Ockham & Parsimony

[Philosoft]

This is an offshoot of this thread (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=60331&perpage=25&pagenumber=4), dealing specifically with the usefulness of Ockham's Razor.

Originally posted by Starboy
Philosoft, which kind of parimony are you talking about? Epistemological, ontological or linguistic?
Linguistic parsimony is a strawman, regards Ockham, and a rather stupid one at that. I'm surprised you would bother to include it as a possible choice.

In any case, Ockham is most properly an empirical tool. If a phenomenon can be explained in terms of what is known, that is preferrable to positing unknown entities, which are epistemologically indistinguishable.

For example, abiogenesis is a controversial theory about the origin of life. It does, however, have some empirical support. A theistic explanation for the origin of life would necessarily deny that said empirical evidence is actually evidence of abiogenesis. In its stead, it posits a creative entity that is completely unevidenced. The obvious problem is that the number of posit-able unevidenced explanatory entities is virtually limitless.
And why do you think it any of them is important to the exploration of reality?
Well, obviously we employ some version of Ockham every day, as we are not burdened by the mental weight of considering multiple unevidenced explanatory entities for the mundane happenings of daily life. I have seen no argument to the effect that there is some distinguishable "point" in our explanatory escapades at which Ockham is no longer useful.

[Starboy]

Philosoft, dress it up any way you like. It is a presumption of reality. Very much like the idea that there is an ontology of reality. If there were such a study, science would have to be it.

Starboy

[Bluenose]

The words "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" or: "entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity" are not from any of the extant works of William of Ockham / Occam [died 1349].

BUT he did say: "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate" or: "plurality should not be assumed unnecessarily" in Quodlibeta number 5 question 1 article 2.

[Philosoft]

Originally posted by Starboy
Philosoft, dress it up any way you like. It is a presumption of reality. Very much like the idea that there is an ontology of reality. If there were such a study, science would have to be it.
Sometimes I have to wonder why I bother.

[Starboy]

Sorry Philosoft.

Okay lets take your claim:

Originally posted by philosopft
In any case, Ockham is most properly an empirical tool. If a phenomenon can be explained in terms of what is known, that is preferrable to positing unknown entities, which are epistemologically indistinguishable.

How can it be an empirical tool if one of the explanitive entities is unknown?

Starboy

[Demosthenes]

Starboy, you're missing the point. Occam's razor comes into play when we have information and evidence at hand to explain something. Since we can successfully explain that particular something, there is no need to postulate any unknown entities since to do so would be superfluous. The term "empirical" simply means that it is verifiable through experiment.

Occam's razor is often ambused when it's used in more of a theoretical nature since when we're dealing with abstract concepts with no grounding in reality, we have no way of knowing whether one way is better than the other.

[Starboy]

Demosthenese, it was philosoft’s claim that Ockham’s razor is important to science, and in particular empirical science. His statement of the principle makes that claim seem ridiculous. Anyone that tries to construct an experiment to determine the effect of an unknown entity will soon come to realize that one does not need Ockham’s razor to figure that out. Perhaps philosoft stated the principle incorrectly. There are many variants out there.

Starboy

[Starboy]

To all,

Here is some reading pertaining to Occam's Razor that you might find interesting.

Further Experimental Evidence against the Utility of Occam's Razor (http://www.cs.washington.edu/research/jair/volume4/webb96a-html/webb96a.html)

Nobel Prize Committee (http://zebu.uoregon.edu/~js/glossary/occams_razor.html)

Was Occam wrong? (http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/W.Langdon/occam/)

Occam's Razor (http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam's_Razor)

What is Occam's Razor (http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/~dkoks/Faq/General/occam.html)

What is Occam's razor? (http://phyun5.ucr.edu/~wudka/Physics7/Notes_www/node10.html)

Encyclopædia Britannica (http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=58133)

And there is a link to a very good criticism of the razor but I can't find it. If I come across it I’ll post it here.

The interesting thing to note is that there are several universities and the Britannica that do make statements of Occam's razor that are indeed presumptions about reality.

Starboy

[Bluenose]

Originally posted by Starboy


Further Experimental Evidence against the Utility of Occam's Razor (http://www.cs.washington.edu/research/jair/volume4/webb96a-html/webb96a.html)

Starboy

That paper is not about natural "reality" but AI and logic trees in computers. Logic (a branch of philosophy) is used in maths and science et cet. The word parsimony does not appear in the entire paper.

Occam's razor is the application of the principle of parsimony to whatever you understand to be 'entities'.

[ComestibleVenom]

Originally posted by Philosoft

In any case, Ockham is most properly an empirical tool.


Is it really any less proper to rate information by how much they give for how little in any other context?

[Philosoft]

Originally posted by ComestibleVenom
Is it really any less proper to rate information by how much they give for how little in any other context?
I'm having trouble parsing this sentence. Can you restate?

[Philosoft]

Originally posted by Starboy
Demosthenese, it was philosoft’s claim that Ockham’s razor is important to science, and in particular empirical science. His statement of the principle makes that claim seem ridiculous.
I'll have to ask you to explain this.
Anyone that tries to construct an experiment to determine the effect of an unknown entity will soon come to realize that one does not need Ockham’s razor to figure that out.
I don't know what this is supposed to mean. Ockham is a theory-building tool - one of the fundamentals of a good theory is parsimony, and Ockham helps us decide what is or is not parsimoius. It's not of much use in experimental design.
Perhaps philosoft stated the principle incorrectly. There are many variants out there.
And most of them are strawmen or misapplications. Let me ask you this: what kinds of things do we miss by employing Ockham?

[Starboy]

Originally posted by Philosoft

I'll have to ask you to explain this.


Sorry about that Philosoft. I understood you to claim that Ockham's razor was an empirical tool. To me that says lab tool, as in an aid to determining which experiment to perform. As a one time empericist I can tell you that theories that contain entities that are unknown usually don't get experiments performed against them for the obvious reason that an empiricist has a hard time measuring something that is not known. Perhaps I interpreted you too literally. Maybe you could elaborate on what you meant.

Originally posted by Philosoft
I don't know what this is supposed to mean. Ockham is a theory-building tool - one of the fundamentals of a good theory is parsimony, and Ockham helps us decide what is or is not parsimoius. It's not of much use in experimental design.

Sorry again philosoft. I may have misread you again. When you said:

"In any case, Ockham is most properly an empirical tool."

I took it to mean that you were saying that Ockham's razor was an empirical tool.

Originally posted by Philosoft
And most of them are strawmen or misapplications. Let me ask you this: what kinds of things do we miss by employing Ockham?

That may be so, but a good many of them come from Nobel Laureates.

Starboy

[Starboy]

Originally posted by Philosoft
Let me ask you this: what kinds of things do we miss by employing Ockham?

My claim Philosoft is not that Ockham's razor causes people to miss things. My claim is it is not the sort of thing that an enterprise that is exploring reality should engage in. That most of the statements of parsimony that I am familiar with do indeed make presumptions on reality. That to make a presumption about the very reality that you are trying to explore is not a good idea. Now maybe you have no issue with this statement and see parsimony as something else. If so please state your concept of parsimony clearly.

Actually now that I think on it more, perhaps a presumption of reality could cause a person to miss something. Let us say that you are exploring some land and you come to a fork in the road and you presume that the fork on the left could reveal nothing interesting. Boy could you be wrong!

Starboy

[student738]

"Anyone that tries to construct an experiment to determine the effect of an unknown entity will soon come to realize that one does not need Ockham’s razor to figure that out."
If it is as you suggest, I believe it would be beneficial to the discussion if you can please walk us through the setup and execution of such an experiment, so that, if it is as you say, we will see clearly that Ockham's razor is not needed.

[student738]

There is I believe the scenario in which an effect is causally overdetermined by multiple material, sense-accessible causes where our initial observation of the effect produces empirical evidence insufficient to distinguish between any two determining causes.

In this case, any single determining cause will provide an adequate explanation of the effect. However, if upon discovering this determining cause we consider the matter closed, it seems that we "miss something important" about what has occurred. We are in this scenario ignoring material, sense-accessible causes.

In some instances of the above scenario, we will not and can not possibly uncover additional determining causes without revisting the effect, without observing, studying, or analyzing it further.

In these instances, if we apply an Ockham-like principle, the limiting result of this principle will only be overcome if we also apply some other principle by which we determine that amount of investigation of an effect which is sufficient to warrant our settling upon an explanation as adequate. That is, a principle by the application of which even though a conclusion adequately explains present observations, we continue our investigation where our observations are inappropriately limited or "shallow".

[Starboy]

student738, you are making me think that I am speaking a foreign language when I post on the philosophical forums. If someone claims that property Y of an object will change depending on the amount of agent X that it contains, however the person will not tell you what agent X is or anything else other than that it will change property Y, and no one has ever seen property Y change in a way that would suggest the existence of an agent X, then as an experimentalist I would pass on performing that experiment. Now if on the other hand property Y were seen to change in an unexplained way and someone posited agent X as the cause but with no explanations as to what it was or how to detect it, then I would pass on it as well. It is still a phenomenon in search of an explanation. The proposer may have an idea that is of interest to a theoretician but not to pure experimentalists (this is not to say that there are not some experimentalist that would not be willing to take a crack at explaining it). It is not until there is a testable explanation of how X and Y are connected that the experimentalist has something to go on.

Now I have seen some say that parsimony is an experimental tool in that it can aid the experimentalist in determining which theory or explanation to test first. The implicit assumption is that somehow the experimentalist will reduce the time and effort needed to select the appropriate theory. I say it is bull. There is no way to know if "all things being equal" is the case WRT to two or more theories unless you do the experiments or have done the experiments.

Now in the case where two theories predict the exact same things, well from an experimentalist’s point of view both theories churn out the same set of numbers. What is the point of doing the experiment to compare their results? The best they could do is show that both theories are wrong. When they do predict the same results it is up to the theoreticians to find some aspect of each theory that does not predict the same outcome. Then the experimentalist has something to go on.

