The Death of Subjectivism

[Alonzo Fyfe]

If I could accomplish one small thing within the Internet Infidel community it would be to take common subjectivism between my thumb and forefingers, squash it, and dispose of the remains, where it would never be seen or heard from again.

By 'Subjectivism' I do not mean the denial of intrinsic values. Any here who know me know that I believe that all true value claims describe relationships between states of affairs and desires.

Rather, what I call 'common' subjectivism is the idea that one person can hold that a moral proposition is true, another can hold that is false -- or in some other sense one person can 'accept' a proposition and another 'reject' it -- without contradicting each other.

I have given my arguments against this elsewhere, most recently in a formal debate (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=59835) on the subject, and in a series of essays, Ethics Without Got (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=46876).

But I want to claim that common subjectivism is not only wrong, but advocating it is destructive of the things that the people here tend to value. The person who retreats to subjecivism in a debate immediately destroys the foundation of any social change they want to defend.

Do you want to argue that church and state ought to be separate? Well, 'ought' -- according to subjectivism -- is merely a matter of opinion, and nothing can really be said against the individual who holds a different opinion. No argument can be raised against them, there is no truth of the matter, the only thing that the subjectivist can say is "three cheers for separating church and state."

Unfortunately, the people cheering are so few they are drowned out by the curses and the boos from the other side.

"You're out voted. Too bad for you. We win. Don't like it? Tough."

The message that needs to be communicated clearly, and that can be communicated honestly, is that mixing church and state is an objectively, knowably, bad idea -- like using a match to see if there is gas in the gas tank. Those who promote this mixture are laying the foundation for new rounds of abuses and violence that are clearly evident, not only in our history, but around the globe today.

September 11, North Ireland, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Pakistan/India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Phillipines, you can hardly swing a dead cat without hitting a religious zealout out to kill somebody. All of it aims from the zealot's craving to take control of the apparatus of government to subject the population to their interpretation of God's Will. Which is just another way of saying that they want to control the apparatus of government to force populations into obeying their own will -- only, by attributing it to God, demagoges have long noticed that they can get a bit more compliance.

And this is objectively, visibly, knowably, immoral. It is evil.

Unfortunately, the subjectivist cannot say this. Or, at the very best, can only offer a concept of evil that is so diluted that almost by definition nobody else needs to pay attention to it.

Pressed on the matter, the subjectivist eventually says, "There is no truth of the matter, one opinion is as good as any other." says the subjectivist. To which, the Theist asks, "If any opinion is as good as any other, why are you standing there telling me that my opinion is wrong? Go away, little boy. You bother me."

Nope. One has to be able to stand up, toe to toe and eye to eye, with those who wish to mix church and state and say, "You are WRONG. What you are advocating is WRONG. It may make you feel good. You may like it. But that does not change the fact that what you are advocating is something that no decent person would advocate."

[xorbie]

:notworthy

Bravo Alonzo. Subjectivists (who tend to be atheistic), give atheists a bad name in the morals department. The idea that two people can disagree and both be "right" is bullcrap. Either they aren't disagreeing, or one is wrong. This goes for objective claims of Truth, and should, as I have seen you state several times, apply for claims about morality.

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe

If I could accomplish one small thing within the Internet Infidel community it would be to take common subjectivism between my thumb and forefingers, squash it, and dispose of the remains, where it would never be seen or heard from again.
Well, it's not going to happen while you are simultaneously arguing implicitly for subjectivism on another thread. (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?threadid=61689)
Of course, you can always try claiming objective morals derived magically without any reference to nature, but hey, there are certain problems with that.
:)
Rather, what I call 'common' subjectivism is the idea that one person can hold that a moral proposition is true, another can hold that is false -- or in some other sense one person can 'accept' a proposition and another 'reject' it -- without contradicting each other.
Mischaracterization through your conflation.

A subjectivist describes two contradicting moral statements as being equal on merit of existance ---- which would not stop a subjectivist from prescribing a moral stance of her own.
:)
But I want to claim that common subjectivism is not only wrong, but advocating it is destructive of the things that the people here tend to value. The person who retreats to subjecivism in a debate immediately destroys the foundation of any social change they want to defend.
Bad mistake. You're making a consequentialist utilitarian argument against subjectivism, which undercuts your position completely.

The message that needs to be communicated clearly, and that can be communicated honestly, is that mixing church and state is an objectively, knowably, bad idea
Communicate the idea all you like. It doesn't make it true.

-- like using a match to see if there is gas in the gas tank. Those who promote this mixture are laying the foundation for new rounds of abuses and violence that are clearly evident, not only in our history, but around the globe today.
This explains why the USA with its strict church/state seperation is almost unique among highly industrialized nations in its religiousity, while today many West European nations with established state churches are very secular.
Oh wait.
:confused:

Maybe it explains why so many of those selfsame European nations now allow homosexual marriages, or at least legally-recognised homo partnerships, and the USA doesn't ?

Nope. no go. :(
And this is objectively, visibly, knowably, immoral. It is evil.
Uh huh. You are claiming "objective" status for consequentialist ethics derived from subjective ethical judgments of your own.
No can do.
;)
Unfortunately, the subjectivist cannot say this. Or, at the very best, can only offer a concept of evil that is so diluted that almost by definition nobody else needs to pay attention to it.
Actually, you have a point here, though it's not the one you wish to make.
Since frankly overt subjectivism is usually the province of liberals, often they're left huffing and puffing when it comes to the question of evil.
However, meet me. :)
I'm different. And I have no problems tackling the question of evil.
Pressed on the matter, the subjectivist eventually says, "There is no truth of the matter, one opinion is as good as any other." says the subjectivist.
Wrong again.
You conflate subjectivism with extreme relativism; and you've been around here long enough to know the two are not the same, so why the pretense ?

Existance does not equal "truth".
To say that two competing moral stances both exist does not equal stating that both are true ccording to the moral framework of the observer.

One has to be able to stand up, toe to toe and eye to eye, with those who wish to mix church and state and say, "You are WRONG.See above.
And there are plenty worse problems in the world than church/state seperation.

[tronvillain]

Alonzo Fyfe:
Do you want to argue that church and state ought to be separate? Well, 'ought' -- according to subjectivism -- is merely a matter of opinion, and nothing can really be said against the individual who holds a different opinion. No argument can be raised against them, there is no truth of the matter, the only thing that the subjectivist can say is "three cheers for separating church and state."
Ah, but it is not necessarily true that under subjectivism no argument can be raised against someone in favour of the unification of church and state. It really depends on exactly how the person supports the unification of church and states and on what other values they profess to hold: one can show that there is a flaw in their argument for the unification of church and state or show that their other values conflict with the unification of church and state. Of course, it is possible that their support and values present are invulernable to attack, but in that case there is no solution but to simply oppose them.
Unfortunately, the people cheering are so few they are drowned out by the curses and the boos from the other side.

"You're out voted. Too bad for you. We win. Don't like it? Tough."

The message that needs to be communicated clearly, and that can be communicated honestly, is that mixing church and state is an objectively, knowably, bad idea -- like using a match to see if there is gas in the gas tank. Those who promote this mixture are laying the foundation for new rounds of abuses and violence that are clearly evident, not only in our history, but around the globe today.

September 11, North Ireland, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Pakistan/India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Phillipines, you can hardly swing a dead cat without hitting a religious zealout out to kill somebody. All of it aims from the zealot's craving to take control of the apparatus of government to subject the population to their interpretation of God's Will. Which is just another way of saying that they want to control the apparatus of government to force populations into obeying their own will -- only, by attributing it to God, demagoges have long noticed that they can get a bit more compliance.
It is objectively and knowably a bad idea if you object to what appear to be its likely effects. Since most people share a similar subjective perspective, most people would agree that it is a bad idea if those are in fact its effects.
Unfortunately, the subjectivist cannot say this. Or, at the very best, can only offer a concept of evil that is so diluted that almost by definition nobody else needs to pay attention to it.

Pressed on the matter, the subjectivist eventually says, "There is no truth of the matter, one opinion is as good as any other." says the subjectivist. To which, the Theist asks, "If any opinion is as good as any other, why are you standing there telling me that my opinion is wrong? Go away, little boy. You bother me."

Nope. One has to be able to stand up, toe to toe and eye to eye, with those who wish to mix church and state and say, "You are WRONG. What you are advocating is WRONG. It may make you feel good. You may like it. But that does not change the fact that what you are advocating is something that no decent person would advocate."
A subjectivist says no such thing, though they may say "There is no truth of the matter, one subjective feeling is ultimately as good as any other." A subjectivist does not think that the opinion that the world is flat is as valid as the opinion that the world is round. It is trivially easy for the subjectivist to stand up and say "You are WRONG. What you are advocating is WRONG. It may make you feel good. You may like it. But that does not change the fact that what you are advocating is something that no decent person would advocate." I am a subjectivist, and I am perfectly capable of saying such a thing, with the understanding that ultimately it depends on a foundation of subjective feelings.

:rolleyes:

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Gurder:: Well, it's not going to happen while you are simultaneiously arguing implicitly for subjectivism in another thread.

The classic false dichotomy.

Premise 1: Either moral claims must reflect some absolute entirely human-independent supernatural property, or everybody gets to make up whatever moral view they like.

Premise 2: Moral claims do not reflect some absolute entirely human-independent supernatural property.

Conclusion: Therefore, everybody gets to make up whatever moral view they like.

Nope, there are other options available. In my arguments referenced above I use location as an example of something that is not an absolute entirely human-independent supernatural property, and yet we can't just think something to a new location. Locational properties are relative, and yet there is still an objective, knowable fact of the matter.



