greater than c. This is a somewhat different situation.

The problem is that even with absolutely complete knowledge there is no objective “now”.

But there are, I argue, objective "now"s. There is no center to the surface of a sphere; but there are surely points upon it. And we can surely observe each and every point.

What about this do you not understand?

I think I was assuming that your example only involved two reference frames, each observing the other; now I realize it takes four (or at least three); one observer observing two events in two separate frames moving relative to him, and another observer observing the same events, moving relative to those same two frames, but in a different manner. I apologize for the confusion.

Before leaving this subject I want to remind you of an important point that I made earlier but which you ignored.

More likely I just didn't notice it ;)

It is simply impossible that God can be “embedded” in any meaningful way in His own creation. In other words, it’s impossible that He experiences time in the way that we do; that there is a “present moment” for Him in terms of this universe’s time; that He experiences the “river of time”; the slow, continuous transition of the “future” into the “present” and then into the “past”. This would only make sense if this universe’s time existed before this universe did, and what GR makes manifest is that this cannot be so: this universe’s time could no more have existed before this universe did than this universe’s space, or its matter and energy, could have. God could no more operate in this universe’s time than He could be composed of this universe’s matter.

Unless his own nature changed at the moment of creation...I freely admit that this is certainly not a mainstream thought at all.

But it seems to me there is still yet another way to conceive of an eternal, truly timeless god's awareness of all moments, past present and future (though it would make him appear to be powerless, perhaps...) but I will have to adress that tomorrow as well :(

What you or anyone else can imagine is irrelevant.

No, no, you misunderstand me. I'm merely saying that I want to make sure I'm discussing the best possible knowledge an observer could have in these situations, under ideal conditions. A naive observer wouldn't make head or tail out of redshift spectrography; but an astronomer could.

Besides, this is an absurd objection coming from someone talking about God. No one can imagine God.

Well, now, wait a minute, this seems to be an odd claim coming from someone who I assume does not believe in a god to imagine...

No one can imagine what it really would mean for a being to be omnipotent or omniscient or “perfectly good”.

Very interesting--but why do you think so?

No one can imagine how something can be a “necessary” or “self-existent” being or the “first cause”

Oh I don't know about that--the laws of physics appear to be treated by many cosmologists as though they are self-existing, indeed causeless. Now it's their task as scientists to do so--until, that is, they can think of a reason not to. But there's as of yet no indication that they will, or want to.

No one can imagine how “creation ex nihilo” is supposed to work.

And yet I'm supposed to presuppose a vacuum state in which an inflationary universe arises? Is that really the alternative? (Though for that matter, inflationary cosmology is pretty close to something that I myself at least would be willing to call creation ex nihilo...)

And no one can imagine how one and the same being can be simultaneously “fully man” and “fully God”, or how three persons can be one “personal being”. To accept religion at all is to accept all sorts of unimaginable things as being true.

These also seem to be odd claims about the nature of things you don't even think exist...if you're saying they're logically inconsistent, alright...but theologians have made attempts to state them in logical terms. Now you might think they have failed in their attempts, but that is another argument for another thread...

That’s not the point. The point is that your definitions of terms like “omnipotent” and omniscient” are far out of the mainstream.

Alright, and I have agreed to use a different term in my previous message if one is called for.

If everyone were to invent his own private langauage as you have done, communication would be impossible.

It's not a private language. As I said, "omnipotent" at least includes the idea of "having all powers which actually exist." I myself can't think of another term for that concept, but there could be one out there. I'm willing to use it if it's suggested.

If you want them to understand your concept you have to say that you do not agree that God is omnipotent, or else waste endless hours explaining that you don’t mean the same thing by “omnipotent” as everyone else.

Well, actually perhaps I could save everyone endless hours by explaining what I mean! ;) So I apologize if I did not effectively do that.

But then, I do think that god is omnipotent! Again, I cannot think of a word which means "having all actual powers" besides "omnipotent", so I have perhaps falsely believed I am forced to use it. Perhaps I should have thought of a term like "maxipotent". So, if it is better for the purposes of debate for me to try and state the meanings of controversial terms at the outset, I will sincerely try harder to do so.

Which is more sensible: to use the term “blue” to refer to the color everyone else calls “green” and then explain to everyone that what you mean by “blue” is what they call “green”, or simply adopt the commonly accepted usage?

But if I encountered the color aquamarine, and didn't have the word "aquamarine" at my disposal, I would have to make do with what words I had as best I could ;)

So then, just to clarify for everyone; I belive in a maxipotent god. I would be happy to explain what that means if there is any confusion.

[the_cave]

Had a few moments this morning to collect my thoughts and think about this some more...don't have time right now to write down everything, but I thought I would at least put down some general impressions...

Originally posted by the_cave
Now having said all his, I admit the situation is immesurably complictated when you introduce more and more reference frames. Yet all reference frames at least had a common origin--the Big Bang. And, some of them either remain a relative rest with one another, or at some point come to relative rest. (Now, I know that even if some of those frames come to relative rest with one another, there are still those which remain in constant relative motion, but I may have to come back tomorrow to finish this discussion, as it's late and I can't think straight. I apologize. I'll try to address the idea of simultaneous events across all reference frames then. Bit of a promissory note, I know...)

Here's what I'm ultimately trying to say:

All frames, and all timelines, have a common origin--the singularity of the big bang, at which all points in space-time were one and the same.

Following this unitary event, each and every point in spacetime has a running present. Were a conscious mind such as ours in any location in spacetime, it would be aware of a moving present moment.

What I am claiming ultimately is that all these moving present moments are ontologically simultaneous, regardless of the speeds of each point relative to the others, regardless of anyone's accelerations, and regardless of whether or not there is an objective reference frame in which to know their "true" order. In other words, there is really only one, single, moving present moment throughout the universe, even if that moving present moment inhabits multiple reference frames moving with relative speeds among one another. (And I can definitely say I have no idea whether this idea has been stated anywhere else.)

I think I was assuming that your example only involved two reference frames, each observing the other; now I realize it takes four (or at least three); one observer observing two events in two separate frames moving relative to him, and another observer observing the same events, moving relative to those same two frames, but in a different manner. I apologize for the confusion.

And so to return to this, sure, different observers in different reference frames could become aware of events in different orders. Both sequences would be equally valid epistemologies--but they are not equally valid ontologies. That's what I was getting at in comparing naive observers to cosmologists--naive observers might confuse their epistemology with their ontology. They might assume that the order in which they observed the events was the order in which they happened. But it's simply the ontological case that the murders actually happened at specific times in each and every possible reference frame, and there was an objective order to them; one murder happened at one moment in the universal moving present, and the other murder happened at a different moment, either before or after (or else at the same time.) The knowledge of the order of the murders may well differ; but the sequence of their occurence doesn't, and that's true for each and every reference frame. (I would say that we know this because our cosmos, rather fortunately enough, has an objective reference point in spacetime--the Big Bang, a shared event which every reference frame has a relative motion towards. If there were no Big Bang, then yes, I think we would be in a lot of trouble. Of course, Big Bang cosmology had not been developed when GR was.)