At best parsimony is a theoretical tool. But if it is, then it is a presumption about reality. Those very successful theoreticians such as Einstein have restated it to something like:

As simple as possible but no simpler.

The application is purely a matter of personal judgment, how does one know when something is too simple or not simple enough? The story of the Cosmological Constant is a cautionary tale to all theoreticians that would take parsimony too seriously. In any case the final test of any theory is to compare predictions against what is observed in reality not parsimony. If Ockham were alive today I think he would tell you the very same thing.

Starboy

[student738]

A different language? I frequently feel similar, surprisingly enough.

Starboy said:
"If someone claims that property Y of an object will change depending on the amount of agent X that it contains, however the person will not tell you what agent X is or anything else other than that it will change property Y, and no one has ever seen property Y change in a way that would suggest the existence of an agent X, then as an experimentalist I would pass on performing that experiment."
But isn't this Ockham's razor by another name? To illustrate, if you were to ask yourself why you would pass on the experiment, what would your answer be?

Allow me to put the scenario you suggest into terms of a typical Ockham's razor example case. I will use your words as carefully as I can. Suppose that we observe a change in property Y of an object. Now, suppose someone posits that an addition of 10 mL of solution X to Y will produce the observed change. However (as you say), this person either will not tell us what X is, or past observations of similar changes in Y offer no evidence to suggest the presence of solution X in the reaction.

Is this a satisfactory restating of the scenario?

In this case, when positing an explanation of the observed change in Y, applying Ockham's razor, it is inappropriate to posit unevidenced cause/entity/solution X. Thus, as you have concluded, we will not test for the presence of X.

As you say, you would pass on performing an experiment to test this hypothesis. What explanation as to why you would do so is there other than that it is fruitless to posit and test unevidenced hypotheses?

Perhaps I am being too liberal with what is intended by "applying Ockham's razor". Do you see that to be the case? Others?

[Starboy]

student738, the example shown was not prompted by my understanding of Ockham's razor but by Philosofts claim of what it was. In any case, if a philosopher showed up in the lab and said, looky here, you should not do such experiments for philosophical reasons when I wouldn’t do them for practical reasons, I would tell’em to get lost.

Starboy

[student738]

In the case that there exists insufficient evidence to form any reasonable hypothesis at all on which to base further investigation, and where it is further the case that additional evidence can not be obtained or is difficult to obtain, it may be appropriate to work from a "hunch" or a "guess".

In this case, if the value of determining the cause of the observed effect is significant, of course the correct approach will not be to merely sit on one's hands as if Ockham's razor were a law instead of a tool.

What's more, I suspect that in many sorts of scenarios Ockham's razor goes further to in fact accurately comment on reality by way of probability. More on this as I think it through.

[Starboy]

Originally posted by student738
What's more, I suspect that in many sorts of scenarios Ockham's razor goes further to in fact accurately comment on reality by way of probability.

This is what many advocates seem to think as well. As I see it such statements are presumptions of the very reality you are trying to explore. Not a good idea.

Starboy

[Philosoft]

Originally posted by Starboy
Sorry about that Philosoft. I understood you to claim that Ockham's razor was an empirical tool. To me that says lab tool, as in an aid to determining which experiment to perform.
I don't know. Maybe someone could develop a method to employ Ockham in such a fashion, but I'm not inclined to consider it. It is an empirical tool insofar as it helps us decide what information has both support and explanatory value.
As a one time empericist I can tell you that theories that contain entities that are unknown usually don't get experiments performed against them for the obvious reason that an empiricist has a hard time measuring something that is not known. Perhaps I interpreted you too literally. Maybe you could elaborate on what you meant.
I think we should drop the experiment discussion altogether. It doesn't appear to be relevant.
Sorry again philosoft. I may have misread you again. When you said:

"In any case, Ockham is most properly an empirical tool."

I took it to mean that you were saying that Ockham's razor was an empirical tool.
Right. It can help us select between competing explanations based on empirical support.

[Philosoft]

Originally posted by Starboy
My claim Philosoft is not that Ockham's razor causes people to miss things. My claim is it is not the sort of thing that an enterprise that is exploring reality should engage in. That most of the statements of parsimony that I am familiar with do indeed make presumptions on reality. That to make a presumption about the very reality that you are trying to explore is not a good idea. Now maybe you have no issue with this statement and see parsimony as something else. If so please state your concept of parsimony clearly.
I still don't see why Ockham necessitates presumptions about reality. Ockham doesn't seek to prevent us from studying the supernatural, for example, only that we should have at least a general idea what it is we're talking about before we start positing it as an explanation.
Actually now that I think on it more, perhaps a presumption of reality could cause a person to miss something. Let us say that you are exploring some land and you come to a fork in the road and you presume that the fork on the left could reveal nothing interesting. Boy could you be wrong!
How is such a presumption in any way a valid use of Ockham's Razor? Why would Ockham have anything to say about the road on the left?

[Philosoft]

Originally posted by Starboy
This is what many advocates seem to think as well. As I see it such statements are presumptions of the very reality you are trying to explore. Not a good idea.
As I see it, from a scientific standpoint, the only necessary presumption about reality is that there are at least some things about it we can understand. Then if Ockham tells us we shouldn't waste our time considering the things we can't understand... well, is that such a huge problem epistemologically?

[Starboy]

Originally posted by Philosoft
As I see it, from a scientific standpoint, the only necessary presumption about reality is that there are at least some things about it we can understand. Then if Ockham tells us we shouldn't waste our time considering the things we can't understand... well, is that such a huge problem epistemologically?

It that is indeed what Ockham intended with the razor, it may be necessary for philosophical persuits but hardly seems necessary for scientific investigations.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
It that is indeed what Ockham intended with the razor, it may be necessary for philosophical persuits but hardly seems necessary for scientific investigations.
Perhaps an example would help and my favorite example is the solar system. It could well be argued that the sun goes round the earth, however, the math required to calculate the trajectories and explain the effects of gravity would become extremely complex. Thus, as (I think was) pointed out by Philosoft, parsimony can help us develop empirical theories that are more easily understood.

Cheers, John

[Starboy]

Originally posted by John Page
Perhaps an example would help and my favorite example is the solar system. It could well be argued that the sun goes round the earth, however, the math required to calculate the trajectories and explain the effects of gravity would become extremely complex. Thus, as (I think was) pointed out by Philosoft, parsimony can help us develop empirical theories that are more easily understood.

Cheers, John

John, are you saying that the Copernican/Kepler explanation was equivalent to the explanation of Ptolemy? For one thing, it was found that the predicted motions became seriously out of whack after 1,000 years. And second, Galileo was able to explain (albeit incorrectly) the tides based on the Copernican/Kepler explanation. It may have been that the goal of Copernicus was to replace the Ptolemaic explanation with something simpler, but it eventually won out not because it was simpler but because it made more accurate predictions and explained more.

The funny thing about science is that it almost never happens that there are two theories competing with one another that predict the exact same results. In the very rare case that it does happen someone usually shows that both theories are the same theory expressed in different representations.

If two theories do not predict the same results then parsimony is not how one is chosen over the other. It is experiment on nature.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
....It may have been that the goal of Copernicus was to replace the Ptolemaic explanation with something simpler, but it eventually won out not because it was simpler but because it made more accurate predictions and explained more.
Like I said, the math would need to be more complex. I didn't mention anything about Ptolemy.

[Starboy]

Originally posted by John Page
Like I said, the math would need to be more complex. I didn't mention anything about Ptolemy.

Maybe I misunderstand you, but I understood the advocates of parsimony to claim its usefulness in the case of two or more competing scientific explanations. Your particular example only makes sense in the historical context of the Copernican/Kepler explanation against the Ptolemaic. In this day and age the reigning explanation is GR and can be expressed in any coordinate system you like.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
Maybe I misunderstand you, but I understood the advocates of parsimony to claim its usefulness in the case of two or more competing scientific explanations. Your particular example only makes sense in the historical context of the Copernican/Kepler explanation against the Ptolemaic. In this day and age the reigning explanation is GR and can be expressed in any coordinate system you like.
My example was merely that, an example. As you point out, the mental model presented by Newtonian mechanics turns out to have flaws when applied celestially. Arguably it was necessary for mankind's brains to assimilate and understand the world as lumps of stuff before moving on to a point of view that renders our wireframe perception inaccurate.

Cheers, john

[JP2]

I posted this on a different forum. Is this a good definition/application of the theory or am I way off the mark?

Occam's Razor could be expressed, simply as:

"In deciding between two competing theories, ceteras parabus, the theory containing the lesser amount of pluralities is prefferable and more likely to be accurate."

Two issues:

1) Ceteras parabus (all other things being equal) is rarely the state of affairs when presented with two differing theories. That is, you are unlikely to have two theories that use the same available evidence in the same capcity and reach two identical conclusions with only the nature of the theories differing.

2) Pluralities refer, fundamentally, to the complexity of the mechanisms of the theories that reach the same conclusion. If you have one theory that either takes a large amount of steps or involves a highly complex underlying schemata and one that takes a few amount of steps and involves a more simple schemata, it makes more sense to adopt the latter theory - presuming, of course, all other things (the conclusions, the evidence etc.) are equal.

Therefore, because of the abstract nature of this theory - with few genuine real-world examples to support it with - it should be, would be and is rarely used as an instrument of the scientific method. If I were to invoke it though, using a real world example, it may look like this:

Theory #1: God is the uncaused cause of the big-bang, which in turn is the cause of the universe.

God -> Big Bang -> Universe (3 steps/pluralities)

Theory #2: The big-bang is the uncaused cause of the universe.