Gurder:: You're making a consequentialist utilitarian argument against subjectivism, which undercuts your position completely.

It seems you skipped right on past the part of my post where I said that I have discussed why Common Subjectivism is wrong elsewhere (and gave references to where), and that here I was going to focus on why Common Subjectivism is unwise.

This one point undercuts most of your comments against me. What you have taken as my argument against subjectivism is not, in fact, my argument against subjectivism. Read one of the two referenced threads for that argument.



Gurder:: A subjectivist describes two contradicting moral statements as being equal on merit of existance -- which would not stop a subjectivist from prescribing a moral stance of her own.

Yes. A moral stance which is a completely worthless, impotent, groundless waste of everybody's time.

She might as well be drawing prescriptions out of a hat and shouting them into the wind. It does not matter which one is drawn, and nobody else has any reason to listen to the one she happened to draw as those that she could have drawn.

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
....
Nope, there are other options available. In my arguments referenced above I use location as an example of something that is not an absolute entirely human-independent supernatural property, and yet we can't just think something to a new location. Locational properties are relative, and yet there is still an objective, knowable fact of the matter.
You mean you have an ethic, that being church-state seperation, and you want to define it as "objective" merely because it accords with your own subjective ethics .... but you'll retreat into vagueness whenever asked to define the source and nature of these so-called objectivbe ethics.

And I love your consequentialist utilitarian argument in favour of an ethic, which were it "objective", would not need such justification.
You've also skipped the part where I even proved your empirical justification of your church-state seperation ethic wrong.
It seems you skipped right on past the part of my post where I said that I have discussed why Common Subjectivism is wrong elsewhere (and gave references to where),
Wrong !
I've read everything you've posted on the subject.
It seems you simply skip the refutations.
Yes. A moral stance which is a completely worthless, impotent, groundless waste of everybody's time.
*yawn*
Rhetoric does not an objective ethic make.


All you are doiing is attempting an argument to authority in favour of a particular ethic, the authority being here the supposed consequences.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by tronvillain
Of course, it is possible that their support and values present are invulernable to attack, but in that case there is no solution but to simply oppose them.

Except moral claims are not about their individual values. Once you enter into a moral debate, such as the overall merits of separation of church and state, you give up the idea that 'this is about me' and enter into a context in which it only makes sense to say 'this is about us.'

At which point, we leave agent-subjectivism and start talking about something that is substantially agent-objective.

If you enter into the debate thinking "this is about me," you're not talking about morality any more. Your claims are as much nonsense as entering into a horse-auction and debating the features of a mustang while thinking, "This is about a car."

It's an equivocation, a pun, a bad joke, and it makes the equivocator look stupid, and gives everybody else a reason to stifle a chuckle, politely say goodby, and go to where they can have an intelligent conversation talking about mustangs.

Originally posted by tronvillain
It is trivially easy for the subjectivist to stand up and say "You are WRONG. What you are advocating is WRONG. . . . I am a subjectivist, and I am perfectly capable of saying such a thing, with the understanding that ultimately it depends on a foundation of subjective feelings.

Sure, you can say it.

But can you mean it?

What are you saying when you are saying it is wrong. Nothing more than, "I don't like it." But you are not giving me one iota of a reason why it is true -- why the opposite view is mistaken by all who hold it.

And if others can hold the opposite view without being mistaken, then (wait a second while I enter into the body of such a person), "Why in heck are you standing there wasting my time?"

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe

Except moral claims are not about their individual values. Once you enter into a moral debate, such as the overall merits of separation of church and state, you give up the idea that 'this is about me' and enter into a context in which it only makes sense to say 'this is about us.'

At which point, we leave agent-subjectivism and start talking about something that is substantially agent-objective.
Bollocks.
We enter intersubjective agreement on values, and tzhe initial impetus comes from individual values.
If you enter into the debate thinking "this is about me," you're not talking about morality any more......It's an equivocation, a pun, a bad joke, and it makes the equivocator look stupid, and gives everybody else a reason to stifle a chuckle, politely say goodby, and go to where they can have an intelligent conversation talking about mustangs.

Mere rhetoric.
And if others can hold the opposite view without being mistaken,
I love the way you consistantly pretend that a subjectivist statement that all expressed moral stances empirically exist as moral stances somehow magically renders them all morally equal to the moral observer.
But it still doesn't make it true.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Gurdur
We enter intersubjective agreement on values, and tzhe initial impetus comes from individual values.

No, we don't. Intersubjectivity respects only the sameness of people, and ignore the differences. But, the differences between individuals are as relevant as the ways in which they are the same.


Originally posted by Gurdur
I love the way you consistantly pretend that a subjectivist statement that all expressed moral stances empirically exist as moral stances somehow magically renders them all morally equal to the moral observer.
But it still doesn't make it true.

Actually, we may be discussing two different definitions of 'subjecitvism' -- because nowhere in the view that I said I wanted to squash did I mention anything about the view that "all expressed moral stances empirically exist."

Descriptive subjectivism, or moral sociology, is a completely different field. For example, we can sit and have a nice chat about the views of right and wrong that dominated ancient Greece. Our conversation about ancient Greek morality can then drift into a discussion about ancient Greek science, and what they held were scientific facts. But just as the existence of ancient Greek science does not prove that science itself is subjective, the existence of ancient Greek morality does not prove that morality is subjective.

What I am arguing against is the stronger statement that all systems are equally valid -- that (for example) ancient Greek science/morality is just as valid as contemporary science/morality.

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe

No, we don't. Intersubjectivity respects only the sameness of people, and ignore the differences.
Wrong !
You willfully ignore bargaining and accomodational behaviour in human democracies on ethical issues.
Actually, we may be discussing two different definitions of 'subjecitvism'
Correct.
:)
I am working with the standard accepted definition of "subjectivism". Of course, AFAIK.

You are working with your individual and conflated definition.

Descriptive subjectivism, or moral sociology, is a completely different field.
Gosh, you admit then that conbflation between extremist relativism and subjectivism is not a good thing ?
Good-o.
:)

So why don't you use the term "extreme relativism" rather than "subjectivism" ?
It would save much to-ing and fro-ing.

BTW, can you actually point out any extreme relativists on this board ? Ones who are not out-and-out nihilists ?

I ask, since you said you wished to crush that ideology here --- and I simply don't see it happening much.

But if you did point out to me where it's happening here on this board, I will happily join you in a crusade upon it.
I loathe extremist relativism.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Gurdur
[You willfully ignore bargaining and accomodational behaviour in human democracies on ethical issues.

These views are called 'contractarian' and are not the types of views that I am talking about.

'Intersubjective' means that the attitude is subjective, but all subjects happen to have the same attitude. It pays attention to common attitudes, but ignores uncommon attitudes (which are not, by definition, intersubjective).

Contractarian theories are not subjective. They take subjective attitudes as input, but their output is totally objective.


Originally posted by Gurdur
I am working with the standard accepted definition of "subjectivism". Of course, AFAIK. You are working with your individual and conflated definition.

A term can have multiple definitions, without any of them having any claim to being 'the standard accepted definition.'

I do not believe that 'subjective' has a standard definition, which is why I opened my post by giving two possible definitions, and specifying which of the two I would be using.

You have stated that you are using a view of subjectivism that is purely discriptive. But, morality is prescriptive. Since I am talking about prescriptions, and you are talking about descriptions, then it makes sense to conclude that we are not talking about the same thing.

Subjective prescriptivity makes no sense (except when the agent is prescribing for himself -- never when he is prescribing for others) because the subjective prescriptivity is only valid for the subject.


Originally posted by Gurdur
So why don't you use the term "extreme relativism" rather than "subjectivism" ?

Because 'relativism' is confusing. As I mentioned earlier, relative properties (such as location) can still be objective. So, relativism does not exclude objectivism. And, in fact, I hold that moral properties are relative AND objective -- in the same way that locational properties are relative AND objective.

So, I can't argue against relativism. I argue, instead, against the view that is actually in error -- subjectivism.

[Calzaer]

The idea that two people can disagree and both be "right" is bullcrap.

I say women look best in blue. You say women look best in red. Only one of us can be right, since we're disagreeing. So what's the best color? One of us is obviously not actually as attracted to our stated preference as we are to the other's stated preference, by your own logic.

[xorbie]

Your example fails to contradict anything. If I say "women look best in X" and you say "no, women look best in Y" we are not both right. In fact, I think it is pretty clear that neither of us is objectively right. However, beauty has nothing to do with objective truth, and even less (is this possible?) to do with objective morality.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Calzaer
I say women look best in blue. You say women look best in red. Only one of us can be right, since we're disagreeing. So what's the best color? One of us is obviously not actually as attracted to our stated preference as we are to the other's stated preference, by your own logic.

This example does not contain any element of disagreement.

Person1 is saying, "I prefer women in blue," and Person2 is saying "I prefer women in red."

This is no different than Person1 saying "I live in Denver", and Person2 saying "I live in New York." There is no sense whatsoever to be made of the claim that these two people are in disagreement. Nor does it make sense to say that the two people talking about women in red and blue are in disagreement.

But, when one person says, "There ought to be separation of church and state" and another says "There ought not to be separation of church and state," these two people ARE taken to be in disagreement.

From which it follows that these types of 'ought' claims are relevantly different from the types of claims you use in your example.

If two people are in disagreement, it is required that they be talking about the same thing.

If Person1 is saying that Jim's car is blue, and Person2 is saying that Jim's car is red, and they take themselves to be disagreeing, it is a required assumption that they are talking about the same Jim, the same car, the same blue, and the same red.

