Questions of moral responsibility

[student738]

Suppose that I am a wealthy tyrant. Out of boredom I hire a man, and knowing that he will faithfully carry out my requests, I order him, "Go into the villge. At each intersection, close your eyes and fire a single shot down each street, making no effort to aim at anything in particular. Once you have fired at least once from every intersection, return to me for further instructions."

I know it is possible that my hired servant will kill a person under my orders. However, I also know it is possible that my hired servant under my orders will not kill a person.

I do not intend that my servant kill a person, and I have no desire that he do so. Ordering my servant to fire at least once from each intersection, in and of itself satisfies me.

1) If my servant kills a person under these orders, do I bear more moral responsibility than I would had my servant killed no person?

2) If my servant kills a person under these orders, do I bear less moral responsibility for the killing of the person than I would if my servant kills a person under the orders to go into the village and not leave until he has killed a person?

If to (2) you reply "Yes, you would bear less moral responsibillity", would your reply change for differing values of the probability that a rogue bullet will kill a person?

To (2) I would answer, tentatively, that I bear equal moral responsibility in both cases providing that certain conditions are met: a) I freely give the orders, and b) there is an "unreasonably high" probability that my giving the orders will result in a person being killed, and c) there is reasonable expectation that I consider it to be the case that (b) is true.

I can clearly provide an example of what would be an "unreasonably high" probability, and certainly we could reach widespread agreement over it, but of course it is not so clear what value minimally constitutes an "unreasonably high" probability. This, however, need not concern us yet.

...hopefully I have it all there as I intended; I am a bit tired just now.

[Keith Russell]

Your servant is almost acting as a robot, or a drone vehicle with orders to drive through (rather than fire into) each intersection at high speeds without regards to whether there are any pedestrians in the street.

But, the fact that your servant is a human being, not a robot, or a drone, means that you both bear responsibility for placing other people at risk--whether or not anyone is killed.

And, if any are killed, the responsibility for those deaths should also be shared--you for giving such an order, and your servant, for carrying out such an order without question.

In both cases, whether or not anyone is actually killed, the punishment should be severe. The fact that you both are willing to place others in mortal danger--even if your actions result in no deaths--leads me to believe that neither of you deserve to remain free.

K

[Philosoft]

I think this is a better fit in MF&P...

[Loren Pechtel]

Your orders, your responsibility. If your servant has a mind of his own he *ALSO* has responsibility.

Charges: Reckless endangerment.

If anyone's hit that goes up to manslaughter.

[Keith Russell]

Loren, I was speaking about what the sentence should be, not what a basic sentence might be, in a particular place, and a relatively current time.

K

[winstonjen]

Originally posted by Loren Pechtel
If anyone's hit that goes up to manslaughter.

Only if they're killed. If not, it's assault or attempted murder.

[student738]

I do not so much mean to discuss any particular sentence as I do relative levels of moral responsibility. I say this, of course, because our judicial system may for a great host of reasons not reflect accurately the relative moral responsibility incurred by any two or more acts.

The intention of my example is to investigate moral responsibility for cases in which the perpetrator "should have known" that his or her action may with some "sufficient" degree of probability result in some particular offense.

In the case of (2) under the first set of orders, I do not intend to kill any person at all, but I "should have known" that my action may with some "sufficient" degree of probability result in a person being killed.

In the case of (2) under the second set of orders, I know certainly that my action will result in a person being killed.

I mean to suggest that the moral responsibility I bear in each is equal, given just the conditions I enumerated in my original post.

I mean to suggest further that we apply our conclusions in this and similar examples to investigate relative moral responsibility in cases such as drunk driving resulting in killings, child endangerment resulting in killings, and so forth.