Big Bang -> Universe (2 steps/pluralities)

Therefore, assuming the two theories are equally valid (logically and empirically), identical evidence has been used in the formation of each and an identical conclusion is reached consequentially (none of which may be the case) then we may invoke Occam's Razor and suggest that Theory #2 is the more preferable, because, all other things being equal, it requires the inclusion of fewer pluralities.

[Starboy]

Originally posted by JP2
I posted this on a different forum. Is this a good definition/application of the theory or am I way off the mark?

JP2, those are good points on which I agree. The examples that people use to justify the utility of parsimony are never equal. The god/big bang example is one of the most common examples. Who in their right mind would say that god theories and the big bang theory predict the same things? Perhaps in the case where the two overlap, but there is a great deal more that god theories posit that are more than enough to call them into question. And even when you compare the two theories where they are supposed to predict the same results, depending on the religion they are hardly equivalent.

Parsimony is just one more example of how reality challenged is philosophy and just how much philosophers do not get science.

Starboy

[Starboy]

Originally posted by John Page
My example was merely that, an example. As you point out, the mental model presented by Newtonian mechanics turns out to have flaws when applied celestially. Arguably it was necessary for mankind's brains to assimilate and understand the world as lumps of stuff before moving on to a point of view that renders our wireframe perception inaccurate.

Cheers, john

John, perhaps you and I are having a different discussion, but it was my understanding that when Philosoft opened this thread it was for the purpose of defending parsimony as a philosophical principal that was an important scientific tool. Your example is hardly a defense of such a claim. My attack on parsimony was also part of a larger indictment of philosophy as a human activity that spends a great deal of time fussing over reality without knowing much at all about actual reality and not seeing any reason to do so. Philosophers’ insistence that parsimony is an important tool of science is just one more example of how reality challenged philosophy is.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
John, perhaps you and I are having a different discussion, but it was my understanding that when Philosoft opened this thread it was for the purpose of defending parsimony as a philosophical principal that was an important scientific tool. Your example is hardly a defense of such a claim. My attack on parsimony was also part of a larger indictment of philosophy as a human activity that spends a great deal of time fussing over reality without knowing much at all about actual reality and not seeing any reason to do so. Philosophers’ insistence that parsimony is an important tool of science is just one more example of how reality challenged philosophy is.
Theory building tool is what I think Philo is getting at. I don't think he/she has insisted on parsimony.

Consider that your knowledge of reality comes from your mind's application of parsimony, compressing the essential features of reality in order to present what is relevant. Ironically, its is the process of your mind that seems to wish that parsimony is irrelevant!

From an epistemological standpoint, a theory describes reality in some way, providing a testable model. If Ockham's Razor is essentially telling us not to invent stuff unnecessarily in constructing a theory or a point of view this seems to be in agreement with your tenor which is to focus on reality itself.

So, it seems to me that you have indicted yourself as much as you have indicted "philosophy"

Cheers, John

[Starboy]

Originally posted by John Page
Theory building tool is what I think Philo is getting at. I don't think he/she has insisted on parsimony.

If so then how do you explain the version attributed to the illustrious theoretician Einstein - "as simple as possible but no simpler". The no simpler part seems to imply that simplicity is not all its cracked up to be. Also the Cosmological Constant is a cautionary tale to all those that would take parsimony too seriously. And lastly, the methods of concoting theories are essentially unimportant. In all cases of successful theoreticians, their methods cannot be emulated by the unwashed masses such as myself. As was often commented on the thinking processes of Richard Feynman - he just doesn't think like the rest of us. Any one who has met and had the opportunity to be taught by Dirac would say the same about him as well.

Starboy

[Philosoft]

Originally posted by Starboy
If so then how do you explain the version attributed to the illustrious theoretician Einstein - "as simple as possible but no simpler".
Are you really criticising Ockham based on a bumper-sticker quality quote?
Also the Cosmological Constant is a cautionary tale to all those that would take parsimony too seriously.
Ockham certainly wouldn't have approved of the method Einstein used to derive his "constant."

[John Page]

Originally posted by John Page
Theory building tool is what I think Philo is getting at. I don't think he/she has insisted on parsimony.
Originally posted by Starboy
If so then how do you explain the version attributed to the illustrious theoretician Einstein.......
Explain? Parsimoniously "Philosoft is not Einstein is not Ockham."

[Starboy]

Sorry John. What are you getting at?

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
Sorry John. What are you getting at?
Different people, different explanations.

This is how I parsimoniously explain the difference which your question highlighted (if Philo says x then how to I explain Einstein saying y).

Cheers, John

[Starboy]

Originally posted by John Page
Different people, different explanations.

This is how I parsimoniously explain the difference which your question highlighted (if Philo says x then how to I explain Einstein saying y).

Cheers, John

That is one of several problems with parsimony.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
That is one of several problems with parsimony.
What is?

[Starboy]

That it's advocates can't seem to agree on what it is.

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
That it's advocates can't seem to agree on what it is.
Well, that would be an issue with the advocates rather than parsimony. I think you will find the same applies to reality.

[Starboy]

Originally posted by John Page
Well, that would be an issue with the advocates rather than parsimony. I think you will find the same applies to reality.

Only if those advocates are religious or philosophical. Science does over time come very close to a consensus about reality, even though what it concedes changes. The amazing thing is that this happens without any central scientific authority. Philosophy and religion on the other hand just become more splintered with differing opinions and interpretations over time. Can’t see how anyone would take them seriously.

Starboy

[John Page]

Astrokid:
I think you will find Science is a historically and taxonomically branch of Philosophy., Furthermore I believe there is a trend in Science to reach a deeper understanding of what reality is through inquiry of exactly how we perceive it. This points back to some of the longer standing philosophical questions - instead of asking what the fundamental particles of reality are we're asking why do we perceive the need for such a hierarchy. Do we need to split quanta for mental satisfaction?

I would agree with you that opinion-mongering doesn't really produce anything of itself and admits of charlatans, but as we seem to agree, its a necessary social process involved at arriving at truths.

Cheers, John

[Starboy]

Originally posted by John Page
Astrokid:
I think you will find Science is a historically and taxonomically branch of Philosophy., Furthermore I believe there is a trend in Science to reach a deeper understanding of what reality is through inquiry of exactly how we perceive it. This points back to some of the longer standing philosophical questions - instead of asking what the fundamental particles of reality are we're asking why do we perceive the need for such a hierarchy. Do we need to split quanta for mental satisfaction?

I would agree with you that opinion-mongering doesn't really produce anything of itself and admits of charlatans, but as we seem to agree, its a necessary social process involved at arriving at truths.

Cheers, John

Toilette Paper, I am aware of the history of science. I am also aware that it had a heck of a time separating from Philosophy. Bacon was not very fond of it and rejected it, even if philosophers claim him as one of their own. Perhaps in this day and age philosophy does concern itself with the questions you present, but the funny thing about those questions is that they do presume that somehow that the best answers to these questions will be arrived at by taking a “mind” centric approach. That is a very philosophical presumption.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
......but the funny thing about those questions is that they do presume that somehow that the best answers to these questions will be arrived at by taking a “mind” centric approach. That is a very philosophical presumption.
:banghead:
They presume nothing of the kind! Seems to me that your presumption rejects good science - once one realizes that the mind can be considered as a measuring instrument w.r.t. reality, how do you argue that a better (or more reliable) understanding of that measuring instrument is not in order?

[Starboy]

Originally posted by John Page
:banghead:
They presume nothing of the kind! Seems to me that your presumption rejects good science - once one realizes that the mind can be considered as a measuring instrument w.r.t. reality, how do you argue that a better (or more reliable) understanding of that measuring instrument is not in order?

That is not the question I was talking about. It was these question I was referring to:

Originally posted by John Page
...instead of asking what the fundamental particles of reality are we're asking why do we perceive the need for such a hierarchy. Do we need to split quanta for mental satisfaction?

If the same old reality challenged approach of philosophy is used on these questions, then I think I'll pass.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
If the same old reality challenged approach of philosophy is used on these questions, then I think I'll pass.
AstroLad:

To what group of philosophers or school of philosophy do you attribute the "reality challenged approach to philosophy"? Is not science itself reality challenged?

[Thomas Ash]

I've always had a niggling problem with Ockham's Razor, about which I've composed this poem (sorry in advance ;) )

Ockham's Razor is not so sharp
A poem in poor verse, by Thomas Ash

The problem
With Ockham
Is it's an axiom

It can't be proved
But only used

In slightly more intelligible form, my point is that Ockham's razor is an axiom for which you can't (so far as I'm aware) offer any justification. It's not even a self-evident axiom, given the number of people who question it and don't use it. The only 'proof' you could offer is that in some cases in science it seems to have worked, but we don't really know if it's a valid assumption.

PS: Please don't be too hard on my artistic attempts... :( ( ;) )

Best wishes,

Thomas Ash


__________
Check out my website for all :cool: infidels, Atheist Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/atheistground/) - and my broader website on politics, philosophy, science and history - Big Issue Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/)!

[Starboy]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
In slightly more intelligible form, my point is that Ockham's razor is an axiom for which you can't (so far as I'm aware) offer any justification. It's not even a self-evident axiom, given the number of people who question it and don't use it. The only 'proof' you could offer is that in some cases in science it seems to have worked, but we don't really know if it's a valid assumption.


Hi Thomas, couldn't agree more. When it comes to science I don't care how you state parsimonly or use it, it is either so trivial as to not be worth talking about or it makes an unjustified assumption about reality. The fact that it might work from time to time indicates nothing. Even a frozen clock is right twice a day.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
The fact that it might work from time to time indicates nothing. Even a frozen clock is right twice a day.
Very succinctly put, Stockhamboy. ;)

[Primal]

Originally posted by Starboy
Philosoft, dress it up any way you like. It is a presumption of reality. Very much like the idea that there is an ontology of reality. If there were such a study, science would have to be it.