If Person1 is saying "There ought to be separation between church and state," and Person2 is saying that there ought not to be separation between church and state, and they take themselves to be disagreeing then it is required . . . I repeat required . . . that they mean the same thing not only by the words 'church', 'state', and 'separation', but that they also mean the same thing by the word 'ought'.

Without this, the subjectivists reduce all moral discussion into a poorly written and not-very-funny Abbott and Costello comedy routine.

Person 1: "A approve of capital punishment."

Person 2: "You are wrong. I do not approve of capital punishment."

Person 1: "You are such an idiot. Anybody can see that I am clearly in favor of capital punishment."

Person 2: "I can not even imagine meeting anybody so stupid that they cannot plainly see that I do not approve of capital punishment."

And so on.

It is as nonsensical as:

Person 1: "I live in Denver."

Person 2: "No, you're wrong. I live in New York."

Person 1: "You are such an idiot. Right now, I am looking out my window at the Rocky Mountains, which are not visible from New York. I am clearly in Denver."

Person 2: "I can not even imagine meeting anybody so stupid that what is outside my window right now is the Empire State Building, in New York!"

This is the absurdity of common subjectivism.

This is the joke that everybody else picks up on the instant an individual mentions that he supports subjectivism.

"Okay. Fine. If you don't want to have a serious discussion about church and state (or capital punishment, or abortion, or gay rights, or animal rights, or the environment, or sex education in public schools, or separation of church and state, or free trade, or whatever), then go on about your business and leave the discussion to those who want to debate it seriously. we're really not in the mood for your subjectivist comedy routine right now. Please, run along now. Bother somebody else."

Subjectivism really should be tossed in the trash bin, except for those who are trying to be funny.

[tronvillain]

Alonzo Fyfe:
Except moral claims are not about their individual values. Once you enter into a moral debate, such as the overall merits of separation of church and state, you give up the idea that 'this is about me' and enter into a context in which it only makes sense to say 'this is about us.'

At which point, we leave agent-subjectivism and start talking about something that is substantially agent-objective.

If you enter into the debate thinking "this is about me," you're not talking about morality any more. Your claims are as much nonsense as entering into a horse-auction and debating the features of a mustang while thinking, "This is about a car."

It's an equivocation, a pun, a bad joke, and it makes the equivocator look stupid, and gives everybody else a reason to stifle a chuckle, politely say goodby, and go to where they can have an intelligent conversation talking about mustangs.
Except that moral claim are ultimately about their individual values. It is just that the individual values of most people include the values of others to a greater or lesser degree. You cannot enter into a moral debate thinking anything but "this is about me" for the simple reason that you are you and not anyone else. You may discuss the facts of church/state seperation, but once those facts are established which course of action is "right" depends upon an individuals subjective perspective.
Sure, you can say it.

But can you mean it?

What are you saying when you are saying it is wrong. Nothing more than, "I don't like it." But you are not giving me one iota of a reason why it is true -- why the opposite view is mistaken by all who hold it.

And if others can hold the opposite view without being mistaken, then (wait a second while I enter into the body of such a person), "Why in heck are you standing there wasting my time?"
Yes, I can mean it, though what I intend it to mean is that "I do not like it." I am not giving you one iota of a reason why it is true? I think the simple fact that I say "I do not like it" should be evidence enough. Or perhaps you mean I am not giving you one iota of a reason why you should not like it too? That is because there is no reason, unless there are facts you are unaware of or logical flaws in your reasoning. For this reason, moral disagreements usually cannot be solved by debate: there is nothing to debate. All that can be done is to agree to disagree or attempt to use force.

[tronvillain]

Alonzo Fyfe:
"Okay. Fine. If you don't want to have a serious discussion about church and state (or capital punishment, or abortion, or gay rights, or animal rights, or the environment, or sex education in public schools, or separation of church and state, or free trade, or whatever), then go on about your business and leave the discussion to those who want to debate it seriously. we're really not in the mood for your subjectivist comedy routine right now. Please, run along now. Bother somebody else."
Oh, you can have a serious discussion about those topics, but only about the facts of the matter. If the facts are established, then any discussion about the morality of any of those topics is a comedy routine. Most moral "debates" are completely ridiculous because they are little different than "I like red!", "No! I like blue!", "No! I like red!", and so on.
If Person1 is saying "There ought to be separation between church and state," and Person2 is saying that there ought not to be separation between church and state, and they take themselves to be disagreeing then it is required . . . I repeat required . . . that they mean the same thing not only by the words 'church', 'state', and 'separation', but that they also mean the same thing by the word 'ought'.
It is possible for this to be an objective disagreement, but it is equally possible for this to be as subjective as "Women ought to wear red (because I find that women look better in red)." versus "Women ought to wear blue (because I find that women look better in blue)." All that is required is that the facts of the matter be established, and every exchange in a "debate" will be reduced to "I like the seperation of church and state" and "I do not like the seperation of church and state."

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by tronvillain
You cannot enter into a moral debate thinking anything but "this is about me" for the simple reason that you are you and not anyone else.

I can know that other people exist. I can know that they have desires. And I can know how states of affairs stand in relationship to those desires.

That is all it takes to make rational statements about other peoples' values. We do it all the time. We do it when we try to pick out a present for somebody else, and when we try to impress them, and even when we try to hurt them. All of these require reasonable deductions as to how states of affairs stand in relationship to somebody else's desires.

There is no mystery here. It is a part of our every day life. Your day is filled with actions that you take based on theories you have drawn up as to how certain states of affairs stand in relationship to the desires of others. We're not talking about tarot cards or astrology charts here, but genuine theories based on observation and abduction about states of affairs stand in relationship to the desires of other people.

Sometime, multiple other people.

You could not live without it. At least not well.


Originally posted by tronvillain
For this reason, moral disagreements usually cannot be solved by debate: there is nothing to debate. All that can be done is to agree to disagree or attempt to use force.

But people do debate.

Here's the real kicker -- sometimes they debate with themselves. They say, to themselves, "I think that capital punishment is wrong. But is it really wrong?" They change their mind. "I used to think this, but now I think that" and they attribute it -- not to a simple change of taste (in the form of "I used to hate blue cheese but now I like it"), but in the form of an actual change of opinion (e.g., I used to think that capital punishment was wrong but now I see that my earlier view was mistaken).

Most importantly, there is something to debate. We are debating what is best for us. "Best for me" is useful input, but "Best for us" is the output that the debate aims for. And "best for us" is objective. Even if it is built out of the subjective, individual, "best for me" inputs, the output is still objective because the output is substantially independent of any of the individual "best for me" inputs.

[PTT]

We are debating what is best for us. "Best for me" is useful input, but "Best for us" is the output that the debate aims for. And "best for us" is objective. Even if it is built out of the subjective, individual, "best for me" inputs, the output is still objective because the output is substantially independent of any of the individual "best for me" inputs.

Not true. "Best for us" changes with the makeup of "us", and is therefore far from objective. It is, in fact, subject to the opinions of "us" as individuals.
A good example would be the democtatic system itself. As "we" individually change our opinions of current government and votes swing from right to left (or vice versa), we have, through the selection of individual "best for me" votes, changed what we decide is "best for us". Therefore we cannot objectively say that right- or left-wing policies are "better for us", and neither one selection is objectively true.
The same is true of the example you bring up regarding separation of church and state. Personally, I happen to agree with the policy of separation, but in a highly religious society a theocracy may be selected by all the "best for me" votes, thereby making it "best for us".

Society is no more than an agreement of individuals to live together in an agreed-upon manner. Morally, we are all selfish and will all vote for "best for me" morals, thereby making the "best for us" moral that society agrees upon, making it law. Morals are therefore no more than the "best for us" which society wants, making it subject to the make-up of that society. There is therefore no objective moral truth.

If you wish to argue for an objective moral truth, a self-evident basis for that truth would be required.

Ta muchly

PTT

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by PTT
"Best for us" changes with the makeup of "us", and is therefore far from objective.

Your conclusion does not follow from your premises.

Our total weight changes with the makeup of "us", yet it is fully objective. Our average age changes with the makeup of "us", yet it too is fully objective. Once we have an agreement over who the "us" are, there is a right answer. An objective answer.

Morality makes it easy, because the makeup of "us" is built into the meaning of the term.

All of us.

Everybody.

There might be some dispute at the fringes as to whether animals or fetuses count as "us". Yet, even here, I believe that arguments can be made. (To count as an "us" a being must have desires.)

Yet, for my purposes here, we can leave this issue alone. If we get to the point that we have reduced the issue to a dispute over these types of questions, I have accomplished virtually all of what I have sought to accomplish . . .

. . . the death of common subjectivism.


Originally posted by PTT
It is, in fact, subject to the opinions of "us" as individuals.
A good example would be the democtatic system itself.

What you say is descriptively true, but irrelevant to the point under contention.

As doctors change their opinions about the causes and effects of different treatment options, they treat diseases differently.

Yet, this has no implications whatsoever on whether these 'opinions' concern a subject that is objective or subjective. It is fully consistent with this to argue that, in medicine, these opinions are about something objective. And the same can be said about morality.

In morality, people routinely seek out evidence as well. We see this every day in other posts in this forum. And all of that evidence makes sense if you interpret the debate as a debate over what is 'best for us'.

[Note: I am using 'best for us' as a heuristic here. A full examination of moral terms, I believe -- and have argued for in the two threads referenced in the opening post -- will show that the argument is about what is 'best for us to like or dislike'. This is a bit more complicated, and I do not think that the complications serve any useful purpose here. Yet, I wanted the reader to be aware of them.]


