Meta-epistemology

[SlateGreySky]

Why should philosophers do epistemology?

What is the cognitive/linguistic/behavioral technique by which epistemology is done? That is, what goes through somebody's head when she's asking, "how do we know?"

One proposal (a modification of what I understand to be John Rawls' general ethical theory) is that we (as thinkers) have in front of us epistemic theories, intuitions about knowledge, and metaphysical theories and intuitions. We shuffle these around, attempting to reconcile the elements of each of the four with elements of all the others.

Any thoughts about this? What do you all think about why epistemology is done in the first place, and what do you think about the question: under what conditions is the epistemologist satisfied?

[John Page]

Originally posted by SlateGreySky
What do you all think about why epistemology is done in the first place,
Improved understanding results and, assuming as a consequence we thereby better compete, the tendency toward epistemological inquiry is preserved and promoted.
Originally posted by SlateGreySky
.....and what do you think about the question: under what conditions is the epistemologist satisfied?
Never. Even if we could answer the question "How is it that we come to know what we know", the epistemological issue continues through investigation of how the same underlying knowledge would be understood through different processes of mind.

Anyone agree?

Cheers, John

[Robert Anthony]

Originally posted by SlateGreySky
Why should philosophers do epistemology?

What is the cognitive/linguistic/behavioral technique by which epistemology is done? That is, what goes through somebody's head when she's asking, "how do we know?"

One proposal (a modification of what I understand to be John Rawls' general ethical theory) is that we (as thinkers) have in front of us epistemic theories, intuitions about knowledge, and metaphysical theories and intuitions. We shuffle these around, attempting to reconcile the elements of each of the four with elements of all the others.

Any thoughts about this? What do you all think about why epistemology is done in the first place, and what do you think about the question: under what conditions is the epistemologist satisfied?

What goes through somebody's head is electrochemical expressions of neuronal energy. Epistemology is the inescapable prejudice of the human nervous system.

[SlateGreySky]

John,

I think I agree with your take on epistemological satisfiability. It seems to me that, as you say, the epistemologist is never satisfied. To me, this has to do with the dialectical nature of both knowledge and the study thereof.

Can you explain, though, what you mean by "the same underlying knowledge" being understood by "different processes of mind?" I guess I'm unclear on how it is that, if the processes of mind are different (I assume you mean something like the existence of two different minds), the underlying "knowledge" could reasonably be said to be the same. Given different minds, wouldn't belief-forming structures (linguistic, cognative, behavioral) necessarily differ, even if only slightly from mind to mind? If that is the case, can we really say that the "knowledge" is the same across the board?

Anyone else is, of course, welcome to chime in . . . .

[John Page]

Originally posted by SlateGreySky
I think I agree with your take on epistemological satisfiability. It seems to me that, as you say, the epistemologist is never satisfied. To me, this has to do with the dialectical nature of both knowledge and the study thereof.

Can you explain, though, what you mean by "the same underlying knowledge" being understood by "different processes of mind?" I guess I'm unclear on how it is that, if the processes of mind are different (I assume you mean something like the existence of two different minds), the underlying "knowledge" could reasonably be said to be the same. Given different minds, wouldn't belief-forming structures (linguistic, cognative, behavioral) necessarily differ, even if only slightly from mind to mind? If that is the case, can we really say that the "knowledge" is the same across the board?

#define The_same_underlying_knowledge = "The epistemologist is never satisfied"

main(){
Process_SlateGreySky(){
printf("Yep");}

Process_John_Page(){
printf("Yep");}
}

The point that I'm trying to make is, while the processes may be different, they may intersubjectively understand the terms to have the same meaning. This being the case we are able to obtain the same underlying knowlegde, i.e. The epistemologist is never satisfied.

I agree that minds differ, but then so do computers that can yield the same underlying result.

Cheers, John

[Adrian Selby]

How can philosophers not do epistemology, if they are interested in understanding life, experience and gaining wisdom. It does seem a necessary byproduct of asking 'why?' while also, in my view, forms a set of underpinning considerations and questions for any discourse such as ethics or politics etc.

[SlateGreySky]

Adrian,

I'd be interested in hearing your answers to the rest of the questions in the original post: namely, when and how are epistemologists satisfied? Is epistemology just the search for a collection of principles by which a proposition can be objectively judged to be "knowledge?"

What do you think?

[Keith Russell]

Epistemology can also reach the conclusion that no proposition can be objective; that 'knoweldge' isn't possible, period.

K

[Adrian Selby]

Is epistemology just the search for a collection of principles by which a proposition can be objectively judged to be "knowledge?"

Perhaps, but study of epistemology should also not predispose one to perhaps ultimately concluding there cannot be something objectively judged to be knowledge. As such, epistemologers may set their stall for relativist or objective explanations of what counts as true, so to satisfy an epistemologer (cute term that) is to satisfy anyone indulging in philosophy, namely, make arguments relating to the subject that are bloody hard to refute :)

------------
the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[John Page]

Originally posted by Keith Russell
Epistemology can also reach the conclusion that no proposition can be objective; that 'knoweldge' isn't possible, period.
Hi Keith:

I have a second sense you deliberatley planted this one for me. :)

I do not think it reasonable to conclude that knowledge is not possible if propositions are not objective. Perhaps you would care to expound.

Cheers, John