Starboy

No it is a presumption concerning human nature. Does anyone doubt that if humans make up stories? And that if then, given a free hand to do so, will do so endlessly?

Didn't think so. That's why we have Occam's Razor, in order to keep the space left for "making up stories" to a bare minimum as well as keep it close to the evidence (for the further one departs from the evidence, the more likely one is to be wrong.)

Starboy's entire argument above is a straw man.

[Starboy]

I would like to propose to the the mods that anyone that constantly invokes the words "straw man" instead of actually pointing out the specific claim that is unrelated to the topic, be banned from IIDB. If there ever was an example of a "straw man" argument primal's post would have to be it. I make no claim to a particular definition of parsimony nor do I claim that is is at all important or not to story telling.

Starboy

[Primal]

You said parsimony equates to some sort of ontological presumption. Show me who has actually said that. Also your little qualifications towards the end are uneccessary for my criticism, as the meaning is quite obvious.

[Starboy]

Primal, I maintain the following:

1) Philosophers claim to hold important a principal they call parsimony or Ockham's razor.

2) Philosophers claim that parsimony is an important tool for science.

My primary claim in this particular topic is that parsimony is not an important tool for science. The argument as not proceeded very far for a few reasons:

1) There is no agreement as to an exact statement of parsimony or Ockham's razor as it applies to science.

2) When specific definitions are presented no one can present specific examples of how the principal is applicable or if it is applicable, that it is at all necessary (in other words trivial cases).

Your attempt at presenting parsimony and showing its applicability to science has been par for the course.

As to your fondness for the words "straw man", the example you point to was a carry over from the original topic this specific topic was created from. It questioned the overall usefulness of philosophy in the first place, thus the observation of mine regarding the science of ontology vs. the philosophy of ontology that you refer to. However that is a different topic. Since it is a different topic, you are creating a claim that has nothing to do with this topic ("straw man"). If you want to pursue it, create another topic and have at it, however I will be sure to not participate.

Starboy

[Starboy]

This is off topic but primals post points out another pet peeve I have regarding philosophers. The use of "straw man" as if it were a magic incantation.

Starboy

[wordfailure]

Starboy:
1) Philosophers claim to hold important a principal they call parsimony or Ockham's razor.
2) Philosophers claim that parsimony is an important tool for science.


How many philosophers? All? Most? Let's see the science.

Starboy:
My primary claim in this particular topic is that parsimony is not an important tool for science.

Is this a scientific claim, a philosophical claim, or 'other'?


Starboy
...thus the observation of mine regarding the science of ontology vs. the philosophy of ontology...

Please define "the science of ontology."

Starboy:
This is off topic but primals post points out another pet peeve I have regarding philosophers. The use of "straw man" as if it were a magic incantation.

How many philosophers? All? Most? Let's see the science.


While we're on pet peeves and other crucial matters of personal taste, don't you just hate how scientists listen to oldies stations on the radio? I mean, how many thousand times can one enjoy the same song?

[Starboy]

Originally posted by wordfailure
Is this a scientific claim, a philosophical claim, or 'other'?

You tell me, I am not the one claiming parsimony is important.

Originally posted by wordfailure
Please define "the science of ontology."

This is off topic.

Originally posted by wordfailure
How many philosophers? All? Most? Let's see the science.

I have no idea of the number, but it is enough to show up in the philosophic and scientific literature and websites all over the place. Just do a google if you want some kind of idea of the prevalence of the idea. Or crack open books on philosophy. You'll find it.

Originally posted by wordfailure
While we're on pet peeves and other crucial matters of personal taste, don't you just hate how scientists listen to oldies stations on the radio? I mean, how many thousand times can one enjoy the same song?

Perhaps it is annoying but I don't think that such scientist would claim that philosophers should listen to such stations or that listening to such stations is important to philosophy.

Starboy

[Primal]

Originally posted by Starboy
Primal, I maintain the following:

1) Philosophers claim to hold important a principal they call parsimony or Ockham's razor.

2) Philosophers claim that parsimony is an important tool for science.

My primary claim in this particular topic is that parsimony is not an important tool for science. The argument as not proceeded very far for a few reasons:

1) There is no agreement as to an exact statement of parsimony or Ockham's razor as it applies to science.

2) When specific definitions are presented no one can present specific examples of how the principal is applicable or if it is applicable, that it is at all necessary (in other words trivial cases).

Your attempt at presenting parsimony and showing its applicability to science has been par for the course.





Ok for your first part change it to many or some philosophers and you would be correct.


In regards to the second part of your criticism:

1) It is an approximate stadnard. No one needs to agree exactly what the principle of parsimony is verbatim for it to be useful (no standard in science is universally established verbatim).



2. The reason specific examples are not invoked is because Occam's Razor, like observation and deduction, applies to all scientific endeavors.


To figure out why try this thought expiriment. Lets say we are trying to figure out the cause of rain. I say "it's a rain elf".

You posit condensation, evaporation, temperature etc. I then say "yes that's all good....but you need my elf too."

Then someone else comes and proclaims "No! you need two elves!"

How do you get rid of two elves? The same way you get rid of one: Occam's Razor.

As to your last point I am not sure but it appears as if you are saying philosophy is not useful.



If that is your case, then your case is absurd.

[Hugo Holbling]

I made a few remarks on parsimony here (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&postid=1171442#post1171442) which may explain some of the difficulties with the concept, but i'd like to look again at Philosoft's OP, since i missed it at the time.

If a phenomenon can be explained in terms of what is known, that is preferrable to positing unknown entities, which are epistemologically indistinguishable.

In fact, this isn't obvious. The unknown (or additional) entities parsed by Ockham's razor may have explanatory power outside the domain of consideration, or they may offer further methodological suggestions, subsequently showing that the utility (or truth) of the former explanation was too narrow. The extra terms may be methodologically interesting and stimulating even if they turn out to be completely in error. As Bohr was fond of saying, parsimony is judged after the event. It makes little methodological sense - to hammer the point home - to disallow additional entities before their consequences have been investigated; indeed, the application of parsimony as we have seen suggested in this thread throughout the history of science would likely have proved disasterous, from our point-of-view.

In its stead, it posits a creative entity that is completely unevidenced. The obvious problem is that the number of posit-able unevidenced explanatory entities is virtually limitless.

In the first instance, the lack of evidence for a posited entity is hardly a problem for scientists who are able to continue their efforts regardless. Moreover, this risks putting the cart before the horse: a theory may predict the existence of an entity for which there is no evidence but which is as a result subsequently discovered; that is, a strictly empirical understanding here is inadequate. Empirical terms may be driven by theory or entirely theory-laden. Secondly, while there may be a limitless supply of alternative hypotheses (as asserted by the strong underdetermination of theories), not all of them will have interesting enough consequences to pursue. The methodological point is once again: how can we know the utility (or truth) of apparently unevidenced or unwarranted theories/entities before the fact? Given that so many have turned out to be of benefit in the past - so goes the historical argument - why assume to the contrary now?

I have seen no argument to the effect that there is some distinguishable "point" in our explanatory escapades at which Ockham is no longer useful.

Consider a theory, T1 say, within a domain D. T1 predicts P, while the actual state of affairs is in fact P', close to P but their difference being beyond experimental possibilities. It is of little use to hope that an increase in experimental capabilities will lead to the discovery of P' because there is no apparent need to refine T1. Suppose instead that we propose additional theories T2, T3, etc, which differ from T1 with D and which predict P'. Ockham's razor cannot help us decide whether or not to pursue these new theories, but when we investigate them further we may find that T2, say, is confirmed where T1 was, makes novel predictions not given by T1 or suggests answers to problems for T1; in that case, then, we may chose to reject T1 and adopt T2, even though no refuting case has been made against T1.

Needless to say, this has happened on more than one occasion in the history of science and Ockham's razor was of no use. Insistence on the truth of an idea in spite of a lack of additional utility seems to have been, generally speaking, more important.

[Starboy]

Originally posted by Primal
Ok for your first part change it to many or some philosophers and you would be correct.

It doesn't say all philosophers, it is your presumption that it does.

Originally posted by Primal
In regards to the second part of your criticism:

1) It is an approximate stadnard. No one needs to agree exactly what the principle of parsimony is verbatim for it to be useful (no standard in science is universally established verbatim).

That sounds like a very religious argument. How do you know that you don't have your own particular brand of parsimony that is unlike anyone else and is bogus? You don't get to make up your own version of modus ponens, do you?

Originally posted by Primal
2. The reason specific examples are not invoked is because Occam's Razor, like observation and deduction, applies to all scientific endeavors.

Yet another religious argument. You have basically said, 'I know it is there but I can't point it out to you.' If you don't have a concrete example then you do not know for a fact that it is applicable even if only one case exists,

Originally posted by Primal
To figure out why try this thought expiriment. Lets say we are trying to figure out the cause of rain. I say "it's a rain elf".

You posit condensation, evaporation, temperature etc. I then say "yes that's all good....but you need my elf too."

Then someone else comes and proclaims "No! you need two elves!"

How do you get rid of two elves? The same way you get rid of one: Occam's Razor.

Primal, this is gibberish. Since when has science been concerned about elves? Your example leaves me with the impression that you have no idea what you are talking about.

Originally posted by Primal
As to your last point I am not sure but it appears as if you are saying philosophy is not useful.

If that is your case, then your case is absurd.

That is another topic. (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=47547)

Starboy

[Primal]

That sounds like a very religious argument. How do you know that you don't have your own particular brand of parsimony that is unlike anyone else and is bogus? You don't get to make up your own version of modus ponens, do you?

And that sounds like a very dogmatic argument. The fact is there is no rule that every word or standard has to be totally and universally defined. The very request is absurd and presumptuous.

Yet another religious argument. You have basically said, 'I know it is there but I can't point it out to you.' If you don't have a concrete example then you do not know for a fact that it is applicable even if only one case exists,


Yet another ridiculous argument. I likewise can't point out evolution, genes or atoms....guess belief in those things are religious. I can't point out existence as a whole, guess that is rubbish.