Originally posted by PTT
Therefore we cannot objectively say that right- or left-wing policies are "better for us", and neither one selection is objectively true.

Then we had better close down the Moral Principles and Political Discussions forums on this board, because a great deal of what goes on there is exactly what you say cannot be done.

Virtually every post can be sensibly read as somebody seeking to provide evidence in support of a conclusion of what is "best for us".

Not only CAN we talk about such things, it would be foolish of us to choose not to. We would be condemning ourselves and each other to lives of solitude, misery, and violent confict. We would be robbing ourselves of the benefits of cooperation.


Originally posted by PTT
Personally, I happen to agree with the policy of separation, but in a highly religious society a theocracy may be selected by all the "best for me" votes, thereby making it "best for us".

Even if everybody voted for such a proposition, it would not necessarily (and, I would argue, not even in fact) make it the case that this is "best for us".

If all of the "best for me" votes closed all of the hospitals and required faith healing as the only form of medicine, people may believe that this is "best for us", but they would be mistaken.

On the same types of grounds, replacing evolution with creationism in the public schools is a clear "best for us" mistake. The ignorance in biology and medicine that would result from this would be a great detriment to the medical sciences.

And, indeed, I am fully prepared to defend separation of church and state as the "best for us" opinion over accomodation. Why? Just look at the history books and the newspapers -- nearly every act of large-scale violence being committed by one group of people against another is motivated by religious groups seeking to obtain contol of the powers of the state.

And look at the reasons offered by the founding fathers, and the philosophers they payed attention to. That state-sponsored religion serves only to "make half the world fools and the other half hypocrites" is a very good "best for us" option against state-sponsored religion.


Originally posted by PTT
Society is no more than an agreement of individuals to live together in an agreed-upon manner.

This is perfectly consistent with what I have said before, because in an agreement to live together there is an interest in seeking to discover what is 'best for us'.


Originally posted by PTT
Morally, we are all selfish and will all vote for "best for me" morals . . .

As a psychological theory, psychological egoism is an archaic 19th century idea that could not withstand scientific scrutiny.

Humans are beings that seek the maximum fulfillment of their desires, given their beliefs. But there is no limit to what those desires may be. Some desires are self-regarding (selfish, or self-destructive). Other desires are other-regarding (altruistic, or sadistic). And some desires do not person-regarding at all, but thing-regarding.

These desires may include an aversion to telling lies, an aversion to taking things that do not belong to you, a desire to treat all people fairly, an aversion to killing innocent people.


Originally posted by PTT
If you wish to argue for an objective moral truth, a self-evident basis for that truth would be required.

This is no more true than it is to say that arguing for an objective scientific truth requires a self-evident basis for that truth.

Einstein's theory of relativity, for example, is perfectly objective. (Relativity. Objective. Get it?). Yet, it is far . . . far . . . far away from being in any sense self-evident.

[strubenuff]

Alonzo,
I'm joining in late, but I'm having trouble understanding you so I thought I'd ask. You believe that morals aren't subjective because morals are the average of everyone's personal beliefs as to what is "best for us" (which is equivalent to "what we prefer/like") at any given time in history? You also think objective morals need a self-evident basis as much as locations need a self-evident basis ("intrinsic, absolute location")?

I don't understand what basis either of those have (although neither may accurately describe your position). Averaging subjective opinions will give you an objective average (ie-the statistical mean), but that doesn't make the answer any more "correct" than any other opinion. And, with respect to location, it is all relative. That's why no self-evident basis is needed.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Alonzo . . . You believe that morals aren't subjective because morals are the average of everyone's personal beliefs as to what is "best for us" (which is equivalent to "what we prefer/like") at any given time in history?

Beliefs have nothing to do with morals, or with any type of value. Value exists in the form of relationships between states of affairs and desires. What these relationships are is independent of what anybody may believe them to be. For example, regular exercise is good for you regardless of what you believe.

Morals are concerned with evaluating states of affairs relative to desires (so they are subjective in a broad sense), but NOT the desires of the agent (so they are objective in a narrow sense).

There is a right answer to be found, a right answer that is the same for all of us, regardless of what any one of us may think or want that answer to be. That right answer concerns a relationship between a state of affairs and all desires, but it is still a right answer.



You also think objective morals need a self-evident basis as much as locations need a self-evident basis ("intrinsic, absolute location")?

This is true, but I want to exercise some caution.

Objective value, like objective location, requires no self-evident, obvious, intrinsic, absolute basis. Both objectively describe relationships, and whatever the fact of the matter is it is independent on what anybody may believe or want that relationship to be.

Both are objective. Neither involves an intrinsic, absolute property.

[Adrian Selby]

The message that needs to be communicated clearly, and that can be communicated honestly, is that mixing church and state is an objectively, knowably, bad idea -- like using a match to see if there is gas in the gas tank. Those who promote this mixture are laying the foundation for new rounds of abuses and violence that are clearly evident, not only in our history, but around the globe today.

The problem then isn't so much one of identifying church with state per se, but one of individuals abusing their power. The roots of socialism lie in Christianity, I'm no Christian, far from it, but insofar as the two share anything, namely, the view that one's welfare is best served altruistically, it follows that a state system founded on this ideal has the potential to do good. It's a matter of historical fact that this hasn't been the case, though the facts are arguable, depending on who you count as beneficiaries.

Either way, you can't pretend that identifying church and state is objectively a bad thing, because that would imply only bad could ever come of it. This isn't necessarily true. I can conceivably 'promote the mixture' on the basis that the people at the top are good people, and the people whom they govern make them accountable, and all can see that the Christian principles are those of charity, not greed etc. etc.

All we can say on your view is that mixing church and state has been a bad thing, and can be a bad thing when people with no concern for the teachings of the Bible (in particular) are given power. As there is no convincing argument in my mind for the view that separating the two leads to any fewer atrocities as far as the governing elect is concerned, I'm not sure that a case can't be made by a subjectivist for the contrary to your assertion.

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the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[Adrian Selby]

regular exercise is good for you regardless of what you believe.

I disagree. Regular exercise may be considered 'good' if what one values is one's sustained health. Given that one can have regular exercise and smoke and drink and eat fatty foods, it follows that the rationale on which to judge exercise good seems to imply that abstinence from tobacco, alcohol, excess cholesterol is also good. However, it isn't the case that people value a lower heartbeat, not puffing excessively when scaling some steps and salad.

Some believe it is good to be wanton, to enjoy what fruits there are in youth, or instead think that long hours at work, or at some art of their own, or drinking and smoking in an active social life contribute far more to the quality of their life than exercise.

You need to mount an argument for why they live their life wrongly when they consciously do not consider as 'good' regular exercise.

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the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[Alonzo Fyfe]

I disagree. Regular exercise may be considered 'good' if what one values is one's sustained health.


I agree. But please note. I said that regular exercise is good for you regardless of what you believe.

I did not say that regular exercise is good for you regardless of what you desire. If I had said this, I would have been wrong, for the reasons you provided.

In fact, I have repeatedly said that all value exists in the form of relationships between states of affairs (e.g., exercising) and desires. Change the desires, and you have a whole new relationship.

Again, this is just like location. The location of something is given relative to something else. Move the 'something else', and a true location statement becomes false. Or, what is true about the location relative to one thing, may not be true about the location relative to another thing.

But, location statements are still objective. Scientists, for example, have no trouble at all incorporating location statements into their theories.

So, what you have written is fully consistent with what I have said -- as long as you do not confuse beliefs with desires.

(Note:

Beliefs have a truth value, but no motivational force. I believe that I work in Denver. What I believe is true only if "I work in Denver" is true.

Desires have a motivational force but no truth value. If I work in Denver is true, this does not make my desire that I work in Denver true. Rather, it makes my desire that I work in Denver fulfilled.

If what you are writing about has motivational force and is capable of fulfillment, then you are not talking about a belief. You are talking about a desire.)



Some believe it is good to be wanton . . .

What are you really talking about. Are you really talking about people who "Believe it is good that I am wonton" or people who for whom wontoness would fulfill their desires?

If they "believe it is good", then we can ask if that belief is true or false. We look at the desires that are relevant in that particular use of the word 'good', and ask if the relationship between being wonton and those desires is what the person believes it to be. If it is not, then the belief is false. Objectively false.

What if they desire to be wonton? We can still ask if the desire is good, by looking at whether the desire to be wanton fulfills or thwarts other desires. Just as we can ask whether the desire to smoke is good by asking whether the desire to smoke fulfills or thwarts other desires.

Again, what people believe is irrelevant. Only what they desire is relevant.

Here, we must take care to make another careful distinction -- to distinguish between moral good and other types of good. Particularly, good in the sense of 'good food'. 'good music', 'good painting'.

This use of the word 'good' is agent-desire-subjective in the sense that the subjectivists claim. And, I think, this is one of the traps of moral subjectivism. Because some uses of good are subjective, they want to interpret all uses as subjective, and it just does not work.

Again, the analogy to location proves useful. Sometimes, I give the location of things relative to where I am. I can speak about my wife being 10 miles away, and about my cat being on my lap. But there is no rule of law or nature that dictates that the fact that I sometimes make these agent-relative statements, that I must never make other-relative statements. "The keys are on the table" and "The Empire State Building is in New York" are still allowable statements.

Similarly, there is nothing . . . nothing about the fact that some value statements are agent-desire-subjective that implies that we an not speak about relationships between states of affairs and desires not our own, or not exclusively our own.

One alternative to "relative to my desires" is "relative to all of our desires". And this is the alternative that makes the most sense of moral claims and moral arguments. Plus, it is substantially independent of the beliefs or the desires of the agent making the moral statement.