Can you give me a universally accepted definition of "gene", "science", "observation" or "color"?

And I have given an example, with the elf. You simply just don't like it (which is just too bad for you. )

Primal, this is gibberish. Since when has science been concerned about elves? Your example leaves me with the impression that you have no idea what you are talking about.



Missing the point.


Einstein: " Lets say a train went at the speed of light."

Starboy: "Oh well that's gibberish, science isn't concerned with imaginary trains."


Einstein: "But lets just say."

Starboy: "No! Your argument sounds religious."


It's called a hypothetical example starboy. Merely avoiding it with some cheap non sequitur proves nothing.

Why isn't science concerned with invisible rain elves exactly?

You have failed to give me an answer as to why....but I have one: Occam's Razor. It gets rid of those pesky little elves with ease.


Can you give me a better, working solution? Not simply a dogmatic rejection of the elf theory. I'm all ears.

[Starboy]

Primal you are such a whiner. You can’t even give me a coherent definition of what you think parsimony is, never mind what others think it is. What does it matter that others can’t agree, when you can't express what it is?

As far as I can tell, Primal, you seem to think that parsimony is important for getting rid of pesky little elves. I say that you are fooling yourself if you think that parsimony is a reasonable argument in such cases. It shows a great poverty of critical thinking skills.

Starboy

[Starboy]

Originally posted by Primal
Can you give me a better, working solution? Not simply a dogmatic rejection of the elf theory. I'm all ears.

I’m not going to comment about your elf example since like most of your posts it is so vague as to be gibberish. Lets take a specific example, crop circles. It is a real phenomenon that you can examine directly. How does parsimony apply to crop circles?

Starboy

[Primal]

Originally posted by Starboy
Primal you are such a whiner. You can?t even give me a coherent definition of what you think parsimony is, never mind what others think it is. What does it matter that others can?t agree, when you can't express what it is?

I didn't say they couldn't agree on what it is. Everyone knows what a person means by parsimony, just like everyone knows what people mean by science and pornography. They can agree on this meaning. What they have agreed on is a definition. And universal defitions are not always necessary for one to understand what a word or phrase means.

As far as I can tell, Primal, you seem to think that parsimony is important for getting rid of pesky little elves. I say that you are fooling yourself if you think that parsimony is a reasonable argument in such cases. It shows a great poverty of critical thinking skills.

Starboy


And your little ad hominem shows a great deal more poverty still.

[Primal]

Originally posted by Starboy
I?m not going to comment about your elf example since like most of your posts it is so vague as to be gibberish. Lets take a specific example, crop circles. It is a real phenomenon that you can examine directly. How does parsimony apply to crop circles?

Starboy

So in other words you can't refute my point concerning rain elves. Why am I not suprised?

As for crop circles that's easy. We know people do make them, we know they can in secrecy. So using parsimony, we posit that the idea that they are man made is more probable then the idea that they are made by aliens. Such is less extraordinary, posits less entities and is more in line with background knowledge.


So now that I answered your question, will you answer mine? If you fail to do so I will assume (with good reason) that you simply cannot.

[Starboy]

Originally posted by Primal
So in other words you can't refute my point concerning rain elves. Why am I not suprised?

As for crop circles that's easy. We know people do make them, we know they can in secrecy. So using parsimony, we posit that the idea that they are man made is more probable then the idea that they are made by aliens. Such is less extraordinary, posits less entities and is more in line with background knowledge.


So now that I answered your question, will you answer mine? If you fail to do so I will assume (with good reason) that you simply cannot.

Okay primal, now based on your supposed use of parsimony, define what it is.

Starboy

[Primal]

Tell me why I have to define it. I think everyone knows what I mean by it and I can describe it. Basically "do not multiply entities beyond necessity" with necessity being determined by evidence and logic.

Most definitions are approximations anyways. Lets say I defined "tiger" as "big, striped, cat". We one day find a mutant tiger with no stripes. Or a big house cat with stripes. Or genetically modify a lion to have stripes. Or paint stripes on a lion. You can even say "that born from a tiger" and we could plant a lion embryon into a tigress. If she gave birth, we would have something born of a tiger, but not a tiger.

Or lets say "big cat with tiger DNA" now that begs the question. Or we can say "around this kind of DNA" if we were desperate...in which case...what I can take some tiger cells. Some skin flakes and put them in a jar. Now we have tiger DNA, but no tiger. (The fact that we even distinguish between tiger DNA and tiger proves that a definiton by means of DNA will fail.)


Yet everyone knows what I mean by a tiger. We have a rough approximation of the phenotype. And that works well enough for most discourse and reasoning about the issue. For all intents and purposes I can use "big, striped cat" and get by. People would know what I mean and that's what is important.

I say the same is true with a lot of percepts and concepts. Including Occam's Razor.

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
Okay primal, now based on your supposed use of parsimony, define what it is.
AsteroidProgeny:

C'mon, you're the one who says they don't like parsimony - why don't you define it the way you don't like it.

Cheers, John

[theophilus]

Originally posted by Demosthenes
Starboy, you're missing the point. Occam's razor comes into play when we have information and evidence at hand to explain something. Since we can successfully explain that particular something, there is no need to postulate any unknown entities since to do so would be superfluous. The term "empirical" simply means that it is verifiable through experiment.

Ever heard of David Hume?

Occam's razor is often ambused when it's used in more of a theoretical nature since when we're dealing with abstract concepts with no grounding in reality, we have no way of knowing whether one way is better than the other.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by student738
There is I believe the scenario in which an effect is causally overdetermined by multiple material, sense-accessible causes where our initial observation of the effect produces empirical evidence insufficient to distinguish between any two determining causes.

In this case, any single determining cause will provide an adequate explanation of the effect. However, if upon discovering this determining cause we consider the matter closed, it seems that we "miss something important" about what has occurred. We are in this scenario ignoring material, sense-accessible causes.

I could be wrong, but I don't think causation is a sensory experience. Two events are observed to occur in sequence - causation is "assigned" to the first. Is that not correct?

In some instances of the above scenario, we will not and can not possibly uncover additional determining causes without revisting the effect, without observing, studying, or analyzing it further.

In these instances, if we apply an Ockham-like principle, the limiting result of this principle will only be overcome if we also apply some other principle by which we determine that amount of investigation of an effect which is sufficient to warrant our settling upon an explanation as adequate. That is, a principle by the application of which even though a conclusion adequately explains present observations, we continue our investigation where our observations are inappropriately limited or "shallow".

[theophilus]

Originally posted by Starboy
This is off topic but primals post points out another pet peeve I have regarding philosophers. The use of "straw man" as if it were a magic incantation.

Starboy

Much as they invoke Occam's Razor to exclude "non-natural" explanations.

[Starboy]

Originally posted by theophilus
Much as they invoke Occam's Razor to exclude "non-natural" explanations.

Agreed. It is intuition masquerading as reason.

[Starboy]

Okay Primal and John; here is lesson on of critical thinking 101.

1) Primal it is you that claims that parsimony is important.
2) You also claim to know what it is and how to apply it.
3) You are asking me to accept your claim that you do know what it is and how to apply it and as far as I can tell you expect me to accept it based on your insistence.

I will give you the benefit of the doubt and assume you are an idiot. An idiot will sign a contract without reading and understanding what they have signed. What you are asking me to do is:

1) Accept a concept you can't even state.
2) And then comment on your use of the concept.

To do this I must assume that you know what you are talking about. This assumption is not well supported by your previous posts.

Primal you are the one claiming parsimony is important and useful for science or anything else for that matter. You are the one that must support that claim. If you cannot or will not and yet still insist that it should be accepted then you are either an idiot or a con man.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
Okay Primal and John; here is lesson on of critical thinking 101....
SpaceCadet:

Irrelevant. Here is your very first post from this thread -
Originally posted by Starboy
Philosoft, dress it up any way you like. It is a presumption of reality. Very much like the idea that there is an ontology of reality. If there were such a study, science would have to be it.


Let's face it, you're not happy with Ockham's Razor but you're not telling anyone exactly what it is that you're unhappy with an why. It seems that while denying an ontology of reality can be valid there is a recurring theme of Starboy and/or science knows better. And that is not good science.

My suggestion is that you pick whatever dictionary or other reference definition you wish of Ockham's Razor and/or parsimony and we continue the debate from there.

Cheers, John

[Starboy]

Originally posted by John Page
My suggestion is that you pick whatever dictionary or other reference definition you wish of Ockham's Razor and/or parsimony and we continue the debate from there.

Cheers, John

John, I have tried that, but whenever I do, someone else pipes in and says that the proposed definition is not parsimony. Since I do not claim parsimony is important it is not for me to define it. It is for those that advocate parsimony.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
John, I have tried that....
OK let's try again with this:Ockham's razor

Ockham's razor (also spelled Occam's razor, pronounced AHK-uhmz RAY-zuhr) is the idea that, in trying to understand something, getting unnecessary information out of the way is the fastest way to the truth or to the best explanation. William of Ockham (1285-1349), English theologian and philosopher, spent his life developing a philosophy that reconciled religious belief with demonstratable, generally experienced truth, mainly by separating the two. Where earlier philosophers attempted to justify God's existence with rational proof, Ockham declared religious belief to be incapable of such proof and a matter of faith. He rejected the notions preserved from Classical times of the independent existence of qualities such as truth, hardness, and durability and said these ideas had value only as descriptions of particular objects and were really characteristics of human cognition.
Ockham was noted for his insistence on paying close attention to language as a tool for thinking and on observation as a tool for testing reality. His thinking and writing is considered to have laid the groundwork for modern scientific inquiry.

Ockham's insistence on the use of parsimony (we might call it minimalism) in thought resulted in some later writer's invention of the term, Ockham's razor. Among his statements (translated from his Latin) are: "Plurality is not to be assumed without necessity" and "What can be done with fewer [assumptions] is done in vain with more." One consequence of this methodology is the idea that the simplest or most obvious explanation of several competing ones is the one that should be preferred until it is proven wrong.
So let's assume Ockham's Razor is parsimony in the sense of rejecting unnecessary information or assumptions. Given your earlier comments, it is ironic that "His thinking and writing is considered to have laid the groundwork for modern scientific inquiry." Furthermore, I don't think any of your opponents in this thread have gone as far as advocating parsimony as the only way to solutions, just as a tool.

Cheers, John

[Starboy]

I am assuming that the snippet constitutes your definition and explanation of the use of Ockham’s razor. Lets examine the claims it makes:

1) “in trying to understand something, getting unnecessary information out of the way is the fastest way to the truth or to the best explanation”
2) "Plurality is not to be assumed without necessity"
3) "What can be done with fewer [assumptions] is done in vain with more."
4) "One consequence of this methodology is the idea that the simplest or most obvious explanation of several competing ones is the one that should be preferred until it is proven wrong."

Lets examine each claim:

1) “in trying to understand something, getting unnecessary information out of the way is the fastest way to the truth or to the best explanation”

This sounds great, but how does one determine if information is unnecessary when one is first trying to understand something?


2) "Plurality is not to be assumed without necessity"

How do you decide the necessity? Intuition? Whose intuition? Your intuition? My intuition?


3) "What can be done with fewer [assumptions] is done in vain with more."

Wouldn’t that depend on exactly what can be done with one set of assumptions vs. the other?


4) "One consequence of this methodology is the idea that the simplest or most obvious explanation of several competing ones is the one that should be preferred until it is proven wrong."

Isn’t this just a presumption that the universe is simple? Why should the simplest explanation be the most preferred? I’ll give you a simple explanation – ‘god did and made everything.’ Can’t get any simpler than that and I challenge you to prove it is wrong.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
I am assuming that the snippet constitutes your definition and explanation of the use of Ockham’s razor.
An incorrect and very unscientific assumption of yours, parsimoniuos though it may be. ;)
Originally posted by Starboy
Lets examine each claim:

1) “in trying to understand something, getting unnecessary information out of the way is the fastest way to the truth or to the best explanation”

This sounds great, but how does one determine if information is unnecessary when one is first trying to understand something?

Well, if you have data on acceleration under gravity that are consistent with the inverse square rule, why would you need to worry about the mass of the object? Most people agree it is counter-intuitive that attained velocity is independent of mass.
Originally posted by Starboy
2) "Plurality is not to be assumed without necessity"

How do you decide the necessity? Intuition? Whose intuition? Your intuition? My intuition?

I think this is a direct quote of Ockham and my response is the same as for claim #1.
Originally posted by Starboy
3) "What can be done with fewer [assumptions] is done in vain with more."

Wouldn’t that depend on exactly what can be done with one set of assumptions vs. the other?
I think Ockham is saying that if an increased number of assumptions are used to attain the same result, the additional assumptions are extraneous. Note: I think the assumptions are an entirely different matter from observational data, and agree with your prior comments that we should not discard data purely because they don't fit our assumptions.
Originally posted by Starboy
4) "One consequence of this methodology is the idea that the simplest or most obvious explanation of several competing ones is the one that should be preferred until it is proven wrong."

Isn’t this just a presumption that the universe is simple? Why should the simplest explanation be the most preferred?
Not at all, please see my previous comment on not discarding data because it doesn't jive with a (nice, simple, elegant) set of assumptions. Assumptions are there to be challenged and observational data to be made more comprehensive and accurate. I think one might insert to the quote "...is the idea that, all other things being the same the simplest explanation..."

Perhaps an intesresting case is the move from Newtonian physics to GR and SR explanations which supports your position (our at least my understanding of your position) that assumptions should not be set in concrete - but I don't think your respondents are claiming this either.
Originally posted by Starboy
I’ll give you a simple explanation – ‘god did and made everything.’ Can’t get any simpler than that and I challenge you to prove it is wrong.
Well, in the absence of reliable observational data, your assumption is premature.

Cheers, John

[theophilus]

Originally posted by Starboy
I would like to propose to the the mods that anyone that constantly invokes the words "straw man" instead of actually pointing out the specific claim that is unrelated to the topic, be banned from IIDB. If there ever was an example of a "straw man" argument primal's post would have to be it. I make no claim to a particular definition of parsimony nor do I claim that is is at all important or not to story telling.

Starboy

I concur (if anyone is counting votes). Except I would add all other types of non-substantiated blurts. e.g., "that's rediculous, impossible, etc."

[theophilus]

Originally posted by Starboy
Agreed. It is intuition masquerading as reason.

I would call it a prejudice.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
Well, in the absence of reliable observational data, your assumption is premature.

Cheers, John

But there is no absence of data; it is your interpretation of the data, based on a naturalistic assumption that is the issue.

What "reliable observational data" do you have that naturalism is an adequate explanation for all phenomenon that does not assume that naturalism is an adequate explanation for all phenomenon.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
Let's face it, you're not happy with Ockham's Razor but you're not telling anyone exactly what it is that you're unhappy with an why. It seems that while denying an ontology of reality can be valid there is a recurring theme of Starboy and/or science knows better. And that is not good science.

Not speaking for Starboy, the problem is not with OR but with the application, i.e., the general assusmption that non-emprircal, i.e., supernatural, explanations are de facto superfluous to the explanation of phenomenon, that naturalism is an adqeuate explanation for everything.

Does the fact that a simple data set may explain a phenomenon does not "requre" that it is the explanation. Wouldn't that require noing a priori what the answer was.

Aren't most explanations for physical phenomenon merely conjectures based on the assumption that "laws" of nature are real, i.e., naturalism?

Isn't it correct that physics still seems to assume causation? How is this warranted if no one has offered a convincing rebuttal to Hume?

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
But there is no absence of data; it is your interpretation of the data, based on a naturalistic assumption that is the issue.
Here's Starboy's example: ‘god did and made everything.’
Please provide what you consider to be reliable observational data supporting the truth or falsity of Starboy's example.
Originally posted by theophilus
What "reliable observational data" do you have that naturalism is an adequate explanation for all phenomenon that does not assume that naturalism is an adequate explanation for all phenomenon.
What reliable observational data do you have that I believe naturalism is an adeuqate explanation for anything?

Cheers, John

[Starboy]

Originally posted by Starboy
I am assuming that the snippet constitutes your definition and explanation of the use of Ockham’s razor.
Originally posted by John Page
An incorrect and very unscientific assumption of yours, parsimoniuos though it may be.
John, I agree. You seem to be such a slippery rascal that if you said something was black you probably meant it was green on Tuesday but red on Thursday. I wonder why I bother with you at all.
Originally posted by Starboy
Lets examine each claim:

1) “in trying to understand something, getting unnecessary information out of the way is the fastest way to the truth or to the best explanation”

This sounds great, but how does one determine if information is unnecessary when one is first trying to understand something?
Originally posted by John Page
Well, if you have data on acceleration under gravity that are consistent with the inverse square rule, why would you need to worry about the mass of the object? Most people agree it is counter-intuitive that attained velocity is independent of mass.
John Page, if you have data on gravity you don’t need to invoke parsimony. What supports the selection of one explanation over another now becomes the data, not some lame idea about simplicity.
Originally posted by Starboy
2) "Plurality is not to be assumed without necessity"

How do you decide the necessity? Intuition? Whose intuition? Your intuition? My intuition?
Originally posted by John Page
I think this is a direct quote of Ockham and my response is the same as for claim #1.
John, what do you do if there is no data to support one explanation over the other? Punt? Use Ockham’s? If you use Ockham’s what makes you think that your choice is any better then flipping a coin?
Originally posted by Starboy
3) "What can be done with fewer [assumptions] is done in vain with more."

Wouldn’t that depend on exactly what can be done with one set of assumptions vs. the other?
Originally posted by John Page
I think Ockham is saying that if an increased number of assumptions are used to attain the same result, the additional assumptions are extraneous. Note: I think the assumptions are an entirely different matter from observational data, and agree with your prior comments that we should not discard data purely because they don't fit our assumptions.
What if they don’t achieve the same results, then what? It is extremely rare that two different explanations achieve the same results. And what do you do in the case where the two explanations achieve the same results but have no assumptions in common? Which assumption is the extraneous? And in the case where all assumptions are the same except for one, isn’t it obvious that the assumption is extraneous? It is a trivial case and hardly is worth talking about. In any case the vast number of times that I have seen Ockham’s applied, the opposing explanations did not achieve the same results. Who could claim that a universe directed by ghosts, souls, demons, spirits, gods and so forth created in a mythic tale is going to predict the same things as a universe composed of forces, fields, particles, waves, atoms, and so forth? And if there is a question as to which explanation to choose wouldn’t the data be more important than some lame idea about simplicity?
Originally posted by Starboy
4) "One consequence of this methodology is the idea that the simplest or most obvious explanation of several competing ones is the one that should be preferred until it is proven wrong."

Isn’t this just a presumption that the universe is simple? Why should the simplest explanation be the most preferred?
Originally posted by John Page
Not at all, please see my previous comment on not discarding data because it doesn't jive with a (nice, simple, elegant) set of assumptions. Assumptions are there to be challenged and observational data to be made more comprehensive and accurate. I think one might insert to the quote "...is the idea that, all other things being the same the simplest explanation..."