You need to mount an argument for why they live their life wrongly when they consciously do not consider as 'good' regular exercise.

Who are 'they'? As argued above, I need a clearer statement about whether we are talking about beliefs or desires, as well as which beliefs/desires, before I can know what you are asking here.

[strubenuff]

I'm still confused, but I've been having a bad day so it's probbaly me and not your explanation. Let's work with an example to try and clear things up: I want to kill Henry (he's an asshole). I desire to kill Henry. I believe I should kill Henry. I would prefer to kill Henry. I would like to kill henry. I think that about covers everything. So, the question is: is it objectively wrong for me to kill Henry?

You're telling me that the answer is unknown. But, it could simply be found. All we have to do is ask every living person whether or not they desire for me to kill Henry, take the average, and I have my set of values?

[Adrian Selby]

Rather, what I call 'common' subjectivism is the idea that one person can hold that a moral proposition is true, another can hold that is false -- or in some other sense one person can 'accept' a proposition and another 'reject' it -- without contradicting each other.

BTW, thanks for outlining your requirement for clarification, I think I am using the terms interchangeably, belief and desire, but this is due to their semantic proximity in the common parlance.

One ought to exercise regularly - is this a moral proposition? How do we begin to say that this statement can be true regardless of what people believe?

I think you need to clarify how beliefs have anything to do with moral propositions. You seem to be saying they don't. Beliefs have truth value, so I can believe that regular exercise promotes physical wellbeing, but my desires are for other pursuits. Here my belief is true, but it does not affect my actions of course. However, I could have other desires such as a desire for wellbeing, along with the belief that regular exercise promotes physical wellbeing.

How is this inconsistent with subjectivism? A subjectivist would contend that statements such as 'one ought to exercise' reflect the predilections and desires of the latter, and are no more 'right' than the predilections and desires of the former, though both correctly believe that regular exercise promotes physical wellbeing.

Asking whether smoking thwarts further desires (how do you thwart a dispositional state?) may get the answer 'it stops me running the 100 in 12 seconds' but not smoking may thwart me in my attempt to 'look cool to my peers', which, in looking cool, will lead to the propagation of desires such as 'social acceptance'.

This use of the word 'good' is agent-desire-subjective in the sense that the subjectivists claim. And, I think, this is one of the traps of moral subjectivism. Because some uses of good are subjective, they want to interpret all uses as subjective, and it just does not work.

So you're saying the use of the word 'good' in 'moral good' is to be interpreted as subjectivists say it is? If so, aren't you contradicting yourself.

As for the possibility of good food and music not being subjective, I don't see how the subjectivist cannot assert that a foodstuff is not to them a 'good' foodstuff. Unless you're defining good food merely as 'any foodstuff that offers sustenance and is edible' rather than 'any food that is cooked in such a way as to create a more complex flavour or mixture of flavours' I don't see how you can argue that the subjectivist view is wrong. Lamb and mint sauce might indeed be considered widely as compatible flavours, but if one hates mint sauce, then while one might believe the proposition as true that 'lamb and mint are compatible flavours to the human palette' they might disagree, suggesting both that the flavours are not compatible to them, and suggesting it is not true that, objectively speaking, the flavours are compatible, clearly, the compatibility depends on one's taste. Moreover, it depends on whether one considers the compatibility good in the sense that it can be compared more favourably to other compatibilities. I would not be averse to lamb and ice cream, odd platefellows though they might be.

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the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by strubenuff
I'm still confused, but I've been having a bad day so it's probbaly me and not your explanation. . . .

Okay, you can cut out the Socrates imitation.


Originally posted by strubenuff
. . . Let's work with an example to try and clear things up: I want to kill Henry (he's an asshole). I desire to kill Henry. I believe I should kill Henry. I would prefer to kill Henry. I would like to kill henry. I think that about covers everything. So, the question is: is it objectively wrong for me to kill Henry?

Yes, it is objectively wrong for you to kill Harry. (Probably, given certain standard assumptions and conditions, such as you and Henry are human, Henry is not about to flip a switch that would turn off the Sun, and the like).

"Wrong" means "Not what a person with good desires would do."

"Good desires" = "Those desires that are compatible with the fulfillment of the desires of others." [Note: Desires, like everything else, only have value in terms of their relationship to other desires. There are no 'intrinsic' values.]

A person with good desires will almost certainly have an aversion to killing innocent people, thus an aversion to killing Henry, thus would not do it.

It is an objective fact that an aversion to killing is good relative all to other desires. And it is an objective fact that a person with an aversion to killing will not kill Henry. And it doesn't take anything such as asking everybody any question or averaging to reach this conclusion. It does not take anything more complicated than to recognize that since killing is such a desire-thwarting activity, an aversion to killing would be desire-fulfilling.

If you want a fuller defense of this account, then check out the two threads that I referenced in my opening post.

[tronvillain]

Alonzo Fyfe, I would enjoy seeing a response to my other post first, but I will respond now anyway:
I can know that other people exist. I can know that they have desires. And I can know how states of affairs stand in relationship to those desires.

That is all it takes to make rational statements about other peoples' values. We do it all the time. We do it when we try to pick out a present for somebody else, and when we try to impress them, and even when we try to hurt them. All of these require reasonable deductions as to how states of affairs stand in relationship to somebody else's desires.

There is no mystery here. It is a part of our every day life. Your day is filled with actions that you take based on theories you have drawn up as to how certain states of affairs stand in relationship to the desires of others. We're not talking about tarot cards or astrology charts here, but genuine theories based on observation and abduction about states of affairs stand in relationship to the desires of other people.

Sometime, multiple other people.

You could not live without it. At least not well.
Oh, you can easily make rational statements about other people's values. We do indeed do it all the time. This does not change the fact that you cannot enter into a moral debate thinking anything but "this is about me" for the simple reason that you are you and not anyone else. Even if (and it is a big if) you take into account the values of everyone else equally, you only do so because of your values.
But people do debate.
Yes, people do debate. Frequently the debate is about the facts of the matter, such as whether y will be a consequence of x or not, but much of the debate is usually completely pointless. That is, it is no different than - and just as ridiculous as - two people arguing about whether asparagus is tasty or disgusting.
Here's the real kicker -- sometimes they debate with themselves. They say, to themselves, "I think that capital punishment is wrong. But is it really wrong?" They change their mind. "I used to think this, but now I think that" and they attribute it -- not to a simple change of taste (in the form of "I used to hate blue cheese but now I like it"), but in the form of an actual change of opinion (e.g., I used to think that capital punishment was wrong but now I see that my earlier view was mistaken).
Now, do people debate with themselves? I do not myself, but perhaps other people do. Still, if they change their mind and it is not the result of new information or a line of reasoning previously unexplored then what could explain it but a simple change of taste? In the first case someone might think "I was mistaken." but in the second case they would probably think something like "I was a bad person."
Most importantly, there is something to debate. We are debating what is best for us. "Best for me" is useful input, but "Best for us" is the output that the debate aims for. And "best for us" is objective. Even if it is built out of the subjective, individual, "best for me" inputs, the output is still objective because the output is substantially independent of any of the individual "best for me" inputs.
It is not clear that we are debating what is "best for us." Who ever agreed to define "moral" as "the sum total of subjective individual 'best for me' inputs?" I know I didn't. You might (probably with the assistance of some relatively arbitrary rules) be able to assemble some sort of rough concensus of "best for me" inputs on some issues (that is essentially how we get laws) but that does not compell anyone to agree that your answer is what is "moral."

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Adrian Selby
One ought to exercise regularly - is this a moral proposition?

No.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
How do we begin to say that this statement can be true regardless of what people believe?

Like this:

This statement can be true . . .

(Sorry. I'll go back to my room now.)


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
I think you need to clarify how beliefs have anything to do with moral propositions. You seem to be saying they don't.


Value statements describe relationships between states of affairs and desires.

Notice that, in the above sentence, the word "belief" does not appear. Only desires and states of affairs being evaluated are relevant to value. Beliefs are not relevant.

A "belief" by definition, is motivationally neutral. Beliefs describe the world, they do not prescribe anything.

(Desires, on the other hand, prescribe. They do not describe.)


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
Beliefs have truth value, so I can believe that regular exercise promotes physical wellbeing, but my desires are for other pursuits. Here my belief is true, but it does not affect my actions of course. However, I could have other desires such as a desire for wellbeing, along with the belief that regular exercise promotes physical wellbeing. How is this inconsistent with subjectivism?

It is not inconsistent with subjectivism. But, you are talking here about practical 'ought'. This is not moral 'ought'.

Practical 'ought' is subjective. By definition, practical 'ought' considers only the desires of the agent.

Moral 'ought' is objective. By definition, moral 'ought' considers all desires that exist, not just those of the agent. Consequently, the truth or falsity of a moral claim is substantially independent of the agent's (or assessor's) own psychological states.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
Asking whether smoking thwarts further desires (how do you thwart a dispositional state?) . . .

It is a technical term used within the BDI Theory of psychology within which I am operating in this argument.

All beliefs and desires are propositional attitudes. They describe a mental attitude to a proposition.

A proposition is the meaning component of a statement. "I am writing this post" and "Alonzo is writing this post" are two different statements, but they describe only one proposition (given the fact that I am Alonzo).

Propositional attitudes can always be written in the form:

Agent <attitude> that <proposition>

Thus, they are called propositional attitudes.

Cute, isn't it.

I believe that I work in Denver, CO
I desire that I work in Denver, CO

Note that "I work in Denver, CO" is a proposition. A statement, capable of being true or false. In this case, it happens to be true.