Perhaps an intesresting case is the move from Newtonian physics to GR and SR explanations which supports your position (our at least my understanding of your position) that assumptions should not be set in concrete - but I don't think your respondents are claiming this either.
John, the respondents are all over the place. Using the responses to my challenges on parsimony as a sample of the uses, applications, definitions and interpretations of Ockham’s razor I would conclude that there is no reason to suspect that two different people looking at the same explanations would invoke or justify Ockham’s in any way that could be even loosely be considered to be common except for the most common use of Ockham’s by atheists as some sort of magic incantation to eliminate explanations that include supernatural assumptions.
Originally posted by Starboy
I’ll give you a simple explanation – ‘god did and made everything.’ Can’t get any simpler than that and I challenge you to prove it is wrong.
Originally posted by John Page
Well, in the absence of reliable observational data, your assumption is premature.

Cheers, John
John, you just gave me a data point and it supports my claim. Unless you meant to say that yes, you have a simpler explanation and that yes, you can prove my statement is wrong. If that is so then present it. Put up or shut up.

Starboy

[John Page]

Originally posted by Starboy
John, I agree. You seem to be such a slippery rascal that if you said something was black you probably meant it was green on Tuesday but red on Thursday. I wonder why I bother with you at all.
Straw man. ;)
Originally posted by Starboy
John Page, if you have data on gravity you don’t need to invoke parsimony. What supports the selection of one explanation over another now becomes the data, not some lame idea about simplicity.
I would suggest that is the process of mind that concocts and prefers and selects one explanation of the data over another explanation. To come to a clear and easily communicable explanation is, I venture, aided by parsimony. I for one would not disagree that neither complexity nor simplicity make the solution "right" - the fit with observation data is prime unless one prefers confabulated solutions.
Originally posted by Starboy
John, what do you do if there is no data to support one explanation over the other? Punt? Use Ockham’s? If you use Ockham’s what makes you think that your choice is any better then flipping a coin?
Nothing, drop kick, try Ockham's, nothing and see above.
Originally posted by Starboy
What if they don’t achieve the same results, then what? It is extremely rare that two different explanations achieve the same results. And what do you do in the case where the two explanations achieve the same results but have no assumptions in common? Which assumption is the extraneous? And in the case where all assumptions are the same except for one, isn’t it obvious that the assumption is extraneous? It is a trivial case and hardly is worth talking about. In any case the vast number of times that I have seen Ockham’s applied, the opposing explanations did not achieve the same results......
Yes and, of course, this is your mind's attempt to generate and rationalize a parsimonious explanation as to why parsiomnious explanations are not "right".
Originally posted by Starboy
John, the respondents are all over the place......
Another piece of evidence to support the relativists point of view that all points of view are relative. Of course, some claim to be more related to the real world than others.
Originally posted by Starboy
John, you just gave me a data point and it supports my claim. Unless you meant to say that yes, you have a simpler explanation and that yes, you can prove my statement is wrong. If that is so then present it. Put up or shut up.
Shut up is an option? Your proof is based on inadequate data , I fear. However, I think 100% success rate in predicting outcomes is a much better :D razor than Ockham's. Its simple, too!

Cheers, John

[Philosoft]

Originally posted by theophilus
But there is no absence of data; it is your interpretation of the data, based on a naturalistic assumption that is the issue.
I wonder about this. What is the alternative to a "naturalistic assumption"? A "supernaturalistic assumption? If so, and if your "supernaturalistic assumption" has unobservable entities, how do you know which supernatural to assume?

If we start with a "naturalistic assumption," it is possible that we might encounter something incongruous, forcing some alteration of our assumption. But a "supernatural assumption" can be easily modified to explain literally anything. If we assume a being who can do any action, how can we ever know what that being is doing, or not doing, unless we can observe it acting?

[Hugo Holbling]

It concerns me that i have already given answers to the points continuing to be raised here in my previous post. If i have not explained myself badly (again), i would appreciate learning where i was in error. The fact is that the history of science is replete with instances of parsimony being ignored because the consequences of additional assumptions or entities were apparently more important.

[John Page]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
....i would appreciate learning where i was in error. The fact is that the history of science is replete with instances of parsimony being ignored because the consequences of additional assumptions or entities were apparently more important.
Hi Hugo!

The issue doesn't seem to be examples - and there are counter examples where important data that didn't fit a theory was overlooked. I think it comes down to this - In order to prove that parsimony is important we have to define what it is, how it operates and show why it is superior.

I think theophilus summed up the issue very well:Not speaking for Starboy, the problem is not with OR but with the application, i.e., the general assusmption that non-emprircal, i.e., supernatural, explanations are de facto superfluous to the explanation of phenomenon, that naturalism is an adqeuate explanation for everything.

Let me suggest the concept of the brain as a device that compresses its experiences in a manner which enables them to be efficiently stored and manipulated. This being the case, parsimony could be characterized as the brain's overall strategy for understanding reality. I offer, then, this tentative conclusion as to why parsimony is useful without actually being an answer for anything.

Comments?

Cheers, John

[wordfailure]

John Page:
Let me suggest the concept of the brain as a device that compresses its experiences in a manner which enables them to be efficiently stored and manipulated. This being the case, parsimony could be characterized as the brain's overall strategy for understanding reality. I offer, then, this tentative conclusion as to why parsimony is useful without actually being an answer for anything.

I agree. Considering, for example, Primal's crop circle illustration from earlier in this thread...

As for crop circles that's easy. We know people do make them, we know they can in secrecy. So using parsimony, we posit that the idea that they are man made is more probable then the idea that they are made by aliens. Such is less extraordinary, posits less entities and is more in line with background knowledge.

Direct material proof of who or what is responsible is not available to most of us, but brains seem to need to process the information anyway. We are going to believe something about crop circles, proof or no proof, if only to the extent required to decide if our concept of the world ought to be adjusted (if necessary) to include secretive alien visitors or not. So whether or not parsimony is a legitimate tool of science, it certainly seems to be a tool of scientists, and everyone else.

[Hugo Holbling]

Originally posted by wordfailure:
Considering, for example, Primal's crop circle illustration from earlier in this thread...

I have already considered this example in the thread (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&postid=1174142#post1174142) linked to in my other post.

Originally posted by John Page:
This being the case, parsimony could be characterized as the brain's overall strategy for understanding reality. I offer, then, this tentative conclusion as to why parsimony is useful without actually being an answer for anything.

The point is that parsimony is not useful because the ceteris paribus clause very rarely (if ever) applies. Parsimony was not useful to Pauli (as Starboy noted) or Bohr, to use the examples already given, and scientists frequently violate it because the consequences of additional entities or theories are not clear before the fact and have to be investigated. It may be thought of as a rule-of-thumb but then its employment can have little force in argument; as a methodological approach it would restrict science and explicitly disallow many of the novel tactics used by scientists in the past.

It seems the only way to charitably interpret the use of parsimony is to follow Bohr and apply it after the event, but then other considerations have already decided the matter (as in the crop circle example).

[John Page]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
The point is that parsimony is not useful because the ceteris paribus clause very rarely (if ever) applies....
Put too strongly for me. I agree parsimony is not always useful. What do you think about the need for parsimonious methods of mind given that the universe does not appear to fit inside one's brain?

Cheers, John

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
Here's Starboy's example:
Please provide what you consider to be reliable observational data supporting the truth or falsity of Starboy's example.

I doubt that Starboy claims that there is "observational" data, i.e., sensory data, to support this claim and your request indicates that you assume that all truth claims are testable by empirical means.

What reliable observational data do you have that I believe naturalism is an adeuqate explanation for anything?

"Well, in the absence of reliable observational data, your assumption is premature."

Am I incorrect in inferring from this statement that you believe that "naturalism is an adequate" test for all truth claims? If so, I apologize and would appreciate a clarification.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
Put too strongly for me. I agree parsimony is not always useful. What do you think about the need for parsimonious methods of mind given that the universe does not appear to fit inside one's brain?

Cheers, John

Perhaps "humility" would be a better approach.

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
Perhaps "humility" would be a better approach.
For what?

[theophilus]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
It concerns me that i have already given answers to the points continuing to be raised here in my previous post. If i have not explained myself badly (again), i would appreciate learning where i was in error.

Gee, I can't imagine how that feels!

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
For what?


"given that the universe does not appear to fit inside one's brain?"

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
Let me suggest the concept of the brain as a device that compresses its experiences in a manner which enables them to be efficiently stored and manipulated.

Comments?

Cheers, John

Assuming your "computer" metaphor (if that's fair) I would ask from where the Brain receives it's instructions, i.e., to compress its data.

Can a brain actually store experiences? Isn't it more accurate to say it retains images of experience?

Just asking.

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
I doubt that Starboy claims that there is "observational" data, i.e., sensory data, to support this claim and your request indicates that you assume that all truth claims are testable by empirical means. [/QUOTE]

Here is Starboy's challenge:"I’ll give you a simple explanation – ‘god did and made everything.’ Can’t get any simpler than that and I challenge you to prove it is wrong."

My initial response was an attempt to discover what type of proof Starboy would be bound to expect. Since Starboy has placed a lot of emphasis on science and data previosuly in the thread I though it a good opportunity to critique his reasoning. When you responded, my instinct was to separate the data from the method to see which of them was in parsimony. ;)

Originally posted by theophilus
Am I incorrect in inferring from this statement that you believe that "naturalism is an adequate" test for all truth claims? If so, I apologize and would appreciate a clarification.
Assuming you are addressing the question to me, my answer is a resouinding No. Truth claims need to be tested in the context of the system against which they are held to be true. That system could be a formal logic, Starboy's mind or yours. Regarding naturalism as a "test", I'm not sure I understand you.

Cheers, John

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
Quoted from John Page: "given that the universe does not appear to fit inside one's brain?"
:confused: How does humility assist in the stuffing of more universe into one's cranium?

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
Assuming your "computer" metaphor (if that's fair) I would ask from where the Brain receives it's instructions, i.e., to compress its data.
I wasn't consciously putting forward a computing analogy but, anyhow, I believe the "instructions" are generated internally and the brain has evolved its ability to precis its experiences.
Originally posted by theophilus
Can a brain actually store experiences?
Now let me see if I can remember what I did yesterday..... (this is my way avoiding an explanation by offering you a self-verification method, not intended as sarcasm).
Originally posted by theophilus
Isn't it more accurate to say it retains images of experience?
I would say an image is part of an experience, a term generally used to refer to visual or pictorial memories.