Whenever a situation exists in which:

(1) Agent desires that <proposition>

(2) <proposition> is true.

Then the desire is fulfilled.

Thus, if I desire that I work in Denver, CO, and "I work in Denver, CO" is true, then my desire is fulfilled.

Like I said, this is a stipulated technical definition. It simply means, "In this theory, we are going to use the word 'fulfilled' for a desire whenever the proposition that describes the object of the desire is true."

Similarly, whenever a situation exists in which:

(1) Agent desires that <proposition>

(2) <proposition> is false.

Then the desire is thwarted.

Again, this use of the word 'thwarted' is simply a stipulation that means nothing other than that the agent has a desire that P and P is false.

Desires have motivational force. Desires motivate us to make or keep the propositions that are the objects of our desire true. (As you said, a desire is a dispositional state. A desire is a disposition to make or keep the proposition that is the object of the desire true.)

If I desire that I work in Denver, CO, then I am motivated to a degree proportional to the strength of the desire (disposed) to make it the case that "I work in Denver, CO" becomes or remains true.



Originally posted by Adrian Selby
So you're saying the use of the word 'good' in 'moral good' is to be interpreted as subjectivists say it is?

Um . . . no.

Nyet.

Not at all.

Nope.

The common moral subjectivist says that the word 'good' in 'moral good' refers only to the attitudes of the speaker.

I am saying that the common moral subjectivist is full of horse hockey. The word 'good' in 'moral good' refers to all desires, regardless of who has them. As such, they are substantially independent of the attitudes of the speaker.

I want to see common moral subjectivism exposed for the intellectually vacant idea that it is. Hung out to dry. Tied up, tossed on a train, and ridden out of town on a rail.


Originally posted by Adrian Selby
As for the possibility of good food and music not being subjective, I don't see how the subjectivist cannot assert that a foodstuff is not to them a 'good' foodstuff. Unless you're defining good food merely as 'any foodstuff that offers sustenance and is edible' rather than 'any food that is cooked in such a way as to create a more complex flavour or mixture of flavours' I don't see how you can argue that the subjectivist view is wrong.

I can't. The subjectivist is right, about food.

You are correct that by the phrase 'good food' I meant 'good tasting food', not 'good for you food.'

However, this gives me a chance to point out that what we are talking about here are two different meanings of the word 'good'.

One meaning of good food (the good tasting sense) relates the food directly to the desires of the agent. It looks only at what the agent would find directly pleasing or displeasing.

A second meaning of good food (the good for you sense) relates the food indirectly to the desires of the agent. A food is good for you if it aids in the fulfillment of other desires you may have, regardless of how much or how little you enjoy the experience of eating it.

'Good' has multiple meanings, each describing different types of relationships between different states of affairs and different desires.

And 'moral good' relates states of affairs to all desires regardless of who has them, and is substantially independent of the desires of any given agent.

Subjectivism about moral value is a mistake.

[Holy Heretic]

This is actually pretty frustrating- not being able to participate fully in these juicy conversations, but I'll add a few comments anyway.

Gurdur makes a point I cherish: "I love the way you consistantly pretend that a subjectivist statement that all expressed moral stances empirically exist as moral stances somehow magically renders them all morally equal to the moral observer."

This is a common psychological fault with objectivists: they feel the only possible driving force behind human outrage is a breach of moral universality- they cannot accept that disposition is a potent means of evaluation.

I'll quote from the debate:

The moral absolutist believes that human judgment without transcendent morality is impossible. So he implies that all men who assert that judgment involves preference should abstain from it, and proclaims a contradiction when they don't fall for his own proclivities. Such maxims are nonexistent. Nothing within the relativist doctrine demands the suspension of sensibility or value. An act of injustice exists as an impracticality amidst men, and it is wholly consistent that they withhold their tolerance. Such impracticalities are not of matching moral merit -they are what people deem them to be- and there is no intrinsic obligation of forbearance. The action is simply offensive; and sensible men act to prevent offense.

When the debate comes to an end I'll be happy to review various statements made here which strike my nerves...

[Adrian Selby]

Moral 'ought' is objective. By definition, moral 'ought' considers all desires that exist, not just those of the agent. Consequently, the truth or falsity of a moral claim is substantially independent of the agent's (or assessor's) own psychological states.

I think you're missing the point, the subjectivist is making a point about the nature of moral statements, namely, that while some view them as having to consider all desires that exist, they are in fact only considerations of one's own, and the imputing of desires on others reflects one's own views on the issue.

Why is it this is wrong? Is it to do with this thing from the other thread of there being some calculus whereby there is a net thwarting of desires over a net propagation?

Why is the statement 'one ought to.....' not a moral proposition if it prescribes some course of action? Is it because it isn't expressed as 'everyone ought to...'?

I don't agree that 'by definition' moral ought considers all desires that exist, and regardless, it isn't that simple, its the weighting of those desires and the reasons for weighting them that have a moral impact, I can weight the considerations of my mother's desires over my wife's when it comes to whether she chooses abortion or not, but I don't. It is meaningful to ask if it is right of me to do that. Furthermore, if I consciously consider a broad range of desires, on the parts of other people, but don't consider them relevant, am I supposed to weight them more?

[99Percent]

I find it an obvious contradiction for moral subjectivists to deny that there are others with desires of their own, and that they are moral agents by themselves.

[Adrian Selby]

Who's claiming that nobody outside a moral subjectivist cannot be considered a moral agent. Isn' t the subjectivist view one of acknowledging that there is no objective way of arbitrating between such views, put crudely?

[Alonzo Fyfe]

tronvillain

I have difficulty answering your original post because I do not find much of an argument. It is just an assertion.

All that is required is that the facts of the matter be established, and every exchange in a "debate" will be reduced to "I like the seperation of church and state" and "I do not like the seperation of church and state."

It does not address the two problems that I have raised.

First, if you enter into a discussion with the claim, "There ought to be separation between church and state, and I mean this in the common subjectivist sense," then you are announcing that what you are saying has no validity for anybody else. You are saying, "What I am saying is insignificant to anybody but me. Ignore me. I'm just over here making random noises."

Second, this violates a rule of language. If two people enter an arena of debate, it is assumed (and, indeed, it is necessary for communication) that they debate the same proposition. If they enter holding different propositions (for an extreme example, one enters the arena of debate holding 'Dinosaurs were warm blooded' and the other enters with the proposition 'Rattlesnake meat tastes like chicken," there is nothing to debate. Subjectivism holds that everybody enters the arena of public debate on moral issues holding a different proposition, and yet they debate.

I can introduce a third problem: the Euthyphro argument.

"Do you approve of X because X is good, or is X good because you approve of it?" If the latter is true, then anything that is approved of becomes good. If you come to approve of torturing young children for pleasure, then torturing young children for pleasure is good. And there is no 'special reason' to approve of, or disapprove of, torturing young children for pleasure.

A 'good for us' (or, more exactly, 'good for us to like') conception handles all three of these problems.

• The propositions are relevant to others.

• People enter the arena of debate holding the same proposition, so there is something to debate.

• Torturing young children for pleasure is not something that is 'good for us to like' (where 'us' means 'all of us' -- including the children).

At the same time, we are not introducing any type of metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. We are not introducing supernatural 'intrinsic value' properties. All value continues to be nothing more than relationships between states of affairs and desires. We need only to recognize the all-too-obvious fact that other desires exist, and that we can discuss objectively true (or false) propositions describing relationships between states of affairs and desires that are not our own.

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Adrian Selby

Isn' t the subjectivist view one of acknowledging that there is no objective way of arbitrating between such views, put crudely? Precisely.
Though, mind you, intersubjective arbitration goes a long way.
:)

Alonzo Fyfe is simply using different terminology to the rest of us, as well as trying to bring in a strong social component.
Personally I think it's merely an attempt to bring in an argument from authority, but hey.
I'm still waiting on an answer from Alonzo Fyfe here (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?threadid=59622&perpage=25&pagenumber=2), which may clear up confusion.

99Percent, of course, is an Objectivist, and denies the existance of a moral subjectivist who holds ethics differently from those he adjudges as "good".

It is indeed a hard life for those of us who recognise the empirical subjectivity of ethics, yet still manage to be strongly moral, albeit subjectively and intersubjectively so.
:cool:

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Oh, you can easily make rational statements about other people's values. We do indeed do it all the time. This does not change the fact that you cannot enter into a moral debate thinking anything but "this is about me" for the simple reason that you are you and not anyone else.

This sounds to me like a direct contradiction. I can make rational statements about relationships between states of affairs and desires that are not my own -- except when I enter into a moral debate -- where something somehow prevents me from making rational statements about relationships between states of affairs and desires not my own.

If I can make these rational statements, when why can't I make them when engaged in a moral debate?


Even if (and it is a big if) you take into account the values of everyone else equally, you only do so because of your values.

It sounds to me as if you are talking about the causes of action, not the meaning of propositions.

If Jack Horner says, "The T-Rex was a scavenger", he says this because he believes it. And yet, it does not follow from this that the statement "The T-Rex was a scavenger" (spoken by Jack Horner) means nothing more than that Jack Horner believes it. It's not a statement about Jack Horner, it is a statement about T-Rex.

Similarly, if Alonzo Fyfe says, "There ought to be separation between church and state," he certainly says this because he believes it. And yet, it does not follow from this that the statement "There ought to be separation between church and state" (spoken by Alonzo Fyfe) means nothing more than that Alonzo Fyfe believes it. It is not a statement about Alonzo Fyfe, it is a statement about the separation of church and state.