Cheers, John

[theophilus]

Originally posted by Philosoft
I wonder about this. What is the alternative to a "naturalistic assumption"? A "supernaturalistic assumption? If so, and if your "supernaturalistic assumption" has unobservable entities, how do you know which supernatural to assume?

Fair question.

Of course, a general or theoretical supernatural assumption would be subject to the problem you pose. I hope you recognize that this problem applies equally to naturalism, though in the opposite direction.

So, in order for a supernatural assumption to be useful, it must be specific as to how it enables us to understand reality. Christian theism does this because it is not simply assumed or deduced from pre-existing data - it is based on revelation (I am not arguing this here, merely clarifying).

Based on scripture, we can understand the various aspects of our experience, we can have confidence in both our senses and intellect (created in the image of God). The presence of evil as a real thing and a foundation for scientific investigation is established. There is more, but I think this is at least the beginning of the answer your question.

If we start with a "naturalistic assumption," it is possible that we might encounter something incongruous, forcing some alteration of our assumption. But a "supernatural assumption" can be easily modified to explain literally anything.

There is a general misconception that an epistemology based on Christian theism simply says "god did it," and puts an end to any further attempt to understand, i.e., that Christians aren't interested in understanding "how" the universe works. After all Newton, Keppler, et al were Christians who based their science on the "supernatural assumptiom" that the God who is revealed in the Bible governs his creation in such a way that our senses and reason are not deceived (though finite and fallible).

As I've said elsewhere, since God's creative purpose requires communication with mankind, knowledge is not only possible, it is inescapable.

This may be more than you wanted and I certainly do not claim that the mere assumption answers all the questions relating to "how" a thing happens (except ultimately) or which of the possible explanations is correct. It does provide assurance that we can at least attempt an answer.

If we assume a being who can do any action, how can we ever know what that being is doing, or not doing, unless we can observe it acting?

I hope I answered this - revelation.
Your question really puts you right back where you started from, i.e., assuming that "observation" is the test of all truth claims. It also assumes, perhpas unconsciously, that God's workings are NOT observable to us, again based on a naturalistic assumption.

[theophilus]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by John Page
I wasn't consciously putting forward a computing analogy but, anyhow, I believe the "instructions" are generated internally and the brain has evolved its ability to precis its experiences.

I certainly didn't mean to put words in your mouth.

Let me see if I understand correctly: the brain is a self-instructing computer.

Doesn't this raise the "which came first" problem. If the brains capacity to instruct itself "evolved" over millions of years, how did it function prior to developing that capacity.
If there was not "plan" by which the brain worked, how did it work to get to the point that it could organize itself?

Certainly under this scenario, it would not have been a computer at all, just a hard drive, i.e., a data storage device. Maybe not, even a hard disk requires instructions.

Let me say what a refreshing experience it is to be able to "argue" without ridicule and insult - I've been over at EoG.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
:confused: How does humility assist in the stuffing of more universe into one's cranium?

It doesn't - perhaps I missfired. I thought you were speaking of the universe conceptually, not literally.

It helps keep a proper perspective in our desire to know "everything."

[theophilus]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by John Page

Here is Starboy's challenge:"I’ll give you a simple explanation – ‘god did and made everything.’ Can’t get any simpler than that and I challenge you to prove it is wrong."

My initial response was an attempt to discover what type of proof Starboy would be bound to expect. Since Starboy has placed a lot of emphasis on science and data previosuly in the thread I though it a good opportunity to critique his reasoning. When you responded, my instinct was to separate the data from the method to see which of them was in parsimony. ;)

I should have clarified that, whatever Starboy's intent, I do not assert that God's existence/workings can be perceived sensorilly (sp?). That is why the issue of miracles is largely misunderstood by believers and unbelievers alike. The significance of a supernatural "event" is determined by its context in the relationship that exists/does not exist between God and a people. The resurrection, contrary to popular opinion, is not proof of anything from an observational context. It is only proof in a pre-established, prophetic context. Even if there were universal consent to the "fact" of the resurrection, there could be no understanding of its significance without revelation. "Gee, strange things sure happen sometimes."

Assuming you are addressing the question to me, my answer is a resouinding No. Truth claims need to be tested in the context of the system against which they are held to be true. That system could be a formal logic, Starboy's mind or yours. Regarding naturalism as a "test", I'm not sure I understand you.

Yes, I was addressing you based on your request for "observable" evidence of God. Perhaps I misunderstand, but observable would appear to mean "perceived by the sense of signt (though other senses could be involved). We do not observe things intellectually, do we? We might "perceive" something intellectually, e.g., an unlterior motive, but not physical objects.

I took your request to mean you wanted to "see" some evidence for God; as Gordon Stein said, you wanted him to "put in an appearance."

This goes back to the issue of whether or not all truth claims are evaluated in the same manner, i.e., natural and supernatural. Incidentally, may I just point out that Christian supernaturalism includes naturalism, but the opposite is impossible.

[theophilus]

I apologize if I have taken this discussion off track. That is not my intention.

I just follow the discussion wherever it seems to go. I have no desire to direct (or redirect) it.

I have been accussed of "hijacking" threads on EoG.

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
[QUOTE]Let me see if I understand correctly: the brain is a self-instructing computer.
The analogy can be drawn, let's leave it at that.
Originally posted by theophilus
[QUOTE]Doesn't this raise the "which came first" problem. If the brains capacity to instruct itself "evolved" over millions of years, how did it function prior to developing that capacity.
If there was not "plan" by which the brain worked, how did it work to get to the point that it could organize itself?
There was no plan, IMO, I am not a subscriber to ID theories. How did the first brains come into being? I'd be interested in an achaeologist's view. My understanding is that certain chemical mixes (esp. including amino acids) gave rise to chemical mechanisms that were self-replicating. These entities were the precursor to life as we know it, over generations they developed (unconsciously) specialized functions which in turn involved to information processing nervous systems. Why? Evolutionary advantage.
Originally posted by theophilus
[QUOTE]Let me say what a refreshing experience it is to be able to "argue" without ridicule and insult - I've been over at EoG.
We're all wrong and its a matter of opinion who's wronger.

Cheers, John

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
I should have clarified that, whatever Starboy's intent, I do not assert that God's existence/workings can be perceived sensorilly (sp?). Then how can we know them at all? It does not seem necessary to invent god for the explanation of anything, to me. Taking Ockham's Razor, then, god is unnecessary for explanation of ther natural world.
Originally posted by theophilus
That is why the issue of miracles is largely misunderstood by believers and unbelievers alike. The significance of a supernatural "event" is determined by its context in the relationship that exists/does not exist between God and a people. The resurrection, contrary to popular opinion, is not proof of anything from an observational context. It is only proof in a pre-established, prophetic context. Even if there were universal consent to the "fact" of the resurrection, there could be no understanding of its significance without revelation. "Gee, strange things sure happen sometimes."
Fundamentalists do not take the same view, I think because they have figured out that if religious events are interpreted only as metaphor then religion itself is merely a metaphor. As to revelation, science does not exclude the wonder of discovery. The underlying issue is whether we're talking about something verifiable as opposed to pyschsomatically generated.
Originally posted by theophilus
Yes, I was addressing you based on your request for "observable" evidence of God. Perhaps I misunderstand, but observable would appear to mean "perceived by the sense of signt (though other senses could be involved). We do not observe things intellectually, do we? We might "perceive" something intellectually, e.g., an unlterior motive, but not physical objects.
First, "intellectual perceptions" are perceptions of our own attitudes and thought processes. The difficulty with these is that we currently lack the technology to verify percisely the patterns of brain activity that relate to a specific thought. Experience of god is a subjective one, that is, an individual experience. I suggest that, in the absence of scientifically verifiable observations, the most parsimonious explanation for god is that it is an imaginary concept. Brain research, IMO, points in this direction.Originally posted by theophilus
I took your request to mean you wanted to "see" some evidence for God; as Gordon Stein said, you wanted him to "put in an appearance."
Apparitions are not admissable.
Originally posted by theophilus
This goes back to the issue of whether or not all truth claims are evaluated in the same manner, i.e., natural and supernatural. Incidentally, may I just point out that Christian supernaturalism includes naturalism, but the opposite is impossible.
Please see above!! Christian Supernaturalism is a belief system spawned of the natural world which includes unsupported beliefs of many kinds. Nihilism is another.

Cheers, John

[theophilus]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by John Page
Then how can we know them at all? It does not seem necessary to invent god for the explanation of anything, to me. Taking Ockham's Razor, then, god is unnecessary for explanation of ther natural world.

Hmmmm. This is beginning to feel like a broken record ala EoG.
How do we know ANYTHING at all? That, after all, is THE question, isn't it. You are still trying to reconcile supernaturalism from within your naturalistic worldview. You assume that you have THE means of interpreting all of reality and the "God hypothesis" doesn't make sense, i.e., "inventing God" to explain things. You begin from the starting point that God isn't necessary to explain anything, so, therefore, we don't need him.
Surely, you can see that that begs the question whether naturalism - fallible, finite reason, is adequate to explain anything. How did you discover what reality IS in the first place so you'd know how to verify it?

Fundamentalists do not take the same view, I think because they have figured out that if religious events are interpreted only as metaphor then religion itself is merely a metaphor.

I am a fundamentalist (in the traditional sense) and I don't think I said that miracles are merely metaphors. I said miracles are not self-interpreting, i.e., the resurrection "proves" that Jesus was God. I said the significance of any "real" supernatural event can only be understood in its prophetic covenantal context.

As to revelation, science does not exclude the wonder of discovery. The underlying