The causes of a speech act, and the meaning of the proposition spoken, are two different issues, and the subjectivity of the former in no way argues for the the subjectivity of the latter.


Yes, people do debate. Frequently the debate is about the facts of the matter, such as whether y will be a consequence of x or not, but much of the debate is usually completely pointless. That is, it is no different than - and just as ridiculous as - two people arguing about whether asparagus is tasty or disgusting.

There is a principle in the philosophy of language, known as the Principle of Charity, that says, "All else being equal, if the debate is between two interpretations, where one interpretation renders the statements meaningless or false, and another renders the statement meaningful and true, the latter interpretation prevails."

I would argue that if it is true that a language of "good for us to like" did not exist, we would be strongly advised to create one. Fortunately, we do not have to create one. A language of "good for us to like" already exists, and it exists within our moral language.


Now, do people debate with themselves? I do not myself, but perhaps other people do.

I have spent all of my adult life debating these these things, not only with other people, but with myself. Sitting in a high school class, when the teacher wrote on the chalk board the casualty figures for the Civil War, I thought about all of those who fought and died for the Confederacy and thought, "What a waste of a life, to spend it in the defense of something evil (slavery, racism). I think of those who martyr themselves for their God and think, "What a waste of a life?" How do I ensure that I do not waste my life in the defense of something evil?

12 years of college in the field of moral philosophy, and now a decade out of college, this has continued to be my top concern. "How do I know that I am not spending my life in the defense of something evil?"

I debate myself all the time. And, what you see in these forums, is the results of that self-debate. And, since I have spent so much time in this field, I have known many others who would say the same thing.

Okay, personal anecdotal stories are not 'proof' of anything. I think I can add nothing else but to ask you (and the reader) to make your own observations.


It is not clear that we are debating what is "best for us." Who ever agreed to define moral" as "the sum total of subjective individual 'best for me' inputs?"

Who ever agreed to define 'moral' as 'personal likes and dislikes?'

You can ask the same question about most words. In some cases, you can find some committee that stipulates a definition. In most cases (e.g., rock, star, running, fire, animal) the meaning simply emerges.

The proof of any theory of meaning rests in its ability to make sense in the way that the word is actually used by those people who are using it.

The problem with common subjectivism is that it fails this test. It does not account for the assumed significance to others of moral propositions. It does not account for moral debate. It cannot handle the Euthyphro problem.

If I could add two additional problems for the common subjectivist theory of meaning:

(4) It cannot account for the noncontingent relevance of harm to others. ("Good for us to like" theory handles this quite well).

(5) It can't distinguish between moral 'taste' and other questions of 'taste', which threatens to imply that questions of taste such as what to have for supper and what wine to drink with it are moral questions. ("Good for us to like" theory holds that the difference is that matters of taste are relative to the desires of the individual, matters of ethics are relative to all desires, and consequently matters of taste cannot be moral questions.)

The proof of a theory of meaning rests in its ability to explain the way people use the word.

Common subjectivism fails that test.

That is why Common subjectivism must die, particularly among the atheist community. It makes us look like idiots.

[Holy Heretic]

It is indeed a hard life for those of us who recognise the empirical subjectivity of ethics, yet still manage to be strongly moral, albeit subjectively and intersubjectively so.

I would also add that Objectivism is grounded in the need to avoid moral conflict and problem solving- or, in any case, to lessen the raw acerbity of the situation. Its been a common means of escape ever since Kant proceeded with the deification of his desires.

Moral subjectivism supposes human rationality- Objectivism functions on that same fear which leads men to repeatedly beseech a firm and constricting collar to fit around the necks of men.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by Holy Heretic
I would also add that Objectivism is grounded in the need to avoid moral conflict and problem solving- or, in any case, to lessen the raw acerbity of the situation. Its been a common means of escape ever since Kant proceeded with the deification of his desires.

Moral subjectivism supposes human rationality- Objectivism functions on that same fear which leads men to repeatedly beseech a firm and constricting collar to fit around the necks of men.

Actually, I do not approve of the ad hominem contained within.

If you have a point to make against the theory, then attack the theory. Not the people who hold it.

[tronvillain]

Alonzo Fyfe:
I have difficulty answering your original post because I do not find much of an argument. It is just an assertion.

All that is required is that the facts of the matter be established, and every exchange in a "debate" will be reduced to "I like the seperation of church and state" and "I do not like the seperation of church and state."

It does not address the two problems that I have raised.
I consider it more of an observation than an assertion. When you take away debate over the facts of a moral issue, all that appears to remain is people stating their preferences.
First, if you enter into a discussion with the claim, "There ought to be separation between church and state, and I mean this in the common subjectivist sense," then you are announcing that what you are saying has no validity for anybody else. You are saying, "What I am saying is insignificant to anybody but me. Ignore me. I'm just over here making random noises."
I am not announcing that what I say has no validity for no one else, merely that what I say does not necessarily have validity for anyone else (someone else might share my position after all and an awareness of my position may be important in the decision making of others). Besides, in most "moral" discussions there are still the facts and reasoning to be discussed ("there ought to be seperation between church and state because..."), both of which are important to everyone.
Second, this violates a rule of language. If two people enter an arena of debate, it is assumed (and, indeed, it is necessary for communication) that they debate the same proposition. If they enter holding different propositions (for an extreme example, one enters the arena of debate holding 'Dinosaurs were warm blooded' and the other enters with the proposition 'Rattlesnake meat tastes like chicken," there is nothing to debate. Subjectivism holds that everybody enters the arena of public debate on moral issues holding a different proposition, and yet they debate.
Did I ever say that they are not debating the same proposition? They are debating whether or not something should happen, such as the seperation of church and state. What I am saying is that once the facts of the matter are established, there can be no resolution to the debate. It amount to nothing more than yelling your preference at the other person, and in case you were not aware, people do argue over whether or not Pepsi or Coke is better. :rolleyes:
I can introduce a third problem: the Euthyphro argument.

"Do you approve of X because X is good, or is X good because you approve of it?" If the latter is true, then anything that is approved of becomes good. If you come to approve of torturing young children for pleasure, then torturing young children for pleasure is good. And there is no 'special reason' to approve of, or disapprove of, torturing young children for pleasure.
Why should that be a problem? I approve of X because I am such that things such as X cause in me approval, and so I call it "good." Yes, if I come to approve of torturing young children for pleasure, then torturing young children for pleasure is good, from my perspective. What is your point?
A 'good for us' (or, more exactly, 'good for us to like') conception handles all three of these problems.

• The propositions are relevant to others.

• People enter the arena of debate holding the same proposition, so there is something to debate.

• Torturing young children for pleasure is not something that is 'good for us to like' (where 'us' means 'all of us' -- including the children).

At the same time, we are not introducing any type of metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. We are not introducing supernatural 'intrinsic value' properties. All value continues to be nothing more than relationships between states of affairs and desires. We need only to recognize the all-too-obvious fact that other desires exist, and that we can discuss objectively true (or false) propositions describing relationships between states of affairs and desires that are not our own.
Ah, but my conception deals with all three of those "problems" without difficulty, and has the added bonus of not requiring people to care about the desires of everyone else without providing any reason to do so. Yes, we can "discuss objectively true (or false) propositions describing relationships between states of affairs and desires that are not our own" but so what? It is simply not how morality works.

[Holy Heretic]

Actually, I do not approve of the ad hominem contained within.

Well, I'm not looking for approval- I'm just putting in my two cents for the heck of it. Besides, I don't pretend that it's a valid refutation of objectivism- only an observation concerning the nature of its proponents. It's as worthy as being inspected as any other piece of knowledge.

[strubenuff]

Okay, you can cut out the Socrates imitation.
I don't know enough about Socrates to know what it is I am supposed to be imitating...

Wrong" means "Not what a person with good desires would do."
Which is entitely subjective...

"Good desires" = "Those desires that are compatible with the fulfillment of the desires of others." [Note: Desires, like everything else, only have value in terms of their relationship to other desires. There are no 'intrinsic' values.]
On what basis? Isn't it a fallacy to appeal to the majority?

A person with good desires will almost certainly have an aversion to killing innocent people, thus an aversion to killing Henry, thus would not do it.
What makes someone "innocent"? Who decided killing "innocent" people is incompatible with the majority fulfilling their desires? Isn't the death of Henry nearly irrelevant to the majority fulfilling their desires (the majority being everyone on earth, as you've defined it)?


It is an objective fact that an aversion to killing is good relative all to other desires.
How? You've certainly studied this area far more extensively that I have. Explain it to me.

And it is an objective fact that a person with an aversion to killing will not kill Henry.
Nonsense. I have aversions to all sorts of things that I still do regularly.

And it doesn't take anything such as asking everybody any question or averaging to reach this conclusion. It does not take anything more complicated than to recognize that since killing is such a desire-thwarting activity, an aversion to killing would be desire-fulfilling.
It's my desire to kill Henry. I don't see how I'm limiting the majority of people from fulfilling their desires by killing him.

As for the Euthyphro problem, what exactly is it? See Tron's post. There is no problem.

I read your other two posts that you linked to. I find you repeat your arguments. My problem is that I don't understand what basis they have.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

strubenuff

I don't know enough about Socrates to know what it is I am supposed to be imitating...

Socrates, or at least as he is represented by Plato, had a habit of approaching people who considered themselves "wise" and saying, "I am a poor humble citizen who lacks an understanding of these things, Perhaps you would be so kind as to explain it to me so that I may benefit and become a better person for it."

Then, through a series of questions, he would lead his victim into a trap that showed a significant flaw in his opponent's 'wisdom'.


Anyway, to my statement, Wrong" means "Not what a person with good desires would do.", you write, Which is entitely subjective...

Which is true, the definition is subjective. All definitions are subjective.

The definition of "circle" as "a closed curved line whose points are all of equal distant from a point not on the line" is subjective. People just made it up. Yet, do you claim that there are no objective truths in the field of mathematics -- that, for example, whether 3 + 3 = 6 is 'subjective' because the definition of '3' is subjective?

For another example, the definition of an "atom" is subjective as well. At one time, it used to mean "without parts" (a - tom). Now, it means something else. We have made a subjective decision to change the meaning of the term. But, is chemistry subjective?

It is a fallacy to infer from the fact that a definition is subjective that the subject of study that the term is used in is also subjective. If this were a valid inference, then all fields of study are subjective. You cannot name a field of study that does not use terms that humans (subjectively) invented.


To my comment "Good desires" = "Those desires that are compatible with the fulfillment of the desires of others." [Note: Desires, like everything else, only have value in terms of their relationship to other desires. There are no 'intrinsic' values.

You write: On what basis? Isn't it a fallacy to appeal to the majority?

There is no appeal to a majority here.

This is true on the same general basis as "A circle is a closed curved line whose points are all of equal distant from a point not on the line."

It is true in the sense that this definition makes sense of how people use the term 'circle'.

And, by the way, the word 'circle' was invented centuries before anybody even imagined expressing its definition as: ". . . a closed curved line whose points are all of equal distant from a point not on the line." It was given this expression by people who looked at the way people were generally using the word 'circle', and discovering a formal expression that made sense of its use.

Which is the same thing that I am doing to the phrase "Good desires".



What makes someone "innocent"?

Innocent = a person who has not done anything that a person with good desires would not do.


Who decided killing "innocent" people is incompatible with the majority fulfilling their desires?

Again, you use the word 'majority' when I do not care a fig about the majority.

Killing generally thwarts the desires of the people killed. There might be a few specific exceptions, but this is not proof against the general claim. Killing thwarts desires. If it did not, then we would all be seeking to be killed. (This last statement is not literally true, but close enough, I think, to get the relevant point across without getting into a lot of messy details.)


Isn't the death of Henry nearly irrelevant to the majority fulfilling their desires (the majority being everyone on earth, as you've defined it)?

Probably.

But, then, you are once again using this term 'majority' where I hold that it is not relevant.

Also, I have no specific concern with the death of Henry. His death is a symptom -- a side effect -- of what I am concerned with, which is the aversion to killing innocent people. A general aversion to killing innocent people is good in that it would make it possible for people to better fulfill their desires. The death of Henry is significant as material evidence that this aversion to killing innocent people is absent.


Where I write, It is an objective fact that an aversion to killing is good relative all to other desires., you ask, How?

I would actually think it obvious and not in need of an explanation.

And if I really do need to explain it, I can do so in very general terms, or in very specific and technical detail.

In general terms:

(1) Killing thwarts desires. This is shown true by the fact that people generally avoid being killed -- and that no argument exists that they are irrational to do so -- under standard conditions.

(2) Whatever thwarts a desire is bad. This follows from the proposition that value only exists as relationships between states of affairs and desires. This is a scientific claim that these relationships fully explains and predicts (in the scientific sense) all observations in the real world associated with the phenomena of valuing. You cannot provide me with an example of value that is not an example of a relationship between the object of evaluation and some set of desires.

(3) An aversion to killing an innocent person will reduce the total number of killings of innocent people. This is true by the definition of 'aversion' -- since an aversion to X is a disposition to avoid that which will make it the case that X is true. In this case, X = killing an innocent person.

[Note: You are correct, elsewhere, where you commented that an aversion will not absolutely prevent the killing, but it will reduce the likelihood of killing. The stronger the aversion to killing innocent people is generally within a population, the fewer the number of killings that would occur, all else remaining equal.]


(4) Thus, an aversion to killing will reduce the total amount of badness.



You've certainly studied this area far more extensively that I have. Explain it to me.

Welcome back, Socrates.

[Note: Please don't take the references to Socrates the wrong way. I consider Socrates to be one of the most admirable people who has ever lived, and I am certain that anybody here who is familiar with Plato's writings can easily see the spirit of Socrates in phrases such as this.


It's my desire to kill Henry. I don't see how I'm limiting the majority of people from fulfilling their desires by killing him.

Ultimately, your point here is not relevant, because it is not the act but the desires behind the act that are important.

If a person sees a single cockroach in their kitchen, that single cockroach is of little significance. It will not eat much. But it is generally a sign of a much larger problem, and the concern is to get rid of the much larger problem, which is the general infestation of cockroaches. Of course, in dealing with that larger problem, this one cockroach must die.

Hey, don't take it personally. It isn't personal. When you killed Henry, you showed that you were a cockroach. And in ridding our society of cockroaches, well, you put your name on the list.

[This is a very loose analogy. It contains the relevant points, however. The object of concern is not the murder of Henry, it is the general dispositions that made the murder of Henry happen.]


Oh, and the Euthyphro problem: Eythyphro (http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html)

This will also help you to understand the references to your comments as being like those of Socrates.

[The AntiChris]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
Anyway, to my statement, Wrong" means "Not what a person with good desires would do.", you write, Which is entitely subjective...

Which is true, the definition is subjective. All definitions are subjective.

The definition of "circle" as "a closed curved line whose points are all of equal distant from a point not on the line" is subjective. People just made it up. Yet, do you claim that there are no objective truths in the field of mathematics -- that, for example, whether 3 + 3 = 6 is 'subjective' because the definition of '3' is subjective?

For another example, the definition of an "atom" is subjective as well. At one time, it used to mean "without parts" (a - tom). Now, it means something else. We have made a subjective decision to change the meaning of the term. But, is chemistry subjective?

It is a fallacy to infer from the fact that a definition is subjective that the subject of study that the term is used in is also subjective. If this were a valid inference, then all fields of study are subjective. You cannot name a field of study that does not use terms that humans (subjectively) invented.
This only makes sense if "wrong" has some objective existence, in the same way as circles and atoms, independent of human minds.

Doesn't this presuppose the very thing that's at issue here?

Chris

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by The AntiChris
This only makes sense if "wrong" has some objective existence, in the same way as circles and atoms, independent of human minds.

Doesn't this presuppose the very thing that's at issue here?

Chris

Only if I concluded the above argument with "therefore, morality is objective". However, this is not the conclusion of the above argument. The conclusion of the above argument is "Therefore, this argument in defense of the thesis that morality is subjective is invalid."

As you know, an invalid argument can still have a true conclusion. The invalid argument simply fails to offer support for that conclusion.

Inference from the subjectivity of language to the subjectivity of propositions within that language is invalid. It fails to supply support for the thesis that morality is subjective. Morality may still be subjective, but you're going to have to look somewhere else to find proof of that.

[The AntiChris]

Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
Only if I concluded the above argument with "therefore, morality is objective".
Yes, you're right of course.

Chris

[strubenuff]

Socrates, or at least as he is represented by Plato, had a habit of approaching people who considered themselves "wise" and saying, "I am a poor humble citizen who lacks an understanding of these things, Perhaps you would be so kind as to explain it to me so that I may benefit and become a better person for it."
I know the basics; I've read several dialogues and essays. I found your statement insulting, and didn't understand the correlation between this and me having a rough day.

Killing generally thwarts the desires of the people killed. There might be a few specific exceptions, but this is not proof against the general claim. Killing thwarts desires. If it did not, then we would all be seeking to be killed. (This last statement is not literally true, but close enough, I think, to get the relevant point across without getting into a lot of messy details.)
I thought that was irrelevant. Unless I misunderstood you, my desire to kill Henry is wrong because the majority of people don't want me to kill Henry (it interferes with their ability to fulfill their desires). How could Henry's desire to live (or do anything else) possibly override my desire to kill him?

I'm short on time, so i'll just respond to the rest of your post in general. You say that killing Henry isn't the actual problem, it's that I don't have an aversion to killing innocent people. Though I could still kill Henry and have an aversion to killing innocent people (which would make me think morality isn't objective as in "A is always true," but rather subjective in a near objective sense "A is almost always true."), let's presume Henry is an asshole like I said. Being one, he has obviously done something that an innocent person would not due, and is therefor guilty. Furthermore, as a "cockroach," Henry should die. It might be my objigation to kill him...

It seems to me that the real issue is that we live in different environments. Referencing your definition statements (mostly circles) and your use of the word "common," this is more likely a case of conflicting unique backgrounds, than anything else. I agree that, by your logic, you're absolutely correct. Morals are objective. However, I too am correct in saying they're not. This is because, by definition (mine), morals are subjective. Similaly, by definition (yours), morals are objective. To the best of my knowledge, I've never met anyone who believes morals are objective, and therefor would agree with your definition of them. Since you believe your defintion is the "common" usage, one would deduce the exact opposite goes for you and those you know. It's "common" that appears to be the subjective term in this debate.

I don't believe your other arguments (such as the Euthyphro problem) have any merit. This is mostly because I don't see what the "problem" is (see tron's post). Unfortunately, economics is becoming quite intense and I don't have time to go into more depth at the moment (or read your link on Socrates). Perhaps another time.

[Alonzo Fyfe]

Originally posted by strubenuff
[B]I know the basics; I've read several dialogues and essays. I found your statement insulting, and didn't understand the correlation between this and me having a rough day.

No insult was intended. Quite the opposite, in fact. I had hoped to induce a bit of a smile.

My debate opponent has posted his next post. I must spend the next few days crafting my response there.

I'll be back.